,,an ,,essay ,,concerning ,,human ,,understanding ,,by ,,john ,,locke ,based on the #b;d ,edition ,,contents ,,of ,,the ,,second ,,volume ,,book ,,iii4 ,,of ,,words4 ,,chap4 ,i4 ,,of ,,words ,,or ,,language ,,in ,,general ,,ii4 ,,of ,,the ,,signification ,,of ,,words ,,iii4 ,,of ,,general ,,terms ,,iv4 ,,of ,,the ,,names ,,of ,,simple ,,ideas ,v4 ,,of ,,the ,,names ,,of ,,mixed ,,modes ,,and ,,relations ,,vi4 ,,of ,,the ,,names ,,of ,,substances ,,vii4 ,,of ,,particles ,,viii4 ,,of ,,abstract ,,and ,,concrete ,,terms ,,ix4 ,,of ,,the ,,imperfection ,,of ,,words ,x4 ,,of ,,the ,,abuse ,,of ,,words ,,xi4 ,,of ,,the ,,remedies ,,of ,,the ,,foregoing ,,imperfection ,,and ,,abuses ,,book ,,iv4 ,,of ,,knowledge ,,and ,,probability4 ,,chap4 ,i4 ,,of ,,knowledge ,,in ,,general ,,ii4 ,,of ,,the ,,degrees ,,of ,,our ,,knowledge ,,iii4 ,,of ,,the ,,extent ,,of ,,human ,,knowledge ,,iv4 ,,of ,,the ,,reality ,,of ,,our ,,knowledge ,v4 ,,of ,,truth ,,in ,,general ,,vi4 ,,of ,,universal ,,propositions3 ,,their ,,truth ,,and ,,certainty ,,vii4 ,,of ,,maxims ,,viii4 ,,of ,,trifling ,,propositions ,,ix4 ,,of ,,our ,,threefold ,,knowledge ,,of ,,existence ,x4 ,,of ,,our ,,knowledge ,,of ,,the ,,existence ,,of ,a ,,god ,,xi4 ,,of ,,our ,,knowledge ,,of ,,the ,,existence ,,of ,,other ,,things ,,xii4 ,,of ,,the ,,improvement ,,of ,,our ,,knowledge ,,xiii4 ,,some ,,other ,,considerations ,,concerning ,,our ,,knowledge ,,xiv4 ,,of ,,judgment ,,xv4 ,,of ,,probability ,,xvi4 ,,of ,,the ,,degrees ,,of ,,assent ,,xvii4 ,,of ,,reason ,,and ,,syllogism ,,xviii4 ,,of ,,faith ,,and ,,reason1 ,,and ,,their ,,distinct ,,provinces ,,xix4 ,,of ,,enthusiasm ,,xx4 ,,of ,,wrong ,,assent1 ,,or ,,error ,,xxi4 ,,of ,,the ,,division ,,of ,,the ,,sciences ,,book ,,iii ,,of ,,words ,,chapter ,i4 ,,of ,,words ,,or ,,language ,,in ,,general4 #a4 ,man fitted to form articulated ,sounds4 ,god1 having designed man for a sociable creature1 made him not only with an inclination1 and under a necessity to have fellowship with those of his own kind1 but furnished him also with language1 which was to be the great instrument and common tie of society4 ,man1 therefore1 had by nature his organs so fashioned1 as to be fit to frame articulate sounds1 which we call words4 ,but this was not enough to produce language2 for parrots1 and several other birds1 will be taught to make articulate sounds distinct enough1 which yet by no means are capable of language4 #b4 ,to use these sounds as ,signs of ,ideas4 ,besides articulate sounds1 therefore1 it was further necessary that he should be able to use these sounds as signs of internal conceptions2 and to make them stand as marks for the ideas within his own mind1 whereby they might be made known to others1 and the thoughts of men's minds be conveyed from one to another4 #c4 ,to make them general ,signs4 ,but neither was this sufficient to make words so useful as they ought to be4 ,it is not enough for the perfection of language1 that sounds can be made signs of ideas1 unless those signs can be so made use of as to comprehend several particular things3 for the multiplication of words would have perplexed their use1 had every particular thing need of a distinct name to be signified by4 ,to remedy this inconvenience1 language had yet a further improvement in the use of ,,general ,,terms1 whereby one word was made to mark a multitude of particular existences3 which advantageous use of sounds was obtained only by the difference of the ideas they were made signs of3 those names becoming general1 which are made to stand for ,,general ,,ideas1 and those remaining particular1 where the ,,ideas they are used for are ,,particular4 #d4 ,to make them signify the absence of positive ,ideas4 ,besides these names which stand for ideas1 there be other words which men make use of1 not to signify any idea1 but the want or absence of some ideas1 simple or complex1 or all ideas together2 such as are ,,nihil in ,latin1 and in ,english1 ,,ignorance and ,,barrenness4 ,all which negative or privative words cannot be said properly to belong to1 or signify no ideas3 for then they would be perfectly insignificant sounds2 but they relate to positive ideas1 and signify their absence4 #e4 ,words ultimately derived from such as signify sensible ,ideas4 ,it may also lead us a little towards the original of all our notions and knowledge1 if we remark how great a dependence our words have on common sensible ideas2 and how those which are made use of to stand for actions and notions quite removed from sense1 have their rise from thence1 and from obvious sensible ideas are transferred to more abstruse significations1 and made to stand for ideas that come not under the cognizance of our senses2 v4g4 to ,,imagine1 ,,apprehend1 ,,comprehend1 ,,adhere1 ,,conceive1 ,,instil1 ,,disgust1 ,,disturbance1 ,,tranquillity1 c41 are all words taken from the operations of sensible things1 and applied to certain modes of thinking4 ,,spirit1 in its primary signification1 is breath2 ,,angel1 a messenger3 and ,i doubt not but1 if we could trace them to their sources1 we should find1 in all languages1 the names which stand for things that fall not under our senses to have had their first rise from sensible ideas4 ,by which we may give some kind of guess what kind of notions they were1 and whence derived1 which filled their minds who were the first beginners of languages1 and how nature1 even in the naming of things1 unawares suggested to men the originals and principles of all their knowledge3 whilst1 to give names that might make known to others any operations they felt in themselves1 or any other ideas that came not under their senses1 they were fain to borrow words from ordinary known ideas of sensation1 by that means to make others the more easily to conceive those operations they experimented in themselves1 which made no outward sensible appearances2 and then1 when they had got known and agreed names to signify those internal operations of their own minds1 they were sufficiently furnished to make known by words all their other ideas2 since they could consist of nothing but either of outward sensible perceptions1 or of the inward operations of their minds about them2 we having1 as has been proved1 no ideas at all1 but what originally come either from sensible objects without1 or what we feel within ourselves1 from the inward workings of our own spirits1 of which we are conscious to ourselves within4 #f4 ,distribution of subjects to be treated of4 ,but to understand better the use and force of ,language1 as subservient to instruction and knowledge1 it will be convenient to consider3 ,first1 ,,to ,,what ,,it ,,is ,,that ,,names1 ,,in ,,the ,,use ,,of ,,language1 ,,are ,,immediately ,,applied4 ,secondly1 ,since all 7except proper7 names are general1 and so stand not particularly for this or that single thing1 but for sorts and ranks of things1 it will be necessary to consider1 in the next place1 what the sorts and kinds1 or1 if you rather like the ,latin names1 ,,what ,,the ,,species ,,and ,,genera ,,of ,,things ,,are1 ,,wherein ,,they ,,consist1 ,,and ,,how ,,they ,,come ,,to ,,be ,,made4 ,these being 7as they ought7 well looked into1 we shall the better come to find the right use of words2 the natural advantages and defects of language2 and the remedies that ought to be used1 to avoid the inconveniences of obscurity or uncertainty in the signification of words3 without which it is impossible to discourse with any clearness or order concerning knowledge3 which1 being conversant about propositions1 and those most commonly universal ones1 has greater connexion with words than perhaps is suspected4 ,these considerations1 therefore1 shall be the matter of the following chapters4 ,,chapter ,,ii4 ,,of ,,the ,,signification ,,of ,,words4 #a4 ,words are sensible ,signs1 necessary for ,communication of ,ideas4 ,man1 though he have great variety of thoughts1 and such from which others as well as himself might receive profit and delight2 yet they are all within his own breast1 invisible and hidden from others1 nor can of themselves be made to appear4 ,the comfort and advantage of society not being to be had without communication of thoughts1 it was necessary that man should find out some external sensible signs1 whereof those invisible ideas1 which his thoughts are made up of1 might be made known to others4 ,for this purpose nothing was so fit1 either for plenty or quickness1 as those articulate sounds1 which with so much ease and variety he found himself able to make4 ,thus we may conceive how ,,words1 which were by nature so well adapted to that purpose1 came to be made use of by men as the signs of their ideas2 not by any natural connexion that there is between particular articulate sounds and certain ideas1 for then there would be but one language amongst all men2 but by a voluntary imposition1 whereby such a word is made arbitrarily the mark of such an idea4 ,the use1 then1 of words1 is to be sensible marks of ideas2 and the ideas they stand for are their proper and immediate signification4 #b4 ,words1 in their immediate ,signification1 are the sensible ,signs of his ,ideas who uses them4 ,the use men have of these marks being either to record their own thoughts1 for the assistance of their own memory2 or1 as it were1 to bring out their ideas1 and lay them before the view of others3 words1 in their primary or immediate signification1 stand for nothing but ,,the ,,ideas ,,in ,,the ,,mind ,,of ,,him ,,that ,,uses ,,them1 how imperfectly soever or carelessly those ideas are collected from the things which they are supposed to represent4 ,when a man speaks to another1 it is that he may be understood3 and the end of speech is1 that those sounds1 as marks1 may make known his ideas to the hearer4 ,that then which words are the marks of are the ideas of the speaker3 nor can any one apply them as marks1 immediately1 to anything else but the ideas that he himself hath3 for this would be to make them signs of his own conceptions1 and yet apply them to other ideas2 which would be to make them signs and not signs of his ideas at the same time2 and so in effect to have no signification at all4 ,words being voluntary signs1 they cannot be voluntary signs imposed by him on things he knows not4 ,that would be to make them signs of nothing1 sounds without signification4 ,a man cannot make his words the signs either of qualities in things1 or of conceptions in the mind of another1 whereof he has none in his own4 ,till he has some ideas of his own1 he cannot suppose them to correspond with the conceptions of another man2 nor can he use any signs for them3 for thus they would be the signs of he knows not what1 which is in truth to be the signs of nothing4 ,but when he represents to himself other men's ideas by some of his own1 if he consent to give them the same names that other men do1 it is still to his own ideas2 to ideas that he has1 and not to ideas that he has not4 #c4 ,examples of this4 ,this is so necessary in the use of language1 that in this respect the knowing and the ignorant1 the learned and the unlearned1 use the words they speak 7with any meaning7 all alike4 ,they1 in every man's mouth1 stand for the ideas he has1 and which he would express by them4 ,a child having taken notice of nothing in the metal he hears called ,,gold1 but the bright shining yellow colour1 he applies the word gold only to his own idea of that colour1 and nothing else2 and therefore calls the same colour in a peacock's tail gold4 ,another that hath better observed1 adds to shining yellow great weight3 and then the sound gold1 when he uses it1 stands for a complex idea of a shining yellow and a very weighty substance4 ,another adds to those qualities fusibility3 and then the word gold signifies to him a body1 bright1 yellow1 fusible1 and very heavy4 ,another adds malleability4 ,each of these uses equally the word gold1 when they have occasion to express the idea which they have applied it to3 but it is evident that each can apply it only to his own idea2 nor can he make it stand as a sign of such a complex idea as he has not4 #d4 ,words are often secretly referred1 ,first to the ,ideas supposed to be in other men's minds4 ,but though words1 as they are used by men1 can properly and immediately signify nothing but the ideas that are in the mind of the speaker2 yet they in their thoughts give them a secret reference to two other things4 ,first1 ,,they ,,suppose ,,their ,,words ,,to ,,be ,,marks ,,of ,,the ,,ideas ,,in ,,the ,,minds ,,also ,,of ,,other ,,men1 ,,with ,,whom ,,they ,,communicate2 for else they should talk in vain1 and could not be understood1 if the sounds they applied to one idea were such as by the hearer were applied to another1 which is to speak two languages4 ,but in this men stand not usually to examine1 whether the idea they1 and those they discourse with have in their minds be the same3 but think it enough that they use the word1 as they imagine1 in the common acceptation of that language2 in which they suppose that the idea they make it a sign of is precisely the same to which the understanding men of that country apply that name4 #e4 ,secondly1 to the ,reality of ,things4 ,secondly1 ,because men would not be thought to talk barely of their own imagination1 but of things as really they are2 therefore they often suppose the ,,words ,,to ,,stand ,,also ,,for ,,the ,,reality ,,of ,,things4 ,but this relating more particularly to substances and their names1 as perhaps the former does to simple ideas and modes1 we shall speak of these two different ways of applying words more at large1 when we come to treat of the names of mixed modes and substances in particular3 though give me leave here to say1 that it is a perverting the use of words1 and brings unavoidable obscurity and confusion into their signification1 whenever we make them stand for anything but those ideas we have in our own minds4 #f4 ,words by ,use readily excite ,ideas of their objects4 ,concerning words1 also1 it is further to be considered3 ,first1 that they being immediately the signs of men's ideas1 and by that means the instruments whereby men communicate their conceptions1 and express to one another those thoughts and imaginations they have within their own breasts2 there comes1 by constant use1 to be such a connexion between certain sounds and the ideas they stand for1 that the names heard1 almost as readily excite certain ideas as if the objects themselves1 which are apt to produce them1 did actually affect the senses4 ,which is manifestly so in all obvious sensible qualities1 and in all substances that frequently and familiarly occur to us4 #g4 ,words are often used without ,signification1 and ,why4 ,secondly1 ,that though the proper and immediate signification of words are ideas in the mind of the speaker1 yet1 because by familiar use from our cradles1 we come to learn certain articulate sounds very perfectly1 and have them readily on our tongues1 and always at hand in our memories1 but yet are not always careful to examine or settle their significations perfectly2 it often happens that men1 even when they would apply themselves to an attentive consideration1 do set their thoughts more on words than things4 ,nay1 because words are many of them learned before the ideas are known for which they stand3 therefore some1 not only children but men1 speak several words no otherwise than parrots do1 only because they have learned them1 and have been accustomed to those sounds4 ,but so far as words are of use and signification1 so far is there a constant connexion between the sound and the idea1 and a designation that the one stands for the other2 without which application of them1 they are nothing but so much insignificant noise4 #h4 ,their ,signification perfectly arbitrary1 not the consequence of a natural connexion4 ,words1 by long and familiar use1 as has been said1 come to excite in men certain ideas so constantly and readily1 that they are apt to suppose a natural connexion between them4 ,but that they signify only men's peculiar ideas1 and that ,,by ,a ,,perfect ,,arbitrary ,,imposition1 is evident1 in that they often fail to excite in others 7even that use the same language7 the same ideas we take them to be signs of3 and every man has so inviolable a liberty to make words stand for what ideas he pleases1 that no one hath the power to make others have the same ideas in their minds that he has1 when they use the same words that he does4 ,and therefore the great ,augustus himself1 in the possession of that power which ruled the world1 acknowledged he could not make a new ,latin word3 which was as much as to say1 that he could not arbitrarily appoint what idea any sound should be a sign of1 in the mouths and common language of his subjects4 ,it is true1 common use1 by a tacit consent1 appropriates certain sounds to certain ideas in all languages1 which so far limits the signification of that sound1 that unless a man applies it to the same idea1 he does not speak properly3 and let me add1 that unless a man's words excite the same ideas in the hearer which he makes them stand for in speaking1 he does not speak intelligibly4 ,but whatever be the consequence of any man's using of words differently1 either from their general meaning1 or the particular sense of the person to whom he addresses them2 this is certain1 their signification1 in his use of them1 is limited to his ideas1 and they can be signs of nothing else4 ,,chapter ,,iii4 ,,of ,,general ,,terms4 #a4 ,the greatest ,part of ,words are general terms4 ,all things that exist being particulars1 it may perhaps be thought reasonable that words1 which ought to be conformed to things1 should be so too1--,i mean in their signification3 but yet we find quite the contrary4 ,the far greatest part of words that make all languages are general terms3 which has not been the effect of neglect or chance1 but of reason and necessity4 #b4 ,that every particular ,thing should have a ,name for itself is impossible4 ,first1 ,it is impossible that every particular thing should have a distinct peculiar name4 ,for1 the signification and use of words depending on that connexion which the mind makes between its ideas and the sounds it uses as signs of them1 it is necessary1 in the application of names to things1 that the mind should have distinct ideas of the things1 and retain also the particular name that belongs to every one1 with its peculiar appropriation to that idea4 ,but it is beyond the power of human capacity to frame and retain distinct ideas of all the particular things we meet with3 every bird and beast men saw2 every tree and plant that affected the senses1 could not find a place in the most capacious understanding4 ,if it be looked on as an instance of a prodigious memory1 that some generals have been able to call every soldier in their army by his proper name1 we may easily find a reason why men have never attempted to give names to each sheep in their flock1 or crow that flies over their heads2 much less to call every leaf of plants1 or grain of sand that came in their way1 by a peculiar name4 #c4 ,and would be useless1 if it were possible4 ,secondly1 ,if it were possible1 it would yet be useless2 because it would not serve to the chief end of language4 ,men would in vain heap up names of particular things1 that would not serve them to communicate their thoughts4 ,men learn names1 and use them in talk with others1 only that they may be understood3 which is then only done when1 by use or consent1 the sound ,i make by the organs of speech1 excites in another man's mind who hears it1 the idea ,i apply it to in mine1 when ,i speak it4 ,this cannot be done by names applied to particular things2 whereof ,i alone having the ideas in my mind1 the names of them could not be significant or intelligible to another1 who was not acquainted with all those very particular things which had fallen under my notice4 #d4 ,a distinct name for every particular thing not fitted for enlargement of knowledge4 ,thirdly1 ,but yet1 granting this also feasible1 7which ,i think is not17 yet a distinct name for every particular thing would not be of any great use for the improvement of knowledge3 which1 though founded in particular things1 enlarges itself by general views2 to which things reduced into sorts1 under general names1 are properly subservient4 ,these1 with the names belonging to them1 come within some compass1 and do not multiply every moment1 beyond what either the mind can contain1 or use requires4 ,and therefore1 in these1 men have for the most part stopped3 but yet not so as to hinder themselves from distinguishing particular things by appropriated names1 where convenience demands it4 ,and therefore in their own species1 which they have most to do with1 and wherein they have often occasion to mention particular persons1 they make use of proper names2 and there distinct individuals have distinct denominations4 #e4 ,what things have proper ,names1 and why4 ,besides persons1 countries also1 cities1 rivers1 mountains1 and other the like distinctions of place have usually found peculiar names1 and that for the same reason2 they being such as men have often as occasion to mark particularly1 and1 as it were1 set before others in their discourses with them4 ,and ,i doubt not but1 if we had reason to mention particular horses as often as as have reason to mention particular men1 we should have proper names for the one1 as familiar as for the other1 and ,bucephalus would be a word as much in use as ,alexander4 ,and therefore we see that1 amongst jockeys1 horses have their proper names to be known and distinguished by1 as commonly as their servants3 because1 amongst them1 there is often occasion to mention this or that particular horse when he is out of sight4 #f4 ,how general ,words are made4 ,the next thing to be considered is1--,how general words come to be made4 ,for1 since all things that exist are only particulars1 how come we by general terms2 or where find we those general natures they are supposed to stand for8 ,words become general by being made the signs of general ideas3 and ideas become general1 by separating from them the circumstances of time and place1 and any other ideas that may determine them to this or that particular existence4 ,by this way of abstraction they are made capable of representing more individuals than one2 each of which having in it a conformity to that abstract idea1 is 7as we call it7 of that sort4 #g4 ,shown by the way we enlarge our complex ideas from infancy4 ,but1 to deduce this a little more distinctly1 it will not perhaps be amiss to trace our notions and names from their beginning1 and observe by what degrees we proceed1 and by what steps we enlarge our ideas from our first infancy4 ,there is nothing more evident1 than that the ideas of the persons children converse with 7to instance in them alone7 are1 like the persons themselves1 only particular4 ,the ideas of the nurse and the mother are well framed in their minds2 and1 like pictures of them there1 represent only those individuals4 ,the names they first gave to them are confined to these individuals2 and the names of ,,nurse and ,,mamma1 the child uses1 determine themselves to those persons4 ,afterwards1 when time and a larger acquaintance have made them observe that there are a great many other things in the world1 that in some common agreements of shape1 and several other qualities1 resemble their father and mother1 and those persons they have been used to1 they frame an idea1 which they find those many particulars do partake in2 and to that they give1 with others1 the name ,,man1 for example4 ,and thus they come to have a general name1 and a general idea4 ,wherein they make nothing new2 but only leave out of the complex idea they had of ,peter and ,james1 ,mary and ,jane1 that which is peculiar to each1 and retain only what is common to them all4 #h4 ,and further enlarge our complex ideas1 by still leaving out properties contained in them4 ,by the same way that they come by the general name and idea of ,,man1 they easily advance to more general names and notions4 ,for1 observing that several things that differ from their idea of man1 and cannot therefore be comprehended out under that name1 have yet certain qualities wherein they agree with man1 by retaining only those qualities1 and uniting them into one idea1 they have again another and more general idea2 to which having given a name they make a term of a more comprehensive extension3 which new idea is made1 not by any new addition1 but only as before1 by leaving out the shape1 and some other properties signified by the name man1 and retaining only a body1 with life1 sense1 and spontaneous motion1 comprehended under the name animal4 #i4 ,general natures are nothing but abstract and partial ideas of more complex ones4 ,that this is the way whereby men first formed general ideas1 and general names to them1 ,i think is so evident1 that there needs no other proof of it but the considering of a man's self1 or others1 and the ordinary proceedings of their minds in knowledge4 ,and he that thinks ,,general ,,natures or ,,notions are anything else but such abstract and partial ideas of more complex ones1 taken at first from particular existences1 will1 ,i fear1 be at a loss where to find them4 ,for let any one effect1 and then tell me1 wherein does his idea of ,,man differ from that of ,,peter and ,,paul1 or his idea of ,,horse from that of ,,bucephalus1 but in the leaving out something that is peculiar to each individual1 and retaining so much of those particular complex ideas of several particular existences as they are found to agree in8 ,of the complex ideas signified by the names ,,man and ,,horse1 leaving out but those particulars wherein they differ1 and retaining only those wherein they agree1 and of those making a new distinct complex idea1 and giving the name ,,animal to it1 one has a more general term1 that comprehends with man several other creatures4 ,leave out of the idea of ,,animal1 sense and spontaneous motion1 and the remaining complex idea1 made up of the remaining simple ones of body1 life1 and nourishment1 becomes a more general one1 under the more comprehensive term1 ,,vivens4 ,and1 not to dwell longer upon this particular1 so evident in itself2 by the same way the mind proceeds to ,,body1 ,,substance1 and at last to ,,being1 ,,thing1 and such universal terms1 which stand for any of our ideas whatsoever4 ,to conclude3 this whole mystery of genera and species1 which make such a noise in the schools1 and are with justice so little regarded out of them1 is nothing else but ,,abstract ,,ideas1 more or less comprehensive1 with names annexed to them4 ,in all which this is constant and unvariable1 ,that every more general term stands for such an idea1 and is but a part of any of those contained under it4 #aj4 ,why the ,genus is ordinarily made ,use of in ,definitions4 ,this may show us the reason why1 in the defining of words1 which is nothing but declaring their signification1 we make use of the ,,genus1 or next general word that comprehends it4 ,which is not out of necessity1 but only to save the labour of enumerating the several simple ideas which the next general word or ,,genus stands for2 or1 perhaps1 sometimes the shame of not being able to do it4 ,but though defining by ,,genus and ,,differentia 7,i crave leave to use these terms of art1 though originally ,latin1 since they most properly suit those notions they are applied to71 ,i say1 though defining by the ,,genus be the shortest way1 yet ,i think it may be doubted whether it be the best4 ,this ,i am sure1 it is not the only1 and so not absolutely necessary4 ,for1 definition being nothing but making another understand by words what idea the term defined stands for1 a definition is best made by enumerating those simple ideas that are combined in the signification of the term defined3 and if1 instead of such an enumeration1 men have accustomed themselves to use the next general term1 it has not been out of necessity1 or for greater clearness1 but for quickness and dispatch sake4 ,for ,i think that1 to one who desired to know what idea the word ,,man stood for2 if it should be said1 that man was a solid extended substance1 having life1 sense1 spontaneous motion1 and the faculty of reasoning1 ,i doubt not but the meaning of the term man would be as well understood1 and the idea it stands for be at least as clearly made known1 as when it is defined to be a rational animal3 which1 by the several definitions of ,,animal1 ,,vivens1 and ,,corpus1 resolves itself into those enumerated ideas4 ,i have1 in explaining the term ,,man1 followed here the ordinary definition of the schools2 which1 though perhaps not the most1 exact1 yet serves well enough to my present purpose4 ,and one may1 in this instance1 see what gave occasion to the rule1 that a definition must consist of ,,genus and ,,differentia2 and it suffices to show us the little necessity there is of such a rule1 or advantage in the strict observing of it4 ,for1 definitions1 as has been said1 being only the explaining of one word by several others1 so that the meaning or idea it stands for may be certainly known2 languages are not always so made according to the rules of logic1 that every term can have its signification exactly and clearly expressed by two others4 ,experience sufficiently satisfies us to the contrary2 or else those who have made this rule have done ill1 that they have given us so few definitions conformable to it4 ,but of definitions more in the next chapter4 #aa4 ,general and ,universal are ,creatures of the ,understanding1 and belong not to the ,real ,existence of things4 ,to return to general words3 it is plain1 by what has been said1 that ,,general and ,,universal belong not to the real existence of things2 but are the inventions and creatures of the understanding1 made by it for its own use1 and concern only signs1 whether words or ideas4 ,words are general1 as has been said1 when used for signs of general ideas1 and so are applicable indifferently to many particular things2 and ideas are general when they are set up as the representatives of many particular things3 but universality belongs not to things themselves1 which are all of them particular in their existence1 even those words and ideas which in their signification are general4 ,when therefore we quit particulars1 the generals that rest are only creatures of our own making2 their general nature being nothing but the capacity they are put into1 by the understanding1 of signifying or representing many particulars4 ,for the signification they have is nothing but a relation that1 by the mind of man1 is added to them4 #ab4 ,abstract ,ideas are the ,essences of ,genera and ,species4 ,the next thing therefore to be considered is1 ,what kind of signification it is that general words have4 ,for1 as it is evident that they do not signify barely one particular thing2 for then they would not be general terms1 but proper names1 so1 on the other side1 it is as evident they do not signify a plurality2 for ,,man and ,,men would then signify the same2 and the distinction of numbers 7as the grammarians call them7 would be superfluous and useless4 ,that then which general words signify is a ,,sort of things2 and each of them does that1 by being a sign of an abstract idea in the mind2 to which idea1 as things existing are found to agree1 so they come to be ranked under that name1 or1 which is all one1 be of that sort4 ,whereby it is evident that the ,,essences of the sorts1 or1 if the ,latin word pleases better1 ,,species of things1 are nothing else but these abstract ideas4 ,for the having the essence of any species1 being that which makes anything to be of that species2 and the conformity to the idea to which the name is annexed being that which gives a right to that name2 the having the essence1 and the having that conformity1 must needs be the same thing3 since to be of any species1 and to have a right to the name of that species1 is all one4 ,as1 for example1 to be a ,,man1 or of the ,,species man1 and to have right to the ,,name man1 is the same thing4 ,again1 to be a man1 or of the species man1 and have the ,,essence of a man1 is the same thing4 ,now1 since nothing can be a man1 or have a right to the name man1 but what has a conformity to the abstract idea the name man stands for1 nor anything be a man1 or have a right to the species man1 but what has the essence of that species2 it follows1 that the abstract idea for which the name stands1 and the essence of the species1 is one and the same4 ,from whence it is easy to observe1 that the essences of the sorts of things1 and1 consequently1 the sorting of things1 is the workmanship of the understanding that abstracts and makes those general ideas4 #ac4 ,they are the ,workmanship of the ,understanding1 but have their ,foundation in the ,similitude of ,things4 ,i would not here be thought to forget1 much less to deny1 that ,nature1 in the production of things1 makes several of them alike3 there is nothing more obvious1 especially in the races of animals1 and all things propagated by seed4 ,but yet ,i think we may say1 ,,the ,,sorting ,,of ,,them ,,under ,,names ,,is ,,the ,,workmanship ,,of ,,the ,,understanding1 ,,taking ,,occasion1 ,,from ,,the ,,similitude ,,it ,,observes ,,amongst ,,them1 ,,to ,,make ,,abstract ,,general ,,ideas1 and set them up in the mind1 with names annexed to them1 as patterns or forms1 7for1 in that sense1 the word ,,form has a very proper signification17 to which as particular things existing are found to agree1 so they come to be of that species1 have that denomination1 or are put into that ,,classis4 ,for when we say this is a man1 that a horse2 this justice1 that cruelty2 this a watch1 that a jack2 what do we else but rank things under different specific names1 as agreeing to those abstract ideas1 of which we have made those names the signs8 ,and what are the essences of those species set out and marked by names1 but those abstract ideas in the mind2 which are1 as it were1 the bonds between particular things that exist1 and the names they are to be ranked under8 ,and when general names have any connexion with particular beings1 these abstract ideas are the medium that unites them3 so that the essences of species1 as distinguished and denominated by us1 neither are nor can be anything but those precise abstract ideas we have in our minds4 ,and therefore the supposed real essences of substances1 if different from our abstract ideas1 cannot be the essences of the species ,,we rank things into4 ,for two species may be one1 as rationally as two different essences be the essence of one species3 and ,i demand what are the alterations which may1 or may not be made in a ,,horse or ,,lead1 without making either of them to be of another species8 ,in determining the species of things by ,,our abstract ideas1 this is easy to resolve3 but if any one will regulate himself herein by supposed ,,real essences1 he will ,i suppose1 be at a loss3 and he will never be able to know when anything precisely ceases to be of the species of a ,,horse or ,,lead4 #ad4 ,each distinct abstract ,idea is a distinct ,essence4 ,nor will any one wonder that ,i say these essences1 or abstract ideas 7which are the measures of name1 and the boundaries of species7 are the workmanship of the understanding1 who considers that at least the complex ones are often1 in several men1 different collections of simple ideas2 and therefore that is ,,covetousness to one man1 which is not so to another4 ,nay1 even in substances1 where their abstract ideas seem to be taken from the things themselves1 they are not constantly the same2 no1 not in that species which is most familiar to us1 and with which we have the most intimate acquaintance3 it having been more than once doubted1 whether the ,,foetus born of a woman were a ,,man1 even so far as that it hath been debated1 whether it were or were not to be nourished and baptized3 which could not be1 if the abstract idea or essence to which the name man belonged were of nature's making2 and were not the uncertain and various collection of simple ideas1 which the understanding put together1 and then1 abstracting it1 affixed a name to it4 ,so that1 in truth1 every distinct abstract idea is a distinct essence2 and the names that stand for such distinct ideas are the names of things essentially different4 ,thus a circle is as essentially different from an oval as a sheep from a goat2 and rain is as essentially different from snow as water from earth3 that abstract idea which is the essence of one being impossible to be communicated to the other4 ,and thus any two abstract ideas1 that in any part vary one from another1 with two distinct names annexed to them1 constitute two distinct sorts1 or1 if you please1 ,,species1 as essentially different as any two of the most remote or opposite in the world4 #ae4 ,several significations of the word ,essence4 ,but since the essences of things are thought by some 7and not without reason7 to be wholly unknown1 it may not be amiss to consider the several significations of the word ,,essence4 ,real essences4 ,first1 ,essence may be taken for the very being of anything1 whereby it is what it is4 ,and thus the real internal1 but generally 7in substances7 unknown constitution of things1 whereon their discoverable qualities depend1 may be called their essence4 ,this is the proper original signification of the word1 as is evident from the formation of it2 essential in its primary notation1 signifying properly1 being4 ,and in this sense it is still used1 when we speak of the essence of ,,particular things1 without giving them any name4 ,nominal ,essences4 ,secondly1 ,the learning and disputes of the schools having been much busied about genus and species1 the word essence has almost lost its primary signification3 and1 instead of the real constitution of things1 has been almost wholly applied to the artificial constitution of genus and species4 ,it is true1 there is ordinarily supposed a real constitution of the sorts of things2 and it is past doubt there must be some real constitution1 on which any collection of simple ideas co-existing must depend4 ,but1 it being evident that things are ranked under names into sorts or species1 only as they agree to certain abstract ideas1 to which we have annexed those names1 the essence of each ,,genus1 or sort1 comes to be nothing but that abstract idea which the general1 or sortal 7if ,i may have leave so to call it from sort1 as ,i do general from genus17 name stands for4 ,and this we shall find to be that which the word essence imports in its most familiar use4 ,these two sorts of essences1 ,i suppose1 may not unfitly be termed1 the one the ,,real1 the other ,,nominal ,,essence4 #af4 ,constant ,connexion between the ,name and nominal ,essence4 ,between the ,,nominal ,,essence and the ,,name there is so near a connexion1 that the name of any sort of things cannot be attributed to any particular being but what has this essence1 whereby it answers that abstract idea whereof that name is the sign4 #ag4 ,supposition1 that ,species are distinguished by their real ,essences useless4 ,concerning the ,,real ,,essences of corporeal substances 7to mention these only7 there are1 if ,i mistake not1 two opinions4 ,the one is of those who1 using the word essence for they know not what1 suppose a certain number of those essences1 according to which all natural things are made1 and wherein they do exactly every one of them partake1 and so become of this or that species4 ,the other and more rational opinion is of those who look on all natural things to have a real1 but unknown1 constitution of their insensible parts2 from which flow those sensible qualities which serve us to distinguish them one from another1 according as we have occasion to rank them into sorts1 under common denominations4 ,the former of these opinions1 which supposes these essences as a certain number of forms or moulds1 wherein all natural things that exist are cast1 and do equally partake1 has1 ,i imagine1 very much perplexed the knowledge of natural things4 ,the frequent productions of monsters1 in all the species of animals1 and of changelings1 and other strange issues of human birth1 carry with them difficulties1 not possible to consist with this hypothesis2 since it is as impossible that two things partaking exactly of the same real essence should have different properties1 as that two figures partaking of the same real essence of a circle should have different properties4 ,but were there no other reason against it1 yet the supposition of essences that cannot be known2 and the making of them1 nevertheless1 to be that which distinguishes the species of things1 is so wholly useless and unserviceable to any part of our knowledge1 that that alone were sufficient to make us lay it by1 and content ourselves with such essences of the sorts or species of things as come within the reach of our knowledge3 which1 when seriously considered1 will be found1 as ,i have said1 to be nothing else but1 those ,,abstract complex ideas to which we have annexed distinct general names4 #ah4 ,real and nominal ,essence ,essences being thus distinguished into nominal and real1 we may further observe1 that1 in the species of simple ideas and modes1 they are always the same2 but in substances always quite different4 ,thus1 a figure including a space between three lines1 is the real as well as nominal essence of a triangle2 it being not only the abstract idea to which the general name is annexed1 but the very ,,essentia or being of the thing itself2 that foundation from which all its properties flow1 and to which they are all inseparably annexed4 ,but it is far otherwise concerning that parcel of matter which makes the ring on my finger2 wherein these two essences are apparently different4 ,for1 it is the real constitution of its insensible parts1 on which depend all those properties of colour1 weight1 fusibility1 fixedness1 c41 which are to be found in it2 which constitution we know not1 and so1 having no particular idea of1 having no name that is the sign of it4 ,but yet it is its colour1 weight1 fusibility1 fixedness1 c41 which makes it to be gold1 or gives it a right to that name1 which is therefore its nominal essence4 ,since nothing can be called gold but what has a conformity of qualities to that abstract complex idea to which that name is annexed4 ,but this distinction of essences1 belonging particularly to substances1 we shall1 when we come to consider their names1 have an occasion to treat of more fully4 #ai4 ,essences ingenerable and incorruptible4 ,that such abstract ideas1 with names to them1 as we have been speaking of are essences1 may further appear by what we are told concerning essences1 viz4 that they are all ingenerable and incorruptible4 ,which cannot be true of the real constitutions of things1 which begin and perish with them4 ,all things that exist1 besides their ,author1 are all liable to change2 especially those things we are acquainted with1 and have ranked into bands under distinct names or ensigns4 ,thus1 that which was grass to-day is to-morrow the flesh of a sheep2 and1 within a few days after1 becomes part of a man3 in all which and the like changes1 it is evident their real essence--i4 e4 that constitution whereon the properties of these several things depended--is destroyed1 and perishes with them4 ,but essences being taken for ideas established in the mind1 with names annexed to them1 they are supposed to remain steadily the same1 whatever mutations the particular substances are liable to4 ,for1 whatever becomes of ,,alexander and ,,bucephalus1 the ideas to which ,,man and ,,horse are annexed1 are supposed nevertheless to remain the same2 and so the essences of those species are preserved whole and undestroyed1 whatever changes happen to any or all of the individuals of those species4 ,by this means the essence of a species rests safe and entire1 without the existence of so much as one individual of that kind4 ,for1 were there now no circle existing anywhere in the world1 7as perhaps that figure exists not anywhere exactly marked out17 yet the idea annexed to that name would not cease to be what it is2 nor cease to be as a pattern to determine which of the particular figures we meet with have or have not a right to the ,,name circle1 and so to show which of them1 by having that essence1 was of that species4 ,and though there neither were nor had been in nature such a beast as an ,,unicorn1 or such a fish as a ,,mermaid2 yet1 supposing those names to stand for complex abstract ideas that contained no inconsistency in them1 the essence of a mermaid is as intelligible as that of a man2 and the idea of an unicorn as certain1 steady1 and permanent as that of a horse4 ,from what has been said1 it is evident1 that the doctrine of the immutability of essences proves them to be only abstract ideas2 and is founded on the relation established between them and certain sounds as signs of them2 and will always be true1 as long as the same name can have the same signification4 #bj4 ,recapitulation4 ,to conclude4 ,this is that which in short ,i would say1 viz4 that all the great business of ,,genera and ,,species1 and their ,,essences1 amounts to no more but this3--,that men making abstract ideas1 and settling them in their minds with names annexed to them1 do thereby enable themselves to consider things1 and discourse of them1 as it were in bundles1 for the easier and readier improvement and communication of their knowledge1 which would advance but slowly were their words and thoughts confined only to particulars4 ,,chapter ,,iv4 ,,of ,,the ,,names ,,of ,,simple ,,ideas4 #a4 ,names of simple ,ideas1 ,modes1 and ,substances1 have each something peculiar4 ,though all words1 as ,i have shown1 signify nothing immediately but the ideas in the mind of the speaker2 yet1 upon a nearer survey1 we shall find the names of ,,simple ,,ideas1 ,,mixed ,,modes 7under which ,i comprise ,,relations too71 and ,,natural ,,substances1 have each of them something peculiar and different from the other4 ,for example3-- #b4 ,first1 ,names of simple ,ideas1 and of ,substances intimate real ,existence4 ,first1 the names of ,,simple ,,ideas and ,,substances1 with the abstract ideas in the mind which they immediately signify1 intimate also some real existence1 from which was derived their original pattern4 ,but the names of ,,mixed ,,modes terminate in the idea that is in the mind1 and lead not the thoughts any further2 as we shall see more at large in the following chapter4 #c4 ,secondly1 ,names of simple ,ideas and ,modes signify always both real and nominal ,essences4 ,secondly1 ,the names of simple ideas and modes signify always the real as well as nominal essence of their species4 ,but the names of natural substances signify rarely1 if ever1 anything but barely the nominal essences of those species2 as we shall show in the chapter that treats of the names of substances in particular4 #d4 ,thirdly1 ,names of simple ,ideas are undefinable4 ,thirdly1 ,the names of simple ideas are not capable of any definition2 the names of all complex ideas are4 ,it has not1 that ,i know1 been yet observed by anybody what words are1 and what are not1 capable of being defined2 the want whereof is 7as ,i am apt to think7 not seldom the occasion of great wrangling and obscurity in men's discourses1 whilst some demand definitions of terms that cannot be defined2 and others think they ought not to rest satisfied in an explication made by a more general word1 and its restriction1 7or to speak in terms of art1 by a genus and difference17 when1 even after such definition1 made according to rule1 those who hear it have often no more a clear conception of the meaning of the word than they had before4 ,this at least ,i think1 that the showing what words are1 and what are not1 capable of definitions1 and wherein consists a good definition1 is not wholly besides our present purpose2 and perhaps will afford so much light to the nature of these signs and our ideas1 as to deserve a more particular consideration4 #e4 ,if all names were definable1 it would be a ,process ,,in ,,infinitum4 ,i will not here trouble myself to prove that all terms are not definable1 from that progress ,,in ,,infinitum1 which it will visibly lead us into1 if we should allow that all names could be defined4 ,for1 if the terms of one definition were still to be defined by another1 where at last should we stop8 ,but ,i shall1 from the nature of our ideas1 and the signification of our words1 show ,,why ,,some ,,names ,,can1 ,,and ,,others ,,cannot ,,be ,,defined2 and ,,which ,,they ,,are4 #f4 ,what a ,definition is4 ,i think it is agreed1 that a ,,definition is nothing else but ,,the ,,showing ,,the ,,meaning ,,of ,,one ,,word ,,by ,,several ,,other ,,not ,,synonymous ,,terms4 ,the meaning of words being only the ideas they are made to stand for by him that uses them1 the meaning of any term is then showed1 or the word is defined1 when1 by other words1 the idea it is made the sign of1 and annexed to1 in the mind of the speaker1 is as it were represented1 or set before the view of another2 and thus its signification ascertained4 ,this is the only use and end of definitions2 and therefore the only measure of what is1 or is not a good definition4 #g4 ,simple ,ideas1 why undefinable4 ,this being premised1 ,i say that the ,,names ,,of ,,simple ,,ideas1 ,,and ,,those ,,only1 ,,are ,,incapable ,,of ,,being ,,defined4 ,the reason whereof is this1 ,that the several terms of a definition1 signifying several ideas1 they can all together by no means represent an idea which has no composition at all3 and therefore a definition1 which is properly nothing but the showing the meaning of one word by several others not signifying each the same thing1 can in the names of simple ideas have no place4 #h4 ,instances3 ,scholastic definitions of ,motion4 ,the not observing this difference in our ideas1 and their names1 has produced that eminent trifling in the schools1 which is so easy to be observed in the definitions they give us of some few of these simple ideas4 ,for1 as to the greatest part of them1 even those masters of definitions were fain to leave them untouched1 merely by the impossibility they found in it4 ,what more exquisite jargon could the wit of man invent1 than this definition3--',the act of a being in power1 as far forth as in power2' which would puzzle any rational man1 to whom it was not already known by its famous absurdity1 to guess what word it could ever be supposed to be the explication of4 ,if ,tully1 asking a ,dutchman what ,,beweeginge was1 should have received this explication in his own language1 that it was 'actus entis in potentia quatenus in potentia2' ,i ask whether any one can imagine he could thereby have understood what the word ,,beweeginge signified1 or have guessed what idea a ,dutchman ordinarily had in his mind1 and would signify to another1 when he used that sound8 #i4 ,modern definition of ,motion4 ,nor have the modern philosophers1 who have endeavoured to throw off the jargon of the schools1 and speak intelligibly1 much better succeeded in defining simple ideas1 whether by explaining their causes1 or any otherwise4 ,the atomists1 who define motion to be 'a passage from one place to another1' what do they more than put one synonymous word for another8 ,for what is ,,passage other than ,,motion8 ,and if they were asked what passage was1 how would they better define it than by motion8 ,for is it not at least as proper and significant to say1 ,passage is a motion from one place to another1 as to say1 ,motion is a passage1 c48 ,this is to translate1 and not to define1 when we change two words of the same signification one for another2 which1 when one is better understood than the other1 may serve to discover what idea the unknown stands for2 but is very far from a definition1 unless we will say every ,english word in the dictionary is the definition of the ,latin word it answers1 and that motion is a definition of ,,motus4 ,nor will 'the successive application of the parts of the superficies of one body to those of another1' which the ,cartesians give us1 prove a much better definition of motion1 when well examined4 #aj4 ,definitions of ,light4 ',the act of perspicuous1 as far forth as perspicuous1' is another ,peripatetic definition of a simple idea2 which1 though not more absurd than the former of motion1 yet betrays its uselessness and insignificancy more plainly2 because experience will easily convince any one that it cannot make the meaning of the word ,,light 7which it pretends to define7 at all understood by a blind man1 but the definition of motion appears not at first sight so useless1 because it escapes this way of trial4 ,for this simple idea1 entering by the touch as well as sight1 it is impossible to show an example of any one who has no other way to get the idea of motion1 but barely by the definition of that name4 ,those who tell us that light is a great number of little globules1 striking briskly on the bottom of the eye1 speak more intelligibly than the ,schools3 but yet these words never so well understood would make the idea the word light stands for no more known to a man that understands it not before1 than if one should tell him that light was nothing but a company of little tennis-balls1 which fairies all day long struck with rackets against some men's foreheads1 whilst they passed by others4 ,for granting this explication of the thing to be true1 yet the idea of the cause of light1 if we had it never so exact1 would no more give us the idea of light itself1 as it is such a particular perception in us1 than the idea of the figure and motion of a sharp piece of steel would give us the idea of that pain which it is able to cause in us4 ,for the cause of any sensation1 and the sensation itself1 in all the simple ideas of one sense1 are two ideas2 and two ideas so different and distant one from another1 that no two can be more so4 ,and therefore1 should ,des ,cartes's globules strike never so long on the retina of a man who was blind by a gutta serena1 he would thereby never have any idea of light1 or anything approaching it1 though he understood never so well what little globules were1 and what striking on another body was4 ,and therefore the ,cartesians very well distinguish between that light which is the cause of that sensation in us1 and the idea which is produced in us by it1 and is that which is properly light4 #aa4 ,simple ,ideas1 why undefinable1 further explained4 ,simple ideas1 as has been shown1 are only to be got by those impressions objects themselves make on our minds1 by the proper inlets appointed to each sort4 ,if they are not received this way1 all the words in the world1 made use of to explain or define any of their names1 will never be able to produce in us the idea it stands for4 ,for1 words being sounds1 can produce in us no other simple ideas than of those very sounds2 nor excite any in us1 but by that voluntary connexion which is known to be between them and those simple ideas which common use has made them the signs of4 ,he that thinks otherwise1 let him try if any words can give him the taste of a pine apple1 and make him have the true idea of the relish of that celebrated delicious fruit4 ,so far as he is told it has a resemblance with any tastes whereof he has the ideas already in his memory1 imprinted there by sensible objects1 not strangers to his palate1 so far may he approach that resemblance in his mind4 ,but this is not giving us that idea by a definition1 but exciting in us other simple ideas by their known names2 which will be still very different from the true taste of that fruit itself4 ,in light and colours1 and all other simple ideas1 it is the same thing3 for the signification of sounds is not natural1 but only imposed and arbitrary4 ,and no ,,definition of light or redness is more fitted or able to produce either of those ideas in us1 than the ,,sound light or red1 by itself4 ,for1 to hope to produce an idea of light or colour by a sound1 however formed1 is to expect that sounds should be visible1 or colours audible2 and to make the ears do the office of all the other senses4 ,which is all one as to say1 that we might taste1 smell1 and see by the ears3 a sort of philosophy worthy only of ,sancho ,panza1 who had the faculty to see ,dulcinea by hearsay4 ,and therefore he that has not before received into his mind1 by the proper inlet1 the simple idea which any word stands for1 can never come to know the signification of that word by any other words or sounds whatsoever1 put together according to any rules of definition4 ,the only way is1 by applying to his senses the proper object2 and so producing that idea in him1 for which he has learned the name already4 ,a studious blind man1 who had mightily beat his head about visible objects1 and made use of the explication of his books and friends1 to understand those names of light and colours which often came in his way1 bragged one day1 ,that he now understood what ,,scarlet signified4 ,upon which1 his friend demanding what scarlet was8 ,the blind man answered1 ,it was like the sound of a trumpet4 ,just such an understanding of the name of any other simple idea will he have1 who hopes to get it only from a definition1 or other words made use of to explain it4 #ab4 ,the contrary shown in complex ideas1 by instances of a ,statue and ,rainbow4 ,the case is quite otherwise in ,,complex ,,ideas2 which1 consisting of several simple ones1 it is in the power of words1 standing for the several ideas that make that composition1 to imprint complex ideas in the mind which were never there before1 and so make their names be understood4 ,in such collections of ideas1 passing under one name1 definition1 or the teaching the signification of one word by several others1 has place1 and may make us understand the names of things which never came within the reach of our senses2 and frame ideas suitable to those in other men's minds1 when they use those names3 provided that none of the terms of the definition stand for any such simple ideas1 which he to whom the explication is made has never yet had in his thought4 ,thus the word ,,statue may be explained to a blind man by other words1 when ,,picture cannot2 his senses having given him the idea of figure1 but not of colours1 which therefore words cannot excite in him4 ,this gained the prize to the painter against the statuary3 each of which contending for the excellency of his art1 and the statuary bragging that his was to be preferred1 because it reached further1 and even those who had lost their eyes could yet perceive the excellency of it4 ,the painter agreed to refer himself to the judgment of a blind man2 who being brought where there was a statue made by the one1 and a picture drawn by the other2 he was first led to the statue1 in which he traced with his hands all the lineaments of the face and body1 and with great admiration applauded the skill of the workman4 ,but being led to the picture1 and having his hands laid upon it1 was told1 that now he touched the head1 and then the forehead1 eyes1 nose1 c41 as his hand moved over the parts of the picture on the cloth1 without finding any the least distinction3 whereupon he cried out1 that certainly that must needs be a very admirable and divine piece of workmanship1 which could represent to them all those parts1 where he could neither feel nor perceive anything4 #ac4 ,colours indefinable to the born-blind4 ,he that should use the word ,,rainbow to one who knew all those colours1 but yet had never seen that phenomenon1 would1 by enumerating the figure1 largeness1 position1 and order of the colours1 so well define that word that it might be perfectly understood4 ,but yet that definition1 how exact and perfect soever1 would never make a blind man understand it2 because several of the simple ideas that make that complex one1 being such as he never received by sensation and experience1 no words are able to excite them in his mind4 #ad4 ,complex ,ideas definable only when the simple ideas of which they consist have been got from experience4 ,simple ideas1 as has been shown1 can only be got by experience from those objects which are proper to produce in us those perceptions4 ,when1 by this means1 we have our minds stored with them1 and know the names for them1 then we are in a condition to define1 and by definition to understand1 the names of complex ideas that are made up of them4 ,but when any term stands for a simple idea that a man has never yet had in his mind1 it is impossible by any words to make known its meaning to him4 ,when any term stands for an idea a man is acquainted with1 but is ignorant that that term is the sign of it1 then another name of the same idea1 which he has been accustomed to1 may make him understand its meaning4 ,but in no case whatsoever is any name of any simple idea capable of a definition4 #ae4 ,fourthly1 ,names of simple ,ideas of less doubtful meaning than those of mixed modes and substances4 ,fourthly1 ,but though the names of simple ideas have not the help of definition to determine their signification1 yet that hinders not but that they are generally less doubtful and uncertain than those of mixed modes and substances2 because they1 standing only for one simple perception1 men for the most part easily and perfectly agree in their signification2 and there is little room for mistake and wrangling about their meaning4 ,he that knows once that whiteness is the name of that colour he has observed in snow or milk1 will not be apt to misapply that word1 as long as he retains that idea2 which when he has quite lost1 he is not apt to mistake the meaning of it1 but perceives he understands it not4 ,there is neither a multiplicity of simple ideas to be put together1 which makes the doubtfulness in the names of mixed modes2 nor a supposed1 but an unknown1 real essence1 with properties depending thereon1 the precise number whereof is also unknown1 which makes the difficulty in the names of substances4 ,but1 on the contrary1 in simple ideas the whole signification of the name is known at once1 and consists not of parts1 whereof more or less being put in1 the idea may be varied1 and so the signification of name be obscure1 or uncertain4 #af4 ,simple ,ideas have few ,ascents in linea praedicamentali4 ,fifthly1 ,this further may be observed concerning simple ,simple ideas and their names1 that they have but few ascents in linea praedicamentali1 7as they call it17 from the lowest species to the summum genus4 ,the reason whereof is1 that the lowest species being but one simple idea1 nothing can be left out of it1 that so the difference being taken away1 it may agree with some other thing in one idea common to them both2 which1 having one name1 is the genus of the other two3 v4g4 there is nothing that can be left out of the idea of white and red to make them agree in one common appearance1 and so have one general name2 as ,,rationality being left out of the complex idea of man1 makes it agree with brute in the more general idea and name of animal4 ,and therefore when1 to avoid unpleasant enumerations1 men would comprehend both white and red1 and several other such simple ideas1 under one general name1 they have been fain to do it by a word which denotes only the way they get into the mind4 ,for when white1 red1 and yellow are all comprehended under the genus or name colour1 it signifies no more but such ideas as are produced in the mind only by the sight1 and have entrance only through the eyes4 ,and when they would frame yet a more general term to comprehend both colours and sounds1 and the like simple ideas1 they do it by a word that signifies all such as come into the mind only by one sense4 ,and so the general term ,,quality1 in its ordinary acceptation1 comprehends colours1 sounds1 tastes1 smells1 and tangible qualities1 with distinction from extension1 number1 motion1 pleasure1 and pain1 which make impressions on the mind and introduce their ideas by more senses than one4 #ag4 ,sixthly1 ,names of simple ,ideas not arbitrary1 but perfectly taken from the existence of things4 ,sixthly1 ,the names of simple ideas1 substances1 and mixed modes have also this difference3 that those of ,,mixed ,,modes stand for ideas perfectly arbitrary2 those of ,,substances are not perfectly so1 but refer to a pattern1 though with some latitude2 and those of ,,simple ,,ideas are perfectly taken from the existence of things1 and are not arbitrary at all4 ,which1 what difference it makes in the significations of their names1 we shall see in the following chapters4 ,simple modes4 ,the names of ,,simple ,,modes differ little from those of simple ideas4 ,,chapter ,v4 ,,of ,,the ,,names ,,of ,,mixed ,,modes ,,and ,,relations4 #a4 ,mixed modes stand for abstract ,ideas1 as other general ,names4 ,the names of ,,mixed ,,modes1 being general1 they stand1 as has been shewed1 for sorts or species of things1 each of which has its peculiar essence4 ,the essences of these species also1 as has been shewed1 are nothing but the abstract ideas in the mind1 to which the name is annexed4 ,thus far the names and essences of mixed modes have nothing but what is common to them with other ideas3 but if we take a little nearer survey of them1 we shall find that they have something peculiar1 which perhaps may deserve our attention4 #b4 ,first1 ,the abstract ,ideas they stand for are made by the ,understanding4 ,the first particularity ,i shall observe in them1 is1 that the abstract ideas1 or1 if you please1 the essences1 of the several species of mixed modes1 are ,,made ,,by ,,the ,,understanding1 wherein they differ from those of simple ideas3 in which sort the mind has no power to make any one1 but only receives such as are presented to it by the real existence of things operating upon it4 #c4 ,secondly1 ,made arbitrarily1 and without ,patterns4 ,in the next place1 these essences of the species of mixed modes are not only made by the mind1 but ,,made ,,very ,,arbitrarily1 ,,made ,,without ,,patterns1 ,,or ,,reference ,,to ,,any ,,real ,,existence4 ,wherein they differ from those of substances1 which carry with them the supposition of some real being1 from which they are taken1 and to which they are conformable4 ,but1 in its complex ideas of mixed modes1 the mind takes a liberty not to follow the existence of things exactly4 ,it unites and retains certain collections1 as so many distinct specific ideas2 whilst others1 that as often occur in nature1 and are as plainly suggested by outward things1 pass neglected1 without particular names or specifications4 ,nor does the mind1 in these of mixed modes1 as in the complex idea of substances1 examine them by the real existence of things2 or verify them by patterns containing such peculiar compositions in nature4 ,to know whether his idea of ,,adultery or ,,incest be right1 will a man seek it anywhere amongst things existing8 ,or is it true because any one has been witness to such an action8 ,no3 but it suffices here1 that men have put together such a collection into one complex idea1 that makes the archetype and specific idea2 whether ever any such action were committed in rerum natura or no4 #d4 ,how this is done4 ,to understand this right1 we must consider wherein this making of these complex ideas consists2 and that is not in the making any new idea1 but putting together those which the mind had before4 ,wherein the mind does these three things3 ,first1 ,it chooses a certain number2 ,secondly1 ,it gives them connexion1 and makes them into one idea2 ,thirdly1 ,it ties them together by a name4 ,if we examine how the mind proceeds in these1 and what liberty it takes in them1 we shall easily observe how these essences of the species of mixed modes are the workmanship of the mind2 and1 consequently1 that the species themselves are of men's making4 #e4 ,evidently arbitrary1 in that the ,idea is often before the ,existence4 ,nobody can doubt but that these ideas of mixed modes are made by a voluntary collection of ideas1 put together in the mind1 independent from any original patterns in nature1 who will but reflect that this sort of complex ideas may be made1 abstracted1 and have names given them1 and so a species be constituted1 before any one individual of that species ever existed4 ,who can doubt but the ideas of ,,sacrilege or ,,adultery might be framed in the minds of men1 and have names given them1 and so these species of mixed modes be constituted1 before either of them was ever committed2 and might be as well discoursed of and reasoned about1 and as certain truths discovered of them1 whilst yet they had no being but in the understanding1 as well as now1 that they have but too frequently a real existence8 ,whereby it is plain how much the sorts of mixed modes are the creatures of the understanding1 where they have a being as subservient to all the ends of real truth and knowledge1 as when they really exist4 ,and we cannot doubt but law-makers have often made laws about species of actions which were only the creatures of their own understandings2 beings that had no other existence but in their own minds4 ,and ,i think nobody can deny but that the ,,resurrection was a species of mixed modes in the mind1 before it really existed4 #f4 ,instances3 ,murder1 ,incest1 ,stabbing4 ,to see how arbitrarily these essences of mixed modes are made by the mind1 we need but take a view of almost any of them4 ,a little looking into them will satisfy us1 that it is the mind that combines several scattered independent ideas into one complex one2 and1 by the common name it gives them1 makes them the essence of a certain species1 without regulating itself by any connexion they have in nature4 ,for what greater connexion in nature has the idea of a man than the idea of a sheep with killing1 that this is made a particular species of action1 signified by the word ,,murder1 and the other not8 ,or what union is there in nature between the idea of the relation of a father with killing than that of a son or neighbour1 that those are combined into one complex idea1 and thereby made the essence of the distinct species ,,parricide1 whilst the other makes no distinct species at all8 ,but1 though they have made killing a man's father or mother a distinct species from killing his son or daughter1 yet1 in some other cases1 son and daughter are taken in too1 as well as father and mother3 and they are all equally comprehended in the same species1 as in that of ,,incest4 ,thus the mind in mixed modes arbitrarily unites into complex ideas such as it finds convenient2 whilst others that have altogether as much union in nature are left loose1 and never combined into one idea1 because they have no need of one name4 ,it is evident then that the mind1 by its free choice1 gives a connexion to a certain number of ideas1 which in nature have no more union with one another than others that it leaves out3 why else is the part of the weapon the beginning of the wound is made with taken notice of1 to make the distinct species called ,,stabbing1 and the figure and matter of the weapon left out8 ,i do not say this is done without reason1 as we shall see more by and by2 but this ,i say1 that it is done by the free choice of the mind1 pursuing its own ends2 and that1 therefore1 these species of mixed modes are the workmanship of the understanding4 ,and there is nothing more evident than that1 for the most part1 in the framing these ideas1 the mind searches not its patterns in nature1 nor refers the ideas it makes to the real existence of things1 but puts such together as may best serve its own purposes1 without tying itself to a precise imitation of anything that really exists4 #g4 ,but still subservient to the ,end of ,language1 and not made at random4 ,but1 though these complex ideas or essences of mixed modes depend on the mind1 and are made by it with great liberty1 yet they are not made at random1 and jumbled together without any reason at all4 ,though these complex ideas be not always copied from nature1 yet they are always suited to the end for which abstract ideas are made3 and though they be combinations made of ideas that are loose enough1 and have as little union in themselves as several other to which the mind never gives a connexion that combines them into one idea2 yet they are always made for the convenience of communication1 which is the chief end of language4 ,the use of language is1 by short sounds1 to signify with ease and dispatch general conceptions2 wherein not only abundance of particulars may be contained1 but also a great variety of independent ideas collected into one complex one4 ,in the making therefore of the species of mixed modes1 men have had regard only to such combinations as they had occasion to mention one to another4 ,those they have combined into distinct complex ideas1 and given names to2 whilst others1 that in nature have as near a union1 are left loose and unregarded4 ,for1 to go no further than human actions themselves1 if they would make distinct abstract ideas of all the varieties which might be observed in them1 the number must be infinite1 and the memory confounded with the plenty1 as well as overcharged to little purpose4 ,it suffices that men make and name so many complex ideas of these mixed modes as they find they have occasion to have names for1 in the ordinary occurrence of their affairs4 ,if they join to the idea of killing the idea of father or mother1 and so make a distinct species from killing a man's son or neighbour1 it is because of the different heinousness of the crime1 and the distinct punishment is due to the murdering a man's father and mother1 different to what ought to be inflicted on the murder of a son or neighbour2 and therefore they find it necessary to mention it by a distinct name1 which is the end of making that distinct combination4 ,but though the ideas of mother and daughter are so differently treated1 in reference to the idea of killing1 that the one is joined with it to make a distinct abstract idea with a name1 and so a distinct species1 and the other not2 yet1 in respect of carnal knowledge1 they are both taken in under ,,incest3 and that still for the same convenience of expressing under one name1 and reckoning of one species1 such unclean mixtures as have a peculiar turpitude beyond others2 and this to avoid circumlocutions and tedious descriptions4 #h4 ,whereof the intranslatable ,words of divers ,languages are a ,proof4 ,a moderate skill in different languages will easily satisfy one of the truth of this1 it being so obvious to observe great store of words in one language which have not any that answer them in another4 ,which plainly shows that those of one country1 by their customs and manner of life1 have found occasion to make several complex ideas1 and given names to them1 which others never collected into specific ideas4 ,this could not have happened if these species were the steady workmanship of nature1 and not collections made and abstracted by the mind1 in order to naming1 and for the convenience of communication4 ,the terms of our law1 which are not empty sounds1 will hardly find words that answer them in the ,spanish or ,italian1 no scanty languages2 much less1 ,i think1 could any one translate them into the ,caribbee or ,westoe tongues3 and the ,,versura of the ,romans1 or ,,corban of the ,jews1 have no words in other languages to answer them2 the reason whereof is plain1 from what has been said4 ,nay1 if we look a little more nearly into this matter1 and exactly compare different languages1 we shall find that1 though they have words which in translations and dictionaries are supposed to answer one another1 yet there is scarce one often amongst the names of complex ideas1 especially of mixed modes1 that stands for the same precise idea which the word does that in dictionaries it is rendered by4 ,there are no ideas more common and less compounded than the measures of time1 extension1 and weight2 and the ,latin names1 ,,hora1 ,,pes1 ,,libra1 are without difficulty rendered by the ,english names1 ,,hour1 ,,foot1 and ,,pound3 but yet there is nothing more evident than that the ideas a ,roman annexed to these ,latin names1 were very far different from those which an ,englishman expresses by those ,english ones4 ,and if either of these should make use of the measures that those of the other language designed by their names1 he would be quite out in his account4 ,these are too sensible proofs to be doubted2 and we shall find this much more so in the names of more abstract and compounded ideas1 such as are the greatest part of those which make up moral discourses3 whose names1 when men come curiously to compare with those they are translated into1 in other languages1 they will find very few of them exactly to correspond in the whole extent of their significations4 #i4 ,this shows ,species to be made for ,communication4 ,the reason why ,i take so particular notice of this is1 that we may not be mistaken about ,,genera and ,,species1 and their ,,essences1 as if they were things regularly and constantly made by nature1 and had a real existence in things2 when they appear1 upon a more wary survey1 to be nothing else but an artifice of the understanding1 for the easier signifying such collections of ideas as it should often have occasion to communicate by one general term2 under which divers particulars1 as far forth as they agreed to that abstract idea1 might be comprehended4 ,and if the doubtful signification of the word ,,species may make it sound harsh to some1 that ,i say the species of mixed modes are 'made by the understanding'2 yet1 ,i think1 it can by nobody be denied that it is the mind makes those abstract complex ideas to which specific names are given4 ,and if it be true1 as it is1 that the mind makes the patterns for sorting and naming of things1 ,i leave it to be considered who makes the boundaries of the sort or species2 since with me ,,species and ,,sort have no other difference than that of a ,latin and ,english idiom4 #aj4 ,in mixed ,modes it is the ,name that ties the ,combination of simple ideas together1 and makes it a ,species4 ,the near relation that there is between ,,species1 ,,essences1 and their ,,general ,,name1 at least in mixed modes1 will further appear when we consider1 that it is the name that seems to preserve those essences1 and give them their lasting duration4 ,for1 the connexion between the loose parts of those complex ideas being made by the mind1 this union1 which has no particular foundation in nature1 would cease again1 were there not something that did1 as it were1 hold it together1 and keep the parts from scattering4 ,though therefore it be the mind that makes the collection1 it is the name which is as it were the knot that ties them fast together4 ,what a vast variety of different ideas does the word ,,triumphus hold together1 and deliver to us as one species6 ,had this name been never made1 or quite lost1 we might1 no doubt1 have had descriptions of what passed in that solemnity3 but yet1 ,i think1 that which holds those different parts together1 in the unity of one complex idea1 is that very word annexed to it2 without which the several parts of that would no more be thought to make one thing1 than any other show1 which having never been made but once1 had never been united into one complex idea1 under one denomination4 ,how much1 therefore1 in mixed modes1 the unity necessary to any essence depends on the mind2 and how much the continuation and fixing of that unity depends on the name in common use annexed to it1 ,i leave to be considered by those who look upon essences and species as real established things in nature4 #aa4 ,suitable to this1 we find that men speaking of mixed modes1 seldom imagine or take any other for species of them1 but such as are set out by name3 because they1 being of man's making only1 in order to naming1 no such species are taken notice of1 or supposed to be1 unless a name be joined to it1 as the sign of man's having combined into one idea several loose ones2 and by that name giving a lasting union to the parts which would otherwise cease to have any1 as soon as the mind laid by that abstract idea1 and ceased actually to think on it4 ,but when a name is once annexed to it1 wherein the parts of that complex idea have a settled and permanent union1 then is the essence1 as it were1 established1 and the species looked on as complete4 ,for to what purpose should the memory charge itself with such compositions1 unless it were by abstraction to make them general8 ,and to what purpose make them general1 unless it were that they might have general names for the convenience of discourse and communication8 ,thus we see1 that killing a man with a sword or a hatchet are looked on as no distinct species of action2 but if the point of the sword first enter the body1 it passes for a distinct species1 where it has a distinct name1 as in ,england1 in whose language it is called ,,stabbing3 but in another country1 where it has not happened to be specified under a peculiar name1 it passes not for a distinct species4 ,but in the species of corporeal substances1 though it be the mind that makes the nominal essence1 yet1 since those ideas which are combined in it are supposed to have an union in nature whether the mind joins them or not1 therefore those are looked on as distinct species1 without any operation of the mind1 either abstracting1 or giving a name to that complex idea4 #ab4 ,for the ,originals of our mixed ,modes1 we look no further than the ,mind2 which also shows them to be the ,workmanship of the ,understanding4 ,conformable also to what has been said concerning the essences of the species of mixed modes1 that they are the creatures of the understanding rather than the works of nature2 conformable1 ,i say1 to this1 we find that their names lead our thoughts to the mind1 and no further4 ,when we speak of ,,justice1 or ,,gratitude1 we frame to ourselves no imagination of anything existing1 which we would conceive2 but our thoughts terminate in the abstract ideas of those virtues1 and look not further2 as they do when we speak of a ,,horse1 or ,,iron1 whose specific ideas we consider not as barely in the mind1 but as in things themselves1 which afford the original patterns of those ideas4 ,but in mixed modes1 at least the most considerable parts of them1 which are moral beings1 we consider the original patterns as being in the mind1 and to those we refer for the distinguishing of particular beings under names4 ,and hence ,i think it is that these essences of the species of mixed modes are by a more particular name called ,,notions2 as1 by a peculiar right1 appertaining to the understanding4 #ac4 ,their being made by the ,understanding without ,patterns1 shows the ,reason why they are so compounded4 ,hence1 likewise1 we may learn why the complex ideas of mixed modes are commonly more compounded and decompounded than those of natural substances4 ,because they being the workmanship of the understanding1 pursuing only its own ends1 and the conveniency of expressing in short those ideas it would make known to another1 it does with great liberty unite often into one abstract idea things that1 in their nature1 have no coherence2 and so under one term bundle together a great variety of compounded and decompounded ideas4 ,thus the name of ,,procession3 what a great mixture of independent ideas of persons1 habits1 tapers1 orders1 motions1 sounds1 does it contain in that complex one1 which the mind of man has arbitrarily put together1 to express by that one name8 ,whereas the complex ideas of the sorts of substances are usually made up of only a small number of simple ones2 and in the species of animals1 these two1 viz4 shape and voice1 commonly make the whole nominal essence4 #ad4 ,names of mixed ,modes stand alway for their real ,essences1 which are the workmanship of our minds4 ,another thing we may observe from what has been said is1 ,that the names of mixed modes always signify 7when they have any determined signification7 the ,,real essences of their species4 ,for1 these abstract ideas being the workmanship of the mind1 and not referred to the real existence of things1 there is no supposition of anything more signified by that name1 but barely that complex idea the mind itself has formed2 which is all it would have expressed by it2 and is that on which all the properties of the species depend1 and from which alone they all flow3 and so in these the real and nominal essence is the same2 which1 of what concernment it is to the certain knowledge of general truth1 we shall see hereafter4 #ae4 ,why their ,names are usually got before their ,ideas4 ,this also may show us the reason why for the most part the names of mixed modes are got before the ideas they stand for are perfectly known4 ,because there being no species of these ordinarily taken notice of but what have names1 and those species1 or rather their essences1 being abstract complex ideas1 made arbitrarily by the mind1 it is convenient1 if not necessary1 to know the names1 before one endeavour to frame these complex ideas3 unless a man will fill his head with a company of abstract complex ideas1 which1 others having no names for1 he has nothing to do with1 but to lay by and forget again4 ,i confess that1 in the beginning of languages1 it was necessary to have the idea before one gave it the name3 and so it is still1 where1 making a new complex idea1 one also1 by giving it a new name1 makes a new word4 ,but this concerns not languages made1 which have generally pretty well provided for ideas which men have frequent occasion to have and communicate2 and in such1 ,i ask whether it be not the ordinary method1 that children learn the names of mixed modes before they have their ideas8 ,what one of a thousand ever frames the abstract ideas of ,,glory and ,,ambition1 before he has heard the names of them8 ,in simple ideas and substances ,i grant it is otherwise2 which1 being such ideas as have a real existence and union in nature1 the ideas and names are got one before the other1 as it happens4 #af4 ,reason of my being so large on this ,subject4 ,what has been said here of ,,mixed ,,modes is1 with very little difference1 applicable also to ,,relations2 which1 since every man himself may observe1 ,i may spare myself the pains to enlarge on3 especially1 since what ,i have here said concerning ,words in this third ,book1 will possibly be thought by some to this be much more than what so slight a subject required4 ,i allow it might be brought into a narrower compass2 but ,i was willing to stay my reader on an argument that appears to me new and a little out of the way1 7,i am sure it is one ,i thought not of when ,i began to write17 that1 by searching it to the bottom1 and turning it on every side1 some part or other might meet with every one's thoughts1 and give occasion to the most averse or negligent to reflect on a general miscarriage1 which1 though of great consequence1 is little taken notice of4 ,when it is considered what a pudder is made about ,,essences1 and how much all sorts of knowledge1 discourse1 and conversation are pestered and disordered by the careless and confused use and application of words1 it will perhaps be thought worth while thoroughly to lay it open4 ,and ,i shall be pardoned if ,i have dwelt long on an argument which ,i think1 therefore1 needs to be inculcated1 because the faults men are usually guilty of in this kind1 are not only the greatest hindrances of true knowledge1 but are so well thought of as to pass for it4 ,men would often see what a small pittance of reason and truth1 or possibly none at all1 is mixed with those huffing opinions they are swelled with2 if they would but look beyond fashionable sounds1 and observe what ,,ideas are or are not comprehended under those words with which they are so armed at all points1 and with which they so confidently lay about them4 ,i shall imagine ,i have done some service to truth1 peace1 and learning1 if1 by any enlargement on this subject1 ,i can make men reflect on their own use of language2 and give them reason to suspect1 that1 since it is frequent for others1 it may also be possible for them1 to have sometimes very good and approved words in their mouths and writings1 with very uncertain1 little1 or no signification4 ,and therefore it is not unreasonable for them to be wary herein themselves1 and not to be unwilling to have them examined by others4 ,with this design1 therefore1 ,i shall go on with what ,i have further to say concerning this matter4 ,,chapter ,,vi4 ,,of ,,the ,,names ,,of ,,substances4 #a4 ,the common ,names of ,substances stand for ,sorts4 ,the common names of substances1 as well as other general terms1 stand for ,,sorts3 which is nothing else but the being made signs of such complex ideas wherein several particular substances do or might agree1 by virtue of which they are capable of being comprehended in one common conception1 and signified by one name4 ,i say do or might agree3 for though there be but one sun existing in the world1 yet the idea of it being abstracted1 so that more substances 7if there were several7 might each agree in it1 it is as much a sort as if there were as many suns as there are stars4 ,they want not their reasons who think there are1 and that each fixed star would answer the idea the name sun stands for1 to one who was placed in a due distance3 which1 by the way1 may show us how much the sorts1 or1 if you please1 ,,genera and ,,species of things 7for those ,latin terms signify to me no more than the ,english word sort7 depend on such collections of ideas as men have made1 and not on the real nature of things2 since it is not impossible but that1 in propriety of speech1 that might be a sun to one which is a star to another4 #b4 ,the ,essence of each ,sort of substance is our abstract ,idea to which the name is annexed4 ,the measure and boundary of each sort or species1 whereby it is constituted that particular sort1 and distinguished from others1 is that we call its ,,essence1 which is nothing but that abstract idea to which the name is annexed2 so that everything contained in that idea is essential to that sort4 ,this1 though it be all the essence of natural substances that ,,we know1 or by which we distinguish them into sorts1 yet ,i call it by a peculiar name1 the ,,nominal ,,essence1 to distinguish it from the real constitution of substances1 upon which depends this nominal essence1 and all the properties of that sort2 which1 therefore1 as has been said1 may be called the ,,real ,,essence3 v4g4 the nominal essence of gold is that complex idea the word gold stands for1 let it be1 for instance1 a body yellow1 of a certain weight1 malleable1 fusible1 and fixed4 ,but the real essence is the constitution of the insensible parts of that body1 on which those qualities and all the other properties of gold depend4 ,how far these two are different1 though they are both called essence1 is obvious at first sight to discover4 #c4 ,the nominal and real ,essence different4 ,for1 though perhaps voluntary motion1 with sense and reason1 joined to a body of a certain shape1 be the complex idea to which ,i and others annex the name ,,man1 and so be the nominal essence of the species so called3 yet nobody will say that complex idea is the real essence and source of all those operations which are to be found in any individual of that sort4 ,the foundation of all those qualities which are the ingredients of our complex idea1 is something quite different3 and had we such a knowledge of that constitution of man2 from which his faculties of moving1 sensation1 and reasoning1 and other powers flow1 and on which his so regular shape depends1 as it is possible angels have1 and it is certain his ,maker has1 we should have a quite other idea of his essence than what now is contained in our definition of that species1 be it what it will3 and our idea of any individual man would be as far different from what it is now1 as is his who knows all the springs and wheels and other contrivances within of the famous clock at ,strasburg1 from that which a gazing countryman has of it1 who barely sees the motion of the hand1 and hears the clock strike1 and observes only some of the outward appearances4 #d4 ,nothing essential to ,individuals4 ,that ,,essence1 in the ordinary use of the word1 relates to sorts1 and that it is considered in particular beings no further than as they are ranked into sorts1 appears from hence3 that1 take but away the abstract ideas by which we sort individuals1 and rank them under common names1 and then the thought of anything essential to any of them instantly vanishes3 we have no notion of the one without the other1 which plainly shows their relation4 ,it is necessary for me to be as ,i am2 ,god and nature has made me so3 but there is nothing ,i have is essential to me4 ,an accident or disease may very much alter my colour or shape2 a fever or fall may take away my reason or memory1 or both2 and an apoplexy leave neither sense1 nor understanding1 no1 nor life4 ,other creatures of my shape may be made with more and better1 or fewer and worse faculties than ,i have2 and others may have reason and sense in a shape and body very different from mine4 ,none of these are essential to the one or the other1 or to any individual whatever1 till the mind refers it to some sort or species of things2 and then presently1 according to the abstract idea of that sort1 something is found essential4 ,let any one examine his own thoughts1 and he will find that as soon as he supposes or speaks of essential1 the consideration of some species1 or the complex idea signified by some general name1 comes into his mind2 and it is in reference to that that this or that quality is said to be essential4 ,so that if it be asked1 whether it be essential to me or any other particular corporeal being1 to have reason8 ,i say1 no2 no more than it is essential to this white thing ,i write on to have words in it4 ,but if that particular being be to be counted of the sort ,,man1 and to have the name ,,man given it1 then reason is essential to it2 supposing reason to be a part of the complex idea the name man stands for3 as it is essential to this thing ,i write on to contain words1 if ,i will give it the name ,,treatise1 and rank it under that species4 ,so that essential and not essential relate only to our abstract ideas1 and the names annexed to them2 which amounts to no more than this1 ,that whatever particular thing has not in it those qualities which are contained in the abstract idea which any general term stands for1 cannot be ranked under that species1 nor be called by that name2 since that abstract idea is the very essence of that species4 #e4 ,the only essences perceived by us in individual substances are those qualities which entitle them to receive their names4 ,thus1 if the idea of ,,body with some people be bare extension or space1 then solidity is not essential to body3 if others make the idea to which they give the name ,,body to be solidity and extension1 then solidity is essential to body4 ,that therefore1 and that alone1 is considered as essential1 which makes a part of the complex idea the name of a sort stands for2 without which no particular thing can be reckoned of that sort1 nor be entitled to that name4 ,should there be found a parcel of matter that had all the other qualities that are in iron1 but wanted obedience to the loadstone1 and would neither be drawn by it nor receive direction from it1 would any one question whether it wanted anything essential8 ,it would be absurd to ask1 ,whether a thing really existing wanted anything essential to it4 ,or could it be demanded1 ,whether this made an essential or specific difference or no1 since ,,we have no other measure of essential or specific but our abstract ideas8 ,and to talk of specific differences in ,,nature1 without reference to general ideas in names1 is to talk unintelligibly4 ,for ,i would ask any one1 ,what is sufficient to make an essential difference in nature between any two particular beings1 without any regard had to some abstract idea1 which is looked upon as the essence and standard of a species8 ,all such patterns and standards being quite laid aside1 particular beings1 considered barely in themselves1 will be found to have all their qualities equally essential2 and everything in each individual will be essential to it2 or1 which is more1 nothing at all4 ,for1 though it may be reasonable to ask1 ,whether obeying the magnet be essential to iron8 yet ,i think it is very improper and insignificant to ask1 whether it be essential to the particular parcel of matter ,i cut my pen with2 without considering it under the name ,,iron1 or as being of a certain species4 ,and if1 as has been said1 our abstract ideas1 which have names annexed to them1 are the boundaries of species1 nothing can be essential but what is contained in those ideas4 #f4 ,even the real essences of individual substances imply potential sorts4 ,it is true1 ,i have often mentioned a ,,real ,,essence1 distinct in substances from those abstract ideas of them1 which ,i call their nominal essence4 ,by this real essence ,i mean1 that real constitution of anything1 which is the foundation of all those properties that are combined in1 and are constantly found to co-exist with the nominal essence2 that particular constitution which everything has within itself1 without any relation to anything without it4 ,but essence1 even in this sense1 ,,relates ,,to ,a ,,sort1 ,,and ,,supposes ,a ,,species4 ,for1 being that real constitution on which the properties depend1 it necessarily supposes a sort of things1 properties belonging only to species1 and not to individuals3 v4 g4 supposing the nominal essence of gold to be a body of such a peculiar colour and weight1 with malleability and fusibility1 the real essence is that constitution of the parts of matter on which these qualities and their union depend2 and is also the foundation of its solubility in aqua regia and other properties1 accompanying that complex idea4 ,here are essences and properties1 but all upon supposition of a sort or general abstract idea1 which is considered as immutable2 but there is no individual parcel of matter to which any of these qualities are so annexed as to be essential to it or inseparable from it4 ,that which is essential belongs to it as a condition whereby it is of this or that sort3 but take away the consideration of its being ranked under the name of some abstract idea1 and then there is nothing necessary to it1 nothing inseparable from it4 ,indeed1 as to the real essences of substances1 we only suppose their being1 without precisely knowing what they are2 but that which annexes them still to the species is the nominal essence1 of which they are the supposed foundation and cause4 #g4 ,the nominal ,essence bounds the ,species to us4 ,the next thing to be considered is1 by which of those essences it is that substances are determined into sorts or species2 and that1 it is evident1 is by the nominal essence4 ,for it is that alone that the name1 which is the mark of the sort1 signifies4 ,it is impossible1 therefore1 that anything should determine the sorts of things1 which ,,we rank under general names1 but that idea which that name is designed as a mark for2 which is that1 as has been shown1 which we call nominal essence4 ,why do we say this is a horse1 and that a mule2 this is an animal1 that an herb8 ,how comes any particular thing to be of this or that sort1 but because it has that nominal essence2 or1 which is all one1 agrees to that abstract idea1 that name is annexed to8 ,and ,i desire any one but to reflect on his own thoughts1 when he hears or speaks any of those or other names of substances1 to know what sort of essences they stand for4 #h4 ,the nature of ,species as formed by us4 ,and that the species of things to us are nothing but the ranking them under distinct names1 according to the complex ideas in ,,us1 and not according to precise1 distinct1 real essences in ,,them1 is plain from hence3--,that we find many of the individuals that are ranked into one sort1 called by one common name1 and so received as being of one species1 have yet qualities1 depending on their real constitutions1 as far different one from another as from others from which they are accounted to differ specifically4 ,this1 as it is easy to be observed by all who have to do with natural bodies1 so chemists especially are often1 by sad experience1 convinced of it1 when they1 sometimes in vain1 seek for the same qualities in one parcel of sulphur1 antimony1 or vitriol1 which they have found in others4 ,for1 though they are bodies of the same species1 having the same nominal essence1 under the same name1 yet do they often1 upon severe ways of examination1 betray qualities so different one from another1 as to frustrate the expectation and labour of very wary chemists4 ,but if things were distinguished into species1 according to their real essences1 it would be as impossible to find different properties in any two individual substances of the same species1 as it is to find different properties in two circles1 or two equilateral triangles4 ,that is properly the essence to ,,us1 which determines every particular to this or that ,,classis2 or1 which is the same thing1 to this or that general name3 and what can that be else1 but that abstract idea to which that name is annexed2 and so has1 in truth1 a reference1 not so much to the being of particular things1 as to their general denominations8 #i4 ,not the real ,essence1 or texture of parts1 which we know not4 ,nor indeed can we rank and sort things1 and consequently 7which is the end of sorting7 denominate them1 by their real essences2 because we know them not4 ,our faculties carry us no further towards the knowledge and distinction of substances1 than a collection of ,,those ,,sensible ,,ideas ,,which ,,we ,,observe ,,in ,,them2 which1 however made with the greatest diligence and exactness we are capable of1 yet is more remote from the true internal constitution from which those qualities flow1 than1 as ,i said1 a countryman's idea is from the inward contrivance of that famous clock at ,strasburg1 whereof he only sees the outward figure and motions4 ,there is not so contemptible a plant or animal1 that does not confound the most enlarged understanding4 ,though the familiar use of things about us take off our wonder1 yet it cures not our ignorance4 ,when we come to examine the stones we tread on1 or the iron we daily handle1 we presently find we know not their make2 and can give no reason of the different qualities we find in them4 ,it is evident the internal constitution1 whereon their properties depend1 is unknown to us3 for to go no further than the grossest and most obvious we can imagine amongst them1 ,what is that texture of parts1 that real essence1 that makes lead and antimony fusible1 wood and stones not8 ,what makes lead and iron malleable1 antimony and stones not8 ,and yet how infinitely these come short of the fine contrivances and inconceivable real essences of plants or animals1 every one knows4 ,the workmanship of the all-wise and powerful ,god in the great fabric of the universe1 and every part thereof1 further exceeds the capacity and comprehension of the most inquisitive and intelligent man1 than the best contrivance of the most ingenious man doth the conceptions of the most ignorant of rational creatures4 ,therefore we in vain pretend to range things into sorts1 and dispose them into certain classes under names1 by their real essences1 that are so far from our discovery or comprehension4 ,a blind man may as soon sort things by their colours1 and he that has lost his smell as well distinguish a lily and a rose by their odours1 as by those internal constitutions which he knows not4 ,he that thinks he can distinguish sheep and goats by their real essences1 that are unknown to him1 may be pleased to try his skill in those species called ,,cassiowary and ,,querechinchio2 and by their internal real essences determine the boundaries of those species1 without knowing the complex idea of sensible qualities that each of those names stand for1 in the countries where those animals are to be found4 #aj4 ,not the substantial ,form1 which know ,not4 ,those1 therefore1 who have been taught that the several species of substances had their distinct internal ,,substantial ,,forms1 and that it was those ,,forms which made the distinction of substances into their true species and genera1 were led yet further out of the way by having their minds set upon fruitless inquiries after 'substantial forms'2 wholly unintelligible1 and whereof we have scarce so much as any obscure or confused conception in general4 #aa4 ,that the ,nominal ,essence is that only whereby we distinguish ,species of ,substances1 further evident1 from our ideas of finite ,spirits and of ,god4 ,that our ranking and distinguishing natural substances into species consists in the nominal essences the mind makes1 and not in the real essences to be found in the things themselves1 is further evident from our ideas of spirits4 ,for the mind getting1 only by reflecting on its own operations1 those simple ideas which it attributes to spirits1 it hath or can have no other notion of spirit but by attributing all those operations it finds in itself to a sort of beings2 without consideration of matter4 ,and even the most advanced notion we have of ,,god is but attributing the same simple ideas which we have got from reflection on what we find in ourselves1 and which we conceive to have more perfection in them than would be in their absence2 attributing1 ,i say1 those simple ideas to ,him in an unlimited degree4 ,thus1 having got from reflecting on ourselves the idea of existence1 knowledge1 power and pleasure--each of which we find it better to have than to want2 and the more we have of each the better--joining all these together1 with infinity to each of them1 we have the complex idea of an eternal1 omniscient1 omnipotent1 infinitely wise and happy being4 ,and though we are told that there are different species of angels2 yet we know not how to frame distinct specific ideas of them3 not out of any conceit that the existence of more species than one of spirits is impossible2 but because having no more simple ideas 7nor being able to frame more7 applicable to such beings1 but only those few taken from ourselves1 and from the actions of our own minds in thinking1 and being delighted1 and moving several parts of our bodies2 we can no otherwise distinguish in our conceptions the several species of spirits1 one from another1 but by attributing those operations and powers we find in ourselves to them in a higher or lower degree2 and so have no very distinct specific ideas of spirits1 except only of ,,god1 to whom we attribute both duration and all those other ideas with infinity2 to the other spirits1 with limitation3 nor1 as ,i humbly conceive1 do we1 between ,,god and them in our ideas1 put any difference1 by any number of simple ideas which we have of one and not of the other1 but only that of infinity4 ,all the particular ideas of existence1 knowledge1 will1 power1 and motion1 c41 being ideas derived from the operations of our minds1 we attribute all of them to all sorts of spirits1 with the difference only of degrees2 to the utmost we can imagine1 even infinity1 when we would frame as well as we can an idea of the ,first ,being2 who yet1 it is certain1 is infinitely more remote1 in the real excellency of his nature1 from the highest and perfectest of all created beings1 than the greatest man1 nay1 purest seraph1 is from the most contemptible part of matter2 and consequently must infinitely exceed what our narrow understandings can conceive of ,him4 #ab4 ,of finite ,spirits there are probably numberless ,species in a continuous series of gradations4 ,it is not impossible to conceive1 nor repugnant to reason1 that there may be many species of spirits1 as much separated and diversified one from another by distinct properties whereof we have no ideas1 as the species of sensible things are distinguished one from another by qualities which we know and observe in them4 ,that there should be more species of intelligent creatures above us1 than there are of sensible and material below us1 is probable to me from hence3 that in all the visible corporeal world1 we see no chasms or gaps4 ,all quite down from us the descent is by easy steps1 and a continued series of things1 that in each remove differ very little one from the other4 ,there are fishes that have wings1 and are not strangers to the airy region3 and there are some birds that are inhabitants of the water1 whose blood is cold as fishes1 and their flesh so like in taste that the scrupulous are allowed them on fish-days4 ,there are animals so near of kin both to birds and beasts that they are in the middle between both3 amphibious animals link the terrestrial and aquatic together2 seals live at land and sea1 and porpoises have the warm blood and entrails of a hog2 not to mention what is confidently reported of mermaids1 or sea-men4 ,there are some brutes that seem to have as much knowledge and reason as some that are called men3 and the animal and vegetable kingdoms are so nearly joined1 that1 if you will take the lowest of one and the highest of the other1 there will scarce be perceived any great difference between them3 and so on1 till we come to the lowest and the most inorganical parts of matter1 we shall find everywhere that the several species are linked together1 and differ but in almost insensible degrees4 ,and when we consider the infinite power and wisdom of the ,maker1 we have reason to think that it is suitable to the magnificent harmony of the universe1 and the great design and infinite goodness of the ,architect1 that the species of creatures should also1 by gentle degrees1 ascend upward from us toward his infinite perfection1 as we see they gradually descend from us downwards3 which if it be probable1 we have reason then to be persuaded that there are far more species of creatures above us than there are beneath2 we being1 in degrees of perfection1 much more remote from the infinite being of ,god than we are from the lowest state of being1 and that which approaches nearest to nothing4 ,and yet of all those distinct species1 for the reasons abovesaid1 we have no clear distinct ideas4 #ac4 ,the ,nominal ,essence that of the ,species1 as conceived by us1 proved from ,water and ,ice4 ,but to return to the species of corporeal substances4 ,if ,i should ask any one whether ice and water were two distinct species of things1 ,i doubt not but ,i should be answered in the affirmative3 and it cannot be denied but he that says they are two distinct species is in the right4 ,but if an ,englishman bred in ,jamaica1 who perhaps had never seen nor heard of ice1 coming into ,england in the winter1 find the water he put in his basin at night in a great part frozen in the morning1 and1 not knowing any peculiar name it had1 should call it hardened water2 ,i ask whether this would be a new species to him1 different from water8 ,and ,i think it would be answered here1 ,it would not be to him a new species1 no more than congealed jelly1 when it is cold1 is a distinct species from the same jelly fluid and warm2 or than liquid gold in the furnace is a distinct species from hard gold in the hands of a workman4 ,and if this be so1 it is plain that ,,our ,,distinct ,,species are ,,nothing ,,but ,,distinct ,,complex ,,ideas1 ,,with ,,distinct ,,names ,,annexed ,,to ,,them4 ,it is true every substance that exists has its peculiar constitution1 whereon depend those sensible qualities and powers we observe in it2 but the ranking of things into species 7which is nothing but sorting them under several titles7 is done by us according to the ideas that ,,we have of them3 which1 though sufficient to distinguish them by names1 so that we may be able to discourse of them when we have them not present before us2 yet if we suppose it to be done by their real internal constitutions1 and that things existing are distinguished by nature into species1 by real essences1 according as we distinguish them into species by names1 we shall be liable to great mistakes4 #ad4 ,difficulties in the supposition of a certain number of real ,essences ,to distinguish substantial beings into species1 according to the usual supposition1 that there are certain precise essences or forms of things1 whereby all the individuals existing are1 by nature distinguished into species1 these things are necessary3-- #ae4 ,a crude supposition4 ,first1 ,to be assured that nature1 in the production of things1 always designs them to partake of certain regulated established essences1 which are to be the models of all things to be produced4 ,this1 in that crude sense it is usually proposed1 would need some better explication1 before it can fully be assented to4 #af4 ,monstrous births4 ,secondly1 ,it would be necessary to know whether nature always attains that essence it designs in the production of things4 ,the irregular and monstrous births1 that in divers sorts of animals have been observed1 will always give us reason to doubt of one or both of these4 #ag4 ,are monsters really a distinct species8 ,thirdly1 ,it ought to be determined whether those we call monsters be really a distinct species1 according to the scholastic notion of the word species2 since it is certain that everything that exists has its particular constitution4 ,and yet we find that some of these monstrous productions have few or none of those qualities which are supposed to result from1 and accompany1 the essence of that species from whence they derive their originals1 and to which1 by their descent1 they seem to belong4 #ah4 ,men can have no ideas of ,real ,essences4 ,fourthly1 ,the real essences of those things which we distinguish into species1 and as so distinguished we name1 ought to be known2 i4e4 we ought to have ideas of them4 ,but since we are ignorant in these four points1 the supposed real essences of things stand ,,us not in stead for the distinguishing substances into species4 #ai4 ,our ,nominal ,essences of ,substances not perfect collections of the properties that flow from the ,real ,essence4 ,fifthly1 ,the only imaginable help in this case would be1 that1 having framed perfect complex ideas of the properties of things flowing from their different real essences1 we should thereby distinguish them into species4 ,but neither can this be done4 ,for1 being ignorant of the real essence itself1 it is impossible to know all those properties that flow from it1 and are so annexed to it1 that any one of them being away1 we may certainly conclude that that essence is not there1 and so the thing is not of that species4 ,we can never know what is the precise number of properties depending on the real essence of gold1 any one of which failing1 the real essence of gold1 and consequently gold1 would not be there1 unless we knew the real essence of gold itself1 and by that determined that species4 ,by the word ,,gold here1 ,i must be understood to design a particular piece of matter2 v4 g4 the last guinea that was coined4 ,for1 if it should stand here1 in its ordinary signification1 for that complex idea which ,i or any one else calls gold1 i4 e4 for the nominal essence of gold1 it would be jargon4 ,so hard is it to show the various meaning and imperfection of words1 when we have nothing else but words to do it by4 #bj4 ,hence names independent of ,real ,essence4 ,by all which it is clear1 that our distinguishing substances into species by names1 is not at all founded on their real essences2 nor can we pretend to range and determine them exactly into species1 according to internal essential differences4 #ba4 ,but stand for such collections of simple ideas as we have made the ,name stand for4 ,but since1 as has been remarked1 we have need of ,,general words1 though we know not the real essences of things2 all we can do is1 to collect such a number of simple ideas as1 by examination1 we find to be united together in things existing1 and thereof to make one complex idea4 ,which1 though it be not the real essence of any substance that exists1 is yet the specific essence to which our name belongs1 and is convertible with it2 by which we may at least try the truth of these nominal essences4 ,for example3 there be that say that the essence of body is ,,extension2 if it be so1 we can never mistake in putting the essence of anything for the thing itself4 ,let us then in discourse put extension for body1 and when we would say that body moves1 let us say that extension moves1 and see how ill it will look4 ,he that should say that one extension by impulse moves another extension1 would1 by the bare expression1 sufficiently show the absurdity of such a notion4 ,the essence of anything in respect of us1 is the whole complex idea comprehended and marked by that name2 and in substances1 besides the several distinct simple ideas that make them up1 the confused one of substance1 or of an unknown support and cause of their union1 is always a part3 and therefore the essence of body is not bare extension1 but an extended solid thing2 and so to say1 an extended solid thing moves1 or impels another1 is all one1 and as intelligible1 as to say1 ,,body moves or impels4 ,likewise1 to say that a rational animal is capable of conversation1 is all one as to say a man2 but no one will say that rationality is capable of conversation1 because it makes not the whole essence to which we give the name man4 #bb4 ,our ,abstract ,ideas are to us the ,measures of the ,species we make in instance in that of ,man4 ,there are creatures in the world that have shapes like ours1 but are hairy1 and want language and reason4 ,there are naturals amongst us that have perfectly our shape1 but want reason1 and some of them language too4 ,there are creatures1 as it is said1 7sit fides penes authorem1 but there appears no contradiction that there should be such17 that1 with language and reason and a shape in other things agreeing with ours1 have hairy tails2 others where the males have no beards1 and others where the females have4 ,if it be asked whether these be all men or no1 all of human species8 it is plain1 the question refers only to the nominal essence3 for those of them to whom the definition of the word man1 or the complex idea signified by that name1 agrees1 are men1 and the other not4 ,but if the inquiry be made concerning the supposed real essence2 and whether the internal constitution and frame of these several creatures be specifically different1 it is wholly impossible for us to answer1 no part of that going into our specific idea3 only we have reason to think1 that where the faculties or outward frame so much differs1 the internal constitution is not exactly the same4 ,but what difference in the real internal constitution makes a specific difference it is in vain to inquire2 whilst our measures of species be1 as they are1 only our abstract ideas1 which we know2 and not that internal constitution1 which makes no part of them4 ,shall the difference of hair only on the skin be a mark of a different internal specific constitution between a changeling and a drill1 when they agree in shape1 and want of reason and speech8 ,and shall not the want of reason and speech be a sign to us of different real constitutions and species between a changeling and a reasonable man8 ,and so of the rest1 if we pretend that distinction of species or sorts is fixedly established by the real frame and secret constitutions of things4 #bc4 ,species in ,animals not distinguished by ,generation4 ,nor let any one say1 that the power of propagation in animals by the mixture of male and female1 and in plants by seeds1 keeps the supposed real species distinct and entire1 ,for1 granting this to be true1 it would help us in the distinction of the species of things no further than the tribes of animals and vegetables4 ,what must we do for the rest8 ,but in those too it is not sufficient3 for if history lie not1 women have conceived by drills2 and what real species1 by that measure1 such a production will be in nature will be a new question3 and we have reason to think this is not impossible1 since mules and jumarts1 the one from the mixture of an ass and a mare1 the other from the mixture of a bull and a mare1 are so frequent in the world4 ,i once saw a creature that was the issue of a cat and a rat1 and had the plain marks of both about it2 wherein nature appeared to have followed the pattern of neither sort alone1 but to have jumbled them both together4 ,to which he that shall add the monstrous productions that are so frequently to be met with in nature1 will find it hard1 even in the race of animals1 to determine by the pedigree of what species every animal's issue is2 and be at a loss about the real essence1 which he thinks certainly conveyed by generation1 and has alone a right to the specific name4 ,but further1 if the species of animals and plants are to be distinguished only by propagation1 must ,i go to the ,indies to see the sire and dam of the one1 and the plant from which the seed was gathered that produced the other1 to know whether this be a tiger or that tea8 #bd4 ,not by substantial ,forms4 ,upon the whole matter1 it is evident that it is their own collections of sensible qualities that men make the essences of ,,their several sorts of substances2 and that their real internal structures are not considered by the greatest part of men in the sorting them4 ,much less were any ,,substantial ,,forms ever thought on by any but those who have in this one part of the world learned the language of the schools3 and yet those ignorant men1 who pretend not any insight into the real essences1 nor trouble themselves about substantial forms1 but are content with knowing things one from another by their sensible qualities1 are often better acquainted with their differences2 can more nicely distinguish them from their uses2 and better know what they expect from each1 than those learned quick-sighted men1 who look so deep into them1 and talk so confidently of something more hidden and essential4 #be4 ,the specific ,essences that are common made by ,men4 ,but supposing that the ,,real essences of substances were discoverable by those that would severely apply themselves to that inquiry1 yet we could not reasonably think that the ranking of things under general names was regulated by those internal real constitutions1 or anything else but their ,,obvious appearances2 since languages1 in all countries1 have been established long before sciences4 ,so that they have not been philosophers or logicians1 or such who have troubled themselves about forms and essences1 that have made the general names that are in use amongst the several nations of men3 but those more or less comprehensive terms have1 for the most part1 in all languages1 received their birth and signification from ignorant and illiterate people1 who sorted and denominated things by those sensible qualities they found in them2 thereby to signify them1 when absent1 to others1 whether they had an occasion to mention a sort or a particular thing4 #bf4 ,therefore very various and uncertain in the ideas of different men4 ,since then it is evident that we sort and name substances by their nominal and not by their real essences1 the next thing to be considered is how1 and by whom these essences come to be made4 ,as to the latter1 it is evident they are made by the mind1 and not by nature3 for were they ,nature's workmanship1 they could not be so various and different in several men as experience tells us they are4 ,for if we will examine it1 we shall not find the nominal essence of any one species of substances in all men the same3 no1 not of that which of all others we are the most intimately acquainted with4 ,it could not possibly be that the abstract idea to which the name ,,man is given should be different in several men1 if it were of ,nature's making2 and that to one it should be animal rationale1 and to another1 animal implume bipes latis unguibus4 ,he that annexes the name man to a complex idea1 made up of sense and spontaneous motion1 joined to a body of such a shape1 has thereby one essence of the species man2 and he that1 upon further examination1 adds rationality1 has another essence of the species he calls man3 by which means the same individual will be a true man to the one which is not so to the other4 ,i think there is scarce any one will allow this upright figure1 so well known1 to be the essential difference of the species man2 and yet how far men determine of the sorts of animals rather by their shape than descent1 is very visible2 since it has been more than once debated1 whether several human foetuses should be preserved or received to baptism or no1 only because of the difference of their outward configuration from the ordinary make of children1 without knowing whether they were not as capable of reason as infants cast in another mould3 some whereof1 though of an approved shape1 are never capable of as much appearance of reason all their lives as is to be found in an ape1 or an elephant1 and never give any signs of being acted by a rational soul4 ,whereby it is evident1 that the outward figure1 which only was found wanting1 and not the faculty of reason1 which nobody could know would be wanting in its due season1 was made essential to the human species4 ,the learned divine and lawyer must1 on such occasions1 renounce his sacred definition of animal rationale1 and substitute some other essence of the human species4 ,monsieur ,menage furnishes us with an example worth the taking notice of on this occasion3 ',when the abbot of ,saint ,martin1' says he1 'was born1 he had so little of the figure of a man1 that it bespake him rather a monster4 ,it was for some time under deliberation1 whether he should be baptized or no4 ,however1 he was baptized1 and declared a man provisionally till time should show what he would prove4 ,nature had moulded him so untowardly1 that he was called all his life the ,abbot ,malotru2 i4e4 ill-shaped4 ,he was of ,caen4 7,menagiana1 #bgh1 #dcj47 ,this child1 we see1 was very near being excluded out of the species of man1 barely by his shape4 ,he escaped very narrowly as he was2 and it is certain1 a figure a little more oddly turned had cast him1 and he had been executed1 as a thing not to be allowed to pass for a man4 ,and yet there can be no reason given why1 if the lineaments of his face had been a little altered1 a rational soul could not have been lodged in him2 why a visage somewhat longer1 or a nose flatter1 or a wider mouth1 could not have consisted1 as well as the rest of his ill figure1 with such a soul1 such parts1 as made him1 disfigured as he was1 capable to be a dignitary in the church4 #bg4 ,nominal ,essences of particular substances are undetermined by nature1 and therefore various as men vary4 ,wherein1 then1 would ,i gladly know1 consist the precise and unmovable boundaries of that species8 ,it is plain1 if we examine1 there is no such thing made by ,nature1 and established by her amongst men4 ,the real essence of that or any other sort of substances1 it is evident1 we know not2 and therefore are so undetermined in our nominal essences1 which we make ourselves1 that1 if several men were to be asked concerning some oddly-shaped foetus1 as soon as born1 whether it were a man or no1 it is past doubt one should meet with different answers4 ,which could not happen1 if the nominal essences1 whereby we limit and distinguish the species of substances1 were not made by man with some liberty2 but were exactly copied from precise boundaries set by nature1 whereby it distinguished all substances into certain species4 ,who would undertake to resolve what species that monster was of which is mentioned by ,licetus 7lib4 i4 c4 #c71 with a man's head and hog's body8 ,or those other which to the bodies of men had the heads of beasts1 as dogs1 horses1 c4 ,if any of these creatures had lived1 and could have spoke1 it would have increased the difficulty4 ,had the upper part to the middle been of human shape1 and all below swine1 had it been murder to destroy it8 ,or must the bishop have been consulted1 whether it were man enough to be admitted to the font or no8 ,as ,i have been told it happened in ,france some years since1 in somewhat a like case4 ,so uncertain are the boundaries of species of animals to us1 who have no other measures than the complex ideas of our own collecting3 and so far are we from certainly knowing what a ,,man is2 though perhaps it will be judged great ignorance to make any doubt about it4 ,and yet ,i think ,i may say1 that the certain boundaries of that species are so far from being determined1 and the precise number of simple ideas which make the nominal essence so far from being settles and perfectly known1 that very material doubts may still arise about it4 ,and ,i imagine none of the definitions of the word ,,man which we yet have1 nor descriptios of that sort of animal1 are so perfect and exact as to satisfy a considerate inquisitive person2 much less to obtain a general consent1 and to be that which men would everywhere stick by1 in the decision of cases1 and determining of life and death1 baptism or no baptism1 in productions that mights happen4 #bh4 ,but not so arbitrary as ,mixed ,modes4 ,but though these nominal essences of substances are made by the mind1 they are not yet made so arbitrarily as those of mixed modes4 ,to the making of any nominal essence1 it is necessary1 ,first1 that the ideas whereof it consists have such a union as to make but one idea1 how compounded soever4 ,secondly1 that the particular ideas so united be exactly the same1 neither more nor less4 ,for if two abstract complex ideas differ either in number or sorts of their component parts1 they make two different1 and not one and the same essence4 ,in the first of these1 the mind1 in making its complex ideas of substances1 only follows nature2 and puts none together which are not supposed to have a union in nature4 ,nobody joins the voice of a sheep with the shape of a horse2 nor the colour of lead with the weight and fixedness of gold1 to be the complex ideas of any real substances2 unless he has a mind to fill his head with chimeras1 and his discourse with unintelligible words4 ,men observing certain qualities always joined and existing together1 therein copied nature2 and of ideas so united made their complex ones of substances4 ,for1 though men may make what complex ideas they please1 and give what names to them they will2 yet1 if they will be understood ,,when ,,they ,,speak ,,of ,,things ,,really ,,existing1 they must in some degree conform their ideas to the things they would speak of2 or else men's language will be like that of ,babel2 and every man's words1 being intelligible only to himself1 would no longer serve to conversation and the ordinary affairs of life1 if the ideas they stand for be not some way answering the common appearances and agreement of substances as they really exist4 #bi4 ,our ,nominal ,essences of substances usually consist of a few obvious qualities observed in things4 ,secondly1 ,though the mind of man1 in making its complex ideas of substances1 never puts any together that do not really1 or are not supposed to1 co-exist2 and so it truly borrows that union from nature3 yet the number it combines depends upon the various care1 industry1 or fancy of him that makes it4 ,men generally content themselves with some few sensible obvious qualities2 and often1 if not always1 leave out others as material and as firmly united as those that they take4 ,of sensible substances there are two sorts3 one of organized bodies1 which are propagated by seed2 and in these the ,,shape is that which to us is the leading quality1 and most characteristical part1 that determines the species4 ,and therefore in vegetables and animals1 an extended solid substance of such a certain figure usually serves the turn4 ,for however some men seem to prize their definition of animal rationale1 yet should there a creature be found that had language and reason1 but partaked not of the usual shape of a man1 ,i believe it would hardly pass for a man1 how much soever it were animal rationale4 ,and if ,balaam's ass had all his life discoursed as rationally as he did once with his master1 ,i doubt yet whether any one would have thought him worthy the name man1 or allowed him to be of the same species with himself4 ,as in vegetables and animals it is the shape1 so in most other bodies1 not propagated by seed1 it is the ,,colour we most fix on1 and are most led by4 ,thus where we find the colour of gold1 we are apt to imagine all the other qualities comprehended in our complex idea to be there also3 and we commonly take these two obvious qualities1 viz4 shape and colour1 for so presumptive ideas of several species1 that in a good picture1 we readily say1 this is a lion1 and that a rose2 this is a gold1 and that a silver goblet1 only by the different figures and colours represented to the eye by the pencil4 #cj4 ,yet1 imperfect as they thus are1 they serve for common converse4 ,but though this serves well enough for gross and confused conceptions1 and inaccurate ways of talking and thinking2 yet ,,men ,,are ,,far ,,enough ,,from ,,having ,,agreed ,,on ,,the ,,precise ,,number ,,of ,,simple ,,ideas ,,or ,,qualities ,,belonging ,,to ,,any ,,sort ,,of ,,things1 ,,signified ,,by ,,its ,,name4 ,nor is it a wonder2 since it requires much time1 pains1 and skill1 strict inquiry1 and long examination to find out what1 and how many1 those simple ideas are1 which are constantly and inseparably united in nature1 and are always to be found together in the same subject4 ,most men1 wanting either time1 inclination1 or industry enough for this1 even to some tolerable degree1 content themselves with some few obvious and outward appearances of things1 thereby readily to distinguish and sort them for the common affairs of life3 and so1 without further examination1 give them names1 or take up the names already in use4 ,which1 though in common conversation they pass well enough for the signs of some few obvious qualities co-existing1 are yet far enough from comprehending1 in a settled signification1 a precise number of simple ideas1 much less all those which are united in nature4 ,he that shall consider1 after so much stir about genus and species1 and such a deal of talk of specific differences1 how few words we have yet settled definitions of1 may with reason imagine1 that those ,,forms which there hath been so much noise made about are only chimeras1 which give us no light into the specific natures of things4 ,and he that shall consider how far the names of substances are from having significations wherein all who use them do agree1 will have reason to conclude that1 though the nominal essences of substances are all supposed to be copied from nature1 yet they are all1 or most of them1 very imperfect4 ,since the composition of those complex ideas are1 in several men1 very different3 and therefore that these boundaries of species are as men1 and not as ,nature1 makes them1 if at least there are in nature any such prefixed bounds4 ,it is true that many particular substances are so made by ,nature1 that they have agreement and likeness one with another1 and so afford a foundation of being ranked into sorts4 ,but the sorting of things by us1 or the making of determinate species1 being in order to naming and comprehending them under general terms1 ,i cannot see how it can be properly said1 that ,nature sets the boundaries of the species of things3 or1 if it be so1 our boundaries of species are not exactly conformable to those in nature4 ,for we1 having need of general names for present use1 stay not for a perfect discovery of all those qualities which would ,,best show us their most material differences and agreements2 but we ourselves divide them1 by certain obvious appearances1 into species1 that we may the easier under general names communicate our thoughts about them4 ,for1 having no other knowledge of any substance but of the simple ideas that are united in it2 and observing several particular things to agree with others in several of those simple ideas2 we make that collection our specific idea1 and give it a general name2 that in recording our thoughts1 and in our discourse with others1 we may in one short word designate all the individuals that agree in that complex idea1 without enumerating the simple ideas that make it up2 and so not waste our time and breath in tedious descriptions3 which we see they are fain to do who would discourse of any new sort of things they have not yet a name for4 #ca4 ,essences of ,species under the same ,name very different in different minds4 ,but however these species of substances pass well enough in ordinary conversation1 it is plain that this complex idea wherein they observe several individuals to agree1 is by different men made very differently2 by some more1 and others less accurately4 ,in some1 this complex idea contains a greater1 and in others a smaller number of qualities2 and so is apparently such as the mind makes it4 ,the yellow shining colour makes gold to children2 others add weight1 malleableness1 and fusibility2 and others yet other qualities1 which they find joined with that yellow colour1 as constantly as its weight and fusibility4 ,for in all these and the like qualities1 one has as good a right to be put into the complex idea of that substance wherein they are all joined as another4 ,and therefore different men1 leaving out or putting in several simple ideas which others do not1 according to their various examination1 skill1 or observation of that subject1 have different essences of gold1 which must therefore be of their own and not of nature's making4 #cb4 ,the more general our ,ideas of ,substances are1 the more incomplete and partial they are4 ,if the number of simple ideas that make the nominal essence of the lowest species1 or first sorting1 of individuals1 depends on the mind of man1 variously collecting them1 it is much more evident that they do so in the more comprehensive classes1 which1 by the masters of logic1 are called genera4 ,these are complex ideas designedly imperfect3 and it is visible at first sight1 that several of those qualities that are to be found in the things themselves are purposely left out of generical ideas4 ,for1 as the mind1 to make general ideas comprehending several particulars1 leaves out those of time and place1 and such other1 that make them incommunicable to more than one individual2 so to make other yet more general ideas1 that may comprehend different sorts1 it leaves out those qualities that distinguish them1 and puts into its new collection only such ideas as are common to several sorts4 ,the same convenience that made men express several parcels of yellow matter coming from ,guinea and ,peru under one name1 sets them also upon making of one name that may comprehend both gold and silver1 and some other bodies of different sorts4 ,this is done by leaving out those qualities1 which are peculiar to each sort1 and retaining a complex idea made up of those that are common to them all4 ,to which the name ,,metal being annexed1 there is a genus constituted2 the essence whereof being that abstract idea1 containing only malleableness and fusibility1 with certain degrees of weight and fixedness1 wherein some bodies of several kinds agree1 leaves out the colour and other qualities peculiar to gold and silver1 and the other sorts comprehended under the name metal4 ,whereby it is plain that men follow not exactly the patterns set them by nature1 when they make their general ideas of substances2 since there is no body to be found which has barely malleableness and fusibility in it1 without other qualities as inseparable as those4 ,but men1 in making their general ideas1 seeking more the convenience of language1 and quick dispatch by short and comprehensive signs1 than the true and precise nature of things as they exist1 have1 in the framing their abstract ideas1 chiefly pursued that end2 which was to be furnished with store of general and variously comprehensive names4 ,so that in this whole business of genera and species1 the genus1 or more comprehensive1 is but a partial conception of what is in the species2 and the species but a partial idea of what is to be found in each individual4 ,if therefore any one will think that a man1 and a horse1 and an animal1 and a plant1 c41 are distinguished by real essences made by nature1 he must think nature to be very liberal of these real essences1 making one for body1 another for an animal1 and another for a horse2 and all these essences liberally bestowed upon ,bucephalus4 ,but if we would rightly consider what is done in all these genera and species1 or sorts1 we should find that there is no new thing made2 but only more or less comprehensive signs1 whereby we may be enabled to express in a few syllables great numbers of particular things1 as they agree in more or less general conceptions1 which we have framed to that purpose4 ,in all which we may observe1 that the more general term is always the name of a less complex idea2 and that each genus is but a partial conception of2 the species comprehended under it4 ,so that if these abstract general ideas be thought to be complete1 it can only be in respect of a certain established relation between them and certain names which are made use of to signify them2 and not in respect of anything existing1 as made by nature4 #cc4 ,this all accommodated to the end of the ,speech4 ,this is adjusted to the true end of speech1 which is to be the easiest and shortest way of communicating our notions4 ,for thus he that would discourse of things1 as they agreed in the complex idea of extension and solidity1 needed but use the word ,,body to denote all such4 ,he that to these would join others1 signified by the words life1 sense1 and spontaneous motion1 needed but use the word ,,animal to signify all which partaked of those ideas1 and he that had made a complex idea of a body1 with life1 sense1 and motion1 with the faculty of reasoning1 and a certain shape joined to it1 needed but use the short monosyllable ,,man1 to express all particulars that correspond to that complex idea4 ,this is the proper business of genus and species3 and this men do without any consideration of real essences1 or substantial forms2 which come not within the reach of our knowledge when we think of those things1 nor within the signification of our words when we discourse with others4 #cd4 ,instance in ,cassowaries4 ,were ,i to talk with any one of a sort of birds ,i lately saw in ,st4 ,james's ,park1 about three or four feet high1 with a covering of something between feathers and hair1 of a dark brown colour1 without wings1 but in the place thereof two or three little branches coming down like sprigs of ,spanish broom1 long great legs1 with feet only of three claws1 and without a tail2 ,i must make this description of it1 and so may make others understand me4 ,but when ,i am told that the name of it is ,,cassuaris1 ,i may then use that word to stand in discourse for all my complex idea mentioned in that description2 though by that word1 which is now become a specific name1 ,i know no more of the real essence or constitution of that sort of animals than ,i did before2 and knew probably as much of the nature of that species of birds before ,i learned the name1 as many ,englishmen do of swans or herons1 which are specific names1 very well known1 of sorts of birds common in ,england4 #ce4 ,men determine the ,sorts of ,substances1 which may be sorted variously4 ,from what has been said1 it is evident that ,,men make sorts of things4 ,for1 it being different essences alone that make different species1 it is plain that they who make those abstract ideas which are the nominal essences do thereby make the species1 or sort4 ,should there be a body found1 having all the other qualities of gold except malleableness1 it would no doubt be made a question whether it were gold or not1 i4e4 whether it were of that species4 ,this could be determined only by that abstract idea to which every one annexed the name gold3 so that it would be true gold to him1 and belong to that species1 who included not malleableness in his nominal essence1 signified by the sound gold2 and on the other side it would not be true gold1 or of that species1 to him who included malleableness in his specific idea4 ,and who1 ,i pray1 is it that makes these diverse species1 even under one and the same name1 but men that make two different abstract ideas1 consisting not exactly of the same collection of qualities8 ,nor is it a mere supposition to imagine that a body may exist wherein the other obvious qualities of gold may be without malleableness2 since it is certain that gold itself will be sometimes so eager1 7as artists call it17 that it will as little endure the hammer as glass itself4 ,what we have said of the putting in1 or leaving out of malleableness1 in the complex idea the name gold is by any one annexed to1 may be said of its peculiar weight1 fixedness1 and several other the like qualities3 for whatever is left out1 or put in1 it is still the complex idea to which that name is annexed that makes the species3 and as any particular parcel of matter answers that idea1 so the name of the sort belongs truly to it2 and it is of that species4 ,and thus anything is true gold1 perfect metal4 ,all which determination of the species1 it is plain1 depends on the understanding of man1 making this or that complex idea4 #cf4 ,nature makes the ,similitudes of ,substances4 ,this1 then1 in short1 is the case3 ,nature makes many ,,particular ,,things1 which do agree one with another in many sensible qualities1 and probably too in their internal frame and constitution3 but it is not this real essence that distinguishes them into species2 it is men who1 taking occasion from the qualities they find united in them1 and wherein they observe often several individuals to agree1 range them into sorts1 in order to their naming1 for the convenience of comprehensive signs2 under which individuals1 according to their conformity to this or that abstract idea1 come to be ranked as under ensigns3 so that this is of the blue1 that the red regiment2 this is a man1 that a drill3 and in this1 ,i think1 consists the whole business of genus and species4 #cg4 ,the manner of sorting particular beings the work of fallible men1 though nature makes things alike4 ,i do not deny but nature1 in the constant production of particular beings1 makes them not always new and various1 but very much alike and of kin one to another3 but ,i think it nevertheless true1 that the boundaries of the species1 whereby men sort them1 are made by men2 since the essences of the species1 distinguished by different names1 are1 as has been proved1 of man's making1 and seldom adequate to the internal nature of the things they are taken from4 ,so that we may truly say1 such a manner of sorting of things is the workmanship of men4 #ch4 ,each abstract ,idea1 with a name to it1 makes a nominal ,essence4 ,one thing ,i doubt not but will seem very strange in this doctrine1 which is1 that from what has been said it will follow1 that each abstract idea1 with a name to it1 makes a distinct species4 ,but who can help it1 if truth will have it so8 ,for so it must remain till somebody can show us the species of things limited and distinguished by something else2 and let us see that general terms signify not our abstract ideas1 but something different from them4 ,i would fain know why a shock and a hound are not as distinct species as a spaniel and an elephant4 ,we have no other idea of the different essence of an elephant and a spaniel1 than we have of the different essence of a shock and a hound2 all the essential difference1 whereby we know and distinguish them one from another1 consisting only in the different collection of simple ideas1 to which we have given those different names4 #ci4 ,how ,genera and ,species are related to naming4 ,how much the making of species and genera is in order to general names2 and how much general names are necessary1 if not to the being1 yet at least to the completing of a species1 and making it pass for such1 will appear1 besides what has been said above concerning ice and water1 in a very familiar example4 ,a silent and a striking watch are but one species1 to those who have but one name for them3 but he that has the name ,,watch for one1 and ,,clock for the other1 and distinct complex ideas to which those names belong1 to ,,him they are different species4 ,it will be said perhaps1 that the inward contrivance and constitution is different between these two1 which the watchmaker has a clear idea of4 ,and yet it is plain they are but one species to him1 when he has but one name for them4 ,for what is sufficient in the inward contrivance to make a new species8 ,there are some watches that are made with four wheels1 others with five2 is this a specific difference to the workman8 ,some have strings and physics1 and others none2 some have the balance loose1 and others regulated by a spiral spring1 and others by hogs' bristles4 ,are any or all of these enough to make a specific difference to the workman1 that knows each of these and several other different contrivances in the internal constitutions of watches8 ,it is certain each of these hath a real difference from the rest2 but whether it be an essential1 a specific difference or no1 relates only to the complex idea to which the name watch is given3 as long as they all agree in the idea which that name stands for1 and that name does not as a generical name comprehend different species under it1 they are not essentially nor specifically different4 ,but if any one will make minuter divisions1 from differences that he knows in the internal frame of watches1 and to such precise complex ideas give names that shall prevail2 they will then be new species1 to them who have those ideas with names to them1 and can by those differences distinguish watches into these several sorts2 and then ,,watch will be a generical name4 ,but yet they would be no distinct species to men ignorant of clock-work1 and the inward contrivances of watches1 who had no other idea but the outward shape and bulk1 with the marking of the hours by the hand4 ,for to them all those other names would be but synonymous terms for the same idea1 and signify no more1 nor no other thing but a watch4 ,just thus ,i think it is in natural things4 ,nobody will doubt that the wheels or springs 7if ,i may so say7 within1 are different in a ,,rational ,,man and a ,,changeling2 no more than that there is a difference in the frame between a ,,drill and a ,,changeling4 ,but whether one or both these differences be essential or specifical1 is only to be known to us by their agreement or disagreement with the complex idea that the name man stands for3 for by that alone can it be determined whether one1 or both1 or neither of those be a man4 #dj4 ,species of ,artificial ,things less confused than ,natural4 ,from what has been before said1 we may see the reason why1 in the species of artificial things1 there is generally less confusion and uncertainty than in natural4 ,because an artificial thing being a production of man1 which the artificer designed1 and therefore well knows the idea of1 the name of it is supposed to stand for no other idea1 nor to import any other essence1 than what is certainly to be known1 and easy enough to be apprehended4 ,for the idea or essence of the several sorts of artificial things1 consisting for the most part in nothing but the determinate figure of sensible parts1 and sometimes motion depending thereon1 which the artificer fashions in matter1 such as he finds for his turn2 it is not beyond the reach of our faculties to attain a certain idea thereof2 and so settle the signification of the names whereby the species of artificial things are distinguished1 with less doubt1 obscurity1 and equivocation than we can in things natural1 whose differences and operations depend upon contrivances beyond the reach of our discoveries4 #da4 ,artificial ,things of distinct ,species4 ,i must be excused here if ,i think artificial things are of distinct species as well as natural3 since ,i find they are as plainly and orderly ranked into sorts1 by different abstract ideas1 with general names annexed to them1 as distinct one from another as those of natural substances4 ,for why should we not think a watch and pistol as distinct species one from another1 as a horse and a dog2 they being expressed in our minds by distinct ideas1 and to others by distinct appellations8 #db4 ,substances alone1 of all our several sorts of ideas1 have proper ,names4 ,this is further to be observed concerning substances1 that they alone of all our several sorts of ideas have particular or proper names1 whereby one only particular thing is signified4 ,because in simple ideas1 modes1 and relations1 it seldom happens that men have occasion to mention often this or that particular when it is absent4 ,besides1 the greatest part of mixed modes1 being actions which perish in their birth1 are not capable of a lasting duration1 as substances which are the actors2 and wherein the simple ideas that make up the complex ideas designed by the name have a lasting union4 #dc4 ,difficult to lead another by words into the thoughts of things stripped of those abstract ideas we give them4 ,i must beg pardon of my reader for having dwelt so long upon this subject1 and perhaps with some obscurity4 ,but ,i desire it may be considered1 how difficult it is to lead another by words into the thoughts of things1 stripped of those specifical differences we give them3 which things1 if ,i name not1 ,i say nothing2 and if ,i do name them1 ,i thereby rank them into some sort or other1 and suggest to the mind the usual abstract idea of that species2 and so cross my purpose4 ,for1 to talk of a man1 and to lay by1 at the same time1 the ordinary signification of the name man1 which is our complex idea usually annexed to it2 and bid the reader consider man1 as he is in himself1 and as he is really distinguished from others in his internal constitution1 or real essence1 that is1 by something he knows not what1 looks like trifling3 and yet thus one must do who would speak of the supposed real essences and species of things1 as thought to be made by nature1 if it be but only to make it understood1 that there is no such thing signified by the general names which substances are called by4 ,but because it is difficult by known familiar names to do this1 give me leave to endeavour by an example to make the different consideration the mind has of specific names and ideas a little more clear2 and to show how the complex ideas of modes are referred sometimes to archetypes in the minds of other intelligent beings1 or1 which is the same1 to the signification annexed by others to their received names2 and sometimes to no archetypes at all4 ,give me leave also to show how the mind always refers its ideas of substances1 either to the substances themselves1 or to the signification of their names1 as to the archetypes2 and also to make plain the nature of species or sorting of things1 as apprehended and made use of by us2 and of the essences belonging to those species3 which is perhaps of more moment to discover the extent and certainty of our knowledge than we at first imagine4 #dd4 ,instances of mixed ,modes names ,,kinneah and ,,niouph4 ,let us suppose ,adam1 in the state of a grown man1 with a good understanding1 but in a strange country1 with all things new and unknown about him2 and no other faculties to attain the knowledge of them but what one of this age has now4 ,he observes ,lamech more melancholy than usual1 and imagines it to be from a suspicion he has of his wife ,adah1 7whom he most ardently loved7 that she had too much kindness for another man4 ,adam discourses these his thoughts to ,eve1 and desires her to take care that ,adah commit not folly3 and in these discourses with ,eve he makes use of these two new words ,,kinneah and ,,niouph4 ,in time1 ,adam's mistake appears1 for he finds ,lamech's trouble proceeded from having killed a man3 but yet the two names ,,kinneah and ,,niouph1 7the one standing for suspicion in a husband of his wife's disloyalty to him2 and the other for the act of committing disloyalty17 lost not their distinct significations4 ,it is plain then1 that here were two distinct complex ideas of mixed modes1 with names to them1 two distinct species of actions essentially different2 ,i ask wherein consisted the essences of these two distinct species of actions8 ,and it is plain it consisted in a precise combination of simple ideas1 different in one from the other4 ,i ask1 whether the complex idea in ,adam's mind1 which he called ,,kinneah1 were adequate or not8 ,and it is plain it was2 for it being a combination of simple ideas1 which he1 without any regard to any archetype1 without respect to anything as a pattern1 voluntarily put together1 abstracted1 and gave the name ,,kinneah to1 to express in short to others1 by that one sound1 all the simple ideas contained and united in that complex one2 it must necessarily follow that it was an adequate idea4 ,his own choice having made that combination1 it had all in it he intended it should1 and so could not but be perfect1 could not but be adequate2 it being referred to no other archetype which it was supposed to represent4 #de4 ,these words1 ,,kinneah and ,,niouph1 by degrees grew into common use1 and then the case was somewhat altered4 ,adam's children had the same faculties1 and thereby the same power that he had1 to make what complex ideas of mixed modes they pleased in their own minds2 to abstract them1 and make what sounds they pleased the signs of them3 but the use of names being to make our ideas within us known to others1 that cannot be done1 but when the same sign stands for the same idea in two who would communicate their thoughts and discourse together4 ,those1 therefore1 of ,adam's children1 that found these two words1 ,,kinneah and ,,niouph1 in familiar use1 could not take them for insignificant sounds1 but must needs conclude they stood for something2 for certain ideas1 abstract ideas1 they being general names2 which abstract ideas were the essences of the species distinguished by those names4 ,if therefore1 they would use these words as names of species already established and agreed on1 they were obliged to conform the ideas in their minds1 signified by these names1 to the ideas that they stood for in other men's minds1 as to their patterns and archetypes2 and then indeed their ideas of these complex modes were liable to be inadequate1 as being very apt 7especially those that consisted of combinations of many simple ideas7 not to be exactly conformable to the ideas in other men's minds1 using the same names2 though for this there be usually a remedy at hand1 which is to ask the meaning of any word we understand not of him that uses it3 it being as impossible to know certainly what the words jealousy and adultery 7which ,i think answer ,hebrew and ,hebrew7 stand for in another man's mind1 with whom ,i would discourse about them2 as it was impossible1 in the beginning of language1 to know what ,,kinneah and ,,niouph stood for in another man's mind1 without explication2 they being voluntary signs in every one4 #df4 ,instances of a species of ,substance named ,,zahab4 ,let us now also consider1 after the same manner1 the names of substances in their first application4 ,one of ,adam's children1 roving in the mountains1 lights on a glittering substance which pleases his eye4 ,home he carries it to ,adam1 who1 upon consideration of it1 finds it to be hard1 to have a bright yellow colour1 and an exceeding great weight4 ,these perhaps1 at first1 are all the qualities he takes notice of in it2 and abstracting this complex idea1 consisting of a substance having that peculiar bright yellowness1 and a weight very great in proportion to its bulk1 he gives the name ,,zahab1 to denominate and mark all substances that have these sensible qualities in them4 ,it is evident now1 that1 in this case1 ,adam acts quite differently from what he did before1 in forming those ideas of mixed modes to which he gave the names ,,kinneah and ,,niouph4 ,for there he put ideas together only by his own imagination1 not taken from the existence of anything2 and to them he gave names to denominate all things that should happen to agree to those his abstract ideas1 without considering whether any such thing did exist or not3 the standard there was of his own making4 ,but in the forming his idea of this new substance1 he takes the quite contrary course2 here he has a standard made by nature2 and therefore1 being to represent that to himself1 by the idea he has of it1 even when it is absent1 he puts in no simple idea into his complex one1 but what he has the perception of from the thing itself4 ,he takes care that his idea be conformable to this archetype1 and intends the name should stand for an idea so conformable4 #dg4 ,this piece of matter1 thus denominated ,,zahab by ,adam1 being quite different from any he had seen before1 nobody1 ,i think1 will deny to be a distinct species1 and to have its peculiar essence2 and that the name ,,zahab is the mark of the species1 and a name belonging to all things partaking in that essence4 ,but here it is plain the essence ,adam made the name ,,zahab stand for was nothing but a body hard1 shining1 yellow1 and very heavy4 ,but the inquisitive mind of man1 not content with the knowledge of these1 as ,i may say1 superficial qualities1 puts ,adam upon further examination of this matter4 ,he therefore knocks1 and beats it with flints1 to see what was discoverable in the inside3 he finds it yield to blows1 but not easily separate into pieces3 he finds it will bend without breaking4 ,is not now ductility to be added to his former idea1 and made part of the essence of the species that name ,,zahab stands for8 ,further trials discover fusibility and fixedness4 ,are not they also1 by the same reason that any of the others were1 to be put into the complex idea signified by the name ,,zahab8 ,if not1 what reason will there be shown more for the one than the other8 ,if these must1 then all the other properties1 which any further trials shall discover in this matter1 ought by the same reason to make a part of the ingredients of the complex idea which the name ,,zahab stands for1 and so be the essence of the species marked by that name4 ,which properties1 because they are endless1 it is plain that the idea made after this fashion1 by this archetype1 will be always inadequate4 #dh4 ,the ,abstract ,ideas of ,substances always imperfect and therefore various4 ,but this is not all4 ,it would also follow that the names of substances would not only have1 as in truth they have1 but would also be supposed to have different significations1 as used by different men1 which would very much cumber the use of language4 ,for if every distinct quality that were discovered in any matter by any one were supposed to make a necessary part of the complex idea signified by the common name given to it1 it must follow1 that men must suppose the same word to signify different things in different men3 since they cannot doubt but different men may have discovered several qualities1 in substances of the same denomination1 which others know nothing of4 #di4 ,therefore to fix the ,nominal ,species ,real ,essence supposed4 ,to avoid this therefore1 they have supposed a real essence belonging to every species1 from which these properties all flow1 and would have their name of the species stand for that4 ,but they1 not having any idea of that real essence in substances1 and their words signifying nothing but the ideas they have1 that which is done by this attempt is only to put the name or sound in the place and stead of the thing having that real essence1 without knowing what the real essence is1 and this is that which men do when they speak of species of things1 as supposing them made by nature1 and distinguished by real essences4 #ej4 ,which ,supposition is of no ,use4 ,for1 let us consider1 when we affirm that 'all gold is fixed1' either it means that fixedness is a part of the definition1 i4 e41 part of the nominal essence the word gold stands for2 and so this affirmation1 'all gold is fixed1' contains nothing but the signification of the term gold4 ,or else it means1 that fixedness1 not being a part of the definition of the gold1 is a property of that substance itself3 in which case it is plain that the word gold stands in the place of a substance1 having the real essence of a species of things made by nature4 ,in which way of substitution it has so confused and uncertain a signification1 that1 though this proposition--'gold is fixed'--be in that sense an affirmation of something real2 yet it is a truth will always fail us in its particular application1 and so is of no real use or certainty4 ,for let it be ever so true1 that all gold1 i4 e4 all that has the real essence of gold1 is fixed1 what serves this for1 whilst we know not1 in this sense1 ,,what ,,is ,,or ,,is ,,not ,,gold8 ,for if we know not the real essence of gold1 it is impossible we should know what parcel of matter has that essence1 and so whether ,,it be true gold or no4 #ea4 ,conclusion4 ,to conclude3 what liberty ,adam had at first to make any complex ideas of ,,mixed ,,modes by no other pattern but by his own thoughts1 the same have all men ever since had4 ,and the same necessity of conforming his ideas of ,,substances to things without him1 as to archetypes made by nature1 that ,adam was under1 if he would not wilfully impose upon himself1 the same are all men ever since under too4 ,the same liberty also that ,adam had of affixing any new name to any idea1 the same has any one still1 7especially the beginners of languages1 if we can imagine any such27 but only with this difference1 that1 in places where men in society have already established a language amongst them1 the significations of words are very warily and sparingly to be altered4 ,because men being furnished already with names for their ideas1 and common use having appropriated known names to certain ideas1 an affected misapplication of them cannot but be very ridiculous4 ,he that hath new notions will perhaps venture sometimes on the coining of new terms to express them3 but men think it a boldness1 and it is uncertain whether common use will ever make them pass for current4 ,but in communication with others1 it is necessary that we conform the ideas we make the vulgar words of any language stand for to their known proper significations1 7which ,i have explained at large already17 or else to make known that new signification we apply them to4 ,,chapter ,,vii4 ,,of ,,particles4 #a4 ,particles connect ,parts1 or whole ,sentences together4 ,besides words which are names of ideas in the mind1 there are a great many others that are made use of to signify the ,,connexion that the mind gives to ideas1 or to propositions1 one with another4 ,the mind1 in communicating its thoughts to others1 does not only need signs of the ideas it has then before it1 but others also1 to show or intimate some particular action of its own1 at that time1 relating to those ideas4 ,this it does several ways2 as ,i,s and ,i,s ,,not1 are the general marks1 of the mind1 affirming or denying4 ,but besides affirmation or negation1 without which there is in words no truth or falsehood1 the mind does1 in declaring its sentiments to others1 connect not only the parts of propositions1 but whole sentences one to another1 with their several relations and dependencies1 to make a coherent discourse4 #b4 ,in right use of ,particles consists the ,art of ,well-speaking ,the words whereby it signifies what connexion it gives to the several affirmations and negations1 that it unites in one continued reasoning or narration1 are generally called ,,particles3 and it is in the right use of these that more particularly consists the clearness and beauty of a good style4 ,to think well1 it is not enough that a man has ideas clear and distinct in his thoughts1 nor that he observes the agreement or disagreement of some of them2 but he must think in train1 and observe the dependence of his thoughts and reasonings upon one another4 ,and to express well such methodical and rational thoughts1 he must have words to show what connexion1 restriction1 distinction1 opposition1 emphasis1 c41 he gives to each respective part of his discourse4 ,to mistake in any of these1 is to puzzle instead of informing his hearer3 and therefore it is1 that those words which are not truly by themselves the names of any ideas are of such constant and indispensable use in language1 and do much contribute to men's well expressing themselves4 #c4 ,they say what ,relation the ,mind gives to its own ,thoughts4 ,this part of grammar has been perhaps as much neglected as some others over-diligently cultivated4 ,it is easy for men to write1 one after another1 of cases and genders1 moods and tenses1 gerunds and supines3 in these and the like there has been great diligence used2 and particles themselves1 in some languages1 have been1 with great show of exactness1 ranked into their several orders4 ,but though ,,prepositions and ,,conjunctions1 c41 are names well known in grammar1 and the particles contained under them carefully ranked into their distinct subdivisions2 yet he who would show the right use of particles1 and what significancy and force they have1 must take a little more pains1 enter into his own thoughts1 and observe nicely the several postures of his mind in discoursing4 #d4 ,they are all marks of some action or intimation of the mind4 ,neither is it enough1 for the explaining of these words1 to render them1 as is usual in dictionaries1 by words of another tongue which come nearest to their signification3 for what is meant by them is commonly as hard to be understood in one as another language4 ,they are all marks of some action or intimation of the mind2 and therefore to understand them rightly1 the several views1 postures1 stands1 turns1 limitations1 and exceptions1 and several other thoughts of the mind1 for which we have either none or very deficient names1 are diligently to be studied4 ,of these there is a great variety1 much exceeding the number of particles that most languages have to express them by3 and therefore it is not to be wondered that most of these particles have divers and sometimes almost opposite significations4 ,in the ,hebrew tongue there is a particle consisting of but one single letter1 of which there are reckoned up1 as ,i remember1 seventy1 ,i am sure above fifty1 several significations4 #e4 ,instance in ,but4 ',but' is a particle1 none more familiar in our language3 and he that says it is a discretive conjunction1 and that it answers to sed ,latin1 or mais in ,french1 thinks he has sufficiently explained it4 ,but yet it seems to me to intimate several relations the mind gives to the several propositions or parts of them which it joins by this monosyllable4 ,first1 ',but to say no more3' here it intimates a stop of the mind in the course it was going1 before it came quite to the end of it4 ,secondly1 ',i saw but two plants2' here it shows that the mind limits the sense to what is expressed1 with a negation of all other4 ,thirdly1',you pray2 but it is not that ,god would bring you to the true religion4' ,fourthly1 ',but that he would confirm you in your own4' ,the first of these ,,buts intimates a supposition in the mind of something otherwise than it should be2 the latter shows that the mind makes a direct opposition between that and what goes before it4 ,fifthly1 ',all animals have sense1 but a dog is an animal3' here it signifies little more but that the latter proposition is joined to the former1 as the minor of a syllogism4 #f4 ,this ,matter of the use of ,particles but lightly touched here4 ,to these1 ,i doubt not1 might be added a great many other significations of this particle1 if it were my business to examine it in its full latitude1 and consider it in all the places it is to be found3 which if one should do1 ,i doubt whether in all those manners it is made use of1 it would deserve the title of ,,discretive1 which grammarians give to it4 ,but ,i intend not here a full explication of this sort of signs4 ,the instances ,i have given in this one may give occasion to reflect on their use and force in language1 and lead us into the contemplation of several actions of our minds in discoursing1 which it has found a way to intimate to others by these particles1 some whereof constantly1 and others in certain constructions1 have the sense of a whole sentence contained in them4 ,,chapter ,,viii4 ,,of ,,abstract ,,and ,,concrete ,,terms4 #a4 ,abstract ,terms predicated one on another and why4 ,the ordinary words of language1 and our common use of them1 would have given us light into the nature of our ideas1 if they had been but considered with attention4 ,the mind1 as has been shown1 has a power to abstract its ideas1 and so they become essences1 general essences1 whereby the sorts of things are distinguished4 ,now each abstract idea being distinct1 so that of any two the one can never be the other1 the mind will1 by its intuitive knowledge1 perceive their difference1 and therefore in propositions no two whole ideas can ever be affirmed one of another4 ,this we see in the common use of language1 which permits not any two abstract words1 or names of abstract ideas1 to be affirmed one of another4 ,for how near of kin soever they may seem to be1 and how certain soever it is that man is an animal1 or rational1 or white1 yet every one at first hearing perceives the falsehood of these propositions3 ,,humanity ,,is ,,animality1 or ,,rationality1 or ,,whiteness3 and this is as evident as any of the most allowed maxims4 ,all our affirmations then are only in concrete1 which is the affirming1 not one abstract idea to be another1 but one abstract idea to be joined to another2 which abstract ideas1 in substances1 may be of any sort2 in all the rest are little else but of relations2 and in substances the most frequent are of powers3 v4g4 'a man is white1' signifies that the thing that has the essence of a man has also in it the essence of whiteness1 which is nothing but a power to produce the idea of whiteness in one whose eyes can discover ordinary objects3 or1 'a man is rational1' signifies that the same thing that hath the essence of a man hath also in it the essence of rationality1 i4e4 a power of reasoning4 #b4 ,they show the ,difference of our ,ideas4 ,this distinction of names shows us also the difference of our ideas3 for if we observe them1 we shall find that ,,our ,,simple ,,ideas ,,have ,,all ,,abstract ,,as ,,well ,,as ,,concrete ,,names3 the one whereof is 7to speak the language of grammarians7 a substantive1 the other an adjective2 as whiteness1 white2 sweetness1 sweet4 ,the like also holds in our ideas of modes and relations2 as justice1 just2 equality1 equal3 only with this difference1 that some of the concrete names of relations amongst men chiefly are substantives2 as1 paternitas1 pater2 whereof it were easy to render a reason4 ,but as to our ideas of substances1 we have very few or no abstract names at all4 ,for though the ,schools have introduced animalitas1 humanitas1 corporietas1 and some others2 yet they hold no proportion with that infinite number of names of substances1 to which they never were ridiculous enough to attempt the coining of abstract ones3 and those few that the ,schools forged1 and put into the mouths of their scholars1 could never yet get admittance into common use1 or obtain the license of public approbation4 ,which seems to me at least to intimate the confession of all mankind1 that they have no ideas of the real essences of substances1 since they have not names for such ideas3 which no doubt they would have had1 had not their consciousness to themselves of their ignorance of them kept them from so idle an attempt4 ,and therefore1 though they had ideas enough to distinguish gold from a stone1 and metal from wood2 yet they but timorously ventured on such terms1 as aurietas and saxietas1 metallietas and lignietas1 or the like names1 which should pretend to signify the real essences of those substances whereof they knew they had no ideas4 ,and indeed it was only the doctrine of ,,substantial ,,forms1 and the confidence of mistaken pretenders to a knowledge that they had not1 which first coined and then introduced animalitas and humanitas1 and the like2 which yet went very little further than their own ,schools1 and could never get to be current amongst understanding men4 ,indeed1 humanitas was a word in familiar use amongst the ,romans2 but in a far different sense1 and stood not for the abstract essence of any substance2 but was the abstracted name of a mode1 and its concrete humanus1 not homo4 ,,chapter ,,ix4 ,,of ,,the ,,imperfection ,,of ,,words4 #a4 ,words are used for recording and communicating our ,thoughts4 ,from what has been said in the foregoing chapters1 it is easy to perceive what imperfection there is in language1 and how the very nature of words makes it almost unavoidable for many of them to be doubtful and uncertain in their significations4 ,to examine the perfection or imperfection of words1 it is necessary first to consider their use and end3 for as they are more or less fitted to attain that1 so they are more or less perfect4 ,we have1 in the former part of this discourse often1 upon occasion1 mentioned a double use of words4 ,first1 ,one for the recording of our own thoughts4 ,secondly1 ,the other for the communicating of our thoughts to others4 #b4 ,any ,words will serve for recording4 ,as to the first of these1 ,,for ,,the ,,recording ,,our ,,own ,,thoughts ,,for ,,the ,,help ,,of ,,our ,,own ,,memories1 whereby1 as it were1 we talk to ourselves1 any words will serve the turn4 ,for since sounds are voluntary and indifferent signs of any ideas1 a man may use what words he pleases to signify his own ideas to himself3 and there will be no imperfection in them1 if he constantly use the same sign for the same idea3 for then he cannot fail of having his meaning understood1 wherein consists the right use and perfection of language4 #c4 ,communication by ,words either for civil or philosophical purposes4 ,secondly1 ,as to ,,communication ,,by ,,words1 that too has a double use4 ,i4 ,civil4 ,,ii4 ,philosophical4 ,first1 ,by1 their ,,civil use1 ,i mean such a communication of thoughts and ideas by words1 as may serve for the upholding common conversation and commerce1 about the ordinary affairs and conveniences of civil life1 in the societies of men1 one amongst another4 ,secondly1 ,by the ,,philosophical use of words1 ,i mean such a use of them as may serve to convey the precise notions of things1 and to express in general propositions certain and undoubted truths1 which the mind may rest upon and be satisfied with in its search after true knowledge4 ,these two uses are very distinct2 and a great deal less exactness will serve in the one than in the other1 as we shall see in what follows4 #d4 ,the imperfection of ,words is the ,doubtfulness or ambiguity of their ,signification1 which is caused by the sort of ideas they stand for4 ,the chief end of language in communication being to be understood1 words serve not well for that end1 neither in civil nor philosophical discourse1 when any word does not excite in the hearer the same idea which it stands for in the mind of the speaker4 ,now1 since sounds have no natural connexion with our ideas1 but have all their signification from the arbitrary imposition of men1 the doubtfulness and uncertainty of their signification1 which is the imperfection we here are speaking of1 has its cause more in the ideas they stand for than in any incapacity there is in one sound more than in another to signify any idea3 for in that regard they are all equally perfect4 ,that then which makes doubtfulness and uncertainty in the signification of some more than other words1 is the difference of ideas they stand for4 #e4 ,natural ,causes of their ,imperfection1 especially in those that stand for ,mixed ,modes1 and for our ideas of ,substances4 ,words having naturally no signification1 the idea which each stands for must be learned and retained1 by those who would exchange thoughts1 and hold intelligible discourse with others1 in any language4 ,but this is the hardest to be done where1 ,first1 ,the ideas they stand for are very complex1 and made up of a great number of ideas put together4 ,secondly1 ,where the ideas they stand for have no certain connexion in nature2 and so no settled standard anywhere in nature existing1 to rectify and adjust them by4 ,thirdly1 ,when the signification of the word is referred to a standard1 which standard is not easy to be known4 ,fourthly1 ,where the signification of the word and the real essence of the thing are not exactly the same4 ,these are difficulties that attend the signification of several words that are intelligible4 ,those which are not intelligible at all1 such as names standing for any simple ideas which another has not organs or faculties to attain2 as the names of colours to a blind man1 or sounds to a deaf man1 need not here be mentioned4 ,in all these cases we shall find an imperfection in words2 which ,i shall more at large explain1 in their particular application to our several sorts of ideas3 for if we examine them1 we shall find that the ,,names ,,of ,m,,ixed ,m,,odes ,,are ,,most ,,liable ,,to ,,doubtfulness ,,and ,,imperfection1 ,,for ,,the ,,two ,,first ,,of ,,these ,,reasons2 and the ,,names ,,of ,s,,ubstances ,,chiefly ,,for ,,the ,,two ,,latter4 #f4 ,the ,names of mixed ,modes doubtful4 ,first1 ,the names of ,,mixed ,,modes are1 many of them1 liable to great uncertainty and obscurity in their signification4 ,i4 ,because the ,ideas they stand for are so complex4 ,because of that ,,great ,,composition these complex ideas are often made up of4 ,to make words serviceable to the end of communication1 it is necessary1 as has been said1 that they excite in the hearer exactly the same idea they stand for in the mind of the speaker4 ,without this1 men fill one another's heads with noise and sounds2 but convey not thereby their thoughts1 and lay not before one another their ideas1 which is the end of discourse and language4 ,but when a word stands for a very complex idea that is compounded and decompounded1 it is not easy for men to form and retain that idea so exactly1 as to make the name in common use stand for the same precise idea1 without any the least variation4 ,hence it comes to pass that men's names of very compound ideas1 such as for the most part are moral words1 have seldom in two different men the same precise signification2 since one man's complex idea seldom agrees with another's1 and often differs from his own--from that which he had yesterday1 or will have tomorrow4 #g4 ,secondly because they have no ,standards in ,nature4 ,because the names of mixed modes for the most part ,,want ,,standards ,,in ,,nature1 whereby men may rectify and adjust their significations2 therefore they are very various and doubtful4 ,they are assemblages of ideas put together at the pleasure of the mind1 pursuing its own ends of discourse1 and suited to its own notions2 whereby it designs not to copy anything really existing1 but to denominate and rank things as they come to agree with those archetypes or forms it has made4 ,he that first brought the word ,,sham1 or ,,wheedle1 or ,,banter1 in use1 put together as he thought fit those ideas he made it stand for2 and as it is with any new names of modes that are now brought into any language1 so it was with the old ones when they were first made use of4 ,names1 therefore1 that stand for collections of ideas which the mind makes at pleasure must needs be of doubtful signification1 when such collections are nowhere to be found constantly united in nature1 nor any patterns to be shown whereby men may adjust them4 ,what the word ,,murder1 or ,,sacrilege1 c41 signifies can never be known from things themselves3 there be many of the parts of those complex ideas which are not visible in the action itself2 the intention of the mind1 or the relation of holy things1 which make a part of murder or sacrilege1 have no necessary connexion with the outward and visible action of him that commits either3 and the pulling the trigger of the gun with which the murder is committed1 and is all the action that perhaps is visible1 has no natural connexion with those other ideas that make up the complex one named murder4 ,they have their union and combination only from the understanding which unites them under one name3 but1 uniting them without any rule or pattern1 it cannot be but that the signification of the name that stands for such voluntary collections should be often various in the minds of different men1 who have scarce any standing rule to regulate themselves and their notions by1 in such arbitrary ideas4 #h4 ,common use1 or propriety not a sufficient ,remedy4 ,it is true1 common use1 that is1 the rule of propriety may be supposed here to afford some aid1 to settle the signification of language2 and it cannot be denied but that in some measure it does4 ,common use regulates the meaning of words pretty well for common conversation2 but nobody having an authority to establish the precise signification of words1 nor determine to what ideas any one shall annex them1 common use is not sufficient to adjust them to ,philosophical ,discourses2 there being scarce any name of any very complex idea 7to say nothing of others7 which1 in common use1 has not a great latitude1 and which1 keeping within the bounds of propriety1 may not be made the sign of far different ideas4 ,besides1 the rule and measure of propriety itself being nowhere established1 it is often matter of dispute1 whether this or that way of using a word be propriety of speech or no4 ,from all which it is evident1 that the names of such kind of very complex ideas are naturally liable to this imperfection1 to be of doubtful and uncertain signification2 and even in men that have a mind to understand one another1 do not always stand for the same idea in speaker and hearer4 ,though the names ,,glory and ,,gratitude be the same in every man's mouth through a whole country1 yet the complex collective idea which every one thinks on or intends by that name1 is apparently very different in men using the same language4 #i4 ,the way of learning these ,names contributes also to their ,doubtfulness4 ,the way also wherein the names of mixed modes are ordinarily learned1 does not a little contribute to the doubtfulness of their signification4 ,for if we will observe how children learn languages1 we shall find that1 to make them understand what the names of simple ideas or substances stand for1 people ordinarily show them the thing whereof they would have them have the idea2 and then repeat to them the name that stands for it2 as ,,white1 ,,sweet1 ,,milk1 ,,sugar1 ,,cat1 ,,dog4 ,but as for mixed modes1 especially the most material of them1 ,,moral ,,words1 the sounds are usually learned first2 and then1 to know what complex ideas they stand for1 they are either beholden to the explication of others1 or 7which happens for the most part7 are left to their own observation and industry2 which being little laid out in the search of the true and precise meaning of names1 these moral words are in most men's mouths little more than bare sounds2 or when they have any1 it is for the most part but a very loose and undetermined1 and1 consequently1 obscure and confused signification4 ,and even those themselves who have with more attention settled their notions1 do yet hardly avoid the inconvenience to have them stand for complex ideas different from those which other1 even intelligent and studious men1 make them the signs of4 ,where shall one find any1 either controversial debate1 or familiar discourse1 concerning honour1 faith1 grace1 religion1 church1 c41 wherein it is not easy to observe the different notions men have of them8 ,which is nothing but this1 that they are not agreed in the signification of those words1 nor have in their minds the same complex ideas which they make them stand for1 and so all the contests that follow thereupon are only about the meaning of a sound4 ,and hence we see that1 in the interpretation of laws1 whether divine or human1 there is no end2 comments beget comments1 and explications make new matter for explications2 and of limiting1 distinguishing1 varying the signification of these moral words there is no end4 ,these ideas of men's making are1 by men still having the same power1 multiplied in infinitum4 ,many a man who was pretty well satisfied of the meaning of a text of ,scripture1 or clause in the code1 at first reading1 has1 by consulting commentators1 quite lost the sense of it1 and by these elucidations given rise or increase to his doubts1 and drawn obscurity upon the place4 ,i say not this that ,i think commentaries needless2 but to show how uncertain the names of mixed modes naturally are1 even in the mouths of those who had both the intention and the faculty of speaking as clearly as language was capable to express their thoughts4 #aj4 ,hence unavoidable ,obscurity in ancient ,authors4 ,what obscurity this has unavoidably brought upon the writings of men who have lived in remote ages1 and different countries1 it will be needless to take notice4 ,since the numerous volumes of learned men1 employing their thoughts that way1 are proofs more than enough1 to show what attention1 study1 sagacity1 and reasoning are required to find out the true meaning of ancient authors4 ,but1 there being no writings we have any great concernment to be very solicitous about the meaning of1 but those that contain either truths we are required to believe1 or laws we are to obey1 and draw inconveniences on us when we mistake or transgress1 we may be less anxious about the sense of other authors2 who1 writing but their own opinions1 we are under no greater necessity to know them1 than they to know ours4 ,our good or evil depending not on their decrees1 we may safely be ignorant of their notions3 and therefore in the reading of them1 if they do not use their words with a due clearness and perspicuity1 we may lay them aside1 and without any injury done them1 resolve thus with ourselves1 ,si non vis intelligi1 debes negligi4 #aa4 ,names of ,substances of doubtful ,signification1 because the ideas they stand for relate to the reality of things4 ,if the signification of the names of mixed modes be uncertain1 because there be no real standards existing in nature to which those ideas are referred1 and by which they may be adjusted1 the names of ,,substances are of a doubtful signification1 for a contrary reason1 viz4 because the ideas they stand for are supposed conformable to the reality of things1 and are referred to as standards made by ,nature4 ,in our ideas of substances we have not the liberty1 as in mixed modes1 to frame what combinations we think fit1 to be the characteristical notes to rank and denominate things by4 ,in these we must follow ,nature1 suit our complex ideas to real existences1 and regulate the signification of their names by the things themselves1 if we will have our names to be signs of them1 and stand for them4 ,here1 it is true1 we have patterns to follow2 but patterns that will make the signification of their names very uncertain3 for names must be of a very unsteady and various meaning1 if the ideas they stand for be referred to standards without us1 that either cannot be known at all1 or can be known but imperfectly and uncertainly4 #ab4 ,names of ,substances referred1 ,i4 ,to real ,essences that cannot be known4 ,the names of substances have1 as has been shown1 a double reference in their ordinary use4 ,first1 ,sometimes they are made to stand for1 and so their signification is supposed to agree to1 ,,the ,,real ,,constitution ,,of ,,things1 from which all their properties flow1 and in which they all centre4 ,but this real constitution1 or 7as it is apt to be called7 essence1 being utterly unknown to us1 any sound that is put to stand for it must be very uncertain in its application2 and it will be impossible to know what things are or ought to be called a ,,horse1 or ,,antimony1 when those words are put for real essences that we have no ideas of at all4 ,and therefore in this supposition1 the names of substances being referred to standards that cannot be known1 their significations can never be adjusted and established by those standards4 #ac4 ,secondly1 ,to co-existing ,qualities1 which are known but imperfectly4 ,secondly1 ,the simple ideas that are ,,found ,,to ,,co-,,exist ,,in ,,substances being that which their names immediately signify1 these1 as united in the several sorts of things1 are the proper standards to which their names are referred1 and by which their significations may be best rectified4 ,but neither will these archetypes so well serve to this purpose as to leave these names without very various and uncertain significations4 ,because these simple ideas that co-exist1 and are united in the same subject1 being very numerous1 and having all an equal right to go into the complex specific idea which the specific name is to stand for1 men1 though they propose to themselves the very same subject to consider1 yet frame very different ideas about it2 and so the name they use for it unavoidably comes to have1 in several men1 very different significations4 ,the simple qualities which make up the complex ideas1 being most of them powers1 in relation to changes which they are apt to make in1 or receive from other bodies1 are almost infinite4 ,he that shall but observe what a great variety of alterations any one of the baser metals is apt to receive1 from the different application only of fire2 and how much a greater number of changes any of them will receive in the hands of a chymist1 by the application of other bodies1 will not think it strange that ,i count the properties of any sort of bodies not easy to be collected1 and completely known1 by the ways of inquiry which our faculties are capable of4 ,they being therefore at least so many1 that no man can know the precise and definite number1 they are differently discovered by different men1 according to their various skill1 attention1 and ways of handling2 who therefore cannot choose but have different ideas of the same substance1 and therefore make the signification of its common name very various and uncertain4 ,for the complex ideas of substances1 being made up of such simple ones as are supposed to co-exist in nature1 every one has a right to put into his complex idea those qualities he has found to be united together4 ,for1 though in the substance of gold one satisfies himself with colour and weight1 yet another thinks solubility in aqua regia as necessary to be joined with that colour in his idea of gold1 as any one does its fusibility2 solubility in aqua regia being a quality as constantly joined with its colour and weight as fusibility or any other2 others put into it ductility or fixedness1 c41 as they have been taught by tradition or experience4 ,who of all these has established the right signification of the word1 gold8 ,or who shall be the judge to determine8 ,each has his standard in nature1 which he appeals to1 and with reason thinks he has the same right to put into his complex idea signified by the word gold1 those qualities1 which1 upon trial1 he has found united2 as another who has not so well examined has to leave them out2 or a third1 who has made other trials1 has to put in others4 ,for the union in nature of these qualities being the true ground of their union in one complex idea1 who can say one of them has more reason to be put in or left out than another8 ,from hence it will unavoidably follow1 that the complex ideas of substances in men using the same names for them1 will be very various1 and so the significations of those names very uncertain4 #ad4 ,thirdly1 ,to co-existing ,qualities which are known but imperfectly4 ,besides1 there is scarce any particular thing existing1 which1 in some of its simple ideas1 does not communicate with a greater1 and in others a less number of particular beings3 who shall determine in this case which are those that are to make up the precise collection that is to be signified by the specific name8 or can with any just authority prescribe1 which obvious or common qualities are to be left out2 or which more secret1 or more particular1 are to be put into the signification of the name of any substance8 ,all which together1 seldom or never fail to produce that various and doubtful signification in the names of substances1 which causes such uncertainty1 disputes1 or mistakes1 when we come to a philosophical use of them4 #ae4 ,with this imperfection1 they may serve for civil1 but not well for philosophical ,use4 ,it is true1 as to civil and common conversation1 the general names of substances1 regulated in their ordinary signification by some obvious qualities1 7as by the shape and figure in things of known seminal propagation1 and in other substances1 for the most part by colour1 joined with some other sensible qualities17 do well enough to design the things men would be understood to speak of3 and so they usually conceive well enough the substances meant by the word gold or apple1 to distinguish the one from the other4 ,but in ,,philosophical inquiries and debates1 where general truths are to be established1 and consequences drawn from positions laid down1 there the precise signification of the names of substances will be found not only not to be well established but also very hard to be so4 ,for example3 he that shall make malleability1 or a certain degree of fixedness1 a part of his complex idea of gold1 may make propositions concerning gold1 and draw consequences from them1 that will truly and clearly follow from gold1 taken in such a signification3 but yet such as another man can never be forced to admit1 nor be convinced of their truth1 who makes not malleableness1 or the same degree of fixedness1 part of that complex idea that the name gold1 in his use of it1 stands for4 #af4 ,instance1 ,liquor4 ,this is a natural and almost unavoidable imperfection in almost all the names of substances1 in all languages whatsoever1 which men will easily find when1 once passing from confused or loose notions1 they come to more strict and close inquiries4 ,for then they will be convinced how doubtful and obscure those words are in their signification1 which in ordinary use appeared very clear and determined4 ,i was once in a meeting of very learned and ingenious physicians1 where by chance there arose a question1 whether any liquor passed through the filaments of the nerves4 ,the debate having been managed a good while1 by variety of arguments on both sides1 ,i 7who had been used to suspect1 that the greatest part of disputes were more about the signification of words than a real difference in the conception of things7 desired1 that1 before they went any further on in this dispute1 they would first examine and establish amongst them1 what the word ,,liquor signified4 ,they at first were a little surprised at the proposal2 and had they been persons less ingenious1 they might perhaps have taken it for a very frivolous or extravagant one3 since there was no one there that thought not himself to understand very perfectly what the word liquor stood for2 which ,i think1 too1 none of the most perplexed names of substances4 ,however1 they were pleased to comply with my motion2 and upon examination found that the signification of that word was not so settled or certain as they had all imagined2 but that each of them made it a sign of a different complex idea4 ,this made them perceive that the main of their dispute was about the signification of that term2 and that they differed very little in their opinions concerning ,,some fluid and subtle matter1 passing through the conduits of the nerves2 though it was not so easy to agree whether it was to be called ,,liquor or no1 a thing1 which1 when considered1 they thought it not worth the contending about4 #ag4 ,instance1 ,gold4 ,how much this is the case in the greatest part of disputes that men are engaged so hotly in1 ,i shall perhaps have an occasion in another place to take notice4 ,let us only here consider a little more exactly the fore-mentioned instance of the word ,,gold1 and we shall see how hard it is precisely to determine its signification4 ,i think all agree to make it stand for a body of a certain yellow shining colour2 which being the idea to which children have annexed that name1 the shining yellow part of a peacock's tail is properly to them gold4 ,others finding fusibility joined with that yellow colour in certain parcels of matter1 make of that combination a complex idea to which they give the name gold1 to denote a sort of substances2 and so exclude from being gold all such yellow shining bodies as by fire will be reduced to ashes2 and admit to be of that species1 or to be comprehended under that name gold1 only such substances as having that shining yellow colour1 will by fire be reduced to fusion1 and not to ashes4 ,another1 by the same reason1 adds the weight1 which1 being a quality as straightly joined with that colour as its fusibility1 he thinks has the same reason to be joined in its idea1 and to be signified by its name3 and therefore the other made up of body1 of such a colour and fusibility1 to be imperfect2 and so on of all the rest3 wherein no one can show a reason why some of the inseparable qualities1 that are always united in nature1 should be put into the nominal essence1 and others left out1 or why the word gold1 signifying that sort of body the ring on his finger is made of1 should determine that sort rather by its colour1 weight1 and fusibility1 than by its colour1 weight1 and solubility in aqua regia3 since the dissolving it by that liquor is as inseparable from it as the fusion by fire1 and they are both of them nothing but the relation which that substance has to two other bodies1 which have a power to operate differently upon it4 ,for by what right is it that fusibility comes to be a part of the essence signified by the word gold1 and solubility but a property of it8 ,or why is its colour part of the essence1 and its malleableness but a property8 ,that which ,i mean is this1 ,that these being all but properties1 depending on its real constitution1 and nothing but powers1 either active or passive1 in reference to other bodies1 no one has authority to determine the signification of the word gold 7as referred to such a body existing in nature7 more to one collection of ideas to be found in that body than to another3 whereby the signification of that name must unavoidably be very uncertain4 ,since1 as has been said1 several people observe several properties in the same substance2 and ,i think ,i may say nobody all4 ,and therefore we have but very imperfect descriptions of things1 and words have very uncertain significations4 #ah4 ,the ,names of simple ,ideas the least doubtful4 ,from what has been said1 it is easy to observe what has been before remarked1 viz4 that the ,,names ,,of ,,simple ,,ideas are1 of all others1 the least liable to mistakes1 and that for these reasons4 ,first1 ,because the ideas they stand for1 being each but one single perception1 are much easier got1 and more clearly retained1 than the more complex ones1 and therefore are not liable to the uncertainty which usually attends those compounded ones of substances and mixed modes1 in which the precise number of simple ideas that make them up are not easily agreed1 so readily kept in mind4 ,and1 ,secondly1 ,because they are never referred to any other essence1 but barely that perception they immediately signify3 which reference is that which renders the signification of the names of substances naturally so perplexed1 and gives occasion to so many disputes4 ,men that do not perversely use their words1 or on purpose set themselves to cavil1 seldom mistake1 in any language which they are acquainted with1 the use and signification of the name of simple ideas4 ,,white and ,,sweet1 ,,yellow and ,,bitter1 carry a very obvious meaning with them1 which every one precisely comprehends1 or easily perceives he is ignorant of1 and seeks to be informed4 ,but what precise collection of simple ideas ,,modesty or ,,frugality stand for1 in another's use1 is not so certainly known4 ,and however we are apt to think we well enough know what is meant by ,,gold or ,,iron2 yet the precise complex idea others make them the signs of is not so certain3 and ,i believe it is very seldom that1 in speaker and hearer1 they stand for exactly the same collection4 ,which must needs produce mistakes and disputes1 when they are made use of in discourses1 wherein men have to do with universal propositions1 and would settle in their minds universal truths1 and consider the consequences that follow from them4 #ai4 ,and next to them1 simple ,modes4 ,by the same rule1 the names of ,,simple ,,modes are1 next to those of simple ideas1 least liable to doubt and uncertainty2 especially those of figure and number1 of which men have so clear and distinct ideas4 ,who ever that had a mind to understand them mistook the ordinary meaning of ,,seven1 or a ,,triangle8 ,and in general the least compounded ideas in every kind have the least dubious names4 #bj4 ,the most doubtful are the ,names of very compounded mixed ,modes and ,substances4 ,mixed modes1 therefore1 that are made up but of a few and obvious simple ideas1 have usually names of no very uncertain signification4 ,but the names of mixed modes1 which comprehend a great number of simple ideas1 are commonly of a very doubtful and undetermined meaning1 as has been shown4 ,the names of substances1 being annexed to ideas that are neither the real essences1 nor exact representations of the patterns they are referred to1 are liable to yet greater imperfection and uncertainty1 especially when we come to a philosophical use of them4 #ba4 ,why this ,imperfection charged upon ,words4 ,the great disorder that happens in our names of substances1 proceeding1 for the most part1 from our want of knowledge1 and inability to penetrate into their real constitutions1 it may probably be wondered why ,i charge this as an imperfection rather upon our words than understandings4 ,this exception has so much appearance of justice1 that ,i think myself obliged to give a reason why ,i have followed this method4 ,i must confess1 then1 that1 when ,i first began this ,discourse of the ,understanding1 and a good while after1 ,i had not the least thought that any consideration of words was at all necessary to it4 ,but when1 having passed over the original and composition of our ideas1 ,i began to examine the extent and certainty of our knowledge1 ,i found it had so near a connexion with words1 that1 unless their force and manner of signification were first well observed1 there could be very little said clearly and pertinently concerning knowledge3 which being conversant about truth1 had constantly to do with propositions4 ,and though it terminated in things1 yet it was for the most part so much by the intervention of words1 that they seemed scarce separable from our general knowledge4 ,at least they interpose themselves so much between our understandings1 and the truth which it would contemplate and apprehend1 that1 like the medium through which visible objects pass1 the obscurity and disorder do not seldom cast a mist before our eyes1 and impose upon our understandings4 ,if we consider1 in the fallacies men put upon themselves1 as well as others1 and the mistakes in men's disputes and notions1 how great a part is owing to words1 and their uncertain or mistaken significations1 we shall have reason to think this no small obstacle in the way to knowledge2 which ,i conclude we are the more carefully to be warned of1 because it has been so far from being taken notice of as an inconvenience1 that the arts of improving it have been made the business of men's study1 and obtained the reputation of learning and subtilty1 as we shall see in the following chapter4 ,but ,i am apt to imagine1 that1 were the imperfections of language1 as the instrument of knowledge1 more thoroughly weighed1 a great many of the controversies that make such a noise in the world1 would of themselves cease2 and the way to knowledge1 and perhaps peace too1 lie a great deal opener than it does4 #bb4 ,this should teach us ,moderation in imposing our own ,sense of old ,authors4 ,sure ,i am that the signification of words in all languages1 depending very much on the thoughts1 notions1 and ideas of him that uses them1 must unavoidably be of great uncertainty to men of the same language and country4 ,this is so evident in the ,greek authors1 that he that shall peruse their writings will find in almost every one of them1 a distinct language1 though the same words4 ,but when to this natural difficulty in every country1 there shall be added different countries and remote ages1 wherein the speakers and writers had very different notions1 tempers1 customs1 ornaments1 and figures of speech1 c41 every one of which influenced the signification of their words then1 though to us now they are lost and unknown2 it would become us to be charitable one to another in our interpretations or misunderstandings of those ancient writings2 which1 though of great concernment to be understood1 are liable to the unavoidable difficulties of speech1 which 7if we except the names of simple ideas1 and some very obvious things7 is not capable1 without a constant defining the terms1 of conveying the sense and intention of the speaker1 without any manner of doubt and uncertainty to the hearer4 ,and in discourses of religion1 law1 and morality1 as they are matters of the highest concernment1 so there will be the greatest difficulty4 #bc4 ,especially of the ,old and ,new ,testament ,scriptures4 ,the volumes of interpreters and commentators on the ,old and ,new ,testament are but too manifest proofs of this4 ,though everything said in the text be infallibly true1 yet the reader may be1 nay1 cannot choose but be1 very fallible in the understanding of it4 ,nor is it to be wondered1 that the will of ,god1 when clothed in words1 should be liable to that doubt and uncertainty which unavoidably attends that sort of conveyance1 when even his ,son1 whilst clothed in flesh1 was subject to all the frailties and inconveniences of human nature1 sin excepted4 ,and we ought to magnify his goodness1 that he hath spread before all the world such legible characters of his works and providence1 and given all mankind so sufficient a light of reason1 that they to whom this written word never came1 could not 7whenever they set themselves to search7 either doubt of the being of a ,god1 or of the obedience due to him4 ,since then the precepts of ,natural ,religion are plain1 and very intelligible to all mankind1 and seldom come to be controverted2 and other revealed truths1 which are conveyed to us by books and languages1 are liable to the common and natural obscurities and difficulties incident to words2 methinks it would become us to be more careful and diligent in observing the former1 and less magisterial1 positive1 and imperious1 in imposing our own sense and interpretations of the latter4 ,,chapter ,x4 ,,of ,,the ,,abuse ,,of ,,words4 #a4 ,woeful abuse of ,words4 ,besides the imperfection that is naturally in language1 and the obscurity and confusion that is so hard to be avoided in the use of words1 there are several ,,wilful faults and neglects which men are guilty of in this way of communication1 whereby they render these signs less clear and distinct in their signification than naturally they need to be4 #b4 ,first1 ,words are often employed without any1 or without clear ,ideas4 ,,first1 ,in this kind the first and most palpable abuse is1 the using of words without clear and distinct ideas2 or1 which is worse1 signs without anything signified4 ,of these there are two sorts3-- ,i4 ,some words introduced without clear ideas annexed to them1 even in their first original4 ,one may observe1 in all languages1 certain words that1 if they be examined1 will be found in their first original1 and their appropriated use1 not to stand for any clear and distinct ideas4 ,these1 for the most part1 the several sects of philosophy and religion have introduced4 ,for their authors or promoters1 either affecting something singular1 and out of the way of common apprehensions1 or to support some strange opinions1 or cover some weakness of their hypothesis1 seldom fail to coin new words1 and such as1 when they come to be examined1 may justly be called ,,insignificant ,,terms4 ,for1 having either had no determinate collection of ideas annexed to them when they were first invented2 or at least such as1 if well examined1 will be found inconsistent1 it is no wonder1 if1 afterwards1 in the vulgar use of the same party1 they remain empty sounds1 with little or no signification1 amongst those who think it enough to have them often in their mouths1 as the distinguishing characters of their ,church or ,school1 without much troubling their heads to examine what are the precise ideas they stand for4 ,i shall not need here to heap up instances2 every man's reading and conversation will sufficiently furnish him4 ,or if he wants to be better stored1 the great mint-masters of this kind of terms1 ,i mean the ,schoolmen and ,metaphysicians 7under which ,i think the disputing natural and moral philosophers of these latter ages may be comprehended7 have wherewithal abundantly to content him4 #c4 ,,ii4 ,other ,words1 to which ideas were annexed at first1 used afterwards without distinct meanings4 ,others there be who extend this abuse yet further1 who take so little care to lay by words1 which1 in their primary notation have scarce any clear and distinct ideas which they are annexed to1 that1 by an unpardonable negligence1 they familiarly use words which the propriety of language ,,has affixed to very important ideas1 without any distinct meaning at all4 ,,wisdom1 ,,glory1 ,,grace1 c41 are words frequent enough in every man's mouth2 but if a great many of those who use them should be asked what they mean by them1 they would be at a stand1 and not know what to answer3 a plain proof1 that1 though they have learned those sounds1 and have them ready at their tongues ends1 yet there are no determined ideas laid up in their minds1 which are to be expressed to others by them4 #d4 ,this occasioned by men learning ,names before they have the ,ideas the names belong to4 ,men having been accustomed from their cradles to learn words which are easily got and retained1 before they knew or had framed the complex ideas to which they were annexed1 or which were to be found in the things they were thought to stand for1 they usually continue to do so all their lives2 and without taking the pains necessary to settle in their minds determined ideas1 they use their words for such unsteady and confused notions as they have1 contenting themselves with the same words other people use2 as if their very sound necessarily carried with it constantly the same meaning4 ,this1 though men make a shift with in the ordinary occurrences of life1 where they find it necessary to be understood1 and therefore they make signs till they are so2 yet this insignificancy in their words1 when they come to reason concerning either their tenets or interest1 manifestly fills their discourse with abundance of empty unintelligible noise and jargon1 especially in moral matters1 where the words for the most part standing for arbitrary and numerous collections of ideas1 not regularly and permanently united in nature1 their bare sounds are often only thought on1 or at least very obscure and uncertain notions annexed to them4 ,men take the words they find in use amongst their neighbours2 and that they may not seem ignorant what they stand for1 use them confidently1 without much troubling their heads about a certain fixed meaning2 whereby1 besides the ease of it1 they obtain this advantage1 ,that1 as in such discourses they seldom are in the right1 so they are as seldom to be convinced that they are in the wrong2 it being all one to go about to draw those men out of their mistakes who have no settled notions1 as to dispossess a vagrant of his habitation who has no settled abode4 ,this ,i guess to be so2 and every one may observe in himself and others whether it be so or not4 #e4 ,secondly ,unsteady ,application of them4 ,,secondly1 ,another great abuse of words is ,,inconstancy in the use of them4 ,it is hard to find a discourse written on any subject1 especially of controversy1 wherein one shall not observe1 if he read with attention1 the same words 7and those commonly the most material in the discourse1 and upon which the argument turns7 used sometimes for one collection of simple ideas1 and sometimes for another2 which is a perfect abuse of language4 ,words being intended for signs of my ideas1 to make them known to others1 not by any natural signification1 but by a voluntary imposition1 it is plain cheat and abuse1 when ,i make them stand sometimes for one thing and sometimes for another2 the wilful doing whereof can be imputed to nothing but great folly1 or greater dishonesty4 ,and a man1 in his accounts with another may1 with as much fairness make the characters of numbers stand sometimes for one and sometimes for another collection of units3 v4g4 this character #c1 stand sometimes for three1 sometimes for four1 and sometimes for eight1 as in his discourse or reasoning make the same words stand for different collections of simple ideas4 ,if men should do so in their reckonings1 ,i wonder who would have to do with them8 ,one who would speak thus in the affairs and business of the world1 and call #h sometimes seven1 and sometimes nine1 as best served his advantage1 would presently have clapped upon him1 one of the two names men are commonly disgusted with4 ,and yet in arguings and learned contests1 the same sort of proceedings passes commonly for wit and learning2 but to me it appears a greater dishonesty than the misplacing of counters in the casting up a debt2 and the cheat the greater1 by how much truth is of greater concernment and value than money4 #f4 ,thirdly1 ,affected ,obscurity1 as in the ,peripatetic and other sects of ,philosophy4 ,,thirdly4 ,another abuse of language is an ,,affected ,,obscurity2 by either applying old words to new and unusual significations2 or introducing new and ambiguous terms1 without defining either2 or else putting them so together1 as may confound their ordinary meaning4 ,though the ,peripatetick philosophy has been most eminent in this way1 yet other sects have not been wholly clear of it4 ,there are scarce any of them that are not cumbered with some difficulties 7such is the imperfection of human knowledge17 which they have been fain to cover with obscurity of terms1 and to confound the signification of words1 which1 like a mist before people's eyes1 might hinder their weak parts from being discovered4 ,that ,,body and ,,extension in common use1 stand for two distinct ideas1 is plain to any one that will but reflect a little4 ,for were their signification precisely the same1 it would be as proper1 and as intelligible to say1 'the body of an extension1' as the 'extension of a body2' and yet there are those who find it necessary to confound their signification4 ,to this abuse1 and the mischiefs of confounding the signification of words1 logic1 and the liberal sciences as they have been handled in the schools1 have given reputation2 and the admired ,art of ,disputing hath added much to the natural imperfection of languages1 whilst it has been made use of and fitted to perplex the signification of words1 more than to discover the knowledge and truth of things3 and he that will look into that sort of learned writings1 will find the words there much more obscure1 uncertain1 and undetermined in their meaning1 than they are in ordinary conversation4 #g4 ,logic and ,dispute have much contributed to this4 ,this is unavoidably to be so1 where men's parts and learning are estimated by their skill in disputing4 ,and if reputation and reward shall attend these conquests1 which depend mostly on the fineness and niceties of words1 it is no wonder if the wit of man so employed1 should perplex1 involve1 and subtilize the signification of sounds1 so as never to want something to say in opposing or defending any question2 the victory being adjudged not to him who had truth on his side1 but the last word in the dispute4 #h4 ,calling it ,subtlety4 ,this1 though a very useless skill1 and that which ,i think the direct opposite to the ways of knowledge1 hath yet passed hitherto under the laudable and esteemed names of ,,subtlety and ,,acuteness1 and has had the applause of the schools1 and encouragement of one part of the learned men of the world4 ,and no wonder1 since the philosophers of old1 7the disputing and wrangling philosophers ,i mean1 such as ,lucian wittily and with reason taxes17 and the ,schoolmen since1 aiming at glory and esteem1 for their great and universal knowledge1 easier a great deal to be pretended to than really acquired1 found this a good expedient to cover their ignorance1 with a curious and inexplicable web of perplexed words1 and procure to themselves the admiration of others1 by unintelligible terms1 the apter to produce wonder because they could not be understood2 whilst it appears in all history1 that these profound doctors were no wiser nor more useful than their neighbours1 and brought but small advantage to human life or the societies wherein they lived2 unless the coining of new words1 where they produced no new things to apply them to1 or the perplexing or obscuring the signification of old ones1 and so bringing all things into question and dispute1 were a thing profitable to the life of man1 or worthy commendation and reward4 #i4 ,this ,learning very little benefits ,society4 ,for1 notwithstanding these learned disputants1 these all-knowing doctors1 it was to the unscholastic statesman that the governments of the world owed their peace1 defence1 and liberties2 and from the illiterate and contemned mechanic 7a name of disgrace7 that they received the improvements of useful arts4 ,nevertheless1 this artificial ignorance1 and learned gibberish1 prevailed mightily in these last ages1 by the interest and artifice of those who found no easier way to that pitch of authority and dominion they have attained1 than by amusing the men of business1 and ignorant1 with hard words1 or employing the ingenious and idle in intricate disputes about unintelligible terms1 and holding them perpetually entangled in that endless labyrinth4 ,besides1 there is no such way to gain admittance1 or give defence to strange and absurd doctrines1 as to guard them round about with legions of obscure1 doubtful1 and undefined words4 ,which yet make these retreats more like the dens of robbers1 or holes of foxes1 than the fortresses of fair warriors2 which1 if it be hard to get them out of1 it is not for the strength that is in them1 but the briars and thorns1 and the obscurity of the thickets they are beset with4 ,for untruth being unacceptable to the mind of man1 there is no other defence left for absurdity but obscurity4 #aj4 ,but destroys the instruments of ,knowledge and communication4 ,thus learned ignorance1 and this art of keeping even inquisitive men from true knowledge1 hath been propagated in the world1 and hath much perplexed1 whilst it pretended to inform the understanding4 ,for we see that other well-meaning and wise men1 whose education and parts had not acquired that ,,acuteness1 could intelligibly express themselves to one another2 and in its plain use make a benefit of language4 ,but though unlearned men well enough understood the words white and black2 c41 and had constant notions of the ideas signified by those words2 yet there were philosophers found who had learning and subtlety enough to prove that snow was black2 i4e4 to prove that white was black4 ,whereby they had the advantage to destroy the instruments and means of discourse1 conversation1 instruction1 and society2 whilst1 with great art and subtlety1 they did no more but perplex and confound the signification of words1 and thereby render language less useful than the real defects of it had made it2 a gift which the illiterate had not attained to4 #aa4 ,as useful as to confound the sound that the ,letters of the ,alphabet stand for4 ,these learned men did equally instruct men's understandings1 and profit their lives1 as he who should alter the signification of known characters1 and1 by a subtle device of learning1 far surpassing the capacity of the illiterate1 dull1 and vulgar1 should in his writing show that he could put ,a for ,b1 and ,d for ,e1 c41 to the no small admiration and benefit of for his reader4 ,it being as senseless to put ,,black1 which is a word agreed on to stand for one sensible idea1 to put it1 ,i say1 for another1 or the contrary idea2 i4e4 to call ,,snow ,,black1 as to put this mark ,a1 which is a character agreed on to stand for one modification of sound1 made by a certain motion of the organs of speech1 for ,b1 which is agreed on to stand for another modification of sound1 made by another certain mode of the organs of speech4 #ab4 ,this ,art has perplexed ,religion and ,justice4 ,nor hath this mischief stopped in logical niceties1 or curious empty speculations2 it hath invaded the great concernments of human life and society2 obscured and perplexed the material truths of law and divinity2 brought confusion1 disorder1 and uncertainty into the affairs of mankind2 and if not destroyed1 yet in a great measure rendered useless1 these two great rules1 religion and justice4 ,what have the greatest part of the comments and disputes upon the laws of ,god and man served for1 but to make the meaning more doubtful1 and perplex the sense8 ,what have been the effect of those multiplied curious distinctions1 and acute niceties1 but obscurity and uncertainty1 leaving the words more unintelligible1 and the reader more at a loss8 ,how else comes it to pass that princes1 speaking or writing to their servants1 in their ordinary commands are easily understood2 speaking to their people1 in their laws1 are not so8 ,and1 as ,i remarked before1 doth it not often happen that a man of an ordinary capacity very well understands a text1 or a law1 that he reads1 till he consults an expositor1 or goes to counsel2 who1 by that time he hath done explaining them1 makes the words signify either nothing at all1 or what he pleases4 #ac4 and ought not to pass for ,learning4 ,whether any by-interests of these professions have occasioned this1 ,i will not here examine2 but ,i leave it to be considered1 whether it would not be well for mankind1 whose concernment it is to know things as they are1 and to do what they ought1 and not to spend their lives in talking about them1 or tossing words to and fro2--whether it would not be well1 ,i say1 that the use of words were made plain and direct2 and that language1 which was given us for the improvement of knowledge and bond of society1 should not be employed to darken truth and unsettle people's rights2 to raise mists1 and render unintelligible both morality and religion8 ,or that at least1 if this will happen1 it should not be thought learning or knowledge to do so8 #ad4 ,,iv4 ,fourthly1 by taking ,words for ,things4 ,,fourthly1 ,another great abuse of words is1 the ,,taking ,,them ,,for ,,things4 ,this1 though it in some degree concerns all names in general1 yet more particularly affects those of substances4 ,to this abuse those men are most subject who most confine their thoughts to any one system1 and give themselves up into a firm belief of the perfection of any received hypothesis3 whereby they come to be persuaded that the terms of that sect are so suited to the nature of things1 that they perfectly correspond with their real existence4 ,who is there that has been bred up in the ,peripatetick philosophy1 who does not think the ,ten ,names1 under which are ranked the ,ten ,predicaments1 to be exactly conformable to the nature of things8 ,who is there of that school that is not persuaded that ,,substantial ,,forms1 ,,vegetative ,,souls1 ,,abhorrence ,,of ,a ,,vacuum1 ,,intentional ,,species1 c41 are something real8 ,these words men have learned from their very entrance upon knowledge1 and have found their masters and systems lay great stress upon them3 and therefore they cannot quit the opinion1 that they are conformable to nature1 and are the representations of something that really exists4 ,the ,platonists have their ,,soul ,,of ,,the ,,world1 and the ,epicureans their ,,endeavor ,,towards ,,motion in their atoms when at rest4 ,there is scarce any sect in philosophy has not a distinct set of terms that others understand not4 ,but yet this gibberish1 which1 in the weakness of human understanding1 serves so well to palliate men's ignorance1 and cover their errors1 comes1 by familiar use amongst those of the same tribe1 to seem the most important part of language1 and of all other the terms the most significant3 and should ,,aerial and ,,oetherial ,,vehicles come once1 by the prevalency of that doctrine1 to be generally received anywhere1 no doubt those terms would make impressions on men's minds1 so as to establish them in the persuasion of the reality of such things1 as much as ,peripatetick ,,forms and ,,intentional ,,species have heretofore done4 #ae4 ,instance1 in ,matter4 ,how much names taken for things are apt to mislead the understanding1 the attentive reading of philosophical writers would abundantly discover2 and that perhaps in words little suspected of any such misuse4 ,i shall instance in one only1 and that a very familiar one4 ,how many intricate disputes have there been about ,,matter1 as if there were some such thing really in nature1 distinct from ,,body2 as it is evident the word matter stands for an idea distinct from the idea of body8 ,for if the ideas these two terms stood for were precisely the same1 they might indifferently in all places be put for one another4 ,but we see that though it be proper to say1 ,there is one matter of all bodies1 one cannot say1 ,there is one body of all matters3 we familiarly say one body is bigger than another2 but it sounds harsh 7and ,i think is never used7 to say one matter is bigger than another4 ,whence comes this1 then8 ,viz4 from hence3 that1 though matter and body be not really distinct1 but wherever there is the one there is the other2 yet matter and body stand for two different conceptions1 whereof the one is incomplete1 and but a part of the other4 ,for body stands for a solid extended figured substance1 whereof matter is but a partial and more confused conception2 it seeming to me to be used for the substance and solidity of body1 without taking in its extension and figure3 and therefore it is that1 speaking of matter1 we speak of it always as one1 because in truth it expressly contains nothing but the idea of a solid substance1 which is everywhere the same1 everywhere uniform4 ,this being our idea of matter1 we no more conceive or speak of different ,,matters in the world than we do of different solidities2 though we both conceive and speak of different bodies1 because extension and figure are capable of variation4 ,but1 since solidity cannot exist without extension and figure1 the taking matter to be the name of something really existing under that precision1 has no doubt produced those obscure and unintelligible discourses and disputes1 which have filled the heads and books of philosophers concerning materia prima2 which imperfection or abuse1 how far it may concern a great many other general terms ,i leave to be considered4 ,this1 ,i think1 ,i may at least say1 that we should have a great many fewer disputes in the world1 if words were taken for what they are1 the signs of our ideas only2 and not for things themselves4 ,for1 when we argue about ,,matter1 or any the like term1 we truly argue only about the idea we express by that sound1 whether that precise idea agree to anything really existing in nature or no4 ,and if men would tell what ideas they make their words stand for1 there could not be half that obscurity or wrangling in the search or support of truth that there is4 #af4 ,this makes ,errors lasting4 ,but whatever inconvenience follows from this mistake of words1 this ,i am sure1 that1 by constant and familiar use1 they charm men into notions far remote from the truth of things4 ,it would be a hard matter to persuade any one that the words which his father1 or schoolmaster1 the parson of the parish1 or such a reverend doctor used1 signified nothing that really existed in nature3 which perhaps is none of the least causes that men are so hardly drawn to quit their mistakes1 even in opinions purely philosophical1 and where they have no other interest but truth4 ,for the words they have a long time been used to1 remaining firm in their minds1 it is no wonder that the wrong notions annexed to them should not be removed4 #ag4 ,fifthly1 by setting them in the place of what they cannot signify4 ,v4 ,,fifthly1 ,another abuse of words is1 ,,the ,,setting ,,them ,,in ,,the ,,place ,,of ,,things ,,which ,,they ,,do ,,or ,,can ,,by ,,no ,,means ,,signify4 ,we may observe that1 in the general names of substances1 whereof the ,,nominal essences are only known to us1 when we put them into propositions1 and affirm or deny anything about them1 we do most commonly tacitly suppose or intend1 they should stand for the ,,real essence of a certain sort of substances4 ,for1 when a man says gold is malleable1 he means and would insinuate something more than this1 ,that what ,i call gold is malleable1 7though truly it amounts to no more17 but would have this understood1 viz4 ,that gold1 i4e4 what has the real essence of gold1 is malleable2 which amounts to thus much1 that malleableness depends on1 and is inseparable from the real essence of gold4 ,but a man1 not knowing wherein that real essence consists1 the connexion in his mind of malleableness is not truly with an essence he knows not1 but only with the sound gold he puts for it4 ,thus1 when we say that ,,animal ,,rationale is1 and animal imflume bipes latis unguibus is not a good definition of a man2 it is plain we suppose the name man in this case to stand for the real essence of a species1 and would signify that 'a rational animal' better described that real essence than 'a two-legged animal with broad nails1 and without feathers4' ,for else1 why might not ,plato as properly make the word word in ,greek1 or ,,man1 stand for his complex idea1 made up of the idea of a body1 distinguished from others by a certain shape and other outward appearances1 as ,aristotle make the complex idea to which he gave the name word in ,greek1 or ,,man1 of body and the faculty of reasoning joined together2 unless the name word in ,greek1 or ,,man1 were supposed to stand for something else than what it signifies2 and to be put in the place of some other thing than the idea a man professes he would express by it8 #ah4 ,,vi4 ,putting them for the real ,essences of ,substances4 ,it is true the names of substances would be much more useful1 and propositions made in them much more certain1 were the real essences of substances the ideas in our minds which those words signified4 ,and it is for want of those real essences that our words convey so little knowledge or certainty in our discourses about them2 and therefore the mind1 to remove that imperfection as much as it can1 makes them1 by a secret supposition1 to stand for a thing having that real essence1 as if thereby it made some nearer approaches to it4 ,for1 though the word ,,man or ,,gold signify nothing truly but a complex idea of properties united together in one sort of substances2 yet there is scarce anybody1 in the use of these words1 but often supposes each of those names to stand for a thing having the real essence on which these properties depend4 ,which is so far from diminishing the imperfection of our words1 that by a plain abuse it adds to it1 when we would make them stand for something1 which1 not being in our complex idea1 the name we use can no ways be the sign of4 #ai4 ,hence we think ,change of our ,complex ,ideas of ,substances not to change their ,species4 ,this shows us the reason why in ,,mixed ,,modes any of the ideas that make the composition of the complex one being left out or changed1 it is allowed to be another thing1 i4e4 to be of another species1 as is plain in ,,chance-,,medley1 ,,manslaughter1 ,,murder1 ,,parricide1 c4 ,the reason whereof is1 because the complex idea signified by that name is the real as well as nominal essence2 and there is no secret reference of that name to any other essence but that4 ,but in ,,substances1 it is not so4 ,for though in that called ,,gold1 one puts into his complex idea what another leaves out1 and vice versa3 yet men do not usually think that therefore the species is changed3 because they secretly in their minds refer that name1 and suppose it annexed to a real immutable essence of a thing existing1 on which those properties depend4 ,he that adds to his complex idea of gold that of fixedness and solubility in ,,aqua ,,regia1 which he put not in it before1 is not thought to have changed the species2 but only to have a more perfect idea1 by adding another simple idea1 which is always in fact joined with those other1 of which his former complex idea consisted4 ,but this reference of the name to a thing1 whereof we have not the idea1 is so far from helping at all1 that it only serves the more to involve us in difficulties4 ,for by this tacit reference to the real essence of that species of bodies1 the word ,,gold 7which1 by standing for a more or less perfect collection of simple ideas1 serves to design that sort of body well enough in civil discourse7 comes to have no signification at all1 being put for somewhat whereof we have no idea at all1 and so can signify nothing at all1 when the body itself is away4 ,for however it may be thought all one1 yet1 if well considered1 it will be found a quite different thing1 to argue about gold in name1 and about a parcel in the body itself1 v4g4 a piece of leaf-gold laid before us2 though in discourse we are fain to substitute the name for the thing4 #bj4 ,the ,cause of this ,abuse1 a supposition of ,nature's working always regularly1 in setting boundaries to ,species4 ,that which ,i think very much disposes men to substitute their names for the real essences of species1 is the supposition before mentioned1 that nature works regularly in the production of things1 and sets the boundaries to each of those species1 by giving exactly the same real internal constitution to each individual which we rank under one general name4 ,whereas any one who observes their different qualities can hardly doubt1 that many of the individuals1 called by the same name1 are1 in their internal constitution1 as different one from another as several of those which are ranked under different specific names4 ,this supposition1 however1 that the same precise and internal constitution goes always with the same specific name1 makes men forward to take those names for the representatives of those real essences2 though indeed they signify nothing but the complex ideas they have in their minds when they use them4 ,so that1 if ,i may so say1 signifying one thing1 and being supposed for1 or put in the place of another1 they cannot but1 in such a kind of use1 cause a great deal of uncertainty in men's discourses2 especially in those who have thoroughly imbibed the doctrine of ,,substantial ,,forms1 whereby they firmly imagine the several species of things to be determined and distinguished4 #ba4 ,this ,abuse contains two false ,suppositions4 ,but however preposterous and absurd it be to make our names stand for ideas we have not1 or 7which is all one7 essences that we know not1 it being in effect to make our words the signs of nothing2 yet it is evident to any one who ever so little reflects on the use men make of their words1 that there is nothing more familiar4 ,when a man asks whether this or that thing he sees1 let it be a drill1 or a monstrous foetus1 be a ,,man or no2 it is evident the question is not1 ,whether that particular thing agree to his complex idea expressed by the name man3 but whether it has in it the real essence of a species of things which he supposes his name man to stand for4 ,in which way of using the names of substances1 there are these false suppositions contained3-- ,first1 that there are certain precise essences according to which nature makes all particular things1 and by which they are distinguished into species4 ,that everything has a real constitution1 whereby it is what it is1 and on which its sensible qualities depend1 is past doubt3 but ,i think it has been proved that this makes not the distinction of species as ,,we rank them1 nor the boundaries of their names4 ,secondly1 this tacitly also insinuates1 as if we had ,,ideas of these proposed essences4 ,for to what purpose else is it1 to inquire whether this or that thing have the real essence of the species man1 if we did not suppose that there were such a specifick essence known8 ,which yet is utterly false4 ,and therefore such application of names as would make them stand for ideas which we have not1 must needs cause great disorder in discourses and reasonings about them1 and be a great inconvenience in our communication by words4 #bb4 ,,vi4 ,sixthly1 by proceeding upon the supposition that the words we use have a certain and evident ,signification which other men cannot but understand4 ,,sixthly1 there remains yet another more general1 though perhaps less observed1 abuse of words2 and that is1 that men having by a long and familiar use annexed to them certain ideas1 they are apt to imagine ,,so ,,near ,,and ,,necessary ,a ,,connexion ,,between ,,the ,,names ,,and ,,signification ,,they ,,use ,,them ,,in1 that they forwardly suppose one cannot but understand what their meaning is2 and therefore one ought to acquiesce in the words delivered1 as if it were past doubt that1 in the use of those common received sounds1 the speaker and hearer had necessarily the same precise ideas4 ,whence presuming1 that when they have in discourse used any term1 they have thereby1 as it were1 set before others the very thing they talked of4 ,and so likewise taking the words of others1 as naturally standing for just what they themselves have been accustomed to apply them to1 they never trouble themselves to explain their own1 or understand clearly others' meaning4 ,from whence commonly proceeds noise1 and wrangling1 without improvement or information2 whilst men take words to be the constant regular marks of agreed notions1 which in truth are no more but the voluntary and unsteady signs of their own ideas4 ,and yet men think it strange1 if in discourse1 or 7where it is often absolutely necessary7 in dispute1 one sometimes asks the meaning of their terms3 though the arguings one may every day observe in conversation make it evident1 that there are few names of complex ideas which any two men use for the same just precise collection4 ,it is hard to name a word which will not be a clear instance of this4 ,,life is a term1 none more familiar4 ,any one almost would take it for an affront to be asked what he meant by it4 ,and yet if it comes in question1 whether a plant that lies ready formed in the seed have life2 whether the embryo in an egg before incubation1 or a man in a swoon without sense or motion1 be alive or no2 it is easy to perceive that a clear1 distinct1 settled idea does not always accompany the use of so known a word as that of life is4 ,some gross and confused conceptions men indeed ordinarily have1 to which they apply the common words of their language2 and such a loose use of their words serves them well enough in their ordinary discourses or affairs4 ,but this is not sufficient for philosophical inquiries4 ,knowledge and reasoning require precise determinate ideas4 ,and though men will not be so importunately dull as not to understand what others say1 without demanding an explication of their terms2 nor so troublesomely critical as to correct others in the use of the words they receive from them3 yet1 where truth and knowledge are concerned in the case1 ,i know not what fault it can be1 to desire the explication of words whose sense seems dubious2 or why a man should be ashamed to own his ignorance in what sense another man uses his words2 since he has no other way of certainly knowing it but by being informed4 ,this abuse of taking words upon trust has nowhere spread so far1 nor with so ill effects1 as amongst men of letters4 ,the multiplication and obstinacy of disputes1 which have so laid waste the intellectual world1 is owing to nothing more than to this ill use of words4 ,for though it be generally believed that there is great diversity of opinions in the volumes and variety of controversies the world is distracted with2 yet the most ,i can find that the contending learned men of different parties do1 in their arguings one with another1 is1 that they speak different languages4 ,for ,i am apt to imagine1 that when any of them1 quitting terms1 think upon things1 and know what they think1 they think all the same3 though perhaps what they would have be different4 #bc4 ,the ,ends of ,language3 ,first1 ,to convey our ,ideas4 ,to conclude this consideration of the imperfection and abuse of language4 ,the ends of language in our discourse with others being chiefly these three3 ,first1 to make known one man's thoughts or ideas to another2 ,secondly1 to do so with as much ease and quickness as possible2 and1 ,thirdly1 thereby to convey the knowledge of things3 language is either abused or deficient1 when it fails of any of these three4 ,first1 ,words fail in the first of these ends1 and lay not open one man's ideas to another's view3 #a4 ,when men have names in their mouths without any determinate ideas in their minds whereof they are the signs3 or1 #b4 ,when they apply the common received names of any language to ideas1 to which the common use of that language does not apply them3 or #c4 ,when they apply them very unsteadily1 making them stand now for one1 and by and by for another idea4 #bd4 ,secondly1 ,to do it with ,quickness4 ,secondly1 ,men fail of conveying their thoughts with the quickness and ease that may be1 when they have complex ideas without having any distinct names for them4 ,this is sometimes the fault of the language itself1 which has not in it a sound yet applied to such a signification2 and sometimes the fault of the man1 who has not yet learned the name for that idea he would show another4 #be4 ,thirdly1 ,therewith to convey the ,knowledge of ,things4 ,thirdly1 there is no knowledge of things conveyed by men's words1 when their ideas agree not to the reality of things4 ,though it be a defect that has its original in our ideas1 which are not so conformable to the nature of things as attention1 study and application might make them1 yet it fails not to extend itself to our words too1 when we use them as signs of real beings1 which yet never had any reality or existence4 #bf4 ,how ,men's ,words fail in all these3 ,first1 when used without any ideas4 ,first1 ,he that hath words of any language1 without distinct ideas in his mind to which he applies them1 does1 so far as he uses them in discourse1 only make a noise without any sense or signification2 and how learned soever he may seem1 by the use of hard words or learned terms1 is not much more advanced thereby in knowledge1 than he would be in learning1 who had nothing in his study but the bare titles of books1 without possessing the contents of them4 ,for all such words1 however put into discourse1 according to the right construction of grammatical rules1 or the harmony of well-turned periods1 do yet amount to nothing but bare sounds1 and nothing else4 #bg4 ,secondly1 when complex ideas are without names annexed to them4 ,secondly1 ,he that has complex ideas1 without particular names for them1 would be in no better case than a bookseller1 who had in his warehouse volumes that lay there unbound1 and without titles1 which he could therefore make known to others only by showing the loose sheets1 and communicate them only by tale4 ,this man is hindered in his discourse1 for want of words to communicate his complex ideas1 which he is therefore forced to make known by an enumeration of the simple ones that compose them2 and so is fain often to use twenty words1 to express what another man signifies in one4 #bh4 ,thirdly1 when the same sign is not put for the same idea4 ,thirdly1 ,he that puts not constantly the same sign for the same idea1 but uses the same word sometimes in one and sometimes in another signification1 ought to pass in the schools and conversation for as fair a man1 as he does in the market and exchange1 who sells several things under the same name4 #bi4 ,fourthly1 when words are diverted from their common use4 ,fourthly1 ,he that applies the words of any language to ideas different from those to which the common use of that country applies them1 however his own understanding may be filled with truth and light1 will not by such words be able to convey much of it to others1 without defining his terms4 ,for however the sounds are such as are familiarly known1 and easily enter the ears of those who are accustomed to them2 yet standing for other ideas than those they usually are annexed to1 and are wont to excite in the mind of the hearers1 they cannot make known the thoughts of him who thus uses them4 #cj4 ,fifthly1 when they are names of fantastical imaginations4 ,fifthly1 ,he that imagined to himself substances such as never have been1 and filled his head with ideas which have not any correspondence with the real nature of things1 to which yet he gives settled and defined names1 may fill his discourse1 and perhaps another man's head1 with the fantastical imaginations of his own brain1 but will be very far from advancing thereby one jot in real and true knowledge4 #ca4 ,summary4 ,he that hath names without ideas1 wants meaning in his words1 and speaks only empty sounds4 ,he that hath complex ideas without names for them1 wants liberty and dispatch in his expressions1 and is necessitated to use periphrases4 ,he that uses his words loosely and unsteadily will either be not minded or not understood4 ,he that applies his names to ideas different from their common use1 wants propriety in his language1 and speaks gibberish4 ,and he that hath the ideas of substances disagreeing with the real existence of things1 so far wants the materials of true knowledge in his understanding1 and hath instead thereof chimeras4 #cb4 ,how men's words fail when they stand for ,substances4 ,in our notions concerning ,substances1 we are liable to all the former inconveniences3 v4 g4 he that uses the word ,,tarantula1 without having any imagination or idea of what it stands for1 pronounces a good word2 but so long means nothing at all by it4 #b4 ,he that1 in a newly-discovered country1 shall see several sorts of animals and vegetables1 unknown to him before1 may have as true ideas of them1 as of a horse or a stag2 but can speak of them only by a description1 till he shall either take the names the natives call them by1 or give them names himself4 #c4 ,he that uses the word ,,body sometimes for pure extension1 and sometimes for extension and solidity together1 will talk very fallaciously4 #d4 ,he that gives the name ,,horse to that idea which common usage calls ,,mule1 talks improperly1 and will not be understood4 #e4 ,he that thinks the name ,,centaur stands for some real being1 imposes on himself1 and mistakes words for things4 #cc4 ,how when they stand for ,modes and ,relations4 ,in ,modes and ,relations generally1 we are liable only to the four first of these inconveniences2 viz4 #a4 ,i may have in my memory the names of modes1 as ,,gratitude or ,,charity1 and yet not have any precise ideas annexed in my thoughts to those names1 #b4 ,i may have ideas1 and not know the names that belong to them3 v4 g4 ,i may have the idea of a man's drinking till his colour and humour be altered1 till his tongue trips1 and his eyes look red1 and his feet fail him2 and yet not know that it is to be called ,,drunkenness4 #c4 ,i may have the ideas of virtues or vices1 and names also1 but apply them amiss3 v4 g4 when ,i apply the name ,,frugality to that idea which others call and signify by this sound1 ,,covetousness4 #d4 ,i may use any of those names with inconstancy4 #e4 ,but1 in modes and relations1 ,i cannot have ideas disagreeing to the existence of things3 for modes being complex ideas1 made by the mind at pleasure1 and relation being but by way of considering or comparing two things together1 and so also an idea of my own making1 these ideas can scarce be found to disagree with anything existing2 since they are not in the mind as the copies of things regularly made by nature1 nor as properties inseparably flowing from the internal constitution or essence of any substance2 but1 as it were1 patterns lodged in my memory1 with names annexed to them1 to denominate actions and relations by1 as they come to exist4 ,but the mistake is commonly in my giving a wrong name to my conceptions2 and so using words in a different sense from other people3 ,i am not understood1 but am thought to have wrong ideas of them1 when ,i give wrong names to them4 ,only if ,i put in my ideas of mixed modes or relations any inconsistent ideas together1 ,i fill my head also with chimeras2 since such ideas1 if well examined1 cannot so much as exist in the mind1 much less any real being ever be denominated from them4 #cd4 ,seventhly1 ,language is often abused by ,figurative ,speech4 ,since wit and fancy find easier entertainment in the world than dry truth and real knowledge1 figurative speeches and allusion in language will hardly be admitted as an imperfection or abuse of it4 ,i confess1 in discourses where we seek rather pleasure and delight than information and improvement1 such ornaments as are borrowed from them can scarce pass for faults4 ,but yet if we would speak of things as they are1 we must allow that all the art of rhetoric1 besides order and clearness2 all the artificial and figurative application of words eloquence hath invented1 are for nothing else but to insinuate wrong ideas1 move the passions1 and thereby mislead the judgment2 and so indeed are perfect cheats3 and therefore1 however laudable or allowable oratory may render them in harangues and popular addresses1 they are certainly1 in all discourses that pretend to inform or instruct1 wholly to be avoided2 and where truth and knowledge are concerned1 cannot but be thought a great fault1 either of the language or person that makes use of them4 ,what and how various they are1 will be superfluous here to take notice2 the books of rhetoric which abound in the world1 will instruct those who want to be informed3 only ,i cannot but observe how little the preservation and improvement of truth and knowledge is the care and concern of mankind2 since the arts of fallacy are endowed and preferred4 ,it is evident how much men love to deceive and be deceived1 since rhetoric1 that powerful instrument of error and deceit1 has its established professors1 is publicly taught1 and has always been had in great reputation3 and ,i doubt not but it will be thought great boldness1 if not brutality1 in me to have said thus much against it4 ,eloquence1 like the fair sex1 has too prevailing beauties in it to suffer itself ever to be spoken against4 ,and it is in vain to find fault with those arts of deceiving1 wherein men find pleasure to be deceived4 ,,chapter ,,xi4 ,,of ,,the ,,remedies ,,of ,,the ,,foregoing ,,imperfections ,,and ,,abuses ,,of ,,words4 #a4 ,remedies are worth seeking4 ,the natural and improved imperfections of languages we have seen above at large3 and speech being the great bond that holds society together1 and the common conduit1 whereby the improvements of knowledge are conveyed from one man and one generation to another1 it would well deserve our most serious thoughts to consider1 what remedies are to be found for the inconveniences above mentioned4 #b4 ,are not easy to find4 ,i am not so vain as to think that any one can pretend to attempt the perfect reforming the languages of the world1 no not so much as of his own country1 without rendering himself ridiculous4 ,to require that men should use their words constantly in the same sense1 and for none but determined and uniform ideas1 would be to think that all men should have the same notions1 and should talk of nothing but what they have clear and distinct ideas of3 which is not to be expected by any one who hath not vanity enough to imagine he can prevail with men to be very knowing or very silent4 ,and he must be very little skilled in the world1 who thinks that a voluble tongue shall accompany only a good understanding2 or that men's talking much or little should hold proportion only to their knowledge4 #c4 ,but yet necessary to those who search after ,truth4 ,but though the market and exchange must be left to their own ways of talking1 and gossipings not be robbed of their ancient privilege3 though the schools1 and men of argument would perhaps take it amiss to have anything offered1 to abate the length or lessen the number of their disputes2 yet methinks those who pretend seriously to search after or maintain truth1 should think themselves obliged to study how they might deliver themselves without obscurity1 doubtfulness1 or equivocation1 to which men's words are naturally liable1 if care be not taken4 #d4 ,misuse of ,words the great ,cause of ,errors4 ,for he that shall well consider the errors and obscurity1 the mistakes and confusion1 that are spread in the world by an ill use of words1 will find some reason to doubt whether language1 as it has been employed1 has contributed more to the improvement or hindrance of knowledge amongst mankind4 ,how many are there1 that1 when they would think on things1 fix their thoughts only on words1 especially when they would apply their minds to moral matters8 ,and who then can wonder if the result of such contemplations and reasonings1 about little more than sounds1 whilst the ideas they annex to them are very confused and very unsteady1 or perhaps none at all2 who can wonder1 ,i say1 that such thoughts and reasonings end in nothing but obscurity and mistake1 without any clear judgment or knowledge8 #e4 ,has made men more conceited and obstinate4 ,this inconvenience1 in an ill use of words1 men suffer in their own private meditations3 but much more manifest are the disorders which follow from it1 in conversation1 discourse1 and arguings with others4 ,for language being the great conduit1 whereby men convey their discoveries1 reasonings1 and knowledge1 from one to another1 he that makes an ill use of it1 though he does not corrupt the fountains of knowledge1 which are in things themselves1 yet he does1 as much as in him lies1 break or stop the pipes whereby it is distributed to the public use and advantage of mankind4 ,he that uses words without any clear and steady meaning1 what does he but lead himself and others into errors8 ,and he that designedly does it1 ought to be looked on as an enemy to truth and knowledge4 ,and yet who can wonder that all the sciences and parts of knowledge have been so overcharged with obscure and equivocal terms1 and insignificant and doubtful expressions1 capable to make the most attentive or quick-sighted very little1 or not at all1 the more knowing or orthodox3 since subtlety1 in those who make profession to teach or defend truth1 hath passed so much for a virtue3 a virtue1 indeed1 which1 consisting for the most part in nothing but the fallacious and illusory use of obscure or deceitful terms1 is only fit to make men more conceited in their ignorance1 and more obstinate in their errors4 #f4 ,addicted to ,wrangling about sounds4 ,let us look into the books of controversy of any kind1 there we shall see that the effect of obscure1 unsteady1 or equivocal terms is nothing but noise and wrangling about sounds1 without convincing or bettering a man's understanding4 ,for if the idea be not agreed on1 betwixt the speaker and hearer1 for which the words stand1 the argument is not about things1 but names4 ,as often as such a word whose signification is not ascertained betwixt them1 comes in use1 their understandings have no other object wherein they agree1 but barely the sound2 the things that they think on at that time1 as expressed by that word1 being quite different4 #g4 ,instance1 ,bat and ,bird4 ,whether a ,,bat be a ,,bird or no1 is not a question1 ,whether a bat be another thing than indeed it is1 or have other qualities than indeed it has2 for that would be extremely absurd to doubt of4 ,but the question is1 7i7 ,either between those that acknowledged themselves to have but imperfect ideas of one or both of this sort of things1 for which these names are supposed to stand4 ,and then it is a real inquiry concerning the ,,nature of a bird or a bat1 to make their yet imperfect ideas of it more complete2 by examining whether all the simple ideas to which1 combined together1 they both give name bird1 be all to be found in a bat3 but this is a question only of inquirers 7not disputers7 who neither affirm nor deny1 but examine3 ,or1 7#b7 ,it is a question between disputants2 whereof the one affirms1 and the other denies that a bat is a bird4 ,and then the question is barely about the signification of one or both these ,,words2 in that they not having both the same complex ideas to which they give these two names1 one holds and the other denies1 that these two names may be affirmed one of another4 ,were they agreed in the signification of these two names1 it were impossible they should dispute about them4 ,for they would presently and clearly see 7were that adjusted between them17 whether all the simple ideas of the more general name bird were found in the complex idea of a bat or no2 and so there could be no doubt whether a bat were a bird or no4 ,and here ,i desire it may be considered1 and carefully examined1 whether the greatest part of the disputes in the world are not merely verbal1 and about the signification of words2 and whether1 if the terms they are made in were defined1 and reduced in their signification 7as they must be where they signify anything7 to determined collections of the simple ideas they do or should stand for1 those disputes would not end of themselves1 and immediately vanish4 ,i leave it then to be considered1 what the learning of disputation is1 and how well they are employed for the advantage of themselves or others1 whose business is only the vain ostentation of sounds2 i4 e4 those who spend their lives in disputes and controversies4 ,when ,i shall see any of those combatants strip all his terms of ambiguity and obscurity1 7which every one may do in the words he uses himself17 ,i shall think him a champion for knowledge1 truth1 and peace1 and not the slave of vain-glory1 ambition1 or a party4 #h4 ,remedies4 ,to remedy the defects of speech before mentioned to some degree1 and to prevent the inconveniences that follow from them1 ,i imagine the observation of these following rules may be of use1 till somebody better able shall judge it worth his while to think more maturely on this matter1 and oblige the world with his thoughts on it4 ,first ,remedy3 ,to use no ,word without an ,idea annexed to it4 ,first1 ,a man shall take care to use no word without a signification1 no name without an idea for which he makes it stand4 ,this rule will not seem altogether needless to any one who shall take the pains to recollect how often he has met with such words as ,,instinct1 ,,sympathy1 and ,,antipathy1 c41 in the discourse of others1 so made use of as he might easily conclude that those that used them had no ideas in their minds to which they applied them1 but spoke them only as sounds1 which usually served instead of reasons on the like occasions4 ,not but that these words1 and the like1 have very proper significations in which they may be used2 but there being no natural connexion between any words and any ideas1 these1 and any other1 may be learned by rote1 and pronounced or writ by men who have no ideas in their minds to which they have annexed them1 and for which they make them stand2 which is necessary they should1 if men would speak intelligibly even to themselves alone4 #i4 ,second ,remedy3 ,to have distinct1 determinate ,ideas annexed to ,words1 especially in mixed ,modes4 ,secondly1 ,it is not enough a man uses his words as signs of some ideas3 those he annexes them to1 if they be simple1 must be clear and distinct2 if complex1 must be determinate1 i4e4 the precise collection of simple ideas settled in the mind1 with that sound annexed to it1 as the sign of that precise determined collection1 and no other4 ,this is very necessary in names of modes1 and especially moral words2 which1 having no settled objects in nature1 from whence their ideas are taken1 as from their original1 are apt to be very confused4 ,,justice is a word in every man's mouth1 but most commonly with a very undetermined1 loose signification2 which will always be so1 unless a man has in his mind a distinct comprehension of the component parts that complex idea consists of and if it be decompounded1 must be able to resolve it still only till he at last comes to the simple ideas that make it up3 and unless this be done1 a man makes an ill use of the word1 let it be justice1 for example1 or any other4 ,i do not say1 a man needs stand to recollect1 and make this analysis at large1 every time the word justice comes in his way3 but this at least is necessary1 that he have so examined the signification of that name1 and settled the idea of all its parts in his mind1 that he can do it when he pleases4 ,if any one who makes his complex idea of justice to be1 such a treatment of the person or goods of another as is according to law1 hath not a clear and distinct idea what ,,law is1 which makes a part of his complex idea of justice1 it is plain his idea of justice itself will be confused and imperfect4 ,this exactness will1 perhaps1 be judged very troublesome2 and therefore most men will think they may be excused from settling the complex ideas of mixed modes so precisely in their minds4 ,but yet ,i must say1 till this be done1 it must not be wondered1 that they have a great deal of obscurity and confusion in their own minds1 and a great deal of wrangling in their discourse with others4 #aj4 ,and distinct and conformable ideas in ,words that stand for ,substances4 ,in the names of substances1 for a right use of them1 something more is required than barely ,,determined ,,ideas4 ,in these the names must also be ,,conformable ,,to ,,things ,,as ,,they ,,exist2 but of this ,i shall have occasion to speak more at large by and by4 ,this exactness is absolutely necessary in inquiries after philosophical knowledge1 and in controversies about truth4 ,and though it would be well1 too1 if it extended itself to common conversation and the ordinary affairs of life2 yet ,i think that is scarce to be expected4 ,vulgar notions suit vulgar discourses3 and both1 though confused enough1 yet serve pretty well the market and the wake4 ,merchants and lovers1 cooks and tailors1 have words wherewithal to dispatch their ordinary affairs3 and so1 ,i think1 might philosophers and disputants too1 if they had a mind to understand1 and to clearly understood4 #aa4 ,third ,remedy3 ,to apply ,words to such ideas as common use has annexed them to4 ,thirdly1 it is not enough that men have ideas1 determined ideas1 for which they make these signs stand2 but they must also take care to apply their words as near as may be to such ideas as common use has annexed them to4 ,for words1 especially of languages already framed1 being no man's private possession1 but the common measure of commerce and communication1 it is not for any one at pleasure to change the stamp they are current in1 nor alter the ideas they are affixed to2 or at least1 when there is a necessity to do so1 he is bound to give notice of it4 ,men's intentions in speaking are1 or at least should be1 to be understood2 which cannot be without frequent explanations1 demands1 and other the like incommodious interruptions1 where men do not follow common use4 ,propriety of speech is that which gives our thoughts entrance into other men's minds with the greatest ease and advantage3 and therefore deserves some part of our care and study1 especially in the names of moral words4 ,the proper signification and use of terms is best to be learned from those who in their writings and discourses appear to have had the clearest notions1 and applied to them their terms with the exactest choice and fitness4 ,this way of using a man's words1 according to the propriety of the language1 though it have not always the good fortune to be understood2 yet most commonly leaves the blame of it on him who is so unskilful in the language he speaks1 as not to understand it when made use of as it ought to be4 #ab4 ,fourth ,remedy3 ,to declare the meaning in which we use them4 ,fourthly1 ,but1 because common use has not so visibly annexed any signification to words1 as to make men know always certainly what they precisely stand for3 and because men1 in the improvement of their knowledge1 come to have ideas different from the vulgar and ordinary received ones1 for which they must either make new words1 7which men seldom venture to do1 for fear of being thought guilty of affectation or novelty17 or else must use old ones in a new signification3 therefore1 after the observation of the foregoing rules1 it is sometimes necessary1 for the ascertaining the signification of words1 to ,,declare ,,their ,,meaning2 where either common use has left it uncertain and loose1 7as it has in most names of very complex ideas27 or where the term1 being very material in the discourse1 and that upon which it chiefly turns1 is liable to any doubtfulness or mistake4 #ac4 ,and that in three ,ways4 ,as the ideas men's words stand for are of different sorts1 so the way of making known the ideas they stand for1 when there is occasion1 is also different4 ,for though ,,defining be thought the proper way to make known the proper signification of words2 yet there are some words that will not be defined1 as there are others whose precise meaning cannot be made known but by definition3 and perhaps a third1 which partake somewhat of both the other1 as we shall see in the names of simple ideas1 modes1 and substances4 #ad4 ,in ,simple ,ideas1 either by synonymous terms1 or by showing examples4 ,i4 ,first1 when a man makes use of the name of any simple idea1 which he perceives is not understood1 or is in danger to be mistaken1 he is obliged1 by the laws of ingenuity and the end of speech1 to declare his meaning1 and make known what idea he makes it stand for4 ,this1 as has been shown1 cannot be done by definition3 and therefore1 when a synonymous word fails to do it1 there is but one of these ways left4 ,first1 ,sometimes the ,,naming the subject wherein that simple idea is to be found1 will make its name to be understood by those who are acquainted with that subject1 and know it by that name4 ,so to make a countryman understand what ,,feuillemorte colour signifies1 it may suffice to tell him1 it is the colour of withered leaves falling in autumn4 ,secondly1 but the only sure way of making known the signification of the name of any simple idea1 is ,,by ,,presenting ,,to ,,his ,,senses ,,that ,,subject ,,which ,,may ,,produce ,,it ,,in ,,his ,,mind1 and make him actually have the idea that word stands for4 #ae4 ,in mixed ,modes1 by ,definition4 ,,ii4 ,secondly1 ,mixed modes1 especially those belonging to morality1 being most of them such combinations of ideas as the mind puts together of its own choice1 and whereof there are not always standing patterns to be found existing1 the signification of their names cannot be made known1 as those of simple ideas1 by any showing3 but1 in recompense thereof1 may be perfectly and exactly defined4 ,for they being combinations of several ideas that the mind of man has arbitrarily put together1 without reference to any archetypes1 men may1 if they please1 exactly know the ideas that go to each composition1 and so both use these words in a certain and undoubted signification1 and perfectly declare1 when there is occasion1 what they stand for4 ,this1 if well considered1 would lay great blame on those who make not their discourses about ,,moral things very clear and distinct4 ,for since the precise signification of the names of mixed modes1 or1 which is all one1 the real essence of each species is to be known1 they being not of nature's1 but man's making1 it is a great negligence and perverseness to discourse of moral things with uncertainty and obscurity2 which is more pardonable in treating of natural substances1 where doubtful terms are hardly to be avoided1 for a quite contrary reason1 as we shall see by and by4 #af4 ,morality capable of ,demonstration4 ,upon this ground it is that ,i am bold to think that morality is capable of demonstration1 as well as mathematics3 since the precise real essence of the things moral words stand for may be perfectly known1 and so the congruity and incongruity of the things themselves be certainly discovered2 in which consists perfect knowledge4 ,nor let any one object1 that the names of substances are often to be made use of in morality1 as well as those of modes1 from which will arise obscurity4 ,for1 as to substances1 when concerned in moral discourses1 their divers natures are not so much inquired into as supposed3 v4g4 when we say that man is subject to law1 we mean nothing by man but a corporeal rational creature3 what the real essence or other qualities of that creature are in this case is no way considered4 ,and1 therefore1 whether a child or changeling be a man1 in a physical sense1 may amongst the naturalists be as disputable as it will1 it concerns not at all the moral man1 as ,i may call him1 which is this immovable1 unchangeable idea1 a corporeal rational being4 ,for1 were there a monkey1 or any other creature1 to be found that had the use of reason to such a degree1 as to be able to understand general signs1 and to deduce consequences about general ideas1 he would no doubt be subject to law1 and in that sense be a ,,man1 how much soever he differed in shape from others of that name4 ,the names of substances1 if they be used in them as they should1 can no more disturb moral than they do mathematical discourses2 where1 if the mathematician speaks of a cube or globe of gold1 or of any other body1 he has his clear1 settled idea1 which varies not1 though it may by mistake be applied to a particular body to which it belongs not4 #ag4 ,definitions can make moral ,discourse clear4 ,this ,i have here mentioned1 by the by1 to show of what consequence it is for men1 in their names of mixed modes1 and consequently in all their moral discourses1 to define their words when there is occasion3 since thereby moral knowledge may be brought to so great clearness and certainty4 ,and it must be great want of ingenuousness 7to say no worse of it7 to refuse to do it3 since a definition is the only way whereby the precise meaning of moral words can be known2 and yet a way whereby their meaning may be known certainly1 and without leaving any room for any contest about it4 ,and therefore the negligence or perverseness of mankind cannot be excused1 if their discourses in morality be not much more clear than those in natural philosophy3 since they are about ideas in the mind1 which are none of them false or disproportionate2 they having no external beings for the archetypes which they are referred to and must correspond with4 ,it is far easier for men to frame in their minds an idea1 which shall be the standard to which they will give the name justice2 with which pattern so made1 all actions that agree shall pass under that denomination1 than1 having seen ,aristides1 to frame an idea that shall in all things be exactly like him2 who is as he is1 let men make what idea they please of him4 ,for the one1 they need but know the combination of ideas that are put together in their own minds2 for the other1 they must inquire into the whole nature1 and abstruse hidden constitution1 and various qualities of a thing existing without them4 #ah4 ,and is the only way in which the meaning of mixed ,modes can be made known4 ,another reason that makes the defining of mixed modes so necessary1 especially of moral words1 is what ,i mentioned a little before1 viz4 that it is the only way whereby the signification of the most of them can be known with certainty4 ,for the ideas they stand for1 being for the most part such whose component parts nowhere exist together1 but scattered and mingled with others1 it is the mind alone that collects them1 and gives them the union of one idea3 and it is only by words enumerating the several simple ideas which the mind has united1 that we can make known to others what their names stand for2 the assistance of the senses in this case not helping us1 by the proposal of sensible objects1 to show the ideas which our names of this kind stand for1 as it does often in the names of sensible simple ideas1 and also to some degree in those of substances4 #ai4 ,in ,substances1 both by showing and by defining4 ,,iii4 ,thirdly1 for the explaining the signification of the names of substances1 as they stand for the ideas we have of their distinct species1 both the forementioned ways1 viz4 of showing and defining1 are requisite1 in many cases1 to be made use of4 ,for1 there being ordinarily in each sort some leading qualities1 to which we suppose the other ideas which make up our complex idea of that species annexed1 we forwardly give the specific name to that thing wherein that characteristic mark is found1 which we take to be the most distinguishing idea of that species4 ,these leading or characteristical 7as ,i may call them7 ideas1 in the sorts of animals and vegetables1 are 7as has been before remarked1 ch vi4 ,section #bi and ch4 ix4 ,section #ae7 mostly figure2 and in inanimate bodies1 colour2 and in some1 both together4 ,now1 #bj4 ,ideas of the leading ,qualities of ,substances are best got by showing4 ,these leading sensible qualities are those which make the chief ingredients of our specific ideas1 and consequently the most observable and invariable part in the definitions of our specific names1 as attributed to sorts of substances coming under our knowledge4 ,for though the sound ,,man1 in its own nature1 be as apt to signify a complex idea made up of animality and rationality1 united in the same subject1 as to signify any other combination2 yet1 used as a mark to stand for a sort of creatures we count of our own kind1 perhaps the outward shape is as necessary to be taken into our complex idea1 signified by the word man1 as any other we find in it3 and therefore1 why ,plato's ,,animal ,,implume ,,bipes ,,latis ,,unguibus should not be a good definition of the name man1 standing for that sort of creatures1 will not be easy to show3 for it is the shape1 as the leading quality1 that seems more to determine that species1 than a faculty of reasoning1 which appears not at first1 and in some never4 ,and if this be not allowed to be so1 ,i do not know how they can be excused from murder who kill monstrous births1 7as we call them17 because of an unordinary shape1 without knowing whether they have a rational soul or no2 which can be no more discerned in a well-formed than ill-shaped infant1 as soon as born4 ,and who is it has informed us that a rational soul can inhabit no tenement1 unless it has just such a sort of frontispiece2 or can join itself to1 and inform no sort of body1 but one that is just of such an outward structure8 #ba4 ,and can hardly be made known otherwise4 ,now these leading qualities are best made known by showing1 and can hardly be made known otherwise4 ,for the shape of a horse or cassowary will be but rudely and imperfectly imprinted on the mind by words2 the sight of the animals doth it a thousand times better4 ,and the idea of the particular colour of gold is not to be got by any description of it1 but only by the frequent exercise of the eyes about as is evident in those who are used to this metal1 who frequently distinguish true from counterfeit1 pure from adulterate1 by the sight1 where others 7who have as good eyes1 but yet by use have not got the precise nice idea of that peculiar yellow7 shall not perceive any difference4 ,the like may be said of those other simple ideas1 peculiar in their kind to any substance2 for which precise ideas there are no peculiar names4 ,the particular ringing sound there is in gold1 distinct from the sound of other bodies1 has no particular name annexed to it1 no more than the particular yellow that belongs to that metal4 #bb4 ,the ,ideas of the ,powers of ,substances are best known by ,definition4 ,but because many of the simple ideas that make up our specific ideas of substances are powers which lie not obvious to our senses in the things as they ordinarily appear2 therefore1 in the signification of our names of substances1 some part of the signification will be better made known by enumerating those simple ideas1 than by showing the substance itself4 ,for1 he that to the yellow shining colour of gold1 got by sight1 shall1 from my enumerating them1 have the ideas of great ductility1 fusibility1 fixedness1 and solubility1 in aqua regia1 will have a perfecter idea of gold than he can have by seeing a piece of gold1 and thereby imprinting in his mind only its obvious qualities4 ,but if the formal constitution of this shining1 heavy1 ductile thing1 7from whence all these its properties flow17 lay open to our senses1 as the formal constitution or essence of a triangle does1 the signification of the word gold might as easily be ascertained as that of triangle4 #bc4 ,a ,reflection on the ,knowledge of corporeal things possessed by ,spirits separate from bodies4 ,hence we may take notice1 how much the foundation of all our knowledge of corporeal things lies in our senses4 ,for how spirits1 separate from bodies1 7whose knowledge and ideas of these things are certainly much more perfect than ours17 know them1 we have no notion1 no idea at all4 ,the whole extent of our knowledge or imagination reaches not beyond our own ideas limited to our ways of perception4 ,though yet it be not to be doubted that spirits of a higher rank than those immersed in flesh may have as clear ideas of the radical constitution of substances as we have of a triangle1 and so perceive how all their properties and operations flow from thence3 but the manner how they come by that knowledge exceeds our conceptions4 #bd4 ,ideas of ,substances must also be conformable to ,things4 ,fourthly1 ,but1 though definitions will serve to explain the names of substances as they stand for our ideas1 yet they leave them not without great imperfection as they stand for things4 ,for our names of substances being not put barely for our ideas1 but being made use of ultimately to represent things1 and so are put in their place1 their signification must agree with the truth of things as well as with men's ideas4 ,and therefore1 in substances1 we are not always to rest in the ordinary complex idea commonly received as the signification of that word1 but must go a little further1 and inquire into the nature and properties of the things themselves1 and thereby perfect1 as much as we can1 our ideas of their distinct species2 or else learn them from such as are used to that sort of things1 and are experienced in them4 ,for1 since it is intended their names should stand for such collections of simple ideas as do really exist in things themselves1 as well as for the complex idea in other men's minds1 which in their ordinary acceptation they stand for1 therefore1 to define their names right1 natural history is to be inquired into1 and their properties are1 with care and examination1 to be found out4 ,for it is not enough1 for the avoiding inconveniences in discourse and arguings about natural bodies and substantial things1 to have learned1 from the propriety of the language1 the common1 but confused1 or very imperfect1 idea to which each word is applied1 and to keep them to that idea in our use of them2 but we must1 by acquainting ourselves with the history of that sort of things1 rectify and settle our complex idea belonging to each specific name2 and in discourse with others1 7if we find them mistake us17 we ought to tell what the complex idea is that we make such a name stand for4 ,this is the more necessary to be done by all those who search after knowledge and philosophical verity1 in that children1 being taught words1 whilst they have but imperfect notions of things1 apply them at random1 and without much thinking1 and seldom frame determined ideas to be signified by them4 ,which custom 7it being easy1 and serving well enough for the ordinary affairs of life and conversation7 they are apt to continue when they are men3 and so begin at the wrong end1 learning words first and perfectly1 but make the notions to which they apply those words afterwards very overtly4 ,by this means it comes to pass1 that men speaking the language of their country1 i4e4 according to grammar rules of that language1 do yet speak very improperly of things themselves2 and1 by their arguing one with another1 make but small progress in the discoveries of useful truths1 and the knowledge of things1 as they are to be found in themselves1 and not in our imaginations2 and it matters not much for the improvement of our knowledge how they are called4 #be4 ,not easy to be made so4 ,it were therefore to be wished1 ,that men versed in physical inquiries1 and acquainted with the several sorts of natural bodies1 would set down those simple ideas wherein they observe the individuals of each sort constantly to agree4 ,this would remedy a great deal of that confusion which comes from several persons applying the same name to a collection of a smaller or greater number of sensible qualities1 proportionably as they have been more or less acquainted with1 or accurate in examining1 the qualities of any sort of things which come under one denomination4 ,but a dictionary of this sort1 containing1 as it were1 a natural history1 requires too many hands as well as too much time1 cost1 pains1 and sagacity ever to be hoped for2 and till that be done1 we must content ourselves with such definitions of the names of substances as explain the sense men use them in4 ,and it would be well1 where there is occasion1 if they would afford us so much4 ,this yet is not usually done2 but men talk to one another1 and dispute in words1 whose meaning is not agreed between them1 out of a mistake that the significations of common words are certainly established1 and the precise ideas they stand for perfectly known2 and that it is a shame to be ignorant of them4 ,both which suppositions are false1 no names of complex ideas having so settled determined significations1 that they are constantly used for the same precise ideas4 ,nor is it a shame for a man to have a certain knowledge of anything1 but by the necessary ways of attaining it2 and so it is no discredit not to know what precise idea any sound stands for in another man's mind1 without he declare it to me by some other way than barely using that sound1 there being no other way1 without such a declaration1 certainly to know it4 ,indeed the necessity of communication by language brings men to an agreement in the signification of common words1 within some tolerable latitude1 that may serve for ordinary conversation3 and so a man cannot be supposed wholly ignorant of the ideas which are annexed to words by common use1 in a language familiar to him4 ,but common use being but a very uncertain rule1 which reduces itself at last to the ideas of particular men1 proves often but a very variable standard4 ,but though such a ,dictionary as ,i have above mentioned will require too much time1 cost1 and pains to be hoped for in this age2 yet methinks it is not unreasonable to propose1 that words standing for things which are known and distinguished by their outward shapes should be expressed by little draughts and prints made of them4 ,a vocabulary made after this fashion would perhaps with more ease1 and in less time1 teach the true signification of many terms1 especially in languages of remote countries or ages1 and settle truer ideas in men's minds of several things1 whereof we read the names in ancient authors1 than all the large and laborious comments of learned critics4 ,naturalists1 that treat of plants and animals1 have found the benefit of this way3 and he that has had occasion to consult them will have reason to confess that he has a clearer idea of ,,apium or ,,ibex1 from a little print of that herb or beast1 than he could have from a long definition of the names of either of them4 ,and so no doubt he would have of ,,strigil and ,,sistrum1 if1 instead of ,,currycomb and ,,cymbal1 7which are the ,english names dictionaries render them by17 he could see stamped in the margin small pictures of these instruments1 as they were in use amongst the ancients4 ,,toga1 ,,tunica1 ,,pallium1 are words easily translated by ,,gown1 ,,coat1 and ,,cloak2 but we have thereby no more true ideas of the fashion of those habits amongst the ,romans1 than we have of the faces of the tailors who made them4 ,such things as these1 which the eye distinguishes by their shapes1 would be best let into the mind by draughts made of them1 and more determine the signification of such words1 than any other words set for them1 or made use of to define them4 ,but this is only by the bye4 #bf4 ,v4 ,fifth ,remedy3 ,to use the same word constantly in the same sense4 ,fifthly1 ,if men will not be at the pains to declare the meaning of their words1 and definitions of their terms are not to be had1 yet this is the least that can be expected1 that1 in all discourses wherein one man pretends to instruct or convince another1 he should use the same word constantly in the same sense4 ,if this were done1 7which nobody can refuse without great disingenuity17 many of the books extant might be spared2 many of the controversies in dispute would be at an end2 several of those great volumes1 swollen with ambiguous words1 now used in one sense1 and by and by in another1 would shrink into a very narrow compass2 and many of the philosophers 7to mention no other7 as well as poets works1 might be contained in a nutshell4 #bg4 ,when not so used1 the ,variation is to be explained4 ,but after all1 the provision of words is so scanty in respect to that infinite variety of thoughts1 that men1 wanting terms to suit their precise notions1 will1 notwithstanding their utmost caution1 be forced often to use the same word in somewhat different senses4 ,and though in the continuation of a discourse1 or the pursuit of an argument1 there can be hardly room to digress into a particular definition1 as often as a man varies the signification of any term2 yet the import of the discourse will1 for the most part1 if there be no designed fallacy1 sufficiently lead candid and intelligent readers into the true meaning of it2 but where there is not sufficient to guide the reader1 there it concerns the writer to explain his meaning1 and show in what sense he there uses that term4 ,,book ,,iv ,,of ,,knowledge ,,and ,,probability ,,synopsis ,,of ,,the ,,fourth ,,book4 ,locke's review of the different sorts of ideas1 or appearances of what exists1 that can be entertained in a human understanding1 and of their relations to words1 leads1 in the ,fourth ,book1 to an investigation of the extent and validity of the ,knowledge that our ideas bring within our reach2 and into the nature of faith in ,probability1 by which assent is extended beyond ,knowledge1 for the conduct of life4 ,he finds 7ch4 i1 ii7 that ,knowledge is either an intuitive1 a demonstrative1 or a sensuous perception of absolute certainty1 in regard to one or other of four sorts of agreement or disagreement on the part of ideas3--7#a7 of each idea with itself1 as identical1 and different from every other2 7#b7 in their abstract relations to one another2 7#c7 in their necessary connexions1 as qualities and powers coexisting in concrete substances2 and 7#d7 as revelations to us of the final realities of existence4 ,the unconditional certainty that constitutes ,knowledge is perceptible by man only in regard to the first1 second1 and fourth of these four sorts3 in all general propositions only in regard to the first and second2 that is to say1 in identical propositions1 and in those which express abstract relations of simple or mixed modes1 in which nominal and real essences coincide1 e4 g4 propositions in pure mathematics and abstract morality 7chh4 iii1 v-viii74 ,the fourth sort1 which express certainty as to realities of existence1 refer to any of three realities4 ,for every man is able to perceive with absolute certainty that he himself exists1 that ,god must exist1 and that finite beings other than himself exist2--the first of these perceptions being awakened by all our ideas1 the second as the consequence of perception of the first1 and the last in the reception of our simple ideas of sense 7chh4 i4 ,section #g2 ii4 ,section #ad2 iii4 ,section #ba2 iv1 ix-xi74 ,agreement of the third sort1 of necessary coexistence of simple ideas as qualities and powers in particular substances1 with which all physical inquiry is concerned1 lies beyond human ,knowledge2 for here the nominal and real essences are not coincident3 general propositions of this sort are determined by analogies of experience1 in judgments that are more or less probable3 intellectually necessary science of nature presupposes ,omniscience2 man's interpretations of nature have to turn upon presumptions of ,probability 7chh4 iii4 ,sections #i-ag2 iv4 ,section,s #aa-ag2 vi1 xiv-xvi74 ,in forming their stock of ,certainties and ,probabilities men employ the faculty of reason1 faith in divine revelation1 and enthusiasm 7chh4 xvii-xix72 much misled by the last1 as well as by other causes of 'wrong assent' 7ch4 xx71 when they are at work in 'the three great provinces of the intellectual world' 7ch4 xxi71 concerned respectively with 7#a7 'things as knowable' 7physica72 7#b7 'actions as they depend on us in order to happiness' 7practica72 and 7#c7 methods for interpreting the signs of what is1 and of what ought to be1 that are presented in our ideas and words 7logica74 ,,chapter ,i4 ,,of ,,knowledge ,,in ,,general4 #a4 ,our ,knowledge conversant about our ,ideas only4 ,since the mind1 in all its thoughts and reasonings1 hath no other immediate object but its own ideas1 which it alone does or can contemplate1 it is evident that our knowledge is only conversant about them4 #b4 ,knowledge is the ,perception of the ,agreement or ,disagreement of two ,ideas4 ,,knowledge then seems to me to be nothing but ,,the ,,perception ,,of ,,the ,,connexion ,,of ,,and ,,agreement1 ,,or ,,disagreement ,,and ,,repugnancy ,,of ,,any ,,of ,,our ,,ideas4 ,in this alone it consists4 ,where this perception is1 there is knowledge1 and where it is not1 there1 though we may fancy1 guess1 or believe1 yet we always come short of knowledge4 ,for when we know that white is not black1 what do we else but perceive1 that these two ideas do not agree8 ,when we possess ourselves with the utmost security of the demonstration1 that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones1 what do we more but perceive1 that equality to two right ones does necessarily agree to1 and is inseparable from1 the three angles of a triangle8 #c4 ,this ,agreement or ,disagreement may be any of four sorts4 ,but to understand a little more distinctly wherein this agreement or disagreement consists1 ,i think we may reduce it all to these four sorts3 ,i4 ,,identity1 or ,,diversity4 ,,ii4 ,,relation4 ,,iii4 ,,co-,,existence1 or ,,necessary ,,connexion4 ,,iv4 ,,real ,,existence4 #d4 ,first1 ,of ,identity1 or ,diversity in ideas4 ,,first1 ,as to the first sort of agreement or disagreement1 viz4 ,,identity or ,,diversity4 ,it is the first act of the mind1 when it has any sentiments or ideas at all1 to perceive its ideas2 and so far as it perceives them1 to know each what it is1 and thereby also to perceive their difference1 and that one is not another4 ,this is so absolutely necessary1 that without it there could be no knowledge1 no reasoning1 no imagination1 no distinct thoughts at all4 ,by this the mind clearly and infallibly perceives each idea to agree with itself1 and to be what it is2 and all distinct ideas to disagree1 i4 e4 the one not to be the other3 and this it does without pains1 labour1 or deduction2 but at first view1 by its natural power of perception and distinction4 ,and though men of art have reduced this into those general rules1 ,,what ,,is1 ,,is1 and ,,it ,,is ,,impossible ,,for ,,the ,,same ,,thing ,,to ,,be ,,and ,,not ,,to ,,be1 for ready application in all cases1 wherein there may be occasion to reflect on it3 yet it is certain that the first exercise of this faculty is about particular ideas4 ,a man infallibly knows1 as soon as ever he has them in his mind1 that the ideas he calls ,,white and ,,round are the very ideas they are2 and that they are not other ideas which he calls ,,red or ,,square4 ,nor can any maxim or proposition in the world make him know it clearer or surer than he did before1 and without any such general rule4 ,this then is the first agreement or disagreement which the mind perceives in its ideas2 which it always perceives at first sight3 and if there ever happen any doubt about it1 it will always be found to be about the names1 and not the ideas themselves1 whose identity and diversity will always be perceived1 as soon and clearly as the ideas themselves are2 nor can it possibly be otherwise4 #e4 ,secondly1 ,of abstract ,relations between ideas4 ,,secondly1 the next sort of agreement or disagreement the mind perceives in any of its ideas may1 ,i think1 be called ,,relative1 and is nothing but the perception of the ,,relation between any two ideas1 of what kind soever1 whether substances1 modes1 or any other4 ,for1 since all distinct ideas must eternally be known not to be the same1 and so be universally and constantly denied one of another1 there could be no room for any positive knowledge at all1 if we could not perceive any relation between our ideas1 and find out the agreement or disagreement they have one with another1 in several ways the mind takes of comparing them4 #f4 ,thirdly1 ,of their necessary ,co-existence in ,substances4 ,,thirdly1 ,the third sort of agreement or disagreement to be found in our ideas1 which the perception of the mind is employed about1 is ,,co-,,existence or ,,non-,,co-,,existence in the ,,same ,,subject2 and this belongs particularly to substances4 ,thus when we pronounce concerning gold1 that it is fixed1 our knowledge of this truth amounts to no more but this1 that fixedness1 or a power to remain in the fire unconsumed1 is an idea that always accompanies and is joined with that particular sort of yellowness1 weight1 fusibility1 malleableness1 and solubility in ,,aqua ,,regia1 which make our complex idea signified by the word gold4 #g4 ,fourthly1 ,of real ,existence agreeing to any idea4 ,,fourthly1 ,the fourth and last sort is that of ,,actual ,,real ,,existence agreeing to any idea4 ,within these four sorts of agreement or disagreement is1 ,i suppose1 contained all the knowledge we have1 or are capable of4 ,for all the inquiries we can make concerning any of our ideas1 all that we know or can affirm concerning any of them1 is1 ,that it is1 or is not1 the same with some other2 that it does or does not always co-exist with some other idea in the same subject2 that it has this or that relation with some other idea2 or that it has a real existence without the mind4 ,thus1 'blue is not yellow1' is of identity4 ',two triangles upon equal bases between two parallels are equal1' is of relation4 ',iron is susceptible of magnetical impressions1' is of co-existence4 ',god is1' is of real existence4 ,though identity and co-existence are truly nothing but relations1 yet they are such peculiar ways of agreement or disagreement of our ideas1 that they deserve well to be considered as distinct heads1 and not under relation in general2 since they are so different grounds of affirmation and negation1 as will easily appear to any one1 who will but reflect on what is said in several places of this ,,essay4 ,i should now proceed to examine the several degrees of our knowledge1 but that it is necessary first1 to consider the different acceptations of the word ,,knowledge4 #h4 ,knowledge is either actual or habitual4 ,there are several ways wherein the mind is possessed of truth2 each of which is called knowledge4 ,i4 ,there is ,,actual ,,knowledge1 which is the present view the mind has of the agreement or disagreement of any of its ideas1 or of the relation they have one to another4 ,,ii4 ,a man is said to know any proposition1 which having been once laid before his thoughts1 he evidently perceived the agreement or disagreement of the ideas whereof it consists2 and so lodged it in his memory1 that whenever that proposition comes again to be reflected on1 he1 without doubt or hesitation1 embraces the right side1 assents to1 and is certain of the truth of it4 ,this1 ,i think1 one may call ,,habitual ,,knowledge4 ,and thus a man may be said to know all those truths which are lodged in his memory1 by a foregoing clear and full perception1 whereof the mind is assured past doubt as often as it has occasion to reflect on them4 ,for our finite understandings being able to think clearly and distinctly but on one thing at once1 if men had no knowledge of any more than what they actually thought on1 they would all be very ignorant3 and he that knew most1 would know but one truth1 that being all he was able to think on at one time4 #i4 ,habitual ,knowledge is of two degrees4 ,of habitual knowledge there are1 also1 vulgarly speaking1 two degrees3 ,first1 ,the one is of such truths laid up in the memory as1 whenever they occur to the mind1 it ,,actually ,,perceives ,,the ,,relation is between those ideas4 ,and this is in all those truths whereof we have an intuitive knowledge2 where the ideas themselves1 by an immediate view1 discover their agreement or disagreement one with another4 ,secondly1 ,the other is of such truths whereof the mind having been convinced1 it ,,retains ,,the ,,memory ,,of ,,the ,,conviction1 ,,without ,,the ,,proofs4 ,thus1 a man that remembers certainly that he once perceived the demonstration1 that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones1 is certain that he knows it1 because he cannot doubt the truth of it4 ,in his adherence to a truth1 where the demonstration by which it was at first known is forgot1 though a man may be thought rather to believe his memory than really to know1 and this way of entertaining a truth seemed formerly to me like something between opinion and knowledge2 a sort of assurance which exceeds bare belief1 for that relies on the testimony of another2--yet upon a due examination ,i find it comes not short of perfect certainty1 and is in effect true knowledge4 ,that which is apt to mislead our first thoughts into a mistake in this matter is1 that the agreement or disagreement of the ideas in this case is not perceived1 as it was at first1 by an actual view of all the intermediate ideas whereby the agreement or disagreement of those in the proposition was at first perceived2 but by other intermediate ideas1 that show the agreement or disagreement of the ideas contained in the proposition whose certainty we remember4 ,for example3 in this proposition1 that 'the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones1' one who has seen and clearly perceived the demonstration of this truth knows it to be true1 when that demonstration is gone out of his mind2 so that at present it is not actually in view1 and possibly cannot be recollected3 but he knows it in a different way from what he did before4 ,the agreement of the two ideas joined in that proposition is perceived2 but it is by the intervention of other ideas than those which at first produced that perception4 ,he remembers1 i4e4 he knows 7for remembrance is but the reviving of some past knowledge7 that he was once certain of the truth of this proposition1 that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones4 ,the immutability of the same relations between the same immutable things is now the idea that shows him1 that if the three angles of a triangle were once equal to two right ones1 they will always be equal to two right ones4 ,and hence he comes to be certain1 that what was once true in the case1 is always true2 what ideas once agreed will always agree2 and consequently what he once knew to be true1 he will always know to be true2 as long as he can remember that he once knew it4 ,upon this ground it is1 that particular demonstrations in mathematics afford general knowledge4 ,if then the perception1 that the same ideas will ,,eternally have the same habitudes and relations1 be not a sufficient ground of knowledge1 there could be no knowledge of general propositions in mathematics2 for no mathematical demonstration would be any other than particular3 and when a man had demonstrated any proposition concerning one triangle or circle1 his knowledge would not reach beyond that particular diagram4 ,if he would extend it further1 he must renew his demonstration in another instance1 before he could know it to be true in another like triangle1 and so on3 by which means one could never come to the knowledge of any general propositions4 ,nobody1 ,i think1 can deny1 that ,mr4 ,newton certainly knows any proposition that he now at any time reads in his book to be true2 though he has not in actual view that admirable chain of intermediate ideas whereby he at first discovered it to be true4 ,such a memory as that1 able to retain such a train of particulars1 may be well thought beyond the reach of human faculties1 when the very discovery1 perception1 and laying together that wonderful connexion of ideas1 is found to surpass most readers' comprehension4 ,but yet it is evident the author himself knows the proposition to be true1 remembering he once saw the connexion of those ideas2 as certainly as he knows such a man wounded another1 remembering that he saw him run him through4 ,but because the memory is not always so clear as actual perception1 and does in all men more or less decay in length of time1 this1 amongst other differences1 is one which shows that ,,demonstrative knowledge is much more imperfect than ,,intuitive1 as we shall see in the following chapter4 ,,chapter ,,ii4 ,,of ,,the ,,degrees ,,of ,,our ,,knowledge4 #a4 ,of the degrees1 or differences in clearness1 of our ,knowledge3 ,i4 ,intuitive ,all our knowledge consisting1 as ,i have said1 in the view the mind has of its own ideas1 which is the utmost light and greatest certainty we1 with our faculties1 and in our way of knowledge1 are capable of1 it may not be amiss to consider a little the degrees of its evidence4 ,the different clearness of our knowledge seems to me to lie in the different way of perception the mind has of the agreement or disagreement of any of its ideas4 ,for if we will reflect on our own ways of thinking1 we will find1 that sometimes the mind perceives the agreement or disagreement of two ideas ,,immediately ,,by ,,themselves1 without the intervention of any other3 and this ,i think we may call ,,intuitive ,,knowledge4 ,for in this the mind is at no pains of proving or examining1 but perceives the truth as the eye doth light1 only by being directed towards it4 ,thus the mind perceives that ,,white is not ,,black1 that a ,,circle is not a ,,triangle1 that ,,three are more than ,,two and equal to ,,one ,,and ,,two4 ,such kinds of truths the mind perceives at the first sight of the ideas together1 by bare intuition2 without the intervention of any other idea3 and this kind of knowledge is the clearest and most certain that human frailty is capable of4 ,this part of knowledge is irresistible1 and1 like bright sunshine1 forces itself immediately to be perceived1 as soon as ever the mind turns its view that way2 and leaves no room for hesitation1 doubt1 or examination1 but the mind is presently filled with the clear light of it4 ,,it ,,is ,,on ,,this ,,intuition ,,that ,,depends ,,all ,,the ,,certainty ,,and ,,evidence ,,of ,,all ,,our ,,knowledge2 which certainty every one finds to be so great1 that he cannot imagine1 and therefore not require a greater3 for a man cannot conceive himself capable of a greater certainty than to know that any idea in his mind is such as he perceives it to be2 and that two ideas1 wherein he perceives a difference1 are different and not precisely the same4 ,he that demands a greater certainty than this1 demands he knows not what1 and shows only that he has a mind to be a sceptic1 without being able to be so4 ,certainty depends so wholly on this intuition1 that1 in the next degree of knowledge which ,i call demonstrative1 this intuition is necessary in all the connexions of the intermediate ideas1 without which we cannot attain knowledge and certainty4 #b4 ,,ii4 ,demonstrative4 ,the next degree of knowledge is1 where the mind perceives the agreement or disagreement of any ideas1 but not immediately4 ,though wherever the mind perceives the agreement or disagreement of any of its ideas1 there be certain knowledge2 yet it does not always happen1 that the mind sees that agreement or disagreement1 which there is between them1 even where it is discoverable2 and in that case remains in ignorance1 and at most gets no further than a probable conjecture4 ,the reason why the mind cannot always perceive presently the agreement or disagreement of two ideas1 is1 because those ideas1 concerning whose agreement or disagreement the inquiry is made1 cannot by the mind be so put together as to show it4 ,in this case then1 when the mind cannot so bring its ideas together as by their immediate comparison1 and as it were juxta-position or application one to another1 to perceive their agreement or disagreement1 it is fain1 ,,by ,,the ,,intervention ,,of ,,other ,,ideas1 7one or more1 as it happens7 to discover the agreement or disagreement which it searches2 and this is that which we call ,,reasoning4 ,thus1 the mind being willing to know the agreement or disagreement in bigness between the three angles of a triangle and two right ones1 cannot by an immediate view and comparing them do it3 because the three angles of a triangle cannot be brought at once1 and be compared with any other one1 or two1 angles2 and so of this the mind has no immediate1 no intuitive knowledge4 ,in this case the mind is fain to find out some other angles1 to which the three angles of a triangle have an equality2 and1 finding those equal to two right ones1 comes to know their equality to two right ones4 #c4 ,demonstration depends on clearly perceived proofs4 ,those intervening ideas1 which serve to show the agreement of any two others1 are called ,,proofs2 and where the agreement and disagreement is by this means plainly and clearly perceived1 it is called ,,demonstration2 it being ,,shown to the understanding1 and the mind made to see that it is so4 ,a quickness in the mind to find out these intermediate ideas1 7that shall discover the agreement or disagreement of any other17 and to apply them right1 is1 ,i suppose1 that which is called ,,sagacity4 #d4 ,as certain1 but not so easy and ready as ,intuitive ,knowledge4 ,this knowledge1 by intervening proofs1 though it be certain1 yet the evidence of it is not altogether so clear and bright1 nor the assent so ready1 as in intuitive knowledge4 ,for1 though in demonstration the mind does at last perceive the agreement or disagreement of the ideas it considers2 yet it is not without pains and attention3 there must be more than one transient view to find it4 ,a steady application and pursuit are required to this discovery3 and there must be a progression by steps and degrees1 before the mind can in this way arrive at certainty1 and come to perceive the agreement or repugnancy between two ideas that need proofs and the use of reason to show it4 #e4 ,the demonstrated conclusion not without ,doubt1 precedent to the demonstration4 ,another difference between intuitive and demonstrative knowledge is1 that1 though in the latter all doubt be removed when1 by the intervention of the intermediate ideas1 the agreement or disagreement is perceived1 yet before the demonstration there was a doubt2 which in intuitive knowledge cannot happen to the mind that has its faculty of perception left to a degree capable of distinct ideas2 no more than it can be a doubt to the eye 7that can distinctly see white and black71 ,whether this ink and this paper be all of a colour4 ,if there be sight in the eyes1 it will1 at first glimpse1 without hesitation1 perceive the words printed on this paper different from the colour of the paper3 and so if the mind have the faculty of distinct perception1 it will perceive the agreement or disagreement of those ideas that produce intuitive knowledge4 ,if the eyes have lost the faculty of seeing1 or the mind of perceiving1 we in vain inquire after the quickness of sight in one1 or clearness of perception in the other4 #f4 ,not so clear as ,intuitive ,knowledge4 ,it is true1 the perception produced by demonstration is also very clear2 yet it is often with a great abatement of that evident lustre and full assurance that always accompany that which ,i call intuitive3 like a face reflected by several mirrors one to another1 where1 as long as it retains the similitude and agreement with the object1 it produces a knowledge2 but it is still1 in every successive reflection1 with a lessening of that perfect clearness and distinctness which is in the first2 till at last1 after many removes1 it has a great mixture of dimness1 and is not at first sight so knowable1 especially to weak eyes4 ,thus it is with knowledge made out by a long train of proof4 #g4 ,each ,step in ,demonstrated ,knowledge must have ,intuitive ,evidence4 ,now1 in every step reason makes in demonstrative knowledge1 there is an intuitive knowledge of that agreement or disagreement it seeks with the next intermediate idea which it uses as a proof3 for if it were not so1 that yet would need a proof2 since without the perception of such agreement or disagreement1 there is no knowledge produced3 if it be perceived by itself1 it is intuitive knowledge3 if it cannot be perceived by itself1 there is need of some intervening idea1 as a common measure1 to show their agreement or disagreement4 ,by which it is plain1 that every step in reasoning that produces knowledge1 has intuitive certainty2 which when the mind perceives1 there is no more required but to remember it1 to make the agreement or disagreement of the ideas concerning which we inquire visible and certain4 ,so that to make anything a demonstration1 it is necessary to perceive the immediate agreement of the intervening ideas1 whereby the agreement or disagreement of the two ideas under examination 7whereof the one is always the first1 and the other the last in the account7 is found4 ,this intuitive perception of the agreement or disagreement of the intermediate ideas1 in each step and progression of the demonstration1 must also be carried exactly in the mind1 and a man must be sure that no part is left out3 which1 because in long deductions1 and the use of many proofs1 the memory does not always so readily and exactly retain2 therefore it comes to pass1 that this is more imperfect than intuitive knowledge1 and men embrace often falsehood for demonstrations4 #h4 ,hence the ,mistake1 ex praecognitis1 et praeconcessis4 ,the necessity of this intuitive knowledge1 in each step of scientifical or demonstrative reasoning1 gave occasion1 ,i imagine1 to that mistaken axiom1 ,that all reasoning was ,,ex ,,praecognitis ,,et ,,praeconcessis3 which1 how far it is a mistake1 ,i shall have occasion to show more at large1 when ,i come to consider propositions1 and particularly those propositions which are called maxims1 and to show that it is by a mistake that they are supposed to be the foundations of all our knowledge and reasonings4 #i4 ,demonstration not limited to ideas of mathematical ,quantity4 ,it has been generally taken for granted1 that mathematics alone are capable of demonstrative certainty3 but to have such an agreement or disagreement as may intuitively be perceived1 being1 as ,i imagine1 not the privilege of the ideas of number1 extension1 and figure alone1 it may possibly be the want of due method and application in us1 and not of sufficient evidence in things1 that demonstration has been thought to have so little to do in other parts of knowledge1 and been scarce so much as aimed at by any but mathematicians4 ,for whatever ideas we have wherein the mind can perceive the immediate agreement or disagreement that is between them1 there the mind is capable of intuitive knowledge2 and where it can perceive the agreement or disagreement of any two ideas1 by an intuitive perception of the agreement or disagreement they have with any intermediate ideas1 there the mind is capable of demonstration3 which is not limited to ideas of extension1 figure1 number1 and their modes4 #aj4 ,why it has been thought to be so limited4 ,the reason why it has been generally sought for1 and supposed to be only in those1 ,i imagine has been1 not only the general usefulness of those sciences2 but because1 in comparing their equality or excess1 the modes of numbers have every the least difference very clear and perceivable3 and though in extension every the least excess is not so perceptible1 yet the mind has found out ways to examine1 and discover demonstratively1 the just equality of two angles1 or extensions1 or figures3 and both these1 i4 e4 numbers and figures1 can be set down by visible and lasting marks1 wherein the ideas under consideration are perfectly determined2 which for the most part they are not1 where they are marked only by names and words4 #aa4 ,modes of ,qualities not demonstrable like modes of ,quantity4 ,but in other simple ideas1 whose modes and differences are made and counted by degrees1 and not quantity1 we have not so nice and accurate a distinction of their differences as to perceive1 or find ways to measure1 their just equality1 or the least differences4 ,for those other simple ideas1 being appearances of sensations produced in us1 by the size1 figure1 number1 and motion of minute corpuscles singly insensible2 their different degrees also depend upon the variation of some or of all those causes3 which1 since it cannot be observed by us1 in particles of matter whereof each is too subtile to be perceived1 it is impossible for us to have any exact measures of the different degrees of these simple ideas4 ,for1 supposing the sensation or idea we name whiteness be produced in us by a certain number of globules1 which1 having a verticity about their own centres1 strike upon the retina of the eye1 with a certain degree of rotation1 as well as progressive swiftness2 it will hence easily follow1 that the more the superficial parts of any body are so ordered as to reflect the greater number of globules of light1 and to give them the proper rotation1 which is fit to produce this sensation of white in us1 the more white will that body appear1 that from an equal space sends to the retina the greater number of such corpuscles1 with that peculiar sort of motion4 ,i do not say that the nature of light consists in very small round globules2 nor of whiteness in such a texture of parts as gives a certain rotation to these globules when it reflects them3 for ,i am not now treating physically of light or colours4 ,but this ,i think ,i may say1 that ,i cannot 7and ,i would be glad any one would make intelligible that he did7 conceive how bodies without us can any ways affect our senses1 but by the immediate contact of the sensible bodies themselves1 as in tasting and feeling1 or the impulse of some sensible particles coming from them1 as in seeing1 hearing1 and smelling2 by the different impulse of which parts1 caused by their different size1 figure1 and motion1 the variety of sensations is produced in us4 #ab4 ,particles of light and simple ideas of colour4 ,whether then they be globules or no2 or whether they have a verticity about their own centres that produces the idea of whiteness in us2 this is certain1 that the more particles of light are reflected from a body1 fitted to give them that peculiar motion which produces the sensation of whiteness in us2 and possibly too1 the quicker that peculiar motion is1--the whiter does the body appear from which the greatest number are reflected1 as is evident in the same piece of paper put in the sunbeams1 in the shade1 and in a dark hole2 in each of which it will produce in us the idea of whiteness in far different degrees4 #ac4 ,the secondary ,qualities of things not discovered by ,demonstration4 ,not knowing1 therefore1 what number of particles1 nor what motion of them1 is fit to produce any precise degree of whiteness1 we cannot ,,demonstrate the certain equality of any two degrees of whiteness2 because we have no certain standard to measure them by1 nor means to distinguish every the least real difference1 the only help we have being from our senses1 which in this point fail us4 ,but where the difference is so great as to produce in the mind clearly distinct ideas1 whose differences can be perfectly retained1 there these ideas or colours1 as we see in different kinds1 as blue and red1 are as capable of demonstration as ideas of number and extension4 ,what ,i have here said of whiteness and colours1 ,i think holds true in all secondary qualities and their modes4 #ad4 ,,iii4 ,sensitive ,knowledge of the particular ,existence of finite beings without us4 ,these two1 viz4 intuition and demonstration1 are the degrees of our ,,knowledge2 whatever comes short of one of these1 with what assurance soever embraced1 is but ,,faith or ,,opinion1 but not knowledge1 at least in all general truths4 ,there is1 indeed1 another perception of the mind1 employed about ,,the ,,particular ,,existence ,,of ,,finite ,,beings ,,without ,,us1 which1 going beyond bare probability1 and yet not reaching perfectly to either of the foregoing degrees of certainty1 passes under the name of ,,knowledge4 ,there can be nothing more certain than that the idea we receive from an external object is in our minds3 this is intuitive knowledge4 ,but whether there be anything more than barely that idea in our minds2 whether we can thence certainly infer the existence of anything without us1 which corresponds to that idea1 is that whereof some men think there may be a question made2 because men may have such ideas in their minds1 when no such thing exists1 no such object affects their senses4 ,but yet here ,i think we are provided with an evidence that puts us past doubting4 ,for ,i ask any one1 ,whether he be not invincibly conscious to himself of a different perception1 when he looks on the sun by day1 and thinks on it by night2 when he actually tastes wormwood1 or smells a rose1 or only thinks on that savour or odour8 ,we as plainly find the difference there is between any idea revived in our minds by our own memory1 and actually coming into our minds by our senses1 as we do between any two distinct ideas4 ,if any one say1 a dream may do the same thing1 and all these ideas may be produced1 in us without any external objects2 he may please to dream that ,i make him this answer3--,i4 ,that it is no great matter1 whether ,i remove his scruple or no3 where all is but dream1 reasoning and arguments are of no use1 truth and knowledge nothing4 #b4 ,that ,i believe he will allow a very manifest difference between dreaming of being in the fire1 and being actually in it4 ,but yet if he be resolved to appear so sceptical as to maintain1 that what ,i call being actually in the fire is nothing but a dream2 and that we cannot thereby certainly know1 that any such thing as fire actually exists without us3 ,i answer1 ,that we certainly finding that pleasure or pain follows upon the application of certain objects to us1 whose existence we perceive1 or dream that we perceive1 by our senses2 this certainty is as great as our happiness or misery1 beyond which we have no concernment to know or to be4 ,so that1 ,i think1 we may add to the two former sorts of knowledge this also1 of the existence of particular external objects1 by that perception and consciousness we have of the actual entrance of ideas from them1 and allow these three degrees of knowledge1 viz4 ,,intuitive1 ,,demonstrative1 and ,,sensitive2 in each of which there are different degrees and ways of evidence and certainty4 #ae4 ,knowledge not always clear1 where the ,ideas that enter into it are clear4 ,but since our knowledge is founded on and employed about our ideas only1 will it not follow from thence that it is conformable to our ideas2 and that where our ideas are clear and distinct1 or obscure and confused1 our knowledge will be so too8 ,to which ,i answer1 ,no3 for our knowledge consisting in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of any two ideas1 its clearness or obscurity consists in the clearness or obscurity of that perception1 and not in the clearness or obscurity of the ideas themselves3 v4 g4 a man that has as clear ideas of the angles of a triangle1 and of equality to two right ones1 as any mathematician in the world1 may yet have but a very obscure perception of their ,,agreement1 and so have but a very obscure knowledge of it4 ,but ideas which1 by reason of their obscurity or otherwise1 are confused1 cannot produce any clear or distinct knowledge2 because1 as far as any ideas are confused1 so far the mind cannot perceive clearly whether they agree or disagree4 ,or to express the same thing in a way less apt to be misunderstood3 he that hath not determined ideas to the words he uses1 cannot make propositions of them of whose truth he can be certain4 ,,chapter ,,iii4 ,,of ,,the ,,extent ,,of ,,human ,,knowledge4 #a4 ,extent of our ,knowledge4 ,knowledge1 as has been said1 lying in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of any of our ideas1 it follows from hence1 ,that1 ,first1 it extends no further than we have ,ideas4 ,first1 we can have knowledge no further than we have ,,ideas4 #b4 ,secondly1 ,it extends no further than we can perceive their ,agreement or ,disagreement4 ,secondly1 ,that we can have no knowledge further than we can have ,,perception of that agreement or disagreement4 ,which perception being3 #a4 ,either by ,,intuition1 or the immediate comparing any two ideas2 or1 #b4 ,by ,,reason1 examining the agreement or disagreement of two ideas1 by the intervention of some others2 or1 #c4 ,by ,,sensation1 perceiving the existence of particular things3 hence it also follows3 #c4 ,thirdly1 ,intuitive ,knowledge extends itself not to all the relation of all our ,ideas4 ,thirdly1 ,that we cannot have an ,,intuitive ,,knowledge that shall extend itself to all our ideas1 and all that we would know about them2 because we cannot examine and perceive all the relations they have one to another1 by juxta-position1 or an immediate comparison one with another4 ,thus1 having the ideas of an obtuse and an acute angled triangle1 both drawn from equal bases1 and between parallels1 ,i can1 by intuitive knowledge1 perceive the one not to be the other1 but cannot that way know whether they be equal or no2 because their agreement or disagreement in equality can never be perceived by an immediate comparing them3 the difference of figure makes their parts incapable of an exact immediate application2 and therefore there is need of some intervening qualities to measure them by1 which is demonstration1 or rational knowledge4 #d4 ,fourthly1 ,nor does ,demonstrative ,knowledge4 ,fourthly1 ,it follows1 also1 from what is above observed1 that our ,,rational ,,knowledge cannot reach to the whole extent of our ideas3 because between two different ideas we would examine1 we cannot always find such mediums as we can connect one to another with an intuitive knowledge in all the parts of the deduction2 and wherever that fails1 we come short of knowledge and demonstration4 #e4 ,fifthly1 ,sensitive ,knowledge narrower than either4 ,fifthly1 ,,sensitive ,,knowledge reaching no further than the existence of things actually present to our senses1 is yet much narrower than either of the former4 #f4 ,sixthly1 ,our ,knowledge1 therefore narrower than our ,ideas4 ,sixthly1 ,from all which it is evident1 that the ,,extent ,,of ,,our ,,knowledge comes not only short of the reality of things1 but even of the extent of our own ideas4 ,though our knowledge be limited to our ideas1 and cannot exceed them either in extent or perfection2 and though these be very narrow bounds1 in respect of the extent of ,all-being1 and far short of what we may justly imagine to be in some even created understandings1 not tied down to the dull and narrow information that is to be received from some few1 and not very acute1 ways of perception1 such as are our senses2 yet it would be well with us if our knowledge were but as large as our ideas1 and there were not many doubts and inquiries ,,concerning ,,the ,,ideas ,,we ,,have1 whereof we are not1 nor ,i believe ever shall be in this world resolved4 ,nevertheless1 ,i do not question but that human knowledge1 under the present circumstances of our beings and constitutions1 may be carried much further than it has hitherto been1 if men would sincerely1 and with freedom of mind1 employ all that industry and labour of thought1 in improving the means of discovering truth1 which they do for the colouring or support of falsehood1 to maintain a system1 interest1 or party they are once engaged in4 ,but yet after all1 ,i think ,i may1 without injury to human perfection1 be confident1 that our knowledge would never reach to all we might desire to know concerning those ideas we have2 nor be able to surmount all the difficulties1 and resolve all the questions that might arise concerning any of them4 ,we have the ideas of a ,,square1 a ,,circle1 and ,,equality2 and yet1 perhaps1 shall never be able to find a circle equal to a square1 and certainly know that it is so4 ,we have the ideas of ,,matter and ,,thinking1 but possibly shall never be able to know whether any mere material being thinks or no2 it being impossible for us1 by the contemplation of our own ideas1 without revelation1 to discover whether ,omnipotency has not given to some systems of matter1 fitly disposed1 a power to perceive and think1 or else joined and fixed to matter1 so disposed1 a thinking immaterial substance3 it being1 in respect of our notions1 not much more remote from our comprehension to conceive that ,,god can1 if he pleases1 superadd to matter ,a ,,faculty ,,of ,,thinking1 than that he should superadd to it ,,another ,,substance ,,with ,a ,,faculty ,,of ,,thinking2 since we know not wherein thinking consists1 nor to what sort of substances the ,almighty has been pleased to give that power1 which cannot be in any created being1 but merely by the good pleasure and bounty of the ,creator4 ,for ,i see no contradiction in it1 that the first ,eternal thinking ,being1 or ,omnipotent ,spirit1 should1 if he pleased1 give to certain systems of created senseless matter1 put together as he thinks fit1 some degrees of sense1 perception1 and thought3 though1 as ,i think ,i have proved1 lib4 iv4 ch4 #aj1 ,section #ad1 c41 it is no less than a contradiction to suppose matter 7which is evidently in its own nature void of sense and thought7 should be that ,eternal first-thinking ,being4 ,what certainty of knowledge can any one have1 that some perceptions1 such as1 v4 g41 pleasure and pain1 should not be in some bodies themselves1 after a certain manner modified and moved1 as well as that they should be in an immaterial substance1 upon the motion of the parts of body3 ,body1 as far as we can conceive1 being able only to strike and affect body1 and motion1 according to the utmost reach of our ideas1 being able to produce nothing but motion2 so that when we allow it to produce pleasure or pain1 or the idea of a colour or sound1 we are fain to quit our reason1 go beyond our ideas1 and attribute it wholly to the good pleasure of our ,maker4 ,for1 since we must allow ,he has annexed effects to motion which we can no way conceive motion able to produce1 what reason have we to conclude that ,he could not order them as well to be produced in a subject we cannot conceive capable of them1 as well as in a subject we cannot conceive the motion of matter can any way operate upon8 ,i say not this1 that ,i would any way lessen the belief of the soul's immateriality3 ,i am not here speaking of probability1 but knowledge1 and ,i think not only that it becomes the modesty of philosophy not to pronounce magisterially1 where we want that evidence that can produce knowledge2 but also1 that it is of use to us to discern how far our knowledge does reach2 for the state we are at present in1 not being that of vision1 we must in many things content ourselves with faith and probability3 and in the present question1 about the ,immateriality of the ,soul1 if our faculties cannot arrive at demonstrative certainty1 we need not think it strange4 ,all the great ends of morality and religion are well enough secured1 without philosophical proofs of the soul's immateriality2 since it is evident1 that he who made us at the beginning to subsist here1 sensible intelligent beings1 and for several years continued us in such a state1 can and will restore us to the like state of sensibility in another world1 and make us capable there to receive the retribution he has designed to men1 according to their doings in this life4 ,and therefore it is not of such mighty necessity to determine one way or the other1 as some1 over-zealous for or against the immateriality of the soul1 have been forward to make the world believe4 ,who1 either on the one side1 indulging too much their thoughts immersed altogether in matter1 can allow no existence to what is not material3 or who1 on the other side1 finding not ,,cogitation within the natural powers of matter1 examined over and over again by the utmost intention of mind1 have the confidence to conclude--,that ,omnipotency itself cannot give perception and thought to a substance which has the modification of solidity4 ,he that considers how hardly sensation is1 in our thoughts1 reconcilable to extended matter2 or existence to anything that has no extension at all1 will confess that he is very far from certainly knowing what his soul is4 ,it is a point which seems to me to be put out of the reach of our knowledge3 and he who will give himself leave to consider freely1 and look into the dark and intricate part of each hypothesis1 will scarce find his reason able to determine him fixedly for or against the soul's materiality4 ,since1 on which side soever he views it1 either as an ,,unextended ,,substance1 or as a ,,thinking ,,extended ,,matter1 the difficulty to conceive either will1 whilst either alone is in his thoughts1 still drive him to the contrary side4 ,an unfair way which some men take with themselves3 who1 because of the inconceivableness of something they find in one1 throw themselves violently into the contrary hypothesis1 though altogether as unintelligible to an unbiassed understanding4 ,this serves not only to show the weakness and the scantiness of our knowledge1 but the insignificant triumph of such sort of arguments2 which1 drawn from our own views1 may satisfy us that we can find no certainty on one side of the question3 but do not at all thereby help us to truth by running into the opposite opinion2 which1 on examination1 will be found clogged with equal difficulties4 ,for what safety1 what advantage to any one is it1 for the avoiding the seeming absurdities1 and to him unsurmountable rubs1 he meets with in one opinion1 to take refuge in the contrary1 which is built on something altogether as inexplicable1 and as far remote from his comprehension8 ,it is past controversy1 that we have in us ,,something that thinks2 our very doubts about what it is1 confirm the certainty of its being1 though we must content ourselves in the ignorance of what ,,kind of being it is3 and it is in vain to go about to be sceptical in this1 as it is unreasonable in most other cases to be positive against the being of anything1 because we cannot comprehend its nature4 ,for ,i would fain know what substance exists1 that has not something in it which manifestly baffles our understandings4 ,other spirits1 who see and know the nature and inward constitution of things1 how much must they exceed us in knowledge8 ,to which1 if we add larger comprehension1 which enables them at one glance to see the connexion and agreement of very many ideas1 and readily supplies to them the intermediate proofs1 which we by single and slow steps1 and long poring in the dark1 hardly at last find out1 and are often ready to forget one before we have hunted out another2 we may guess at some part of the happiness of superior ranks of spirits1 who have a quicker and more penetrating sight1 as well as a larger field of knowledge4 ,but to return to the argument in hand3 our knowledge1 ,i say1 is not only limited to the paucity and imperfections of the ideas we have1 and which we employ it about1 but even comes short of that too3 but how far it reaches1 let us now inquire4 #g4 ,how far our ,knowledge reaches4 ,the affirmations or negations we make concerning the ideas we have1 may1 as ,i have before intimated in general1 be reduced to these four sorts1 viz4 identity1 co-existence1 relation1 and real existence4 ,i shall examine how far our knowledge extends in each of these3 #h4 ,firstly1 ,our ,knowledge of ,identity and ,diversity in ideas extends as far as our ,ideas themselves4 ,,first1 as to ,,identity and ,,diversity4 ,in this way of agreement or disagreement of our ideas1 our intuitive knowledge is as far extended as our ideas themselves3 and there can be no idea in the mind1 which it does not1 presently1 by an intuitive knowledge1 perceive to be what it is1 and to be different from any other4 #i4 ,secondly1 ,of their ,co-existence1 extends only a very little way4 ,,secondly1 as to the second sort1 which is the agreement or disagreement of our ideas in ,,co-,,existence1 in this our knowledge is very short2 though in this consists the greatest and most material part of our knowledge concerning substances4 ,for our ideas of the species of substances being1 as ,i have showed1 nothing but certain collections of simple ideas united in one subject1 and so co-existing together2 v4g4 our idea of flame is a body hot1 luminous1 and moving upward2 of gold1 a body heavy to a certain degree1 yellow1 malleable1 and fusible3 for these1 or some such complex ideas as these1 in men's minds1 do these two names of the different substances1 flame and gold1 stand for4 ,when we would know anything further concerning these1 or any other sort of substances1 what do we inquire1 but what ,,other qualities or powers these substances have or have not8 ,which is nothing else but to know what ,,other simple ideas do1 or do not co-exist with those that make up that complex idea8 #aj4 ,because the ,connexion between simple ,ideas in substances is for the most part unknown4 ,this1 how weighty and considerable a part soever of human science1 is yet very narrow1 and scarce any at all4 ,the reason whereof is1 that the simple ideas whereof our complex ideas of substances are made up are1 for the most part1 such as carry with them1 in their own nature1 no ,,visible ,,necessary connexion or inconsistency with any other simple ideas1 whose co-existence with them we would inform ourselves about4 #aa4 ,especially of the secondary ,qualities of ,bodies4 ,the ideas that our complex ones of substances are made up of1 and about which our knowledge concerning substances is most employed1 are those of their secondary qualities2 which depending all 7as has been shown7 upon the primary qualities of their minute and insensible parts2 or1 if not upon them1 upon something yet more remote from our comprehension2 it is impossible we should know which have a ,,necessary union or inconsistency one with another4 ,for1 not knowing the root they spring from1 not knowing what size1 figure1 and texture of parts they are1 on which depend1 and from which result those qualities which make our complex idea of gold1 it is impossible we should know what ,,other qualities result from1 or are incompatible with1 the same constitution of the insensible parts of gold2 and so consequently must always co-exist with that complex idea we have of it1 or else are inconsistent with it4 #ab4 ,because necessary ,connexion between any secondary and the primary ,qualities is undiscoverable by us4 ,besides this ignorance of the primary qualities of the insensible parts of bodies1 on which depend all their secondary qualities1 there is yet another and more incurable part of ignorance1 which sets us more remote from a certain knowledge of the co-existence or ,,inco-,,existence 7if ,i may so say7 of different ideas in the same subject2 and that is1 that there is no discoverable connexion between any secondary quality and those primary qualities which it depends on4 #ac4 ,we have no perfect knowledge of their ,primary ,qualities4 ,that the size1 figure1 and motion of one body should cause a change in the size1 figure1 and motion of another body1 is not beyond our conception2 the separation of the parts of one body upon the intrusion of another2 and the change from rest to motion upon impulse2 these and the like seem to have ,,some ,,connexion one with another4 ,and if we knew these primary qualities of bodies1 we might have reason to hope we might be able to know a great deal more of these operations of them one upon another3 but our minds not being able to discover any connexion betwixt these primary qualities of bodies and the sensations that are produced in us by them1 we can never be able to establish certain and undoubted rules of the ,,consequence or ,,co-,,existence of any secondary qualities1 though we could discover the size1 figure1 or motion of those invisible parts which immediately produce them4 ,we are so far from knowing ,,what figure1 size1 or motion of parts produce a yellow colour1 a sweet taste1 or a sharp sound1 that we can by no means conceive how ,,any size1 figure1 or motion of any particles1 can possibly produce in us the idea of any colour1 taste1 or sound whatsoever3 there is no conceivable connexion between the one and the other4 #ad4 ,and seek in vain for certain and universal knowledge of unperceived qualities in substances4 ,in vain1 therefore1 shall we endeavour to discover by our ideas 7the only true way of certain and universal knowledge7 what other ideas are to be found constantly joined with that of ,,our complex idea of any substance3 since we neither know the real constitution of the minute parts on which their qualities do depend2 nor1 did we know them1 could we discover any necessary connexion between them and any of the secondary qualities3 which is necessary to be done before we can certainly know their necessary co-existence4 ,so1 that1 let our complex idea of any species of substances be what it will1 we can hardly1 from the simple ideas contained in it1 certainly determine the necessary co-existence of any other quality whatsoever4 ,our knowledge in all these inquiries reaches very little further than our experience4 ,indeed some few of the primary qualities have a necessary dependence and visible connexion one with another1 as figure necessarily supposes extension2 receiving or communicating motion by impulse1 supposes solidity4 ,but though these1 and perhaps some others of our ideas have3 yet there are so few of them that have a visible connexion one with another1 that we can by intuition or demonstration discover the co-existence of very few of the qualities that are to be found united in substances3 and we are left only to the assistance of our senses to make known to us what qualities they contain4 ,for of all the qualities that are co-existent in any subject1 without this dependence and evident connexion of their ideas one with another1 we cannot know certainly any two to co-exist1 any further than experience1 by our senses1 informs us4 ,thus1 though we see the yellow colour1 and1 upon trial1 find the weight1 malleableness1 fusibility1 and fixedness that are united in a piece of gold2 yet1 because no one of these ideas has any evident dependence or necessary connexion with the other1 we cannot certainly know that where any four of these are1 the fifth will be there also1 how highly probable soever it may be2 because the highest probability amounts not to certainty1 without which there can be no true knowledge4 ,for this co-existence can be no further known than it is perceived2 and it cannot be perceived but either in particular subjects1 by the observation of our senses1 or1 in general1 by the necessary connexion of the ideas themselves4 #ae4 ,of ,repugnancy to co-exist1 our knowledge is larger4 ,as to the incompatibility or repugnancy to co-existence1 we may know that any subject may have of each sort of primary qualities but one particular at once3 v4g4 each particular extension1 figure1 number of parts1 motion1 excludes all other of each kind4 ,the like also is certain of all sensible ideas peculiar to each sense2 for whatever of each kind is present in any subject1 excludes all other of that sort3 v4g4 no one subject can have two smells or two colours at the same time4 ,to this1 perhaps will be said1 ,has not an opal1 or the infusion of ,,lignum ,,nephriticum1 two colours at the same time8 ,to which ,i answer1 that these bodies1 to eyes differently1 placed1 may at the same time afford different colours3 but ,i take liberty also to say1 that1 to eyes differently placed1 it is different parts of the object that reflect the particles of light3 and therefore it is not the same part of the object1 and so not the very same subject1 which at the same time appears both yellow and azure4 ,for1 it is as impossible that the very same particle of any body should at the same time differently modify or reflect the rays of light1 as that it should have two different figures and textures at the same time4 #af4 ,our ,knowledge of the ,co-existence of ,power in ,bodies extends but a very little ,way4 ,but as to the powers of substances to change the sensible qualities of other bodies1 which make a great part of our inquiries about them1 and is no inconsiderable branch of our knowledge2 ,i doubt as to these1 whether our knowledge reaches much further than our experience2 or whether we can come to the discovery of most of these powers1 and be certain that they are in any subject1 by the connexion with any of those ideas which to us make its essence4 ,because the active and passive powers of bodies1 and their ways of operating1 consisting in a texture and motion of parts which we cannot by any means come to discover2 it is but in very few cases we can be able to perceive their dependence on1 or repugnance to1 any of those ideas which make our complex one of that sort of things4 ,i have here instanced in the corpuscularian hypothesis1 as that which is thought to go furthest in an intelligible explication of those qualities of bodies2 and ,i fear the weakness of human understanding is scarce able to substitute another1 which will afford us a fuller and clearer discovery of the necessary connexion and co-existence of the powers which are to be observed united in several sorts of them4 ,this at least is certain1 that1 whichever hypothesis be clearest and truest1 7for of that it is not my business to determine17 our knowledge concerning corporeal substances will be very little advanced by any of them1 till we are made to see what qualities and powers of bodies have a ,,necessary connexion or repugnancy one with another2 which in the present state of philosophy ,i think we know but to a very small degree3 and ,i doubt whether1 with those faculties we have1 we shall ever be able to carry our general knowledge 7,i say not particular experience7 in this part much further4 ,experience is that which in this part we must depend on4 ,and it were to be wished that it were more improved4 ,we find the advantages some men's generous pains have this way brought to the stock of natural knowledge4 ,and if others1 especially the philosophers by fire1 who pretend to it1 had been so wary in their observations1 and sincere in their reports as those who call themselves philosophers ought to have been1 our acquaintance with the bodies here about us1 and our insight into their powers and operations had been yet much greater4 #ag4 ,of the ,powers that co-exist in ,spirits yet narrower4 ,if we are at a loss in respect of the powers and operations of bodies1 ,i think it is easy to conclude we are much more in the dark in reference to spirits2 whereof we naturally have no ideas but what we draw from that of our own1 by reflecting on the operations of our own souls within us1 as far as they can come within our observation4 ,but how inconsiderable a rank the spirits that inhabit our bodies hold amongst those various and possibly innumerable kinds of nobler beings2 and how far short they come of the endowments and perfections of cherubim and seraphim1 and infinite sorts of spirits above us1 is what by a transient hint in another place ,i have offered to my reader's consideration4 #ah4 ,thirdly1 ,of ,relations between abstracted ideas it is not easy to say how far our knowledge extends4 ,,thirdly1 ,as to the third sort of our knowledge1 viz4 the agreement or disagreement of any of our ideas in any other relation3 this1 as it is the largest field of our knowledge1 so it is hard to determine how far it may extend3 because the advances that are made in this part of knowledge1 depending on our sagacity in finding intermediate ideas1 that may show the relations and habitudes of ideas whose co-existence is not considered1 it is a hard matter to tell when we are at an end of such discoveries2 and when reason has all the helps it is capable of1 for the finding of proofs1 or examining the agreement or disagreement of remote ideas4 ,they that are ignorant of ,algebra cannot imagine the wonders in this kind are to be done by it3 and what further improvements and helps advantageous to other parts of knowledge the sagacious mind of man may yet find out1 it is not easy to determine4 ,this at least ,i believe1 that the ,,ideas ,,of ,,quantity are not those alone that are capable of demonstration and knowledge2 and that other1 and perhaps more useful1 parts of contemplation1 would afford us certainty1 if vices1 passions1 and domineering interest did not oppose or menace such endeavours4 ,morality capable of ,demonstration ,the idea of a supreme ,being1 infinite in power1 goodness1 and wisdom1 whose workmanship we are1 and on whom we depend2 and the idea of ourselves1 as understanding1 rational creatures1 being such as are clear in us1 would1 ,i suppose1 if duly considered and pursued1 afford such foundations of our duty and rules of action as might place ,,morality amongst the ,,sciences ,,capable ,,of ,,demonstration3 wherein ,i doubt not but from self-evident propositions1 by necessary consequences1 as incontestible as those in mathematics1 the measures of right and wrong might be made out1 to any one that will apply himself with the same indifferency and attention to the one as he does to the other of these sciences4 ,the ,,relation of other ,,modes may certainly be perceived1 as well as those of number and extension3 and ,i cannot see why they should not also be capable of demonstration1 if due methods were thought on to examine or pursue their agreement or disagreement4 ',where there is no property there is no injustice1' is a proposition as certain as any demonstration in ,euclid3 for the idea of property being a right to anything1 and the idea of which the name 'injustice' is given being the invasion or violation of that right1 it is evident that these ideas1 being thus established1 and these names annexed to them1 ,i can as certainly know this proposition to be true1 as that a triangle has three angles equal to two right ones4 ,again3 ',no government allows absolute liberty4' ,the idea of government being the establishment of society upon certain rules or laws which require conformity to them2 and the idea of absolute liberty being for any one to do whatever he pleases2 ,i am as capable of being certain of the truth of this proposition as of any in the mathematics4 #ai4 ,two things have made moral ,ideas to be thought incapable of ,demonstration3 their unfitness for sensible representation1 and their complexedness4 ,that which in this respect has given the advantage to the ideas of quantity1 and made them thought more capable of certainty and demonstration1 is1 ,first1 ,that they can be set down and represented by sensible marks1 which have a greater and nearer correspondence with them than any words or sounds whatsoever4 ,diagrams drawn on paper are copies of the ideas in the mind1 and not liable to the uncertainty that words carry in their signification4 ,an angle1 circle1 or square1 drawn in lines1 lies open to the view1 and cannot be mistaken3 it remains unchangeable1 and may at leisure be considered and examined1 and the demonstration be revised1 and all the parts of it may be gone over more than once1 without any danger of the least change in the ideas4 ,this cannot be thus done in moral ideas3 we have no sensible marks that resemble them1 whereby we can set them down2 we have nothing but words to express them by2 which1 though when written they remain the same1 yet the ideas they stand for may change in the same man2 and it is very seldom that they are not different in different persons4 ,secondly1 ,another thing that makes the greater difficulty in ethics is1 ,that moral ideas are commonly more complex than those of the figures ordinarily considered in mathematics4 ,from whence these two inconveniences follow3--,first1 that their names are of more uncertain signification1 the precise collection of simple ideas they stand for not being so easily agreed on2 and so the sign that is used for them in communication always1 and in thinking often1 does not steadily carry with it the same idea4 ,upon which the same disorder1 confusion1 and error follow1 as would if a man1 going to demonstrate something of an heptagon1 should1 in the diagram he took to do it1 leave out one of the angles1 or by oversight make the figure with one angle more than the name ordinarily imported1 or he intended it should when at first he thought of his demonstration4 ,this often happens1 and is hardly avoidable in very complex moral ideas1 where the same name being retained1 one angle1 i4e4 one simple idea1 is left out1 or put in the complex one 7still called by the same name7 more at one time than another4 ,secondly1 ,from the complexedness of these moral ideas there follows another inconvenience1 viz4 that the mind cannot easily retain those precise combinations so exactly and perfectly as is necessary in the examination of the habitudes and correspondences1 agreements or disagreements1 of several of them one with another2 especially where it is to be judged of by long deductions1 and the intervention of several other complex ideas to show the agreement or disagreement of two remote ones4 ,the great help against this which mathematicians find in diagrams and figures1 which remain unalterable in their draughts1 is very apparent1 and the memory would often have great difficulty otherwise to retain them so exactly1 whilst the mind went over the parts of them step by step to examine their several correspondences4 ,and though in casting up a long sum either in addition1 multiplication1 or division1 every part be only a progression of the mind taking a view of its own ideas1 and considering their agreement or disagreement1 and the resolution of the question be nothing but the result of the whole1 made up of such particulars1 whereof the mind has a clear perception3 yet1 without setting down the several parts by marks1 whose precise significations are known1 and by marks that last1 and remain in view when the memory had let them go1 it would be almost impossible to carry so many different ideas in the mind1 without confounding or letting slip some parts of the reckoning1 and thereby making all our reasonings about it useless4 ,in which case the cyphers or marks help not the mind at all to perceive the agreement of any two or more numbers1 their equalities or proportions2 that the mind has only by intuition of its own ideas of the numbers themselves4 ,but the numerical characters are helps to the memory1 to record and retain the several ideas about which the demonstration is made1 whereby a man may know how far his intuitive knowledge in surveying several of the particulars has proceeded2 that so he may without confusion go on to what is yet unknown2 and at last have in one view before him the result of all his perceptions and reasonings4 #bj4 ,remedies of our ,difficulties in dealing demonstratively with moral ideas4 ,one part of these disadvantages in moral ideas which has made them be thought not capable of demonstration1 may in a good measure be remedied by definitions1 setting down that collection of simple ideas1 which every term shall stand for2 and then using the terms steadily and constantly for that precise collection4 ,and what methods algebra1 or something of that kind1 may hereafter suggest1 to remove the other difficulties1 it is not easy to foretell4 ,confident ,i am1 that1 if men would in the same method1 and with the same indifferency1 search after moral as they do mathematical truths1 they would find them have a stronger connexion one with another1 and a more necessary consequence from our clear and distinct ideas1 and to come nearer perfect demonstration than is commonly imagined4 ,but much of this is not to be expected1 whilst the desire of esteem1 riches1 or power makes men espouse the well-endowed opinions in fashion1 and then seek arguments either to make good their beauty1 or varnish over and cover their deformity4 ,nothing being so beautiful to the eye as truth is to the mind2 nothing so deformed and irreconcilable to the understanding as a lie4 ,for though many a man can with satisfaction enough own a no very handsome wife in his bosom2 yet who is bold enough openly to avow that he has espoused a falsehood1 and received into his breast so ugly a thing as a lie8 ,whilst the parties of men cram their tenets down all men's throats whom they can get into their power1 without permitting them to examine their truth or falsehood2 and will not let truth have fair play in the world1 nor men the liberty to search after it2 what improvements can be expected of this kind8 ,what greater light can be hoped for in the moral sciences8 ,the subject part of mankind in most places might1 instead thereof1 with ,egyptian bondage1 expect ,egyptian darkness1 were not the candle of the ,lord set up by himself in men's minds1 which it is impossible for the breath or power of man wholly to extinguish4 #ba4 ,fourthly1 ,of the three real ,existences of which we have certain knowledge4 ,,fourthly1 ,as to the fourth sort of our knowledge1 viz4 of the ,,real ,,actual ,,existence ,,of ,,things1 we have an intuitive knowledge of ,,our ,,own ,,existence1 and a demonstrative knowledge of the existence of a ,,god3 of the existence of ,,anything ,,else1 we have no other but a sensitive knowledge2 which extends not beyond the objects present to our senses4 #bb4 ,our ,ignorance great4 ,our knowledge being so narrow1 as ,i have shown1 it will perhaps give us some light into the present state of our minds if we look a little into the dark side1 and take a view of ,,our ,,ignorance2 which1 being infinitely larger than our knowledge1 may serve much to the quieting of disputes1 and improvement of useful knowledge2 if1 discovering how far we have clear and distinct ideas1 we confine our thoughts within the contemplation of those things that are within the reach of our understandings1 and launch not out into that abyss of darkness1 7where we have not eyes to see1 nor faculties to perceive anything71 out of a presumption that nothing is beyond our comprehension4 ,but to be satisfied of the folly of such a conceit1 we need not go far4 ,he that knows anything1 knows this1 in the first place1 that he need not seek long for instances of his ignorance4 ,the meanest and most obvious things that come in our way have dark sides1 that the quickest sight cannot penetrate into4 ,the clearest and most enlarged understandings of thinking men find themselves puzzled and at a loss in every particle of matter4 ,we shall the less wonder to find it so1 when we consider the ,,causes ,,of ,,our ,,ignorance2 which1 from what has been said1 ,i suppose will be found to be these three3-- ,first1 ,want of ideas4 ,its causes4 ,secondly1 ,want of a discoverable connexion between the ideas we have4 ,thirdly1 ,want of tracing and examining our ideas4 #bc4 ,first1 ,one ,cause of our ignorance ,want of ,ideas4 ,i4 ,want of simple ideas that other creatures in other parts of the universe may have4 ,,first1 ,there are some things1 and those not a few1 that we are ignorant of1 for want of ideas4 ,first1 all the simple ideas we have are confined 7as ,i have shown7 to those we receive from corporeal objects by sensation1 and from the operations of our own minds as the objects of reflection4 ,but how much these few and narrow inlets are disproportionate to the vast whole extent of all beings1 will not be hard to persuade those who are not so foolish as to think their span the measure of all things4 ,what other simple ideas it is possible the creatures in other parts of the universe may have1 by the assistance of senses and faculties more or perfecter than we have1 or different from ours1 it is not for us to determine4 ,but to say or think there are no such1 because we conceive nothing of them1 is no better an argument than if a blind man should be positive in it1 that there was no such thing as sight and colours1 because he had no manner of idea of any such thing1 nor could by any means frame to himself any notions about seeing4 ,the ignorance and darkness that is in us no more hinders nor confines the knowledge that is in others1 than the blindness of a mole is an argument against the quicksightedness of an eagle4 ,he that will consider the infinite power1 wisdom1 and goodness of the ,creator of all things will find reason to think it was not all laid out upon so inconsiderable1 mean1 and impotent a creature as he will find man to be2 who in all probability is one of the lowest of all intellectual beings4 ,what faculties1 therefore1 other species of creatures have to penetrate into the nature and inmost constitutions of things2 what ideas they may receive of them far different from ours1 we know not4 ,this we know and certainly find1 that we want several other views of them besides those we have1 to make discoveries of them more perfect4 ,and we may be convinced that the ideas we can attain to by our faculties are very disproportionate to things themselves1 when a positive1 clear1 distinct one of substance itself1 which is the foundation of all the rest1 is concealed from us4 ,but want of ideas of this kind1 being a part as well as cause of our ignorance1 cannot be described4 ,only this ,i think ,i may confidently say of it1 ,that the intellectual and sensible world are in this perfectly alike3 that that part which we see of either of them holds no proportion with what we see not2 and whatsoever we can reach with our eyes or our thoughts of either of them is but a point1 almost nothing in comparison of the the rest4 #bd4 ,want of simple ideas that men are capable of having1 but having not17#a7 ,because their remoteness1 or1 ,secondly1 ,another great cause of ignorance is the want of ideas we are capable of4 ,as the want of ideas which our faculties are not able to give us shuts us wholly from those views of things which it is reasonable to think other beings1 perfecter than we1 have1 of which we know nothing2 so the want of ideas ,i now speak of keeps us in ignorance of things we conceive capable of being known to us4 ,bulk1 figure1 and motion we have ideas of4 ,but though we are not without ideas of these primary qualities of bodies in general1 yet not knowing what is the particular bulk1 figure1 and motion1 of the greatest part of the bodies of the universe1 we are ignorant of the several powers1 efficacies1 and ways of operation1 whereby the effects which we daily see are produced4 ,these are hid from us1 in some things by being too remote1 and in others by being too minute4 ,when we consider the vast distance of the known and visible parts of the world1 and the reasons we have to think that what lies within our ken is but a small part of the universe1 we shall then discover a huge abyss of ignorance4 ,what are the particular fabrics of the great masses of matter which make up the whole stupendous frame of corporeal beings2 how far they are extended2 what is their motion1 and how continued or communicated2 and what influence they have one upon another1 are contemplations that at first glimpse our thoughts lose themselves in4 ,if we narrow our contemplations1 and confine our thoughts to this little canton--,i mean this system of our sun1 and the grosser masses of matter that visibly move about it1 ,what several sorts of vegetables1 animals1 and intellectual corporeal beings1 infinitely different from those of our little spot of earth1 may there probably be in the other planets1 to the knowledge of which1 even of their outward figures and parts1 we can no way attain whilst we are confined to this earth2 there being no natural means1 either by sensation or reflection1 to convey their certain ideas into our minds8 ,they are out of the reach of those inlets of all our knowledge3 and what sorts of furniture and inhabitants those mansions contain in them we cannot so much as guess1 much less have clear and distinct ideas of them4 #be4 7#b7 ,because of their ,minuteness4 ,if a great1 nay1 far the greatest part of the several ranks of bodies in the universe escape our notice by their remoteness1 there are others that are no less concealed from us by their minuteness4 ,these ,,insensible ,,corpuscles1 being the active parts of matter1 and the great instruments of nature1 on which depend not only all their secondary qualities1 but also most of their natural operations1 our want of precise distinct ideas of their primary qualities keeps us in an incurable ignorance of what we desire to know about them4 ,i doubt not but if we could discover the figure1 size1 texture1 and motion of the minute constituent parts of any two bodies1 we should know without trial several of their operations one upon another2 as we do now the properties of a square or a triangle4 ,did we know the mechanical affections of the particles of rhubarb1 hemlock1 opium1 and a man1 as a watchmaker does those of a watch1 whereby it performs its operations2 and of a file1 which by rubbing on them will alter the figure of any of the wheels2 we should be able to tell beforehand that rhubarb will purge1 hemlock kill1 and opium make a man sleep3 as well as a watchmaker can1 that a little piece of paper laid on the balance will keep the watch from going till it be removed2 or that1 some small part of it being rubbed by a file1 the machine would quite lose its motion1 and the watch go no more4 ,the dissolving of silver in ,,aqua ,,fortis1 and gold in ,,aqua ,,regia1 and not ,,vice ,,versa1 would be then perhaps no more difficult to know than it is to a smith to understand why the turning of one key will open a lock1 and not the turning of another4 ,but whilst we are destitute of senses acute enough to discover the minute particles of bodies1 and to give us ideas of their mechanical affections1 we must be content to be ignorant of their properties and ways of operation2 nor can we be assured about them any further than some few trials we make are able to reach4 ,but whether they will succeed again another time1 we cannot be certain4 ,this hinders our certain knowledge of universal truths concerning natural bodies3 and our reason carries us herein very little beyond particular matter of fact4 #bf4 ,hence no ,science of ,bodies within our reach4 ,and therefore ,i am apt to doubt that1 how far soever human industry may advance useful and experimental philosophy in physical things1 ,,scientifical will still be out of our reach3 because we want perfect and adequate ideas of those very bodies which are nearest to us1 and most under our command4 ,those which we have ranked into classes under names1 and we think ourselves best acquainted with1 we have but very imperfect and incomplete ideas of4 ,distinct ideas of the several sorts of bodies that fall under the examination of our senses perhaps we may have3 but adequate ideas1 ,i suspect1 we have not of any one amongst them4 ,and though the former of these will serve us for common use and discourse1 yet whilst we want the latter1 we are not capable of scientifical knowledge2 nor shall ever be able to discover general1 instructive1 unquestionable truths concerning them4 ,,certainty and ,,demonstration are things we must not1 in these matters1 pretend to4 ,by the colour1 figure1 taste1 and smell1 and other sensible qualities1 we have as clear and distinct ideas of sage and hemlock1 as we have of a circle and a triangle3 but having no ideas of the particular primary qualities of the minute parts of either of these plants1 nor of other bodies which we would apply them to1 we cannot tell what effects they will produce2 nor when we see those effects can we so much as guess1 much less know1 their manner of production4 ,thus1 having no ideas of the particular mechanical affections of the minute parts of bodies that are within our view and reach1 we are ignorant of their constitutions1 powers1 and operations3 and of bodies more remote we are yet more ignorant1 not knowing so much as their very outward shapes1 or the sensible and grosser parts of their constitutions4 #bg4 ,much less a science of unembodied ,spirits4 ,this at first will show us how disproportionate our knowledge is to the whole extent even of material beings2 to which if we add the consideration of that infinite number of spirits that may be1 and probably are1 which are yet more remote from our knowledge1 whereof we have no cognizance1 nor can frame to ourselves any distinct ideas of their several ranks and sorts1 we shall find this cause of ignorance conceal from us1 in an impenetrable obscurity1 almost the whole intellectual world2 a greater certainly1 and more beautiful world than the material4 ,for1 bating some very few1 and those1 if ,i may so call them1 superficial ideas of spirit1 which by reflection we get of our own1 and from thence the best we can collect of the ,father of all spirits1 the eternal independent ,author of them1 and us1 and all things1 we have no certain information1 so much as of the existence of other spirits1 but by revelation4 ,angels of all sorts are naturally beyond our discovery2 and all those intelligences1 whereof it is likely there are more orders than of corporeal substances1 are things whereof our natural faculties give us no certain account at all4 ,that there are minds and thinking beings in other men as well as himself1 every man has a reason1 from their words and actions1 to be satisfied3 and the knowledge of his own mind cannot suffer a man that considers1 to be ignorant that there is a ,god4 ,but that there are degrees of spiritual beings between us and the great ,god1 who is there1 that1 by his own search and ability1 can come to know8 ,much less have we distinct ideas of their different natures1 conditions1 states1 powers1 and several constitutions wherein they agree or differ from one another and from us4 ,and1 therefore1 in what concerns their different species and properties we are in absolute ignorance4 #bh4 ,secondly1 ,another cause1 ,want of a discoverable ,connexion between ,ideas we have4 ,,secondly1 ,what a small part of the substantial beings that are in the universe the want of ideas leaves open to our knowledge1 we have seen4 ,in the next place1 another cause of ignorance1 of no less moment1 is a want of a discoverable connection between those ideas we have4 ,for wherever we want that1 we are utterly incapable of universal and certain knowledge2 and are1 in the former case1 left only to observation and experiment3 which1 how narrow and confined it is1 how far from general knowledge we need not be told4 ,i shall give some few instances of this cause of our ignorance1 and so leave it4 ,it is evident that the bulk1 figure1 and motion of several bodies about us produce in us several sensations1 as of colours1 sounds1 tastes1 smells1 pleasure1 and pain1 c4 ,these mechanical affections of bodies having no affinity at all with those ideas they produce in us1 7there being no conceivable connexion between any impulse of any sort of body and any perception of a colour or smell which we find in our minds17 we can have no distinct knowledge of such operations beyond our experience2 and can reason no otherwise about them1 than as effects produced by the appointment of an infinitely ,wise ,agent1 which perfectly surpass our comprehensions4 ,as the ideas of sensible secondary qualities which we have in our minds1 can by us be no way deduced from bodily causes1 nor any correspondence or connexion be found between them and those primary qualities which 7experience shows us7 produce them in us2 so1 on the other side1 the operation of our minds upon our bodies is as inconceivable4 ,how any thought should produce a motion in body is as remote from the nature of our ideas1 as how any body should produce any thought in the mind4 ,that it is so1 if experience did not convince us1 the consideration of the things themselves would never be able in the least to discover to us4 ,these1 and the like1 though they have a constant and regular connexion in the ordinary course of things2 yet that connexion being not discoverable in the ideas themselves1 which appearing to have no necessary dependence one on another1 we can attribute their connexion to nothing else but the arbitrary determination of that ,all-wise ,agent who has made them to be1 and to operate as they do1 in a way wholly above our weak understandings to conceive4 #bi4 ,instances ,in some of our ideas there are certain relations1 habitudes1 and connexions1 so visibly included in the nature of the ideas themselves1 that we cannot conceive them separable from them by any power whatsoever4 ,and in these only we are capable of certain and universal knowledge4 ,thus the idea of a right-lined triangle necessarily carries with it an equality of its angles to two right ones4 ,nor can we conceive this relation1 this connexion of these two ideas1 to be possibly mutable1 or to depend on any arbitrary power1 which of choice made it thus1 or could make it otherwise4 ,but the coherence and continuity of the parts of matter2 the production of sensation in us of colours and sounds1 c41 by impulse and motion2 nay1 the original rules and communication of motion being such1 wherein we can discover no natural connexion with any ideas we have1 we cannot but ascribe them to the arbitrary will and good pleasure of the ,wise ,architect4 ,i need not1 ,i think1 here mention the resurrection of the dead1 the future state of this globe of earth1 and such other things1 which are by every one acknowledged to depend wholly on the determination of a free agent4 ,the things that1 as far as our observation reaches1 we constantly find to proceed regularly1 we may conclude do act by a law set them2 but yet by a law that we know not3 whereby1 though causes work steadily1 and effects constantly flow from them1 yet their connexions and dependencies being not discoverable in our ideas1 we can have but an experimental knowledge of them4 ,from all which it is easy to perceive what a darkness we are involved in1 how little it is of ,being1 and the things that are1 that we are capable to know4 ,and therefore we shall do no injury to our knowledge1 when we modestly think with ourselves1 that we are so far from being able to comprehend the whole nature of the universe1 and all the things contained in it1 that we are not capable of a philosophical knowledge of the bodies that are about us1 and make a part of us3 concerning their secondary qualities1 powers1 and operations1 we can have no universal certainty4 ,several effects come every day within the notice of our senses1 of which we have so far sensitive knowledge3 but the causes1 manner1 and certainty of their production1 for the two foregoing reasons1 we must be content to be very ignorant of4 ,in these we can go no further than particular experience informs us of matter of fact1 and by analogy to guess what effects the like bodies are1 upon other trials1 like to produce4 ,but as to a ,,perfect ,,science of natural bodies1 7not to mention spiritual beings17 we are1 ,i think1 so far from being capable of any such thing1 that ,i conclude it lost labour to seek after it4 #cj4 ,thirdly ,a third cause1 ,want of ,tracing our ideas4 ,,thirdly1 ,where we have adequate ideas1 and where there is a certain and discoverable connexion between them1 yet we are often ignorant1 for want of tracing those ideas which we have or may have2 and for want of finding out those intermediate ideas1 which may show us what habitude of agreement or disagreement they have one with another4 ,and thus many are ignorant of mathematical truths1 not out of any imperfection of their faculties1 or uncertainty in the things themselves1 but for want of application in acquiring1 examining1 and by due ways comparing those ideas4 ,that which has most contributed to hinder the due tracing of our ideas1 and finding out their relations1 and agreements or disagreements1 one with another1 has been1 ,i suppose1 the ill use of words4 ,it is impossible that men should ever truly seek or certainly discover the agreement or disagreement of ideas themselves1 whilst their thoughts flutter about1 or stick only in sounds of doubtful and uncertain significations4 ,mathematicians abstracting their thoughts from names1 and accustoming themselves to set before their minds the ideas themselves that they would consider1 and not sounds instead of them1 have avoided thereby a great part of that perplexity1 puddering1 and confusion1 which has so much hindered men's progress in other parts of knowledge4 ,for whilst they stick in words of undetermined and uncertain signification1 they are unable to distinguish true from false1 certain from probable1 consistent from inconsistent1 in their own opinions4 ,this having been the fate or misfortune of a great part of men of letters1 the increase brought into the stock of real knowledge has been very little1 in proportion to the schools disputes1 and writings1 the world has been filled with2 whilst students1 being lost in the great wood of words1 knew not whereabouts they were1 how far their discoveries were advanced1 or what was wanting in their own1 or the general stock of knowledge4 ,had men1 in the discoveries of the material1 done as they have in those of the intellectual world1 involved all in the obscurity of uncertain and doubtful ways of talking1 volumes writ of navigation and voyages1 theories and stories of zones and tides1 multiplied and disputed2 nay1 ships built1 and fleets sent out1 would never have taught us the way beyond the line2 and the ,antipodes would be still as much unknown1 as when it was declared heresy to hold there were any4 ,but having spoken sufficiently of words1 and the ill or careless use that is commonly made of them1 ,i shall not say anything more of it here4 #ca4 ,extent of ,human ,knowledge in respect to its ,universality4 ,hitherto we have examined the extent of our knowledge1 in respect of the several sorts of beings that are4 ,there is another extent of it1 in respect of ,,universality1 which will also deserve to be considered2 and in this regard1 our knowledge follows the nature of our ideas4 ,if the ideas are abstract1 whose agreement or disagreement we perceive1 our knowledge is universal4 ,for what is known of such general ideas1 will be true of every particular thing in whom that essence1 i4e4 that abstract idea1 is to be found3 and what is once known of such ideas1 will be perpetually and for ever true4 ,so that as to all ,,general ,,knowledge we must search and find it only in our minds2 and it is only the examining of our own ideas that furnisheth us with that4 ,truths belonging to essences of things 7that is1 to abstract ideas7 are eternal2 and are to be found out by the contemplation only of those essences3 as the existence of things is to be known only from experience4 ,but having more to say of this in the chapters where ,i shall speak of general and real knowledge1 this may here suffice as to the universality of our knowledge in general4 ,,chapter ,,iv4 ,,of ,,the ,,reality ,,of ,,knowledge4 #a4 ,objection4 ',knowledge placed in our ,ideas may be all unreal or chimerical' ,i ,,doubt not but my reader1 by this time1 may be apt to think that ,i have been all this while only building a castle in the air2 and be ready to say to me3-- ',to what purpose all this stir8 ,knowledge1 say you1 is only the perception of the agreement or disagreement of our own ideas3 but who knows what those ideas may be8 ,is there anything so extravagant as the imaginations of men's brains8 ,where is the head that has no chimeras in it8 ,or if there be a sober and a wise man1 what difference will there be1 by your rules1 between his knowledge and that of the most extravagant fancy in the world8 ,they both have their ideas1 and perceive their agreement and disagreement one with another4 ,if there be any difference between them1 the advantage will be on the warm-headed man's side1 as having the more ideas1 and the more lively4 ,and so1 by your rules1 he will be the more knowing4 ,if it be true1 that all knowledge lies only in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of our own ideas1 the visions of an enthusiast and the reasonings of a sober man will be equally certain4 ,it is no matter how things are3 so a man observe but the agreement of his own imaginations1 and talk conformably1 it is all truth1 all certainty4 ,such castles in the air will be as strongholds of truth1 as the demonstrations of ,euclid4 ,that an harpy is not a centaur is by this way as certain knowledge1 and as much a truth1 as that a square is not a circle4 ',but of what use is all this fine knowledge of ,,men',s ,,own ,,imaginations1 to a man that inquires after the reality of things8 ,it matters not what men's fancies are1 it is the knowledge of things that is only to be prized3 it is this alone gives a value to our reasonings1 and preference to one man's knowledge over another's1 that it is of things as they really are1 and not of dreams and fancies4' #b4 ,answer ,not so1 where ,ideas agree with ,things4 ,to which ,i answer1 ,that if our knowledge of our ideas terminate in them1 and reach no further1 where there is something further intended1 our most serious thoughts will be of little more use than the reveries of a crazy brain2 and the truths built thereon of no more weight than the discourses of a man who sees things clearly in a dream1 and with great assurance utters them4 ,but ,i hope1 before ,i have done1 to make it evident1 that this way of certainty1 by the knowledge of our own ideas1 goes a little further than bare imagination3 and ,i believe it will appear that all the certainty of general truths a man has lies in nothing else4 #c4 ,but what shall be the criterion of this agreement8 ,it is evident the mind knows not things immediately1 but only by the intervention of the ideas it has of them4 ,our knowledge1 therefore1 is real only so far as there is a ,,conformity between our ideas and the reality of things4 ,but what shall be here the criterion8 ,how shall the mind1 when it perceives nothing but its own ideas1 know that they agree with things themselves8 ,this1 though it seems not to want difficulty1 yet1 ,i think1 there be two sorts of ideas that we may be assured agree with things4 #d4 ,as1 ,first ,all ,simple ,ideas are really conformed to ,things4 ,,first1 ,the first are simple ideas1 which since the mind1 as has been showed1 can by no means make to itself1 must necessarily be the product of things operating on the mind1 in a natural way1 and producing therein those perceptions which by the ,wisdom and ,will of our ,maker they are ordained and adapted to4 ,from whence it follows1 that simple ideas are not fictions of our fancies1 but the natural and regular productions of things without us1 really operating upon us2 and so carry with them all the conformity which is intended2 or which our state requires3 for they represent to us things under those appearances which they are fitted to produce in us3 whereby we are enabled to distinguish the sorts of particular substances1 to discern the states they are in1 and so to take them for our necessities1 and apply them to our uses4 ,thus the idea of whiteness1 or bitterness1 as it is in the mind1 exactly answering that power which is in any body to produce it there1 has all the real conformity it can or ought to have1 with things without us4 ,and this conformity between our simple ideas and the existence of things1 is sufficient for real knowledge4 #e4 ,secondly1 ,all ,complex ,ideas1 except ideas of ,substances1 are their own archetypes4 ,secondly1 ,all our complex ideas1 ,,except ,,those ,,of ,,substances1 being archetypes of the mind's own making1 not intended to be the copies of anything1 nor referred to the existence of anything1 as to their originals1 cannot want any conformity necessary to real knowledge4 ,for that which is not designed to represent anything but itself1 can never be capable of a wrong representation1 nor mislead us from the true apprehension of anything1 by its dislikeness to it3 and such1 excepting those of substances1 are all our complex ideas4 ,which1 as ,i have showed in another place1 are combinations of ideas1 which the mind1 by its free choice1 puts together1 without considering any connexion they have in nature4 ,and hence it is1 that in all these sorts the ideas themselves are considered as the archetypes1 and things no otherwise regarded1 but as they are conformable to them4 ,so that we cannot but be infallibly certain1 that all the knowledge we attain concerning these ideas is real1 and reaches things themselves4 ,because in all our thoughts1 reasonings1 and discourses of this kind1 we intend things no further than as they are conformable to our ideas4 ,so that in these we cannot miss of a certain and undoubted reality4 #f4 ,hence the reality of ,mathematical ,knowledge ,i doubt not but it will be easily granted1 that the knowledge we have of mathematical truths is not only certain1 but real knowledge2 and not the bare empty vision of vain1 insignificant chimeras of the brain3 and yet1 if we will consider1 we shall find that it is only of our own ideas4 ,the mathematician considers the truth and properties belonging to a rectangle or circle only as they are in idea in his own mind4 ,for it is possible he never found either of them existing mathematically1 i4e4 precisely true1 in his life4 ,but yet the knowledge he has of any truths or properties belonging to a circle1 or any other mathematical figure1 are nevertheless true and certain1 even of real things existing3 because real things are no further concerned1 nor intended to be meant by any such propositions1 than as things really agree to those archetypes in his mind4 ,is it true of the ,,idea of a triangle1 that its three angles are equal to two right ones8 ,it is true also of a triangle1 wherever it ,,really ,,exists4 ,whatever other figure exists1 that it is not exactly answerable to that idea of a triangle in his mind1 is not at all concerned in that proposition4 ,and therefore he is certain all his knowledge concerning such ideas is real knowledge3 because1 intending things no further than they agree with those his ideas1 he is sure what he knows concerning those figures1 when they have ,,barely ,,an ,,ideal ,,existence in his mind1 will hold true of them also when they have ,a ,,real ,,existance in matter3 his consideration being barely of those figures1 which are the same wherever or however they exist4 #g4 ,and of ,moral4 ,and hence it follows that moral knowledge is as capable of real certainty as mathematics4 ,for certainty being but the perception of the agreement or disagreement of our ideas1 and demonstration nothing but the perception of such agreement1 by the intervention of other ideas or mediums2 our moral ideas1 as well as mathematical1 being archetypes themselves1 and so adequate and complete ideas2 all the agreement or disagreement which we shall find in them will produce real knowledge1 as well as in mathematical figures4 #h4 ,existence not required to make ,abstract ,knowledge real4 ,for the attaining of knowledge and certainty1 it is requisite that we have determined ideas3 and1 to make our knowledge real1 it is requisite that the ideas answer their archetypes4 ,nor let it be wondered1 that ,i place the certainty of our knowledge in the consideration of our ideas1 with so little care and regard 7as it may seem7 to the real existence of things3 since most of those discourses which take up the thoughts and engage the disputes of those who pretend to make it their business to inquire after truth and certainty1 will1 ,i presume1 upon examination1 be found to be general propositions1 and notions in which existence is not at all concerned4 ,all the discourses of the mathematicians about the squaring of a circle1 conic sections1 or any other part of mathematics1 concern not the existence of any of those figures3 but their demonstrations1 which depend on their ideas1 are the same1 whether there be any square or circle existing in the world or no4 ,in the same manner1 the truth and certainty of moral discourses abstracts from the lives of men1 and the existence of those virtues in the world whereof they treat3 nor are ,tully's ,offices less true1 because there is nobody in the world that exactly practises his rules1 and lives up to that pattern of a virtuous man which he has given us1 and which existed nowhere when he writ but in idea4 ,if it be true in speculation1 i4e4 in idea1 that murder deserves death1 it will also be true in reality of any action that exists conformable to that idea of murder4 ,as for other actions1 the truth of that proposition concerns them not4 ,and thus it is of all other species of things1 which have no other essences but those ideas which are in the minds of men4 #i4 ,nor will it be less true or certain1 because ,moral ,ideas are of our own making and naming4 ,but it will here be said1 that if moral knowledge be placed in the contemplation of our own moral ideas1 and those1 as other modes1 be of our own making1 ,what strange notions will there be of justice and temperance8 ,what confusion of virtues and vices1 if every one may make what ideas of them he pleases8 ,no confusion or disorder in the things themselves1 nor the reasonings about them2 no more than 7in mathematics7 there would be a disturbance in the demonstration1 or a change in the properties of figures1 and their relations one to another1 if a man should make a triangle with four corners1 or a trapezium with four right angles3 that is1 in plain ,english1 change the names of the figures1 and call that by one name1 which mathematicians call ordinarily by another4 ,for1 let a man make to himself the idea of a figure with three angles1 whereof one is a right one1 and call it1 if he please1 ,,equilaterum or ,,trapezium1 or anything else2 the properties of1 and demonstrations about that idea will be the same as if he called it a rectangular triangle4 ,i confess the change of the name1 by the impropriety of speech1 will at first disturb him who knows not what idea it stands for3 but as soon as the figure is drawn1 the consequences and demonstrations are plain and clear4 ,just the same is it in moral knowledge3 let a man have the idea of taking from others1 without their consent1 what their honest industry has possessed them of1 and call this ,,justice if he please4 ,he that takes the name here without the idea put to it will be mistaken1 by joining another idea of his own to that name3 but strip the idea of that name1 or take it such as it is in the speaker's mind1 and the same things will agree to it1 as if you called it ,,injustice4 ,indeed1 wrong names in moral discourses breed usually more disorder1 because they are not so easily rectified as in mathematics1 where the figure1 once drawn and seen1 makes the name useless and of no force4 ,for what need of a sign1 when the thing signified is present and in view8 ,but in moral names1 that cannot be so easily and shortly done1 because of the many decompositions that go to the making up the complex ideas of those modes4 ,but yet for all this1 the miscalling of any of those ideas1 contrary to the usual signification of the words of that language1 hinders not but that we may have certain and demonstrative knowledge of their several agreements and disagreements1 if we will carefully1 as in mathematics1 keep to the same precise ideas1 and trace ,,them in their several relations one to another1 without being led away by their names4 ,if we but separate the idea under consideration from the sign that stands for it1 our knowledge goes equally on in the discovery of real truth and certainty1 whatever sounds we make use of4 #aj4 ,misnaming disturbs not the certainty of the ,knowledge ,one thing more we are to take notice of1 ,that where ,god or any other law-maker1 hath defined any moral names1 there they have made the essence of that species to which that name belongs2 and there it is not safe to apply or use them otherwise3 but in other cases it is bare impropriety of speech to apply them contrary to the common usage of the country4 ,but yet even this too disturbs not the certainty of that knowledge1 which is still to be had by a due contemplation and comparing of those even nick-named ideas4 #aa4 ,thirdly1 ,our complex ,ideas of ,substances have their ,archetypes without us2 and here knowledge comes short4 ,,thirdly1 ,there is another sort of complex ideas1 which1 being referred to archetypes without us1 may differ from them1 and so our knowledge about them may come short of being real4 ,such are our ideas of substances1 which1 consisting of a collection of simple ideas1 supposed taken from the works of nature1 may yet vary from them2 by having more or different ideas united in them than are to be found united in the things themselves4 ,from whence it comes to pass1 that they may1 and often do1 fail of being exactly conformable to things themselves4 #ab4 ,so far as our complex ideas agree with those ,archetypes without us1 so far our ,knowledge concerning ,substances is real4 ,i say1 then1 that to have ideas of ,,substances which1 by being conformable to things1 may afford us real knowledge1 it is not enough1 as in ,,modes1 to put together such ideas as have no inconsistence1 though they did never before so exist3 v4g4 the ideas of sacrilege or perjury1 c41 were as real and true ideas before1 as after the existence of any such fact4 ,but our ideas of substances1 being supposed copies1 and referred to archetypes without us1 must still be taken from something that does or has existed3 they must not consist of ideas put together at the pleasure of our thoughts1 without any real pattern they were taken from1 though we can perceive no inconsistence in such a combination4 ,the reason whereof is because we1 knowing not what real constitution it is of substances whereon our simple ideas depend1 and which really is the cause of the strict union of some of them one with another1 and the exclusion of others2 there are very few of them that we can be sure are or are not inconsistent in nature3 any further than experience and sensible observation reach ,herein1 therefore1 is founded the reality of our knowledge concerning substances--,that all our complex ideas of them must be such1 and such only1 as are made up of such simple ones as have been discovered to co-exist in nature4 ,and our ideas being thus true1 though not perhaps very exact copies1 are yet the subjects of real 7as far as we have any7 knowledge of them4 ,which 7as has been already shown7 will not be found to reach very far3 but so far as it does1 it will still be real knowledge4 ,whatever ideas we have1 the agreement we find they have with others will still be knowledge4 ,if those ideas be abstract1 it will be general knowledge4 ,but to make it real concerning substances1 the ideas must be taken from the real existence of things4 ,whatever simple ideas have been found to co-exist in any substance1 these we may with confidence join together again1 and so make abstract ideas of substances4 ,for whatever have once had an union in nature1 may be united again4 #ac4 ,in our inquiries about ,substances1 we must consider ,ideas1 and not confine our ,thoughts to ,names1 or ,species supposed set out by ,names4 ,this1 if we rightly consider1 and confine not our thoughts and abstract ideas to names1 as if there were1 or could be no other ,,sorts of things than what known names had already determined1 and1 as it were1 set out1 we should think of things with greater freedom and less confusion than perhaps we do4 ,it would possibly be thought a bold paradox1 if not a very dangerous falsehood1 if ,i should say that some ,,changelings1 who have lived forty years together1 without any appearance of reason1 are something between a man and a beast3 which prejudice is founded upon nothing else but a false supposition1 that these two names1 man and beast1 stand for distinct species so set out by real essences1 that there can come no other species between them3 whereas if we will abstract from those names1 and the supposition of such specific essences made by nature1 wherein all things of the same denominations did exactly and equally partake2 if we would not fancy that there were a certain number of these essences1 wherein all things1 as in moulds1 were cast and formed2 we should find that the idea of the shape1 motion1 and life of a man without reason1 is as much a distinct idea1 and makes as much a distinct sort of things from man and beast1 as the idea of the shape of an ass with reason would be different from either that of man or beast1 and be a species of an animal between1 or distinct from both4 #ad4 ,objection against a ,changeling being something between a ,man and ,beast1 answered4 ,here everybody will be ready to ask1 ,if changelings may be supposed something between man and beast1 pray what are they8 ,i answer1 ,,changelings2 which is as good a word to signify something different from the signification of ,,man or ,,beast1 as the names man and beast are to have significations different one from the other4 ,this1 well considered1 would resolve this matter1 and show my meaning without any more ado4 ,but ,i am not so unacquainted with the zeal of some men1 which enables them to spin consequences1 and to see religion threatened1 whenever any one ventures to quit their forms of speaking1 as not to foresee what names such a proposition as this is like to be charged with3 and without doubt it will be asked1 ,if changelings are something between man and beast1 what will become of them in the other world8 ,to which ,i answer1 ,i4 ,it concerns me not to know or inquire4 ,to their own master they stand or fall4 ,it will make their state neither better nor worse1 whether we determine anything of it or no4 ,they are in the hands of a faithful ,creator and a bountiful ,father1 who disposes not of his creatures according to our narrow thoughts or opinions1 nor distinguishes them according to names and species of our contrivance4 ,and we that know so little of this present world we are in1 may1 ,i think1 content ourselves without being peremptory in defining the different states which creatures shall come into when they go off this stage4 ,it may suffice us1 that ,he hath made known to all those who are capable of instruction1 discoursing1 and reasoning1 that they shall come to an account1 and receive according to what they have done in this body4 #ae4 ,what will become of ,changelings in a future state8 ,but1 ,secondly1 ,i answer1 ,the force of these men's question 7viz4 ,will you deprive changelings of a future state87 is founded on one of these two suppositions1 which are both false4 ,the first is1 ,that all things that have the outward shape and appearance of a man must necessarily be designed to an immortal future being after this life3 or1 secondly1 ,that whatever is of human birth must be so4 ,take away these imaginations1 and such questions will be groundless and ridiculous4 ,i desire then those who think there is no more but an accidental difference between themselves and changelings1 the essence in both being exactly the same1 to consider1 whether they can imagine immortality annexed to any outward shape of the body2 the very proposing it is1 ,i suppose1 enough to make them disown it4 ,no one yet1 that ever ,i heard of1 how much soever immersed in matter1 allowed that excellency to any figure of the gross sensible outward consequence of it2 or that any mass of matter should1 after its dissolution here1 be again restored hereafter to an everlasting state of sense1 perception1 and knowledge1 only because it was moulded into this or that figure1 and had such a particular frame of its visible parts4 ,such an opinion as this1 placing immortality in a certain superficial figure1 turns out of doors all consideration of soul or spirit2 upon whose account alone some corporeal beings have hitherto been concluded immortal1 and others not4 ,this is to attribute more to the outside than inside of things2 and to place the excellency of a man more in the external shape of his body1 than internal perfections of his soul3 which is but little better than to annex the great and inestimable advantage of immortality and life everlasting1 which he has above other material beings1 to annex it1 ,i say1 to the cut of his beard1 or the fashion of his coat4 ,for this or that outward mark of our bodies no more carries with it the hope of an eternal duration1 than the fashion of a man's suit gives him reasonable grounds to imagine it will never wear out1 or that it will make him immortal4 ,it will perhaps be said1 that nobody thinks that the shape makes anything immortal1 but it is the shape that is the sign of a rational soul within1 which is immortal4 ,i wonder who made it the sign of any such thing3 for barely saying it1 will not make it so4 ,it would require some proofs to persuade one of it4 ,no figure that ,i know speaks any such language4 ,for it may as rationally be concluded1 that the dead body of a man1 wherein there is to be found no more appearance or action of life than there is in a statue1 has yet nevertheless a living soul in it1 because of its shape2 as that there is a rational soul in a changeling1 because he has the outside of a rational creature1 when his actions carry far less marks of reason with them1 in the whole course of his life than what are to be found in many a beast4 #af4 ,monsters ,but it is the issue of rational parents1 and must therefore be concluded to have a rational soul4 ,i know not by what logic you must so conclude4 ,i am sure this is a conclusion that men nowhere allow of4 ,for if they did1 they would not make bold1 as everywhere they do to destroy ill-formed and mis-shaped productions4 ,ay1 but these are ,,monsters4 ,let them be so3 what will your drivelling1 unintelligent1 intractable changeling be8 ,shall a defect in the body make a monster2 a defect in the mind 7the far more noble1 and1 in the common phrase1 the far more essential part7 not8 ,shall the want of a nose1 or a neck1 make a monster1 and put such issue out of the rank of men2 the want of reason and understanding1 not8 ,this is to bring all back again to what was exploded just now3 this is to place all in the shape1 and to take the measure of a man only by his outside4 ,to show that according to the ordinary way of reasoning in this matter1 people do lay the whole stress on the figure1 and resolve the whole essence of the species of man 7as they make it7 into the outward shape1 how unreasonable soever it be1 and how much soever they disown it1 we need but trace their thoughts and practice a little further1 and then it will plainly appear4 ,the well-shaped changeling is a man1 has a rational soul1 though it appear not3 this is past doubt1 say you3 make the ears a little longer1 and more pointed1 and the nose a little flatter than ordinary1 and then you begin to boggle3 make the face yet narrower1 flatter1 and longer1 and then you are at a stand3 add still more and more of the likeness of a brute to it1 and let the head be perfectly that of some other animal1 then presently it is a monster2 and it is demonstration with you that it hath no rational soul1 and must be destroyed4 ,where now 7,i ask7 shall be the just measure2 which the utmost bounds of that shape1 that carries with it a rational soul8 ,for1 since there have been human foetuses produced1 half beast and half man2 and others three parts one1 and one part the other2 and so it is possible they may be in all the variety of approaches to the one or the other shape1 and may have several degrees of mixture of the likeness of a man1 or a brute2--,i would gladly know what are those precise lineaments1 which1 according to this hypothesis1 are or are not capable of a rational soul to be joined to them4 ,what sort of outside is the certain sign that there is or is not such an inhabitant within8 ,for till that be done1 we talk at random of ,,man3 and shall always1 ,i fear1 do so1 as long as we give ourselves up to certain sounds1 and the imaginations of settled and fixed species in nature1 we know not what4 ,but1 after all1 ,i desire it may be considered1 that those who think they have answered the difficulty1 by telling us1 that a mis-shaped foetus is a ,,monster1 run into the same fault they are arguing against2 by constituting a species between man and beast4 ,for what else1 ,i pray1 is their monster in the case1 7if the word monster signifies anything at all17 but something neither man nor beast1 but partaking somewhat of either8 ,and just so is the ,,changeling before mentioned4 ,so necessary is it to quit the common notion of species and essences1 if we will truly look into the nature of things1 and examine them by what our faculties can discover in them as they exist1 and not by groundless fancies that have been taken up about them4 #ag4 ,words and ,species4 ,i have mentioned this here1 because ,i think we cannot be too cautious that words and species1 in the ordinary notions which we have been used to of them1 impose not on us4 ,for ,i am apt to think therein lies one great obstacle to our clear and distinct knowledge1 especially in reference to substances3 and from thence has rose a great part of the difficulties about truth and certainty4 ,would we accustom ourselves to separate our contemplations and reasonings from words1 we might in a great measure remedy this inconvenience within our own thoughts3 but yet it would still disturb us in our discourse with others1 as long as we retained the opinion1 that ,,species and their ,,essences were anything else but our abstract ideas 7such as they are7 with names annexed to them1 to be the signs of them4 #ah4 ,recapitulation4 ,wherever we perceive the agreement or disagreement of any of our ideas1 there is certain knowledge3 and wherever we are sure those ideas agree with the reality of things1 there is certain real knowledge4 ,of which agreement of our ideas with the reality of things1 having here given the marks1 ,i think1 ,i have shown ,,wherein ,,it ,,is ,,that ,,certainty1 ,,real ,,certainty1 ,,consists4 ,which1 whatever it was to others1 was1 ,i confess1 to me heretofore1 one of those desiderata which ,i found great want of4 ,,chapter ,v4 ,,of ,,truth ,,in ,,general4 #a4 ,what ,truth is4 ,,what is truth8 was an inquiry many ages since2 and it being that which all mankind either do1 or pretend to search after1 it cannot but be worth our while carefully to examine wherein it consists2 and so acquaint ourselves with the nature of it1 as to observe how the mind distinguishes it from falsehood4 #b4 ,a right joining or separating of signs1 i4e4 either ,ideas or ,words4 ,truth1 then1 seems to me1 in the proper import of the word1 to signify nothing but ,,the ,,joining ,,or ,,seperating ,,of ,,signs1 ,,as ,,the ,,things ,,signified ,,by ,,them ,,do ,,agree ,,or ,,disagree ,,one ,,with ,,another4 ,the joining or separating of signs here meant1 is what by another name we call ,,proposition4 ,so that truth properly belongs only to propositions3 whereof there are two sorts1 viz4 mental and verbal2 as there are two sorts of signs commonly made use of1 viz4 ideas and words4 #c4 ,which make mental or verbal ,propositions4 ,to form a clear notion of truth1 it is very necessary to consider truth of thought1 and truth of words1 distinctly one from another3 but yet it is very difficult to treat of them asunder4 ,because it is unavoidable1 in treating of mental propositions1 to make use of words3 and then the instances given of mental propositions cease immediately to be barely mental1 and become verbal4 ,for a ,,mental ,,proposition being nothing but a bare consideration of the ideas1 as they are in our minds1 stripped of names1 they lose the nature of purely mental propositions as soon as they are put into words4 #d4 ,mental ,propositions are very hard to be treated of4 ,and that which makes it yet harder to treat of mental and verbal propositions separately is1 that most men1 if not all1 in their thinking and reasonings within themselves1 make use of words instead of ideas2 at least when the subject of their meditation contains in it complex ideas4 ,which is a great evidence of the imperfection and uncertainty of our ideas of that kind1 and may1 if attentively made use of1 serve for a mark to show us what are those things we have clear and perfect established ideas of1 and what not4 ,for if we will curiously observe the way our mind takes in thinking and reasoning1 we shall find1 ,i suppose1 that when we make any propositions within our own thoughts about ,,white or ,,black1 ,,sweet or ,,bitter1 a ,,triangle or a ,,circle1 we can and often do frame in our minds the ideas themselves1 without reflecting on the names4 ,but when we would consider1 or make propositions about the more complex ideas1 as of a ,,man1 ,,vitriol1 ,,fortitude1 ,,glory1 we usually put the name for the idea3 because the ideas these names stand for1 being for the most part imperfect1 confused1 and undetermined1 we reflect on the names themselves1 because they are more clear1 certain1 and distinct1 and readier occur to our thoughts than the pure ideas3 and so we make use of these words instead of the ideas themselves1 even when we would meditate and reason within ourselves1 and make tacit mental propositions4 ,in substances1 as has been already noticed1 this is occasioned by the imperfections of our ideas3 we making the name stand for the real essence1 of which we have no idea at all4 ,in modes1 it is occasioned by the great number of simple ideas that go to the making them up4 ,for many of them being compounded1 the name occurs much easier than the complex idea itself1 which requires time and attention to be recollected1 and exactly represented to the mind1 even in those men who have formerly been at the pains to do it2 and is utterly impossible to be done by those who1 though they have ready in their memory the greatest part of the common words of that language1 yet perhaps never troubled themselves in all their lives to consider what precise ideas the most of them stood for4 ,some confused or obscure notions have served their turns2 and many who talk very much of ,,religion and ,,conscience1 of ,,church and ,,faith1 of ,,power and ,,right1 of ,,obstructions and ,,humours1 ,,melancholy and ,,choler1 would perhaps have little left in their thoughts and meditations1 if one should desire them to think only of the things themselves1 and lay by those words with which they so often confound others1 and not seldom themselves also4 #e4 ,mental and ,verbal ,propositions contrasted4 ,but to return to the consideration of truth3 we must1 ,i say1 observe two sorts of propositions that we are capable of making3-- ,first1 ,,mental1 wherein the ideas in our understandings are without the use of words put together1 or separated1 by the mind perceiving or judging of their agreement or disagreement4 ,secondly1 ,,verbal propositions1 which are words1 the signs of our ideas1 put together or separated in affirmative or negative sentences4 ,by which way of affirming or denying1 these signs1 made by sounds1 are1 as it were1 put together or separated from another4 ,so that proposition consists in joining or separating signs2 and truth consists in the putting together or separating those signs1 according as the things which they stand for agree or disagree4 #f4 ,when ,mental ,propositions contain real ,truth1 and when ,verbal4 ,every one's experience will satisfy him1 that the mind1 either by perceiving1 or supposing1 the agreement or disagreement of any of its ideas1 does tacitly within itself put them into a kind of proposition affirmative or negative2 which ,i have endeavoured to express by the terms putting together and separating4 ,but this action of the mind1 which is so familiar to every thinking and reasoning man1 is easier to be conceived by reflecting on what passes in us when we affirm or deny1 than to be explained by words4 ,when a man has in his head the idea of two lines1 viz4 the side and diagonal of a square1 whereof the diagonal is an inch long1 he may have the idea also of the division of that line into a certain number of equal parts2 v4g4 into five1 ten1 a hundred1 a thousand1 or any other number1 and may have the idea of that inch line being divisible1 or not divisible1 into such equal parts1 as a certain number of them will be equal to the sideline4 ,now1 whenever he perceives1 believes1 or supposes such a kind of divisibility to agree or disagree to his idea of that line1 he1 as it were1 joins or separates those two ideas1 viz4 the idea of that line1 and the idea of that kind of divisibility2 and so makes a mental proposition1 which is true or false1 according as such a kind of divisibility1 a divisibility into such ,,aliquot parts1 does really agree to that line or no4 ,when ideas are so put together1 or separated in the mind1 as they or the things they stand for do agree or not1 that is1 as ,i may call it1 ,,mental ,,truth4 ,but ,,truth ,,of ,,words is something more2 and that is the affirming or denying of words one of another1 as the ideas they stand for agree or disagree3 and this again is two-fold2 either purely verbal and trifling1 which ,i shall speak of1 7chap4 viii417 or real and instructive2 which is the object of that real knowledge which we have spoken of already4 #g4 ,objection against verbal ,truth1 that thus it may all be chimerical4 ,but here again will be apt to occur the same doubt about truth1 that did about knowledge3 and it will be objected1 that if truth be nothing but the joining and separating of words in propositions1 as the ideas they stand for agree or disagree in men's minds1 the knowledge of truth is not so valuable a thing as it is taken to be1 nor worth the pains and time men employ in the search of it3 since by this account it amounts to no more than the conformity of words to the chimeras of men's brains4 ,who knows not what odd notions many men's heads are filled with1 and what strange ideas all men's brains are capable of8 ,but if we rest here1 we know the truth of nothing by this rule1 but of the visionary words in our own imaginations2 nor have other truth1 but what as much concerns harpies and centaurs1 as men and horses4 ,for those1 and the like1 may be ideas in our heads1 and have their agreement or disagreement there1 as well as the ideas of real beings1 and so have as true propositions made about them4 ,and it will be altogether as true a proposition to say ,,all ,,centaurs ,,are ,,animals1 as that ,,all ,,men ,,are ,,animals2 and the certainty of one as great as the other4 ,for in both the propositions1 the words are put together according to the agreement of the ideas in our minds3 and the agreement of the idea of animal with that of centaur is as clear and visable to the mind1 as the agreement of the idea of animal with that of man2 and so these two propositions are equally true1 equally certain4 ,but of what use is all such truth to us8 #h4 ,answered1 ,real ,truth is about ,ideas agreeing to things4 ,though what has been said in the foregoing chapter to distinguish real from imaginary knowledge might suffice here1 in answer to this doubt1 to distinguish real truth from chimerical1 or 7if you please7 barely nominal1 they depending both on the same foundation2 yet it may not be amiss here again to consider1 that though our words signify things1 the truth they contain when put into propositions will be only verbal1 when they stand for ideas in the mind that have not an agreement with the reality of things4 ,and therefore truth as well as knowledge may well come under the distinction of verbal and real2 that being only verbal truth1 wherein terms are joined according to the agreement or disagreement of the ideas they stand for2 without regarding whether our ideas are such as really have1 or are capable of having1 an existence in nature4 ,but then it is they contain ,,real ,,truth1 when these signs are joined1 as our ideas agree2 and when our ideas are such as we know are capable of having an existence in nature3 which in substances we cannot know1 but by knowing that such have existed4 #i4 ,truth and ,falsehood in general4 ,truth is the marking down in words the agreement or disagreement of ideas as it is4 ,falsehood is the marking down in words the agreement or disagreement of ideas otherwise than it is4 ,and so far as these ideas1 thus marked by sounds1 agree to their archetypes1 so far only is the truth real4 ,the knowledge of this truth consists in knowing what ideas the words stand for1 and the perception of the agreement or disagreement of those ideas1 according as it is marked by those words4 #aj4 ,general ,propositions to be treated of more at large4 ,but because words are looked on as the great conduits of truth and knowledge1 and that in conveying and receiving of truth1 and commonly in reasoning about it1 we make use of words and propositions1 ,i shall more at large inquire wherein the certainty of real truths contained in propositions consists1 and where it is to be had2 and endeavour to show in what sort of universal propositions we are capable of being certain of their real truth or falsehood4 ,i shall begin with ,,general propositions1 as those which most employ our thoughts1 and exercise our contemplation4 ,general truths are most looked after by the mind as those that most enlarge our knowledge2 and by their comprehensiveness satisfying us at once of many particulars1 enlarge our view1 and shorten our way to knowledge4 #aa4 ,moral and ,metaphysical ,truth4 ,besides truth taken in the strict sense before mentioned1 there are other sorts of truths3 ,as1 #a4 ,moral truth1 which is speaking of things according to the persuasion of our own minds1 though the proposition we speak agree not to the reality of things2 #b4 ,metaphysical truth1 which is nothing but the real existence of things1 conformable to the ideas to which we have annexed their names4 ,this1 though it seems to consist in the very beings of things1 yet1 when considered a little nearly1 will appear to include a tacit proposition1 whereby the mind joins that particular thing to the idea it had before settled with the name to it4 ,but these considerations of truth1 either having been before taken notice of1 or not being much to our present purpose1 it may suffice here only to have mentioned them4 ,,chapter ,,vi4 ,,of ,,universal ,,propositions3 ,,their ,,truth ,,and ,,certainty4 #a4 ,treating of ,words necessary to ,knowledge4 ,,though the examining and judging of ideas by themselves1 their names being quite laid aside1 be the best and surest way to clear and distinct knowledge3 yet1 through the prevailing custom of using sounds for ideas1 ,i think it is very seldom practised4 ,every one may observe how common it is for names to be made use of1 instead of the ideas themselves1 even when men think and reason within their own breasts2 especially if the ideas be very complex1 and made up of a great collection of simple ones4 ,this makes the consideration of ,,words and ,,propositions so necessary a part of the ,treatise of ,knowledge1 that it is very hard to speak intelligibly of the one1 without explaining the other4 #b4 ,general ,truths hardly to be understood1 but in verbal ,propositions4 ,all the knowledge we have1 being only of particular or general truths1 it is evident that whatever may be done in the former of these1 the latter1 which is that which with reason is most sought after1 can never be well made known1 and is very seldom apprehended1 but as conceived and expressed in words4 ,it is not1 therefore1 out of our way1 in the examination of our knowledge1 to inquire into the truth and certainty of universal propositions4 #c4 ,certainty twofold--of ,truth and of ,knowledge4 ,but that we may not be misled in this case by that which is the danger everywhere1 ,i mean by the doubtfulness of terms1 it is fit to observe that certainty is twofold3 ,,certainty ,,of ,,truth and ,,certainty ,,of ,,knowledge4 ,certainty of truth is1 when words are so put together in propositions as exactly to express the agreement or disagreement of the ideas they stand for1 as really it is4 ,certainty of knowledge is to perceive the agreement or disagreement of ideas1 as expressed in any proposition4 ,this we usually call knowing1 or being certain of the truth of any proposition4 #d4 ,no ,proposition can be certainly known to be true1 where the real ,essence of each ,species mentioned is not known4 ,now1 because we cannot be certain of the truth of any general proposition1 unless we know the precise bounds and extent of the species its terms stand for1 it is necessary we should know the essence of each species1 which is that which constitutes and bounds it4 ,this1 in all simple ideas and modes1 is not hard to do4 ,for in these the real and nominal essence being the same1 or1 which is all one1 the abstract idea which the general term stands for being the sole essence and boundary that is or can be supposed of the species1 there can be no doubt how far the species extends1 or what things are comprehended under each term2 which1 it is evident1 are all that have an exact conformity with the idea it stands for1 and no other4 ,but in substances1 wherein a real essence1 distinct from the nominal1 is supposed to constitute1 determine1 and bound the species1 the extent of the general word is very uncertain2 because1 not knowing this real essence1 we cannot know what is1 or what is not of that species2 and1 consequently1 what may or may not with certainty be affirmed of it4 ,and thus1 speaking of a ,,man1 or ,,gold1 or any other species of natural substances1 as supposed constituted by a precise and real essence which nature regularly imparts to every individual of that kind1 whereby it is made to be of that species1 we cannot be certain of the truth of any affirmation or negation made of it4 ,for man or gold1 taken in this sense1 and used for species of things constituted by real essences1 different from the complex idea in the mind of the speaker1 stand for we know not what2 and the extent of these species1 with such boundaries1 are so unknown and undetermined1 that it is impossible with any certainty to affirm1 that all men are rational1 or that all gold is yellow4 ,but where the nominal essence is kept to1 as the boundary of each species1 and men extend the application of any general term no further than to the particular things in which the complex idea it stands for is to be found1 there they are in no danger to mistake the bounds of each species1 nor can be in doubt1 on this account1 whether any proposition be true or not4 ,i have chosen to explain this uncertainty of propositions in this scholastic way1 and have made use of the terms of ,,essences1 and ,,species1 on purpose to show the absurdity and inconvenience there is to think of them as of any other sort of realities1 than barely abstract ideas with names to them4 ,to suppose that the species of things are anything but the sorting of them under general names1 according as they agree to several abstract ideas of which we make those names signs1 is to confound truth1 and introduce uncertainty into all general propositions that can be made about them4 ,though therefore these things might1 to people not possessed with scholastic learning1 be treated of in a better and clearer way yet those wrong notions of essences or species having got root in most people's minds who have received any tincture from the learning which has prevailed in this part of the world1 are to be discovered and removed1 to make way for that use of words which should convey certainty with it4 #e4 ,this more particularly concerns ,substances4 ,the names of substances1 then1 whenever made to stand for species which are supposed to be constituted by real essences which we know not1 are not capable to convey certainty to the understanding4 ,of the truth general propositions made up of such terms we cannot be sure4 ,the reason whereof is plain3 for how can we be sure that this or that quality is in gold1 when we know not what is or is not gold8 ,since in this way of speaking1 nothing is gold but what partakes of an essence1 which we1 not knowing1 cannot know where it is or is not1 and so cannot be sure that any parcel of matter in the world is or is not in this sense gold2 being incurably ignorant whether ,,it has or has not that which makes anything to be called gold2 i4 e4 that real essence of gold whereof we have no idea at all4 ,this being as impossible for us to know as it is for a blind man to tell in what flower the colour of a pansy is or is not to be found1 whilst he has no idea of the colour of a pansy at all4 ,or if we could 7which is impossible7 certainly know where a real essence1 which we know not1 is1 v4g4 in what parcels of matter the real essence of gold is1 yet could we not be sure that this or that quality could with truth be affirmed of gold2 since it is impossible for us to know that this or that quality or idea has a necessary connexion with a real essence of which we have no idea at all1 whatever species that supposed real essence may be imagined to constitute4 #f4 ,on the other side1 the names of substances1 when made use of as they should be1 for the ideas men have in their minds1 though they carry a clear and determinate signification with them1 will not yet serve us to make many universal propositions of whose truth we can be certain4 ,not because in this use of them we are uncertain what things are signified by them1 but because the complex ideas they stand for are such combinations of simple ones as carry not with them any discoverable connexion or repugnancy1 but with a very few other ideas4 #g4 ,the complex ideas that our names of the species of substances properly stand for1 are collections of such qualities as have been observed to co-exist in an unknown substratum1 which we call substance2 but what other qualities necessarily co-exist with such combinations1 we cannot certainly know1 unless we can discover their natural dependence2 which1 in their primary qualities1 we can go but a very little way in2 and in all their secondary qualities we can discover no connexion at all3 for the reasons mentioned1 chap4 iii4 ,viz4 #a4 ,because we know not the real constitutions of substances1 on which each secondary quality particularly depends4 #b4 ,did we know that1 it would serve us only for experimental 7not universal7 knowledge2 and reach with certainty no further than that bare instance3 because our understandings can discover no conceivable connexion between any secondary quality and any modification whatsoever of any of the primary ones4 ,and therefore there are very few general propositions to be made concerning substances1 which can carry with them undoubted certainty4 #h4 ,instance in ,gold4 ',all gold is fixed1' is a proposition whose truth we cannot be certain of1 how universally soever it be believed4 ,for if1 according to the useless imagination of the ,schools1 any one supposes the term gold to stand for a species of things set out by nature1 by a real essence belonging to it1 it is evident he knows not what particular substances are of that species2 and so cannot with certainty affirm anything universally of gold4 ,but if he makes gold stand for a species determined by its nominal essence1 let the nominal essence1 for example1 be the complex idea of a body of a certain yellow colour1 malleable1 fusible1 and heavier than any other known2--in this proper use of the word gold1 there is no difficulty to know what is or is not gold4 ,but yet no other quality can with certainty be universally affirmed or denied of gold1 but what hath a ,,discoverable connexion or inconsistency with that nominal essence4 ,fixedness1 for example1 having no necessary connexion that we can discover1 with the colour1 weight1 or any other simple idea of our complex one1 or with the whole combination together2 it is impossible that we should certainly know the truth of this proposition1 that all gold is fixed4 #i4 ,no discoverable necessary connexion between nominal essence gold1 and other simple ideas4 ,as there is no discoverable connexion between fixedness and the colour1 weight1 and other simple ideas of that nominal essence of gold2 so1 if we make our complex idea of gold1 a body yellow1 fusable1 ductile1 weighty1 and fixed1 we shall be at the same uncertainty concerning solubility in ,,aqua ,,regia1 and for the same reason4 ,since we can never1 from consideration of the ideas themselves1 with certainty affirm or deny of a body whose complex idea is made up of yellow1 very weighty1 ductile1 fusible1 and fixed1 that it is soluble in ,,aqua ,,regia3 and so on of the rest of its qualities4 ,i would gladly meet with one general affirmation concerning any will1 no doubt1 be presently objected1 ,is not this an universal proposition1 ,,all ,,gold ,,is ,,malleable8 ,to which ,i answer1 ,it is a very complex idea the word gold stands for4 ,but then here is nothing affirmed of gold1 but that that sound stands for an idea in which malleableness is contained3 and such a sort of truth and certainty as this it is1 to say a centaur is four-footed4 ,but if malleableness make not a part of the specific essence the name of gold stands for1 it is plain1 ,,all ,,gold ,,is ,,malleable1 is not a certain proposition4 ,because1 let the complex idea of gold be made up of whichsoever of its other qualities you please1 malleableness will not appear to depend on that complex idea1 nor follow from any simple one contained in it3 the connexion that malleableness has 7if it has any7 with those other qualities being only by the intervention of the real constitution of its insensible parts2 which1 since we know not1 it is impossible we should perceive that connexion1 unless we could discover that which ties them together4 #aj4 ,as far as any such ,co-existence can be known1 so far ,universal ,propositions maybe certain4 ,but this will go but a little way4 ,the more1 indeed1 of these co-existing qualities we unite into one complex idea1 under one name1 the more precise and determinate we make the signification of that word2 but never yet make it thereby more capable of universal certainty1 ,,in ,,respect ,,of ,,other ,,qualities ,,not ,,contained ,,in ,,our ,,complex ,,idea3 since we perceive not their connexion or dependence on one another2 being ignorant both of that real constitution in which they are all founded1 and also how they flow from it4 ,for the chief part of our knowledge concerning substances is not1 as in other things1 barely of the relation of two ideas that may exist separately2 but is of the necessary connexion and co-existence of several distinct ideas in the same subject1 or of their repugnancy so to co-exist4 ,could we begin at the other end1 and discover what it was wherein that colour consisted1 what made a body lighter or heavier1 what texture of parts made it malleable1 fusible1 and fixed1 and fit to be dissolved in this sort of liquor1 and not in another2--if1 ,i say1 we had such an idea as this of bodies1 and could perceive wherein all sensible qualities originally consist1 and how they are produced2 we might frame such abstract ideas of them as would furnish us with matter of more general knowledge1 and enable us to make universal propositions1 that should carry general truth and certainty with them4 ,but whilst our complex ideas of the sorts of substances are so remote from that internal real constitution on which their sensible qualities depend1 and are made up of nothing but an imperfect collection of those apparent qualities our senses can discover1 there can be few general propositions concerning substances of whose real truth we can be certainly assured2 since there are but few simple ideas of whose connexion and necessary co-existence we can have certain and undoubted knowledge4 ,i imagine1 amongst all the secondary qualities of substances1 and the powers relating to them1 there cannot any two be named1 whose necessary co-existence1 or repugnance to co-exist1 can certainly be known2 unless in those of the same sense1 which necessarily exclude one another1 as ,i have elsewhere showed4 ,no one1 ,i think1 by the colour that is in any body1 can certainly know what smell1 taste1 sound1 or tangible qualities it has1 nor what alterations it is capable to make or receive on or from other bodies4 ,the same may be said of the sound or taste1 c4 ,our specific names of substances standing for any collections of such ideas1 it is not to be wondered that we can with them make very few general propositions of undoubted real certainty4 ,but yet so far as any complex idea of any sort of substances contains in it any simple idea1 whose ,,necessary co-existence with any other ,,may be discovered1 so far universal propositions may with certainty be made concerning it3 v4g4 could any one discover a necessary connexion between malleableness and the colour or weight of gold1 or any other part of the complex idea signified by that name1 he might make a certain universal proposition concerning gold in this respect2 and the real truth of this proposition1 that ,,all ,,gold ,,is ,,malliable1 would be as certain as of this1 ,,the ,,three ,,angles ,,of ,,all ,,right-,,lined ,,triangles ,,are ,,all ,,equal ,,to ,,two ,,right ,,ones4 #aa4 ,the ,qualities which make our complex ,ideas of ,substances depend mostly on external1 remote1 and unperceived ,causes4 ,had we such ideas of substances as to know what real constitutions produce those sensible qualities we find in them1 and how those qualities flowed from thence1 we could1 by the specific ideas of their real essences in our own minds1 more certainly find out their properties1 and discover what qualities they had or had not1 than we can now by our senses3 and to know the properties of gold1 it would be no more necessary that gold should exist1 and that we should make experiments upon it1 than it is necessary for the knowing the properties of a triangle1 that a triangle should exist in any matter1 the idea in our minds would serve for the one as well as the other4 ,but we are so far from being admitted into the secrets of nature1 that we scarce so much as ever approach the first entrance towards them4 ,for we are wont to consider the substances we meet with1 each of them1 as an entire thing by itself1 having all its qualities in itself1 and independent of other things2 overlooking1 for the most part1 the operations of those invisible fluids they are encompassed with1 and upon whose motions and operations depend the greatest part of those qualities which are taken notice of in them1 and are made by us the inherent marks of distinction whereby we know and denominate them4 ,put a piece of gold anywhere by itself1 separate from the reach and influence of all other bodies1 it will immediately lose all its colour and weight1 and perhaps malleableness too2 which1 for aught ,i know1 would be changed into a perfect friability4 ,water1 in which to us fluidity is an essential quality1 left to itself1 would cease to be fluid4 ,but if inanimate bodies owe so much of their present state to other bodies without them1 that they would not be what they appear to us were those bodies that environ them removed2 it is yet more so in vegetables1 which are nourished1 grow1 and produce leaves1 flowers1 and seeds1 in a constant succession4 ,and if we look a little nearer into the state of animals1 we shall find that their dependence1 as to life1 motion1 and the most considerable qualities to be observed in them1 is so wholly on extrinsical causes and qualities of other bodies that make no part of them1 that they cannot subsist a moment without them3 though yet those bodies on which they depend are little taken notice of1 and make no part of the complex ideas we frame of those animals4 ,take the air but for a minute from the greatest part of living creatures1 and they presently lose sense1 life1 and motion4 ,this the necessity of breathing has forced into our knowledge4 ,but how many other extrinsical and possibly very remote bodies do the springs of these admirable machines depend on1 which are not vulgarly observed1 or so much as thought on2 and how many are there which the severest inquiry can never discover8 ,the inhabitants of this spot of the universe1 though removed so many millions of miles from the sun1 yet depend so much on the duly tempered motion of particles coming from or agitated by it1 that were this earth removed but a small part of the distance out of its present situation1 and placed a little further or nearer that source of heat1 it is more than probable that the greatest part of the animals in it would immediately perish3 since we find them so often destroyed by an excess or defect of the sun's warmth1 which an accidental position in some parts of this our little globe exposes them to4 ,the qualities observed in a loadstone must needs have their source far beyond the confines of that body2 and the ravage made often on several sorts of animals by invisible causes1 the certain death 7as we are told7 of some of them1 by barely passing the line1 or1 as it is certain of other1 by being removed into a neighbouring country2 evidently show that the concurrence and operations of several bodies1 with which they are seldom thought to have anything to do1 is absolutely necessary to make them be what they appear to us1 and to preserve those qualities by which we know and distinguish them4 ,we are then quite out of the way1 when we think that things contain ,,within ,,themselves the qualities that appear to us in them2 and we in vain search for that constitution within the body of a fly or an elephant1 upon which depend those qualities and powers we observe in them4 ,for which1 perhaps1 to understand them aright1 we ought to look not only beyond this our earth and atmosphere1 but even beyond the sun or remotest star our eyes have yet discovered4 ,for how much the being and operation of particular substances in this our globe depends on causes utterly beyond our view1 is impossible for us to determine4 ,we see and perceive some of the motions and grosser operations of things here about us2 but whence the streams come that keep all these curious machines in motion and repair1 how conveyed and modified1 is beyond our notice and apprehension3 and the great parts and wheels1 as ,i may so say1 of this stupendous structure of the universe1 may1 for aught we know1 have such a connexion and dependence in their influences and operations one upon another1 that perhaps things in this our mansion would put on quite another face1 and cease to be what they are1 if some one of the stars or great bodies incomprehensibly remote from us1 should cease to be or move as it does4 ,this is certain3 things1 however absolute and entire they seem in themselves1 are but retainers to other parts of nature1 for that which they are most taken notice of by us4 ,their observable qualities1 actions1 and powers are owing to something without them2 and there is not so complete and perfect a part that we know of nature1 which does not owe the being it has1 and the excellences of it1 to its neighbours2 and we must not confine our thoughts within the surface of any body1 but look a great deal further1 to comprehend perfectly those qualities that are in it4 #ab4 ,our nominal essences of ,substances furnish few universal propositions about them that are certain4 ,if this be so1 it is not to be wondered that we have very imperfect ideas of substances1 and that the real essences1 on which depend their properties and operations1 are unknown to us4 ,we cannot discover so much as that size1 figure1 and texture of their minute and active parts1 which is really in much less the different motions and impulses made in and upon them by bodies from without1 upon which depends1 and by which is formed the greatest and most remarkable part of those qualities we observe in them1 and of which our complex ideas of them are made up4 ,this consideration alone is enough to put an end to all our hopes of ever having the ideas of their real essences2 which whilst we want1 the nominal essences we make use of instead of them will be able to furnish us but very sparingly with any general knowledge1 or universal propositions capable of real certainty4 #ac4 ,judgment of ,probability concerning ,substances may reach further3 but that is not ,knowledge4 ,we are not therefore to wonder1 if certainty be to be found in very few general propositions made concerning substances3 our knowledge of their qualities and properties goes very seldom further than our senses reach and inform us4 ,possibly inquisitive and observing men may1 by strength of judgment1 penetrate further1 and1 on probabilities taken from wary observation1 and hints well laid together1 often guess right at what experience has not yet discovered to them4 ,but this is but guessing still2 it amounts only to opinion1 and has not that certainty which is requisite to knowledge4 ,for all general knowledge lies only in our own thoughts1 and consists barely in the contemplation of our own abstract ideas4 ,wherever we perceive any agreement or disagreement amongst them1 there we have general knowledge2 and by putting the names of those ideas together accordingly in propositions1 can with certainty pronounce general truths4 ,but because the abstract ideas of substances1 for which their specific names stand1 whenever they have any distinct and determinate signification1 have a discoverable connexion or inconsistency with but a very few other ideas1 the certainty of universal propositions concerning substances is very narrow and scanty1 in that part which is our principal inquiry concerning them2 and there are scarce any of the names of substances1 let the idea it is applied to be what it will1 of which we can generally1 and with certainty1 pronounce1 that it has or has not this or that other quality belonging to it1 and constantly co-existing or inconsistent with that idea1 wherever it is to be found4 #ad4 ,what is requisite for our ,knowledge of ,substances4 ,before we can have any tolerable knowledge of this kind1 we must ,first know what changes the primary qualities of one body do regularly produce in the primary qualities of another1 and how4 ,secondly1 ,we must know what primary qualities of any body produce certain sensations or ideas in us4 ,this is in truth no less than to know ,,all the effects of matter1 under its divers modifications of bulk1 figure1 cohesion of parts1 motion and rest4 ,which1 ,i think every body will allow1 is utterly impossible to be known by us without revelation4 ,nor if it were revealed to us what sort of figure1 bulk1 and motion of corpuscles would produce in us the sensation of a yellow colour1 and what sort of figure1 bulk1 and texture of parts in the superficies of any body were fit to give such corpuscles their due motion to produce that colour2 would that be enough to make universal propositions with certainty1 concerning the several sorts of them2 unless we had faculties acute enough to perceive the precise bulk1 figure1 texture1 and motion of bodies1 in those minute parts1 by which they operate on our senses1 so that we might by those frame our abstract ideas of them4 ,i have mentioned here only corporeal substances1 whose operations seem to lie more level to our understandings4 ,for as to the operations of spirits1 both their thinking and moving of bodies1 we at first sight find ourselves at a loss2 though perhaps1 when we have applied our thoughts a little nearer to the consideration of bodies and their operations1 and examined how far our notions1 even in these1 reach with any clearness beyond sensible matter of fact1 we shall be bound to confess that1 even in these too1 our discoveries amount to very little beyond perfect ignorance and incapacity4 #ae4 ,whilst our complex ,ideas of ,substances contain not ideas of their real ,constitutions1 we can make but few general ,propositions concerning them4 ,this is evident1 the abstract complex ideas of substances1 for which their general names stand1 not comprehending their real constitutions1 can afford us very little universal certainty4 ,because our ideas of them are not made up of that on which those qualities we observe in them1 and would inform ourselves about1 do depend1 or with which they have any certain connexion3 v4g4 let the ideas to which we give the name ,,man be1 as it commonly is1 a body of the ordinary shape1 with sense1 voluntary motion1 and reason joined to it4 ,this being the abstract idea1 and consequently the essence of ,,our species1 man1 we can make but very few general certain propositions concerning man1 standing for such an idea4 ,because1 not knowing the real constitution on which sensation1 power of motion1 and reasoning1 with that peculiar shape1 depend1 and whereby they are united together in the same subject1 there are very few other qualities with which we can perceive them to have a necessary connexion3 and therefore we cannot with certainty affirm3 ,that all men sleep by intervals2 ,that no man can be nourished by wood or stones2 ,that all men will be poisoned by hemlock3 because these ideas have no connexion nor repugnancy with this our nominal essence of man1 with this abstract idea that name stands for4 ,we must1 in these and the like1 appeal to trial in particular subjects1 which can reach but a little way4 ,we must content ourselves with probability in the rest3 but can have no general certainty1 whilst our specific idea of man contains not that real constitution which is the root wherein all his inseparable qualities are united1 and from whence they flow4 ,whilst our idea the word ,,man stands for is only an imperfect collection of some sensible qualities and powers in him1 there is no discernible connexion or repugnance between our specific idea1 and the operation of either the parts of hemlock or stones upon his constitution4 ,there are animals that safely eat hemlock1 and others that are nourished by wood and stones3 but as long as we want ideas of those real constitutions of different sorts of animals whereon these and the like qualities and powers depend1 we must not hope to reach certainty in universal propositions concerning them4 ,those few ideas only which have a discernible connexion with our nominal essence1 or any part of it1 can afford us such propositions4 ,but these are so few1 and of so little moment1 that we may justly look on our certain general knowledge of substances as almost none at all4 #af4 ,wherein lies the general ,certainty of ,propositions4 ,to conclude3 general propositions1 of what kind soever1 are then only capable of certainty1 when the terms used in them stand for such ideas1 whose agreement or disagreement1 as there expressed1 is capable to be discovered by us4 ,and we are then certain of their truth or falsehood1 when we perceive the ideas the terms stand for to agree or not agree1 according as they are affirmed or denied one of another4 ,whence we may take notice1 that general certainty is never to be found but in our ideas4 ,whenever we go to seek it elsewhere1 in experiment or observations without us1 our knowledge goes not beyond particulars4 ,it is the contemplation of our own abstract ideas that alone is able to afford us general knowledge4 ,,chapter ,,vii4 ,,of ,,maxims #a4 ,maxims or ,axioms are ,self-evident ,propositions4 ,,there are a sort of propositions1 which1 under the name of ,,maxims and ,,axioms1 have passed for principles of science3 and because they are ,,self-,,evident1 have been supposed innate1 without that anybody 7that ,i know7 ever went about to show the reason and foundation of their clearness or cogency4 ,it may1 however1 be worth while to inquire into the reason of their evidence1 and see whether it be peculiar to them alone2 and also to examine how far they influence and govern our other knowledge4 #b4 ,where in that ,self-evidence consists4 ,knowledge1 as has been shown1 consists in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas4 ,now1 where that agreement or disagreement is perceived immediately by itself1 without the intervention or help of any other1 there our knowledge is self-evident4 ,this will appear to be so to any who will but consider any of those propositions which1 without any proof1 he assents to at first sight3 for in all of them he will find that the reason of his assent is from that agreement or disagreement which the mind1 by an immediate comparing them1 finds in those ideas answering the affirmation or negation in the proposition4 #c4 ,self evidence not peculiar to received ,axioms4 ,this being so1 in the next place1 let us consider whether this self-evidence be peculiar only to those propositions which commonly pass under the name of maxims1 and have the dignity of axioms allowed them4 ,and here it is plain1 that several other truths1 not allowed to be axioms1 partake equally with them in this self-evidence4 ,this we shall see1 if we go over these several sorts of agreement or disagreement of ideas which ,i have above mentioned1 viz4 identity1 relation1 co-existence1 and real existence2 which will discover to us1 that not only those few propositions which have had the credit of maxims are self-evident1 but a great many1 even almost an infinite number of other propositions are such4 #d4 ,as to ,identity and ,diversity all ,propositions are equally self-evident4 ,i4 ,for1 ,,first1 ,the immediate perception of the agreement or disagreement of ,,identity being founded in the mind's having distinct ideas1 this affords us as many self-evident propositions as we have distinct ideas4 ,every one that has any knowledge at all1 has1 as the foundation of it1 various and distinct ideas3 and it is the first act of the mind 7without which it can never be capable of any knowledge7 to know every one of its ideas by itself1 and distinguish it from others4 ,every one finds in himself1 that he knows the ideas he has2 that he knows also1 when any one is in his understanding1 and what it is2 and that when more than one are there1 he knows them distinctly and unconfusedly one from another2 which always being so1 7it being impossible but that he should perceive what he perceives17 he can never be in doubt when any idea is in his mind1 that it is there1 and is that idea it is2 and that two distinct ideas1 when they are in his mind1 are there1 and are not one and the same idea4 ,so that all such affirmations and negations are made without any possibility of doubt1 uncertainty1 or hesitation1 and must necessarily be assented to as soon as understood2 that is1 as soon as we have in our minds determined ideas1 which the terms in the proposition stand for4 ,and1 therefore1 whenever the mind with attention considers any proposition1 so as to perceive the two ideas signified by the terms1 and affirmed or denied one of the other to be the same or different2 it is presently and infallibly certain of the truth of such a proposition2 and this equally whether these propositions be in terms standing for more general ideas1 or such as are less so3 v4g4 whether the general idea of ,being be affirmed of itself1 as in this proposition1 'whatsoever is1 is'2 or a more particular idea be affirmed of itself1 as 'a man is a man'2 or1 'whatsoever is white is white'2 or whether the idea of being in general be denied of not-,being1 which is the only 7if ,i may so call it7 idea different from it1 as in this other proposition1 'it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be'3 or any idea of any particular being be denied of another different from it1 as 'a man is not a horse'2 'red is not blue4' ,the difference of the ideas1 as soon as the terms are understood1 makes the truth of the proposition presently visible1 and that with an equal certainty and easiness in the less as well as the more general propositions2 and all for the same reason1 viz4 because the mind perceives1 in any ideas that it has1 the same idea to be the same with itself2 and two different ideas to be different1 and not the same2 and this it is equally certain of1 whether these ideas be more or less general1 abstract1 and comprehensive4 ,it is not1 therefore1 alone to these two general propositions--'whatsoever is1 is'2 and 'it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be'--that this sort of self-evidence belongs by any peculiar right4 ,the perception of being1 or not being1 belongs no more to these vague ideas1 signified by the terms ,,whatsoever1 and ,,thing1 than it does to any other ideas4 ,these two general maxims1 amounting to no more1 in short1 but this1 that ,,the ,,same ,,is ,,the ,,same1 and ,,the ,,same ,,is ,,not ,,different1 are truths known in more particular instances1 as well as in those general maxims2 and known also in particular instances1 before these general maxims are ever thought on2 and draw all their force from the discernment of the mind employed about particular ideas4 ,there is nothing more visible than that the mind1 without the help of any proof1 or reflection on either of these general propositions1 perceives so clearly1 and knows so certainly1 that the idea of white is the idea of white1 and not the idea of blue2 and that the idea of white1 when it is in the mind1 is there1 and is not absent2 that the consideration of these axioms can add nothing to the evidence or certainty of its knowledge4 ,just so it is 7as every one may experiment in himself7 in all the ideas a man has in his mind3 he knows each to be itself1 and not to be another2 and to be in his mind1 and not away when it is there1 with a certainty that cannot be greater2 and1 therefore1 the truth of no general proposition can be known with a greater certainty1 nor add anything to this4 ,so that1 in respect of identity1 our intuitive knowledge reaches as far as our ideas4 ,and we are capable of making as many self-evident propositions1 as we have names for distinct ideas4 ,and ,i appeal to every one's own mind1 whether this proposition1 'a circle is a circle1' be not as self-evident a proposition as that consisting of more general terms1 'whatsoever is1 is'2 and again1 whether this proposition1 'blue is not red1' be not a proposition that the mind can no more doubt of1 as soon as it understands the words1 than it does of that axiom1 'it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be8' ,and so of all the like4 #e4 ,in ,co-existance we have few self-evident ,propositions4 ,,ii4 ,,secondly1 as to ,,co-,,existance1 or such a necessary connexion between two ideas that1 in the subject where one of them is supposed1 there the other must necessarily be also3 of such agreement or disagreement as this1 the mind has an immediate perception but in very few of them4 ,and therefore in this sort we have but very little intuitive knowledge3 nor are there to be found very many propositions that are self-evident1 though some there are3 v4g4 the idea of filling a place equal to the contents of its superficies1 being annexed to our idea of body1 ,i think it is a self-evident proposition1 that two bodies cannot be in the same place4 #f4 ,,iii4 ,in other ,relations we may have many4 ,,thirdly1 ,as to the ,,relations ,,of ,,modes1 mathematicians have framed many axioms concerning that one relation of equality4 ,as1 'equals taken from equals1 the remainder will be equal'2 which1 with the rest of that kind1 however they are received for maxims by the mathematicians1 and are unquestionable truths1 yet1 ,i think1 that any one who considers them will not find that they have a clearer self-evidence than these1--that 'one and one are equal to two'1 that 'if you take from the five fingers of one hand two1 and from the five fingers of the other hand two1 the remaining numbers will be equal4' ,these and a thousand other such propositions may be found in numbers1 which1 at the very first hearing1 force the assent1 and carry with them an equal if not greater clearness1 than those mathematical axioms4 #g4 ,,iv4 ,concerning real ,existence1 we have none4 ,,fourthly1 as to ,,real ,,existance1 since that has no connexion with any other of our ideas1 but that of ourselves1 and of a ,first ,being1 we have in that1 concerning the real existence of all other beings1 not so much as demonstrative1 much less a self-evident knowledge3 and1 therefore1 concerning those1 there are no maxims4 #h4 ,these ,axioms do not much influence our other ,knowledge4 ,in the next place let us consider1 what influence these received maxims have upon the other parts of our knowledge4 ,the rules established in the schools1 that all reasonings are ,,ex ,,praecognitis ,,et ,,praeconcessis1 seem to lay the foundation of all other knowledge in these maxims1 and to suppose them to be ,,praecognita4 ,whereby1 ,i think1 are meant these two things3 first1 that these axioms are those truths that are first known to the mind2 and1 secondly1 that upon them the other parts of our knowledge depend4 #i4 ,because ,maxims or ,axioms are not the ,truths we first knew4 ,,first1 ,that they are not the truths first known to the mind is evident to experience1 as we have shown in another place4 7,book ,i4 chap1 #a47 ,who perceives not that a child certainly knows that a stranger is not its mother2 that its sucking-bottle is not the rod1 long before he knows that 'it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be8' ,and how many truths are there about numbers1 which it is obvious to observe that the mind is perfectly acquainted with1 and fully convinced of1 before it ever thought on these general maxims1 to which mathematicians1 in their arguings1 do sometimes refer them8 ,whereof the reason is very plain3 for that which makes the mind assent to such propositions1 being nothing else but the perception it has of the agreement or disagreement of its ideas1 according as it finds them affirmed or denied one of another in words it understands2 and every idea being known to be what it is1 and every two distinct ideas being known not to be the same2 it must necessarily follow that such self-evident truths must be first known which consist of ideas that are first in the mind4 ,and the ideas first in the mind1 it is evident1 are those of particular things1 from whence by slow degrees1 the understanding proceeds to some few general ones2 which being taken from the ordinary and familiar objects of sense1 are settled in the mind1 with general names to them4 ,thus ,,particular ,,ideas are first received and distinguished1 and so knowledge got about them2 and next to them1 the less general or specific1 which are next to particular4 ,for abstract ideas are not so obvious or easy to children1 or the yet unexercised mind1 as particular ones4 ,if they seem so to grown men1 it is only because by constant and familiar use they are made so4 ,for1 when we nicely reflect upon them1 we shall find that ,,general ,,ideas are fictions and contrivances of the mind1 that carry difficulty with them and do not so easily offer themselves as we are apt to imagine4 ,for example1 does it not require some pains and skill to form the general idea of a triangle17which is yet none of the more abstract1 comprehensive1 and difficult17 for it must be neither oblique nor rectangle1 neither equilateral1 equicrural1 nor scalinon2 but all and none of these at once4 ,in effect1 it is something imperfect1 that cannot exist2 an idea wherein some part of several different and inconsistant ideas are put together4 ,it is true1 the mind1 in this imperfect state1 has need of such ideas1 and makes all the haste to them it can1 for the conveniency of communication and enlargement of knowledge2 to both which it is naturally very much inclined4 ,but yet one has reason to suspect such ideas are marks of our imperfection2 at least1 this is enough to show that the most abstract and general ideas are not those that the mind is first and most easily acquainted with1 nor such as its earliest knowledge is conversant about4 #aj4 ,because on perception of them the other ,parts of our ,knowledge do not depend4 ,secondly1 from what has been said it plainly follows1 that these magnified maxims are not the principles and foundations of all our other knowledge4 ,for if there be a great many other truths1 which have as much self-evidence as they1 and a great many that we know before them1 it is impossible they should be the principles from which we deduce all other truths4 ,is it impossible to know that one and two are equal to three1 but by virtue of this1 or some such axiom1 viz4 'the whole is equal to all its parts taken together8' ,many a one knows that one and two are equal to three1 without having heard1 or thought on1 that or any other axiom by which it might be proved2 and knows it as certainly as any other man knows1 that 'the whole is equal to all its parts1' or any other maxim2 and all from the same reason of self-evidence3 the equality of those ideas being as visible and certain to him without that or any other axiom as with it1 it needing no proof to make it perceived4 ,nor after the knowledge1 that the whole is equal to all its parts1 does he know that one and two are equal to three1 better or more certainly than he did before4 ,for if there be any odds in those ideas1 the whole and parts are more obscure1 or at least more difficult to be settled in the mind than those of one1 two1 and three4 ,and indeed1 ,i think1 ,i may ask these men1 who will needs have all knowledge1 besides those general principles themselves1 to depend on general1 innate1 and self-evident principles4 ,what principle is requisite to prove that one and one are two1 that two and two are four1 that three times two are six8 ,which being known without any proof1 do evince1 ,that either all knowledge does not depend on certain ,,praecognita or general maxims1 called principles2 or else that these are principles3 and if these are to be counted principles1 a great part of numeration will be so4 ,to which1 if we add all the self-evident propositions which may be made about all our distinct ideas1 principles will be almost infinite1 at least innumerable1 which men arrive to the knowledge of1 at different ages2 and a great many of these innate principles they never come to know all their lives4 ,but whether they come in view of the mind earlier or later1 this is true of them1 that they are all known by their native evidence2 are wholly independent2 receive no light1 nor are capable of any proof one from another2 much less the more particular from the more general1 or the more simple from the more compounded2 the more simple and less abstract being the most familiar1 and the easier and earlier apprehended4 ,but whichever be the clearest ideas1 the evidence and certainty of all such propositions is in this1 ,that a man sees the same idea to be the same idea1 and infallibly perceives two different ideas to be different ideas4 ,for when a man has in his understanding the ideas of one and of two1 the idea of yellow1 and the idea of blue1 he cannot but certainly know that the idea of one is the idea of one1 and not the idea of two2 and that the idea of yellow is the idea of yellow1 and not the idea of blue4 ,for a man cannot confound the ideas in his mind1 which he has distinct3 that would be to have them confused and distinct at the same time1 which is a contradiction3 and to have none distinct1 is to have no use of our faculties1 to have no knowledge at all4 ,and1 therefore1 what idea soever is affirmed of itself1 or whatsoever two entire distinct ideas are denied one of another1 the mind cannot but assent to such a proposition as infallibly true1 as soon as it understands the terms1 without hesitation or need of proof1 or regarding those made in more general terms and called maxims4 #aa4 ,what use these general ,maxims or ,axioms have4 ,what shall we then say8 ,are these general maxims of no use8 ,by no means2 though perhaps their use is not that which it is commonly taken to be4 ,but1 since doubting in the least of what hath been by some men ascribed to these maxims may be apt to be cried out against1 as overturning the foundations of all the sciences2 it may be worth while to consider them with respect to other parts of our knowledge1 and examine more particularly to what purposes they serve1 and to what not4 ,of no use to prove less general propositions1 nor as foundations on consideration of which any science has been built4 7#a7 ,it is evident from what has been already said1 that they are of no use to prove or confirm less general self-evident propositions4 7#b7 ,it is as plain that they are not1 nor have been the foundations whereon any science hath been built4 ,there is1 ,i know1 a great deal of talk1 propagated from scholastic men1 of sciences and the maxims on which they are built3 but it has been my ill-luck never to meet with any such sciences2 much less any one built upon these two maxims1 ,,what ,,is1 ,,is2 and ,,it ,,is ,,impossible ,,for ,,the ,,same ,,thing ,,to ,,be ,,and ,,not ,,to ,,be4 ,and ,i would be glad to be shown where any such science1 erected upon these or any other general axioms is to be found3 and should be obliged to any one who would lay before me the frame and system of any science so built on these or any such like maxims1 that could not be shown to stand as firm without any consideration of them4 ,i ask1 ,whether these general maxims have not the same use in the study of divinity1 and in theological questions1 that they have in other sciences8 ,they serve here1 too1 to silence wranglers1 and put an end to dispute4 ,but ,i think that nobody will therefore say1 that the ,christian religion is built upon these maxims1 or that the knowledge we have of it is derived from these principles4 ,it is from revelation we have received it1 and without revelation these maxims had never been able to help us to it4 ,when we find out an idea by whose intervention we discover the connexion of two others1 this is a revelation from ,god to us by the voice of reason3 for we then come to know a truth that we did not know before4 ,when ,god declares any truth to us1 this is a revelation to us by the voice of his ,spirit1 and we are advanced in our knowledge4 ,but in neither of these do we receive our light or knowledge from maxims4 ,but in the one1 the things themselves afford it3 and we see the truth in them by perceiving their agreement or disagreement4 ,in the other1 ,god himself affords it immediately to us3 and we see the truth of what he says in his unerring veracity4 7#c7 ,nor as helps in the discovery of yet unknown truths4 ,they are not of use to help men forward in the advancement of sciences1 or new discoveries of yet unknown truths4 ,mr4 ,newton1 in his never enough to be admired book1 has demonstrated several propositions1 which are so many new truths1 before unknown to the world1 and are further advances in mathematical knowledge3 but1 for the discovery of these1 it was not the general maxims1 'what is1 is2' or1 'the whole is bigger than a part1' or the like1 that helped him4 ,these were not the clues that led him into the discovery of the truth and certainty of those propositions4 ,nor was it by them that he got the knowledge of those demonstrations1 but by finding out intermediate ideas that showed the agreement or disagreement of the ideas1 as expressed in the propositions he demonstrated4 ,this is the greatest exercise and improvement of human understanding in the enlarging of knowledge1 and advancing the sciences2 wherein they are far enough from receiving any help from the contemplation of these or the like magnified maxims4 ,would those who have this traditional admiration of these propositions1 that they think no step can be made in knowledge without the support of an axiom1 no stone laid in the building of the sciences without a general maxim1 but distinguish between the method of acquiring knowledge1 and of communicating it2 between the method of raising any science1 and that of teaching it to others1 as far as it is advanced--they would see that those general maxims were not the foundations on which the first discoverers raised their admirable structures1 nor the keys that unlocked and opened those secrets of knowledge4 ,though afterwards1 when schools were erected1 and sciences had their professors to teach what others had found out1 they often made use of maxims1 i4e4 laid down certain propositions which were self-evident1 or to be received for true2 which being settled in the minds of their scholars as unquestionable verities1 they on occasion made use of1 to convince them of truths in particular instances1 that were not so familiar to their minds as those general axioms which had before been inculcated to them1 and carefully settled in their minds4 ,though these particular instances1 when well reflected on1 are no less self-evident to the understanding than the general maxims brought to confirm them3 and it was in those particular instances that the first discoverer found the truth1 without the help of the general maxims3 and so may any one else do1 who with attention considers them4 ,maxims of use in the exposition of what has been discovered1 and in silencing obstinate wranglers4 ,to come1 therefore1 to the use that is made of maxims4 7#a7 ,they are of use1 as has been observed1 in the ordinary methods of teaching sciences as far as they are advanced3 but of little or none in advancing them further4 7#b7 ,they are of use in disputes1 for the silencing of obstinate wranglers1 and bringing those contests to some conclusion4 ,whether a need of them to that end came not in the manner following1 ,i crave leave to inquire4 ,the ,schools having made disputation the touchstone of men's abilities1 and the criterion of knowledge1 adjudged victory to him that kept the field3 and he that had the last word was concluded to have the better of the argument1 if not of the cause4 ,but because by this means there was like to be no decision between skilful combatants1 whilst one never failed of a ,,medius ,,terminus to prove any proposition2 and the other could as constantly1 without or with a distinction1 deny the major or minor2 to prevent1 as much as could be1 running out of disputes into an endless train of syllogisms1 certain general propositions--most of them1 indeed1 self-evident--were introduced into the ,schools3 which being such as all men allowed and agreed in1 were looked on as general measures of truth1 and served instead of principles 7where the disputants had not lain down any other between them7 beyond which there was no going1 and which must not be receded from by either side4 ,and thus these maxims1 getting the name of principles1 beyond which men in dispute could not retreat1 were by mistake taken to be the originals and sources from whence all knowledge began1 and the foundations whereon the sciences were built4 ,because when in their disputes they came to any of these1 they stopped there1 and went no further2 the matter was determined4 ,but how much this is a mistake1 hath been already shown4 ,how ,maxims came to be so much in vogue4 ,this method of the ,schools1 which have been thought the fountains of knowledge1 introduced1 as ,i suppose1 the like use of these maxims into a great part of conversation out of the ,schools1 to stop the mouths of cavillers1 whom any one is excused from arguing any longer with1 when they deny these general self-evident principles received by all reasonable men who have once thought of them3 but yet their use herein is but to put an end to wrangling4 ,they in truth1 when urged in such cases1 teach nothing3 that is already done by the intermediate ideas made use of in the debate1 whose connexion may be seen without the help of those maxims1 and so the truth known before the maxim is produced1 and the argument brought to a first principle4 ,men would give off a wrong argument before it came to that1 if in their disputes they proposed to themselves the finding and embracing of truth1 and not a contest for victory4 ,and thus maxims have their use to put a stop to their perverseness1 whose ingenuity should have yielded sooner4 ,but the method of the ,schools having allowed and encouraged men to oppose and resist evident truth till they are baffled1 i4e4 till they are reduced to contradict themselves1 or some established principles3 it is no wonder that they should not in civil conversation be ashamed of that which in the ,schools is counted a virtue and a glory1 viz4 obstinately to maintain that side of the question they have chosen1 whether true or false1 to the last extremity2 even after conviction4 ,a strange way to attain truth and knowledge3 and that which ,i think the rational part of mankind1 not corrupted by education1 could scare believe should ever be admitted amongst the lovers of truth1 and students of religion or nature1 or introduced into the seminaries of those who are to propegate the truths of religion or philosophy amongst the ignorant and unconvinced4 ,how much such a way of learning is like to turn young men's minds from the sincere search and love of truth2 nay1 and to make them doubt whether there is any such thing1 or1 at least1 worth the adhering to1 ,i shall not now inquire4 ,this ,i think1 that1 bating those places1 which brought the ,peripatetic ,philosophy into their schools1 where it continued many ages1 without teaching the world anything but the art of wrangling1 these maxims were nowhere thought the foundations on which the sciences were built1 nor the great helps to the advancement of knowledge4 ,of great use to stop wranglers in disputes1 but of little use to the discovery of truths4 ,as to these general maxims1 therefore1 they are1 as ,i have said1 of great use in disputes1 to stop the mouths of wranglers2 but not of much use to the discovery of unknown truths1 or to help the mind forwards in its search after knowledge4 ,for who ever began to build his knowledge on this general proposition1 ,,what ,,is1 ,,is2 or1 ,,it ,,is ,,impossible ,,for ,,the ,,same ,,thing ,,to ,,be ,,and ,,not ,,to ,,be3 and from either of these1 as from a principle of science1 deduced a system of useful knowledge8 ,wrong opinions often involving contradictions1 one of these maxims1 as a touchstone1 may serve well to show whither they lead4 ,but yet1 however fit to lay open the absurdity or mistake of a man's reasoning or opinion1 they are of very little use for enlightening the understanding3 and it will not be found that the mind receives much help from them in its progress in knowledge2 which would be neither less1 nor less certain1 were these two general propositions never thought on4 ,it is true1 as ,i have said1 they sometimes serve in argumentation to stop a wrangler's mouth1 by showing the absurdity of what he saith1 and by exposing him to the shame of contradicting what all the world knows1 and he himself cannot but own to be true4 ,but it is one thing to show a man that he is in an error1 and another to put him in possession of truth1 and ,i would fain know what truths these two propositions are able to teach1 and by their influence make us know which we did not know before1 or could not know without them4 ,let us reason from them as well as we can1 they are only about identical predications1 and influence1 if any at all1 none but such4 ,each particular proposition concerning identity or diversity is as clearly and certainly known in itself1 if attended to1 as either of these general ones3 only these general ones1 as serving in all cases1 are therefore more inculcated and insisted on4 ,as to other less general maxims1 many of them are no more than bare verbal propositions1 and teach us nothing but the respect and import of names one to another4 ',the whole is equal to all its parts3' what real truth1 ,i beseech you1 does it teach us8 ,what more is contained in that maxim1 than what the signification of the word ,,totum1 or the ,,whole1 does of itself import8 ,and he that knows that the ,,word whole stands for what is made up of all its parts1 knows very little less than that the whole is equal to all its parts4 ,and1 upon the same ground1 ,i think that this proposition1 ',a hill is higher than a valley'1 and several the like1 may also pass for maxims4 ,but yet masters of mathematics1 when they would1 as teachers of what they know1 initiate others in that science do not without reason place this and some other such maxims at the entrance of their systems2 that their scholars1 having in the beginning perfectly acquainted their thoughts with these propositions1 made in such general terms1 may be used to make such reflections1 and have these more general propositions1 as formed rules and sayings1 ready to apply to all particular cases4 ,not that if they be equally weighed1 they are more clear and evident than the particular instances they are brought to confirm2 but that1 being more familiar to the mind1 the very naming them is enough to satisfy the understanding4 ,but this1 ,i say1 is more from our custom of using them1 and the establishment they have got in our minds by our often thinking of them1 than from the different evidence of the things4 ,but before custom has settled methods of thinking and reasoning in our minds1 ,i am apt to imagine it is quite otherwise2 and that the child1 when a part of his apple is taken away1 knows it better in that particular instance1 than by this general proposition1 ',the whole is equal to all its parts2' and that1 if one of these have need to be confirmed to him by the other1 the general has more need to be let into his mind by the particular1 than the particular by the general4 ,for in particulars our knowledge begins1 and so spreads itself1 by degrees1 to generals ,footnote3 ,this is the order in time of the conscious acquistion of knowledge that is human4 ,the ,essay might be regarded as a commentary on this one sentence4 ,our intellectual progress is from particulars and involuntary recipiency1 through reactive doubt and criticism1 into what is at last reasoned faith44 ,though afterwards the mind takes the quite contrary course1 and having drawn its knowledge into as general propositions as it can1 makes those familiar to its thoughts1 and accustoms itself to have recourse to them1 as to the standards of truth and falsehood4 ,footnote3 ,this is the philosophic attitude4 ,therein one consciously apprehends the intellectual necessities that were ,,unconciously ,,presupposed1 its previous intellectual progress4 ,in philosophy we 'draw our knowledge into as general propositions as it can' be made to assume1 and thus either learn to see it as an organic while in a speculative unity1 or learn that it cannot be so seen in a finite intelligence1 and that even at the last it must remain 'broken' and mysterious in the human understanding4 ,by which familiar use of them1 as rules to measure the truth of other propositions1 it comes in time to be thought1 that more particular propositions have their truth and evidence from their conformity to these more general ones1 which1 in discourse and argumentation1 are so frequently urged1 and constantly admitted4 ,and this ,i think to be the reason why1 amongst so many self-evident propositions1 the ,,most ,,general ,,only have had the title of ,,maxims4 #ab4 ,maxims1 if care be not taken in the ,use of ,words1 may prove ,contradictions4 ,one thing further1 ,i think1 it may not be amiss to observe concerning these general maxims1 ,that they are so far from improving or establishing our minds in true knowledge that if our notions be wrong1 loose1 or unsteady1 and we resign up our thoughts to the sound of words1 rather than fix them on settled1 determined ideas of things2 ,i say these general maxims will serve to confirm us in mistakes2 and in such a way of use of words1 which is most common1 will serve to prove contradictions3 v4g4 he that with ,descartes shall frame in his mind an idea of what he calls body to be nothing but extension1 may easily demonstrate that there is no vacuum1 i4e4 no space void of body1 by this maxim1 ,,what ,,is1 ,,is4 ,for the idea to which he annexes the name body1 being bare extension1 his knowledge that space cannot be without body1 is certain4 ,for he knows his own idea of extension clearly and distinctly1 and knows that it is what it is1 and not another idea1 though it be called by these three names1--extension1 body1 space4 ,which three words1 standing for one and the same idea1 may1 no doubt1 with the same evidence and certainty be affirmed one of another1 as each of itself3 and it is as certain1 that1 whilst ,i use them all to stand for one and the same idea1 this predication is as true and identical in its signification1 that 'space is body1' as this predication is true and identical1 that 'body is body1' both in signification and sound4 #ac4 ,instance in ,vacuum4 ,but if another should come and make to himself another idea1 different from ,descartes's1 of the thing1 which yet with ,descartes he calls by the same name body1 and make his idea1 which he expresses by the word body1 to be of a thing that hath both extension and solidity together2 he will as easily demonstrate1 that there may be a vacuum or space without a body1 as ,descartes demonstrated the contrary4 ,because the idea to which he gives the name space being barely the simple one of extension1 and the idea to which he gives the name body being the complex idea of extension and resistibility or solidity1 together in the same subject1 these two ideas are not exactly one and the same1 but in the understanding as distinct as the ideas of one and two1 white and black1 or as of ,,corporeity and ,,humanity1 if ,i may use those barbarous terms3 and therefore the predication of them in our minds1 or in words standing for them1 is not identical1 but the negation of them one of another2 viz4 this proposition3 ',extension or space is not body1' is as true and evidently certain as this maxim1 ,,it ,,is ,,impossible ,,for ,,the ,,same ,,thing ,,to ,,be ,,and ,,not ,,to ,,be1 can make any proposition4 #ad4 ,but they prove not the ,existance of things without us4 ,but yet1 though both these propositions 7as you see7 may be equally demonstrated1 viz4 that there may be a vacuum1 and that there cannot be a vacuum1 by these two certain principles1 viz4 ,,what ,,is1 ,,is1 and ,,the ,,same ,,thing ,,cannot ,,be ,,and ,,not ,,be3 yet neither of these principles will serve to prove to us1 that any1 or what bodies do exist3 for that we are left to our senses to discover to us as far as they can4 ,those universal and self-evident principles being only our constant1 clear1 and distinct knowledge of our own ideas1 more general or comprehensive1 can assure us of nothing that passes without the mind3 their certainty is founded only upon the knowledge we have of each idea by itself1 and of its distinction from others1 about which we cannot be mistaken whilst they are in our minds2 though we may be and often are mistaken when we retain the names without the ideas2 or use them confusedly1 sometimes for one and sometimes for another idea4 ,in which cases the force of these axioms1 reaching only to the sound1 and not the signification of the words1 serves only to lead us into confusion1 mistake1 and error4 ,it is to show men that these maxims1 however cried up for the great guards of truth1 will not secure them from error in a careless loose use of their words1 that ,i have made this remark4 ,in all that is here suggested concerning their little use for the improvement of knowledge1 or dangerous use in undetermined ideas1 ,i have been far enough from saying or intending they should be laid aside2 as some have been too forward to charge me4 ,i affirm them to be truths1 self-evident truths2 and so cannot be laid aside4 ,as far as their influence will reach1 it is in vain to endeavour1 nor will ,i attempt1 to abridge it4 ,but yet1 without any injury to truth or knowledge1 ,i may have reason to think their use is not answerable to the great stress which seems to be laid on them2 and ,i may warn men not to make an ill use of them1 for the confirming themselves in errors4 #ae4 ,they cannot add to our knowledge of ,substances1 and their ,application to complex ,ideas is dangerous4 ,but let them be of what use they will in verbal propositions1 they cannot discover or prove to us the least knowledge of the nature of substances1 as they are found and exist without us1 any further than grounded on experience4 ,and though the consequence of these two propositions1 called principles1 be very clear1 and their use not dangerous or hurtful1 in the probation of such things wherein there is no need at all of them for proof1 but such as are clear by themselves without them1 viz4 where our ideas are determined and known by the names that stand for them3 yet when these principles1 viz4 ,,what ,,is1 ,,is1 and ,,it ,,is ,,impossible ,,for ,,the ,,same ,,thing ,,to ,,be ,,and ,,not ,,to ,,be1 are made use of in the probation of propositions wherein are words standing for complex ideas1 v4g4 man1 horse1 gold1 virtue2 there they are of infinite danger1 and most commonly make men receive and retain falsehood for manifest truth1 and uncertainty for demonstration3 upon which follow error1 obstinacy1 and all the mischiefs that can happen from wrong reasoning4 ,the reason whereof is not1 that these principles are less true or of less force in proving propositions made of terms standing for complex ideas1 than where the propositions are about simple ideas4 ,but because men mistake generally1--thinking that where the same terms are preserved1 the propositions are about the same things1 though the ideas they stand for are in truth different1 therefore these maxims are made use of to support those which in sound and appearance are contradictory propositions2 and is clear in the demonstrations above mentioned about a vacuum4 ,so that whilst men take words for things1 as usually they do1 these maxims may and do commonly serve to prove contradictory propositions2 as shall yet be further made manifest #af4 ,instance in demonstrations about ,man which can only be verbal4 ,for instance3 let ,,man be that concerning which you would by these first principles demonstrate anything1 and we shall see1 that so far as demonstration is by these principles1 it is only verbal1 and gives us no certain1 universal1 true proposition1 or knowledge1 of any being existing without us4 ,first1 a child having framed the idea of a man1 it is probable that his idea is just like that picture which the painter makes of the visible appearances joined together2 and such a complication of ideas together in his understanding makes up the single complex idea which he calls man1 whereof white or flesh-colour in ,england being one1 the child can demonstrate to you that a negro is not a man1 because white colour was one of the constant simple ideas of the complex idea he calls man2 and therefore he can demonstrate1 by the principle1 ,,it ,,is ,,impossible ,,for ,,the ,,same ,,thing ,,to ,,be ,,and ,,not ,,to ,,be1 that a negro is ,,not a man2 the foundation of his certainty being not that universal proposition1 which perhaps he never heard nor thought of1 but the clear1 distinct perception he hath of his own simple ideas of black and white1 which he cannot be persuaded to take1 nor can ever mistake one for another1 whether he knows that maxim or no4 ,and to this child1 or any one who hath such an idea1 which he calls man1 can you never demonstrate that a man hath a soul1 because his idea of man includes no such notion or idea in it4 ,and therefore1 to him1 the principle of ,,what ,,is1 ,,is1 proves not this matter2 but it depends upon collection and observation1 by which he is to make his complex idea called man4 #ag4 ,another instance4 ,secondly1 ,another that hath gone further in framing and collecting the idea he calls ,,man1 and to the outward shape adds laughter and rational discourse1 may demonstrate that infants and changelings are no men1 by this maxim1 ,,it ,,is ,,impossible ,,for ,,the ,,same ,,thing ,,to ,,be ,,and ,,not ,,to ,,be2 and ,i have discoursed with very rational men1 who have actually denied that they are men4 #ah4 ,a third instance4 ,thirdly1 ,perhaps another makes up the complex idea which he calls ,,man1 only out of the ideas of body in general1 and the powers of language and reason1 and leaves out the shape wholly3 this man is able to demonstrate that a man may have no hands1 but be ,,quadrupes1 neither of those being included in his idea of man3 and in whatever body or shape he found speech and reason joined1 that was a man2 because1 having a clear knowledge of such a complex idea1 it is certain that ,,what ,,is1 ,,is4 #ai4 ,little use of these ,maxims in ,proofs where we have clear and distinct ,ideas4 ,so that1 if rightly considered1 ,i think we may say1 ,that where our ideas are determined in our minds1 and have annexed to them by us known and steady names under those settled determinations1 there is little need1 or no use at all of these maxims1 to prove the agreement or disagreement of any of them4 ,he that cannot discern the truth or falsehood of such propositions1 without the help of these and the like maxims1 will not be helped by these maxims to do it3 since he cannot be supposed to know the truth of these maxims themselves without proof1 if he cannot know the truth of others without proof1 which are as self-evident as these4 ,upon this ground it is that intuitive knowledge neither requires nor admits any proof1 one part of it more than another4 ,he that will suppose it does1 takes away the foundation of all knowledge and certainty2 and he that needs any proof to make him certain1 and give his assent to this proposition1 that two are equal to two1 will also have need of a proof to make him admit1 that what is1 is4 ,he that needs a probation to convince him that two are not three1 that white is not black1 that a triangle is not a circle1 c41 or any other two determined distinct ideas are not one and the same1 will need also a demonstration to convince him that ,,it ,,is ,,impossible ,,for ,,the ,,same ,,thing ,,to ,,be ,,and ,,not ,,to ,,be4 #bj4 ,their ,use dangerous where our ,ideas are not determined ,and as these maxims are of little use where we have determined ideas1 so they are1 as ,i have showed1 of dangerous use where our ideas are not determined2 and where we use words that are not annexed to determined ideas1 but such as are of a loose and wandering signification1 sometimes standing for one1 and sometimes for another idea3 from which follow mistake and error1 which these maxims 7brought as proofs to establish propositions1 wherein the terms stand for undetermined ideas7 do by their authority confirm and rivet4 ,,chapter ,,viii4 ,,of ,,trifling ,,propositions4 #a4 ,some ,propositions bring no ,increase to our ,knowledge4 ,,whether the maxims treated of in the foregoing chapter be of that use to real knowledge as is generally supposed1 ,i leave to be considered4 ,this1 ,i think1 may confidently be affirmed1 ,that there ,,are universal propositions1 which1 though they be certainly true1 yet they add no light to our understanding2 bring no increase to our knowledge4 ,such are-- #b4 ,as1 ,first1 identical ,propositions4 ,first1 ,all purely ,,identical ,,propositions4 ,these obviously and at first blush appear to contain no instruction in them2 for when we affirm the said term of itself1 whether it be barely verbal1 or whether it contains any clear and real idea1 it shows us nothing but what we must certainly know before1 whether such a proposition be either made by1 or proposed to us4 ,indeed1 that most general one1 ,,what ,,is1 ,,is1 may serve sometimes to show a man the absurdity he is guilty of1 when1 by circumlocution or equivocal terms1 he would in particular instances deny the same thing of itself2 because nobody will so openly bid defiance to common sense1 as to affirm visible and direct contradictions in plain words2 or1 if he does1 a man is excused if he breaks off any further discourse with him4 ,but yet ,i think ,i may say1 that neither that received maxim1 nor any other identical proposition1 teaches us anything2 and though in such kind of propositions this great and magnified maxim1 boasted to be the foundation of demonstration1 may be and often is made use of to confirm them1 yet all it proves amounts to no more than this1 ,that the same word may with great certainty be affirmed of itself1 without any doubt of the truth of any such proposition2 and let me add1 also1 without any real knowledge4 #c4 ,examples4 ,for1 at this rate1 any very ignorant person1 who can but make a proposition1 and knows what he means when he says ay or no1 may make a million of propositions of whose truth he may be infallibly certain1 and yet not know one thing in the world thereby2 v4g4 'what is a soul1 is a soul2' or1 'a soul is a soul2' 'a spirit is a spirit2' 'a fetiche is a fetiche1' c4 ,these all being equivalent to this proposition1 viz4 ,,what ,,is1 ,,is2 i4e4 what hath existence1 hath existence2 or1 who hath a soul1 hath a soul4 ,what is this more than trifling with words8 ,it is but like a monkey shifting his oyster from one hand to the other3 and had he but words1 might no doubt have said1 ',oyster in right hand is subject1 and oyster in left hand is predicate3' and so might have made a self-evident proposition of oyster1 i4e4 oyster is oyster2 and yet1 with all this1 not have been one whit the wiser or more knowing3 and that way of handling the matter would much at one have satisfied the monkey's hunger1 or a man's understanding1 and they would have improved in knowledge and bulk together4 #d4 ,secondly1 ,propositions in which a part of any complex ,idea is predicated of the ,whole4 ,,ii4 ,another sort of trifling propositions is1 ,,when ,a ,,part ,,of ,,the ,,complex ,,idea ,,is ,,predicated ,,of ,,the ,,name ,,of ,,the ,,whole2 a part of the definition of the word defined4 ,such are all propositions wherein the genus is predicated of the species1 or more comprehensive of less comprehensive terms4 ,for what information1 what knowledge1 carries this proposition in it1 viz4 ',lead is a metal' to a man who knows the complex idea the name lead stands for8 ,all the simple ideas that go to the complex one signified by the term metal1 being nothing but what he before comprehended and signified by the name lead4 ,indeed1 to a man that knows the signification of the word metal1 and not of the word lead1 it is a shorter way to explain the signification of the word lead1 by saying it is a metal1 which at once expresses several of its simple ideas1 than to enumerate them one by one1 telling him it is a body very heavy1 fusible1 and malleable4 #e4 ,as part of the ,definition of the ,term ,defined4 ,alike trifling it is to predicate any other part of the definition of the term defined1 or to affirm anyone of the simple ideas of a complex one of the name of the whole complex idea2 as1 ',all gold is fusible4' ,for fusibility being one of the simple ideas that goes to the making up the complex one the sound gold stands for1 what can it be but playing with sounds1 to affirm that of the name gold1 which is comprehended in its received signification8 ,it would be thought little better than ridiculous to affirm gravely1 as a truth of moment1 that gold is yellow2 and ,i see not how it is any jot more material to say it is fusible1 unless that quality be left out of the complex idea1 of which the sound gold is the mark in ordinary speech4 ,what instruction can it carry with it1 to tell one that which he hath been told already1 or he is supposed to know before8 ,for ,i am supposed to know the signification of the word another uses to me1 or else he is to tell me4 ,and if ,i know that the name gold stands for this complex idea of body1 yellow1 heavy1 fusible1 malleable1 it will not much instruct me to put it solemnly afterwards in a proposition1 and gravely say1 all gold is fusible4 ,such propositions can only serve to show the disingenuity of one who will go from the definition of his own terms1 by reminding him sometimes of it2 but carry no knowledge with them1 but of the signification of words1 however certain they be4 #f4 ,instance1 ,man and ,palfrey4 ',every man is an animal1 or living body1' is as certain a proposition as can be2 but no more conducing to the knowledge of things than to say1 a palfrey is an ambling horse1 or a neighing1 ambling animal1 both being only about the signification of words1 and make me know but this--,that body1 sense1 and motion1 or power of sensation and moving1 are three of those ideas that ,i always comprehend and signify by the word man3 and where they are not to be found together1 the ,,name ,,man belongs not to that thing3 and so of the other--,that body1 sense1 and a certain way of going1 with a certain kind of voice1 are some of those ideas which ,i always comprehend and signify by the ,,word ,,palfrey2 and when they are not to be found together1 the name palfrey belongs not to that thing4 ,it is just the same1 and to the same purpose1 when any term standing for any one or more of the simple ideas1 that altogether make up that complex idea which is called man1 is affirmed of the term man3--v4g4 suppose a ,roman signified by the word ,,homo all these distinct ideas united in one subject1 ,,corporietas1 ,,sensibilitas1 ,,potentia ,,se ,,movendi1 ,,rationalitas1 ,,risibilitas2 he might1 no doubt1 with great certainty1 universally affirm one1 more1 or all of these together of the word ,,homo1 but did no more than say that the word ,,homo1 in his country1 comprehended in its signification all these ideas4 ,much like a romance knight1 who by the word ,,palfrey signified these ideas3--body of a certain figure1 four-legged1 with sense1 motion1 ambling1 neighing1 white1 used to have a woman on his back--might with the same certainty universally affirm also any or all of these of the ,,word palfrey3 but did thereby teach no more1 but that the word palfrey1 in his or romance language1 stood for all these1 and was not to be applied to anything where any of these was wanting ,but he that shall tell me1 that in whatever thing sense1 motion1 reason1 and laughter1 were united1 that thing had actually a notion of ,god1 or would be cast into a sleep by opium1 made indeed an instructive proposition3 because neither having the notion of ,god1 nor being cast into sleep by opium1 being contained in the idea signified by the word man1 we are by such propositions taught something more than barely what the word ,,man stands for3 and therefore the knowledge contained in it is more than verbal4 #g4 ,for this teaches but the ,signification of ,words4 ,before a man makes any proposition1 he is supposed to understand the terms he uses in it1 or else he talks like a parrot1 only making a noise by imitation1 and framing certain sounds1 which he has learnt of others2 but not as a rational creature1 using them for signs of ideas which he has in his mind4 ,the hearer also is supposed to understand the terms as the speaker uses them1 or else he talks jargon1 and makes an unintelligible noise4 ,and therefore he trifles with words who makes such a proposition1 which1 when it is made1 contains no more than one of the terms does1 and which a man was supposed to know before3 v4g4 a triangle hath three sides1 or saffron is yellow4 ,and this is no further tolerable than where a man goes to explain his terms to one who is supposed or declares himself not to understand him2 and then it teaches only the signification of that word1 and the use of that sign4 #h4 ,but adds no real ,knowledge4 ,we can know then the truth of two sorts of propositions with perfect certainty4 ,the one is1 of those trifling propositions which have a certainty in them1 but it is only a verbal certainty1 but not instructive4 ,and1 secondly1 we can know the truth1 and so may be certain in propositions1 which affirm something of another1 which is a necessary consequence of its precise complex idea1 but not contained in it3 as that1 the external angle of all triangles is bigger than either of the opposite internal angles4 ,which relation of the outward angle to either of the opposite internal angles1 making no part of the complex idea signified by the name triangle1 this is a real truth1 and conveys with it instructive real knowledge4 #i4 ,general ,propositions concerning ,substances are often trifling4 ,we having little or no knowledge of what combinations there be of simple ideas existing together in substances1 but by our senses1 we cannot make any universal certain propositions concerning them1 any further than our nominal essences lead us4 ,which being to a very few and inconsiderable truths1 in respect of those which depend on their real constitutions1 the general propositions that are made about substances1 if they are certain1 are for the most part but trifling2 and if they are instructive1 are uncertain1 and such as we can have no knowledge of their real truth1 how much soever constant observation and analogy may assist our judgment in guessing4 ,hence it comes to pass1 that one may often meet with very clear and coherent discourses1 that amount yet to nothing4 ,for it is plain that names of substantial beings1 as well as others1 as far as they have relative significations affixed to them1 may1 with great truth1 be joined negatively and affirmatively in propositions1 as their relative definitions make them fit to be so joined2 and propositions consisting of such terms1 may1 with the same clearness1 be deduced one from another1 as those that convey the most real truths3 and all this without any knowledge of the nature or reality of things existing without us4 ,by this method one may make demonstrations and undoubted propositions in words1 and yet thereby advance not one jot in the knowledge of the truth of things3 v4 g4 he that having learnt these following words1 with their ordinary mutual relative acceptations annexed to them2 v4 g4 ,,substance1 ,,man1 ,,animal1 ,,form1 ,,soul1 ,,vegetative1 ,,sensitive1 ,,rational1 may make several undoubted propositions about the soul1 without knowing at all what the soul really is3 and of this sort1 a man may find an infinite number of propositions1 reasonings1 and conclusions1 in books of metaphysics1 school-divinity1 and some sort of natural philosophy2 and1 after all1 know as little of ,god1 spirits1 or bodies1 as he did before he set out4 #aj4 ,and why4 ,he that hath liberty to define1 i4e4 to determine the signification of his names of substances 7as certainly every one does in effect1 who makes them stand for his own ideas71 and makes their significations at a venture1 taking them from his own or other men's fancies1 and not from an examination or inquiry into the nature of things themselves2 may with little trouble demonstrate them one of another1 according to those several respects and mutual relations he has given them one to another2 wherein1 however things agree or disagree in their own nature1 he needs mind nothing but his own notions1 with the names he hath bestowed upon them3 but thereby no more increases his own knowledge than he does his riches1 who1 taking a bag of counters1 calls one in a certain place a pound1 another in another place a shilling1 and a third in a third place a penny2 and so proceeding1 may undoubtedly reckon right1 and cast up a great sum1 according to his counters so placed1 and standing for more or less as he pleases1 without being one jot the richer1 or without even knowing how much a pound1 shilling1 or penny is1 but only that one is contained in the other twenty times1 and contains the other twelve3 which a man may also do in the signification of words1 by making them1 in respect of one another1 more or less1 or equally comprehensive4 #aa4 ,thirdly1 using ,words variously is trifling with them4 ,though yet concerning most words used in discourses1 equally argumentative and controversial1 there is this more to be complained of1 which is the worst sort of trifling1 and which sets us yet further from the certainty of knowledge we hope to attain by them1 or find in them2 viz4 that most writers are so far from instructing us in the nature and knowledge of things1 that they use their words loosely and uncertainly1 and do not1 by using them constantly and steadily in the same significations make plain and clear deductions of words one from another1 and make their discourses coherent and clear1 7how little soever they were instructive72 which were not difficult to do1 did they not find it convenient to shelter their ignorance or obstinacy under the obscurity and perplexedness of their terms3 to which1 perhaps1 inadvertency and ill custom do in many men much contribute4 #ab4 ,marks of verbal ,propositions4 ,first1 ,predication in ,abstract4 ,to conclude4 ,barely verbal propositions may be known by these following marks3 ,first1 ,all propositions wherein two abstract terms are affirmed one of another1 are barely about the signification of sounds4 ,for since no abstract idea can be the same with any other but itself1 when its abstract name is affirmed of any other term1 it can signify no more but this1 that it may1 or ought to be called by that name2 or that these two names signify the same idea4 ,thus1 should any one say that parsimony is frugality1 that gratitude is justice1 that this or that action is or is not temperate3 however specious these and the like propositions may at first sight seem1 yet when we come to press them1 and examine nicely what they contain1 we shall find that it all amounts to nothing but the signification of those terms4 #ac4 ,secondly1 ,a part of the ,definition predicated of any ,term4 ,secondly1 ,all propositions wherein a part of the complex idea which any term stands for is predicated of that term1 are only verbal3 v4g4 to say that gold is a metal1 or heavy4 ,and thus all propositions wherein more comprehensive words1 called genera1 are affirmed of subordinate or less comprehensive1 called species1 or individuals1 are barely verbal4 ,when by these two rules we have examined the propositions that make up the discourses we ordinarily meet with1 both in and out of books1 we shall perhaps find that a greater part of them than is usually suspected are purely about the signification of words1 and contain nothing in them but the use and application of these signs4 ,this ,i think ,i may lay down for an infallible rule1 ,that1 wherever the distinct idea any word stands for is not known and considered1 and something not contained in the idea is not affirmed or denied of it1 there our thoughts stick wholly in sounds1 and are able to attain no real truth or falsehood4 ,this1 perhaps1 if well heeded1 might save us a great deal of useless amusement and dispute2 and very much shorten our trouble and wandering in the search of real and true knowledge4 ,,chapter ,,ix4 ,,of ,,our ,,threefold ,,knowledge ,,of ,,existence4 #a4 ,general ,propositions that are certain concern not ,existence4 ,,hitherto we have only considered the essences of things2 which being only abstract ideas1 and thereby removed in our thoughts from particular existence1 7that being the proper operation of the mind1 in abstraction1 to consider an idea under no other existence but what it has in the understandings17 gives us no knowledge of real existence at all4 ,where1 by the way1 we may take notice1 that universal propositions of whose truth or falsehood we can have certain knowledge concern not existence3 and further1 that all particular affirmations or negations that would not be certain if they were made general1 are only concerning existence2 they declaring only the accidental union or separation of ideas in things existing1 which1 in their abstract natures1 have no known necessary union or repugnancy4 #b4 ,a threefold ,knowledge of ,existence4 ,but1 leaving the nature of propositions1 and different ways of predication to be considered more at large in another place1 let us proceed now to inquire concerning our knowledge of the ,,existance ,,of ,,things1 and how we come by it4 ,i say1 then1 that we have the knowledge of ,,our ,,own existence by intuition2 of the existence of ,,god by demonstration2 and of ,,other ,,things by sensation4 #c4 ,our ,knowledge of our own ,existence is ,intuitive4 ,as for ,,our ,,own ,,existence1 we perceive it so plainly and so certainly1 that it neither needs nor is capable of any proof for nothing can be more evident to us than our own existence4 ,i think1 ,i reason1 ,i feel pleasure and pain3 can any of these be more evident to me than my own existence8 ,if ,i doubt of all other things1 that very doubt makes me perceive my own existence1 and will not suffer me to doubt of that4 ,for if ,i know ,i feel pain1 it is evident ,i have as certain perception of my own existence1 as of the existence of the pain ,i feel3 or if ,i know ,i doubt1 ,i have as certain perception of the existence of the thing doubting1 as of that thought which ,i ,,call ,,doubt4 ,experience then convinces us1 that we have an ,,intuitive ,,knowledge of our own existence1 and an internal infallible perception that we are4 ,in every act of sensation1 reasoning1 or thinking1 we are conscious to ourselves of our own being2 and1 in this matter1 come not short of the highest degree of certainty4 ,,chapter ,x4 ,,of ,,our ,,knowledge ,,of ,,the ,,existence ,,of ,a ,,god4 #a4 ,we are capable of knowing certainly that there is a ,god4 ,,though ,god has given us no innate ideas of himself2 though he has stamped no original characters on our minds1 wherein we may read his being2 yet having furnished us with those faculties our minds are endowed with1 he hath not left himself without witness3 since we have sense1 perception1 and reason1 and cannot want a clear proof of him1 as long as we carry ,,ourselves about us4 ,nor can we justly complain of our ignorance in this great point2 since he has so plentifully provided us with the means to discover and know him2 so far as is necessary to the end of our being1 and the great concernment of our happiness4 ,but1 though this be the most obvious truth that reason discovers1 and though its evidence be 7if ,i mistake not7 equal to mathematical certainty3 yet it requires thought and attention2 and the mind must apply itself to a regular deduction of it from some part of our intuitive knowledge1 or else we shall be as uncertain and ignorant of this as of other propositions1 which are in themselves capable of clear demonstration4 ,to show1 therefore1 that we are capable of ,,knowing1 i4e4 ,,being ,,certain that there is a ,god1 and ,,how ,,we ,,may ,,come ,,by this certainty1 ,i think we need go no further than ,,ourselves1 and that undoubted knowledge we have of our own existence4 #b4 ,for ,man knows that he himself exists4 ,i think it is beyond question1 that man has a clear idea of his own being2 he knows certainly he exists1 and that he is something4 ,he that can doubt whether he be anything or no1 ,i speak not to2 no more than ,i would argue with pure nothing1 or endeavour to convince nonentity that it were something4 ,if any one pretends to be so sceptical as to deny his own existence1 7for really to doubt of it is manifestly impossible17 let him for me enjoy his beloved happiness of being nothing1 until hunger or some other pain convince him of the contrary4 ,this1 then1 ,i think ,i may take for a truth1 which every one's certain knowledge assures him of1 beyond the liberty of doubting1 viz4 that he is ,,something ,,that ,,actually ,,exists4 #c4 ,he knows also that ,nothing cannot produce a ,being2 therefore ,something must have existed from ,eternity4 ,in the next place1 man knows1 by an intuitive certainty1 that bare ,,nothing ,,can ,,no ,,more ,,produce ,,any ,,real ,,being1 ,,than ,,it ,,can ,,be ,,equal ,,to ,,two ,,right ,,angles4 ,if a man knows not that nonentity1 or the absence of all being1 cannot be equal to two right angles1 it is impossible he should know any demonstration in ,euclid4 ,if1 therefore1 we know there is some real being1 and that nonentity cannot produce any real being1 it is an evident demonstration1 that ,,from ,,eternity ,,there ,,has ,,been ,,something2 since what was not from eternity had a beginning2 and what had a beginning must be produced by something else4 #d4 ,and that eternal ,being must be most powerful4 ,next1 it is evident1 that what had its being and beginning from another1 must also have all that which is in and belongs to its being from another too4 ,all the powers it has must be owing to and received from the same source4 ,this eternal source1 then1 of all being must also be the source and original of all power2 and so ,,this ,,eternal ,,being ,,must ,,be ,,also ,,the ,,most ,,powerful4 #e4 ,and most knowing4 ,again1 a man finds in ,,himself perception and knowledge4 ,we have then got one step further2 and we are certain now that there is not only some being1 but some knowing1 intelligent being in the world4 ,there was a time1 then1 when there was no knowing being1 and when knowledge began to be2 or else there has been also ,a ,,knowing ,,being ,,from ,,eternity4 ,if it be said1 there was a time when no being had any knowledge1 when that eternal being was void of all understanding2 ,i reply1 that then it was impossible there should ever have been any knowledge3 it being as impossible that things wholly void of knowledge1 and operating blindly1 and without any perception1 should produce a knowing being1 as it is impossible that a triangle should make itself three angles bigger than two right ones4 ,for it is as repugnant to the idea of senseless matter1 that it should put into itself sense1 perception1 and knowledge1 as it is repugnant to the idea of a triangle1 that it should put into itself greater angles than two right ones4 #f4 ,and therefore ,god4 ,thus1 from the consideration of ourselves1 and what we infallibly find in our own constitutions1 our reason leads us to the knowledge of this certain and evident truth1--,,that ,,there ,,is ,,an ,,eternal1 ,,most ,,powerful1 ,,and ,,most ,,knowing ,,being2 which whether any one will please to call ,god1 it matters not4 ,the thing is evident2 and from this idea duly considered1 will easily be deduced all those other attributes1 which we ought to ascribe to this eternal ,being4 ,if1 nevertheless1 any one should be found so senselessly arrogant1 as to suppose man alone knowing and wise1 but yet the product of mere ignorance and chance2 and that all the rest of the universe acted only by that blind haphazard2 ,i shall leave with him that very rational and emphatical rebuke of ,tully 7#a4 ii4 ,de ,leg471 to be considered at his leisure3 ',what can be more sillily arrogant and misbecoming1 than for a man to think that he has a mind and understanding in him1 but yet in all the universe beside there is no such thing8 ,or that those things1 which with the utmost stretch of his reason he can scarce comprehend1 should be moved and managed without any reason at all8' ,,quid ,,est ,,enim ,,verius1 ,,quam ,,neminem ,,esse ,,oportere ,,tam ,,stulte ,,arogantem1 ,,ut ,,in ,,se ,,mentem ,,et ,,rationem ,,putet ,,inesse ,,in ,,coelo ,,mundoque ,,non ,,putet8 ,,aut ,,ea ,,quoe ,,viz ,,summa ,,ingenii ,,ratione ,,comprehendat1 ,,nulla ,,ratione ,,moveri ,,putet8 ,from what has been said1 it is plain to me we have a more certain knowledge of the existence of a ,god1 than of anything3 our senses have not immediately discovered to us4 ,nay1 ,i presume ,i may say1 that we more certainly know that there is a ,god1 than that there is anything else without us4 ,when ,i say we ,,know1 ,i mean there is such a knowledge within our reach which we cannot miss1 if we will but apply our minds to that1 as we do to several other inquiries4 #g4 ,our idea of a most perfect ,being1 not the sole ,proof of a ,god4 ,how far the ,,idea of a most perfect being1 which a man1 may frame in his mind1 does or does not prove the ,,existence of a ,god1 ,i will not here examine4 ,for in the different make of men's tempers and application of their thoughts1 some arguments prevail more on one1 and some on another1 for the confirmation of the same truth4 ,but yet1 ,i think1 this ,i may say1 that it is an ill way of establishing this truth1 and silencing atheists1 to lay the whole stress of so important a point as this upon that sole foundation3 and take some men's having that idea of ,god in their minds1 7for it is evident some men have none1 and some worse than none1 and the most very different17 for the only proof of a ,deity2 and out of an over fondness of that darling invention1 cashier1 or at least endeavour to invalidate all other arguments2 and forbid us to hearken to those proofs1 as being weak or fallacious1 which our own existence1 and the sensible parts of the universe offer so clearly and cogently to our thoughts1 that ,i deem it impossible for a considering man to withstand them4 ,for ,i judge it as certain and clear a truth as can anywhere be delivered1 that 'the invisible things of ,god are clearly seen from the creation of the world1 being understood by the things that are made1 even his eternal power and ,godhead4' ,though our own being furnishes us1 as ,i have shown1 with an evident and incontestible proof of a ,deity2 and ,i believe nobody can avoid the cogency of it1 who will but as carefully attend to it1 as to any other demonstration of so many parts3 yet this being so fundamental a truth1 and of that consequence1 that all religion and genuine morality depend thereon1 ,i doubt not but ,i shall be forgiven by my reader if ,i go over some parts of this argument again1 and enlarge a little more upon them4 #h4 ,recapitulation ,something from ,eternity4 ,there is no truth more evident than that ,,something must be ,,from ,,eternity4 ,i never yet heard of any one so unreasonable1 or that could suppose so manifest a contradiction1 as a time wherein there was perfectly nothing4 ,this being of all absurdities the greatest1 to imagine that pure nothing1 the perfect negation and absence of all beings1 should ever produce any real existence4 ,it being1 then1 unavoidable for all rational creatures to conclude1 that ,,something has existed from eternity2 let us next see ,,what ,,kind ,,of ,,thing that must be4 #i4 ,two ,sorts of ,beings1 cogitative and incogitative4 ,there are but two sorts of beings in the world that man knows or conceives4 ,first1 such as are purely material1 without sense1 perception1 or thought1 as the clippings of our beards1 and parings of our nails4 ,secondly1 sensible1 thinking1 perceiving beings1 such as we find ourselves to be4 ,which1 if you please1 we will hereafter call ,,cogitative and ,,incogitative beings2 which to our present purpose1 if for nothing else1 are perhaps better terms than material and immaterial4 #aj4 ,incogitative ,being cannot produce a ,cogitative ,being4 ,if1 then1 there must be something eternal1 let us see what sort of being it must be4 ,and to that it is very obvious to reason1 that it must necessarily be a cogitative being4 ,for it is as impossible to conceive that ever bare incogitative matter should produce a thinking intelligent being1 as that nothing should of itself produce matter4 ,let us suppose any parcel of matter eternal1 great or small1 we shall find it1 in itself1 able to produce nothing4 ,for example3 let us suppose the matter of the next pebble we meet with eternal1 closely united1 and the parts firmly at rest together2 if there were no other being in the world1 must it not eternally remain so1 a dead inactive lump8 ,is it possible to conceive it can add motion to itself1 being purely matter1 or produce anything8 ,matter1 then1 by its own strength1 cannot produce in itself so much as motion3 the motion it has must also be from eternity1 or else be produced1 and added to matter by some other being more powerful than matter2 matter1 as is evident1 having not power to produce motion in itself4 ,but let us suppose motion eternal too3 yet matter1 ,,incogitative matter and motion1 whatever changes it might produce of figure and bulk1 could never produce thought3 knowledge will still be as far beyond the power of motion and matter to produce1 as matter is beyond the power of nothing or nonentity to produce4 ,and ,i appeal to every one's own thoughts1 whether he cannot as easily conceive matter produced by ,,nothing1 as thought to be produced by pure matter1 when1 before1 there was no such thing as thought or an intelligent being existing8 ,divide matter into as many parts as you will1 7which we are apt to imagine a sort of spiritualizing1 or making a thinking thing of it17 vary the figure and motion of it as much as you please--a globe1 cube1 cone1 prism1 cylinder1 c41 whose diameters are but #ajj1jjjth part of a ,,gry1 will operate no otherwise upon other bodies of proportionable bulk1 than those of an inch or foot diameter2 and you may as rationally expect to produce sense1 thought1 and knowledge1 by putting together1 in a certain figure and motion1 gross particles of matter1 as by those that are the very minutest that do anywhere exist4 ,they knock1 impel1 and resist one another1 just as the greater do2 and that is all they can do4 ,so that1 if we will suppose ,,nothing first or eternal1 matter can never begin to be3 if we suppose bare matter without motion1 eternal1 motion can never begin to be3 if we suppose only matter and motion first1 or eternal1 thought can never begin to be4 ,for it is impossible to conceive that matter1 either with or without motion1 could have1 originally1 in and from itself1 sense1 perception1 and knowledge2 as is evident from hence1 that then sense1 perception1 and knowledge1 must be a property eternally inseparable from matter and every particle of it4 ,not to add1 that1 though our general or specific conception of matter makes us speak of it as one thing1 yet really all matter is not one individual thing1 neither is there any such thing existing as ,,one material being1 or ,,one single body that we know or can conceive4 ,and therefore1 if matter were the eternal first cogitative being1 there would not be one eternal1 infinite1 cogitative being1 but an infinite number of eternal1 finite1 cogitative beings1 independent one of another1 of limited force1 and distinct thoughts1 which could never produce that order1 harmony1 and beauty which are to be found in nature4 ,since1 therefore1 whatsoever is the first eternal being must necessarily be cogitative2 and whatsoever is first of all things must necessarily contain in it1 and actually have1 at least1 all the perfections that can ever after exist2 nor can it ever give to another any perfection that it hath not either actually in itself1 or1 at least1 in a higher degree2 it necessarily follows1 that the first eternal being cannot be matter4 #aa4 ,therefore1 there has been an ,eternal ,wisdom4 ,if1 therefore1 it be evident1 that something necessarily must exist from eternity1 it is also as evident1 that that something must necessarily be a cogitative being3 for it is as impossible that incogitative matter should produce a cogitative being1 as that nothing1 or the negation of all being1 should produce a positive being or matter4 #ab4 ,the ,attributes of the ,eternal ,cogitative ,being4 ,though this discovery of the ,,necessary ,,existance ,,of ,a ,,eternal ,,mind does sufficiently lead us into the knowledge of ,god2 since it will hence follow1 that all other knowing beings that have a beginning must depend on him1 and have in other ways of knowledge or extent of power than what ,he gives them2 and therefore1 if he made those1 he made all the less excellent pieces of this universe1--all inanimate beings whereby his omniscience1 power1 and providence will be established1 and all his other attributes necessarily follow yet1 to clear up this a little further1 we will see what doubt can be raised against it4 #ac4 ,whether the ,eternal ,mind may be also material or no4 ,,first1 ,perhaps it will be said1 that1 though it be as clear as demonstration can make it1 that there must be an eternal ,being1 and that ,being must also be knowing3 yet it does not follow but that thinking ,being may also be ,,material4 ,let it be so1 it equally still follows that there is a ,god4 ,for there be an eternal1 omniscient1 omnipotent ,being1 it is certain that there is a ,god1 whether you imagine that ,being to be material or no4 ,but herein1 ,i suppose1 lies the danger and deceit of that supposition3--there being no way to avoid the demonstration1 that there is an eternal knowing ,being1 men devoted to matter1 would willingly have it granted1 that that knowing ,being is material2 and then1 letting slide out of their minds1 or the discourse1 the demonstration whereby an eternal ,,knowing ,being was proved necessarily to exist1 would argue all to be matter1 and so deny a ,god1 that is1 an eternal cogitative ,being3 whereby they are so far from establishing1 that they destroy their own hypothesis4 ,for1 if there can be1 in their opinion1 eternal matter1 without any eternal cogitative ,being1 they manifestly separate matter and thinking1 and suppose no necessary connexion of the one with the other1 and so establish the necessity of an eternal ,spirit1 but not of matter2 since it has been proved already1 that an eternal cogitative ,being is unavoidably to be granted4 ,now1 if thinking and matter may be separated1 the eternal existence of matter will not follow from the eternal existence of a cogitative ,being1 and they suppose it to no purpose4 #ad4 ,not material3 ,first1 because each ,particle of ,matter is not cogitative4 ,but now let us see how they can satisfy themselves1 or others1 that this eternal thinking ,being is material4 ,i4 ,i would ask them1 whether they imagine that all matter1 ,,every ,,particle ,,of ,,matter1 thinks8 ,this1 ,i suppose1 they will scarce say2 since then there would be as many eternal thinking beings as there are particles of matter1 and so an infinity of gods4 ,and yet1 if they will not allow matter as matter1 that is1 every particle of matter1 to be as well cogitative as extended1 they will have as hard a task to make out to their own reasons a cogitative being out of incogitative particles1 as an extended being out of unextended parts1 if ,i may so speak4 #ae4 ,,ii4 ,secondly1 ,because one ,particle alone of ,matter cannot be cogitative4 ,if all matter does not think1 ,i next ask1 ,whether it be ,,only ,,one ,,atom that does so8 ,this has as many absurdities as the other2 for then this atom of matter must be alone eternal or not4 ,if this alone be eternal1 then this alone1 by its powerful thought or will1 made all the rest of matter4 ,and so we have the creation of matter by a powerful thought1 which is that the materialists stick at2 for if they suppose one single thinking atom to have produced all the rest of matter1 they cannot ascribe that pre-eminency to it upon any other account than that of its thinking1 the only supposed difference4 ,but allow it to be by some other way which is above our conception1 it must still be creation2 and these men must give up their great maxim1 ,,ex ,,nihilo ,,nil ,,fit4 ,if it be said1 that all the rest of matter is equally eternal as that thinking atom1 it will be to say anything at pleasure1 though ever so absurd4 ,for to suppose all matter eternal1 and yet one small particle in knowledge and power infinitely above all the rest1 is without any the least appearance of reason to frame an hypothesis4 ,every particle of matter1 as matter1 is capable of all the same figures and motions of any other2 and ,i challenge any one1 in his thoughts1 to add anything else to one above another4 #af4 ,,iii4 ,thirdly1 ,because a ,system of incogitative ,matter cannot be cogitative4 ,if then neither one peculiar atom alone can be this eternal thinking being2 nor all matter1 as matter1 i4 e4 every particle of matter1 can be it2 it only remains1 that it is some certain ,,system of matter1 duly put together1 that is this thinking eternal ,being4 ,this is that which1 ,i imagine1 is that notion which men are aptest to have of ,god2 who would have him a material being1 as most readily suggested to them by the ordinary conceit they have of themselves and other men1 which they take to be material thinking beings4 ,but this imagination1 however more natural1 is no less absurd than the other2 for to suppose the eternal thinking ,being to be nothing else but a composition of particles of matter1 each whereof is incogitative1 is to ascribe all the wisdom and knowledge of that eternal ,being only to the juxta-position of parts2 than which nothing can be more absurd4 ,for unthinking particles of matter1 however put together1 can have nothing thereby added to them1 but a new relation of position1 which it is impossible should give thought and knowledge to them4 #ag4 ,and whether this corporeal ,system is in ,motion or at ,rest4 ,but further3 this corporeal system either has all its parts at rest1 or it is a certain motion of the parts wherein its thinking consists4 ,if it be perfectly at rest1 it is but one lump1 and so can have no privileges above one atom4 ,if it be the motion of its parts on which its thinking depends1 all the thoughts there must be unavoidably accidental and limited2 since all the particles that by motion cause thought1 being each of them in itself without any thought1 cannot regulate its own motions1 much less be regulated by the thought of the whole2 since that thought is not the cause of motion1 7for then it must be antecedent to it1 and so without it17 but the consequence of it2 whereby freedom1 power1 choice1 and all rational and wise thinking or acting1 will be quite taken away3 so that such a thinking being will be no better nor wiser than pure blind matter2 since to resolve all into the accidental unguided motions of blind matter1 or into thought depending on unguided motions of blind matter1 is the same thing3 not to mention the narrowness of such thoughts and knowledge that must depend on the motion of such parts4 ,but there needs no enumeration of any more absurdities and impossibilities in this hypothesis 7however full of them it be7 than that before mentioned2 since1 let this thinking system be all or a part of the matter of the universe1 it is impossible that any one particle should either know its own1 or the motion of any other particle1 or the whole know the motion of every particle2 and so regulate its own thoughts or motions1 or indeed have any thought resulting from such motion4 #ah4 ,matter not co-eternal with an ,eternal ,mind4 ,,secondly1 ,others would have ,matter to be eternal1 notwithstanding that they allow an eternal1 cogitative1 immaterial ,being4 ,this1 though it take not away the being of a ,god1 yet1 since it denies one and the first great piece of his workmanship1 the creation1 let us consider it a little4 ,matter must be allowed eternal3 ,why8 because you cannot conceive how it can be made out of nothing3 why do you not also think yourself eternal8 ,you will answer1 perhaps1 ,because1 about twenty or forty years since1 you began to be4 ,but if ,i ask you1 what that ,,you is1 which began then to be1 you can scarce tell me4 ,the matter whereof you are made began not then to be3 for if it did1 then it is not eternal3 but it began to be put together in such a fashion and frame as makes up your body2 but yet that frame of particles is not you1 it makes not that thinking thing you are2 7for ,i have now to do with one who allows an eternal1 immaterial1 thinking ,being1 but would have unthinking ,matter eternal too27 therefore1 when did that thinking thing begin to be8 ,if it did never begin to be1 then have you always been a thinking thing from eternity2 the absurdity whereof ,i need not confute1 till ,i meet with one who is so void of understanding as to own it4 ,if1 therefore1 you can allow a thinking thing to be made out of nothing1 7as all things that are not eternal must be17 why also can you not allow it possible for a material being to be made out of nothing by an equal power1 but that you have the experience of the one in view1 and not of the other8 ,though1 when well considered1 creation of a spirit will be found to require no less power than the creation of matter4 ,nay1 possibly1 if we would emancipate ourselves from vulgar notions1 and raise our thoughts1 as far as they would reach1 to a closer contemplation of things1 we might be able to aim at some dim and seeming conception how ,,matter might at first be made1 and begin to exist1 by the power of that eternal first ,being3 but to give beginning and being to a ,,spirit would be found a more inconceivable effect of omnipotent power4 ,but this being what would perhaps lead us too far from the notions on which the philosophy now in the world is built1 it would not be pardonable to deviate so far from them2 or to inquire1 so far as grammar itself would authorize1 if the common settled opinion opposes it3 especially in this place1 where the received doctrine serves well enough to our present purpose1 and leaves this past doubt1 that the creation or beginning of any one ,,substance out of nothing being once admitted1 the creation of all other but the ,creator himself1 may1 with the same ease1 be supposed4 #ai4 ,objection3 ,creation out of nothing4 ,but you will say1 ,is it not impossible to admit of the making anything out of nothing1 ,,since ,,we ,,cannot ,,possibly ,,conceive ,,it8 ,i answer1 ,no4 ,because it is not reasonable to deny the power of an infinite being1 because we cannot comprehend its operations4 ,we do not deny other effects upon this ground1 because we cannot possibly conceive the manner of their production4 ,we cannot conceive how anything but impulse of body can move body2 and yet that is not a reason sufficient to make us deny it possible1 against the constant experience we have of it in ourselves1 in all our voluntary motions2 which are produced in us only by the free action or thought of our own minds1 and are not1 nor can be1 the effects of the impulse or determination of the motion of blind matter in or upon our own bodies2 for then it could not be in our power or choice to alter it4 ,for example3 my right hand writes1 whilst my left hand is still3 ,what causes rest in one1 and motion in the other8 ,nothing but my will1--a thought of my mind2 my thought only changing1 the right hand rests1 and the left hand moves4 ,this is matter of fact1 which cannot be denied3 explain this and make it intelligible1 and then the next step will be to understand creation4 ,for the giving a new determination to the motion of the animal spirits 7which some make use of to explain voluntary motion7 clears not the difficulty one jot4 ,to alter the determination of motion1 being in this case no easier nor less1 than to give motion itself3 since the new determination given to the animal spirits must be either immediately by thought1 or by some other body put in their way by thought which was not in their way before1 and so must owe ,,its motion to thought3 either of which leaves ,,voluntary motion as unintelligible as it was before4 ,in the meantime1 it is an over-valuing ourselves to reduce all to the narrow measure of our capacities2 and to conclude all things impossible to be done1 whose manner of doing exceeds our comprehension4 ,this is to make our comprehension infinite1 or ,god finite1 when what ,he can do is limited to what we can conceive of it4 ,if you do not understand the operations of your own finite mind1 that thinking thing within you1 do not deem it strange that you cannot comprehend the operations of that eternal infinite ,mind1 who made and governs all things1 and whom the heaven of heavens cannot contain4 ,,chapter ,,xi4 ,,of ,,our ,,knowledge ,,of ,,the ,,existence ,,of ,,other ,,things4 #a4 ,knowledge of the existence of other ,finite ,beings is to be had only by actual ,sensation4 ,the knowledge of our own being we have by intuition4 ,the existence of a ,god1 reason clearly makes known to us1 as has been shown4 ,the knowledge of the existence of ,,any ,,other ,,thing we can have only by ,,sensation3 for there being no necessary connexion of real existence with any ,,idea a man hath in his memory2 nor of any other existence but that of ,god with the existence of any particular man3 no particular man can know the existence of any other being1 but only when1 by actual operating upon him1 it makes itself perceived by him4 ,for1 the having the idea of anything in our mind1 no more proves the existence of that thing1 than the picture of a man evidences his being in the world1 or the visions of a dream make thereby a true history4 #b4 ,instance3 ,whiteness of this ,paper4 ,it is therefore the ,,actual ,,receiving of ideas from without that gives us notice of the existence of other things1 and makes us know1 that something doth exist at that time without us1 which causes that idea in us2 though perhaps we neither know nor consider how it does it4 ,for it takes not from the certainty of our senses1 and the ideas we receive by them1 that we know not the manner wherein they are produced3 v4g4 whilst ,i write this1 ,i have1 by the paper affecting my eyes1 that idea produced in my mind1 which1 whatever object causes1 ,i call ,,white2 by which ,i know that that quality or accident 7i4e4 whose appearance before my eyes always causes that idea7 doth really exist1 and hath a being without me4 ,and of this1 the greatest assurance ,i can possibly have1 and to which my faculties can attain1 is the testimony of my eyes1 which are the proper and sole judges of this thing2 whose testimony ,i have reason to rely on as so certain1 that ,i can no more doubt1 whilst ,i write this1 that ,i see white and black1 and that something really exists that causes that sensation in me1 than that ,i write or move my hand2 which is a certainty as great as human nature is capable of1 concerning the existence of anything1 but a man's self alone1 and of ,god4 #c4 ,this notice by our ,senses1 though not so certain as ,demonstration1 yet may be called ,knowledge1 and proves the ,existence of ,things without us4 ,the notice we have by our senses of the existing of things without us1 though it be not altogether so certain as our intuitive knowledge1 or the deductions of our reason employed about the clear abstract ideas of our own minds2 yet it is an assurance that deserves the name of ,,knowledge4 ,if we persuade ourselves that our faculties act and inform us right concerning the existence of those objects that affect them1 it cannot pass for an ill-grounded confidence3 for ,i think nobody can1 in earnest1 be so sceptical as to be uncertain of the existence of those things which he sees and feels4 ,at least1 he that can doubt so far1 7whatever he may have with his own thoughts17 will never have any controversy with me2 since he can never be sure ,i say anything contrary to his own opinion4 ,as to myself1 ,i think ,god has given me assurance enough of the existence of things without me3 since1 by their different application1 ,i can produce in myself both pleasure and pain1 which is one great concernment of my present state4 ,this is certain3 the confidence that our faculties do not herein deceive us1 is the greatest assurance we are capable of concerning the existence of material beings4 ,for we cannot act anything but by our faculties2 nor talk of knowledge itself1 but by the help of those faculties which are fitted to apprehend even what knowledge is4 ,but besides the assurance we have from our senses themselves1 that they do not err in the information they give us of the existence of things without us1 when they are affected by them1 we are further confirmed in this assurance by other concurrent reasons3-- #d4 ,i4 ,confirmed by concurrent reasons3--,first1 ,because we cannot have ideas of ,sensation but by the ,inlet of the ,senses4 ,it is plain those perceptions are produced in us by exterior causes affecting our senses3 because those that want the ,,organs of any sense1 never can have the ideas belonging to that sense produced in their minds4 ,this is too evident to be doubted3 and therefore we cannot but be assured that they come in by the organs of that sense1 and no other way4 ,the organs themselves1 it is plain1 do not produce them3 for then the eyes of a man in the dark would produce colours1 and his nose smell roses in the winter3 but we see nobody gets the relish of a pineapple1 till he goes to the ,indies1 where it is1 and tastes it4 #e4 ,,ii4 ,secondly1 ,because we find that an ,idea from actual ,sensation1 and another from memory1 are very distinct ,perceptions4 ,because sometimes ,i find that ,i ,,cannot ,,avoid ,,the ,,having ,,those ,,ideas ,,produced ,,in ,,my ,,mind4 ,for though1 when my eyes are shut1 or windows fast1 ,i can at pleasure recal to my mind the ideas of light1 or the sun1 which former sensations had lodged in my memory2 so ,i can at pleasure lay by ,,that idea1 and take into my view that of the smell of a rose1 or taste of sugar4 ,but1 if ,i turn my eyes at noon towards the sun1 ,i cannot avoid the ideas which the light or sun then produces in me4 ,so that there is a manifest difference between the ideas laid up in my memory1 7over which1 if they were there only1 ,i should have constantly the same power to dispose of them1 and lay them by at pleasure17 and those which force themselves upon me1 and ,i cannot avoid having4 ,and therefore it must needs be some exterior cause1 and the brisk acting of some objects without me1 whose efficacy ,i cannot resist1 that produces those ideas in my mind1 whether ,i will or no4 ,besides1 there is nobody who doth not perceive the difference in himself between contemplating the sun1 as he hath the idea of it in his memory1 and actually looking upon it3 of which two1 his perception is so distinct1 that few of his ideas are more distinguishable one from another4 ,and therefore he hath certain knowledge that they are not ,,both memory1 or the actions of his mind1 and fancies only within him2 but that actual seeing hath a cause without4 #f4 ,,iii4 ,thirdly1 ,because ,pleasure or ,pain1 which accompanies actual ,sensation1 accompanies not the returning of those ,ideas without the external ,objects4 ,add to this1 that many of those ideas are ,,produced ,,in ,,us ,,with ,,pain1 which afterwards we remember without the least offence4 ,thus1 the pain of heat or cold1 when the idea of it is revived in our minds1 gives us no disturbance2 which1 when felt1 was very troublesome2 and is again1 when actually repeated3 which is occasioned by the disorder the external object causes in our bodies when applied to them3 and we remember the pains of hunger1 thirst1 or the headache1 without any pain at all2 which would either never disturb us1 or else constantly do it1 as often as we thought of it1 were there nothing more but ideas floating in our minds1 and appearances entertaining our fancies1 without the real existence of things affecting us from abroad4 ,the same may be said of ,,pleasure1 accompanying several actual sensations4 ,and though mathematical demonstration depends not upon sense1 yet the examining them by diagrams gives great credit to the evidence of our sight1 and seems to give it a certainty approaching to that of demonstration itself4 ,for1 it would be very strange1 that a man should allow it for an undeniable truth1 that two angles of a figure1 which he measures by lines and angles of a diagram1 should be bigger one than the other1 and yet doubt of the existence of those lines and angles1 which by looking on he makes use of to measure that by4 #g4 ,,iv4 ,fourthly1 ,because our ,senses assist one another's ,testimony of the ,existence of outward ,things1 and enable us to predict4 ,our ,,senses in many cases ,,bear ,,witness ,,to ,,the ,,truth ,,of ,,each ,,other',s ,,report1 concerning the existence of sensible things without us4 ,he that ,,sees a fire1 may1 if he doubt whether it be anything more than a bare fancy1 ,,feel it too2 and be convinced1 by putting his hand in it4 ,which certainly could never be put into such exquisite pain by a bare idea or phantom1 unless that the pain be a fancy too3 which yet he cannot1 when the burn is well1 by raising the idea of it1 bring upon himself again4 ,thus ,i see1 whilst ,i write this1 ,i can change the appearance of the paper2 and by designing the letters1 tell ,,beforehand what new idea it shall exhibit the very next moment1 by barely drawing my pen over it3 which will neither appear 7let me fancy as much as ,i will7 if my hands stand still2 or though ,i move my pen1 if my eyes be shut3 nor1 when those characters are once made on the paper1 can ,i choose afterwards but see them as they are2 that is1 have the ideas of such letters as ,i have made4 ,whence it is manifest1 that they are not barely the sport and play of my own imagination1 when ,i find that the characters that were made at the pleasure of my own thoughts1 do not obey them2 nor yet cease to be1 whenever ,i shall fancy it1 but continue to affect my senses constantly and regularly1 according to the figures ,i made them4 ,to which if we will add1 that the sight of those shall from another man1 draw such sounds as ,i beforehand design they shall stand for1 there will be little reason left to doubt that those words ,i write do really exist without me1 when they cause a long series of regular sounds to affect my ears1 which could not be the effect of my imagination1 nor could my memory retain them in that order4 #h4 ,this ,certainty is as great as our ,condition needs4 ,but yet1 if after all this any one will be so sceptical as to distrust his senses1 and to affirm that all we see and hear1 feel and taste1 think and do1 during our whole being1 is but the series and deluding appearances of a long dream1 whereof there is no reality2 and therefore will question the existence of all things1 or our knowledge of anything3 ,i must desire him to consider1 that1 if all be a dream1 then he doth but dream that he makes the question1 and so it is not much matter that a waking man should answer him4 ,but yet1 if he pleases1 he may dream that ,i make him this answer1 ,that the certainty of things existing in ,,rerum ,,natura when we have the testimony of our senses for it is not only as great as our frame can attain to1 but as our condition needs4 ,for1 our faculties being suited not to the full extent of being1 nor to a perfect1 clear1 comprehensive knowledge of things free from all doubt and scruple2 but to the preservation of us1 in whom they are2 and accommodated to the use of life3 they serve to our purpose well enough1 if they will but give us certain notice of those things1 which are convenient or inconvenient to us4 ,for he that sees a candle burning1 and hath experimented the force of its flame by putting his finger in it1 will little doubt that this is something existing without him1 which does him harm1 and puts him to great pain3 which is assurance enough1 when no man requires greater certainty to govern his actions by than what is as certain as his actions themselves4 ,and if our dreamer pleases to try whether the glowing heat of a glass furnace be barely a wandering imagination in a drowsy man's fancy1 by putting his hand into it1 he may perhaps be wakened into a certainty greater than he could wish1 that it is something more than bare imagination4 ,so that this evidence is as great as we can desire1 being as certain to us as our pleasure or pain1 i4e4 happiness or misery2 beyond which we have no concernment1 either of knowing or being4 ,such an assurance of the existence of things without us is sufficient to direct us in the attaining the good and avoiding the evil which is caused by them1 which is the important concernment we have of being made acquainted with them4 #i4 ,but reaches no further than actual ,sensation4 ,in fine1 then1 when our senses do actually convey into our understandings any idea1 we cannot but be satisfied that there doth something ,,at ,,that ,,time really exist without us1 which doth affect our senses1 and by them give notice of itself to our apprehensive faculties1 and actually produce that idea which we then perceive3 and we cannot so far distrust their testimony1 as to doubt that such ,,collections of simple ideas as we have observed by our senses to be united together1 do really exist together4 ,but this knowledge extends as far as the present testimony of our senses1 employed about particular objects that do then affect them1 and no further4 ,for if ,i saw such a collection of simple ideas as is wont to be called ,,man1 existing together one minute since1 and am now alone1 ,i cannot be certain that the same man exists now1 since there is no ,,necessary ,,connexion of his existence a minute since with his existence now3 by a thousand ways he may cease to be1 since ,i had the testimony of my senses for his existence4 ,and if ,i cannot be certain that the man ,i saw last to-day is now in being1 ,i can less be certain that he is so who hath been longer removed from my senses1 and ,i have not seen since yesterday1 or since the last year3 and much less can ,i be certain of the existence of men that ,i never saw4 ,and1 therefore1 though it be highly probable that millions of men do now exist1 yet1 whilst ,i am alone1 writing this1 ,i have not that certainty of it which we strictly call knowledge2 though the great likelihood of it puts me past doubt1 and it be reasonable for me to do several things upon the confidence that there are men 7and men also of my acquaintance1 with whom ,i have to do7 now in the world3 but this is but probability1 not knowledge4 #aj4 ,folly to expect ,demonstration in everything4 ,whereby yet we may observe how foolish and vain a thing it is for a man of a narrow knowledge1 who having reason given him to judge of the different evidence and probability of things1 and to be swayed accordingly2 how vain1 ,i say1 it is to expect demonstration and certainty in things not capable of it2 and refuse assent to very rational propositions1 and act contrary to very plain and clear truths1 because they cannot be made out so evident1 as to surmount every the least 7,i will not say reason1 but7 pretence of doubting4 ,he that1 in the ordinary affairs of life1 would admit of nothing but direct plain demonstration1 would be sure of nothing in this world1 but of perishing quickly4 ,the wholesomeness of his meat or drink would not give him reason to venture on it3 and ,i would fain know what it is he could do upon such grounds as are capable of no doubt1 no objection4 #aa4 ,past ,existence of other things is known by ,memory4 ,as ,,when ,,our ,,senses ,,are ,,actually ,,employed ,,about ,,any ,,object1 we do know that it does exist2 so ,,by ,,our ,,memory we may be assured1 that heretofore things that affected our senses have existed4 ,and thus we have knowledge of the past existence of several things1 whereof our senses having informed us1 our memories still retain the ideas2 and of this we are past all doubt1 so long as we remember well4 ,but this knowledge also reaches no further than our senses have formerly assured us4 ,thus1 seeing water at this instant1 it is an unquestionable truth to me that water doth exist3 and remembering that ,i saw it yesterday1 it will also be always true1 and as long as my memory retains it always an undoubted proposition to me1 that water did exist the #ajth of ,july1 #afhh2 as it will also be equally true that a certain number of very fine colours did exist1 which at the same time ,i saw upon a bubble of that water3 but1 being now quite out of sight both of the water and bubbles too1 it is no more certainly known to me that the water doth now exist1 than that the bubbles or colours therein do so3 it being no more necessary that water should exist to-day1 because it existed yesterday1 than that the colours or bubbles exist to-day1 because they existed yesterday1 though it be exceedingly much more probable2 because water hath been observed to continue long in existence1 but bubbles1 and the colours on them1 quickly cease to be4 #ab4 ,the ,existence of other finite ,spirits not knowable1 and rests on ,faith4 ,what ideas we have of spirits1 and how we come by them1 ,i have already shown4 ,but though we have those ideas in our minds1 and know we have them there1 the having the ideas of spirits does not make us know that any such things do exist without us1 or that there are any finite spirits1 or any other spiritual beings1 but the ,eternal ,god4 ,we have ground from revelation1 and several other reasons1 to believe with assurance that there are such creatures3 but our senses not being able to discover them1 we want the means of knowing their particular existences4 ,for we can no more know that there are finite spirits really existing1 by the idea we have of such beings in our minds1 than by the ideas any one has of fairies or centaurs1 he can come to know that things answering those ideas do really exist4 ,and therefore concerning the existence of finite spirits1 as well as several other things1 we must content ourselves with the evidence of faith2 but universal1 certain propositions concerning this matter are beyond our reach4 ,for however true it may be1 v4g41 that all the intelligent spirits that ,god ever created do still exist1 yet it can never make a part of our certain knowledge4 ,these and the like propositions we may assent to1 as highly probable1 but are not1 ,i fear1 in this state capable of knowing4 ,we are not1 then1 to put others upon demonstrating1 nor ourselves upon search of universal certainty in all those matters2 wherein we are not capable of any other knowledge1 but what our senses give us in this or that particular4 #ac4 ,only particular ,propositions concerning concrete ,existances are knowable4 ,by which it appears that there are two sorts of propositions3--7#a7 ,there is one sort of propositions concerning the existence of anything answerable to such an idea3 as having the idea of an elephant1 phoenix1 motion1 or an angel1 in my mind1 the first and natural inquiry is1 ,whether such a thing does anywhere exist8 ,and this knowledge is only of particulars4 ,no existence of anything without us1 but only of ,god1 can certainly be known further than our senses inform us1 7#b7 ,there is another sort of propositions1 wherein is expressed the agreement or disagreement of ,,our ,,abstract ,,ideas1 and their dependence on one another4 ,such propositions may be universal and certain4 ,so1 having the idea of ,god and myself1 of fear and obedience1 ,i cannot but be sure that ,god is to be feared and obeyed by me3 and this proposition will be certain1 concerning man in general1 if ,i have made an abstract idea of such a species1 whereof ,i am one particular4 ,but yet this proposition1 how certain soever1 that 'men ought to fear and obey ,god' proves not to me the ,,existence of ,,men in the world2 but will be true of all such creatures1 whenever they do exist3 which certainty of such general propositions depends on the agreement or disagreement to be discovered in those abstract ideas4 #ad4 ,and all general ,propositions that are known to be true concern abstract ,ideas4 ,in the former case1 our knowledge is the consequence of the existence of things1 producing ideas in our minds by our senses3 in the latter1 knowledge is the consequence of the ideas 7be they what they will7 that are in our minds1 producing there general certain propositions4 ,many of these are called ,,aeternae ,,veritates1 and all of them indeed are so2 not from being written1 all or any of them1 in the minds of all men2 or that they were any of them propositions in any one's mind1 till he1 having got the abstract ideas1 joined or separated them by affirmation or negation4 ,but wheresoever we can suppose such a creature as man is1 endowed with such faculties1 and thereby furnished with such ideas as we have1 we must conclude1 he must needs1 when he applies his thoughts to the consideration of his ideas1 know the truth of certain propositions that will arise from the agreement or disagreement which he will perceive in his own ideas4 ,such propositions are therefore called ,,eternal ,,truths1 not because they are eternal propositions actually formed1 and antecedent to the understanding that at any time makes them2 nor because they are imprinted on the mind from any patterns that are anywhere out of the mind1 and existed before3 but because1 being once made about abstract ideas1 so as to be true1 they will1 whenever they can be supposed to be made again at any time1 past or come1 by a mind having those ideas1 always actually be true4 ,for names being supposed to stand perpetually for the same ideas1 and the same ideas having immutably the same habitudes one to another1 propositions concerning any abstract ideas that are once true must needs be ,,eternal ,,verities4 ,,chapter ,,xii4 ,,of ,,the ,,improvement ,,of ,,our ,,knowledge #a4 ,knowledge is not got from ,maxims4 ,,it having been the common received opinion amongst men of letters1 that ,,maxims were the foundation of all knowledge2 and that the sciences were each of them built upon certain ,,praecognita1 from whence the understanding was to take its rise1 and by which it was to conduct itself in its inquiries into the matters belonging to that science1 the beaten road of the ,schools has been1 to lay down in the beginning one or more ,,general ,,propositions1 as foundations whereon to build the knowledge that was to be had of that subject4 ,these doctrines1 thus laid down for foundations of any science1 were called ,,principles1 as the beginnings from which we must set out1 and look no further backwards in our inquiries1 as we have already observed4 #b4 7,the ,occasion of that ,opinion47 ,one thing which might probably give an occasion to this way of proceeding in other sciences1 was 7as ,i suppose7 the good success it seemed to have in ,,mathematics1 wherein men1 being observed to attain a great certainty of knowledge1 these sciences came by pre-eminence to be called word in ,greek1 and word in ,greek1 learning1 or things learned1 thoroughly learned1 as having of all others the greatest certainty1 clearness1 and evidence in them4 #c4 ,but from comparing clear and distinct ,ideas4 ,but if any one will consider1 he will 7,i guess7 find1 that the great advancement and certainty of real knowledge which men arrived to in these sciences1 was not owing to the influence of these principles1 nor derived from any peculiar advantage they received from two or three general maxims1 laid down in the beginning2 but from the clear1 distinct1 complete ideas their thoughts were employed about1 and the relation of equality and excess so clear between some of them1 that they had an intuitive knowledge1 and by ,,that a way to discover it in others2 and this without the help of those maxims4 ,for ,i ask1 ,is it not possible for a young lad to know that his whole body is bigger than his little finger1 but by virtue of this axiom1 that ,,the ,,whole ,,is ,,bigger ,,than ,a ,,part2 nor be assured of it1 till he has learned that maxim8 ,or cannot a country wench know that1 having received a shilling from one that owes her three1 and a shilling also from another that owes her three1 the remaining debts in each of their hands are equal8 ,cannot she know this1 ,i say1 unless she fetch the certainty of it from this maxim1 that ,,if ,,you ,,take ,,equals ,,from ,,equals1 ,,the ,,remainder ,,will ,,be ,,equals1 a maxim which possibly she never heard or thought of8 ,i desire any one to consider1 from what has been elsewhere said1 which is known first and clearest by most people1 the particular instance1 or the general rule2 and which it is that gives life and birth to the other4 ,these general rules are but the comparing our more general and abstract ideas1 which are the workmanship of the mind1 made1 and names given to them for the easier dispatch in its reasonings1 and drawing into comprehensive terms and short rules its various and multiplied observations4 ,but knowledge began in the mind1 and was founded on particulars2 though afterwards1 perhaps1 no notice was taken thereof3 it being natural for the mind 7forward still to enlarge its knowledge7 most attentively to lay up those general notions1 and make the proper use of them1 which is to disburden the memory of the cumbersome load of particulars4 ,for ,i desire it may be considered1 what more certainty there is to a child1 or any one1 that his body1 little finger1 and all1 is bigger than his little finger alone1 after you have given to his body the name ,,whole1 and to his little finger the name ,,part1 than he could have had before2 or what new knowledge concerning his body can these two relative terms give him1 which he could not have without them8 ,could he not know that his body was bigger than his little finger1 if his language were yet so imperfect that he had no such relative terms as whole and part8 ,i ask1 further1 when he has got these names1 how is he more certain that his body is a whole1 and his little finger a part1 than he was or might be certain before he learnt those terms1 that his body was bigger than his little finger8 ,any one may as reasonably doubt or deny that his little finger is a part of his body1 as that it is less than his body4 ,and he that can doubt whether it be less1 will as certainly doubt whether it be a part4 ,so that the maxim1 the whole is bigger than a part1 can never be made use of to prove the little finger less than the body1 but when it is useless1 by being brought to convince one of a truth which he knows already4 ,for he that does not certainly know that any parcel of matter1 with another parcel of matter joined to it1 is bigger than either of them alone1 will never be able to know it by the help of these two relative terms1 whole and part1 make of them what maxim you please4 #d4 ,dangerous to build upon precarious ,principles4 ,but be it in the mathematics as it will1 whether it be clearer1 that1 taking an inch from a black line of two inches1 and an inch from a red line of two inches1 the remaining parts of the two lines will be equal1 or that ,,if ,,you ,,take ,,equals ,,from ,,equals1 ,,the ,,remainder ,,will ,,be ,,equals3 which1 ,i say1 of these two is the clearer and first known1 ,i leave to any one to determine1 it not being material to my present occasion4 ,that which ,i have here to do1 is to inquire1 whether1 if it be the readiest way to knowledge to begin with general maxims1 and build upon them1 it be yet a safe way to take the ,,principles which are laid down in any other science as unquestionable truths2 and so receive them without examination1 and adhere to them1 without suffering them to be doubted of1 because mathematicians have been so happy1 or so fair1 to use none but self-evident and undeniable4 ,if this be so1 ,i know not what may not pass for truth in morality1 what may not be introduced and proved in natural philosophy4 ,let that principle of some of the old philosophers1 ,that all is ,matter1 and that there is nothing else1 be received for certain and indubitable1 and it will be easy to be seen by the writings of some that have revived it again in our days1 what consequences it will lead us into4 ,let any one1 with ,polemo1 take the world2 or with the ,stoics1 the aether1 or the sun2 or with ,anaximenes1 the air1 to be ,god2 and what a divinity1 religion1 and worship must we needs have6 ,nothing can be so dangerous as ,,principles thus ,,taken ,,up ,,without ,,questioning ,,or ,,examination2 especially if they be such as concern morality1 which influence men's lives1 and give a bias to all their actions4 ,who might not justly expect another kind of life in ,aristippus1 who placed happiness in bodily pleasure2 and in ,antisthenes1 who made virtue sufficient to felicity8 ,and he who1 with ,plato1 shall place beatitude in the knowledge of ,god1 will have his thoughts raised to other contemplations than those who look not beyond this spot of earth1 and those perishing things which are to be had in it4 ,he that1 with ,archelaus1 shall lay it down as a principle1 that right and wrong1 honest and dishonest1 are defined only by laws1 and not by nature1 will have other measures of moral rectitude and gravity1 than those who take it for granted that we are under obligations antecedent to all human constitutions4 #e4 ,to do so is no certain ,way to ,truth4 ,if1 therefore1 those that pass for ,,principles are ,,not ,,certain1 7which we must have some way to know1 that we may be able to distinguish them from those that are doubtful17 but are only made so to us by our blind assent1 we are liable to be misled by them2 and instead of being guided into truth1 we shall1 by principles1 be only confirmed in mistake and error4 #f4 ,but to compare clear1 complete ,ideas1 under steady ,names4 ,but since the knowledge of the certainty of principles1 as well as of all other truths1 depends only upon the perception we have of the agreement or disagreement of our ideas1 the way to improve our knowledge is not1 ,i am sure1 blindly1 and with an implicit faith1 to receive and swallow principles2 but is1 ,i think1 to get and fix in our minds clear1 distinct1 and complete ideas1 as far as they are to be had1 and annex to them proper and constant names4 ,and thus1 perhaps1 without any other principles1 but ,,barely ,,considering ,,those ,,perfect ,,ideas1 and by ,,comparing ,,them ,,one ,,with ,,another2 finding their agreement and disagreement1 and their several relations and habitudes2 we shall get more true and clear knowledge by the conduct of this one rule1 than by taking up principles1 and thereby putting our minds into the disposal of others4 #g4 ,the true ,method of advancing ,knowledge is by considering our abstract ,ideas4 ,we must1 therefore1 if we will proceed as reason advises1 adapt our methods of inquiry to ,,the ,,nature ,,of ,,the ,,ideas ,,we ,,examine1 and the truth we search after4 ,general and certain truths are only founded in the habitudes and relations of ,,abstract ,,ideas4 ,a sagacious and methodical application of our thoughts1 for the finding out these relations1 is the only way to discover all that can be put with truth and certainty concerning them into general propositions4 ,by what steps we are to proceed in these1 is to be learned in the schools of the mathematicians1 who1 from very plain and easy beginnings1 by gentle degrees1 and a continued chain of reasonings1 proceed to the discovery and demonstration of truths that appear at first sight beyond human capacity4 ,the art of finding proofs1 and the admirable methods they have invented for the singling out and laying in order those intermediate ideas that demonstratively show the equality or inequality of unapplicable quantities1 is that which has carried them so far1 and produced such wonderful and unexpected discoveries3 but whether something like this1 in respect of other ideas1 as well as those of magnitude1 may not in time be found out1 ,i will not determine4 ,this1 ,i think1 ,i may say1 that if other ideas that are the real as well as nominal essences of their species1 were pursued in the way familiar to mathematicians1 they would carry our thoughts further1 and with greater evidence and clearness than possibly we are apt to imagine4 #h4 ,by which ,morality also may be made clearer4 ,this gave me the confidence to advance that conjecture1 which ,i suggest1 7chap4 iii47 viz4 that ,,morality is capable of demonstration as well as mathematics4 ,for the ideas that ethics are conversant about1 being all real essences1 and such as ,i imagine have a discoverable connexion and agreement one with another2 so far as we can find their habitudes and relations1 so far we shall be possessed of certain1 real1 and general truths2 and ,i doubt not but1 if a right method were taken1 a great part of morality might be made out with that clearness1 that could leave1 to a considering man1 no more reason to doubt1 than he could have to doubt of the truth of propositions in mathematics1 which have been demonstrated to him4 #i4 ,our ,knowledge of ,substances is to be improved1 not by contemplation of abstract ideas1 but only by ,experience4 ,in our search after the knowledge of ,,substances1 our want of ideas that are suitable to such a way of proceeding obliges us to a quite different method4 ,we advance not here1 as in the other1 7where our abstract ideas are real as well as nominal essences17 by contemplating our ideas1 and considering their relations and correspondences2 that helps us very little for the reasons1 that in another place we have at large set down4 ,by which ,i think it is evident1 that substances afford matter of very little ,,general knowledge2 and the bare contemplation of their abstract ideas will carry us but a very little way in the search of truth and certainty4 ,what1 then1 are we to do for the improvement of our knowledge in substantial beings8 ,here we are to take a quite contrary course3 the want of ideas of their real essences sends us from our own thoughts to the things themselves as they exist4 ,,experience ,,here ,,must ,,teach ,,me ,,what ,,reason ,,cannot3 and it is by ,,trying alone1 that ,i can ,,certainly ,,know1 what other qualities co-exist with those of my complex idea1 v4g4 whether that yellow heavy1 fusible body ,i call gold1 be malleable1 or no2 which experience 7which way ever it prove in that particular body ,i examine7 makes me not certain1 that it is so in all1 or any other yellow1 heavy1 fusible bodies1 but that which ,i have tried4 ,because it is no consequence one way or the other from my complex idea3 the necessity or inconsistence of malleability hath no visible connexion with the combination of that colour1 weight1 and fusibility in any body4 ,what ,i have said here of the nominal essence of gold1 supposed to consist of a body of such a determinate colour1 weight1 and fusibility1 will hold true1 if malleableness1 fixedness1 and solubility in aqua regia be added to it4 ,our reasonings from these ideas will carry us but a little way in the certain discovery of the other properties in those masses of matter wherein all these are to be found4 ,because the ,,other properties of such bodies1 depending not on these1 but on that unknown real essence on which these also depend1 we cannot by them discover the rest2 we can go no further than the simple ideas of our nominal essence will carry us1 which is very little beyond themselves2 and so afford us but very sparingly any certain1 universal1 and useful truths4 ,for1 upon trial1 having found that particular piece 7and all others of that colour1 weight1 and fusibility1 that ,i ever tried7 malleable1 that also makes now1 perhaps1 a part of my complex idea1 part of my nominal essence of gold3 whereby though ,i make my complex idea to which ,i affix the name gold1 to consist of more simple ideas than before2 yet still1 it not containing the real essence of any species of bodies1 it helps me not certainly to know 7,i say to know1 perhaps it may be to conjecture7 the other remaining properties of that body1 further than they have a visible connexion with some or all of the simple ideas that make up my nominal essence4 ,for example1 ,i cannot be certain1 from this complex idea1 whether gold be fixed or no2 because1 as before1 there is no ,,necessary connexion or inconsistence to be discovered betwixt a ,,complex ,,idea ,,of ,a ,,body ,,yellow1 ,,heavy1 ,,fusible1 ,,malleable2 betwixt these1 ,i say1 and ,,fixedness2 so that ,i may certainly know1 that in whatsoever body these are found1 there fixedness is sure to be4 ,here1 again1 for assurance1 ,i must apply myself to experience2 as far as that reaches1 ,i may have certain knowledge1 but no further4 #aj4 ,experience may procure is ,convenience1 not ,science4 ,i deny not but a man1 accustomed to rational and regular experiments1 shall be able to see further into the nature of bodies1 and guess righter at their yet unknown properties1 than one that is a stranger to them3 but yet1 as ,i have said1 this is but judgment and opinion1 not knowledge and certainty4 ,this way of ,,getting ,,and ,,improving ,,our ,,knowledge ,,in ,,substances ,,only ,,by ,,experience ,,and ,,history1 which is all that the weakness of our faculties in this state of mediocrity which we are in this world can attain to1 makes me suspect that ,,natural ,,philosophy ,,is ,,not ,,capable ,,is ,,being ,,made ,a ,,science4 ,we are able1 ,i imagine1 to reach very little general knowledge concerning the species of bodies1 and their several properties4 ,experiments and historical observations we may have1 from which we may draw advantages of ease and health1 and thereby increase our stock of conveniences for this life2 but beyond this ,i fear our talents reach not1 nor are our faculties1 as ,i guess1 able to advance4 #aa4 ,we are fitted for moral ,science1 but only for probable interpretations of external ,nature4 ,from whence is it obvious to conclude1 that1 since our faculties are not fitted to penetrate into the internal fabric and real essences of bodies2 but yet plainly discover to us the being of a ,god1 and the knowledge of ourselves1 enough to lead us into a full and clear discovery of our duty and great concernment2 it will become us1 as rational creatures1 to employ those faculties we have about what they are most adapted to1 and follow the direction of nature1 where it seems to point us out the way4 ,for it is rational to conclude1 that our proper employment lies in those inquiries1 and in that sort of knowledge which is most suited to our natural capacities1 and carries in it our greatest interest1 i4e4 the condition of our eternal estate4 ,hence ,i think ,i may conclude1 that ,,morality ,,is ,,the ,,proper ,,science ,,and ,,business ,,of ,,mankind ,,in ,,general1 7who are both concerned and fitted to search out their ,,summum ,,bonum27 as several arts1 conversant about several parts of nature1 are the lot and private talent of particular men1 for the common use of human life1 and their own particular subsistence in this world4 ,of what consequence the discovery of one natural body and its properties may be to human life1 the whole great continent of ,america is a convincing instance3 whose ignorance in useful arts1 and want of the greatest part of the conveniences of life1 in a country that abounded with all sorts of natural plenty1 ,i think may be attributed to their ignorance of what was to be found in a very ordinary1 despicable stone1 ,i mean the mineral of ,,iron4 ,and whatever we think of our parts or improvements in this part of the world1 where knowledge and plenty seem to vie with each other2 yet to any one that will seriously reflect on it1 ,i suppose it will appear past doubt1 that1 were the use of iron lost among us1 we should in a few ages be unavoidably reduced to the wants and ignorance of the ancient savage ,americans1 whose natural endowments and provisions come no way short of those of the most flourishing and polite nations4 ,so that he who first made known the use of that contemptible mineral1 may be truly styled the father of arts1 and author of plenty4 #ab4 ,in the study of ,nature we must beware of ,hypotheses and wrong ,principles4 ,i would not1 therefore1 be thought to disesteem or dissuade the study of ,,nature4 ,i readily agree the contemplation of his works gives us occasion to admire1 revere1 and glorify their ,author3 and1 if rightly directed1 may be of greater benefit to mankind than the monuments of exemplary charity that have at so great charge been raised by the founders of hospitals and almshouses4 ,he that first invented printing1 discovered the use of the compass1 or made public the virtue and right use of ,,kin ,,kina1 did more for the propagation of knowledge1 for the supply and increase of useful commodities1 and saved more from the grave than those who built colleges1 workhouses1 and hospitals4 ,all that ,i would say is1 that we should not be too forwardly possessed with the opinion or expectation of knowledge1 where it is not to be had1 or by ways that will not attain to it3 that we should not take doubtful systems for complete sciences2 nor unintelligible notions for scientifical demonstrations4 ,in the knowledge of bodies1 we must be content to glean what we can from particular experiments3 since we cannot1 from a discovery of their real essences1 grasp at a time whole sheaves1 and in bundles comprehend the nature and properties of whole species together4 ,where our inquiry is concerning co-existence1 or repugnancy to co-exist1 which by contemplation of our ideas we cannot discover2 there experience1 observation1 and natural history1 must give us1 by our senses and by retail1 an insight into corporeal substances4 ,the knowledge of ,,bodies we must get by our senses1 warily employed in taking notice of their qualities and operations on one another3 and what we hope to know of ,,separate ,,spirits in this world1 we must1 ,i think1 expect only from revelation4 ,he that shall consider how little general maxims1 precarious principles1 and hypotheses laid down at pleasure1 have promoted true knowledge1 or helped to satisfy the inquiries of rational men after real improvements2 how little1 ,i say1 the setting out at that end has1 for many ages together1 advanced men's progress1 towards the knowledge of natural philosophy1 ,will think we have reason to thank those who in this latter age have taken another course1 and have trod out to us1 though not an easier way to learned ignorance1 yet a surer way to profitable knowledge4 #ac4 ,the true ,use of ,hypotheses4 ,not that we may not1 to explain any phenomena of nature1 make use of any probable hypothesis whatsoever3 hypotheses1 if they are well made1 are at least great helps to the memory1 and often direct us to new discoveries4 ,but my meaning is1 that we should not take up any one too hastily 7which the mind1 that would always penetrate into the causes of things1 and have principles to rest on1 is very apt to do7 till we have very well examined particulars1 and made several experiments1 in that thing which we would explain by our hypothesis1 and see whether it will agree to them all2 whether our principles will carry us quite through1 and not be as inconsistent with one phenomenon of nature1 as they seem to accommodate and explain another4 ,and at least that we take care that the name of ,,principles deceive us not1 nor impose on us1 by making us receive that for an unquestionable truth1 which is really at best but a very doubtful conjecture2 such as are most 7,i had almost said all7 of the hypotheses in natural philosophy4 #ad4 ,clear and distinct ,ideas with settled ,names1 and the finding of those intermediate ideas which show their ,agreement or ,disagreement1 are the ,ways to enlarge our ,knowledge4 ,but whether natural philosophy be capable of certainty or no1 the ways to enlarge our knowledge1 as far as we are capable1 seems to me1 in short1 to be these two3-- ,first1 ,the first is to get and settle in our minds determined ideas of those things whereof we have general or specific names2 at least1 so many of them as we would consider and improve our knowledge in1 or reason about4 ,and if they be specific ideas of substances1 we should endeavour also to make them as complete as we can1 whereby ,i mean1 that we should put together as many simple ideas as1 being constantly observed to co-exist1 may perfectly determine the species2 and each of those simple ideas which are the ingredients of our complex ones1 should be clear and distinct in our minds4 ,for it being evident that our knowledge cannot exceed our ideas2 as far as they are either imperfect1 confused1 or obscure1 we cannot expect to have certain1 perfect1 or clear knowledge4 ,secondly1 ,the other is the art of finding out those intermediate ideas1 which may show us the agreement or repugnancy of other ideas1 which cannot be immediately compared4 #ae4 ,mathematics an instance of this4 ,that these two 7and not the relying on maxims1 and drawing consequences from some general propositions7 are the right methods of improving our knowledge in the ideas of other modes besides those of quantity1 the consideration of mathematical knowledge will easily inform us4 ,where first we shall find that he that has not a perfect and clear idea of those angles or figures of which he desires to know anything1 is utterly thereby incapable of any knowledge about them4 ,suppose but a man not to have a perfect exact idea of a right angle1 a scalenum1 or trapezium1 and there is nothing more certain than that he will in vain seek any demonstration about them4 ,further1 it is evident1 that it was not the influence of those maxims which are taken for principles in mathematics1 that hath led the masters of that science into those wonderful discoveries they have made4 ,let a man of good parts know all the maxims generally made use of in mathematics ever so perfectly1 and contemplate their extent and consequences as much as he pleases1 he will1 by their assistance1 ,i suppose1 scarce ever come to know that the square of the hypothenuse in a right-angled triangle is equal to the squares of the two other sides4 ,the knowledge that 'the whole is equal to all its parts1' and 'if you take equals from equals1 the remainder will be equal1' c41 helped him not1 ,i presume1 to this demonstration3 and a man may1 ,i think1 pore long enough on those axioms1 without ever seeing one jot the more of mathematical truths4 ,they have been discovered by the thoughts otherwise applied3 the mind had other objects1 other views before it1 far different from those maxims1 when it first got the knowledge of such truths in mathematics1 which men1 well enough acquainted with those received axioms1 but ignorant of their method who first made these demonstrations1 can never sufficiently admire4 ,and who knows what methods to enlarge our knowledge in other parts of science may hereafter be invented1 answering that of algebra in mathematics1 which so readily finds out the ideas of quantities to measure others by2 whose equality or proportion we could otherwise very hardly1 or1 perhaps1 never come to know8 ,,chapter ,,xiii4 ,,some ,,further ,,considerations ,,concerning ,,our ,,knowledge4 #a4 ,our ,knowledge partly necessary partly voluntary4 ,our knowledge1 as in other things1 so in this1 has so great a conformity with our sight1 that it is neither wholly necessary1 nor wholly voluntary4 ,if our knowledge were altogether necessary1 all men's knowledge would not only be alike1 but every man would know all that is knowable2 and if it were wholly voluntary1 some men so little regard or value it1 that they would have extreme little1 or none at all4 ,men that have senses cannot choose but receive some ideas by them2 and if they have memory1 they cannot but retain some of them2 and if they have any distinguishing faculty1 cannot but perceive the agreement or disagreement of some of them one with another2 as he that has eyes1 if he will open them by day1 cannot but see some objects1 and perceive a difference in them4 ,but though a man with his eyes open in the light1 cannot but see1 yet there be certain objects which he may choose whether he will turn his eyes to2 there may be in his reach a book containing pictures and discourses1 capable to delight or instruct him1 which yet he may never have the will to open1 never take the pains to look into4 #b4 ,the application of our ,faculties voluntary2 but they being employed1 we know as things are1 not as we please4 ,there is also another thing in a man's power1 and that is1 though he turns his eyes sometimes towards an object1 yet he may choose whether he will curiously survey it1 and with an intent application endeavour to observe accurately all that is visible in it4 ,but yet1 what he does see1 he cannot see otherwise than he does4 ,it depends not on his will to see that black which appears yellow2 nor to persuade himself1 that what actually scalds him1 feels cold4 ,the earth will not appear painted with flowers1 nor the fields covered with verdure1 whenever he has a mind to it3 in the cold winter1 he cannot help seeing it white and hoary1 if he will look abroad4 ,just thus is it with our understanding3 all that is voluntary in our knowledge is1 the employing or withholding any of our ,,faculties from this or that sort of objects1 and a more or less accurate survey of them3 but1 ,,they ,,being ,,employed1 ,,our ,,will ,,hath ,,no ,,power ,,to ,,determine ,,the ,,knowledge ,,of ,,the ,,mind ,,one ,,way ,,or ,,another2 that is done only by the objects themselves1 as far as they are clearly discovered4 ,and therefore1 as far as men's senses are conversant about external objects1 the mind cannot but receive those ideas which are presented by them1 and be informed of the existence of things without3 and so far as men's thoughts converse with their own determined ideas1 they cannot but in some measure observe the agreement or disagreement that is to be found amongst some of them1 which is so far knowledge3 and if they have names for those ideas which they have thus considered1 they must needs be assured of the truth of those propositions which express that agreement or disagreement they perceive in them1 and be undoubtedly convinced of those truths4 ,for what a man sees1 he cannot but see2 and what he perceives1 he cannot but know that he perceives4 #c4 ,instance in ,numbers4 ,thus he that has got the ideas of numbers1 and hath taken the pains to compare one1 two1 and three1 to six1 cannot choose but know that they are equal3 he that hath got the idea of a triangle1 and found the ways to measure its angles and their magnitudes1 is certain that its three angles are equal to two right ones2 and can as little doubt of that1 as of this truth1 that1 ,it is impossible for the same thing to be1 and not to be4 #d4 ,instance in ,natural ,religion4 ,he also that hath the idea of an intelligent1 but frail and weak being1 made by and depending on another1 who is eternal1 omnipotent1 perfectly wise and good1 will as certainly know that man is to honour1 fear1 and obey ,god1 as that the sun shines when he sees it4 ,for if he hath but the ideas of two such beings in his mind1 and will turn his thoughts that way1 and consider them1 he will as certainly find that the inferior1 finite1 and dependent1 is under an obligation to obey the supreme and infinite1 as he is certain to find that three1 four1 and seven are less than fifteen2 if he will consider and compute those numbers3 nor can he be surer in a clear morning that the sun is risen2 if he will but open his eyes1 and turn them that way4 ,but yet these truths1 being ever so certain1 ever so clear1 he may be ignorant of either1 or all of them1 who will never take the pains to employ his faculties1 as he should1 to inform himself about them4 ,,chapter ,,xiv4 ,,of ,,judgment4 #a4 ,our ,knowledge being short1 we want something else4 ,the understanding faculties being given to man1 not barely for speculation1 but also for the conduct of his life1 man would be at a great loss if he had nothing to direct him but what has the certainty of true knowledge4 ,for that being very short and scanty1 as we have seen1 he would be often utterly in the dark1 and in most of the actions of his life1 perfectly at a stand1 had he nothing to guide him in the absence of clear and certain knowledge4 ,he that will not eat till he has demonstration that it will nourish him2 he that will not stir till he infallibly knows the business he goes about will succeed1 will have little else to do but to sit still and perish4 #b4 ,what ,use to be made of this twilight ,state4 ,therefore1 as ,god has set some things in broad daylight2 as he has given us some certain knowledge1 though limited to a few things in comparison1 probably as a taste of what intellectual creatures are capable of to excite in us a desire and endeavour after a better state3 so1 in the greatest part of our concernments1 he has afforded us only the twilight1 as ,i may so say1 of probability2 suitable1 ,i presume1 to that state of mediocrity and probationership he has been pleased to place us in here2 wherein1 to check our over-confidence and presumption1 we might1 by every day's experience1 be made sensible of our short-sightedness and liableness to error2 the sense whereof might be a constant admonition to us1 to spend the days of this our pilgrimage with industry and care1 in the search and following of that way which might lead us to a state of greater perfection4 ,it being highly rational to think1 even were revelation silent in the case1 that1 as men employ those talents ,god has given them here1 they shall accordingly receive their rewards at the close of the day1 when their sun shall set1 and night shall put an end to their labours4 #c4 ,judgement or assent to ,probability1 supplies our want of ,knowledge4 ,the faculty which ,god has given man to supply the want of clear and certain knowledge1 in cases where that cannot be had1 is ,,judgement3 whereby the mind takes its ideas to agree or disagree2 or1 which is the same1 any proposition to be true or false1 without perceiving a demonstrative evidence in the proofs4 ,the mind sometimes exercises this judgment out of necessity1 where demonstrative proofs and certain knowledge are not to be had2 and sometimes out of laziness1 unskilfulness1 or haste1 even where demonstrative and certain proofs are to be had4 ,men often stay not warily to examine the agreement or disagreement of two ideas1 which they are desirous or concerned to know2 but1 either incapable of such attention as is requisite in a long train of gradations1 or impatient of delay1 lightly cast their eyes on1 or wholly pass by the proofs2 and so1 without making out the demonstration1 determine of the agreement or disagreement of two ideas1 as it were by a view of them as they are at a distance1 and take it to be the one or the other1 as seems most likely to them upon such a loose survey4 ,this faculty of the mind1 when it is exercised immediately about things1 is called ,,judgement2 when about truths delivered in words1 is most commonly called ,,assent or ,,dissent3 which being the most usual way1 wherein the mind has occasion to employ this faculty1 ,i shall1 under these terms1 treat of it1 as feast liable in our language to equivocation4 #d4 ,judgement is the presuming ,things to be so1 without perceiving it4 ,thus the mind has two faculties conversant 7about truth and falsehood73-- ,first1 ,,knowledge1 whereby it certainly ,,perceives1 and is undoubtedly satisfied of the agreement or disagreement of any ideas4 ,secondly1 ,,judgement1 which is the putting ideas together1 or separating them from one another in the mind1 when their certain agreement or disagreement is not perceived1 but ,,presumed to be so2 which is1 as the word imports1 taken to be so before it certainly appears4 ,and if it so unites or separates them as in reality things are1 it is right judgement4 ,,chapter ,,xv4 ,,of ,,probability4 #a4 ,probability is the appearance of ,agreement upon fallible ,proofs4 ,as ,,demonstration is the showing the agreement or disagreement of two ideas1 by the intervention of one or more proofs1 which have a constant1 immutable1 and visible connexion one with another2 so ,,probability is nothing but the appearance of such an agreement or disagreement1 by the intervention of proofs1 whose connexion is not constant and immutable1 or at least is not perceived to be so1 but is1 or appears for the most part to be so1 and is enough to induce the mind to judge the proposition to be true or false1 rather than the contrary4 ,for example3 in the demonstration of it a man perceives the certain1 immutable connexion there is of equality between the three angles of a triangle1 and those intermediate ones which are made use of to show their equality to two right ones2 and so1 by an intuitive knowledge of the agreement or disagreement of the intermediate ideas in each step of the progress1 the whole series is continued with an evidence1 which clearly shows the agreement or disagreement of those three angles in equality to two right ones3 and thus he has certain knowledge that it is so4 ,but another man1 who never took the pains to observe the demonstration1 hearing a mathematician1 a man of credit1 affirm the three angles of a triangle to be equal to two right ones1 assents to it1 i4e4 receives it for true3 in which case the foundation of his assent is the probability of the thing2 the proof being such as for the most part carries truth with it3 the man on whose testimony he receives it1 not being wont to affirm anything contrary to or besides his knowledge1 especially in matters of this kind3 so that that which causes his assent to this proposition1 that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones1 that which makes him take these ideas to agree1 without knowings them to do so1 is the wonted veracity of the speaker in other cases1 or his supposed veracity in this4 #b4 ,it is to supply our ,want of ,knowledge4 ,our knowledge1 as has been shown1 being very narrow1 and we not happy enough to find certain truth in everything which we have occasion to consider2 most of the propositions we think1 reason1 discourse--nay1 act upon1 are such as we cannot have undoubted knowledge of their truth3 yet some of them border so near upon certainty1 that we make no act1 according to the assent1 as resolutely as if they were infallibly demonstrated1 and that our knowledge of them was perfect and certain4 ,but there being degrees herein1 from the very neighbourhood of certainty and demonstration1 quite down to improbability and unlikeness1 even to the confines of impossibility2 and also degrees of assent from full assurance and confidence1 quite down to conjecture1 doubt1 and distrust3 ,i shall come now1 7having1 as ,i think1 found out ,,the ,,bounds ,,of ,,human ,,knowledge ,,and ,,certainty17 in the next place1 to consider ,,the ,,several ,,degrees ,,and ,,grounds ,,of ,,probability1 ,,and ,,assent ,,or ,,faith4 #c4 ,being that which makes us presume ,things to be true1 before we know them to be so4 ,probability is likeliness to be true1 the very notation of the word signifying such a proposition1 for which there be arguments or proofs to make it pass1 or be received for true4 ,the entertainment the mind gives this sort of propositions is called ,,belief1 ,,assent1 or ,,opinion1 which is the admitting or receiving any proposition for true1 upon arguments or proofs that are found to persuade us to receive it as true1 without certain knowledge that it is so4 ,and herein lies the difference between ,,probability and ,,certainty1 ,,faith1 and ,,knowledge1 that in all the parts of knowledge there is intuition2 each immediate idea1 each step has its visible and certain connexion3 in belief1 not so4 ,that which makes me believe1 is something extraneous to the thing ,i believe2 something not evidently joined on both sides to1 and so not manifestly showing the agreement or disagreement of those ideas that are under consideration4 #d4 ,the ,grounds of ,probability are two3 ,conformity with our own ,experience1 or the ,testimony of others4 ,probability then1 being to supply the defect of our knowledge1 and to guide us where that fails1 is always conversant about propositions whereof we have no certainty1 but only some inducements to receive them for true4 ,the grounds of it are1 in short1 these two following3-- ,first1 ,the conformity of anything with our own knowledge1 observation1 and experience4 ,secondly1 ,the testimony of others1 vouching their observation and experience4 ,in the testimony of others is to be considered3 #a4 ,the number4 #b4 ,the integrity4 #c4 ,the skill of the witnesses4 #d4 ,the design of the author1 where it is a testimony out of a book cited4 #e4 ,the consistency of the parts1 and circumstances of the relation4 #f4 ,contrary testimonies4 #e4 ,in this1 all the ,arguments pro and con ought to be examined1 before we come to a ,judgment4 ,probability wanting that intuitive evidence which1 infallibly determines the understanding and produces certain knowledge1 the mind1 if it ,,will ,,proceed ,,rationally1 ought to examine all the grounds of probability1 and see how they make more or less for or against any proposition1 before it assents to or dissents from it2 and1 upon a due balancing the whole1 reject or receive it1 with a more or less firm assent1 proportionably to the preponderancy of the greater grounds of probability on one side or the other4 ,for example3-- ,if ,i myself see a man walk on the ice1 it is past probability2 it is knowledge4 ,but if another tells me he saw a man in ,england1 in the midst of a sharp winter1 walk upon water hardened with cold1 this has so great conformity with what is usually observed to happen1 that ,i am disposed by the natures of the thing itself to assent to it2 unless some manifest suspicion attend the relation of that matter of fact4 ,but if the same thing be told to one born between the tropics1 who never saw nor heard of any such thing before1 there the whole probability relies on testimony3 and as the relators are more in number1 and of more credit1 and have no interest to speak contrary to the truth1 so that matter of fact is like to find more or less belief4 ,though to a man whose experience has always been quite contrary1 and who has never heard of anything like it1 the most untainted credit of a witness will scarce be able to find belief4 ,as it happened to a ,dutch ambassador1 who entertaining the king of ,siam with the particularities of ,holland1 which he was inquisitive after1 amongst other things told him1 that the water in his country would sometimes1 in cold weather1 be so hard1 that men walked upon it1 and that it would bear an elephant1 if he were there4 ,to which the king replied1 ,,hitherto ,i ,,have ,,believed ,,the ,,strange ,,things ,,you ,,have ,,told ,,me1 ,,because ,i ,,look ,,upon ,,you ,,as ,a ,,sober ,,fair ,,man1 ,,but ,,now ,i ,,am ,,sure ,,you ,,lie4 #f4 ,probable arguments capable of great ,variety4 ,upon these grounds depends the probability of any proposition3 and as the conformity of our knowledge1 as the certainty of observations1 as the frequency and constancy of experience1 and the number and credibility of testimonies do more or less agree or disagree with it1 so is any proposition in itself more or less probable4 ,there is another1 ,i confess1 which1 though by itself it be no true ground of probability1 yet is often made use of for one1 by which men most commonly regulate their assent1 and upon which they pin their faith more than anything else1 and that is1 ,,the ,,opinion ,,of ,,others2 though there cannot be a more dangerous thing to rely on1 nor more likely to mislead one2 since there is much more falsehood and error among men1 than truth and knowledge4 ,and if the opinions and persuasions of others1 whom we know and think well of1 be a ground of assent1 men have reason to be ,heathens in ,japan1 ,mahometans in ,turkey1 ,papists in ,spain1 ,protestants in ,england1 and ,lutherans in ,sweden4 ,but of this wrong ground of assent ,i shall have occasion to speak more at large in another place4 ,,chapter ,,xvi4 ,,of ,,the ,,degrees ,,of ,,assent4 #a4 ,our ,assent ought to be regulated by the ,grounds of ,probability4 ,the grounds of probability we have laid down in the foregoing chapter3 as they are the foundations on which our ,,assent is built1 so are they also the measure whereby its several degrees are1 or ought to be regulated3 only we are to take notice1 that1 whatever grounds of probability there may be1 they yet operate no further on the mind which searches after truth1 and endeavours to judge right1 than they appear2 at least1 in the first judgment or search that the mind makes4 ,i confess1 in the opinions men have1 and firmly stick to in the world1 their assent is not always from an actual view of the reasons that at first prevailed with them3 it being in many cases almost impossible1 and in most1 very hard1 even for those who have very admirable memories1 to retain all the proofs which1 upon a due examination1 made them embrace that side of the question4 ,it suffices that they have once with care and fairness sifted the matter as far as they could2 and that they have searched into all the particulars1 that they could imagine to give any light to the question2 and1 with the best of their skill1 cast up the account upon the whole evidence3 and thus1 having once found on which side the probability appeared to ,,them1 after as full and exact an inquiry as they can make1 they lay up the conclusion in their memories1 as a truth they have discovered2 and for the future they remain satisfied with the testimony of their memories1 that this is the opinion that1 by the proofs they have once seen of it1 deserves such a degree of their assent as they afford it4 #b4 ,these can not always be actually in ,view2 and then we must content ourselves with the remembrance that we once saw ground for such a ,degree of ,assent4 ,this is all that the greatest part of men are capable of doing1 in regulating their opinions and judgments2 unless a man will exact of them1 either to retain distinctly in their memories all the proofs concerning any probable truth1 and that too1 in the same order1 and regular deduction of consequences in which they have formerly placed or seen them2 which sometimes is enough to fill a large volume on one single question3 or else they must require a man1 for every opinion that he embraces1 every day to examine the proofs3 both which are impossible4 ,it is unavoidable1 therefore1 that the memory be relied on in the case1 and that men be persuaded of several opinions1 whereof the proofs are not actually in their thoughts2 nay1 which perhaps they are not able actually to recall4 ,without this1 the greatest part of men must be either very sceptics2 or change every moment1 and yield themselves up to whoever1 having lately studied the question1 offers them arguments1 which1 for want of memory1 they are not able presently to answer4 #c4 ,the ill consequence of this1 if our former ,judgments were not rightly made4 ,i cannot but own1 that men's sticking to their past judgment1 and adhering firmly to conclusions formerly made1 is often the cause of great obstinacy in error and mistake4 ,but the fault is not that they rely on their memories for what they have before well judged1 but because they judged before they had well examined4 ,may we not find a great number 7not to say the greatest part7 of men that think they have formed right judgments of several matters2 and that for no other reason1 but because they never thought otherwise8 that themselves to have judged right1 only because they never questioned1 never examined1 their own opinions8 ,which is indeed to think they judged right1 because they never judged at all4 ,and yet these1 of all men1 hold their opinions with the greatest stiffness2 those being generally the most fierce and firm in their tenets1 who have least examined them4 ,what we once ,,know1 we are certain is so3 and we may be secure1 that there are no latent proofs undiscovered1 which may overturn our knowledge1 or bring it in doubt4 ,but1 in matters of ,,probability1 it is not in every case we can be sure that we have all the particulars before us1 that any way concern the question2 and that there is no evidence behind1 and yet unseen1 which may cast the probability on the other side1 and outweigh all that at present seems to preponderate with us4 ,who almost is there that hath the leisure1 patience1 and means to collect together all the proofs concerning most of the opinions he has1 so as safely to conclude that he hath a clear and full view2 and that there is no more to be alleged for his better information8 ,and yet we are forced to determine ourselves on the one side or other4 ,the conduct of our lives1 and the management of our great concerns1 will not bear delay3 for those depend1 for the most part1 on the determination of our judgment in points wherein we are not capable of certain and demonstrative knowledge1 and wherein it is necessary for us to embrace the one side or the other4 #d4 ,the right ,use of it1 mutual ,charity and ,forbearance1 in a necessary diversity of opinions4 ,since1 therefore1 it is unavoidable to the greatest part of men1 if not all1 to have several ,,opinions1 without certain and indubitable proofs of their truth2 and it carries too great an imputation of ignorance1 lightness1 or folly for men to quit and renounce their former tenets presently upon the offer of an argument which they cannot immediately answer1 and show the insufficiency of3 it would1 methinks1 become all men to maintain peace1 and the common offices of humanity1 and friendship1 in the diversity of opinions2 since we cannot reasonably expect that any one should readily and obsequiously quit his own opinion1 and embrace ours1 with a blind resignation to an authority which the understanding of man acknowledges not4 ,for however it may often mistake1 it can own no other guide but reason1 nor blindly submit to the will and dictates of another4 ,if he you would bring over to your sentiments be one that examines before he assents1 you must give him leave at his leisure to go over the account again1 and1 recalling what is out of his mind1 examine all the particulars1 to see on which side the advantage lies3 and if he will not think our arguments of weight enough to engage him anew in so much pains1 it is but what we often do ourselves in the like case2 and we should take it amiss if others should prescribe to us what points we should study4 ,and if he be one who takes his opinions upon trust1 how can we imagine that he should renounce those tenets which time and custom have so settled in his mind1 that he thinks them self-evident1 and of an unquestionably certainty2 or which he takes to be impressions he has received from ,god himself1 or from men sent by him8 ,how can we expect1 ,i say1 that opinions thus settled should be given up to the arguments or authority of a stranger or adversary1 especially if there be any suspicion of interest or design1 as there never fails to be1 where men find themselves ill-trusted8 ,we should do well to commiserate our mutual ignorance1 and endeavour to remove it in all the gentle and fair ways of information2 and not instantly treat others ill1 as obstinate and perverse1 because they will not renounce their own1 and receive our opinions1 or at least those we would force upon them1 when it is more than probable that we are no less obstinate in not embracing some of theirs4 ,for where is the man that has incontestable evidence of the truth of all that he holds1 or of the falsehood of all he condemns2 or can say that he has examined to the bottom all his own1 or other men's opinions8 ,the necessity of believing without knowledge1 nay often upon very slight grounds1 in this fleeting state of action and blindness we are in1 should make us more busy and careful to inform ourselves than constrain others4 ,at least1 those who have not thoroughly examined to the bottom all their own tenets1 must confess they are unfit to prescribe to others2 and are unreasonable in imposing that as truth on other men's belief1 which they themselves have not searched into1 nor weighed the arguments of probability1 on which they should receive or reject it4 ,those who have fairly and truly examined1 and are thereby got past doubt in all the doctrines they profess and govern themselves by1 would have a juster pretence to require others to follow them3 but these are so few in number1 and find so little reason to be magisterial in their opinions1 that nothing insolent and imperious is to be expected from them3 and there is reason to think1 that1 if men were better instructed themselves1 they would be less imposing on others4 #e4 ,probability is either of sensible ,matter of ,fact1 capable of human testimony1 or of what is beyond the evidence of our senses4 ,but to return to the grounds of assent1 and the several degrees of it1 we are to take notice1 that the propositions we receive upon inducements of ,,probability are of ,,two ,,sorts3 either concerning some particular existance1 or1 as it is usually termed1 matter of fact1 which1 falling under observation1 is capable of human testimony2 or else concerning things1 which being beyond the discovery of our senses1 are not capable of any such testimony4 #f4 ,concerning the ,,first of these1 viz4 ,,particular ,,matter ,,of ,,fact4 ,i4 ,the concurrent ,experience of ,,all other ,men with ours1 produces ,assurance approaching to ,knowledge4 ,where any particular thing1 consonant to the constant observation of ourselves and others in the like case1 comes attested by the concurrent reports of all that mention it1 we receive it as easily1 and build as firmly upon it1 as if it were certain knowledge2 and we reason and act thereupon with as little doubt as if it were perfect demonstration4 ,thus1 if all ,englishmen1 who have occasion to mention it1 should affirm that it froze in ,england the last winter1 or that there were swallows seen there in the summer1 ,i think a man could almost as little doubt of it as that seven and four are eleven4 ,the first1 therefore1 and ,,highest ,,degree ,,of ,,probability1 is1 when the general consent of all men1 in all ages1 as far as it can be known1 concurs with a man's constant and never-failing experience in like cases1 to confirm the truth of any particular matter of fact attested by fair witnesses3 such are all the stated constitutions and properties of bodies1 and the regular proceedings of causes and effects in the ordinary course of nature4 ,this we call an argument from the nature of things themselves4 ,for what our own and other men's ,,constant ,,observation has found always to be after the same manner1 that we with reason conclude to be the effect of steady and regular causes2 though they come not within the reach of our knowledge4 ,thus1 ,that fire warmed a man1 made lead fluid1 and changed the colour or consistency in wood or charcoal2 that iron sunk in water1 and swam in quicksilver3 these and the like propositions about particular facts1 being agreeable to our constant experience1 as often as we have to do with these matters2 and being generally spoke of 7when mentioned by others7 as things found constantly to be so1 and therefore not so much as controverted by anybody--we are put past doubt that a relation affirming any such thing to have been1 or any predication that it will happen again in the same manner1 is very true4 ,these ,,probabilities rise so near to ,,certainty1 that they govern our thoughts as absolutely1 and influence all our actions as fully1 as the most evident demonstration2 and in what concerns us we make little or no difference between them and certain knowledge4 ,our belief1 thus grounded1 rises to ,,assurance4 #g4 ,,ii4 ,unquestionable ,testimony1 and our own ,experience that a thing is for the most part so1 produce ,confidence4 ,the ,,next ,,degree ,,of ,,probability is1 when ,i find by my own experience1 and the agreement of all others that mention it1 a thing to be for the most part so1 and that the particular instance of it is attested by many and undoubted witnesses3 v4g4 history giving us such an account of men in all ages1 and my own experience1 as far as ,i had an opportunity to observe1 confirming it1 that most men prefer their private advantage to the public3 if all historians that write of ,tiberius1 say that ,tiberius did so1 it is extremely probable4 ,and in this case1 our assent has a sufficient foundation to raise itself to a degree which we may call ,,confidence4 #h4 ,,iii4 ,fair ,testimony1 and the ,nature of the ,thing indifferent1 produce unavoidable ,assent4 ,in things that happen indifferently1 as that a bird should fly this or that way2 that it should thunder on a man's right or left hand1 c41 when any particular matter of fact is vouched by the concurrent testimony of unsuspected witnesses1 there our assent is also ,,unavoidable4 ,thus3 that there is such a city in ,italy as ,rome3 that about one thousand seven hundred years ago1 there lived in it a man1 called ,julius ,caesar2 that he was a general1 and that he won a battle against another1 called ,pompey4 ,this1 though in the nature of the thing there be nothing for nor against it1 yet being related by historians of credit1 and contradicted by no one writer1 a man cannot avoid believing it1 and can as little doubt of it as he does of the being and actions of his own acquaintance1 whereof he himself is a witness4 #i4 ,experience and ,testimonies clashing1 infinitely vary the ,degrees of ,probability4 ,thus far the matter goes easy enough4 ,probability upon such grounds carries so much evidence with it1 that it naturally determines the judgment1 and leaves us as little liberty to believe or disbelieve1 as a demonstration does1 whether we will know1 or be ignorant4 ,the difficulty is1 when testimonies contradict common experience1 and the reports of history and witnesses clash with the ordinary course of nature1 or with one another2 there it is1 where diligence1 attention1 and exactness are required1 to form a right judgment1 and to proportion the assent to the different evidence and probability of the thing3 which rises and falls1 according as those two foundations of credibility1 viz4 ,,common ,,observation ,,in ,,like ,,cases1 and ,,particular ,,testimonies ,,in ,,that ,,particular ,,instance1 favour or contradict it4 ,these are liable to so great variety of contrary observations1 circumstances1 reports1 different qualifications1 tempers1 designs1 oversights1 c41 of the reporters1 that it is impossible to reduce to precise rules the various degrees wherein men give their assent4 ,this only may be said in general1 ,that as the arguments and proofs ,,pro and ,,con1 upon due examination1 nicely weighing every particular circumstance1 shall to any one appear1 upon the whole matter1 in a greater or less degree to preponderate on either side2 so they are fitted to produce in the mind such different entertainments1 as we call ,,belief1 ,,conjecture1 ,,guess1 ,,doubt1 ,,wavering1 ,,distrust1 ,,disbelief1 c4 #aj4 ,traditional ,testimonies1 the further removed the less their ,proof becomes4 ,this is what concerns assent in matters wherein testimony is made use of3 concerning which1 ,i think1 it may not be amiss to take notice of a rule observed in the law of ,england2 which is1 ,that though the attested copy of a record be good proof1 yet the copy of a copy1 ever so well attested1 and by ever so credible witnesses1 will not be admitted as a proof in judicature4 ,this is so generally approved as reasonable1 and suited to the wisdom and caution to be used in our inquiry after material truths1 that ,i never yet heard of any one that blamed it4 ,this practice1 if it be allowable in the decisions of right and wrong1 carries this observation along with it1 viz4 ,,that ,,any ,,testimony1 ,,the ,,further ,,off ,,it ,,is ,,from ,,the ,,original ,,truth1 ,,the ,,less ,,force ,,and ,,proof ,,it ,,has4 ,the being and existence of the thing itself1 is what ,i call the original truth4 ,a credible man vouching his knowledge of it is a good proof2 but if another equally credible do witness it from his report1 the testimony is weaker3 and a third that attests the hearsay of an hearsay is yet less considerable4 ,so that in traditional truths1 each remove weakens the force of the proof3 and the more hands the tradition has successively passed through1 the less strength and evidence does it receive from them4 ,this ,i thought necessary to be taken notice of3 because ,i find amongst some men the quite contrary commonly practised1 who look on opinions to gain force by growing older2 and what a thousand years since would not1 to a rational man contemporary with the first voucher1 have appeared at all probable1 is now urged as certain beyond all question1 only because several have since1 from him1 said it one after another4 ,upon this ground propositions1 evidently false or doubtful enough in their first beginning1 come1 by an inverted rule of probability1 to pass for authentic truths2 and those which found or deserved little credit from the mouths of their first authors1 are thought to grow venerable by age1 are urged as undeniable4 #aa4 ,yet ,history is of great ,use4 ,i would not be thought here to lessen the credit and use of ,,history3 it is all the light we have in many cases1 and we receive from it a great part of the useful truths we have1 with a convincing evidence4 ,i think nothing more valuable than the records of antiquity3 ,i wish we had more of them1 and more uncorrupted4 ,but this truth itself forces me to say1 ,that no probability can rise higher than its first original4 ,what has no other evidence than the single testimony of one only witness must stand or fall by his only testimony1 whether good1 bad1 or indifferent2 and though cited afterwards by hundreds of others1 one after another1 is so far from receiving any strength thereby1 that it is only the weaker4 ,passion1 interest1 inadvertency1 mistake of his meaning1 and a thousand odd reasons1 or capricios1 men's minds are acted by1 7impossible to be discovered17 may make one man quote another man's words or meaning wrong4 ,he that has but ever so little examined the citations of writers1 cannot doubt how little credit the quotations deserve1 where the originals are wanting2 and consequently how much less quotations of quotations can be relied on4 ,this is certain1 that what in one age was affirmed upon slight grounds1 can never after come to be more valid in future ages by being often repeated4 ,but the further still it is from the original1 the less valid it is1 and has always less force in the mouth or writing of him that last made use of it than in his from whom he received it4 #ab4 ,secondly1 ,in things which ,sense cannot discover1 ,analogy is the great ,rule of ,probability4 ,,secondly1 ,the probabilities we have hitherto mentioned are only such as concern matter of fact1 and such things as are capable of observation and testimony4 ,there remains that other sort1 concerning which men entertain opinions with variety of assent1 though ,,the ,,things ,,be ,,such1 ,,that ,,falling ,,not ,,under ,,the ,,reach ,,of ,,our ,,senses1 ,,they ,,are ,,not ,,capable ,,of ,,testimony4 ,such are1 #a4 ,the existence1 nature and operations of finite immaterial beings without us2 as spirits1 angels1 devils1 c4 ,or the existence of material beings which1 either for their smallness in themselves or remoteness from us1 our senses cannot take notice of--as1 whether there be any plants1 animals1 and intelligent inhabitants in the planets1 and other mansions of the vast universe4 #b4 ,concerning the manner of operation in most parts of the works of nature3 wherein1 though we see the sensible effects1 yet their causes are unknown1 and we perceive not the ways and manner how they are produced4 ,we see animals are generated1 nourished1 and move2 the loadstone draws iron2 and the parts of a candle1 successively melting1 turn into flame1 and give us both light and heat4 ,these and the like effects we see and know3 but the causes that operate1 and the manner they are produced in1 we can only guess and probably conjecture4 ,for these and the like1 coming not within the scrutiny of human senses1 cannot be examined by them1 or be attested by anybody2 and therefore can appear more or less probable1 only as they more or less agree to truths that are established in our minds1 and as they hold proportion to other parts of our knowledge and observation4 ,,analogy in these matters is the only help we have1 and it is from that alone we draw all our grounds of probability4 ,thus1 observing that the bare rubbing of two bodies violently one upon another1 produces heat1 and very often fire itself1 we have reason to think1 that what we call ,,heat and ,,fire consists in a violent agitation of the imperceptible minute parts of the burning matter4 ,observing likewise that the different refractions of pellucid bodies produce in our eyes the different appearances of several colours2 and also1 that the different ranging and laying the superficial parts of several bodies1 as of velvet1 watered silk1 c41 does the like1 we think it probable that the ,,colour and shining of bodies is in them nothing but the different arrangement and refraction of their minute and insensible parts4 ,thus1 finding in all parts of the creation1 that fall under human observation1 that there is ,a ,,gradual ,,connexion ,,of ,,one ,,with ,,another1 ,,without ,,any ,,great ,,or ,,discernible ,,gaps ,,between1 ,,in ,,all ,,that ,,great ,,variety ,,of ,,things ,,we ,,see ,,in ,,the ,,world1 which are so closely linked together1 that1 in the several ranks of beings1 it is not easy to discover the bounds betwixt them2 we have reason to be persuaded that1 ,,by ,,such ,,gentle ,,steps1 things ascend upwards in degrees of perfection4 ,it is a hard matter to say where sensible and rational begin1 and where insensible and irrational end3 and who is there quick-sighted enough to determine precisely which is the lowest species of living things1 and which the first of those which have no life8 ,things1 as far as we can observe1 lessen and augment1 as the quantity does in a regular cone2 where1 though there be a manifest odds betwixt the bigness of the diameter at a remote distance1 yet the difference between the upper and under1 where they touch one another1 is hardly discernible4 ,the difference is exceeding great between some men and some animals3 but if we will compare the understanding and abilities of some men and some brutes1 we shall find so little difference1 that it will be hard to say1 that that of the man is either clearer or larger4 ,observing1 ,i say1 such gradual and gentle descents downwards in those parts of the creation that are beneath man1 the rule of analogy may make it probable1 that it is so also in things above us and our observation2 and that there are several ranks of intelligent beings1 excelling us in several degrees of perfection1 ascending upwards towards the infinite perfection of the ,creator1 by gentle steps and differences1 that are every one at no great distance from the next to it4 ,this sort of probability1 which is the best conduct of rational experiments1 and the rise of hypothesis1 has also its use and influence2 and a wary reasoning from analogy leads us often into the discovery of truths and useful productions1 which would otherwise lie concealed4 #ac4 ,one ,case where contrary ,experience lessens not the ,testimony4 ,though the common experience and the ordinary course of things have justly a mighty influence on the minds of men1 to make them give or refuse credit to anything proposed to their belief2 yet there is one case1 wherein the strangeness of the fact lessens not the assent to a fair testimony given of it4 ,for where such supernatural events are suitable to ends aimed at by ,him who has the power to change the course of nature1 there1 ,,under ,,such ,,circumstances1 that may be the fitter to procure belief1 by how much the more they are beyond or contrary to ordinary observation4 ,this is the proper case of ,,miracles1 which1 well attested1 do not only find credit themselves1 but give it also to other truths1 which need such confirmation4 #ad4 ,the bare ,testimony of ,divine ,revelation is the highest ,certainty4 ,besides those we have hitherto mentioned1 there is one sort of propositions that challenge the highest degree of our assent1 upon bare testimony1 whether the thing proposed agree or disagree with common experience1 and the ordinary course of things1 or no4 ,the reason whereof is1 because the testimony is of such an one as cannot deceive nor be deceived3 and that is of ,god himself4 ,this carries with it an assurance beyond doubt1 evidence beyond exception4 ,this is called by a peculiar name1 ,,revelation1 and our assent to it1 ,,faith1 which as absolutely determines our minds1 and as perfectly excludes all wavering1 as our knowledge itself2 and we may as well doubt of our own being1 as we can whether any revelation from ,god be true4 ,so that faith is a settled and sure principle of assent and assurance1 and leaves no manner of room for doubt or hesitation4 ,,only ,,we ,,must ,,be ,,sure ,,that ,,it ,,be ,a ,,divine ,,revelation1 ,,and ,,that ,,we ,,understand ,,it ,,right3 else we shall expose ourselves to all the extravagancy of enthusiasm1 and all the error of wrong principles1 if we have faith and assurance in what is not ,,divine revelation4 ,and therefore1 in those cases1 our assent can be rationally no higher than the evidence of its being a revelation1 and that this is the meaning of the expressions it is delivered in4 ,if the evidence of its being a revelation1 or that this is its true sense1 be only on probable proofs1 our assent can reach no higher than an assurance or diffidence1 arising from the more or less apparent probability of the proofs4 ,but of ,,faith1 and the precedency it ought to have before other arguments of persuasion1 ,i shall speak more hereafter2 where ,i treat of it as it is ordinarily placed1 in contradistinction to reason2 though in truth it be nothing else but ,,an ,,assent ,,founded ,,on ,,the ,,highest ,,reason4 ,,chapter ,,xvii4 ,,of ,,reason #a4 ,various ,significations of the word ,reason4 ,,the word ,,reason in the ,english language has different significations3 sometimes it is taken for true and clear principles3 sometimes for clear and fair deductions from those principles3 and sometimes for the cause1 and particularly the final cause4 ,but the consideration ,i shall have of it here is in a signification different from all these2 and that is1 as it stands for a faculty in man1 that faculty whereby man is supposed to be distinguished from beasts1 and wherein it is evident he much surpasses them4 #b4 ,wherein ,reasoning consists4 ,if general knowledge1 as has been shown1 consists in a perception of the agreement or disagreement of our own ideas1 and the knowledge of the existence of all things without us 7except only of a ,god1 whose existence every man may certainly know and demonstrate to himself from his own existence71 be had only by our senses1 what room is there for the exercise of any other faculty1 but ,,outward ,,sense and ,,inward ,,perception8 ,what need is there of ,,reason8 ,very much3 both for the enlargement of our knowledge1 and regulating our assent4 ,for it hath to do both in knowledge and opinion1 and is necessary and assisting to all our other intellectual faculties1 and indeed contains two of them1 viz4 ,,sagacity and ,,illation4 ,by the one1 it finds out2 and by the other1 it so orders the intermediate ideas as to discover what connexion there is in each link of the chain1 whereby the extremes are held together2 and thereby1 as it were1 to draw into view the truth sought for1 which is that which we call ,,illation or ,,inference1 and consists in nothing but the perception of the connexion there is between the ideas1 in each step of the deduction2 whereby the mind comes to see1 either the certain agreement or disagreement of any two ideas1 as in demonstration1 in which it arrives at ,,knowledge2 or their probable connexion1 on which it gives or withholds its assent1 as in ,,opinion4 ,sense and intuition reach but a very little way4 ,the greatest part of our knowledge depends upon deductions and intermediate ideas3 and in those cases where we are fain to substitute assent instead of knowledge1 and take propositions for true1 without being certain they are so1 we have need to find out1 examine1 and compare the grounds of their probability4 ,in both these cases1 the faculty which finds out the means1 and rightly applies them1 to discover certainty in the one1 and probability in the other1 is that which we call ,,reason4 ,for1 as reason perceives the necessary and indubitable connexion of all the ideas or proofs one to another1 in each step of any demonstration that produces knowledge2 so it likewise perceives the probable connexion of all the ideas or proofs one to another1 in every step of a discourse1 to which it will think assent due4 ,this is the lowest degree of that which can be truly called reason4 ,for where the mind does not perceive this probable connexion1 where it does not discern whether there be any such connexion or no2 there men's opinions are not the product of judgment1 or the consequence of reason1 but the effects of chance and hazard1 of a mind floating at all adventures1 without choice and without direction4 #c4 ,reason in its four degrees4 ,so that we may in ,,reason consider these ,,four ,,degrees3 the first and highest is the discovering and finding out of truths2 the second1 the regular and methodical disposition of them1 and laying them in a clear and fit order1 to make their connexion and force be plainly and easily perceived2 the third is the perceiving their connexion2 and the fourth1 a making a right conclusion4 ,these several degrees may be observed in any mathematical demonstration2 it being one thing to perceive the connexion of each part1 as the demonstration is made by another2 another to perceive the dependence of the conclusion on all the parts2 a third1 to make out a demonstration clearly and neatly one's self2 and something different from all these1 to have first found out these intermediate ideas or proofs by which it is made4 #d4 ,whether ,syllogism is the great ,instrument of ,reason4 ,there is one thing more which ,i shall desire to be considered concerning reason2 and that is1 whether ,,syllogism1 as is generally thought1 be the proper instrument of it1 and the usefullest way of exercising this faculty4 ,the causes ,i have to doubt are these3-- ,first ,cause to doubt this4 ,,first1 ,because syllogism serves our reason but in one only of the forementioned parts of it2 and that is1 to show the ,,connexion ,,of ,,the ,,proofs in any one instance1 and no more2 but in this it is of no great use1 since the mind can perceive such connexion1 where it really is1 as easily1 nay1 perhaps better1 without it4 ,men can reason well who cannot make a ,syllogism4 ,if we will observe the actings of our own minds1 we shall find that we reason best and clearest1 when we only observe the connexion of the proof1 without reducing our thoughts to any rule of syllogism4 ,and therefore we may take notice1 that there are many men that reason exceeding clear and rightly1 who know not how to make a syllogism4 ,he that will look into many parts of ,asia and ,america1 will find men reason there perhaps as acutely as himself1 who yet never heard of a syllogism1 nor can reduce any one argument to those forms3 and ,i believe scarce any one makes syllogisms in reasoning within himself4 ,indeed syllogism is made use of1 on occasion1 to discover a fallacy hid in a rhetorical flourish1 or cunningly wrapt up in a smooth period2 and1 stripping an absurdity of the cover of wit and good language1 show it in its naked deformity4 ,but the mind is not taught to reason by these rules2 it has a native faculty to perceive the coherence or incoherence of its ideas1 and can range them right without any such perplexing repetitions4 ,tell a country gentlewoman that the wind is south-west1 and the weather lowering1 and like to rain1 and she will easily understand it is not safe for her to go abroad thin clad in such a day1 after a fever3 she clearly sees the probable connexion of all these1 viz4 south-west wind1 and clouds1 rain1 wetting1 taking cold1 relapse1 and danger of death1 without tying them together in those artificial and cumbersome fetters of several syllogisms1 that clog and hinder the mind1 which proceeds from one part to another quicker and clearer without them3 and the probability which she easily perceives in things thus in their native state would be quite lost1 if this argument were managed learnedly1 and proposed in ,,mode and ,,figure4 ,for it very often confounds the connexion2 and1 ,i think1 every one will perceive in mathematical demonstrations1 that the knowledge gained thereby comes shortest and clearest without syllogism4 ,secondly1 ,because though syllogism serves to show the force or fallacy of an argument1 made use of in the usual way of discoursing1 ,,by ,,supplying ,,the ,,absent ,,proposition1 and so1 setting it before the view in a clear light2 yet it no less engages the mind in the perplexity of obscure1 equivocal1 and fallacious terms1 wherewith this artificial way of reasoning always abounds3 it being adapted more to the attaining of victory in dispute than the discovery and confirmation of truth in fair enquiries4 #e4 ,syllogism helps little in ,demonstration1 less in ,probability4 ,but however it be in knowledge1 ,i think ,i may truly say1 it is ,,of ,,far ,,less1 ,,or ,,no ,,use ,,at ,,all ,,in ,,probabilities4 ,for the assent there being to be determined by the preponderancy1 after due weighing of all the proofs1 with all circumstances on both sides1 nothing is so unfit to assist the mind in that as syllogism2 which running away with one assumed probability1 or one topical argument1 pursues that till it has led the mind quite out of sight of the thing under consideration2 and1 forcing it upon some remote difficulty1 holds it fast there2 entangled perhaps1 and1 as it were1 manacled1 in the chain of syllogisms1 without allowing it the liberty1 much less affording it the helps1 requisite to show on which side1 all things considered1 is the greater probability4 #f4 ,serves not to increase our ,knowledge1 but to fence with the ,knowledge we suppose we have4 ,but let it help us 7as perhaps may be said7 in convincing men of their errors and mistakes3 7and yet ,i would fain see the man that was forced out of his opinion by dint of syllogism17 yet still it fails our reason in that part1 which1 if not its highest perfection1 is yet certainly its hardest task1 and that which we most need its help in2 and that is ,,the ,,finding ,,out ,,of ,,proofs1 ,,and ,,making ,,new ,,discoveries4 ,the rules of syllogism serve not to furnish the mind with those intermediate ideas that may show the connexion of remote ones4 ,this way of reasoning discovers no new proofs1 but is the art of marshalling and ranging the old ones we have already4 ,the forty-seventh proposition of the first book of ,euclid is very true2 but the discovery of it1 ,i think1 not owing to any rules of common logic4 ,a man knows first and then he is able to prove syllogistically4 ,so that syllogism comes after knowledge1 and then a man has little or no need of it4 ,but it is chiefly by the finding out those ideas that show the connexion of distant ones1 that our stock of knowledge is increased1 and that useful arts and sciences are advanced4 ,syllogism1 at best1 is but the art of fencing with the little knowledge we have1 without making any addition to it4 ,and if a man should employ his reason all this way1 he will not do much otherwise than he who1 having got some iron out of the bowels of the earth1 should have it beaten up all into swords1 and put it into his servants' hands to fence with and bang one another4 ,had the ,king of ,spain employed the hands of his people1 and his ,spanish iron so1 he had brought to light but little of that treasure that lay so long hid in the dark entrails of ,america4 ,and ,i am apt to think that he who shall employ all the force of his reason only in brandishing of syllogisms1 will discover very little of that mass of knowledge which lies yet concealed in the secret recesses of nature2 and which1 ,i am apt to think1 native rustic reason 7as it formerly has done7 is likelier to open a way to1 and add to the common stock of mankind1 rather than any scholastic proceeding by the strict rules of ,,mode and ,,figure4 #g4 ,other ,helps to reason than ,syllogism should be sought4 ,i doubt not1 nevertheless1 but there are ways to be found to assist our reason in this most useful part2 and this the judicious ,hooker encourages me to say1 who in his ,eccl4 ,pol4 #a4 i4 ,section #f1 speaks thus3 ',if there might be added the right helps of true art and learning1 7which helps1 ,i must plainly confess1 this age of the world1 carrying the name of a learned age1 doth neither much know nor generally regard17 there would undoubtedly be almost as much difference in maturity of judgment between men therewith inured1 and that which men now are1 as between men that are now1 and innocents4' ,i do not pretend to have found or discovered here any of those 'right helps of art1' this great man of deep thought mentions3 but that is plain1 that syllogism1 and the logic now in use1 which were as well known in his days1 can be none of those he means4 ,it is sufficient for me1 if by a ,discourse1 perhaps something out of the way1 ,i am sure1 as to me1 wholly new and unborrowed1 ,i shall have given occasion to others to cast about for new discoveries1 and to seek in their own thoughts for those right helps of art1 which will scarce be found1 ,i fear1 by those who servilely confine themselves to the rules and dictates of others4 ,for beaten tracks lead this sort of cattle1 7as an observing ,roman calls them17 whose thoughts reach only to imitation1 ,,non ,,quo ,,eundum ,,est1 ,,sed ,,quo ,,itur4 ,but ,i can be bold to say1 that this age is adorned with some men of that strength of judgment and largeness of comprehension1 that1 if they would employ their thoughts on this subject1 could open new and undiscovered ways to the advancement of knowledge4 #h4 ,we can reason about ,particulars2 and the immediate object of all our reasonings is nothing but particular ideas4 ,having here had occasion to speak of syllogism in general1 and the use of it in reasoning1 and the improvement of our knowledge1 it is fit1 before ,i leave this subject1 to take notice of one manifest mistake in the rules of syllogism3 viz4 that no syllogistical reasoning can be right and conclusive1 but what has at least one ,,general proposition in it4 ,as if we could not reason1 and have knowledge about particulars3 whereas1 in truth1 the matter rightly considered1 the immediate object of all our reasoning and knowledge1 is nothing but particulars4 ,every man's reasoning and knowledge is only about the ideas existing in his own mind2 which are truly1 every one of them1 particular existences3 and our knowledge and reason about other things1 is only as they correspond with those our particular ideas4 ,so that the perception of the agreement or disagreement of our particular ideas1 is the whole and utmost of all our knowledge4 ,universality is but accidental to it1 and consists only in this1 that the particular ideas about which it is are such as more than one particular1 thing can correspond with and be represented by4 ,but the perception of the agreement or disagreement of our particular ideas1 and consequently our knowledge1 is equally clear and certain1 whether either1 or both1 or neither of those ideas1 be capable of representing more real beings than one1 or no4 #i4 ,our ,reason often fails us4 ,,reason1 though it penetrates into the depths of the sea and earth1 elevates our thoughts as high as the stars1 and leads us through the vast spaces and large rooms of this mighty fabric1 yet it comes far short of the real extent of even corporeal being4 ,and there are many instances wherein it fails us3 as1 ,first1 ,in cases when we have no ,ideas4 ,i4 ,it perfectly fails us1 where our ideas fail4 ,it neither does nor can extend itself further than they do4 ,and therefore1 wherever we have no ideas1 our reasoning stops1 and we are at an end of our reckoning3 and if at any time we reason about words which do not stand for any ideas1 it is only about those sounds1 and nothing else4 #aj4 ,secondly1 ,because our ,ideas are often obscure or imperfect4 ,,ii4 ,our reason is often puzzled and at a loss1 because of the obscurity1 confusion1 or imperfection of the ideas it is employed about2 and there we are involved in difficulties and contradictions4 ,thus1 not having any perfect idea of the ,,least ,,extension ,,of ,,matter1 nor of ,,infinity1 we are at a loss about the divisibility of matter2 but having perfect1 clear1 and distinct ideas of ,,number1 our reason meets with none of those inextricable difficulties in numbers1 nor finds itself involved in any contradictions about them4 ,thus1 we having but imperfect ideas of the operations of our minds1 and of the beginning of motion1 or thought how the mind produces either of them in us1 and much imperfecter yet of the operation of ,god1 run into great difficulties about ,,free ,,created ,,agents1 which reason cannot well extricate itself out of4 #aa4 ,,iii4 ,thirdly1 ,because we perceive not intermediate ,ideas to show conclusions4 ,our reason is often at a stand1 because it perceives not those ideas1 which could serve to show the certain or probable agreement or disagreement of any other two ideas3 and in this some men's faculties far outgo others4 ,till algebra1 that great instrument and instance of human sagacity1 was discovered1 men with amazement looked on several of the demonstrations of ancient mathematicians1 and could scarce forbear to think the finding several of those proofs to be something more than human4 #ab4 ,,iv4 ,fourthly1 ,because we often proceed upon wrong ,principles4 ,the mind1 by proceeding upon false principles1 is often engaged in absurdities and difficulties1 brought into straits and contradictions1 without knowing how to free itself3 and in that case it is in vain to implore the help of reason1 unless it be to discover the falsehood and reject the influence of those wrong principles4 ,reason is so far from clearing the difficulties which the building upon false foundations brings a man into1 that if he will pursue it1 it entangles him the more1 and engages him deeper in perplexities4 #ac4 ,v4 ,fifthly1 ,because we often employ doubtful ,terms4 ,as obscure and imperfect ideas often involve our reason1 so1 upon the same ground1 do dubious words and uncertain signs1 often1 in discourses and arguings1 when not warily attended to1 puzzle men's reason1 and bring them to a nonplus4 ,but these two latter are our fault1 and not the fault of reason4 ,but yet the consequences of them are nevertheless obvious2 and the perplexities or errors they fill men's minds with are everywhere observable4 #ad4 ,our highest ,degree of ,knowledge is intuitive1 without ,reasoning4 ,some of the ideas that are in the mind1 are so there1 that they can be by themselves immediately compared one with another3 and in these the mind is able to perceive that they agree or disagree as clearly as that it has them4 ,thus the mind perceives1 that an arch of a circle is less than the whole circle1 as clearly as it does the idea of a circle3 and this1 therefore1 as has been said1 ,i call ,,intuitive ,,knowledge2 which is certain1 beyond all doubt1 and needs no probation1 nor can have any2 this being the highest of all human certainty4 ,in this consists the evidence of all those ,,maxims which nobody has any doubt about1 but every man 7does not1 as is said1 only assent to1 but7 ,,knows to be true1 as soon as ever they are proposed to his understanding4 ,in the discovery of and assent to these truths1 there is no use of the discursive faculty1 ,,no ,,need ,,of ,,reasoning1 but they are known by a superior and higher degree of evidence4 ,and such1 if ,i may guess at things unknown1 ,i am apt to think that angels have now1 and the spirits of just men made perfect shall have1 in a future state1 of thousands of things which now either wholly escape our apprehensions1 or which our short-sighted reason having got some faint glimpse of1 we1 in the dark1 grope after4 #ae4 ,the next is got by ,reasoning4 ,but though we have1 here and there1 a little of this clear light1 some sparks of bright knowledge1 yet the greatest part of our ideas are such1 that we cannot discern their agreement or disagreement by an immediate comparing them4 ,and in all these we have ,,need ,,of ,,reasoning1 and must1 by discourse and inference1 make our discoveries4 ,now of these there are two sorts1 which ,i shall take the liberty to mention here again3-- ,first1 through ,reasonings that are ,demonstrative4 ,first1 ,those whose agreement or disagreement1 though it cannot be seen by an immediate putting them together1 yet may be examined by the intervention of other ideas which can be compared with them4 ,in this case1 when the agreement or disagreement of the intermediate idea1 on both sides1 with those which we would compare1 is ,,plainly ,,discerned3 there it amounts to ,,demonstration whereby knowledge is produced1 which1 though it be certain1 yet it is not so easy1 nor altogether so clear as intuitive knowledge4 ,because in that there is barely one simple intuition1 wherein there is no room for any the least mistake or doubt3 the truth is seen all perfectly at once4 ,in demonstration1 it is true1 there is intuition too1 but not altogether at once2 for there must be a remembrance of the intuition of the agreement of the medium1 or intermediate idea1 with that we compared it with before1 when we compare it with the other3 and where there be many mediums1 there the danger of the mistake is the greater4 ,for each agreement or disagreement of the ideas must be observed and seen in each step of the whole train1 and retained in the memory1 just as it is2 and the mind must be sure that no part of what is necessary to make up the demonstration is omitted or overlooked4 ,this makes some demonstrations long and perplexed1 and too hard for those who have not strength of parts distinctly to perceive1 and exactly carry so many particulars orderly in their heads4 ,and even those who are able to master such intricate speculations1 are fain sometimes to go over them again1 and there is need of more than one review before they can arrive at certainty4 ,but yet where the mind clearly retains the intuition it had of the agreement of any idea with another1 and that with a third1 and that with a fourth1 c41 there the agreement of the first and the fourth is a demonstration1 and produces certain knowledge2 which may be called ,,rational ,,knowledge1 as the other is intuitive4 #af4 ,secondly1 to supply the narrowness of ,demonstrative and ,intuitive ,knowledge we have nothing but ,judgment upon probable reasoning4 ,secondly1 ,there are other ideas1 whose agreement or disagreement can no otherwise be judged of but by the intervention of others which have not a certain agreement with the extremes1 but an ,,usual or ,,likely one3 and in these is that the ,,judgment is properly exercised2 which is the acquiescing of the mind1 that any ideas do agree1 by comparing them with such probable mediums4 ,this1 though it never amounts to knowledge1 no1 not to that which is the lowest degree of it2 yet sometimes the intermediate ideas tie the extremes so firmly together1 and the probability is so clear and strong1 that ,,assent as necessarily follows it1 as ,,knowledge does demonstration4 ,the great excellency and use of the judgment is to observe right1 and take a true estimate of the force and weight of each probability2 and then casting them up all right together1 choose that side which has the overbalance4 #ag4 ,intuition1 ,demonstration1 ,judgment4 ,,intuitive ,,knowledge is the perception of the ,,certain agreement or disagreement of two ideas immediately compared together4 ,,rational ,,knowledge is the perception of the ,,certain agreement or disagreement of any two ideas1 by the intervention of one or more other ideas4 ,,judgment is the thinking or taking two ideas to agree or disagree1 by the intervention of one or more ideas1 whose certain agreement or disagreement with them it does not perceive1 but hath observed to be ,,frequent and ,,usual4 #ah4 ,consequences of ,words1 and ,consequences of ,ideas4 ,though the deducing one proposition from another1 or making inferences in ,,words1 be a great part of reason1 and that which it is usually employed about2 yet the principal act of ratiocination is ,,the ,,finding ,,the ,,agreement ,,or ,,disagreement ,,of ,,two ,,ideas ,,one ,,with ,,another1 ,,by ,,the ,,intervention ,,of ,a ,,third4 ,as a man1 by a yard1 finds two houses to be of the same length1 which could not be brought together to measure their equality by juxta-position4 ,words have their consequences1 as the signs of such ideas3 and things agree or disagree1 as really they are2 but we observe it only by our ideas4 #ai4 ,four sorts of ,arguments4 ,before we quit this subject1 it may be worth our while a little to reflect on ,,four ,,sorts ,,of ,,arguments1 that men1 in their reasonings with others1 do ordinarily make use of to prevail on their assent2 or at least so to awe them as to silence their opposition4 ,first1 ,argumentum ad verecundiam4 ,i4 ,the first is1 to allege the opinions of men1 whose parts1 learning1 eminency1 power1 or some other cause has gained a name1 and settled their reputation in the common esteem with some kind of authority4 ,when men are established in any kind of dignity1 it is thought a breach of modesty for others to derogate any way from it1 and question the authority of men who are in possession of it4 ,this is apt to be censured1 as carrying with it too much pride1 when a man does not readily yield to the determination of approved authors1 which is wont to be received with respect and submission by others3 and it is looked upon as insolence1 for a man to set up and adhere to his own opinion against the current stream of antiquity2 or to put it in the balance against that of some learned doctor1 or otherwise approved writer4 ,whoever backs his tenets with such authorities1 thinks he ought thereby to carry the cause1 and is ready to style it impudence in any one who shall stand out against them4 ,this ,i think may be called ,,argumentum ,,ad ,,verecundiam4 #bj4 ,secondly1 ,argumentum ad ,ignorantiam4 ,,ii4 ,secondly1 ,another way that men ordinarily use to drive others1 and force them to submit their judgments1 and receive the opinion in debate1 is to require the adversary to admit what they allege as a proof1 or to assign a better4 ,and this ,i call ,,argumentum ,,ad ,,ignorantiam4 #ba4 ,thirdly1 ,argumentum ad hominem4 ,,iii4 ,thirdly1 ,a third way is to press a man with consequences drawn from his own principles or concessions4 ,this is already known under the name of ,,argumentum ,,ad ,,hominem4 #bb4 ,fourthly1 ,argumentum ad justicium4 ,the ,fourth alone advances us in knowledge and judgment4 ,,iv4 ,the fourth is the using of proofs drawn from any of the foundations of knowledge or probability4 ,this ,i call ,,argumentum ,,ad ,,justicium4 ,this alone1 of all the four1 brings true instruction with it1 and advances us in our way to knowledge4 ,for1 #a4 ,it argues not another man's opinion to be right1 because ,i1 out of respect1 or any other consideration but that of conviction1 will not contradict him4 #b4 ,it proves not another man to be in the right way1 nor that ,i ought to take the same with him1 because ,i know not a better4 #c4 ,nor does it follow that another man is in the right way1 because he has shown me that ,i am in the wrong4 ,i may be modest1 and therefore not oppose another man's persuasion3 ,i may be ignorant1 and not be able to produce a better3 ,i may be in an error1 and another may show me that ,i am so4 ,this may dispose me1 perhaps1 for the reception of truth1 but helps me not to it3 that must come from proofs and arguments1 and light arising from the nature of things themselves1 and not from my shamefacedness1 ignorance1 or error4 #bc4 ,above1 contrary1 and according to ,reason4 ,by what has been before said of reason1 we may be able to make some guess at the distinction of things1 into those that are according to1 above1 and contrary to reason4 #a4 ,,according ,,to ,,reason are such propositions whose truth we can discover by examining and tracing those ideas we have from sensation and reflection2 and by natural deduction find to be true or probable4 #b4 ,,above ,,reason are such propositions whose truth or probability we cannot by reason derive from those principles4 #c4 ,,contrary ,,to ,,reason are such propositions as are inconsistent with or irreconcilable to our clear and distinct ideas4 ,thus the existence of one ,god is according to reason2 the existence of more than one ,god1 contrary to reason2 the resurrection of the dead1 above reason4 ,,above ,,reason also may be taken in a double sense1 viz4 either as signifying above probability1 or above certainty3 and in that large sense also1 ,,contrary ,,to ,,reason1 is1 ,i suppose1 sometimes taken4 #bd4 ,reason and ,faith not opposite1 for ,faith must be regulated by ,reason4 ,there is another use of the word ,,reason1 wherein it is ,,opposed ,,to ,,faith3 which1 though it be in itself a very improper way of speaking1 yet common use has so authorized it1 that it would be folly either to oppose or hope to remedy it4 ,only ,i think it may not be amiss to take notice1 that1 however faith be opposed to reason1 faith is nothing but a firm assent of the mind3 which1 if it be regulated1 as is our duty1 cannot be afforded to anything but upon good reason2 and so cannot be opposite to it4 ,he that believes without having any reason for believing1 may be in love with his own fancies2 but neither seeks truth as he ought1 nor pays the obedience due to his ,maker1 who would have him use those discerning faculties he has given him1 to keep him out of mistake and error4 ,he that does not this to the best of his power1 however he sometimes lights on truth1 is in the right but by chance2 and ,i know not whether the luckiness of the accident will excuse the irregularity of his proceeding4 ,this at least is certain1 that he must be accountable for whatever mistakes he runs into3 whereas he that makes use of the light and faculties ,god has given him1 and seeks sincerely to discover truth by those helps and abilities he has1 may have this satisfaction in doing his duty as a rational creature1 that1 though he should miss truth1 he will not miss the reward of it4 ,for he governs his assent right1 and places it as he should1 who1 in any case or matter whatsoever1 believes or disbelieves according as reason directs him4 ,he that doth otherwise1 transgresses against his own light1 and misuses those faculties which were given him to no other end1 but to search and follow the clearer evidence and greater probability4 ,but since reason and faith are by some men opposed1 we will so consider them in the following chapter4 ,,chapter ,,xviii4 ,,of ,,faith ,,and ,,reason1 ,,and ,,their ,,distinct ,,provinces4 #a4 ,necessary to know their boundaries4 ,it has been above shown1 #a4 ,that we are of necessity ignorant1 and want knowledge of all sorts1 where we want ideas4 #b4 ,that we are ignorant1 and want rational knowledge1 where we want proofs4 #c4 ,that we want certain knowledge and certainty1 as far as we want clear and determined specific ideas4 #d4 ,that we want probability to direct our assent in matters where we have neither knowledge of our own nor testimony of other men to bottom our reason upon4 ,from these things thus premised1 ,i think we may come to lay down ,,the ,,measures ,,and ,,boundaries ,,between ,,faith ,,and ,,reason3 the want whereof may possibly have been the cause1 if not of great disorders1 yet at least of great disputes1 and perhaps mistakes in the world4 ,for till it be resolved how far we are to be guided by reason1 and how far by faith1 we shall in vain dispute1 and endeavour to convince one another in matters of religion4 #b4 ,faith and ,reason1 what1 as contradistingushed4 ,i find every sect1 as far as reason will help them1 make use of it gladly3 and where it fails them1 they cry out1 ,it is matter of faith1 and above reason4 ,and ,i do not see how they can argue with any one1 or ever convince a gainsayer who makes use of the same plea1 without setting down strict boundaries between faith and reason2 which ought to be the first point established in all questions where faith has anything to do4 ,,reason1 therefore1 here1 as contradistinguished to ,,faith1 ,i take to be the discovery of the certainty or probability of such propositions or truths1 which the mind arrives at by deduction made from such ideas1 which it has got by the use of its natural faculties2 viz4 by sensation or reflection4 ,,faith1 on the other side1 is the assent to any proposition1 not thus made out by the deductions of reason1 but upon the credit of the proposer1 as coming from ,god1 in some extraordinary way of communication4 ,this way of discovering truths to men1 we call ,,revelation4 #c4 ,first1 ,no new simple ,idea can be conveyed by traditional ,revelation4 ,,first1 ,then ,i say1 that ,,no ,,man ,,inspired ,,by ,,god ,,can ,,by ,,any ,,revelation ,,communicate ,,to ,,others ,,any ,,new ,,simple ,,ideas ,,which ,,they ,,had ,,not ,,before ,,from ,,sensation ,,or ,,reflection4 ,for1 whatsoever impressions he himself may have from the immediate hand of ,god1 this revelation1 if it be of new simple ideas1 cannot be conveyed to another1 either by words or any other signs4 ,because words1 by their immediate operation on us1 cause no other ideas but of their natural sounds3 and it is by the custom of using them for signs1 that they excite and revive in our minds latent ideas2 but yet only such ideas as were there before4 ,for words1 seen or heard1 recal to our thoughts those ideas only which to us they have been wont to be signs of1 but cannot introduce any perfectly new1 and formerly unknown simple ideas4 ,the same holds in all other signs2 which cannot signify to us things of which we have before never had any idea at all4 ,thus whatever things were discovered to ,st4 ,paul1 when he was rapt up into the third heaven2 whatever new ideas his mind there received1 all the description he can make to others of that place1 is only this1 ,that there are such things1 'as eye hath not seen1 nor ear heard1 nor hath it entered into the heart of man to conceive4' ,and supposing ,god should discover to any one1 supernaturally1 a species of creatures inhabiting1 for example1 ,jupiter or ,saturn1 7for that it is possible there may be such1 nobody can deny17 which had six senses2 and imprint on his mind the ideas conveyed to theirs by that sixth sense3 he could no more1 by words1 produce in the minds of other men those ideas imprinted by that sixth sense1 than one of us could convey the idea of any colour1 by the sound of words1 into a man who1 having the other four senses perfect1 had always totally wanted the fifth1 of seeing4 ,for our simple ideas1 then1 which are the foundation1 and sole matter of all our notions and knowledge1 we must depend wholly on our reason1 ,i mean our natural faculties2 and can by no means receive them1 or any of them1 from traditional revelation4 ,i say1 ,,traditional ,,revelation1 in distinction to ,,original ,,revelation4 ,by the one1 ,i mean that first impression which is made immediately by ,god on the mind of any man1 to which we cannot set any bounds2 and by the other1 those impressions delivered over to others in words1 and the ordinary ways of conveying our conceptions one to another4 #d4 ,secondly1 ,traditional ,revelation may make us know ,propositions knowable also by ,reason1 but not with the same ,certainty that ,reason doth4 ,,secondly1 ,i say that ,,the ,,same ,,truths ,,may ,,be ,,discovered1 ,,and ,,conveyed ,,down ,,from ,,revelation1 ,,which ,,are ,,discernable ,,to ,,us ,,by ,,reason1 ,,and ,,by ,,those ,,ideas ,,we ,,naturally ,,may ,,have4 ,so ,god might1 by revelation1 discover the truth of any proposition in ,euclid2 as well as men1 by the natural use of their faculties1 come to make the discovery themselves4 ,in all things of this kind there is little need or use of revelation1 ,god having furnished us with natural and surer means to arrive at the knowledge of them4 ,for whatsoever truth we come to the clear discovery of1 from the knowledge and contemplation of our own ideas1 will always be certainer to us than those which are conveyed to us by ,,traditional ,,revelation4 ,for the knowledge we have that this revelation came at first from ,god1 can never be so sure as the knowledge we have from the clear and distinct perception of the agreement or disagreement of our own ideas3 v4g4 if it were revealed some ages since1 that the three angles of a triangle were equal to two right ones1 ,i might assent to the truth of that proposition1 upon the credit of the tradition1 that it was revealed3 but that would never amount to so great a certainty as the knowledge of it1 upon the comparing and measuring my own ideas of two right angles1 and the three angles of a triangle4 ,the like holds in matter of fact knowable by our senses2 v4g4 the history of the deluge is conveyed to us by writings which had their original from revelation3 and yet nobody1 ,i think1 will say he has as certain and clear a knowledge of the flood as ,noah1 that saw it2 or that he himself would have had1 had he then been alive and seen it4 ,for he has no greater an assurance than that of his senses1 that it is writ in the book supposed writ by ,moses inspired3 but he has not so great an assurance that ,moses wrote that book as if he had seen ,moses write it4 ,so that the assurance of its being a revelation is less still than the assurance of his senses4 #e4 ,even ,original ,revelation cannot be admitted against the clear ,evidence of ,reason4 ,in propositions1 then1 whose certainty is built upon the clear perception of the agreement or disagreement of our ideas1 attained either by immediate intuition1 as in self-evident propositions1 or by evident deductions of reason in demonstrations we need not the assistance of revelation1 as necessary to gain our assent1 and introduce them into our minds4 ,because the natural ways of knowledge could settle them there1 or had done it already2 which is the greatest assurance we can possibly have of anything1 unless where ,god immediately reveals it to us3 and there too our assurance can be no greater than our knowledge is1 that it ,,is a revelation from ,god4 ,but yet nothing1 ,i think1 can1 under that title1 shake or overrule plain knowledge2 or rationally prevail with any man to admit it for true1 in a direct contradiction to the clear evidence of his own understanding4 ,for1 since no evidence of our faculties1 by which we receive such revelations1 can exceed1 if equal1 the certainty of our intuitive knowledge1 we can never receive for a truth anything that is directly contrary to our clear and distinct knowledge2 v4g4 the ideas of one body and one place do so clearly agree1 and the mind has so evident a perception of their agreement1 that we can never assent to a proposition that affirms the same body to be in two distant places at once1 however it should pretend to the authority of a divine revelation3 since the evidence1 first1 that we deceive not ourselves1 in ascribing it to ,god2 secondly1 that we understand it right2 can never be so great as the evidence of our own intuitive knowledge1 whereby we discern it impossible for the same body to be in two places at once4 ,and therefore ,,no ,,proposition ,,can ,,be ,,received ,,for ,,divine ,,revelation1 ,,or ,,obtain ,,the ,,assent ,,due ,,to ,,all ,,such1 ,,if ,,it ,,be ,,contradictory ,,to ,,our ,,clear ,,intuitive ,,knowledge4 ,because this would be to subvert the principles and foundations of all knowledge1 evidence1 and assent whatsoever3 and there would be left no difference between truth and falsehood1 no measures of credible and incredible in the world1 if doubtful propositions shall take place before self-evident2 and what we certainly know give way to what we may possibly be mistaken in4 ,in propositions therefore contrary to the clear perception of the agreement or disagreement of any of our ideas1 it will be in vain to urge them as matters of faith4 ,they cannot move our assent under that or any other title whatsoever4 ,for faith can never convince us of anything that contradicts our knowledge4 ,because1 though faith be founded on the testimony of ,god 7who cannot lie7 revealing any proposition to us3 yet we cannot have an assurance of the truth of its being a divine revelation greater than our own knowledge4 ,since the whole strength of the certainty depends upon our knowledge that ,god revealed it2 which1 in this case1 where the proposition supposed revealed contradicts our knowledge or reason1 will always have this objection hanging to it1 viz4 that we cannot tell how to conceive that to come from ,god1 the bountiful ,author of our being1 which1 if received for true1 must overturn all the principles and foundations of knowledge he has given us2 render all our faculties useless2 wholly destroy the most excellent part of his workmanship1 our understandings2 and put a man in a condition wherein he will have less light1 less conduct than the beast that perisheth4 ,for if the mind of man can never have a clearer 7and perhaps not so clear7 evidence of anything to be a divine revelation1 as it has of the principles of its own reason1 it can never have a ground to quit the clear evidence of its reason1 to give a place to a proposition1 whose revelation has not a greater evidence than those principles have4 #f4 ,traditional ,revelation much less4 ,thus far a man has use of reason1 and ought to hearken to it1 even in immediate and original revelation1 where it is supposed to be made to himself4 ,but to all those who pretend not to immediate revelation1 but are required to pay obedience1 and to receive the truths revealed to others1 which1 by the tradition of writings1 or word of mouth1 are conveyed down to them1 reason has a great deal more to do1 and is that only which can induce us to receive them4 ,for matter of faith being only divine revelation1 and nothing else1 faith1 as we use the word1 7called commonly ,,divine ,,faith71 has to do with no propositions1 but those which are supposed to be divinely revealed4 ,so that ,i do not see how those who make revelation alone the sole object of faith can say1 ,that it is a matter of faith1 and not of reason1 to believe that such or such a proposition1 to be found in such or such a book1 is of divine inspiration2 unless it be revealed that that proposition1 or all in that book1 was communicated by divine inspiration4 ,without such a revelation1 the believing1 or not believing1 that proposition1 or book1 to be of divine authority1 can never be matter of faith1 but matter of reason2 and such as ,i must come to an assent to only by the use of my reason1 which can never require or enable me to believe that which is contrary to itself3 it being impossible for reason ever to procure any assent to that which to itself appears unreasonable4 ,in all things1 therefore1 where we have clear evidence from our ideas1 and those principles of knowledge ,i have above mentioned1 reason is the proper judge2 and revelation1 though it may1 in consenting with it1 confirm its dictates1 yet cannot in such cases invalidate its decrees3 nor can we be obliged1 where we have the clear and evident sentence of reason1 to quit it for the contrary opinion1 under a pretence that it is matter of faith3 which can have no authority against the plain and clear dictates of reason4 #g4 ,thirdly1 things above ,reason are1 when revealed1 the proper matter of faith4 ,but1 ,,thirdly1 ,there being many things wherein we have very imperfect notions1 or none at all2 and other things1 of whose past1 present1 or future existence1 by the natural use of our faculties1 we can have no knowledge at all2 these1 as being beyond the discovery of our natural faculties1 and ,,above ,,reason1 are1 when revealed1 ,,the ,,proper ,,matter ,,of ,,faith4 ,thus1 that part of the angels rebelled against ,god1 and thereby lost their first happy state3 and that the dead shall rise1 and live again3 these and the like1 being beyond the discovery of reason1 are purely matters of faith1 with which reason has directly nothing to do4 #h4 ,or not contrary to ,reason1 if revealed1 are ,matter of ,faith2 and must carry it against probable conjectures of ,reason4 ,but since ,god1 in giving us the light of reason1 has not thereby tied up his own hands from affording us1 when he thinks fit1 the light of revelation in any of those matters wherein our natural faculties are able to give a probable determination2 ,,revelation1 where ,god has been pleased to give it1 ,,must ,,carry ,,it ,,against ,,the ,,probable ,,conjectures ,,of ,,reason4 ,because the mind not being certain of the truth of that it does not evidently know1 but only yielding to the probability that appears in it1 is bound to give up its assent to such a testimony which1 it is satisfied1 comes from one who cannot err1 and will not deceive4 ,but yet1 it still belongs to reason to judge of the truth of its being a revelation1 and of the signification of the words wherein it is delivered4 ,indeed1 if anything shall be thought revelation which is contrary to the plain principles of reason1 and the evident knowledge the mind has of its own clear and distinct ideas2 there reason must be hearkened to1 as to a matter within its province4 ,since a man can never have so certain a knowledge1 that a proposition which contradicts the clear principles and evidence of his own knowledge was divinely revealed1 or that he understands the words rightly wherein it is delivered1 as he has that the contrary is true1 and so is bound to consider and judge of it as a matter of reason1 and not swallow it1 without examination1 as a matter of faith4 #i4 ,revelation in ,matters where ,reason cannot judge1 or but probably1 ought to be hearkened to4 ,first1 ,whatever proposition is revealed1 of whose truth our mind1 by its natural faculties and notions1 cannot judge1 that is purely matter of faith1 and above reason4 ,secondly1 ,all propositions whereof the mind1 by the use of its natural faculties1 can come to determine and judge1 from naturally acquired ideas1 are matter of reason2 with this difference still1 that1 in those concerning which it has but an uncertain evidence1 and so is persuaded of their truth only upon probable grounds1 which still admit a possibility of the contrary to be true1 without doing violence to the certain evidence of its own knowledge1 and overturning the principles of all reason2 in such probable propositions1 ,i say1 an evident revelation ought to determine our assent1 even against probability4 ,for where the principles of reason have not evidenced a proposition to be certainly true or false1 there clear revelation1 as another principle of truth and ground of assent1 may determine2 and so it may be matter of faith1 and be also above reason4 ,because reason1 in that particular matter1 being able to reach no higher than probability1 faith gave the determination where reason came short2 and revelation discovered on which side the truth lay4 #aj4 ,in ,matters where ,reason can afford certain ,knowledge1 that is to be hearkened to4 ,thus far the dominion of faith reaches1 and that without any violence or hindrance to reason2 which is not injured or disturbed1 but assisted and improved by new discoveries of truth1 coming from the eternal fountain of all knowledge4 ,whatever ,god hath revealed is certainly true3 no doubt can be made of it4 ,this is the proper object of faith3 but whether it be a ,,divine revelation or no1 reason must judge2 which can never permit the mind to reject a greater evidence to embrace what is less evident1 nor allow it to entertain probability in opposition to knowledge and certainty4 ,there can be no evidence that any traditional revelation is of divine original1 in the words we receive it1 and in the sense we understand it1 so clear and so certain as that of the principles of reason3 and therefore ,,nothing ,,that ,,is ,,contrary ,,to1 ,,and ,,inconsistent ,,with1 ,,the ,,clear ,,and ,,self-,,evident ,,dictates ,,of ,,reason1 ,,has ,a ,,right ,,to ,,be ,,urged ,,or ,,assented ,,to ,,as ,a ,,matter ,,of ,,faith1 ,,wherein ,,reason ,,hath ,,nothing ,,to ,,do4 ,whatsoever is divine revelation1 ought to overrule all our opinions1 prejudices1 and interest1 and hath a right to be received with full assent4 ,such a submission as this1 of our reason to faith1 takes not away the landmarks of knowledge3 this shakes not the foundations of reason1 but leaves us that use of our faculties for which they were given us4 #aa4 ,if the ,boundaries be not set between ,faith and ,reason1 no ,enthusiasm or ,extravagancy in ,religion can be contradicted4 ,if the provinces of faith and reason are not kept distinct by these boundaries1 there will1 in matters of religion1 be no room for reason at all2 and those extravagant opinions and ceremonies that are to be found in the several religions of the world will not deserve to be blamed4 ,for1 to this crying up of faith in ,,opposition to reason1 we may1 ,i think1 in good measure ascribe those absurdities that fill almost all the religions which possess and divide mankind4 ,for men having been principled with an opinion1 that they must not consult reason in the things of religion1 however apparently contradictory to common sense and the very principles of all their knowledge1 have let loose their fancies and natural superstition2 and have been by them led into so strange opinions1 and extravagant practices in religion1 that a considerate man cannot but stand amazed1 at their follies1 and judge them so far from being acceptable to the great and wise ,god1 that he cannot avoid thinking them ridiculous and offensive to a sober good man4 ,so that1 in effect1 religion1 which should most distinguish us from beasts1 and ought most peculiarly to elevate us1 as rational creatures1 above brutes1 is that wherein men often appear most irrational1 and more senseless than beasts themselves4 ,,credo1 ,,quia ,,impossibile ,,est3 ,i believe1 because it is impossible1 might1 in a good man1 pass for a sally of zeal2 but would prove a very ill rule for men to choose their opinions or religion by4 ,,chapter ,,xix4 not in early editions ,,chapter ,,xx4 ,,of ,,wrong ,,assent1 ,,or ,,error4 #a4 ,causes of ,error1 or how men come to give assent contrary to probability4 ,,knowledge being to be had only of visible and certain truth1 ,,error is not a fault of our knowledge1 but a mistake of our judgment giving assent to that which is not true4 ,but if assent be grounded on likelihood1 if the proper object and motive of our assent be probability1 and that probability consists in what is laid down in the foregoing chapters1 it will be demanded ,,how ,,men ,,come ,,to ,,give ,,their ,,assents ,,contrary ,,to ,,probability4 ,for there is nothing more common than contrariety of opinions2 nothing more obvious than that one man wholly disbelieves what another only doubts of1 and a third steadfastly believes and firmly adheres to4 ,the reasons whereof1 though they may be very various1 yet1 ,i suppose may all be reduced to these four3 ,i4 ,,want ,,of ,,proofs4 ,,ii4 ,,want ,,of ,,ability ,,to ,,use ,,them4 ,,iii4 ,,want ,,of ,,will ,,to ,,see ,,them4 ,,iv4 ,,wrong ,,measures ,,of ,,probability4 #b4 ,first cause of ,error1 ,want of ,proofs4 ,,first1 ,by ,,want ,,of ,,proofs1 ,i do not mean only the want of those proofs which are nowhere extant1 and so are nowhere to be had2 but the want even of those proofs which are in being1 or might be procured4 ,and thus men want proofs1 who have not the convenience or opportunity to make experiments and observations themselves1 tending to the proof of any proposition2 nor likewise the convenience to inquire into and collect the testimonies of others3 and in this state are the greatest part of mankind1 who are given up to labour1 and enslaved to the necessity of their mean condition1 whose lives are worn out only in the provisions for living4 ,these men's opportunities of knowledge and inquiry are commonly as narrow as their fortunes2 and their understandings are but little instructed1 when all their whole time and pains is laid out to still the croaking of their own bellies1 or the cries of their children4 ,it is not to be expected that a man who drudges on all his life in a laborious trade1 should be more knowing in the variety of things done in the world than a packhorse1 who is driven constantly forwards and backwards in a narrow lane and dirty road1 only to market1 should be skilled in the geography of the country4 ,nor is it at all more possible1 that he who wants leisure1 books1 and languages1 and the opportunity of conversing with variety of men1 should be in a condition to collect those testimonies and observations which are in being1 and are necessary to make out many1 nay most1 of the propositions that1 in the societies of men1 are judged of the greatest moment2 or to find out grounds of assurance so great as the belief of the points he would build on them is thought necessary4 ,so that a great part of mankind are1 by the natural and unalterable state of things in this world1 and the constitution of human affairs1 unavoidably given over to invincible ignorance of those proofs on which others build1 and which are necessary to establish those opinions3 the greatest part of men1 having much to do to get the means of living1 are not in a condition to look after those of learned and laborious inquiries4 #c4 ,objection1 ,what shall become of those who want ,proofs8 ,answered4 ,what shall we say1 then8 ,are the greatest part of mankind1 by the necessity of their condition1 subjected to unavoidable ignorance1 in those things which are of greatest importance to them8 7for of those it is obvious to inquire47 ,have the bulk of mankind no other guide but accident and blind chance to conduct them to their happiness or misery8 ,are the current opinions1 and licensed guides of every country sufficient evidence and security to every man to venture his great concernments on2 nay1 his everlasting happiness or misery8 ,or can those be the certain and infallible oracles and standards of truth1 which teach one thing in ,christendom and another in ,turkey8 ,or shall a poor countryman be eternally happy1 for having the chance to be born in ,italy2 or a day-labourer be unavoidably lost1 because he had the ill-luck to be born in ,england8 ,how ready some men may be to say some of these things1 ,i will not here examine3 but this ,i am sure1 that men must allow one or other of these to be true1 7let them choose which they please17 or else grant that ,god has furnished men with faculties sufficient to direct them in the way they should take1 if they will but seriously employ them that way1 when their ordinary vocations allow them the leisure4 ,no man is so wholly taken up with the attendance on the means of living1 as to have no spare time at all to think of his soul1 and inform himself in matters of religion4 ,were men as intent upon this as they are on things of lower concernment1 there are none so enslaved to the necessities of life who might not find many vacancies that might be husbanded to this advantage of their knowledge4 #d4 ,people hindered from ,inquiry4 ,besides those whose improvements and informations are straitened by the narrowness of their fortunes1 there are others whose largeness of fortune would plentifully enough supply books1 and other requisites for clearing of doubts1 and discovering of truth3 but they are cooped in close1 by the laws of their countries1 and the strict guards of those whose interest it is to keep them ignorant1 lest1 knowing more1 they should believe the less in them4 ,these are as far1 nay further1 from the liberty and opportunities of a fair inquiry1 than these poor and wretched labourers we before spoke of3 and however they may seem high and great1 are confined to narrowness of thought1 and enslaved in that which should be the freest part of man1 their understandings4 ,this is generally the case of all those who live in places where care is taken to propagate truth without knowledge2 where men are forced1 at a venture1 to be of the religion of the country2 and must therefore swallow down opinions1 as silly people do empiric's pills1 without knowing what they are made of1 or how they will work1 and having nothing to do but believe that they will do the cure3 but in this are much more miserable than they1 in that they are not at liberty to refuse swallowing what perhaps they had rather let alone2 or to choose the physician1 to whose conduct they would trust themselves4 #e4 ,second ,cause of ,error1 ,want of skill to use ,proofs4 ,,secondly1 ,those who ,,want ,,skill ,,to ,,use ,,those ,,evidences ,,they ,,have ,,of ,,probabilities2 who cannot carry a train of consequences in their heads2 nor weigh exactly the preponderancy of contrary proofs and testimonies1 making every circumstance its due allowance2 may be easily misled to assent to positions that are not probable4 ,there are some men of one1 some but of two syllogisms1 and no more2 and others that can but advance one step further4 ,these cannot always discern that side on which the strongest proofs lie2 cannot constantly follow that which in itself is the more probable opinion4 ,now that there is such a difference between men1 in respect of their understandings1 ,i think nobody1 who has had any conversation with his neighbours1 will question3 though he never was at ,westminster-,hall or the ,exchange on the one hand1 nor at ,alms-houses or ,bedlam on the other4 ,which great difference in men's intellectuals1 whether it rises from any defect in the organs of the body1 particularly adapted to thinking2 or in the dulness or untractableness of those faculties for want of use2 or1 as some think1 in the natural differences of men's souls themselves2 or some1 or all of these together2 it matters not here to examine3 only this is evident1 that there is a difference of degrees in men's understandings1 apprehensions1 and reasonings1 to so great a latitude1 that one may1 without doing injury to mankind1 affirm1 that there is a greater distance between some men and others in this respect1 than between some men and some beasts4 ,but how this comes about is a speculation1 though of great consequence1 yet not necessary to our present purpose4 #f4 ,third cause of ,error1 ,want of ,will to use them4 ,,thirdly1 ,there are another sort of people that want proofs1 not because they are out of their reach1 but ,,because ,,they ,,will ,,not ,,use ,,them3 who1 though they have riches and leisure enough1 and want neither parts nor learning1 may yet1 through their hot pursuit of pleasure1 or business1 or else out of laziness or fear that the doctrines whose truth they would inquire into would not suit well with their opinions1 lives or designs1 may never come to the knowledge of1 nor give their assent to1 those possibilities which lie so much within their view1 that1 to be convinced of them1 they need but turn their eyes that way4 ,we know some men will not read a letter which is supposed to bring ill news2 and many men forbear to cast up their accounts1 or so much as think upon their estates1 who have reason to fear their affairs are in no very good posture4 ,how men1 whose plentiful fortunes allow them leisure to improve their understandings1 can satisfy themselves with a lazy ignorance1 ,i cannot tell3 but methinks they have a low opinion of their souls1 who lay out all their incomes in provisions for the body1 and employ none of it to procure the means and helps of knowledge2 who take great care to appear always in a neat and splendid outside1 and would think themselves miserable in coarse clothes1 or a patched coat1 and yet contentedly suffer their minds to appear abroad in a piebald livery of coarse patches and borrowed shreds1 such as it has pleased chance1 or their country tailor 7,i mean the common opinion of those they have conversed with7 to clothe them in4 ,i will not here mention how unreasonable this is for men that ever think of a future state1 and their concernment in it1 which no rational man can avoid to do sometimes3 nor shall ,i take notice what a shame and confusion it is to the greatest contemners of knowledge1 to be found ignorant in things they are concerned to know4 ,but this at least is worth the consideration of those who call themselves gentlemen1 ,that1 however they may think credit1 respect1 power1 and authority the concomitants of their birth and fortune1 yet they will find all these still carried away from them by men of lower condition1 who surpass them in knowledge4 ,they who are blind will always be led by those that see1 or else fall into the ditch3 and he is certainly the most subjected1 the most enslaved1 who is so in his understanding4 ,in the foregoing instances some of the causes have been shown of wrong assent1 and how it comes to pass1 that probable doctrines are not always received with an assent proportionable to the reasons which are to be had for their probability3 but hitherto we have considered only such probabilities whose proofs do exist1 but do not appear to him who embraces the error4 #g4 ,fourth cause of ,error1 ,wrong ,measures of ,probability3 which are-- ,,fourthly1 ,there remains yet the last sort1 who1 even where the real probabilities appear1 and are plainly laid before them1 do not admit of the conviction1 nor yield unto manifest reasons1 but do either suspend their assent1 or give it to the less probable opinion4 ,and to this danger are those exposed who have taken up ,,wrong ,,measures ,,of ,,probability1 which are3 ,i4 ,,propositions ,,that ,,are ,,in ,,themselves ,,certain ,,and ,,evident1 ,,but ,,doubtful ,,and ,,false1 ,,taken ,,up ,,for ,,principles4 ,,ii4 ,,received ,,hypotheses4 ,,iii4 ,,predominant ,,passions ,,or ,,inclinations4 ,,iv4 ,,authority4 #h4 ,i4 ,doubtful ,propositions taken for ,principles4 ,the first and firmest ground of probability is the conformity anything has to our own knowledge2 especially that part of our knowledge which we have embraced1 and continue to look on as ,,principles4 ,these have so great an influence upon our opinions1 that it is usually by them we judge of truth1 and measure probability2 to that degree1 that what is inconsistent with our principles1 is so far from passing for probable with us1 that it will not be allowed possible4 ,the reverence borne to these principles is so great1 and their authority so paramount to all other1 that the testimony1 not only of other men1 but the evidence of our own senses are often rejected1 when they offer to vouch anything contrary to these established rules4 ,how much the doctrine of ,,innate ,,principles1 and that principles are not to be proved or questioned1 has contributed to this1 ,i will not here examine4 ,this ,i readily grant1 that one truth cannot contradict another3 but withal ,i take leave also to say1 that every one ought very carefully to beware what he admits for a principle1 to examine it strictly1 and see whether he certainly knows it to be true of itself1 by its own evidence1 or whether he does only with assurance believe it to be so1 upon the authority of others4 ,for he hath a strong bias put into his understanding1 which will unavoidably misguide his assent1 who hath imbibed ,,wrong ,,principles1 and has blindly given himself up to the authority of any opinion in itself not evidently true4 #i4 ,instilled in childhood4 ,there is nothing more ordinary than children's receiving into their minds propositions 7especially about matters of religion7 from their parents1 nurses1 or those about them3 which being insinuated into their unwary as well as unbiassed understandings1 and fastened by degrees1 are at last 7equally whether true or false7 riveted there by long custom and education1 beyond all possibility of being pulled out again4 ,for men1 when they are grown up1 reflecting upon their opinions1 and finding those of this sort to be as ancient in their minds as their very memories1 not having observed their early insinuation1 nor by what means they got them1 they are apt to reverence them as sacred things1 and not to suffer them to be profaned1 touched1 or questioned3 they look on them as the ,urim and ,thummim set up in their minds immediately by ,god himself1 to be the great and unerring deciders of truth and falsehood1 and the judges to which they are to appeal in all manner of controversies4 #aj4 ,of irresistible efficacy4 ,this opinion of his principles 7let them be what they will7 being once established in any one's mind1 it is easy to be imagined what reception any proposition shall find1 how clearly soever proved1 that shall invalidate their authority1 or at all thwart with these internal oracles2 whereas the grossest absurdities and improbabilities1 being but agreeable to such principles1 go down glibly1 and are easily digested4 ,the great obstinacy that is to be found in men firmly believing quite contrary opinions1 though many times equally absurd1 in the various religions of mankind1 are as evident a proof as they are an unavoidable consequence of this way of reasoning from received traditional principles4 ,so that men will disbelieve their own eyes1 renounce the evidence of their senses1 and give their own experience the lie1 rather than admit of anything disagreeing with these sacred tenets4 ,take an intelligent ,romanist that1 from the first dawning of any notions in his understanding1 hath had this principle constantly inculcated1 viz4 that he must believe as the church 7i4e4 those of his communion7 believes1 or that the pope is infallible1 and this he never so much as heard questioned1 till at forty or fifty years old he met with one of other principles3 how is he prepared easily to swallow1 not only against all probability1 but even the clear evidence of his senses1 the doctrine of ,,transubstantiation8 ,this principle has such an influence on his mind1 that he will believe that to be flesh which he sees to be bread4 ,and what way will you take to convince a man of any improbable opinion he holds1 who1 with some philosophers1 hath laid down this as a foundation of reasoning1 ,that he must believe his reason 7for so men improperly call arguments drawn from their principles7 against his senses8 ,let an enthusiast be principled that he or his teacher is inspired1 and acted by an immediate communication of the ,divine ,spirit1 and you in vain bring the evidence of clear reasons against his doctrine4 ,whoever1 therefore1 have imbibed wrong principles1 are not1 in things inconsistent with these principles1 to be moved by the most apparent and convincing probabilities1 till they are so candid and ingenuous to themselves1 as to be persuaded to examine even those very principles1 which many never suffer themselves to do4 #aa4 ,received ,hypotheses4 ,next to these are men whose understandings are cast into a mould1 and fashioned just to the size of a received ,,hypothesis4 ,the difference between these and the former1 is1 that they will admit of matter of fact1 and agree with dissenters in that2 but differ only in assigning of reasons and explaining the manner of operation4 ,these are not at that open defiance with their senses1 with the former3 they can endure to hearken to their information a little more patiently2 but will by no means admit of their reports in the explanation of things2 nor be prevailed on by probabilities1 which would convince them that things are not brought about just after the same manner that they have decreed within themselves that they are4 ,would it not be an insufferable thing for a learned professor1 and that which his scarlet would blush at1 to have his authority of forty years standing1 wrought out of hard rock1 ,greek and ,latin1 with no small expense of time and candle1 and confirmed by general tradition and a reverend beard1 in an instant overturned by an upstart novelist8 ,can any one expect that he should be made to confess1 that what he taught his scholars thirty years ago was all error and mistake2 and that he sold them hard words and ignorance at a very dear rate4 ,what probabilities1 ,i say1 are sufficient to prevail in such a case8 ,and who ever1 by the most cogent arguments1 will be prevailed with to disrobe himself at once of all his old opinions1 and pretences to knowledge and learning1 which with hard study he hath all this time been labouring for2 and turn himself out stark naked1 in quest afresh of new notions8 ,all the arguments that can be used will be as little able to prevail1 as the wind did with the traveller to part with his cloak1 which he held only the faster4 ,to this of wrong hypothesis may be reduced the errors that may be occasioned by a true hypothesis1 or right principles1 but not rightly understood4 ,there is nothing more familiar than this4 ,the instances of men contending for different opinions1 which they all derive from the infallible truth of the ,scripture1 are an undeniable proof of it4 ,all that call themselves ,christians1 allow the text that says1word in ,greek1 to carry in it the obligation to a very weighty duty4 ,but yet how very erroneous will one of their practices be1 who1 understanding nothing but the ,french1 take this rule with one translation to be1 ,,repentez-,,vous1 repent2 or with the other1 ,,fatiez ,,penitence1 do penance4 #ab4 ,,iii4 ,predominant ,passions4 ,probabilities which cross men's appetites and prevailing passions run the same fate4 ,let ever so much probability hang on one side of a covetous man's reasoning1 and money on the other2 it is easy to foresee which will outweigh4 ,earthly minds1 like mud walls1 resist the strongest batteries3 and though1 perhaps1 sometimes the force of a clear argument may make some impression1 yet they nevertheless stand firm1 and keep out the enemy1 truth1 that would captivate or disturb them4 ,tell a man passionately in love1 that he is jilted2 bring a score of witnesses of the falsehood of his mistress1 it is ten to one but three kind words of hers shall invalidate all their testimonies4 ,,quod ,,volumus1 ,,facile ,,credimus2 what suits our wishes1 is forwardly believed1 is1 ,i suppose1 what every one hath more than once experimented3 and though men cannot always openly gainsay or resist the force of manifest probabilities that make against them1 yet yield they not to the argument4 ,not but that it is the nature of the understanding constantly to close with the more probable side2 but yet a man hath a power to suspend and restrain its inquiries1 and not permit a full and satisfactory examination1 as far as the matter in question is capable1 and will bear it to be made4 ,until that be done1 there will be always these two ways left of evading the most apparent probabilities3 #ac4 ,two ,means of evading ,probabilities3 #a4 ,supposed ,fallacy latent in the words employed4 ,first1 ,that the arguments being 7as for the most part they are7 brought in words1 ,,there ,,may ,,be ,a ,,fallacy ,,latent ,,in ,,them3 and the consequences being1 perhaps1 many in train1 they may be some of them incoherent4 ,there are very few discourses so short1 clear1 and consistent1 to which most men may not1 with satisfaction enough to themselves1 raise this doubt2 and from whose conviction they may not1 without reproach of disingenuity or unreasonableness1 set themselves free with the old reply1 ,non persuadebis1 etiamsi persuaseris2 though ,i cannot answer1 ,i will not yield4 #ad4 ,supposed unknown ,arguments for the contrary4 ,secondly1 ,manifest probabilities maybe evaded1 and the assent withheld1 upon this suggestion1 ,that ,i know not yet all that may be said on the contrary side4 ,and therefore1 though ,i be beaten1 it is not necessary ,i should yield1 not knowing what forces there are in reserve behind4 ,this is a refuge against conviction so open and so wide1 that it is hard to determine when a man is quite out of the verge of it4 #ae4 ,what ,probabilities naturally determine the ,assent4 ,but yet there is some end of it2 and a man having carefully inquired into all the grounds of probability and unlikeliness2 done his utmost to inform himself in all particulars fairly1 and cast up the sum total on both sides2 may1 in most cases1 come to acknowledge1 upon the whole matter1 on which side the probability rests3 wherein some proofs in matter of reason1 being suppositions upon universal experience1 are so cogent and clear1 and some testimonies in matter of fact so universal1 that he cannot refuse his assent4 ,so that ,i think we may conclude1 that1 in propositions1 where though the proofs in view are of most moment1 yet there are sufficient grounds to suspect that there is either fallacy in words1 or certain proofs as considerable to be produced on the contrary side2 there assent1 suspense1 or dissent1 are often voluntary actions4 ,but where the proofs are such as make it highly probable1 and there is not sufficient ground to suspect that there is either fallacy of words 7which sober and serious consideration may discover7 nor equally valid proofs yet undiscovered1 latent on the other side 7which also the nature of the thing may1 in some cases1 make plain to a considerate man27 there1 ,i think1 a man who has weighed them can scarce refuse his assent to the side on which the greater probability appears4 ,whether it be probable that a promiscuous jumble of printing letters should often fall into a method and order1 which should stamp on paper a coherent discourse2 or that a blind fortuitous concourse of atoms1 not guided by an understanding agent1 should frequently constitute the bodies of any species of animals3 in these and the like cases1 ,i think1 nobody that considers them can be one jot at a stand which side to take1 nor at all waver in his assent4 ,lastly1 when there can be no supposition 7the thing in its own nature indifferent1 and wholly depending upon the testimony of witnesses7 that there is as fair testimony against1 as for the matter of fact attested2 which by inquiry is to be learned1 v4g4 whether there was one thousand seven hundred years ago such a man at ,rome as ,julius ,caesar3 in all such cases1 ,i say1 ,i think it is not in any rational man's power to refuse his assent2 but that it necessarily follows1 and closes with such probabilities4 ,in other less clear cases1 ,i think it is in man's power to suspend his assent2 and perhaps content himself with the proofs he has1 if they favour the opinion that suits with his inclination or interest1 and so stop from further search4 ,but that a man should afford his assent to that side on which the less probability appears to him1 seems to me utterly impracticable1 and as impossible as it is to believe the same thing probable and improbable at the same time4 #af4 ,where it is in our ,power to suspend our ,judgment4 ,as knowledge is no more arbitrary than perception2 so1 ,i think1 assent is no more in our power than knowledge4 ,when the agreement of any two ideas appears to our minds1 whether immediately or by the assistance of reason1 ,i can no more refuse to perceive1 no more avoid knowing it1 than ,i can avoid seeing those objects which ,i turn my eyes to1 and look on in daylight2 and what upon full examination ,i find the most probable1 ,i cannot deny my assent to4 ,but1 though we cannot hinder our knowledge1 where the agreement is once perceived2 nor our assent1 where the probability manifestly appears upon due consideration of all the measures of it3 yet we can hinder both ,,knowledge and ,,assent1 ,,by ,,stopping ,,our ,,inquiry1 and not employing our faculties in the search of any truth4 ,if it were not so1 ignorance1 error1 or infidelity1 could not in any case be a fault4 ,thus1 in some cases we can prevent or suspend our assent3 but can a man versed in modern or ancient history doubt whether there is such a place as ,rome1 or whether there was such a man as ,julius ,caesar8 ,indeed1 there are millions of truths that a man is not1 or may not think himself concerned to know2 as whether our king ,richard the ,third was crooked or no2 or whether ,roger ,bacon was a mathematician or a magician4 ,in these and such like cases1 where the assent one way or other is of no importance to the interest of any one2 no action1 no concernment of his following or depending thereon1 there it is not strange that the mind should give itself up to the common opinion1 or render itself to the first comer4 ,these and the like opinions are of so little weight and moment1 that1 like motes in the sun1 their tendencies are very rarely taken notice of4 ,they are there1 as it were1 by chance1 and the mind lets them float at liberty4 ,but where the mind judges that the proposition has concernment in it3 where the assent or not assenting is thought to draw consequences of moment after it1 and good and evil to depend on choosing or refusing the right side1 and the mind sets itself seriously to inquire and examine the probability3 there ,i think it is not in our choice to take which side we please1 if manifest odds appear on either4 ,the greater probability1 ,i think1 in that case will determine the assent3 and a man can no more avoid assenting1 or taking it to be true1 where he perceives the greater probability1 than he can avoid knowing it to be true1 where he perceives the agreement or disagreement of any two ideas4 ,if this be so1 the foundation of error will lie in wrong measures of probability2 as the foundation of vice in wrong measures of good4 #ag4 ,,iv4 ,authority ,the fourth and last wrong measure of probability ,i shall take notice of1 and which keeps in ignorance or error more people than all the other together1 is that which ,i have mentioned in the foregoing chapter3 ,i mean the giving up our assent to the common received opinions1 either of our friends or party1 neighbourhood or country4 ,how many men have no other ground for their tenets1 than the supposed honesty1 or learning1 or number of those of the same profession8 ,as if honest or bookish men could not err2 or truth were to be established by the vote of the multitude3 yet this with most men serves the turn4 ,the tenet has had the attestation of reverend antiquity2 it comes to me with the passport of former ages1 and therefore ,i am secure in the reception ,i give it3 other men have been and are of the same opinion1 7for that is all is said17 and therefore it is reasonable for me to embrace it4 ,a man may more justifiably throw up cross and pile for his opinions1 than take them up by such measures4 ,all men are liable to error1 and most men are in many points1 by passion or interest1 under temptation to it4 ,if we could but see the secret motives that influenced the men of name and learning in the world1 and the leaders of parties1 we should not always find that it was the embracing of truth for its own sake1 that made them espouse the doctrines they owned and maintained4 ,this at least is certain1 there is not an opinion so absurd1 which a man may not receive upon this ground4 ,there is no error to be named1 which has not had its professors3 and a man shall never want crooked paths to walk in1 if he thinks that he is in the right way1 wherever he has the footsteps of others to follow4 #ah4 ,not so many men in ,errors as is commonly supposed4 ,but1 notwithstanding the great noise is made in the world about errors and opinions1 ,i must do mankind that right as to say1 ,,there ,,are ,,not ,,so ,,many ,,men ,,in ,,errors ,,and ,,wrong ,,opinions ,,as ,,is ,,commonly ,,supposed4 ,not that ,i think they embrace the truth2 but indeed1 because concerning those doctrines they keep such a stir about1 they have no thought1 no opinion at all4 ,for if any one should a little catechise the greatest part of the partizans of most of the sects in the world1 he would not find1 concerning those matters they are so zealous for1 that they have any opinions of their own3 much less would he have reason to think that they took them upon the examination of arguments and appearance of probability4 ,they are resolved to stick to a party that education or interest has engaged them in2 and there1 like the common soldiers of an army1 show their courage and warmth as their leaders direct1 without ever examining1 or so much as knowing1 the cause they contend for4 ,if a man's life shows that he has no serious regard for religion2 for what reason should we think that he beats his head about the opinions of his church1 and troubles himself to examine the grounds of this or that doctrine8 ,it is enough for him to obey his leaders1 to have his hand and his tongue ready for the support of the common cause1 and thereby approve himself to those who can give him credit1 preferment1 or protection in that society4 ,thus men become professors of1 and combatants for1 those opinions they were never convinced of nor proselytes to2 no1 nor ever had so much as floating in their heads3 and though one cannot say there are fewer improbable or erroneous opinions in the world than there are1 yet this is certain2 there are fewer that actually assent to them1 and mistake them for truths1 than is imagined4 ,,chapter ,,xxi4 ,,of ,,the ,,division ,,of ,,the ,,sciences4 #a4 ,science may be divided into three sorts4 ,all that can fall within the compass of human understanding1 being either1 ,,first1 the nature of things1 as they are in themselves1 their relations1 and their manner of operation3 or1 ,,secondly1 that which man himself ought to do1 as a rational and voluntary agent1 for the attainment of any end1 especially happiness3 or1 ,,thirdly1 the ways and means whereby the knowledge of both the one and the other of these is attained and communicated2 ,i think science may be divided properly into these three sorts3-- #b4 ,first1 ,physica4 ,,first1 ,the knowledge of things1 as they are in their own proper beings1 then constitution1 properties1 and operations2 whereby ,i mean not only matter and body1 but spirits also1 which have their proper natures1 constitutions1 and operations1 as well as bodies4 ,this1 in a little more enlarged sense of the word1 ,i call word in ,greek3 physika1 or ,,natural ,,philosophy4 ,the end of this is bare speculative truth3 and whatsoever can afford the mind of man any such1 falls under this branch1 whether it be ,god himself1 angels1 spirits1 bodies2 or any of their affections1 as number1 and figure1 c4 #c4 ,secondly1 ,practica4 ,,secondly1 word in ,greek3 praktika1 ,the skill of right applying our own powers and actions1 for the attainment of things good and useful4 ,the most considerable under this head is ,,ethics1 which is the seeking out those rules and measures of human actions1 which lead to happiness1 and the means to practise them4 ,the end of this is not bare speculation and the knowledge of truth2 but right1 and a conduct suitable to it4 #d4 ,thirdly1 word in ,greek3 ,semeiotika ,,thirdly1 the third branch may be called word in ,greek3 ,semeiotika1 or ,,the ,,doctrine ,,of ,,signs2 the most usual whereof being words1 it is aptly enough termed also word in ,greek3 ,logika1 ,,logic3 the business whereof is to consider the nature of signs1 the mind makes use of for the understanding of things1 or conveying its knowledge to others4 ,for1 since the things the mind contemplates are none of them1 besides itself1 present to the understanding1 it is necessary that something else1 as a sign or representation of the thing it considers1 should be present to it3 and these are ,,ideas4 ,and because the scene of ideas that makes one man's thoughts cannot be laid open to the immediate view of another1 nor laid up anywhere but in the memory1 a no very sure repository3 therefore to communicate our thoughts to one another1 as well as record them for our own use1 signs of our ideas are also necessary3 those which men have found most convenient1 and therefore generally make use of1 are ,,articulate ,,sounds4 ,the consideration1 then1 of ,,ideas and ,,words as the great instruments of knowledge1 makes no despicable part of their contemplation who would take a view of human knowledge in the whole extent of it4 ,and perhaps if they were distinctly weighed1 and duly considered1 they would afford us another sort of logic and critic1 than what we have been hitherto acquainted with4 #e4 ,this is the first and most general ,division of the ,objects of our ,understanding4 ,this seems to me the first and most general1 as well as natural division of the objects of our understanding4 ,for a man can employ his thoughts about nothing1 but either1 the contemplation of ,,things themselves1 for the discovery of truth2 or about the things in his own power1 which are his own ,,actions1 for the attainment of his own ends2 or the ,,signs the mind makes use of both in the one and the other1 and the right ordering of them1 for its clearer information4 ,all which three1 viz4 ,,things1 as they are in themselves knowable2 ,,actions as they depend on us1 in order to happiness2 and the right use of ,,signs in order to knowledge1 being ,,toto ,,coelo different1 they seemed to me to be the three great provinces of the intellectual world1 wholly separate and distinct one from another4 ,the ,end