,an ,essay ,concerning ,humane ,understanding ,,in ,,four ,,books ,by ,john ,locke image ,quam bellum est velle confiteri potius nescire quod nescias1 quam ista effutientem nauseare1 atque ipsum sibi displicere6 ,cic4 de ,natur4 ,deor4 l4 #a4 ,,london3 ,printed by ,eliz4 ,holt1 for ,thomas ,basset1 at the ,george in ,fleet ,street1 near ,st4 ,dunstan's ,church4 ,,mdcxc ,,contents ,,the ,,epistle ,,to ,,the ,,reader ,,essay ,,concerning ,,humane ,,understanding4 ,,book ,i ,,neither ,,principles ,,nor ,,ideas ,,are ,,innate ,,chapter ,i4 ,,introduction4 ,,chapter ,,ii4 ,,no ,,innate ,,speculative ,,principles4 ,,chapter ,,iii4 ,,no ,,innate ,,practical ,,principles ,,chapter ,,iv4 ,,other ,,considerations ,,concerning ,,innate ,,principles1 ,,both ,,speculative ,,and ,,practical4 ,,book ,,ii ,,of ,,ideas ,,chapter ,i4 ,,of ,,ideas ,,in ,,general1 ,,and ,,their ,,original4 ,,chapter ,,ii4 ,,of ,,simple ,,ideas4 ,,chapter ,,iii4 ,,of ,,simple ,,ideas ,,of ,,sense4 ,,chapter ,,iv4 ,,idea ,,of ,,solidity4 ,,chapter ,v4 ,,of ,,simple ,,ideas ,,of ,,divers ,,senses4 ,,chapter ,,vi4 ,,of ,,simple ,,ideas ,,of ,,reflection4 ,,chapter ,,vii4 ,,of ,,simple ,,ideas ,,of ,,both ,,sensation ,,and ,,reflection4 ,,chapter ,,viii4 ,,some ,,further ,,considerations ,,concerning ,,our ,,simple ,,ideas ,,of ,,sensation4 ,,chapter ,,ix4 ,,of ,,perception4 ,,chapter ,x4 ,,of ,,retention4 ,,chapter ,,xi4 ,,of ,,discerning1 ,,and ,,other ,,operations ,,of ,,the ,,mind4 ,,chapter ,,xii4 ,,of ,,complex ,,ideas4 ,,chapter ,,xiii4 ,,complex ,,ideas ,,of ,,simple ,,modes3--,,and ,,first1 ,,of ,,the ,,simple ,,modes ,,of ,,idea ,,of ,,space4 ,,chapter ,,xiv4 ,,idea ,,of ,,duration ,,and ,,its ,,simple ,,modes4 ,,chapter ,,xv4 ,,ideas ,,of ,,duration ,,and ,,expansion1 ,,considered ,,together4 ,,chapter ,,xvi4 ,,idea ,,of ,,number4 ,,chapter ,,xvii4 ,,of ,,infinity4 ,,chapter ,,xviii4 ,,other ,,simple ,,modes4 ,,chapter ,,xix4 ,,of ,,the ,,modes ,,of ,,thinking4 ,,chapter ,,xx4 ,,of ,,modes ,,of ,,pleasure ,,and ,,pain4 ,,chapter ,,xxi4 ,,of ,,power4 ,,chapter ,,xxii4 ,,of ,,mixed ,,modes4 ,,chapter ,,xxiii4 ,,of ,,our ,,complex ,,ideas ,,of ,,substances4 ,,chapter ,,xxiv4 ,,of ,,collective ,,ideas ,,of ,,substances4 ,,chapter ,,xxv4 ,,of ,,relation4 ,,chapter ,,xxvi4 ,,of ,,cause ,,and ,,effect1 ,,and ,,other ,,relations4 ,,chapter ,,xxvii4 ,,of ,,identity ,,and ,,diversity4 ,,chapter ,,xxviii4 ,,of ,,other ,,relations4 ,,chapter ,,xxix4 ,,of ,,clear ,,and ,,obscure1 ,,distinct ,,and ,,confused ,,ideas4 ,,chapter ,,xxx4 ,,of ,,real ,,and ,,fantastical ,,ideas4 ,,chapter ,,xxxi4 ,,of ,,adequate ,,and ,,inadequate ,,ideas4 ,,chapter ,,xxxii4 ,,of ,,true ,,and ,,false ,,ideas4 ,,chapter ,,xxxiii4 ,,of ,,the ,,association ,,of ,,ideas4 ,,to ,,the ,,right ,,honourable ,,thomas1 ,,earl ,,of ,,pembroke ,,and ,,montgomery1 ,,baron ,,herbert ,,of ,,cardiff ,,lord ,,ross1 ,,of ,,kendal1 ,,par1 ,,fitzhugh1 ,,marmion1 ,,st4 ,,quintin1 ,,and ,,shurland2 ,,lord ,,president ,,of ,,his ,,majesty',s ,,most ,,honourable ,,privy ,,council2 ,,and ,,lord ,,lieutenant ,,of ,,the ,,county ,,of ,,wilts1 ,,and ,,of ,,south ,,wales4 ,,my ,,lord1 ,this ,treatise1 which is grown up under your lordship's eye1 and has ventured into the world by your order1 does now1 by a natural kind of right1 come to your lordship for that protection which you several years since promised it4 ,it is not that ,i think any name1 how great soever1 set at the beginning of a book1 will be able to cover the faults that are to be found in it4 ,things in print must stand and fall by their own worth1 or the reader's fancy4 ,but there being nothing more to be desired for truth than a fair unprejudiced hearing1 nobody is more likely to procure me that than your lordship1 who are allowed to have got so intimate an acquaintance with her1 in her more retired recesses4 ,your lordship is known to have so far advanced your speculations in the most abstract and general knowledge of things1 beyond the ordinary reach or common methods1 that your allowance and approbation of the design of this ,treatise will at least preserve it from being condemned without reading1 and will prevail to have those parts a little weighed1 which might otherwise perhaps be thought to deserve no consideration1 for being somewhat out of the common road4 ,the imputation of ,novelty is a terrible charge amongst those who judge of men's heads1 as they do of their perukes1 by the fashion1 and can allow none to be right but the received doctrines4 ,truth scarce ever yet carried it by vote anywhere at its first appearance3 new opinions are always suspected1 and usually opposed1 without any other reason but because they are not already common4 ,but truth1 like gold1 is not the less so for being newly brought out of the mine4 ,it is trial and examination must give it price1 and not any antique fashion2 and though it be not yet current by the public stamp1 yet it may1 for all that1 be as old as nature1 and is certainly not the less genuine4 ,your lordship can give great and convincing instances of this1 whenever you please to oblige the public with some of those large and comprehensive discoveries you have made of truths hitherto unknown1 unless to some few1 from whom your lordship has been pleased not wholly to conceal them4 ,this alone were a sufficient reason1 were there no other1 why ,i should dedicate this ,essay to your lordship2 and its having some little correspondence with some parts of that nobler and vast system of the sciences your lordship has made so new1 exact1 and instructive a draught of1 ,i think it glory enough1 if your lordship permit me to boast1 that here and there ,i have fallen into some thoughts not wholly different from yours4 ,if your lordship think fit that1 by your encouragement1 this should appear in the world1 ,i hope it may be a reason1 some time or other1 to lead your lordship further2 and you will allow me to say1 that you here give the world an earnest of something that1 if they can bear with this1 will be truly worth their expectation4 ,this1 my lord1 shows what a present ,i here make to your lordship2 just such as the poor man does to his rich and great neighbour1 by whom the basket of flowers or fruit is not ill taken1 though he has more plenty of his own growth1 and in much greater perfection4 ,worthless things receive a value when they are made the offerings of respect1 esteem1 and gratitude3 these you have given me so mighty and peculiar reasons to have1 in the highest degree1 for your lordship1 that if they can add a price to what they go along with1 proportionable to their own greatness1 ,i can with confidence brag1 ,i here make your lordship the richest present you ever received4 ,this ,i am sure1 ,i am under the greatest obligations to seek all occasions to acknowledge a long train of favours ,i have received from your lordship2 favours1 though great and important in themselves1 yet made much more so by the forwardness1 concern1 and kindness1 and other obliging circumstances1 that never failed to accompany them4 ,to all this you are pleased to add that which gives yet more weight and relish to all the rest3 you vouchsafe to continue me in some degrees of your esteem1 and allow me a place in your good thoughts1 ,i had almost said friendship4 ,this1 my lord1 your words and actions so constantly show on all occasions1 even to others when ,i am absent1 that it is not vanity in me to mention what everybody knows3 but it would be want of good manners not to acknowledge what so many are witnesses of1 and every day tell me ,i am indebted to your lordship for4 ,i wish they could as easily assist my gratitude1 as they convince me of the great and growing engagements it has to your lordship4 ,this ,i am sure1 ,i should write of the ,,understanding without having any1 if ,i were not extremely sensible of them1 and did not lay hold on this opportunity to testify to the world how much ,i am obliged to be1 and how much ,i am1 ,,my ,,lord1 ,your ,lordship's most humble and most obedient servant1 ,,john ,,locke #b ,dorset ,court1 #bdth of ,may1 #afhi ,,the ,,epistle ,,to ,,the ,,reader ,,reader1 ,i have put into thy hands what has been the diversion of some of my idle and heavy hours4 ,if it has the good luck to prove so of any of thine1 and thou hast but half so much pleasure in reading as ,i had in writing it1 thou wilt as little think thy money1 as ,i do my pains1 ill bestowed4 ,mistake not this for a commendation of my work2 nor conclude1 because ,i was pleased with the doing of it1 that therefore ,i am fondly taken with it now it is done4 ,he that hawks at larks and sparrows has no less sport1 though a much less considerable quarry1 than he that flies at nobler game3 and he is little acquainted with the subject of this treatise--the ,,understanding--who does not know that1 as it is the most elevated faculty of the soul1 so it is employed with a greater and more constant delight than any of the other4 ,its searches after truth are a sort of hawking and hunting1 wherein the very pursuit makes a great part of the pleasure4 ,every step the mind takes in its progress towards ,knowledge makes some discovery1 which is not only new1 but the best too1 for the time at least4 ,for the understanding1 like the eye1 judging of objects only by its own sight1 cannot but be pleased with what it discovers1 having less regret for what has escaped it1 because it is unknown4 ,thus he who has raised himself above the alms-basket1 and1 not content to live lazily on scraps of begged opinions1 sets his own thoughts on work1 to find and follow truth1 will 7whatever he lights on7 not miss the hunter's satisfaction2 every moment of his pursuit will reward his pains with some delight2 and he will have reason to think his time not ill spent1 even when he cannot much boast of any great acquisition4 ,this1 ,reader1 is the entertainment of those who let loose their own thoughts1 and follow them in writing2 which thou oughtest not to envy them1 since they afford thee an opportunity of the like diversion1 if thou wilt make use of thy own thoughts in reading4 ,it is to them1 if they are thy own1 that ,i refer myself3 but if they are taken upon trust from others1 it is no great matter what they are2 they are not following truth1 but some meaner consideration2 and it is not worth while to be concerned what he says or thinks1 who says or thinks only as he is directed by another4 ,if thou judgest for thyself ,i know thou wilt judge candidly1 and then ,i shall not be harmed or offended1 whatever be thy censure4 ,for though it be certain that there is nothing in this ,treatise of the truth whereof ,i am not fully persuaded1 yet ,i consider myself as liable to mistakes as ,i can think thee1 and know that this book must stand or fall with thee1 not by any opinion ,i have of it1 but thy own4 ,if thou findest little in it new or instructive to thee1 thou art not to blame me for it4 ,it was not meant for those that had already mastered this subject1 and made a thorough acquaintance with their own understandings2 but for my own information1 and the satisfaction of a few friends1 who acknowledged themselves not to have sufficiently considered it4 ,were it fit to trouble thee with the history of this ,essay1 ,i should tell thee1 that five or six friends meeting at my chamber1 and discoursing on a subject very remote from this1 found themselves quickly at a stand1 by the difficulties that rose on every side4 ,after we had awhile puzzled ourselves1 without coming any nearer a resolution of those doubts which perplexed us1 it came into my thoughts that we took a wrong course2 and that before we set ourselves upon inquiries of that nature1 it was necessary to examine our own abilities1 and see what ,,objects our understandings were1 or were not1 fitted to deal with4 ,this ,i proposed to the company1 who all readily assented2 and thereupon it was agreed that this should be our first inquiry4 ,some hasty and undigested thoughts1 on a subject ,i had never before considered1 which ,i set down against our next meeting1 gave the first entrance into this ,discourse2 which having been thus begun by chance1 was continued by intreaty2 written by incoherent parcels2 and after long intervals of neglect1 resumed again1 as my humour or occasions permitted2 and at last1 in a retirement where an attendance on my health gave me leisure1 it was brought into that order thou now seest it4 ,this discontinued way of writing may have occasioned1 besides others1 two contrary faults1 viz41 that too little and too much may be said in it4 ,if thou findest anything wanting1 ,i shall be glad that what ,i have written gives thee any desire that ,i should have gone further4 ,if it seems too much to thee1 thou must blame the subject2 for when ,i put pen to paper1 ,i thought all ,i should have to say on this matter would have been contained in one sheet of paper2 but the further ,i went the larger prospect ,i had2 new discoveries led me still on1 and so it grew insensibly to the bulk it now appears in4 ,i will not deny1 but possibly it might be reduced to a narrower compass than it is1 and that some parts of it might be contracted1 the way it has been writ in1 by catches1 and many long intervals of interruption1 being apt to cause some repetitions4 ,but to confess the truth1 ,i am now too lazy1 or too busy1 to make it shorter4 ,i am not ignorant how little ,i herein consult my own reputation1 when ,i knowingly let it go with a fault1 so apt to disgust the most judicious1 who are always the nicest readers4 ,but they who know sloth is apt to content itself with any excuse1 will pardon me if mine has prevailed on me1 where ,i think ,i have a very good one4 ,i will not therefore allege in my defence1 that the same notion1 having different respects1 may be convenient or necessary to prove or illustrate several parts of the same discourse1 and that so it has happened in many parts of this3 but waiving that1 ,i shall frankly avow that ,i have sometimes dwelt long upon the same argument1 and expressed it different ways1 with a quite different design4 ,i pretend not to publish this ,essay for the information of men of large thoughts and quick apprehensions2 to such masters of knowledge ,i profess myself a scholar1 and therefore warn them beforehand not to expect anything here1 but what1 being spun out of my own coarse thoughts1 is fitted to men of my own size1 to whom1 perhaps1 it will not be unacceptable that ,i have taken some pains to make plain and familiar to their thoughts some truths which established prejudice1 or the abstractedness of the ideas themselves1 might render difficult4 ,some objects had need be turned on every side2 and when the notion is new1 as ,i confess some of these are to me2 or out of the ordinary road1 as ,i suspect they will appear to others1 it is not one simple view of it that will gain it admittance into every understanding1 or fix it there with a clear and lasting impression4 ,there are few1 ,i believe1 who have not observed in themselves or others1 that what in one way of proposing was very obscure1 another way of expressing it has made very clear and intelligible2 though afterwards the mind found little difference in the phrases1 and wondered why one failed to be understood more than the other4 ,but everything does not hit alike upon every man's imagination4 ,we have our understandings no less different than our palates2 and he that thinks the same truth shall be equally relished by every one in the same dress1 may as well hope to feast every one with the same sort of cookery3 the meat may be the same1 and the nourishment good1 yet every one not be able to receive it with that seasoning2 and it must be dressed another way1 if you will have it go down with some1 even of strong constitutions4 ,the truth is1 those who advised me to publish it1 advised me1 for this reason1 to publish it as it is3 and since ,i have been brought to let it go abroad1 ,i desire it should be understood by whoever gives himself the pains to read it4 ,i have so little affection to be in print1 that if ,i were not flattered this ,essay might be of some use to others1 as ,i think it has been to me1 ,i should have confined it to the view of some friends1 who gave the first occasion to it4 ,my appearing therefore in print being on purpose to be as useful as ,i may1 ,i think it necessary to make what ,i have to say as easy and intelligible to all sorts of readers as ,i can4 ,and ,i had much rather the speculative and quick-sighted should complain of my being in some parts tedious1 than that any one1 not accustomed to abstract speculations1 or prepossessed with different notions1 should mistake or not comprehend my meaning4 ,it will possibly be censured as a great piece of vanity or insolence in me1 to pretend to instruct this our knowing age2 it amounting to little less1 when ,i own1 that ,i publish this ,essay with hopes it may be useful to others4 ,but1 if it may be permitted to speak freely of those who with a feigned modesty condemn as useless what they themselves write1 methinks it savours much more of vanity or insolence to publish a book for any other end2 and he fails very much of that respect he owes the public1 who prints1 and consequently expects men should read1 that wherein he intends not they should meet with anything of use to themselves or others3 and should nothing else be found allowable in this ,treatise1 yet my design will not cease to be so2 and the goodness of my intention ought to be some excuse for the worthlessness of my present4 ,it is that chiefly which secures me from the fear of censure1 which ,i expect not to escape more than better writers4 ,men's principles1 notions1 and relishes are so different1 that it is hard to find a book which pleases or displeases all men4 ,i acknowledge the age we live in is not the least knowing1 and therefore not the most easy to be satisfied4 ,if ,i have not the good luck to please1 yet nobody ought to be offended with me4 ,i plainly tell all my readers1 except half a dozen1 this ,treatise was not at first intended for them2 and therefore they need not be at the trouble to be of that number4 ,but yet if any one thinks fit to be angry and rail at it1 he may do it securely1 for ,i shall find some better way of spending my time than in such kind of conversation4 ,i shall always have the satisfaction to have aimed sincerely at truth and usefulness1 though in one of the meanest ways4 ,the commonwealth of learning is not at this time without master-builders1 whose mighty designs1 in advancing the sciences1 will leave lasting monuments to the admiration of posterity3 but every one must not hope to be a ,boyle or a ,sydenham2 and in an age that produces such masters as the great ,huygenius and the incomparable ,mr4 ,newton1 with some others of that strain1 it is ambition enough to be employed as an under-labourer in clearing the ground a little1 and removing some of the rubbish that lies in the way to knowledge2--which certainly had been very much more advanced in the world1 if the endeavours of ingenious and industrious men had not been much cumbered with the learned but frivolous use of uncouth1 affected1 or unintelligible terms1 introduced into the sciences1 and there made an art of1 to that degree that ,philosophy1 which is nothing but the true knowledge of things1 was thought unfit or incapable to be brought into well-bred company and polite conversation4 ,vague and insignificant forms of speech1 and abuse of language1 have so long passed for mysteries of science2 and hard and misapplied words1 with little or no meaning1 have1 by prescription1 such a right to be mistaken for deep learning and height of speculation1 that it will not be easy to persuade either those who speak or those who hear them1 that they are but the covers of ignorance1 and hindrance of true knowledge4 ,to break in upon the sanctuary of vanity and ignorance will be1 ,i suppose1 some service to human understanding2 though so few are apt to think they deceive or are deceived in the use of words2 or that the language of the sect they are of has any faults in it which ought to be examined or corrected1 that ,i hope ,i shall be pardoned if ,i have in the ,third ,book dwelt long on this subject1 and endeavoured to make it so plain1 that neither the inveterateness of the mischief1 nor the prevalency of the fashion1 shall be any excuse for those who will not take care about the meaning of their own words1 and will not suffer the significancy of their expressions to be inquired into4 ,i have been told that a short ,epitome of this ,treatise1 which was printed in #afhh1 was by some condemned without reading1 because ,,innate ,,ideas were denied in it2 they too hastily concluding1 that if innate ideas were not supposed1 there would be little left either of the notion or proof of spirits4 ,if any one take the like offence at the entrance of this ,treatise1 ,i shall desire him to read it through2 and then ,i hope he will be convinced1 that the taking away false foundations is not to the prejudice but advantage of truth1 which is never injured or endangered so much as when mixed with1 or built on1 falsehood4 ,in the ,second ,edition ,i added as followeth3-- ,the bookseller will not forgive me if ,i say nothing of this ,new ,edition1 which he has promised1 by the correctness of it1 shall make amends for the many faults committed in the former4 ,he desires too1 that it should be known that it has one whole new chapter concerning ,identity1 and many additions and amendments in other places4 ,these ,i must inform my reader are not all new matter1 but most of them either further confirmation of what ,i had said1 or explications1 to prevent others being mistaken in the sense of what was formerly printed1 and not any variation in me from it4 ,i must only except the alterations ,i have made in ,book ,,ii4 chap4 xxi4 ,what ,i had there written concerning ,liberty and the ,will1 ,i thought deserved as accurate a view as ,i am capable of2 those subjects having in all ages exercised the learned part of the world with questions and difficulties1 that have not a little perplexed morality and divinity1 those parts of knowledge that men are most concerned to be clear in4 ,upon a closer inspection into the working of men's minds1 and a stricter examination of those motives and views they are turned by1 ,i have found reason somewhat to alter the thoughts ,i formerly had concerning that which gives the last determination to the ,will in all voluntary actions4 ,this ,i cannot forbear to acknowledge to the world with as much freedom and readiness2 as ,i at first published what then seemed to me to be right2 thinking myself more concerned to quit and renounce any opinion of my own1 than oppose that of another1 when truth appears against it4 ,for it is truth alone ,i seek1 and that will always be welcome to me1 when or from whencesoever it comes4 ,but what forwardness soever ,i have to resign any opinion ,i have1 or to recede from anything ,i have writ1 upon the first evidence of any error in it2 yet this ,i must own1 that ,i have not had the good luck to receive any light from those exceptions ,i have met with in print against any part of my book1 nor have1 from anything that has been urged against it1 found reason to alter my sense in any of the points that have been questioned4 ,whether the subject ,i have in hand requires often more thought and attention than cursory readers1 at least such as are prepossessed1 are willing to allow2 or whether any obscurity in my expressions casts a cloud over it1 and these notions are made difficult to others' apprehensions in my way of treating them2 so it is1 that my meaning1 ,i find1 is often mistaken1 and ,i have not the good luck to be everywhere rightly understood4 ,of this the ingenious author of the ,discourse ,concerning the ,nature of ,man has given me a late instance1 to mention no other4 ,for the civility of his expressions1 and the candour that belongs to his order1 forbid me to think that he would have closed his ,preface with an insinuation1 as if in what ,i had said1 ,book ,,ii4 ch4 xxvii1 concerning the third rule which men refer their actions to1 ,i went about to make virtue vice and vice virtue1 unless he had mistaken my meaning2 which he could not have done if he had given himself the trouble to consider what the argument was ,i was then upon1 and what was the chief design of that chapter1 plainly enough set down in the fourth section and those following4 ,for ,i was there not laying down moral rules1 but showing the original and nature of moral ideas1 and enumerating the rules men make use of in moral relations1 whether these rules were true or false3 and pursuant thereto ,i tell what is everywhere called virtue and vice2 which 8alters not the nature of things10 though men generally do judge of and denominate their actions according to the esteem and fashion of the place and sect they are of4 ,if he had been at the pains to reflect on what ,i had said1 ,bk4 ,i4 ch4 ii4 sect4 #ah1 and ,bk4 ,,ii4 ch4 xxviii4 sect4 #ac1 #ad1 #ae and #bj1 he would have known what ,i think of the eternal and unalterable nature of right and wrong1 and what ,i call virtue and vice4 ,and if he had observed that in the place he quotes ,i only report as a matter of fact what ,,others call virtue and vice1 he would not have found it liable to any great exception4 ,for ,i think ,i am not much out in saying that one of the rules made use of in the world for a ground or measure of a moral relation is--that esteem and reputation which several sorts of actions find variously in the several societies of men1 according to which they are there called virtues or vices4 ,and whatever authority the learned ,mr4 ,lowde places in his ,old ,english ,dictionary1 ,i daresay it nowhere tells him 7if ,i should appeal to it7 that the same action is not in credit1 called and counted a virtue1 in one place1 which1 being in disrepute1 passes for and under the name of vice in another4 ,the taking notice that men bestow the names of #8virtue' and #8vice' according to this rule of ,reputation is all ,i have done1 or can be laid to my charge to have done1 towards the making vice virtue or virtue vice4 ,but the good man does well1 and as becomes his calling1 to be watchful in such points1 and to take the alarm even at expressions1 which1 standing alone by themselves1 might sound ill and be suspected4 #8,tis to this zeal1 allowable in his function1 that ,i forgive his citing as he does these words of mine 7ch4 xxviii4 sect4 ,,ii73 8,even the exhortations of inspired teachers have not feared to appeal to common repute1 ,philip1 iv4 #h20 without taking notice of those immediately preceding1 which introduce them1 and run thus3 8,whereby even in the corruption of manners1 the true boundaries of the law of nature1 which ought to be the rule of virtue and vice1 were pretty well preserved4 ,so that even the exhortations of inspired teachers10 c4 ,by which words1 and the rest of that section1 it is plain that ,i brought that passage of ,st4 ,paul1 not to prove that the general measure of what men called virtue and vice throughout the world was the reputation and fashion of each particular society within itself2 but to show that1 though it were so1 yet1 for reasons ,i there give1 men1 in that way of denominating their actions1 did not for the most part much stray from the ,law of ,nature2 which is that standing and unalterable rule by which they ought to judge of the moral rectitude and gravity of their actions1 and accordingly denominate them virtues or vices4 ,had ,mr4 ,lowde considered this1 he would have found it little to his purpose to have quoted this passage in a sense ,i used it not2 and would ,i imagine have spared the application he subjoins to it1 as not very necessary4 ,but ,i hope this ,second ,edition will give him satisfaction on the point1 and that this matter is now so expressed as to show him there was no cause for scruple4 ,though ,i am forced to differ from him in these apprehensions he has expressed1 in the latter end of his preface1 concerning what ,i had said about virtue and vice1 yet we are better agreed than he thinks in what he says in his third chapter 7p4 #gh7 concerning 8natural inscription and innate notions40 ,i shall not deny him the privilege he claims 7p4 #eb71 to state the question as he pleases1 especially when he states it so as to leave nothing in it contrary to what ,i have said4 ,for1 according to him1 8innate notions1 being conditional things1 depending upon the concurrence of several other circumstances in order to the soul's exerting them10 all that he says for 8innate1 imprinted1 impressed notions0 7for of innate ,,ideas he says nothing at all71 amounts at last only to this--that there are certain propositions which1 though the soul from the beginning1 or when a man is born1 does not know1 yet 8by assistance from the outward senses1 and the help of some previous cultivation10 it may ,,afterwards come certainly to know the truth of2 which is no more than what ,i have affirmed in my ,first ,book4 ,for ,i suppose by the 8soul's exerting them10 he means its beginning to know them2 or else the soul's #8exerting of notions' will be to me a very unintelligible expression2 and ,i think at best is a very unfit one in this1 it misleading men's thoughts by an insinuation1 as if these notions were in the mind before the #8soul exerts them1' i4 e4 before they are known2--whereas truly before they are known1 there is nothing of them in the mind but a capacity to know them1 when the #8concurrence of those circumstances1' which this ingenious author thinks necessary #8in order to the soul's exerting them1' brings them into our knowledge4 ,p4 #eb ,i find him express it thus3 #8,these natural notions are not so imprinted upon the soul as that they naturally and necessarily exert themselves 7even in children and idiots7 without any assistance from the outward senses1 or without the help of some previous cultivation4' ,here1 he says1 they #8exert themselves1' as p4 #gh1 that the #8soul exerts them4' ,when he has explained to himself or others what he means by #8the soul's exerting innate notions1' or their #8exerting themselves2' and what that #8previous cultivation and circumstances' in order to their being exerted are--he will ,i suppose find there is so little of controversy between him and me on the point1 bating that he calls that #8exerting of notions' which ,i in a more vulgar style call #8knowing1' that ,i have reason to think he brought in my name on this occasion only out of the pleasure he has to speak civilly of me2 which ,i must gratefully acknowledge he has done everywhere he mentions me1 not without conferring on me1 as some others have done1 a title ,i have no right to4 ,there are so many instances of this1 that ,i think it justice to my reader and myself to conclude1 that either my book is plainly enough written to be rightly understood by those who peruse it with that attention and indifferency1 which every one who will give himself the pains to read ought to employ in reading2 or else that ,i have written mine so obscurely that it is in vain to go about to mend it4 ,whichever of these be the truth1 it is myself only am affected thereby2 and therefore ,i shall be far from troubling my reader with what ,i think might be said in answer to those several objections ,i have met with1 to passages here and there of my book2 since ,i persuade myself that he who thinks them of moment enough to be concerned whether they are true or false1 will be able to see that what is said is either not well founded1 or else not contrary to my doctrine1 when ,i and my opposer come both to be well understood4 ,if any other authors1 careful that none of their good thoughts should be lost1 have published their censures of my ,essay1 with this honour done to it1 that they will not suffer it to be an essay1 ,i leave it to the public to value the obligation they have to their critical pens1 and shall not waste my reader's time in so idle or ill-natured an employment of mine1 as to lessen the satisfaction any one has in himself1 or gives to others1 in so hasty a confutation of what ,i have written4 ,the booksellers preparing for the ,fourth ,edition of my ,essay1 gave me notice of it1 that ,i might1 if ,i had leisure1 make any additions or alterations ,i should think fit4 ,whereupon ,i thought it convenient to advertise the reader1 that besides several corrections ,i had made here and there1 there was one alteration which it was necessary to mention1 because it ran through the whole book1 and is of consequence to be rightly understood4 ,what ,i thereupon said was this3-- ,,clear and ,,distinct ideas are terms which1 though familiar and frequent in men's mouths1 ,i have reason to think every one who uses does not perfectly understand4 ,and possibly #8tis but here and there one who gives himself the trouble to consider them so far as to know what he himself or others precisely mean by them4 ,i have therefore in most places chose to put ,,determinate or ,,determined1 instead of ,,clear and ,,distinct1 as more likely to direct men's thoughts to my meaning in this matter4 ,by those denominations1 ,i mean some object in the mind1 and consequently determined1 i4 e4 such as it is there seen and perceived to be4 ,this1 ,i think1 may fitly be called a determinate or determined idea1 when such as it is at any time objectively in the mind1 and so determined there1 it is annexed1 and without variation determined1 to a name or articulate sound1 which is to be steadily the sign of that very same object of the mind1 or determinate idea4 ,to explain this a little more particularly4 ,by ,,determinate1 when applied to a simple idea1 ,i mean that simple appearance which the mind has in its view1 or perceives in itself1 when that idea is said to be in it3 by ,,determined1 when applied to a complex idea1 ,i mean such an one as consists of a determinate number of certain simple or less complex ideas1 joined in such a proportion and situation as the mind has before its view1 and sees in itself1 when that idea is present in it1 or should be present in it1 when a man gives a name to it4 ,i say ,,should be1 because it is not every one1 nor perhaps any one1 who is so careful of his language as to use no word till he views in his mind the precise determined idea which he resolves to make it the sign of4 ,the want of this is the cause of no small obscurity and confusion in men's thoughts and discourses4 ,i know there are not words enough in any language to answer all the variety of ideas that enter into men's discourses and reasonings4 ,but this hinders not but that when any one uses any term1 he may have in his mind a determined idea1 which he makes it the sign of1 and to which he should keep it steadily annexed during that present discourse4 ,where he does not1 or cannot do this1 he in vain pretends to clear or distinct ideas3 it is plain his are not so2 and therefore there can be expected nothing but obscurity and confusion1 where such terms are made use of which have not such a precise determination4 ,upon this ground ,i have thought determined ideas a way of speaking less liable to mistakes1 than clear and distinct3 and where men have got such determined ideas of all that they reason1 inquire1 or argue about1 they will find a great part of their doubts and disputes at an end2 the greatest part of the questions and controversies that perplex mankind depending on the doubtful and uncertain use of words1 or 7which is the same7 indetermined ideas1 which they are made to stand for4 ,i have made choice of these terms to signify1 7#a7 ,some immediate object of the mind1 which it perceives and has before it1 distinct from the sound it uses as a sign of it4 7#b7 ,that this idea1 thus determined1 i4e4 which the mind has in itself1 and knows1 and sees there1 be determined without any change to that name1 and that name determined to that precise idea4 ,if men had such determined ideas in their inquiries and discourses1 they would both discern how far their own inquiries and discourses went1 and avoid the greatest part of the disputes and wranglings they have with others4 ,besides this1 the bookseller will think it necessary ,i should advertise the reader that there is an addition of two chapters wholly new2 the one of the ,association of ,ideas1 the other of ,enthusiasm4 ,these1 with some other larger additions never before printed1 he has engaged to print by themselves1 after the same manner1 and for the same purpose1 as was done when this ,essay had the second impression4 ,in the ,sixth ,edition there is very little added or altered4 ,the greatest part of what is new is contained in the twenty-first chapter of the second book1 which any one1 if he thinks it worth while1 may1 with a very little labour1 transcribe into the margin of the former edition4 ,,essay ,,concerning ,,humane ,,understanding4 ,,book ,i ,,neither ,,principles ,,nor ,,ideas ,,are ,,innate ,,chapter ,i4 ,,introduction4 #a4 ,an ,inquiry into the ,understanding pleasant and useful4 ,since it is the ,,understanding that sets man above the rest of sensible beings1 and gives him all the advantage and dominion which he has over them2 it is certainly a subject1 even for its nobleness1 worth our labour to inquire into4 ,the understanding1 like the eye1 whilst it makes us see and perceive all other things1 takes no notice of itself2 and it requires and art and pains to set it at a distance and make it its own object4 ,but whatever be the difficulties that lie in the way of this inquiry2 whatever it be that keeps us so much in the dark to ourselves2 sure ,i am that all the light we can let in upon our minds1 all the acquaintance we can make with our own understandings1 will not only be very pleasant1 but bring us great advantage1 in directing our thoughts in the search of other things4 #b4 ,design4 ,this1 therefore1 being my purpose--to inquire into the original1 certainty1 and extent of ,,human ,,knowledge1 together with the grounds and degrees of ,,belief1 ,,opinion1 and ,,assent2--,i shall not at present meddle with the physical consideration of the mind2 or trouble myself to examine wherein its essence consists2 or by what motions of our spirits or alterations of our bodies we come to have any ,,sensation by our organs1 or any ,,ideas in our understandings2 and whether those ideas do in their formation1 any or all of them1 depend on matter or not4 ,these are speculations which1 however curious and entertaining1 ,i shall decline1 as lying out of my way in the design ,i am now upon4 ,it shall suffice to my present purpose1 to consider the discerning faculties of a man1 as they are employed about the objects which they have to do with4 ,and ,i shall imagine ,i have not wholly misemployed myself in the thoughts ,i shall have on this occasion1 if1 in this historical1 plain method1 ,i can give any account of the ways whereby our understandings come to attain those notions of things we have2 and can set down any measures of the certainty of our knowledge2 or the grounds of those persuasions which are to be found amongst men1 so various1 different1 and wholly contradictory2 and yet asserted somewhere or other with such assurance and confidence1 that he that shall take a view of the opinions of mankind1 observe their opposition1 and at the same time consider the fondness and devotion wherewith they are embraced1 the resolution and eagerness wherewith they are maintained1 may perhaps have reason to suspect1 that either there is no such thing as truth at all1 or that mankind hath no sufficient means to attain a certain knowledge of it4 #c4 ,method4 ,it is therefore worth while to search out the bounds between opinion and knowledge2 and examine by what measures1 in things whereof we have no certain knowledge1 we ought to regulate our assent and moderate our persuasion4 ,in order whereunto ,i shall pursue this following method3-- ,first1 ,i shall inquire into the original of those ideas1 notions1 or whatever else you please to call them1 which a man observes1 and is conscious to himself he has in his mind2 and the ways whereby the understanding comes to be furnished with them4 ,secondly1 ,i shall endeavour to show what knowledge the understanding hath by those ideas2 and the certainty1 evidence1 and extent of it4 ,thirdly1 ,i shall make some inquiry into the nature and grounds of ,,faith or ,,opinion3 whereby ,i mean that assent which we give to any proposition as true1 of whose truth yet we have no certain knowledge4 ,and here we shall have occasion to examine the reasons and degrees of ,,assent4 #d4 ,useful to know the ,extent of our ,comprehension4 ,if by this inquiry into the nature of the understanding1 ,i can discover the powers thereof2 how far they reach2 to what things they are in any degree proportionate2 and where they fail us1 ,i suppose it may be of use to prevail with the busy mind of man to be more cautious in meddling with things exceeding its comprehension2 to stop when it is at the utmost extent of its tether2 and to sit down in a quiet ignorance of those things which1 upon examination1 are found to be beyond the reach of our capacities4 ,we should not then perhaps be so forward1 out of an affectation of an universal knowledge1 to raise questions1 and perplex ourselves and others with disputes about things to which our understandings are not suited2 and of which we cannot frame in our minds any clear or distinct perceptions1 or whereof 7as it has perhaps too often happened7 we have not any notions at all4 ,if we can find out how far the understanding can extend its view2 how far it has faculties to attain certainty2 and in what cases it can only judge and guess1 we may learn to content ourselves with what is attainable by us in this state4 #e4 ,our ,capacity suited to our ,state and ,concerns4 ,for though the comprehension of our understandings comes exceeding short of the vast extent of things1 yet we shall have cause enough to magnify the bountiful ,author of our being1 for that proportion and degree of knowledge he has bestowed on us1 so far above all the rest of the inhabitants of this our mansion4 ,men have reason to be well satisfied with what ,god hath thought fit for them1 since he hath given them 7as ,st4 ,peter says7 words in ,greek1 whatsoever is necessary for the conveniences of life and information of virtue2 and has put within the reach of their discovery1 the comfortable provision for this life1 and the way that leads to a better4 ,how short soever their knowledge may come of an universal or perfect comprehension of whatsoever is1 it yet secures their great concernments1 that they have light enough to lead them to the knowledge of their ,maker1 and the sight of their own duties4 ,men may find matter sufficient to busy their heads1 and employ their hands with variety1 delight1 and satisfaction1 if they will not boldly quarrel with their own constitution1 and throw away the blessings their hands are filled with1 because they are not big enough to grasp everything4 ,we shall not have much reason to complain of the narrowness of our minds1 if we will but employ them about what may be of use to us2 for of that they are very capable4 ,and it will be an unpardonable1 as well as childish peevishness1 if we undervalue the advantages of our knowledge1 and neglect to improve it to the ends for which it was given us1 because there are some things that are set out of the reach of it4 ,it will be no excuse to an idle and untoward servant1 who would not attend his business by candle light1 to plead that he had not broad sunshine4 ,the ,candle that is set up in us shines bright enough for all our purposes4 ,the discoveries we can make with this ought to satisfy us2 and we shall then use our understandings right1 when we entertain all objects in that way and proportion that they are suited to our faculties1 and upon those grounds they are capable of being proposed to us2 and not peremptorily or intemperately require demonstration1 and demand certainty1 where probability only is to be had1 and which is sufficient to govern all our concernments4 ,if we will disbelieve everything1 because we cannot certainly know all things1 we shall do much--what as wisely as he who would not use his legs1 but sit still and perish1 because he had no wings to fly4 #f4 ,knowledge of our ,capacity a ,cure of ,scepticism and ,idleness4 ,when we know our own strength1 we shall the better know what to undertake with hopes of success2 and when we have well surveyed the ,,powers of our own minds1 and made some estimate what we may expect from them1 we shall not be inclined either to sit still1 and not set our thoughts on work at all1 in despair of knowing anything2 nor on the other side1 question everything1 and disclaim all knowledge1 because some things are not to be understood4 ,it is of great use to the sailor to know the length of his line1 though he cannot with it fathom all the depths of the ocean4 ,it is well he knows that it is long enough to reach the bottom1 at such places as are necessary to direct his voyage1 and caution him against running upon shoals that may ruin him4 ,our business here is not to know all things1 but those which concern our conduct4 ,if we can find out those measures1 whereby a rational creature1 put in that state in which man is in this world1 may and ought to govern his opinions1 and actions depending thereon1 we need not to be troubled that some other things escape our knowledge4 #g4 ,occasion of this ,essay4 ,this was that which gave the first rise to this ,essay concerning the understanding4 ,for ,i thought that the first step towards satisfying several inquiries the mind of man was very apt to run into1 was1 to take a survey of our own understandings1 examine our own powers1 and see to what things they were adapted4 ,till that was done ,i suspected we began at the wrong end1 and in vain sought for satisfaction in a quiet and sure possession of truths that most concerned us1 whilst we let loose our thoughts into the vast ocean of ,being2 as if all that boundless extent were the natural and undoubted possession of our understandings1 wherein there was nothing exempt from its decisions1 or that escaped its comprehension4 ,thus men1 extending their inquiries beyond their capacities1 and letting their thoughts wander into those depths where they can find no sure footing1 it is no wonder that they raise questions and multiply disputes1 which1 never coming to any clear resolution1 are proper only to continue and increase their doubts1 and to confirm them at last in perfect scepticism4 ,whereas1 were the capacities of our understandings well considered1 the extent of our knowledge once discovered1 and the horizon found which sets the bounds between the enlightened and dark parts of things2 between what is and what is not comprehensible by us1 men would perhaps with less scruple acquiesce in the avowed ignorance of the one1 and employ their thoughts and discourse with more advantage and satisfaction in the other4 #h4 ,what ,idea stands for4 ,thus much ,i thought necessary to say concerning the occasion of this inquiry into human ,understanding4 ,but1 before ,i proceed on to what ,i have thought on this subject1 ,i must here in the entrance beg pardon of my reader for the frequent use of the word ,,idea1 which he will find in the following treatise4 ,it being that term which1 ,i think1 serves best to stand for whatsoever is the ,,object of the understanding when a man thinks1 ,i have used it to express whatever is meant by ,,phantasm1 ,,notion1 ,,species1 or ,,whatever ,,it ,,is ,,which ,,the ,,mind ,,can ,,be ,,employed ,,about ,,in ,,thinking2 and ,i could not avoid frequently using it4 ,i presume it will be easily granted me1 that there are such ,,ideas in men's minds3 every one is conscious of them in himself2 and men's words and actions will satisfy him that they are in others4 ,our first inquiry then shall be1--how they come into the mind4 ,,chapter ,,ii4 ,,no ,,innate ,,speculative ,,principles4 #a4 ,the way shown how we come by any ,knowledge1 sufficient to prove it not innate4 ,it is an established opinion amongst some men1 that there are in the understanding certain ,,innate ,,principles2 some primary notions1 1 characters1 as it were stamped upon the mind of man2 which the soul receives in its very first being1 and brings into the world with it4 ,it would be sufficient to convince unprejudiced readers of the falseness of this supposition1 if ,i should only show 7as ,i hope ,i shall in the following parts of this ,discourse7 how men1 barely by the use of their natural faculties may attain to all the knowledge they have1 without the help of any innate impressions2 and may arrive at certainty1 without any such original notions or principles4 ,for ,i imagine any one will easily grant that it would be impertinent to suppose the ideas of colours innate in a creature to whom ,god hath given sight1 and a power to receive them by the eyes from external objects3 and no less unreasonable would it be to attribute several truths to the impressions of nature1 and innate characters1 when we may observe in ourselves faculties fit to attain as easy and certain knowledge of them as if they were originally imprinted on the mind4 ,but because a man is not permitted without censure to follow his own thoughts in the search of truth1 when they lead him ever so little out of the common road1 ,i shall set down the reasons that made me doubt of the truth of that opinion1 as an excuse for my mistake1 if ,i be in one2 which ,i leave to be considered by those who1 with me1 dispose themselves to embrace truth wherever they find it4 #b4 ,general ,assent the great ,argument4 ,there is nothing more commonly taken for granted than that there are certain ,,principles1 both ,,speculative and ,,practical1 7for they speak of both71 universally agreed upon by all mankind3 which therefore1 they argue1 must needs be the constant impressions which the souls of men receive in their first beings1 and which they bring into the world with them1 as necessarily and really as they do any of their inherent faculties4 #c4 ,universal ,consent proves nothing innate4 ,this argument1 drawn from universal consent1 has this misfortune in it1 that if it were true in matter of fact1 that there were certain truths wherein all mankind agreed1 it would not prove them innate1 if there can be any other way shown how men may come to that universal agreement1 in the things they do consent in1 which ,i presume may be done4 #d4 8,what is is10 and 8,it is possible for the same ,thing to be and not to be10 not universally assented to4 ,but1 which is worse1 this argument of universal consent1 which is made use of to prove innate principles1 seems to me a demonstration that there are none such3 because there are none to which all mankind give an universal assent4 ,i shall begin with the speculative1 and instance in those magnified principles of demonstration1 8,whatsoever is1 is10 and 8,it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be02 which1 of all others1 ,i think have the most allowed title to innate4 ,these have so settled a reputation of maxims universally received1 that it will no doubt be thought strange if any one should seem to question it4 ,but yet ,i take liberty to say1 that these propositions are so far from having an universal assent1 that there are a great part of mankind to whom they are not so much as known4 #e4 ,not on ,mind naturally imprinted1 because not known to ,children1 ,idiots1 c4 ,for1 first1 it is evident1 that all children and idiots have not the least apprehension or thought of them4 ,and the want of that is enough to destroy that universal assent which must needs be the necessary concomitant of all innate truths3 it seeming to me near a contradiction to say1 that there are truths imprinted on the soul1 which it perceives or understands not3 imprinting1 if it signify anything1 being nothing else but the making certain truths to be perceived4 ,for to imprint anything on the mind without the mind's perceiving it1 seems to me hardly intelligible4 ,if therefore children and idiots have souls1 have minds1 with those impressions upon them1 ,,they must unavoidably perceive them1 and necessarily know and assent to these truths2 which since they do not1 it is evident that there are no such impressions4 ,for if they are not notions naturally imprinted1 how can they be innate8 and if they are notions imprinted1 how can they be unknown8 ,to say a notion is imprinted on the mind1 and yet at the same time to say1 that the mind is ignorant of it1 and never yet took notice of it1 is to make this impression nothing4 ,no proposition can be said to be in the mind which it never yet knew1 which it was never yet conscious of4 ,for if any one may1 then1 by the same reason1 all propositions that are true1 and the mind is capable ever of assenting to1 may be said to be in the mind1 and to be imprinted3 since1 if any one can be said to be in the mind1 which it never yet knew1 it must be only because it is capable of knowing it2 and so the mind is of all truths it ever shall know4 ,nay1 thus truths may be imprinted on the mind which it never did1 nor ever shall know2 for a man may live long1 and die at last in ignorance of many truths which his mind was capable of knowing1 and that with certainty4 ,so that if the capacity of knowing be the natural impression contended for1 all the truths a man ever comes to know will1 by this account1 be every one of them innate2 and this great point will amount to no more1 but only to a very improper way of speaking2 which1 whilst it pretends to assert the contrary1 says nothing different from those who deny innate principles4 ,for nobody1 ,i think1 ever denied that the mind was capable of knowing several truths4 ,the capacity1 they say1 is innate2 the knowledge acquired4 ,but then to what end such contest for certain innate maxims8 ,if truths can be imprinted on the understanding without being perceived1 ,i can see no difference there can be between any truths the mind is ,,capable of knowing in respect of their original3 they must all be innate or all adventitious3 in vain shall a man go about to distinguish them4 ,he therefore that talks of innate notions in the understanding1 cannot 7if he intend thereby any distinct sort of truths7 mean such truths to be in the understanding as it never perceived1 and is yet wholly ignorant of4 ,for if these words 8to be in the understanding0 have any propriety1 they signify to be understood4 ,so that to be in the understanding1 and not to be understood2 to be in the mind and never to be perceived1 is all one as to say anything is and is not in the mind or understanding4 ,if therefore these two propositions1 8,whatsoever is1 is10 and 8,it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be10 are by nature imprinted1 children cannot be ignorant of them3 infants1 and all that have souls1 must necessarily have them in their understandings1 know the truth of them1 and assent to it4 #f4 ,that men know them when they come to the ,use of ,reason answered4 ,to avoid this1 it is usually answered1 that all men know and assent to them1 ,,when ,,they ,,come ,,to ,,the ,,use ,,of ,,reason2 and this is enough to prove them innate4 ,i answer3 #g4 ,doubtful expressions1 that have scarce any signification1 go for clear reasons to those who1 being prepossessed1 take not the pains to examine even what they themselves say4 ,for1 to apply this answer with any tolerable sense to our present purpose1 it must signify one of these two things3 either that as soon as men come to the use of reason these supposed native inscriptions come to be known and observed by them2 or else1 that the use and exercise of men's reason1 assists them in the discovery of these principles1 and certainly makes them known to them4 #h4 ,if ,reason discovered them1 that would not prove them innate4 ,if they mean1 that by the use of reason men may discover these principles1 and that this is sufficient to prove them innate2 their way of arguing will stand thus1 viz4 that whatever truths reason can certainly discover to us1 and make us firmly assent to1 those are all naturally imprinted on the mind2 since that universal assent1 which is made the mark of them1 amounts to no more but this1--that by the use of reason we are capable to come to a certain knowledge of and assent to them2 and1 by this means1 there will be no difference between the maxims of the mathematicians1 and theorems they deduce from them3 all must be equally allowed innate2 they being all discoveries made by the use of reason1 and truths that a rational creature may certainly come to know1 if he apply his thoughts rightly that way4 #i4 ,it is false that ,reason discovers them4 ,but how can these men think the use of reason necessary to discover principles that are supposed innate1 when reason 7if we may believe them7 is nothing else but the faculty of deducing unknown truths from principles or propositions that are already known8 ,that certainly can never be thought innate which we have need of reason to discover2 unless1 as ,i have said1 we will have all the certain truths that reason ever teaches us1 to be innate4 ,we may as well think the use of reason necessary to make our eyes discover visible objects1 as that there should be need of reason1 or the exercise thereof1 to make the understanding see what is originally engraven on it1 and cannot be in the understanding before it be perceived by it4 ,so that to make reason discover those truths thus imprinted1 is to say1 that the use of reason discovers to a man what he knew before3 and if men have those innate impressed truths originally1 and before the use of reason1 and yet are always ignorant of them till they come to the use of reason1 it is in effect to say1 that men know and know them not at the same time4 #aj4 ,no use made of reasoning in the discovery of these two maxims4 ,it will here perhaps be said that mathematical demonstrations1 and other truths that are not innate1 are not assented to as soon as proposed1 wherein they are distinguished from these maxims and other innate truths4 ,i shall have occasion to speak of assent upon the first proposing1 more particularly by and by4 ,i shall here only1 and that very readily1 allow1 that these maxims and mathematical demonstrations are in this different3 that the one have need of reason1 using of proofs1 to make them out and to gain our assent2 but the other1 as soon as understood1 are1 without any the least reasoning1 embraced and assented to4 ,but ,i withal beg leave to observe1 that it lays open the weakness of this subterfuge1 which requires the use of reason for the discovery of these general truths3 since it must be confessed that in their discovery there is no use made of reasoning at all4 ,and ,i think those who give this answer will not be forward to affirm that the knowledge of this maxim1 8,that it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be10 is a deduction of our reason4 ,for this would be to destroy that bounty of nature they seem so fond of1 whilst they make the knowledge of those principles to depend on the labour of our thoughts4 ,for all reasoning is search1 and casting about1 and requires pains and application4 ,and how can it with any tolerable sense be supposed1 that what was imprinted by nature1 as the foundation and guide of our reason1 should need the use of reason to discover it8 #aa4 ,and if there were this would prove them not innate4 ,those who will take the pains to reflect with a little attention on the operations of the understanding1 will find that this ready assent of the mind to some truths1 depends not1 either on native inscription1 or the use of reason1 but on a faculty of the mind quite distinct from both of them1 as we shall see hereafter4 ,reason1 therefore1 having nothing to do in procuring our assent to these maxims1 if by saying1 that 8men know and assent to them1 when they come to the use of reason10 be meant1 that the use of reason assists us in the knowledge of these maxims1 it is utterly false2 and were it true1 would prove them not to be innate4 #ab4 ,the coming of the ,use of ,reason not the ,time we come to know these ,maxims4 ,if by knowing and assenting to them 8when we come to the use of reason10 be meant1 that this is the time when they come to be taken notice of by the mind2 and that as soon as children come to the use of reason1 they come also to know and assent to these maxims2 this also is false and frivolous4 ,first1 it is false2 because it is evident these maxims are not in the mind so early as the use of reason2 and therefore the coming to the use of reason is falsely assigned as the time of their discovery4 ,how many instances of the use of reason may we observe in children1 a long time before they have any knowledge of this maxim1 8,that it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be80 ,and a great part of illiterate people and savages pass many years1 even of their rational age1 without ever thinking on this and the like general propositions4 ,i grant1 men come not to the knowledge of these general and more abstract truths1 which are thought innate1 till they come to the use of reason2 and ,i add1 nor then neither4 ,which is so1 because1 till after they come to the use of reason1 those general abstract ideas are not framed in the mind1 about which those general maxims are1 which are mistaken for innate principles1 but are indeed discoveries made and verities introduced and brought into the mind by the same way1 and discovered by the same steps1 as several other propositions1 which nobody was ever so extravagant as to suppose innate4 ,this ,i hope to make plain in the sequel of this ,discourse4 ,i allow therefore1 a necessity that men should come to the use of reason before they get the knowledge of those general truths2 but deny that men's coming to the use of reason is the time of their discovery4 #ac4 ,by this they are not distinguished from other knowable ,truths4 ,in the mean time it is observable1 that this saying that men know and assent to these maxims 8when they come to the use of reason10 amounts in reality of fact to no more but this1--that they are never known nor taken notice of before the use of reason1 but may possibly be assented to some time after1 during a man's life2 but when is uncertain4 ,and so may all other knowable truths1 as well as these which therefore have no advantage nor distinction from other by this note of being known when we come to the use of reason2 nor are thereby proved to be innate1 but quite the contrary4 #ad4 ,if coming to the ,use of ,reason were the ,time of their ,discovery1 it would not prove them innate4 ,but1 secondly1 were it true that the precise time of their being known and assented to were1 when men come to the use of reason2 neither would that prove them innate4 ,this way of arguing is as frivolous as the supposition itself is false4 ,for1 by what kind of logic will it appear that any notion is originally by nature imprinted in the mind in its first constitution1 because it comes first to be observed and assented to when a faculty of the mind1 which has quite a distinct province1 begins to exert itself8 ,and therefore the coming to the use of speech1 if it were supposed the time that these maxims are first assented to1 7which it may be with as much truth as the time when men come to the use of reason17 would be as good a proof that they were innate1 as to say they are innate because men assent to them when they come to the use of reason4 ,i agree then with these men of innate principles1 that there is no knowledge of these general and self-evident maxims in the mind1 till it comes to the exercise of reason3 but ,i deny that the coming to the use of reason is the precise time when they are first taken notice of2 and if that were the precise time1 ,i deny that it would prove them innate4 ,all that can with any truth be meant by this proposition1 that men #8assent to them when they come to the use of reason1' is no more but this1--that the making of general abstract ideas1 and the understanding of general names1 being a concomitant of the rational faculty1 and growing up with it1 children commonly get not those general ideas1 nor learn the names that stand for them1 till1 having for a good while exercised their reason about familiar and more particular ideas1 they are1 by their ordinary discourse and actions with others1 acknowledged to be capable of rational conversation4 ,if assenting to these maxims1 when men come to the use of reason1 can be true in any other sense1 ,i desire it may be shown2 or at least1 how in this1 or any other sense1 it proves them innate4 #ae4 ,the ,steps by which the ,mind attains several ,truths4 ,the senses at first let in ,,particular ideas1 and furnish the yet empty cabinet1 and the mind by degrees growing familiar with some of them1 they are lodged in the memory1 and names got to them4 ,afterwards1 the mind proceeding further1 abstracts them1 and by degrees learns the use of general names4 ,in this manner the mind comes to be furnished with ideas and language1 the ,,materials about which to exercise its discursive faculty4 ,and the use of reason becomes daily more visible1 as these materials that give it employment increase4 ,but though the having of general ideas and the use of general words and reason usually grow together1 yet ,i see not how this any way proves them innate4 ,the knowledge of some truths1 ,i confess1 is very early in the mind2 but in a way that shows them not to be innate4 ,for1 if we will observe1 we shall find it still to be about ideas1 not innate1 but acquired2 it being about those first which are imprinted by external things1 with which infants have earliest to do1 which make the most frequent impressions on their senses4 ,in ideas thus got1 the mind discovers that some agree and others differ1 probably as soon as it has any use of memory2 as soon as it is able to retain and perceive distinct ideas4 ,but whether it be then or no1 this is certain1 it does so long before it has the use of words2 or comes to that which we commonly call 8the use of reason40 ,for a child knows as certainly before it can speak the difference between the ideas of sweet and bitter 7i4e4 that sweet is not bitter71 as it knows afterwards 7when it comes to speak7 that wormwood and sugarplums are not the same thing4 #af4 ,assent to supposed innate truths depends on having clear and distinct ideas of what their terms mean1 and not on their innateness4 ,a child knows not that three and four are equal to seven1 till he comes to be able to count seven1 and has got the name and idea of equality2 and then1 upon explaining those words1 he presently assents to1 or rather perceives the truth of that proposition4 ,but neither does he then readily assent because it is an innate truth1 nor was his assent wanting till then because he wanted the use of reason2 but the truth of it appears to him as soon as he has settled in his mind the clear and distinct ideas that these names stand for4 ,and then he knows the truth of that proposition upon the same ground and by the same means1 that he knew before that a rod and a cherry are not the same thing2 and upon the same ground also that he may come to know afterwards 8,that it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be10 as shall be more fully shown hereafter4 ,so that the later it is before any one comes to have those general ideas about which those maxims are2 or to know the signification of those generic terms that stand for them2 or to put together in his mind the ideas they stand for2 the later also will it be before he comes to assent to those maxims2--whose terms1 with the ideas they stand for1 being no more innate than those of a cat or a weasel he must stay till time and observation have acquainted him with them2 and then he will be in a capacity to know the truth of these maxims1 upon the first occasion that shall make him put together those ideas in his mind1 and observe whether they agree or disagree1 according as is expressed in those propositions4 ,and therefore it is that a man knows that eighteen and nineteen are equal to thirty-seven1 by the same self-evidence that he knows one and two to be equal to three3 yet a child knows this not so soon as the other2 not for want of the use of reason1 but because the ideas the words eighteen nineteen1 and thirty-seven stand for1 are not so soon got1 as those which are signified by one1 two1 and three4 #ag4 ,assenting as soon as proposed and understood1 proves them not innate4 ,this evasion therefore of general assent when men come to the use of reason1 failing as it does1 and leaving no difference between those supposed innate and other truths that are afterwards acquired and learnt1 men have endeavoured to secure an universal assent to those they call maxims1 by saying1 they are generally assented to as soon as proposed1 and the terms they are proposed in understood3 seeing all men1 even children1 as soon as they hear and understand the terms1 assent to these propositions1 they think it is sufficient to prove them innate4 ,for1 since men never fail after they have once understood the words1 to acknowledge them for undoubted truths1 they would infer1 that certainly these propositions were first lodged in the understanding1 which1 without any teaching1 the mind1 at the very first proposal immediately closes with and assents to1 and after that never doubts again4 #ah4 ,if such an ,assent be a ,mark of ,innate1 then 8that one and two are equal to three1 that ,sweetness is not ,bitterness10 and a thousand the like1 must be innate4 ,in answer to this1 ,i demand whether ready assent given to a proposition1 upon first hearing and understanding the terms1 be a certain mark of an innate principle8 ,if it be not1 such a general assent is in vain urged as a proof of them3 if it be said that it is a mark of innate1 they must then allow all such propositions to be innate which are generally assented to as soon as heard1 whereby they will find themselves plentifully stored with innate principles4 ,for upon the same ground1 viz4 of assent at first hearing and understanding the terms1 that men would have those maxims pass for innate1 they must also admit several propositions about numbers to be innate2 and thus1 that one and two are equal to three1 that two and two are equal to four1 and a multitude of other the like propositions in numbers1 that everybody assents to at first hearing and understanding the terms1 must have a place amongst these innate axioms4 ,nor is this the prerogative of numbers alone1 and propositions made about several of them2 but even natural philosophy1 and all the other sciences1 afford propositions which are sure to meet with assent as soon as they are understood4 ,that 8two bodies cannot be in the same place0 is a truth that nobody any more sticks at than at these maxims1 that 8it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be10 that 8white is not black10 that 8a square is not a circle10 that 8bitterness is not sweetness40 ,these and a million of such other propositions1 as many at least as we have distinct ideas of1 every man in his wits1 at first hearing1 and knowing1 what the names stand for1 must necessarily assent to4 ,if these men will be true to their own rule1 and have assent at first hearing and understanding the terms to be a mark of innate1 they must allow not only as many innate propositions1 as men have distinct ideas2 but as many as men can make propositions wherein1 different ideas are denied one of another4 ,since every proposition wherein one different idea is denied of another1 will as certainly find assent at first hearing and understanding the terms as this general one1 8,it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be10 or that which is the foundation of it and is the easier understood of the two1 8,the same is not different02 by which account they will have legions of innate propositions of this one sort1 without mentioning any other4 ,but1 since no proposition can be innate unless the ideas about which it is be innate1 this will be to suppose all our ideas of colours1 sounds1 tastes1 figure1 c41 innate1 than which there cannot be anything more opposite to reason and experience4 ,universal and ready assent upon hearing and understanding the terms is1 ,i grant1 a mark of self-evidence2 but self-evidence1 depending not on innate impressions1 but on something else1 7as we shall show hereafter17 belongs to several propositions which nobody was yet so extravagant as to pretend to be innate4 #ai4 ,such less general ,propositions known before these universal ,maxims4 ,nor let it be said1 that those more particular self-evident propositions1 which are assented to at first hearing1 as that 8one and two are equal to three10 that 8green is not red10 c41 are received as the consequences of those more universal propositions which are looked on as innate principles2 since any one1 who will but take the pains to observe what passes in the understanding1 will certainly find that these1 and the like less general propositions1 are certainly known1 and firmly assented to by those who are utterly ignorant of those more general maxims2 and so1 being earlier in the mind than those 7as they are called7 first principles1 cannot owe to them the assent wherewith they are received at first hearing4 #bj4 ,one and one equal to ,two1 c41 not general nor useful answered4 ,if it be said1 that these propositions1 viz4 8two and two are equal to four10 8red is not blue10 c41 are not general maxims nor of any great use1 ,i answer1 that makes nothing to the argument of universal assent upon hearing and understanding4 ,for1 if that be the certain mark of innate1 whatever propositions can be found that receives general assent as soon as heard understood1 that must be admitted for an innate proposition as well as this maxim1 8,that it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be10 they being upon this ground equal4 ,and as to the difference of being more general1 that makes this maxim more remote from being innate2 those general and abstract ideas being more strangers to our first apprehensions than those of more particular self-evident propositions2 and therefore it is longer before they are admitted1 and assented to by the growing understanding4 ,and as to the usefulness of these magnified maxims1 that perhaps will not be found so great as is generally conceived1 when it comes in its due place to be more fully considered4 #ba4 ,these ,maxims not being known sometimes till proposed1 proves them not innate4 ,but we have not yet done with 8assenting to propositions at first hearing and understanding their terms40 ,it is fit we first take notice that this1 instead of being a mark that they are innate1 is a proof of the contrary2 since it supposes that several1 who understand and know other things1 are ignorant of these principles till they are proposed to them2 and that one may be unacquainted with these truths till he hears them from others4 ,for1 if they were innate1 what need they be proposed in order to gaining assent1 when1 by being in the understanding1 by a natural and original impression1 7if there were any such17 they could not but be known before8 ,or doth the proposing them print them clearer in the mind than nature did8 ,if so1 then the consequence will be1 that a man knows them better after he has been thus taught them than he did before4 ,whence it will follow that these principles may be made more evident to us by others' teaching than nature has made them by impression3 which will ill agree with the opinion of innate principles1 and give but little authority to them2 but1 on the contrary1 makes them unfit to be the foundations of all our other knowledge2 as they are pretended to be4 ,this cannot be denied1 that men grow first acquainted with many of these self-evident truths upon their being proposed3 but it is clear that whosoever does so1 finds in himself that he then begins to know a proposition1 which he knew not before1 and which from thenceforth he never questions2 not because it was innate1 but because the consideration of the nature of the things contained in those words would not suffer him to think otherwise1 how1 or whensoever he is brought to reflect on them4 ,and if whatever is assented to at first hearing and understanding the terms must pass for an innate principle1 every well-grounded observation1 drawn from particulars into a general rule1 must be innate4 ,when yet it is certain that not all1 but only sagacious heads1 light at first on these observations1 and reduce them into general propositions3 not innate but collected from a preceding acquaintance and reflection on particular instances4 ,these1 when observing men have made them1 unobserving men1 when they are proposed to them cannot refuse their assent to4 #bb4 ,implicitly known before proposing1 signifies that the ,mind is capable of understanding them1 or else signifies nothing4 ,if it be said1 the understanding hath an ,,implicit knowledge of these principles1 but not an ,,explicit1 before this first hearing 7as they must who will say 8that they are in the understanding before they are known107 it will be hard to conceive what is meant by a principle imprinted on the understanding implicitly1 unless it be this1--that the mind is capable of understanding and assenting firmly to such propositions4 ,and thus all mathematical demonstrations1 as well as first principles1 must be received as native impressions on the mind2 which ,i fear they will scarce allow them to be1 who find it harder to demonstrate a proposition than assent to it when demonstrated4 ,and few mathematicians will be forward to believe1 that all the diagrams they have drawn were but copies of those innate characters which nature had engraven upon their minds4 #bc4 ,the ,argument of assenting on first hearing1 is upon a false supposition of no precedent teaching4 ,there is1 ,i fear1 this further weakness in the foregoing argument1 which would persuade us that therefore those maxims are to be thought innate1 which men admit at first hearing2 because they assent to propositions which they are not taught1 nor do receive from the force of any argument or demonstration1 but a bare explication or understanding of the terms4 ,under which there seems to me to lie this fallacy1 that men are supposed not to be taught nor to learn anything de novo2 when1 in truth1 they are taught1 and do learn something they were ignorant of before4 ,for1 first1 it is evident that they have learned the terms1 and their signification2 neither of which was born with them4 ,but this is not all the acquired knowledge in the case3 the ideas themselves1 about which the proposition is1 are not born with them1 no more than their names1 but got afterwards4 ,so that in all propositions that are assented to at first hearing1 the terms of the proposition1 their standing for such ideas1 and the ideas themselves that they stand for1 being neither of them innate1 ,i would fain know what there is remaining in such propositions that is innate4 ,for ,i would gladly have any one name that proposition whose terms or ideas were either of them innate4 ,we by degrees get ideas and names1 and learn their appropriated connexion one with another2 and then to propositions made in such terms1 whose signification we have learnt1 and wherein the agreement or disagreement we can perceive in our ideas when put together is expressed1 we at first hearing assent2 though to other propositions1 in themselves as certain and evident1 but which are concerning ideas not so soon or so easily got1 we are at the same time no way capable of assenting4 ,for1 though a child quickly assents to this proposition1 8,that an apple is not fire10 when by familiar acquaintance he has got the ideas of those two different things distinctly imprinted on his mind1 and has learnt that the names apple and fire stand for them2 yet it will be some years after1 perhaps1 before the same child will assent to this proposition1 8,that it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be02 because that1 though perhaps the words are as easy to be learnt1 yet the signification of them being more large1 comprehensive1 and abstract than of the names annexed to those sensible things the child hath to do with1 it is longer before he learns their precise meaning1 and it requires more time plainly to form in his mind those general ideas they stand for4 ,till that be done1 you will in vain endeavour to make any child assent to a proposition made up of such general terms2 but as soon as ever he has got those ideas1 and learned their names1 he forwardly closes with the one as well as the other of the forementioned propositions3 and with both for the same reason2 viz4 because he finds the ideas he has in his mind to agree or disagree1 according as the words standing for them are affirmed or denied one of another in the proposition4 ,but if propositions be brought to him in words which stand for ideas he has not yet in his mind1 to such propositions1 however evidently true or false in themselves1 he affords neither assent nor dissent1 but is ignorant4 ,for words being but empty sounds1 any further than they are signs of our ideas1 we cannot but assent to them as they correspond to those ideas we have1 but no further than that4 ,but the showing by what steps and ways knowledge comes into our minds2 and the grounds of several degrees of assent1 being2 the business of the following ,discourse1 it may suffice to have only touched on it here1 as one reason that made me doubt of those innate principles4 #bd4 ,not innate because not universally assented to4 ,to conclude this argument of universal consent1 ,i agree with these defenders of innate principles1--that if they are innate1 they must needs have universal assent4 ,for that a truth should be innate and yet not assented to1 is to me as unintelligible as for a man to know a truth and be ignorant of it at the same time4 ,but then1 by these men's own confession1 they cannot be innate2 since they are not assented to by those who understand not the terms2 nor by a great part of those who do understand them1 but have yet never heard nor thought of those propositions2 which1 ,i think1 is at least one half of mankind4 ,but were the number far less1 it would be enough to destroy universal assent1 and thereby show these propositions not to be innate1 if children alone were ignorant of them4 #be4 ,these ,maxims not the first known4 ,but that ,i may not be accused to argue from the thoughts of infants1 which are unknown to us1 and to conclude from what passes in their understandings before they express it2 ,i say next1 that these two general propositions are not the truths that first possess the minds of children1 nor are antecedent to all acquired and adventitious notions3 which1 if they were innate1 they must needs be4 ,whether we can determine it or no1 it matters not1 there is certainly a time when children begin to think1 and their words and actions do assure us that they do so4 ,when therefore they are capable of thought1 of knowledge1 of assent1 can it rationally be supposed they can be ignorant of those notions that nature has imprinted1 were there any such8 ,can it be imagined1 with any appearance of reason1 that they perceive the impressions from things without1 and be at the same time ignorant of those characters which nature itself has taken care to stamp within8 ,can they receive and assent to adventitious notions1 and be ignorant of those which are supposed woven into the very principles of their being1 and imprinted there in indelible characters1 to be the foundation and guide of all their acquired knowledge and future reasonings8 ,this would be to make nature take pains to no purpose2 or at least to write very ill2 since its characters could not be read by those eyes which saw other things very well3 and those are very ill supposed the clearest parts of truth1 and the foundations of all our knowledge1 which are not first known1 and without which the undoubted knowledge of several other things may be had4 ,the child certainly knows1 that the nurse that feeds it is neither the cat it plays with1 nor the blackmoor it is afraid of3 that the wormseed or mustard it refuses1 is not the apple or sugar it cries for3 this it is certainly and undoubtedly assured of3 but will any one say1 it is by virtue of this principle1 8,that it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be10 that it so firmly assents to these and other parts of its knowledge8 ,or that the child has any notion or apprehension of that proposition at an age1 wherein yet1 it is plain1 it knows a great many other truths8 ,he that will say1 children join in these general abstract speculations with their sucking-bottles and their rattles1 may perhaps1 with justice1 be thought to have more passion and zeal for his opinion1 but less sincerity and truth1 than one of that age4 #bf4 ,and so not innate4 ,though therefore there be several general propositions that meet with constant and ready assent1 as soon as proposed to men grown up1 who have attained the use of more general and abstract ideas1 and names standing for them2 yet they not being to be found in those of tender years1 who nevertheless know other things1 they cannot pretend to universal assent of intelligent persons1 and so by no means can be supposed innate2--it being impossible that any truth which is innate 7if there were any such7 should be unknown1 at least to any one who knows anything else4 ,since1 if they are innate truths1 they must be innate thoughts3 there being nothing a truth in the mind that it has never thought on4 ,whereby it is evident1 if there be any innate truths1 they must necessarily be the first of any thought on2 the first that appear4 #bg4 ,not innate1 because they appear least1 where what is innate shows itself clearest4 ,that the general maxims we are discoursing of are not known to children1 idiots1 and a great part of mankind1 we have already sufficiently proved3 whereby it is evident they have not an universal assent1 nor are general impressions4 ,but there is this further argument in it against their being innate3 that these characters1 if they were native and original impressions1 should appear fairest and clearest in those persons in whom yet we find no footsteps of them2 and it is1 in my opinion1 a strong presumption that they are not innate1 since they are least known to those in whom1 if they were innate1 they must needs exert themselves with most force and vigour4 ,for children1 idiots1 savages1 and illiterate people1 being of all others the least corrupted by custom1 or borrowed opinions2 learning and education having not cast their native thoughts into new moulds2 nor by superinducing foreign and studied doctrines1 confounded those fair characters nature had written there2 one might reasonably imagine that in ,,their minds these innate notions should lie open fairly to every one's view1 as it is certain the thoughts of children do4 ,it might very well be expected that these principles should be perfectly known to naturals2 which being stamped immediately on the soul1 7as these men suppose17 can have no dependence on the constitution or organs of the body1 the only confessed difference between them and others4 ,one would think1 according to these men's principles1 that all these native beams of light 7were there any such7 should1 in those who have no reserves1 no arts of concealment1 shine out in their full lustre1 and leave us in no more doubt of their being there1 than we are of their love of pleasure and abhorrence of pain4 ,but alas1 amongst children1 idiots1 savages1 and the grossly illiterate1 what general maxims are to be found8 what universal principles of knowledge8 ,their notions are few and narrow1 borrowed only from those objects they have had most to do with1 and which have made upon their senses the frequentest and strongest impressions4 ,a child knows his nurse and his cradle1 and by degrees the playthings of a little more advanced age2 and a young savage has1 perhaps1 his head filled with love and hunting1 according to the fashion of his tribe4 ,but he that from a child untaught1 or a wild inhabitant of the woods1 will expect these abstract maxims and reputed principles of science1 will1 ,i fear find himself mistaken4 ,such kind of general propositions are seldom mentioned in the huts of ,indians3 much less are they to be found in the thoughts of children1 or any impressions of them on the minds of naturals4 ,they are the language and business of the schools and academies of learned nations accustomed to that sort of conversation or learning1 where disputes are frequent2 these maxims being suited to artificial argumentation and useful for conviction1 but not much conducing to the discovery of truth or advancement of knowledge4 ,but of their small use for the improvement of knowledge ,i shall have occasion to speak more at large1 l4#d1 c4 #g4 #bh4 ,recapitulation4 ,i know not how absurd this may seem to the masters of demonstration4 ,and probably it will hardly go down with anybody at first hearing4 ,i must therefore beg a little truce with prejudice1 and the forbearance of censure1 till ,i have been heard out in the sequel of this ,discourse1 being very willing to submit to better judgments4 ,and since ,i impartially search after truth1 ,i shall not be sorry to be convinced1 that ,i have been too fond of my own notions2 which ,i confess we are all apt to be1 when application and study have warmed our heads with them4 ,upon the whole matter1 ,i cannot see any ground to think these two speculative ,maxims innate3 since they are not universally assented to2 and the assent they so generally find is no other than what several propositions1 not allowed to be innate1 equally partake in with them3 and since the assent that is given them is produced another way1 and comes not from natural inscription1 as ,i doubt not but to make appear in the following ,discourse4 ,and if ,,these 8first principles0 of knowledge and science are found not to be innate1 no ,,other speculative maxims can 7,i suppose71 with better right pretend to be so4 ,,chapter ,,iii4 ,,no ,,innate ,,practical ,,principles #a4 ,no moral ,principles so clear and so generally received as the forementioned speculative ,maxims4 ,if those speculative ,maxims1 whereof we discoursed in the foregoing chapter1 have not an actual universal assent from all mankind1 as we there proved1 it is much more visible concerning ,,practical ,principles1 that they come short of an universal reception3 and ,i think it will be hard to instance any one moral rule which can pretend to so general and ready an assent as1 8,what is1 is02 or to be so manifest a truth as this1 that 8,it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be40 ,whereby it is evident that they are further removed from a title to be innate2 and the doubt of their being native impressions on the mind is stronger against those moral principles than the other4 ,not that it brings their truth at all in question4 ,they are equally true1 though not equally evident4 ,those speculative maxims carry their own evidence with them3 but moral principles require reasoning and discourse1 and some exercise of the mind1 to discover the certainty of their truth4 ,they lie not open as natural characters engraved on the mind2 which1 if any such were1 they must needs be visible by themselves1 and by their own light be certain and known to everybody4 ,but this is no derogation to their truth and certainty2 no more than it is to the truth or certainty of the three angles of a triangle being equal to two right ones because it is not so evident as 8the whole is bigger than a part10 nor so apt to be assented to at first hearing4 ,it may suffice that these moral rules are capable of demonstration3 and therefore it is our own faults if we come not to a certain knowledge of them4 ,but the ignorance wherein many men are of them1 and the slowness of assent wherewith others receive them1 are manifest proofs that they are not innate1 and such as offer themselves to their view without searching4 #b4 ,faith and ,justice not owned as ,principles by all ,men4 ,whether there be any such moral principles1 wherein all men do agree1 ,i appeal to any who have been but moderately conversant in the history of mankind1 and looked abroad beyond the smoke of their own chimneys4 ,where is that practical truth that is universally received1 without doubt or question1 as it must be if innate8 ,,justice1 and keeping of contracts1 is that which most men seem to agree in4 ,this is a principle which is thought to extend itself to the dens of thieves1 and the confederacies of the greatest villains2 and they who have gone furthest towards the putting off of humanity itself1 keep faith and rules of justice one with another4 ,i grant that outlaws themselves do this one amongst another3 but it is without receiving these as the innate laws of nature4 ,they practise them as rules of convenience within their own communities3 but it is impossible to conceive that he embraces justice as a practical principle who acts fairly with his fellow-highwayman1 and at the same time plunders or kills the next honest man he meets with4 ,justice and truth are the common ties of society2 and therefore even outlaws and robbers1 who break with all the world besides1 must keep faith and rules of equity amongst themselves2 or else they cannot hold together4 ,but will any one say1 that those that live by fraud or rapine have innate principles of truth and justice which they allow and assent to8 #c4 ,objection3 though ,men deny them in their ,practice1 yet they admit them in their ,thoughts answered4 ,perhaps it will be urged1 that the tacit assent of their minds agrees to what their practice contradicts4 ,i answer1 first1 ,i have always thought the actions of men the best interpreters of their thoughts4 ,but1 since it is certain that most men's practices1 and some men's open professions1 have either questioned or denied these principles1 it is impossible to establish an universal consent1 7though we should look for it only amongst grown men17 without which it is impossible to conclude them innate4 ,secondly1 it is very strange and unreasonable to suppose innate practical principles1 that terminate only in contemplation4 ,practical principles1 derived from nature1 are there for operation1 and must produce conformity of action1 not barely speculative assent to their truth1 or else they are in vain distinguished from speculative maxims4 ,nature1 ,i confess1 has put into man a desire of happiness and an aversion to misery3 these indeed are innate practical principles which 7as practical principles ought7 ,,do continue constantly to operate and influence all our actions without ceasing3 these may be observed in all persons and all ages1 steady and universal2 but these are ,,inclinations ,,of ,,the ,,appetite to good1 not impressions of truth on the understanding4 ,i deny not that there are natural tendencies imprinted on the minds of men2 and that from the very first instances of sense and perception1 there are some things that are grateful and others unwelcome to them2 some things that they incline to and others that they fly3 but this makes nothing for innate characters on the mind1 which are to be the principles of knowledge regulating our practice4 ,such natural impressions on the understanding are so far from being confirmed hereby1 that this is an argument against them2 since1 if there were certain characters imprinted by nature on the understanding1 as the principles of knowledge1 we could not but perceive them constantly operate in us and influence our knowledge1 as we do those others on the will and appetite2 which never cease to be the constant springs and motives of all our actions1 to which we perpetually feel them strongly impelling us4 #d4 ,moral ,rules need a ,proof1 ergo not innate4 ,another reason that makes me doubt of any innate practical principles is1 that ,i think there cannot any one moral ,rule be propos'd whereof a ,man may not justly demand a ,reason3 which would be perfectly ridiculous and absurd if they were innate2 or so much as self-evident1 which every innate principle must needs be1 and not need any proof to ascertain its truth1 nor want any reason to gain it approbation4 ,he would be thought void of common sense who asked on the one side1 or on the other side went to give a reason ,,why 8it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be40 ,it carries its own light and evidence with it1 and needs no other proof3 he that understands the terms assents to it for its own sake or else nothing will ever be able to prevail with him to do it4 ,but should that most unshaken rule of morality and foundation of all social virtue1 8,that one should do as he would be done unto10 be proposed to one who never heard of it before1 but yet is of capacity to understand its meaning2 might he not without any absurdity ask a reason why8 ,and were not he that proposed it bound to make out the truth and reasonableness of it to him8 ,which plainly shows it not to be innate2 for if it were it could neither want nor receive any proof2 but must needs 7at least as soon as heard and understood7 be received and assented to as an unquestionable truth1 which a man can by no means doubt of4 ,so that the truth of all these moral rules plainly depends upon some other antecedent to them1 and from which they must be deduced2 which could not be if either they were innate or so much as self-evident4 #e4 ,instance in keeping ,compacts ,that men should keep their compacts is certainly a great and undeniable rule in morality4 ,but yet1 if a ,christian1 who has the view of happiness and misery in another life1 be asked why a man must keep his word1 he will give this as a reason3--,because ,god1 who has the power of eternal life and death1 requires it of us4 ,but if a ,hobbist be asked why8 he will answer3--,because the public requires it1 and the ,leviathan will punish you if you do not4 ,and if one of the old philosophers had been asked1 he would have answered3--,because it was dishonest1 below the dignity of a man1 and opposite to virtue1 the highest perfection of human nature1 to do otherwise4 #f4 ,virtue generally approved not because innate1 but because profitable4 ,hence naturally flows the great variety of opinions concerning moral rules which are to be found among men1 according to the different sorts of happiness they have a prospect of1 or propose to themselves2 which could not be if practical principles were innate1 and imprinted in our minds immediately by the hand of ,god4 ,i grant the existence of ,god is so many ways manifest1 and the obedience we owe him so congruous to the light of reason1 that a great part of mankind give testimony to the law of nature3 but yet ,i think it must be allowed that several moral rules may receive from mankind a very general approbation1 without either knowing or admitting the true ground of morality2 which can only be the will and law of a ,god1 who sees men in the dark1 has in his hand rewards and punishments1 and power enough to call to account the proudest offender4 ,for1 ,god having1 by an inseparable connexion1 joined virtue and public happiness together1 and made the practice thereof necessary to the preservation of society1 and visibly beneficial to all with whom the virtuous man has to do2 it is no wonder that every one should not only allow1 but recommend and magnify those rules to others1 from whose observance of them he is sure to reap advantage to himself4 ,he may1 out of interest as well as conviction1 cry up that for sacred1 which1 if once trampled on and profaned1 he himself cannot be safe nor secure4 ,this1 though it takes nothing from the moral and eternal obligation which these rules evidently have1 yet it shows that the outward acknowledgment men pay to them in their words proves not that they are innate principles3 nay1 it proves not so much as that men assent to them inwardly in their own minds1 as the inviolable rules of their own practice2 since we find that self-interest1 and the conveniences of this life1 make many men own an outward profession and approbation of them1 whose actions sufficiently prove that they very little consider the ,lawgiver that prescribed these rules2 nor the hell that he has ordained for the punishment of those that transgress them4 #g4 ,men's actions convince us1 that the ,rule of ,virtue is not their internal ,principle4 ,for1 if we will not in civility allow too much sincerity to the professions of most men1 but think their actions to be the interpreters of their thoughts1 we shall find that they have no such internal veneration for these rules1 nor so full a persuasion of their certainty and obligation4 ,the great principle of morality1 #8,to do as one would be done to1' is more commended than practised4 ,but the breach of this rule cannot be a greater vice1 than to teach others1 that it is no moral rule1 nor obligatory1 would be thought madness1 and contrary to that interest men sacrifice to1 when they break it themselves4 ,perhaps ,,conscience will be urged as checking us for such breaches1 and so the internal obligation and establishment of the rule be preserved4 #h4 ,conscience no ,proof of any innate ,moral ,rule4 ,to which ,i answer1 that ,i doubt not but1 without being written on their hearts1 many men may1 by the same way that they come to the knowledge of other things1 come to assent to several moral rules1 and be convinced of their obligation4 ,others also may come to be of the same mind1 from their education1 company1 and customs of their country2 which persuasion1 however got1 will serve to set conscience on work2 which is nothing else but our own opinion or judgment of the moral rectitude or gravity of our own actions2 and if conscience be a proof of innate principles1 contraries may be innate principles2 since some men with the same bent of conscience prosecute what others avoid4 #i4 ,instances of ,enormities practised without ,remorse4 ,but ,i cannot see how any men should ever transgress those moral rules1 with confidence and serenity1 were they innate1 and stamped upon their minds4 ,view but an army at the sacking of a town1 and see what observation or sense of moral principles1 or what touch of conscience for all the outrages they do4 ,robberies1 murders1 rapes1 are the sports of men set at liberty from punishment and censure4 ,have there not been whole nations1 and those of the most civilized people1 amongst whom the exposing their children1 and leaving them in the fields to perish by want or wild beasts has been the practice2 as little condemned or scrupled as the begetting them8 ,do they not still1 in some countries1 put them into the same graves with their mothers1 if they die in childbirth2 or despatch them1 if a pretended astrologer declares them to have unhappy stars8 ,and are there not places where1 at a certain age1 they kill or expose their parents1 without any remorse at all8 ,in a part of ,asia1 the sick1 when their case comes to be thought desperate1 are carried out and laid on the earth before they are dead2 and left there1 exposed to wind and weather1 to perish without assistance or pity4 ,it is familiar among the ,mingrelians1 a people professing ,christianity1 to bury their children alive without scruple4 ,there are places where they eat their own children4 ,the ,caribbees were wont to geld their children1 on purpose to fat and eat them4 ,and ,garcilasso de la ,vega tells us of a people in ,peru which were wont to fat and eat the children they got on their female captives1 whom they kept as concubines for that purpose1 and when they were past breeding1 the mothers themselves were killed too and eaten4 ,the virtues whereby the ,tououpinambos believed they merited paradise1 were revenge1 and eating abundance of their enemies4 ,they have not so much as a name for ,god1 and have no religion1 no worship4 ,the saints who are canonized amongst the ,turks1 lead lives which one cannot with modesty relate4 ,a remarkable passage to this purpose1 out of the voyage of ,baumgarten1 which is a book not every day to be met with1 ,i shall set down at large1 in the language it is published in4 ,ibi 7sc4 prope ,belbes in ,aegypto7 vidimus sanctum unum ,saracenicum inter arenarum cumulos1 ita ut ex utero matris prodiit nudum sedentem4 ,mos est1 ut didicimus1 ,mahometistis1 ut eos1 qui amentes et sine ratione sunt1 pro sanctis colant et venerentur4 ,insuper et eos1 qui cum diu vitam egerint inquinatissimam1 voluntariam demum poenitentiam et paupertatem1 sanctitate venerandos deputant4 ,ejusmodi vero genus hominum libertatem quandam effrenem habent1 domos quos volunt intrandi1 edendi1 bibendi1 et quod majus est1 concumbendi2 ex quo concubitu1 si proles secuta fuerit1 sancta similiter habetur4 ,his ergo hominibus dum vivunt1 magnos exhibent honores2 mortuis vero vel templa vel monumenta extruunt amplissima1 eosque contingere ac sepelire maximae fortunae ducunt loco4 ,audivimus haec dicta et dicenda per interpretem a ,mucrelo nostro4 ,insuper sanctum ilium1 quern eo loco vidimus1 publicitus apprime commendari1 eum esse hominem sanctum1 divinum ac integritate praecipuum2 eo quod1 nec faminarum unquam esset1 nec puerorum1 sed tantummodo asellarum concubitor atque mularum4 7,peregr4 ,baumgarten1 #a4 ii4 c4 i4 p4 #gc47 ,where then are those innate principles of justice1 piety1 gratitude1 equity1 chastity8 ,or where is that universal consent that assures us there are such inbred rules8 ,murders in duels1 when fashion has made them honourable1 are committed without remorse of conscience3 nay1 in many places innocence in this case is the greatest ignominy4 ,and if we look abroad to take a view of men as they are1 we shall find that they have remorse1 in one place1 for doing or omitting that which others1 in another place1 think they merit by4 #aj4 ,men have contrary practical ,principles4 ,he that will carefully peruse the history of mankind1 and look abroad into the several tribes of men1 and with indifferency survey their actions1 will be able to satisfy himself1 that there is scarce that principle of morality to be named1 or1 rule of virtue to be thought on1 7those only excepted that are absolutely necessary to hold society together1 which commonly too are neglected betwixt distinct societies17 which is not1 somewhere or other1 slighted and condemned by the general fashion of whole societies of men1 governed by practical opinions and rules of living quite opposite to others4 #aa4 ,whole ,nations reject several ,moral ,rules4 ,here perhaps it will be objected1 that it is no argument that the rule is not known1 because it is broken4 ,i grant the objection good where men1 though they transgress1 yet disown not the law2 where fear of shame1 censure1 or punishment1 carries the mark of some awe it has upon them4 ,but it is impossible to conceive that a whole nation of men should all publicly reject and renounce what every one of them certainly and infallibly knew to be a law2 for so they must who have it naturally imprinted on their minds4 ,it is possible men may sometimes own rules of morality which in their private thoughts they do not believe to be true1 only to keep themselves in reputation and esteem amongst those who are persuaded of their obligation4 ,but it is not to be imagined that a whole society of men should publicly and professedly disown and cast off a rule which they could not in their own minds but be infallibly certain was a law2 nor be ignorant that all men they should have to do with knew it to be such3 and therefore must every one of them apprehend from others all the contempt and abhorrence due to one who professes himself void of humanity3 and one who1 confounding the known and natural measures of right and wrong1 cannot but be looked on as the professed enemy of their peace and happiness4 ,whatever practical principle is innate1 cannot but be known to every one to be just and good4 ,it is therefore little less than a contradiction to suppose1 that whole nations of men should1 both in their professions and practice1 unanimously and universally give the lie to what1 by the most invincible evidence1 every one of them knew to be true1 right1 and good4 ,this is enough to satisfy us that no practical rule which is anywhere universally1 and with public approbation or allowance1 transgressed1 can be supposed innate4--,but ,i have something further to add in answer to this objection4 #ab4 ,the generally allowed breach of a rule proof that it is not innate4 ,the breaking of a rule1 say you1 is no argument that it is unknown4 ,i grant it3 but the ,,generally ,,allowed breach of it anywhere1 ,i say1 is a proof that it is not innate4 ,for example3 let us take any of these rules1 which1 being the most obvious deductions of human reason1 and conformable to the natural inclination of the greatest part of men1 fewest people have had the impudence to deny or inconsideration to doubt of4 ,if any can be thought to be naturally imprinted1 none1 ,i think1 can have a fairer pretence to be innate than this3 8,parents1 preserve and cherish your children40 ,when1 therefore1 you say that this is an innate rule1 what do you mean8 ,either that it is an innate principle which upon all occasions excites and directs the actions of all men2 or else1 that it is a truth which all men have imprinted on their minds1 and which therefore they know and assent to4 ,but in neither of these senses is it innate4 ,,first1 that it is not a principle which influences all men's actions1 is what ,i have proved by the examples before cited3 nor need we seek so far as the ,mingrelia or ,peru to find instances of such as neglect1 abuse1 nay1 and destroy their children2 or look on it only as the more than brutality of some savage and barbarous nations1 when we remember that it was a familiar and uncondemned practice amongst the ,greeks and ,romans to expose1 without pity or remorse1 their innocent infants4 ,,secondly1 that it is an innate truth1 known to all men1 is also false4 ,for1 8,parents preserve your children10 is so far from an innate truth1 that it is no truth at all3 it being a command1 and not a proposition1 and so not capable of truth or falsehood4 ,to make it capable of being assented to as true1 it must be reduced to some such proposition as this3 8,it is the duty of parents to preserve their children40 ,but what duty is1 cannot be understood without a law2 nor a law be known or supposed without a lawmaker1 or without reward and punishment2 so that it is impossible that this1 or any other1 practical principle should be innate1 i4e4 be imprinted on the mind as a duty1 without supposing the ideas of ,god1 of law1 of obligation1 of punishment1 of a life after this1 innate3 for that punishment follows not in this life the breach of this rule1 and consequently that it has not the force of a law in countries where the generally allowed practice runs counter to it1 is in itself evident4 ,but these ideas 7which must be all of them innate1 if anything as a duty be so7 are so far from being innate1 that it is not every studious or thinking man1 much less every one that is born1 in whom they are to be found clear and distinct2 and that one of them1 which of all others seems most likely to be innate1 is not so1 7,i mean the idea of ,god17 ,i think1 in the next chapter1 will appear very evident to any considering man4 #ac4 ,if men can be ignorant of what is innate1 certainty is not described by innate principles4 ,from what has been said1 ,i think we may safely conclude that whatever practical rule is in any place generally and with allowance broken1 cannot be supposed innate2 it being impossible that men should1 without shame or fear1 confidently and serenely1 break a rule which they could not but evidently know that ,god had set up1 and would certainly punish the breach of1 7which they must1 if it were innate17 to a degree to make it a very ill bargain to the transgressor4 ,without such a knowledge as this1 a man can never be certain that anything is his duty4 ,ignorance or doubt of the law1 hopes to escape the knowledge or power of the law-maker1 or the like1 may make men give way to a present appetite2 but let any one see the fault1 and the rod by it1 and with the transgression1 a fire ready to punish it2 a pleasure tempting1 and the hand of the ,almighty visibly held up and prepared to take vengeance1 7for this must be the case where any duty is imprinted on the mind17 and then tell me whether it be possible for people with such a prospect1 such a certain knowledge as this1 wantonly1 and without scruple1 to offend against a law which they carry about them in indelible characters1 and that stares them in the face whilst they are breaking it8 ,whether men1 at the same time that they feel in themselves the imprinted edicts of an ,omnipotent ,law-maker1 can1 with assurance and gaiety1 slight and trample underfoot his most sacred injunctions8 ,and lastly1 whether it be possible that whilst a man thus openly bids defiance to this innate law and supreme ,lawgiver1 all the bystanders1 yea1 even the governors and rulers of the people1 full of the same sense both of the law and ,law-maker1 should silently connive1 without testifying their dislike or laying the least blame on it8 ,principles of actions indeed there are lodged in men's appetites2 but these are so far from being innate moral principles1 that if they were left to their full swing they would carry men to the overturning of all morality4 ,moral laws are set as a curb and restraint to these exorbitant desires1 which they cannot be but by rewards and punishments that will overbalance the satisfaction any one shall propose to himself in the breach of the law4 ,if1 therefore1 anything be imprinted on the minds of all men as a law1 all men must have a certain and unavoidable knowledge that certain and unavoidable punishment will attend the breach of it4 ,for if men can be ignorant or doubtful of what is innate1 innate principles are insisted on1 and urged to no purpose2 truth and certainty 7the things pretended7 are not at all secured by them2 but men are in the same uncertain floating estate with as without them4 ,an evident indubitable knowledge of unavoidable punishment1 great enough to make the transgression very uneligible1 must accompany an innate law2 unless with an innate law they can suppose an innate ,gospel too4 ,i would not here be mistaken1 as if1 because ,i deny an innate law ,i thought there were none but positive laws4 ,there is a great deal of difference between an innate law1 and a law of nature between something imprinted on our minds in their very original1 and something that we1 being ignorant of1 may attain to the knowledge of1 by the use and due application of our natural faculties4 ,and ,i think they equally forsake the truth who1 running into contrary extremes1 either affirm an innate law1 or deny that there is a law knowable by the light of nature1 i4e4 without the help of positive revelation4 #ad4 ,those who maintain innate practical ,principles tell us not what they are4 ,the difference there is amongst men in their practical principles is so evident that ,i think ,i need say no more to evince1 that it will be impossible to find any innate moral rules by this mark of general assent2 and it is enough to make one suspect that the supposition of such innate principles is but an opinion taken up at pleasure2 since those who talk so confidently of them are so sparing to tell us ,,which ,,they ,,are4 ,this might with justice be expected from those men who lay stress upon this opinion2 and it gives occasion to distrust either their knowledge or charity1 who1 declaring that ,god has imprinted on the minds of men the foundations of knowledge and the rules of living1 are yet so little favourable to the information of their neighbours1 or the quiet of mankind1 as not to point out to them which they are1 in the variety men are distracted with4 ,but1 in truth1 were there any such innate principles there would be no need to teach them4 ,did men find such innate propositions stamped on their minds1 they would easily be able to distinguish them from other truths that they afterwards learned and deduced from them2 and there would be nothing more easy than to know what1 and how many1 they were4 ,there could be no more doubt about their number than there is about the number of our fingers2 and it is like then every system would be ready to give them us by tale4 ,but since nobody1 that ,i know1 has ventured yet to give a catalogue of them1 they cannot blame those who doubt of these innate principles2 since even they who require men to believe that there are such innate propositions1 do not tell us what they are4 ,it is easy to foresee1 that if different men of different sects should go about to give us a list of those innate practical principles1 they would set down only such as suited their distinct hypotheses1 and were fit to support the doctrines of their particular schools or churches2 a plain evidence that there are no such innate truths4 ,nay1 a great part of men are so far from finding any such innate moral principles in themselves1 that1 by denying freedom to mankind1 and thereby making men no other than bare machines1 they take away not only innate1 but all moral rules whatsoever1 and leave not a possibility to believe any such1 to those who cannot conceive how anything can be capable of a law that is not a free agent4 ,and upon that ground they must necessarily reject all principles of virtue1 who cannot put ,,morality and ,,mechanism together1 which are not very easy to be reconciled or made consistent4 #ae4 ,lord ,herbert's innate ,principles examined4 ,when ,i had written this1 being informed that my ,lord ,herbert had1 in his book ,de ,veritate1 assigned these innate principles1 ,i presently consulted him1 hoping to find in a man of so great parts1 something that might satisfy me in this point1 and put an end to my inquiry4 ,in his chapter ,de ,instinctu ,naturali1 ,i met with these six marks of his ,notitice ,communes3--#a4 ,prioritas4 #b4 ,independentia4 #c4 ,universalitas4 #d4 ,certitudo4 #e4 ,necessitas1 i4 e4 as he explains it1 faciunt ad hominis conservationem4 #f4 ,modus conformationis1 i4e4 ,assensus nulla interposita mora4 ,and at the latter end of his little treatise ,de ,religione ,laici1 he says this of these innate principles3 ,adeo ut non uniuscujusvis religionis confinio arctentur quae ubique vigent veritates4 ,sunt enim in ipsa mente caelitus descriptae1 nullisque traditionibus1 sive scriptis1 sive non scriptis1 obnoxiae1 p4#c ,and ,veritates nostrae catholicae1 quae tanquam indubia ,dei emata in foro interiori descriptae4 ,thus1 having given the marks of the innate principles or common notions1 and asserted their being imprinted on the minds of men by the hand of ,god1 he proceeds to set them down1 and they are these3--#a4 ,esse aliquod supremum numen4 #b4 ,numen illud coli debere4 #c4 ,virtutem cum pietate conjunctam optimum esse rationem cultus divini4 #d4 ,resipiscendum esse a peccatis4 #e4 ,dari praemium vel paenam post hanc vitam transactam4 ,though ,i allow these to be clear truths1 and such as1 if rightly explained1 a rational creature can hardly avoid giving his assent to1 yet ,i think he is far from proving them innate impressions in foro interiori descriptae4 ,for ,i must take leave to observe3-- #af4 ,these five either not all1 or more than all1 if there are any4 ,first1 that these five propositions are either not all1 or more than all1 those common notions written on our minds by the finger of ,god2 if it were reasonable to believe any at all to be so written4 ,since there are other propositions which1 even by his own rules1 have as just a pretence to such an original1 and may be as well admitted for innate principles1 as at least some of these five he enumerates1 viz4 #8,do as thou wouldst be done unto4' ,and perhaps some hundreds of others1 when well considered4 #ag4 ,the supposed marks wanting4 ,secondly1 that all his marks are not to be found in each of his five propositions1 viz4 his first1 second1 and third marks agree perfectly to neither of them2 and the first1 second1 third1 fourth1 and sixth marks agree but ill to his third1 fourth1 and fifth propositions4 ,for1 besides that we are assured from history of many men1 nay whole nations1 who doubt or disbelieve some or all of them1 ,i cannot see how the third1 viz4 8,that virtue joined with piety is the best worship of ,god10 can be an innate principle1 when the name or sound virtue1 is so hard to be understood2 liable to so much uncertainty in its signification2 and the thing it stands for so much contended about and difficult to be known4 ,and therefore this cannot be but a very uncertain rule of human practice1 and serve but very little to the conduct of our lives1 and is therefore very unfit to be assigned as an innate practical principle4 #ah4 ,of little use if they were innate4 ,for let us consider this proposition as to its meaning1 7for it is the sense1 and not sound1 that is and must be the principle or common notion17 viz4 8,virtue is the best worship of ,god10 i4e4 is most acceptable to him2 which1 if virtue be taken1 as most commonly it is1 for those actions which1 according to the different opinions of several countries1 are accounted laudable1 will be a proposition so far from being certain1 that it will not be true4 ,if virtue be taken for actions conformable to ,god's will1 or to the rule prescribed by ,god--which is the true and only measure of virtue when virtue is used to signify what is in its own nature right and good--then this proposition1 8,that virtue is the best worship of ,god10 will be most true and certain1 but of very little use in human life3 since it will amount to no more but this1 viz4 8,that ,god is pleased with the doing of what he commands02--which a man may certainly know to be true1 without knowing what it is that ,god doth command2 and so be as far from any rule or principle of his actions as he was before4 ,and ,i think very few will take a proposition which amounts to no more than this1 viz4 8,that ,god is pleased with the doing of what he himself commands10 for an innate moral principle written on the minds of all men1 7however true and certain it may be17 since it teaches so little4 ,whosoever does so will have reason to think hundreds of propositions innate principles2 since there are many which have as good a title as this to be received for such1 which nobody yet ever put into that rank of innate principles4 #ai4 ,scarce possible that ,god should engrave principles in words of uncertain meaning4 ,nor is the fourth proposition 7viz4 8,men must repent of their sins07 much more instructive1 till what those actions are that are meant by sins be set down4 ,for the word peccata1 or sins1 being put1 as it usually is1 to signify in general ill actions that will draw punishment upon the doers1 what great principle of morality can that be to tell us we should be sorry1 and cease to do that which will bring mischief upon us2 without knowing what those particular actions are that will do so8 ,indeed this is a very true proposition1 and fit to be inculcated on and received by those who are supposed to have been taught ,,what actions in all kinds ,,are sins3 but neither this nor the former can be imagined to be innate principles2 nor to be of any use if they were innate1 unless the particular measures and bounds of all virtues and vices were engraven in men's minds1 and were innate principles also1 which ,i think is very much to be doubted4 ,and therefore1 ,i imagine1 it will scarcely seem possible that ,god should engrave principles in men's minds1 in words of uncertain signification1 such as ,,virtues and ,,sins1 which amongst different men stand for different things3 nay1 it cannot be supposed to be in words at all1 which1 being in most of these principles very general names1 cannot be understood but by knowing the particulars comprehended under them4 ,and in the practical instances1 the measures must be taken from the knowledge of the actions themselves1 and the rules of them1--abstracted from words1 and antecedent to the knowledge of names2 which rules a man must know1 what language soever he chance to learn1 whether ,english or ,japan1 or if he should learn no language at all1 or never should understand the use of words1 as happens in the case of dumb and deaf men4 ,when it shall be made out that men ignorant of words1 or untaught by the laws and customs of their country1 know that it is part of the worship of ,god not to kill another man2 not to know more women than one2 not to procure abortion2 not to expose their children2 not to take from another what is his1 though we want it ourselves1 but on the contrary1 relieve and supply his wants2 and whenever we have done the contrary we ought to repent1 be sorry1 and resolve to do so no more2--when ,i say1 all men shall be proved actually to know and allow all these and a thousand other such rules1 all of which come under these two general words made use of above1 viz4 virtutes et peccata virtues and sins1 there will be more reason for admitting these and the like1 for common notions and practical principles4 ,yet1 after all1 universal consent 7were there any in moral principles7 to truths1 the knowledge whereof may be attained otherwise1 would scarce prove them to be innate2 which is all ,i contend for4 #bj4 ,objection1 ,innate ,principles may be corrupted1 answered4 ,nor will it be of much moment here to offer that very ready but not very material answer1 viz4 that the innate principles of morality may1 by education1 and custom1 and the general opinion of those amongst whom we converse1 be darkened1 and at last quite worn out of the minds of men4 ,which assertion of theirs1 if true1 quite takes away the argument of universal consent1 by which this opinion of innate principles is endeavoured to be proved2 unless those men will think it reasonable that their private persuasions1 or that of their party1 should pass for universal consent2--a thing not unfrequently done1 when men1 presuming themselves to be the only masters of right reason1 cast by the votes and opinions of the rest of mankind as not worthy the reckoning4 ,and then their argument stands thus3--8,the principles which all mankind allow for true1 are innate2 those that men of right reason admit1 are the principles allowed by all mankind2 we1 and those of our mind1 are men of reason2 therefore1 we agreeing1 our principles are innate02--which is a very pretty way of arguing1 and a short cut to infallibility4 ,for otherwise it will be very hard to understand how there be some principles which all men do acknowledge and agree in2 and yet there are none of those principles which are not1 by depraved custom and ill education1 blotted out of the minds of many men3 which is to say1 that all men admit1 but yet many men do deny and dissent from them4 ,and indeed the supposition of ,,such first principles will serve us to very little purpose2 and we shall be as much at a loss with as without them1 if they may1 by any human power--such as the will of our teachers1 or opinions of our companions--be altered or lost in us3 and notwithstanding all this boast of first principles and innate light1 we shall be as much in the dark and uncertainty as if there were no such thing at all3 it being all one to have no rule1 and one that will warp any way2 or amongst various and contrary rules1 not to know which is the right4 ,but concerning innate principles1 ,i desire these men to say1 whether they can or cannot1 by education and custom1 be blurred and blotted out2 if they cannot1 we must find them in all mankind alike1 and they must be clear in everybody2 and if they may suffer variation from adventitious notions1 we must then find them clearest and most perspicuous nearest the fountain1 in children and illiterate people1 who have received least impression from foreign opinions4 ,let them take which side they please1 they will certainly find it inconsistent with visible matter of fact and daily observation4 #ba4 ,contrary ,principles in the ,world4 ,i easily grant that there are great numbers of opinions which1 by men of different countries1 educations1 and tempers1 are received and embraced as first and unquestionable principles2 many whereof1 both for their absurdity as well as oppositions to one another1 it is impossible should be true4 ,but yet all those propositions1 how remote soever from reason are so sacred somewhere or other1 that men even of good understanding in other matters1 will sooner part with their lives1 and whatever is dearest to them1 than suffer themselves to doubt1 or others to question1 the truth of them4 #bb4 ,how men commonly come by their ,principles4 ,this1 however strange it may seem1 is that which every day's experience confirms2 and will not1 perhaps1 appear so wonderful1 if we consider the ways and steps by which it is brought about2 and how really it may come to pass1 that doctrines that have been derived from no better original than the superstition of a nurse1 or the authority of an old woman1 may1 by length of time and consent of neighbours1 grow up to the dignity of ,,principles in religion or morality4 ,for such1 who are careful 7as they call it7 to principle children well1 7and few there be who have not a set of those principles for them1 which they believe in17 instil into the unwary1 and as yet unprejudiced1 understanding1 7for white paper receives any characters17 those doctrines they would have them retain and profess4 ,these being taught them as soon as they have any apprehension2 and still as they grow up confirmed to them1 either by the open profession or tacit consent of all they have to do with2 or at least by those of whose wisdom1 knowledge1 and piety they have an opinion1 who never suffer those propositions to be otherwise mentioned but as the basis and foundation on which they build their religion and manners1 come1 by these means1 to have the reputation of unquestionable1 self-evident1 and innate truths4 #bc4 ,principles supposed innate because we do not remember when we began to hold them4 ,to which we may add1 that when men so instructed are grown up1 and reflect on their own minds1 they cannot find anything more ancient there than those opinions1 which were taught them before their memory began to keep a register of their actions1 or date the time when any new thing appeared to them2 and therefore make no scruple to conclude1 that those propositions of whose knowledge they can find in themselves no original1 were certainly the impress of ,god and nature upon their minds1 and not taught them by any one else4 ,these they entertain and submit to1 as many do to their parents with veneration2 not because it is natural3 nor do children do it where they are not so taught2 but because1 having been always so educated1 and having no remembrance of the beginning of this respect1 they think it is natural4 #bd4 ,how such principles come to be held4 ,this will appear very likely1 and almost unavoidable to come to pass1 if we consider the nature of mankind and the constitution of human affairs2 wherein most men cannot live without employing their time in the daily labours of their callings2 nor be at quiet in their minds without ,,some foundation or principle to rest their thoughts on4 ,there is scarcely any one so floating and superficial in his understanding1 who hath not some reverenced propositions1 which are to him the principles on which he bottoms his reasonings1 and by which he judgeth of truth and falsehood1 right and wrong2 which some1 wanting skill and leisure1 and others the inclination1 and some being taught that they ought not to examine1 there are few to be found who are not exposed by their ignorance1 laziness1 education1 or precipitancy1 to ,,take ,,them ,,upon ,,trust4 #be4 ,further explained4 ,this is evidently the case of all children and young folk2 and custom1 a greater power than nature1 seldom failing to make them worship for divine what she hath inured them to bow their minds and submit their understandings to1 it is no wonder that grown men1 either perplexed in the necessary affairs of life1 or hot in the pursuit of pleasures1 should not seriously sit down to examine their own tenets2 especially when one of their principles is1 that principles ought not to be questioned4 ,and had men leisure1 parts1 and will1 who is there almost that dare shake the foundations of all his past thoughts and actions1 and endure to bring upon himself the shame of having been a long time wholly in mistake and error8 ,who is there hardy enough to contend with the reproach which is everywhere prepared for those who dare venture to dissent from the received opinions of their country or party8 ,and where is the man to be found that can patiently prepare himself to bear the name of whimsical1 sceptical1 or atheist2 which he is sure to meet with1 who does in the least scruple any of the common opinions8 ,and he will be much more afraid to question those principles1 when he shall think them1 as most men do1 the standards set up by ,god in his mind1 to be the rule and touchstone of all other opinions4 ,and what can hinder him from thinking them sacred1 when he finds them the earliest of all his own thoughts1 and the most reverenced by others8 #bf4 ,a worship of idols4 ,it is easy to imagine how1 by these means1 it comes to pass that men worship the idols that have been set up in their minds2 grow fond of the notions they have been long acquainted with there2 and stamp the characters of divinity upon absurdities and errors2 become zealous votaries to bulls and monkeys1 and contend too1 fight1 and die in defence of their opinions4 ,dum solos credit habendos esse deos1 quos ipse colit4 ,for1 since the reasoning faculties of the soul1 which are almost constantly1 though not always warily nor wisely employed1 would not know how to move1 for want of a foundation and footing1 in most men1 who through laziness or avocation do not1 or for want of time1 or true helps1 or for other causes1 cannot penetrate into the principles of knowledge1 and trace truth to its fountain and original1 it is natural for them1 and almost unavoidable1 to take up with some borrowed principles2 which being reputed and presumed to be the evident proofs of other things1 are thought not to need any other proof themselves4 ,whoever shall receive any of these into his mind1 and entertain them there with the reverence usually paid to principles1 never venturing to examine them1 but accustoming himself to believe them1 because they are to be believed1 may take up1 from his education and the fashions of his country1 any absurdity for innate principles2 and by long poring on the same objects1 so dim his sight as to take monsters lodged in his own brain for the images of the ,deity1 and the workmanship of his hands4 #bg4 ,principles must be examined4 ,by this progress1 how many there are who arrive at principles which they believe innate may be easily observed1 in the variety of opposite principles held and contended for by all sorts and degrees of men4 ,and he that shall deny this to be the method wherein most men proceed to the assurance they have of the truth and evidence of their principles1 will perhaps find it a hard matter any other way to account for the contrary tenets1 which are firmly believed1 confidently asserted1 and which great numbers are ready at any time to seal with their blood4 ,and1 indeed1 if it be the privilege of innate principles to be received upon their own authority1 without examination1 ,i know not what may not be believed1 or how any one's principles can be questioned4 ,if they may and ought to be examined and tried1 ,i desire to know how first and innate principles can be tried2 or at least it is reasonable to demand the ,,marks and ,,characters whereby the genuine innate principles may be distinguished from others3 that so1 amidst the great variety of pretenders1 ,i may be kept from mistakes in so material a point as this4 ,when this is done1 ,i shall be ready to embrace such welcome and useful propositions2 and till then ,i may with modesty doubt2 since ,i fear universal consent1 which is the only one produced1 will scarcely prove a sufficient mark to direct my choice1 and assure me of any innate principles4 ,from what has been said1 ,i think it past doubt1 that there are no practical principles wherein all men agree2 and therefore none innate4 ,,chapter ,,iv4 ,,other ,,considerations ,,concerning ,,innate ,,principles1 ,,both ,,speculative ,,and ,,practical4 #a4 ,principles not innate1 unless their ,ideas be innate ,had those who would persuade us that there are innate principles not taken them together in gross1 but considered separately the parts out of which those propositions are made1 they would not1 perhaps1 have been so forward to believe they were innate4 ,since1 if the ,,ideas which made up those truths were not1 it was impossible that the ,,propositions made up of them should be innate1 or our knowledge of them be born with us4 ,for1 if the ideas be not innate1 there was a time when the mind was without those principles2 and then they will not be innate1 but be derived from some other original4 ,for1 where the ideas themselves are not1 there can be no knowledge1 no assent1 no mental or verbal propositions about them4 #b4 ,ideas1 especially those belonging to ,principles1 not born with children ,if we will attentively consider new-born children1 we shall have little reason to think that they bring many ideas into the world with them4 ,for1 bating perhaps some faint ideas of hunger1 and thirst1 and warmth1 and some pains1 which they may have felt in the womb1 there is not the least appearance of any settled ideas at all in them2 especially of ,,ideas ,,answering ,,the ,,terms ,,which ,,make ,,up ,,those ,,universal ,,propositions ,,that ,,are ,,esteemed ,,innate ,,principles4 ,one may perceive how1 by degrees1 afterwards1 ideas come into their minds2 and that they get no more1 nor other1 than what experience1 and the observation of things that come in their way1 furnish them with2 which might be enough to satisfy us that they are not original characters stamped on the mind4 #c4 ,impossibility and ,identity not innate ideas 8,it is impossible for the same thing to be1 and not to be10 is certainly 7if there be any such7 an innate ,,principle4 ,but can any one think1 or will any one say1 that 8impossibility0 and 8identity0 are two innate ,,ideas8 ,are they such as all mankind have1 and bring into the world with them8 ,and are they those which are the first in children1 and antecedent to all acquired ones8 ,if they are innate1 they must needs be so4 ,hath a child an idea of impossibility and identity1 before it has of white or black1 sweet or bitter8 ,and is it from the knowledge of this principle that it concludes1 that wormwood rubbed on the nipple hath not the same taste that it used to receive from thence8 ,is it the actual knowledge of ,,impossibile ,,est ,,idem ,,esse1 ,,et ,,non ,,esse1 that makes a child distinguish between its mother and a stranger2 or that makes it fond of the one and flee the other8 ,or does the mind regulate itself and its assent by ideas that it never yet had8 ,or the understanding draw conclusions from principles which it never yet knew or understood8 ,the names ,,impossibility and ,,identity stand for two ideas1 so far from being innate1 or born with us1 that ,i think it requires great care and attention to form them right in our understandings4 ,they are so far from being brought into the world with us1 so remote from the thoughts of infancy and childhood1 that ,i believe1 upon examination it will be found that many grown men want them4 #d4 ,identity1 an ,idea not innate4 ,if ,,identity 7to instance that alone7 be a native impression1 and consequently so clear and obvious to us that we must needs know it even from our cradles1 ,i would gladly be resolved by any one of seven1 or seventy years old1 whether a man1 being a creature consisting of soul and body1 be the same man when his body is changed8 ,whether ,euphorbus and ,pythagoras1 having had the same soul1 were the same men1 though they lived several ages asunder8 ,nay1 whether the cock too1 which had the same soul1 were not the same1 with both of them8 ,whereby1 perhaps1 it will appear that our idea of ,,sameness is not so settled and clear as to deserve to be thought innate in us4 ,for if those innate ideas are not clear and distinct1 so as to be universally known and naturally agreed on1 they cannot be subjects of universal and undoubted truths1 but will be the unavoidable occasion of perpetual uncertainty4 ,for1 ,i suppose every one's idea of identity will not be the same that ,pythagoras and thousands of his followers have4 ,and which then shall be true8 ,which innate8 ,or are there two different ideas of identity1 both innate8 #e4 ,what makes the same man8 ,nor let any one think that the questions ,i have here proposed about the identity of man are bare empty speculations2 which1 if they were1 would be enough to show1 that there was in the understandings of men no innate idea of identity4 ,he that shall with a little attention reflect on the resurrection1 and consider that divine justice will bring to judgment1 at the last day1 the very same persons1 to be happy or miserable in the other1 who did well or ill in this life1 will find it perhaps not easy to resolve with himself1 what makes the same man1 or wherein identity consists2 and will not be forward to think he1 and every one1 even children themselves1 have naturally a clear idea of it4 #f4 ,whole and ,part not innate ideas4 ,let us examine that principle of mathematics1 viz4 ,,that ,,the ,,whole ,,is ,,bigger ,,than ,a ,,part4 ,this1 ,i take it1 is reckoned amongst innate principles4 ,i am sure it has as good a title as any to be thought so2 which yet nobody can think it to be1 when he considers the ideas it comprehends in it1 ,,whole and ,,part1 are perfectly relative2 but the positive ideas to which they properly and immediately belong are extension and number1 of which alone whole and part are relations4 ,so that if whole and part are innate ideas1 extension and number must be so too2 it being impossible to have an idea of a relation1 without having any at all of the thing to which it belongs1 and in which it is founded4 ,now1 whether the minds of men have naturally imprinted on them the ideas of extension and number1 ,i leave to be considered by those who are the patrons of innate principles4 #g4 ,idea of ,worship not innate4 ,that ,,god ,,is ,,to ,,be ,,worshipped1 is1 without doubt1 as great a truth as any that can enter into the mind of man1 and deserves the first place amongst all practical principles4 ,but yet it can by no means be thought innate1 unless the ideas of ,,god and ,,worship are innate4 ,that the idea the term worship stands for is not in the understanding of children1 and a character stamped on the mind in its first original1 ,i think will be easily granted1 by any one that considers how few there be amongst grown men who have a clear and distinct notion of it4 ,and1 ,i suppose1 there cannot be anything more ridiculous than to say1 that children have this practical principle innate1 8,that ,god is to be worshipped10 and yet that they know not what that worship of ,god is1 which is their duty4 ,but to pass by this4 #h4 ,idea of ,god not innate4 ,if any idea can be imagined innate1 the idea of ,,god may1 of all others1 for many reasons1 be thought so2 since it is hard to conceive how there should be innate moral principles1 without an innate idea of a ,deity4 ,without a notion of a law-maker1 it is impossible to have a notion of a law1 and an obligation to observe it4 ,besides the atheists taken notice of amongst the ancients1 and left branded upon the records of history1 hath not navigation discovered1 in these later ages1 whole nations1 at the bay of ,soldania1 in ,brazil1 and in the ,caribbee islands1 c41 amongst whom there was to be found no notion of a ,god1 no religion8 ,nicholaus del ,techo1 in ,literis ex ,paraquaria1 de ,caiguarum ,conversione1 has these words3 ,reperi eam gentem nullum nomen habere quod ,deum1 et hominis animam significet2 nulla sacra habet1 nulla idola4 ,and perhaps1 if we should with attention mind the lives and discourses of people not so far off1 we should have too much reason to fear1 that many1 in more civilized countries1 have no very strong and clear impressions of a ,deity upon their minds1 and that the complaints of atheism made from the pulpit are not without reason4 ,and though only some profligate wretches own it too barefacedly now2 yet perhaps we should hear more than we do of it from others1 did not the fear of the magistrate's sword1 or their neighbour's censure1 tie up people's tongues2 which1 were the apprehensions of punishment or shame taken away1 would as openly proclaim their atheism as their lives do4 #i4 ,the name of ,god not universal or obscure in meaning4 ,but had all mankind everywhere a notion of a ,god1 7whereof yet history tells us the contrary17 it would not from thence follow1 that the idea of him was innate4 ,for1 though no nation were to be found without a name1 and some few dark notions of him1 yet that would not prove them to be natural impressions on the mind2 no more than the names of fire1 or the sun1 heat1 or number1 do prove the ideas they stand for to be innate2 because the names of those things1 and the ideas of them1 are so universally received and known amongst mankind4 ,nor1 on the contrary1 is the want of such a name1 or the absence of such a notion out of men's minds1 any argument against the being of a ,god2 any more than it would be a proof that there was no loadstone in the world1 because a great part of mankind had neither a notion of any such thing nor a name for it2 or be any show of argument to prove that there are no distinct and various species of angels1 or intelligent beings above us1 because we have no ideas of such distinct species1 or names for them4 ,for1 men being furnished with words1 by the common language of their own countries1 can scarce avoid having some kind of ideas of those things whose names those they converse with have occasion frequently to mention to them4 ,and if they carry with it the notion of excellency1 greatness1 or something extraordinary2 if apprehension and concernment accompany it2 if the fear of absolute and irresistible power set it on upon the mind1--the idea is likely to sink the deeper1 and spread the further2 especially if it be such an idea as is agreeable to the common light of reason1 and naturally deducible from every part of our knowledge1 as that of a ,god is4 ,for the visible marks of extraordinary wisdom and power appear so plainly in all the works of the creation1 that a rational creature1 who will but seriously reflect on them1 cannot miss the discovery of a ,deity4 ,and the influence that the discovery of such a ,being must necessarily have on the minds of all that have but once heard of it is so great1 and carries such a weight of thought and communication with it1 that it seems stranger to me that a whole nation of men should be anywhere found so brutish as to want the notion of a ,god1 than that they should be without any notion of numbers1 or fire4 #aj4 ,ideas of ,god and idea of ,fire4 ,the name of ,god being once mentioned in any part of the world1 to express a superior1 powerful1 wise1 invisible ,being1 the suitableness of such a notion to the principles of common reason1 and the interest men will always have to mention it often1 must necessarily spread it far and wide2 and continue it down to all generations3 though yet the general reception of this name1 and some imperfect and unsteady notions conveyed thereby to the unthinking part of mankind1 prove not the idea to be innate2 but only that they who made the discovery had made a right use of their reason1 thought maturely of the causes of things1 and traced them to their original2 from whom other less considering people having once received so important a notion1 it could not easily be lost again4 #aa4 ,idea of ,god not innate4 ,this is all could be inferred from the notion of a ,god1 were it to be found universally in all the tribes of mankind1 and generally acknowledged1 by men grown to maturity in all countries4 ,for the generality of the acknowledging of a ,god1 as ,i imagine1 is extended no further than that2 which1 if it be sufficient to prove the idea of ,god innate1 will as well prove the idea of fire innate2 since ,i think it may be truly said1 that there is not a person in the world who has a notion of a ,god1 who has not also the idea of fire4 ,i doubt not but if a colony of young children should be placed in an island where no fire was1 they would certainly neither have any notion of such a thing1 nor name for it1 how generally soever it were received and known in all the world besides2 and perhaps too their apprehensions would be as far removed from any name1 or notion1 of a ,god1 till some one amongst them had employed his thoughts to inquire into the constitution and causes of things1 which would easily lead him to the notion of a ,god2 which having once taught to others1 reason1 and the natural propensity of their own thoughts1 would afterwards propagate1 and continue amongst them4 #ab4 ,suitable to ,god's goodness1 that all ,men should have an idea of ,him1 therefore naturally imprinted by ,him1 answered4 ,indeed it is urged1 that it is suitable to the goodness of ,god1 to imprint upon the minds of men characters and notions of himself1 and not to leave them in the dark and doubt in so grand a concernment2 and also1 by that means1 to secure to himself the homage and veneration due from so intelligent a creature as man2 and therefore he has done it4 ,this argument1 if it be of any force1 will prove much more than those who use it in this case expect from it4 ,for1 if we may conclude that ,god hath done for men all that men shall judge is best for them1 because it is suitable to his goodness so to do1 it will prove1 not only that ,god has imprinted on the minds of men an idea of himself1 but that he hath plainly stamped there1 in fair characters1 all that men ought to know or believe of him2 all that they ought to do in obedience to his will2 and that he hath given them a will and affections conformable to it4 ,this1 no doubt1 every one will think better for men1 than that they should1 in the dark1 grope after knowledge1 as ,st4 ,paul tells us all nations did after ,god 7,acts xvii4 #bg72 than that their wills should clash with their understandings1 and their appetites cross their duty4 ,the ,romanists say it is best for men1 and so suitable to the goodness of ,god1 that there should be an infallible judge of controversies on earth2 and therefore there is one4 ,and ,i1 by the same reason1 say it is better for men that every man himself should be infallible4 ,i leave them to consider1 whether1 by the force of this argument1 they shall think that every man ,,is so4 ,i think it a very good argument to say1--the infinitely wise ,god hath made it so2 and therefore it is best4 ,but it seems to me a little too much confidence of our own wisdom to say1--#8,i think it best2 and therefore ,god hath made it so4' ,and in the matter in hand1 it will be in vain to argue from such a topic1 that ,god hath done so1 when certain experience shows us that he hath not4 ,but the goodness of ,god hath not been wanting to men1 without such original impressions of knowledge or ideas stamped on the mind2 since he hath furnished man with those faculties which will serve for the sufficient discovery of all things requisite to the end of such a being2 and ,i doubt not but to show1 that a man1 by the right use of his natural abilities1 may1 without any innate principles1 attain a knowledge of a ,god1 and other things that concern him4 ,god having endued man with those faculties of knowledge which he hath1 was no more obliged by his goodness to plant those innate notions in his mind1 than that1 having given him reason1 hands1 and materials1 he should build him bridges or houses1--which some people in the world1 however of good parts1 do either totally want1 or are but ill provided of1 as well as others are wholly without ideas of ,god and principles of morality1 or at least have but very ill ones2 the reason in both cases being1 that they never employed their parts1 faculties1 and powers industriously that way1 but contented themselves with the opinions1 fashions1 and things of their country1 as they found them1 without looking any further4 ,had you or ,i been born at the ,bay of ,soldania1 possibly our thoughts and notions had not exceeded those brutish ones of the ,hottentots that inhabit there4 ,and had the ,virginia king ,apochancana been educated in ,england1 he had been perhaps as knowing a divine1 and as good a mathematician as any in it2 the difference between him and a more improved ,englishman lying barely in this1 that the exercise of his faculties was bounded within the ways1 modes1 and notions of his own country1 and never directed to any other or further inquiries4 ,and if he had not any idea of a ,god1 it was only because he pursued not those thoughts that would have led him to it4 #ac4 ,ideas of ,god various in different ,men4 ,i grant that if there were any ideas to be found imprinted on the minds of men1 we have reason to expect it should be the notion of his ,maker1 as a mark ,god set on his own workmanship1 to mind man of his dependence and duty2 and that herein should appear the first instances of human knowledge4 ,but how late is it before any such notion is discoverable in children8 ,and when we find it there1 how much more does it resemble the opinion and notion of the teacher1 than represent the true ,god8 ,he that shall observe in children the progress whereby their minds attain the knowledge they have1 will think that the objects they do first and most familiarly converse with are those that make the first impressions on their understandings2 nor will he find the least footsteps of any other4 ,it is easy to take notice how their thoughts enlarge themselves1 only as they come to be acquainted with a greater variety of sensible objects2 to retain the ideas of them in their memories2 and to get the skill to compound and enlarge them1 and several ways put them together4 ,how1 by these means1 they come to frame in their minds an idea men have of a ,deity1 ,i shall hereafter show4 #ad4 ,contrary and inconsistent ideas of ,god under the same name4 ,can it be thought that the ideas men have of ,god are the characters and marks of himself1 engraven in their minds by his own finger1 when we see that1 in the same country1 under one and the same name1 men have far different1 nay often contrary and inconsistent ideas and conceptions of him8 ,their agreeing in a name1 or sound1 will scarce prove an innate notion of him4 #ae4 ,gross ideas of ,god4 ,what true or tolerable notion of a ,deity could they have1 who acknowledged and worshipped hundreds8 ,every deity that they owned above one was an infallible evidence of their ignorance of ,him1 and a proof that they had no true notion of ,god1 where unity1 infinity1 and eternity were excluded4 ,to which1 if we add their gross conceptions of corporeity1 expressed in their images and representations of their deities2 the amours1 marriages1 copulations1 lusts1 quarrels1 and other mean qualities attributed by them to their gods2 we shall have little reason to think that the heathen world1 i4e4 the greatest part of mankind1 had such ideas of ,god in their minds as he himself1 out of care that they should not be mistaken about him1 was author of4 ,and this universality of consent1 so much argued1 if it prove any native impressions1 it will be only this3--that ,god imprinted on the minds of all men speaking the same language1 a ,,name for himself1 but not any ,,idea2 since those people who agreed in the name1 had1 at the same time1 far different apprehensions about the thing signified4 ,if they say that the variety of deities worshipped by the heathen world were but figurative ways of expressing the several attributes of that incomprehensible ,being1 or several parts of his providence1 ,i answer3 what they might be in the original ,i will not here inquire2 but that they were so in the thoughts of the vulgar ,i think nobody will affirm4 ,and he that will consult the voyage of the ,bishop of ,beryte1 c4 #ac1 7not to mention other testimonies17 will find that the theology of the ,siamites professedly owns a plurality of gods3 or1 as the ,abbe de ,choisy more judiciously remarks in his ,journal du ,voyage de ,siam1 #ajg_/agg1 it consists properly in acknowledging no ,god at all4 #af4 ,idea of ,god not innate although wise men of all nations come to have it4 ,if it be said1 that wise men of all nations came to have true conceptions of the unity and infinity of the ,deity1 ,i grant it4 ,but then this1 ,first1 excludes universality of consent in anything but the name2 for those wise men being very few1 perhaps one of a thousand1 this universality is very narrow4 ,secondly1 it seems to me plainly to prove1 that the truest and best notions men have of ,god were not imprinted1 but acquired by thought and meditation1 and a right use of their faculties3 since the wise and considerate men of the world1 by a right and careful employment of their thoughts and reason1 attained true notions in this as well as other things2 whilst the lazy and inconsiderate part of men1 making far the greater number1 took up their notions by chance1 from common tradition and vulgar conceptions1 without much beating their heads about them4 ,and if it be a reason to think the notion of ,god innate1 because all wise men had it1 virtue too must be thought innate2 for that also wise men have always had4 #ag4 ,odd1 low1 and pitiful ideas of ,god common among men4 ,this was evidently the case of all ,gentilism4 ,nor hath even amongst ,jews1 ,christians1 and ,mahometans1 who acknowledged but one ,god1 this doctrine1 and the care taken in those nations to teach men to have true notions of a ,god1 prevailed so far as to make men to have the same and the true ideas of him4 ,how many even amongst us1 will be found upon inquiry to fancy him in the shape of a man sitting in heaven2 and to have many other absurd and unfit conceptions of him8 ,christians as well as ,turks have had whole sects owning and contending earnestly for it1--that the ,deity was corporeal1 and of human shape3 and though we find few now amongst us who profess themselves ,anthropomorphites1 7though some ,i have met with that own it17 yet ,i believe he that will make it his business may find amongst the ignorant and uninstructed ,christians many of that opinion4 ,talk but with country people1 almost of any age1 or young people almost of any condition1 and you shall find that1 though the name of ,god be frequently in their mouths1 yet the notions they apply this name to are so odd1 low1 and pitiful1 that nobody can imagine they were taught by a rational man2 much less that they were characters written by the finger of ,god himself4 ,nor do ,i see how it derogates more from the goodness of ,god1 that he has given us minds unfurnished with these ideas of himself1 than that he hath sent us into the world with bodies unclothed2 and that there is no art or skill born with us4 ,for1 being fitted with faculties to attain these1 it is want of industry and consideration in us1 and not of bounty in him1 if we have them not4 ,it is as certain that there is a ,god1 as that the opposite angles made by the intersection of two straight lines are equal4 ,there was never any rational creature that set himself sincerely to examine the truth of these propositions that could fail to assent to them2 though yet it be past doubt that there are many men1 who1 having not applied their thoughts that way1 are ignorant both of the one and the other4 ,if any one think fit to call this 7which is the utmost of its extent7 ,,universal ,,consent1 such an one ,i easily allow2 but such an universal consent as this proves not the idea of ,god1 any more than it does the idea of such angles1 innate4 #ah4 ,if the ,idea of ,god be not innate1 no other can be supposed innate4 ,since then though the knowledge of a ,god be the most natural discovery of human reason1 yet the idea of him is not innate1 as ,i think is evident from what has been said2 ,i imagine there will be scarce any other idea found that can pretend to it4 ,since if ,god hath set any impression1 any character1 on the understanding of men1 it is most reasonable to expect it should have been some clear and uniform idea of ,himself2 as far as our weak capacities were capable to receive so incomprehensible and infinite an object4 ,but our minds being at first void of that idea which we are most concerned to have1 it is a strong presumption against all other innate characters4 ,i must own1 as far as ,i can observe1 ,i can find none1 and would be glad to be informed by any other4 #ai4 ,idea of ,substance not innate4 ,i confess there is another idea which would be of general use for mankind to have1 as it is of general talk as if they had it2 and that is the idea of ,,substance2 which we neither have nor can have by sensation or reflection4 ,if nature took care to provide us any ideas1 we might well expect they should be such as by our own faculties we cannot procure to ourselves2 but we see1 on the contrary1 that since1 by those ways whereby other ideas are brought into our minds1 this is not1 we have no such clear idea at all2 and therefore signify nothing by the word ,,substance but only an uncertain supposition of we know not what1 i4 e4 of something whereof we have no idea1 which we take to be the substratum1 or support1 of those ideas we do know4 #bj4 ,no ,propositions can be innate1 since no ,ideas are innate4 ,whatever then we talk of innate1 either speculative or practical1 principles1 it may with as much probability be said1 that a man hath #ajj pounds sterling in his pocket1 and yet denied that he hath there either penny1 shilling1 crown1 or other coin out of which the sum is to be made up2 as to think that certain ,,propositions are innate when the ,,ideas about which they are can by no means be supposed to be so4 ,the general reception and assent that is given doth not at all prove1 that the ideas expressed in them are innate2 for in many cases1 however the ideas came there1 the assent to words expressing the agreement or disagreement of such ideas1 will necessarily follow4 ,every one that hath a true idea of ,,god and ,,worship1 will assent to this proposition1 #8,that ,god is to be worshipped1' when expressed in a language he understands2 and every rational man that hath not thought on it to-day1 may be ready to assent to this proposition to-morrow2 and yet millions of men may be well supposed to want one or both those ideas to-day4 ,for1 if we will allow savages1 and most country people1 to have ideas of ,god and worship1 7which conversation with them will not make one forward to believe17 yet ,i think few children can be supposed to have those ideas1 which therefore they must begin to have some time or other2 and then they will also begin to assent to that proposition1 and make very little question of it ever after4 ,but such an assent upon hearing1 no more proves the ,,ideas to be innate1 than it does that one born blind 7with cataracts which will be couched to-morrow7 had the innate ideas of the sun1 or light1 or saffron1 or yellow2 because1 when his sight is cleared1 he will certainly assent to this proposition1 8,that the sun is lucid1 or that saffron is yellow40 ,and therefore1 if such an assent upon hearing cannot prove the ideas innate1 it can much less the ,,propositions made up of those ideas4 ,if they have any innate ideas1 ,i would be glad to be told what1 and how many1 they are4 #ba4 ,no innate ,ideas in the ,memory4 ,to which let me add3 if there be any innate ideas1 any ideas in the mind which the mind does not actually think on1 they must be lodged in the memory2 and from thence must be brought into view by remembrance2 i4 e4 must be known1 when they are remembered1 to have been perceptions in the mind before2 unless remembrance can be without remembrance4 ,for1 to remember is to perceive anything with memory1 or with a consciousness that it was perceived or known before4 ,without this1 whatever idea comes into the mind is new1 and not remembered2 this consciousness of its having been in the mind before1 being that which distinguishes remembering from all other ways of thinking4 ,whatever idea was never ,,perceived by the mind was never in the mind4 ,whatever idea is in the mind1 is1 either an actual perception1 or else1 having been an actual perception1 is so in the mind that1 by the memory1 it can be made an actual perception again4 ,whenever there is the actual perception of any idea without memory1 the idea appears perfectly new and unknown before to the understanding4 ,whenever the memory brings any idea into actual view1 it is with a consciousness that it had been there before1 and was not wholly a stranger to the mind4 ,whether this be not so1 ,i appeal to every one's observation4 ,and then ,i desire an instance of an idea1 pretended to be innate1 which 7before any impression of it by ways hereafter to be mentioned7 any one could revive and remember1 as an idea he had formerly known2 without which consciousness of a former perception there is no remembrance2 and whatever idea comes into the mind without ,,that consciousness is not remembered1 or comes not out of the memory1 nor can be said to be in the mind before that appearance4 ,for what is not either actually in view or in the memory1 is in the mind no way at all1 and is all one as if it had never been there4 ,suppose a child had the use of his eyes till he knows and distinguishes colours2 but then cataracts shut the windows1 and he is forty or fifty years perfectly in the dark2 and in that time perfectly loses all memory of the ideas of colours he once had4 ,this was the case of a blind man ,i once talked with1 who lost his sight by the small-pox when he was a child1 and had no more notion of colours than one born blind4 ,i ask whether any one can say this man had then any ideas of colours in his mind1 any more than one born blind8 ,and ,i think nobody will say that either of them had in his mind any ideas of colours at all4 ,his cataracts are couched1 and then he has the ideas 7which he remembers not7 of colours1 ,,de ,,novo1 by his restored sight1 conveyed to his mind1 and that without any consciousness of a former acquaintance4 ,and these now he can revive and call to mind in the dark4 ,in this case all these ideas of colours which1 when out of view1 can be revived with a consciousness of a former acquaintance1 being thus in the memory1 are said to be in the mind4 ,the use ,i make of this is1--that whatever idea1 being not actually in view1 is in the mind1 is there only by being in the memory2 and if it be not in the memory1 it is not in the mind2 and if it be in the memory1 it cannot by the memory be brought into actual view without a perception that it comes out of the memory2 which is this1 that it had been known before1 and is now remembered4 ,if therefore there be any innate ideas1 they must be in the memory1 or else nowhere in the mind2 and if they be in the memory1 they can be revived without any impression from without2 and whenever they are brought into the mind they are remembered1 i4 e4 they bring with them a perception of their not being wholly new to it4 ,this being a constant and distinguishing difference between what is1 and what is not in the memory1 or in the mind2--that what is not in the memory1 whenever it appears there1 appears perfectly new and unknown before2 and what is in the memory1 or in the mind1 whenever it is suggested by the memory1 appears not to be new1 but the mind finds it in itself1 and knows it was there before4 ,by this it may be tried whether there be any innate ideas in the mind before impression from sensation or reflection4 ,i would fain meet with the man who1 when he came to the use of reason1 or at any other time1 remembered any of them2 and to whom1 after he was born1 they were never new4 ,if any one will say1 there are ideas in the mind that are ,,not in the memory1 ,i desire him to explain himself1 and make what he says intelligible4 #bb4 ,principles not innate1 because of little use or little certainty4 ,besides what ,i have already said1 there is another reason why ,i doubt that neither these nor any other principles are innate4 ,i that am fully persuaded that the infinitely wise ,god made all things in perfect wisdom1 cannot satisfy myself why he should be supposed to print upon the minds of men some universal principles2 whereof those that are pretended innate1 and concern ,,speculation1 are of no great use2 and those that concern ,,practice1 not self-evident2 and neither of them distinguishable from some other truths not allowed to be innate4 ,for1 to what purpose should characters be graven on the mind by the finger of ,god1 which are not clearer there than those which are afterwards introduced1 or cannot be distinguished from them8 ,if any one thinks there are such innate ideas and propositions1 which by their clearness and usefulness are distinguishable from all that is adventitious in the mind and acquired1 it will not be a hard matter for him to tell us ,,which ,,they ,,are2 and then every one will be a fit judge whether they be so or no4 ,since if there be such innate ideas and impressions1 plainly different from all other perceptions and knowledge1 every one will find it true in himself4 ,of the evidence of these supposed innate maxims1 ,i have spoken already3 of their usefulness ,i shall have occasion to speak more hereafter4 #bc4 ,difference of ,men's ,discoveries depends upon the different ,application of their ,faculties4 ,to conclude3 some ideas forwardly offer themselves to all men's understanding2 and some sorts of truths result from any ideas1 as soon as the mind puts them into propositions3 other truths require a train of ideas placed in order1 a due comparing of them1 and deductions made with attention1 before they can be discovered and assented to4 ,some of the first sort1 because of their general and easy reception1 have been mistaken for innate3 but the truth is1 ideas and notions are no more born with us than arts and sciences2 though some of them indeed offer themselves to our faculties more readily than others2 and therefore are more generally received3 though that too be according as the organs of our bodies and powers of our minds happen to be employed2 ,god having fitted men with faculties and means to discover1 receive1 and retain truths1 according as they are employed4 ,the great difference that is to be found in the notions of mankind is1 from the different use they put their faculties to4 ,whilst some 7and those the most7 taking things upon trust1 misemploy their power of assent1 by lazily enslaving their minds to the dictates and dominion of others1 in doctrines which it is their duty carefully to examine1 and not blindly1 with an implicit faith1 to swallow2 others1 employing their thoughts only about some few things1 grow acquainted sufficiently with them1 attain great degrees of knowledge in them1 and are ignorant of all other1 having never let their thoughts loose in the search of other inquiries4 ,thus1 that the three angles of a triangle are quite equal to two right ones is a truth as certain as anything can be1 and ,i think more evident than many of those propositions that go for principles2 and yet there are millions1 however expert in other things1 who know not this at all1 because they never set their thoughts on work about such angles4 ,and he that certainly knows this proposition may yet be utterly ignorant of the truth of other propositions1 in mathematics itself1 which are as clear and evident as this2 because1 in his search of those mathematical truths1 he stopped his thoughts short and went not so far4 ,the same may happen concerning the notions we have of the being of a ,deity4 ,for1 though there be no truth which a man may more evidently make out to himself than the existence of a ,god1 yet he that shall content himself with things as he finds them in this world1 as they minister to his pleasures and passions1 and not make inquiry a little further into their causes1 ends1 and admirable contrivances1 and pursue the thoughts thereof with diligence and attention1 may live long without any notion of such a ,being4 ,and if any person hath by talk put such a notion into his head1 he may perhaps believe it2 but if he hath never examined it1 his knowledge of it will be no perfecter than his1 who having been told1 that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones1 takes it upon trust1 without examining the demonstration2 and may yield his assent as a probable opinion1 but hath no knowledge of the truth of it2 which yet his faculties1 if carefully employed1 were able to make clear and evident to him4 ,but this only1 by the by1 to show how much ,,our ,,knowledge ,,depends ,,upon ,,the ,,right ,,use ,,of ,,those ,,powers ,,nature ,,hath ,,bestowed ,,upon ,,us1 and how little upon ,,such ,,innate ,,principles ,,as ,,are ,,in ,,vain ,,supposed ,,to ,,be ,,in ,,all ,,mankind ,,for ,,their ,,direction2 which all men could not but know if they were there1 or else they would be there to no purpose4 ,and which since all men do not know1 nor can distinguish from other adventitious truths1 we may well conclude there are no such4 #bd4 ,men must think and know for themselves4 ,what censure doubting thus of innate principles may deserve from men1 who will be apt to call it pulling up the old foundations of knowledge and certainty1 ,i cannot tell2--,i persuade myself at least that the way ,i have pursued1 being conformable to truth1 lays those foundations surer4 ,this ,i am certain1 ,i have not made it my business either to quit or follow any authority in the ensuing ,discourse4 ,truth has been my only aim2 and wherever that has appeared to lead1 my thoughts have impartially followed1 without minding whether the footsteps of any other lay that way or not4 ,not that ,i want a due respect to other men's opinions2 but1 after all1 the greatest reverence is due to truth3 and ,i hope it will not be thought arrogance to say1 that perhaps we should make greater progress in the discovery of rational and contemplative knowledge1 if we sought it in the fountain1 ,,in ,,the ,,consideration ,,of ,,things ,,themselves2 and made use rather of our own thoughts than other men's to find it4 ,for ,i think we may as rationally hope to see with other men's eyes1 as to know by other men's understandings4 ,so much as we ourselves consider and comprehend of truth and reason1 so much we possess of real and true knowledge4 ,the floating of other men's opinions in our brains1 makes us not one jot the more knowing1 though they happen to be true4 ,what in them was science1 is in us but opiniatrety2 whilst we give up our assent only to reverend names1 and do not1 as they did1 employ our own reason to understand those truths which gave them reputation4 ,aristotle was certainly a knowing man1 but nobody ever thought him so because he blindly embraced1 and confidently vented the opinions of another4 ,and if the taking up of another's principles1 without examining them1 made not him a philosopher1 ,i suppose it will hardly make anybody else so4 ,in the sciences1 every one has so much as he really knows and comprehends4 ,what he believes only1 and takes upon trust1 are but shreds2 which1 however well in the whole piece1 make no considerable addition to his stock who gathers them4 ,such borrowed wealth1 like fairy money1 though it were gold in the hand from which he received it1 will be but leaves and dust when it comes to use4 #be4 ,whence the ,opinion of ,innate ,principles4 ,when men have found some general propositions that could not be doubted of as soon as understood1 it was1 ,i know1 a short and easy way to conclude them innate4 ,this being once received1 it eased the lazy from the pains of search1 and stopped the inquiry of the doubtful concerning all that was once styled innate4 ,and it was of no small advantage to those who affected to be masters and teachers1 to make this the principle of principles1--,,that ,,principles ,,must ,,not ,,be ,,questioned4 ,for1 having once established this tenet1--that there are innate principles1 it put their followers upon a necessity of receiving ,,some doctrines as such2 which was to take them off from the use of their own reason and judgment1 and put them on believing and taking them upon trust without further examination3 in which posture of blind credulity1 they might be more easily governed by1 and made useful to some sort of men1 who had the skill and office to principle and guide them4 ,nor is it a small power it gives one man over another1 to have the authority to be the dictator of principles1 and teacher of unquestionable truths2 and to make a man swallow that for an innate principle which may serve to his purpose who teacheth them4 ,whereas had they examined the ways whereby men came to the knowledge of many universal truths1 they would have found them to result in the minds of men from the being of things themselves1 when duly considered2 and that they were discovered by the application of those faculties that were fitted by nature to receive and judge of them1 when duly employed about them4 #bf4 ,conclusion4 ,to show ,,how the understanding proceeds herein is the design of the following ,discourse2 which ,i shall proceed to when ,i have first premised1 that hitherto1--to clear my way to those foundations which ,i conceive are the only true ones1 whereon to establish those notions we can have of our own knowledge1--it hath been necessary for me to give an account of the reasons ,i had to doubt of innate principles4 ,and since the arguments which are against them do1 some of them1 rise from common received opinions1 ,i have been forced to take several things for granted2 which is hardly avoidable to any one1 whose task is to show the falsehood or improbability of any tenet2--it happening in controversial discourses as it does in assaulting of towns2 where1 if the ground be but firm whereon the batteries are erected1 there is no further inquiry of whom it is borrowed1 nor whom it belongs to1 so it affords but a fit rise for the present purpose4 ,but in the future part of this ,discourse1 designing to raise an edifice uniform and consistent with itself1 as far as my own experience and observation will assist me1 ,i hope to erect it on such a basis that ,i shall not need to shore it up with props and buttresses1 leaning on borrowed or begged foundations3 or at least1 if mine prove a castle in the air1 ,i will endeavour it shall be all of a piece and hang together4 ,wherein ,i warn the reader not to expect undeniable cogent demonstrations1 unless ,i may be allowed the privilege1 not seldom assumed by others1 to take my principles for granted2 and then1 ,i doubt not1 but ,i can demonstrate too4 ,all that ,i shall say for the principles ,i proceed on is1 that ,i can only appeal to men's own unprejudiced experience and observation whether they be true or not2 and this is enough for a man who professes no more than to lay down candidly and freely his own conjectures1 concerning a subject lying somewhat in the dark1 without any other design than an unbiassed inquiry after truth4 ,,book ,,ii ,,of ,,ideas ,,chapter ,i4 ,,of ,,ideas ,,in ,,general1 ,,and ,,their ,,original4 #a4 ,idea is the ,object of ,thinking4 ,every man being conscious to himself that he thinks2 and that which his mind is applied about whilst thinking being the ,,ideas that are there1 it is past doubt that men have in their minds several ideas1--such as are those expressed by the words whiteness1 hardness1 sweetness1 thinking1 motion1 man1 elephant1 army1 drunkenness1 and others3 it is in the first place then to be inquired1 ,,how ,,he ,,comes ,,by ,,them8 ,i know it is a received doctrine1 that men have native ideas1 and original characters1 stamped upon their minds in their very first being4 ,this opinion ,i have at large examined already2 and1 ,i suppose what ,i have said in the foregoing ,book will be much more easily admitted1 when ,i have shown whence the understanding may get all the ideas it has2 and by what ways and degrees they may come into the mind2--for which ,i shall appeal to every one's own observation and experience4 #b4 ,all ,ideas come from ,sensation or ,reflection4 ,let us then suppose the mind to be1 as we say1 white paper1 void of all characters1 without any ideas3--,how comes it to be furnished8 ,whence comes it by that vast store which the busy and boundless fancy of man has painted on it with an almost endless variety8 ,whence has it all the ,,materials of reason and knowledge8 ,to this ,i answer1 in one word1 from ,,experience4 ,in that all our knowledge is founded2 and from that it ultimately derives itself4 ,our observation employed either1 about external sensible objects1 or about the internal operations of our minds perceived and reflected on by ourselves1 is that which supplies our understandings with all the ,,materials of thinking4 ,these two are the fountains of knowledge1 from whence all the ideas we have1 or can naturally have1 do spring4 #c4 ,the ,objects of ,sensation one ,source of ,ideas ,first1 our ,senses1 conversant about particular sensible objects1 do convey into the mind several distinct perceptions of things1 according to those various ways wherein those objects do affect them4 ,and thus we come by those ,,ideas we have of yellow1 white1 heat1 cold1 soft1 hard1 bitter1 sweet1 and all those which we call sensible qualities2 which when ,i say the senses convey into the mind1 ,i mean1 they from external objects convey into the mind what produces there those perceptions4 ,this great source of most of the ideas we have1 depending wholly upon our senses1 and derived by them to the understanding1 ,i call ,,sensation4 #d4 ,the ,operations of our ,minds1 the other ,source of them4 ,secondly1 the other fountain from which experience furnisheth the understanding with ideas is1--the perception of the operations of our own mind within us1 as it is employed about the ideas it has got2--which operations1 when the soul comes to reflect on and consider1 do furnish the understanding with another set of ideas1 which could not be had from things without4 ,and such are perception1 thinking1 doubting1 believing1 reasoning1 knowing1 willing1 and all the different actings of our own minds2--which we being conscious of1 and observing in ourselves1 do from these receive into our understandings as distinct ideas as we do from bodies affecting our senses4 ,this source of ideas every man has wholly in himself2 and though it be not sense1 as having nothing to do with external objects1 yet it is very like it1 and might properly enough be called ,,internal ,,sense4 ,but as ,i call the other ,sensation1 so ,i call this ,,reflection1 the ideas it affords being such only as the mind gets by reflecting on its own operations within itself4 ,by reflection then1 in the following part of this discourse1 ,i would be understood to mean1 that notice which the mind takes of its own operations1 and the manner of them1 by reason whereof there come to be ideas of these operations in the understanding4 ,these two1 ,i say1 viz4 external material things1 as the objects of ,,sensation1 and the operations of our own minds within1 as the objects of ,,reflection1 are to me the only originals from whence all our ideas take their beginnings4 ,the term ,,operations here ,i use in a large sense1 as comprehending not barely the actions of the mind about its ideas1 but some sort of passions arising sometimes from them1 such as is the satisfaction or uneasiness arising from any thought4 #e4 ,all our ,ideas are of the one or of the other of these4 ,the understanding seems to me not to have the least glimmering of any ideas which it doth not receive from one of these two4 ,,external ,,objects furnish the mind with the ideas of sensible qualities1 which are all those different perceptions they produce in us2 and ,,the ,,mind furnishes the understanding with ideas of its own operations4 ,these1 when we have taken a full survey of them1 and their several modes1 and the compositions made out of them we shall find to contain all our whole stock of ideas2 and that we have nothing in our minds which did not come in one of these two ways4 ,let any one examine his own thoughts1 and thoroughly search into his understanding2 and then let him tell me1 whether all the original ideas he has there1 are any other than of the objects of his senses1 or of the operations of his mind1 considered as objects of his reflection4 ,and how great a mass of knowledge soever he imagines to be lodged there1 he will1 upon taking a strict view1 see that he has not any idea in his mind but what one of these two have imprinted2--though perhaps1 with infinite variety compounded and enlarged by the understanding1 as we shall see hereafter4 #f4 ,observable in ,children4 ,he that attentively considers the state of a child1 at his first coming into the world1 will have little reason to think him stored with plenty of ideas1 that are to be the matter of his future knowledge4 ,it is ,,by ,,degrees he comes to be furnished with them4 ,and though the ideas of obvious and familiar qualities imprint themselves before the memory begins to keep a register of time or order1 yet it is often so late before some unusual qualities come in the way1 that there are few men that cannot recollect the beginning of their acquaintance with them4 ,and if it were worth while1 no doubt a child might be so ordered as to have but a very few1 even of the ordinary ideas1 till he were grown up to a man4 ,but all that are born into the world1 being surrounded with bodies that perpetually and diversely affect them1 variety of ideas1 whether care be taken of it or not1 are imprinted on the minds of children4 ,light and colours are busy at hand everywhere1 when the eye is but open2 sounds and some tangible qualities fail not to solicit their proper senses1 and force an entrance to the mind2--but yet1 ,i think1 it will be granted easily1 that if a child were kept in a place where he never saw any other but black and white till he were a man1 he would have no more ideas of scarlet or green1 than he that from his childhood never tasted an oyster1 or a pine-apple1 has of those particular relishes4 #g4 ,men are differently furnished with these1 according to the different ,objects they converse with4 ,men then come to be furnished with fewer or more simple ideas from without1 according as the objects they converse with afford greater or less variety2 and from the operations of their minds within1 according as they more or less reflect on them4 ,for1 though he that contemplates the operations of his mind1 cannot but have plain and clear ideas of them2 yet1 unless he turn his thoughts that way1 and considers them ,,attentively1 he will no more have clear and distinct ideas of all the operations of his mind1 and all that may be observed therein1 than he will have all the particular ideas of any landscape1 or of the parts and motions of a clock1 who will not turn his eyes to it1 and with attention heed all the parts of it4 ,the picture1 or clock may be so placed1 that they may come in his way every day2 but yet he will have but a confused idea of all the parts they are made up of1 till he applies himself with attention1 to consider them each in particular4 #h4 ,ideas of ,reflection later1 because they need ,attention4 ,and hence we see the reason why it is pretty late before most children get ideas of the operations of their own minds2 and some have not any very clear or perfect ideas of the greatest part of them all their lives4 ,because1 though they pass there continually1 yet1 like floating visions1 they make not deep impressions enough to leave in their mind clear1 distinct1 lasting ideas1 till the understanding turns inward upon itself1 reflects on its own operations1 and makes them the objects of its own contemplation4 ,children when they come first into it1 are surrounded with a world of new things which1 by a constant solicitation of their senses1 draw the mind constantly to them2 forward to take notice of new1 and apt to be delighted with the variety of changing objects4 ,thus the first years are usually employed and diverted in looking abroad4 ,men's business in them is to acquaint themselves with what is to be found without2 and so growing up in a constant attention to outward sensations1 seldom make any considerable reflection on what passes within them1 till they come to be of riper years2 and some scarce ever at all4 #i4 ,the ,soul begins to have ,ideas when it begins to perceive4 ,to ask1 at what ,,time a man has first any ideas1 is to ask1 when he begins to perceive2--,,having ,,ideas1 and ,,perception1 being the same thing4 ,i know it is an opinion1 that the soul always thinks1 and that it has the actual perception of ideas in itself constantly1 as long as it exists2 and that actual thinking is as inseparable from the soul as actual extension is from the body2 which if true1 to inquire after the beginning of a man's ideas is the same as to inquire after the beginning of his soul4 ,for1 by this account1 soul and its ideas1 as body and its extension1 will begin to exist both at the same time4 #aj4 ,the ,soul thinks not always2 for this wants ,proofs4 ,but whether the soul be supposed to exist antecedent to1 or coeval with1 or some time after the first rudiments of organization1 or the beginnings of life in the body1 ,i leave to be disputed by those who have better thought of that matter4 ,i confess myself to have one of those dull souls1 that doth not perceive itself always to contemplate ideas2 nor can conceive it any more necessary for the soul always to think1 than for the body always to move3 the perception of ideas being 7as ,i conceive7 to the soul1 what motion is to the body2 not its essence1 but one of its operations4 ,and therefore1 though thinking be supposed never so much the proper action of the soul1 yet it is not necessary to suppose that it should be always thinking1 always in action4 ,that1 perhaps1 is the privilege of the infinite ,author and ,preserver of all things1 who 8never slumbers nor sleeps02 but is not competent to any finite being1 at least not to the soul of man4 ,we know certainly1 by experience1 that we ,,sometimes think2 and thence draw this infallible consequence1--that there is something in us that has a power to think4 ,but whether that substance ,,perpetually thinks or no1 we can be no further assured than experience informs us4 ,for1 to say that actual thinking is essential to the soul1 and inseparable from it1 is to beg what is in question1 and not to prove it by reason2--which is necessary to be done1 if it be not a self-evident proposition4 ,but whether this1 8,that the soul always thinks10 be a self-evident proposition1 that everybody assents to at first hearing1 ,i appeal to mankind4 ,it is doubted whether ,i thought at all last night or no4 ,the question being about a matter of fact1 it is begging it to bring1 as a proof for it1 an hypothesis1 which is the very thing in dispute3 by which way one may prove anything1 and it is but supposing that all watches1 whilst the balance beats1 think1 and it is sufficiently proved1 and past doubt1 that my watch thought all last night4 ,but he that would not deceive himself1 ought to build his hypothesis on matter of fact1 and make it out by sensible experience1 and not presume on matter of fact1 because of his hypothesis1 that is1 because he supposes it to be so2 which way of proving amounts to this1 that ,i must necessarily think all last night1 because another supposes ,i always think1 though ,i myself cannot perceive that ,i always do so4 ,but men in love with their opinions may not only suppose what is in question1 but allege wrong matter of fact4 ,how else could any one make it an inference of mine1 that a thing is not1 because we are not sensible of it in our sleep8 ,i do not say there is no ,,soul in a man1 because he is not sensible of it in his sleep2 but ,i do say1 he cannot ,,think at any time1 waking or sleeping1 without being sensible of it4 ,our being sensible of it is not necessary to anything but to our thoughts2 and to them it is2 and to them it always will be necessary1 till we can think without being conscious of it4 #aa4 ,it is not always conscious of it4 ,i grant that the soul1 in a waking man1 is never without thought1 because it is the condition of being awake4 ,but whether sleeping without dreaming be not an affection of the whole man1 mind as well as body1 may be worth a waking man's consideration2 it being hard to conceive that anything should think and not be conscious of it4 ,if the soul doth think in a sleeping man without being conscious of it1 ,i ask whether1 during such thinking1 it has any pleasure or pain1 or be capable of happiness or misery8 ,i am sure the man is not2 no more than the bed or earth he lies on4 ,for to be happy or miserable without being conscious of it1 seems to me utterly inconsistent and impossible4 ,or if it be possible that the ,,soul can1 whilst the body is sleeping1 have its thinking1 enjoyments1 and concerns1 its pleasures or pain1 apart1 which the ,,man is not conscious of nor partakes in1--it is certain that ,socrates asleep and ,socrates awake is not the same person2 but his soul when he sleeps1 and ,socrates the man1 consisting of body and soul1 when he is waking1 are two persons3 since waking ,socrates has no knowledge of1 or concernment for that happiness or misery of his soul1 which it enjoys alone by itself whilst he sleeps1 without perceiving anything of it2 no more than he has for the happiness or misery of a man in the ,indies1 whom he knows not4 ,for1 if we take wholly away all consciousness of our actions and sensations1 especially of pleasure and pain1 and the concernment that accompanies it1 it will be hard to know wherein to place personal identity4 #ab4 ,if a sleeping ,man thinks without knowing it1 the sleeping and waking ,man are two ,persons4 ,the soul1 during sound sleep1 thinks1 say these men4 ,whilst it thinks and perceives1 it is capable certainly of those of delight or trouble1 as well as any other perceptions2 and ,,it must necessarily be ,,conscious of its own perceptions4 ,but it has all this apart3 the sleeping ,,man1 it is plain1 is conscious of nothing of all this4 ,let us suppose1 then1 the soul of ,castor1 while he is sleeping1 retired from his body2 which is no impossible supposition for the men ,i have here to do with1 who so liberally allow life1 without a thinking soul1 to all other animals4 ,these men cannot then judge it impossible1 or a contradiction1 that the body should live without the soul2 nor that the soul should subsist and think1 or have perception1 even perception of happiness or misery1 without the body4 ,let us then1 ,i say1 suppose the soul of ,castor separated during his sleep from his body1 to think apart4 ,let us suppose1 too1 that it chooses for its scene of thinking the body of another man1 v4 g4 ,pollux1 who is sleeping without a soul4 ,for1 if ,castor's soul can think1 whilst ,castor is asleep1 what ,castor is never conscious of1 it is no matter what ,,place it chooses to think in4 ,we have here1 then1 the bodies of two men with only one soul between them1 which we will suppose to sleep and wake by turns2 and the soul still thinking in the waking man1 whereof the sleeping man is never conscious1 has never the least perception4 ,i ask1 then1 whether ,castor and ,pollux1 thus with only one soul between them1 which thinks and perceives in one what the other is never conscious of1 nor is concerned for1 are not two as distinct ,,persons as ,castor and ,hercules1 or as ,socrates and ,plato were8 ,and whether one of them might not be very happy1 and the other very miserable8 ,just by the same reason1 they make the soul and the man two persons1 who make the soul think apart what the man is not conscious of4 ,for1 ,i suppose nobody will make identity of persons to consist in the soul's being united to the very same numerical particles of matter4 ,for if that be necessary to identity1 it will be impossible1 in that constant flux of the particles of our bodies1 that any man should be the same person two days1 or two moments1 together4 #ac4 ,impossible to convince those that sleep without dreaming1 that they think4 ,thus1 methinks1 every drowsy nod shakes their doctrine1 who teach that the soul is always thinking4 ,those1 at least1 who do at any time ,,sleep ,,without ,,dreaming1 can never be convinced that their thoughts are sometimes for four hours busy without their knowing of it2 and if they are taken in the very act1 waked in the middle of that sleeping contemplation1 can give no manner of account of it4 #ad4 ,that men dream without remembering it1 in vain urged4 ,it will perhaps be said1--,that the soul thinks even in the soundest sleep1 but the ,,memory retains it not4 ,that the soul in a sleeping man should be this moment busy a thinking1 and the next moment in a waking man not remember nor be able to recollect one jot of all those thoughts1 is very hard to be conceived1 and would need some better proof than bare assertion to make it be believed4 ,for who can without any more ado1 but being barely told so1 imagine that the greatest part of men do1 during all their lives1 for several hours every day1 think of something1 which if they were asked1 even in the middle of these thoughts1 they could remember nothing at all of8 ,most men1 ,i think1 pass a great part of their sleep without dreaming4 ,i once knew a man that was bred a scholar1 and had no bad memory1 who told me he had never dreamed in his life1 till he had that fever he was then newly recovered of1 which was about the five or six and twentieth year of his age4 ,i suppose the world affords more such instances3 at least every one's acquaintance will furnish him with examples enough of such as pass most of their nights without dreaming4 #ae4 ,upon this ,hypothesis1 the ,thoughts of a sleeping ,man ought to be most rational4 ,to think often1 and never to retain it so much as one moment1 is a very useless sort of thinking2 and the soul1 in such a state of thinking1 does very little1 if at all1 excel that of a looking-glass1 which constantly receives variety of images1 or ideas1 but retains none2 they disappear and vanish1 and there remain no footsteps of them2 the looking-glass is never the better for such ideas1 nor the soul for such thoughts4 ,perhaps it will be said1 that in a waking ,,man the materials of the body are employed1 and made use of1 in thinking2 and that the memory of thoughts is retained by the impressions that are made on the brain1 and the traces there left after such thinking2 but that in the thinking of the ,,soul1 which is not perceived in a sleeping man1 there the soul thinks apart1 and making no use of the organs of the body1 leaves no impressions on it1 and consequently no memory of such thoughts4 ,not to mention again the absurdity of two distinct persons1 which follows from this supposition1 ,i answer1 further1--,that whatever ideas the mind can receive and contemplate without the help of the body1 it is reasonable to conclude it can retain without the help of the body too2 or else the soul1 or any separate spirit1 will have but little advantage by thinking4 ,if it has no memory of its own thoughts2 if it cannot lay them up for its own use1 and be able to recall them upon occasion2 if it cannot reflect upon what is past1 and make use of its former experiences1 reasonings1 and contemplations1 to what purpose does it think8 ,they who make the soul a thinking thing1 at this rate1 will not make it a much more noble being than those do whom they condemn1 for allowing it to be nothing but the subtilist parts of matter4 ,characters drawn on dust1 that the first breath of wind effaces2 or impressions made on a heap of atoms1 or animal spirits1 are altogether as useful1 and render the subject as noble1 as the thoughts of a soul that perish in thinking2 that1 once out of sight1 are gone for ever1 and leave no memory of themselves behind them4 ,nature never makes excellent things for mean or no uses3 and it is hardly to be conceived that our infinitely wise ,creator should make so admirable a faculty as the power of thinking1 that faculty which comes nearest the excellency of his own incomprehensible being1 to be so idly and uselessly employed1 at least a fourth part of its time here1 as to think constantly1 without remembering any of those thoughts1 without doing any good to itself or others1 or being any way useful to any other part of the creation4 ,if we will examine it1 we shall not find1 ,i suppose1 the motion of dull and senseless matter1 any where in the universe1 made so little use of and so wholly thrown away4 #af4 ,on this ,hypothesis1 the ,soul must have ,ideas not derived from ,sensation or ,reflection1 of which there is no ,appearance4 ,it is true1 we have sometimes instances of perception whilst we are asleep1 and retain the memory of those thoughts3 but how extravagant and incoherent for the most part they are2 how little conformable to the perfection and order of a rational being1 those who are acquainted with dreams need not be told4 ,this ,i would willingly be satisfied in1--whether the soul1 when it thinks thus apart1 and as it were separate from the body1 acts less rationally than when conjointly with it1 or no4 ,if its separate thoughts be less rational1 then these men must say1 that the soul owes the perfection of rational thinking to the body3 if it does not1 it is a wonder that our dreams should be1 for the most part1 so frivolous and irrational2 and that the soul should retain none of its more rational soliloquies and meditations4 #ag4 ,if ,i think when ,i know it not1 nobody else can know it4 ,those who so confidently tell us that the soul always actually thinks1 ,i would they would also tell us1 what those ideas are that are in the soul of a child1 before or just at the union with the body1 before it hath received any by sensation4 ,the dreams of sleeping men are1 as ,i take it1 all made up of the waking man's ideas2 though for the most part oddly put together4 ,it is strange1 if the soul has ideas of its own that it derived not from sensation or reflection1 7as it must have1 if it thought before it received any impressions from the body17 that it should never1 in its private thinking1 7so private1 that the man himself perceives it not17 retain any of them the very moment it wakes out of them1 and then make the man glad with new discoveries4 ,who can find it reason that the soul should1 in its retirement during sleep1 have so many hours' thoughts1 and yet never light on any of those ideas it borrowed not from sensation or reflection2 or at least preserve the memory of none but such1 which1 being occasioned from the body1 must needs be less natural to a spirit8 ,it is strange the soul should never once in a man's whole life recall over any of its pure native thoughts1 and those ideas it had before it borrowed anything from the body2 never bring into the waking man's view any other ideas but what have a tang of the cask1 and manifestly derive their original from that union4 ,if it always thinks1 and so had ideas before it was united1 or before it received any from the body1 it is not to be supposed but that during sleep it recollects its native ideas2 and during that retirement from communicating with the body1 whilst it thinks by itself1 the ideas it is busied about should be1 sometimes at least1 those more natural and congenial ones which it had in itself1 underived from the body1 or its own operations about them3 which1 since the waking man never remembers1 we must from this hypothesis conclude either that the soul remembers something that the man does not2 or else that memory belongs only to such ideas as are derived from the body1 or the mind's operations about them4 #ah4 ,how knows any one that the ,soul always thinks8 ,for if it be not a self-evident ,proposition1 it needs ,proof4 ,i would be glad also to learn from these men who so confidently pronounce that the human soul1 or1 which is all one1 that a man always thinks1 how they come to know it2 nay1 how they come to know that they themselves think1 when they themselves do not perceive it4 ,this1 ,i am afraid1 is to be sure without proofs1 and to know without perceiving4 ,it is1 ,i suspect1 a confused notion1 taken up to serve an hypothesis2 and none of those clear truths1 that either their own evidence forces us to admit1 or common experience makes it impudence to deny4 ,for the most that can be said of it is1 that it is possible the soul may always think1 but not always retain it in memory4 ,and ,i say1 it is as possible that the soul may not always think2 and much more probable that it should sometimes not think1 than that it should often think1 and that a long while together1 and not be conscious to itself1 the next moment after1 that it had thought4 #ai4 ,that a ,man should be busy in ,thinking1 and yet not retain it the next moment1 very improbable4 ,to suppose the soul to think1 and the man not to perceive it1 is1 as has been said1 to make two persons in one man4 ,and if one considers well these men's way of speaking1 one should be led into a suspicion that they do so4 ,for those who tell us that the ,,soul always thinks1 do never1 that ,i remember1 say that a ,,man always thinks4 ,can the soul think1 and not the man8 ,or a man think1 and not be conscious of it8 ,this1 perhaps1 would be suspected of jargon in others4 ,if they say the man thinks always1 but is not always conscious of it1 they may as well say his body is extended without having parts4 ,for it is altogether as intelligible to say that a body is extended without parts1 as that anything thinks without being conscious of it1 or perceiving that it does so4 ,they who talk thus may1 with as much reason1 if it be necessary to their hypothesis1 say that a man is always hungry1 but that he does not always feel it2 whereas hunger consists in that very sensation1 as thinking consists in being conscious that one thinks4 ,if they say that a man is always conscious to himself of thinking1 ,i ask1 ,how they know it8 ,consciousness is the perception of what passes in a man's own mind4 ,can another man perceive that ,i am conscious of anything1 when ,i perceive it not myself8 ,no man's knowledge here can go beyond his experience4 ,wake a man out of a sound sleep1 and ask him what he was that moment thinking of4 ,if he himself be conscious of nothing he then thought on1 he must be a notable diviner of thoughts that can assure him that he was thinking4 ,may he not1 with more reason1 assure him he was not asleep8 ,this is something beyond philosophy2 and it cannot be less than revelation1 that discovers to another thoughts in my mind1 when ,i can find none there myself4 ,and they must needs have a penetrating sight who can certainly see that ,i think1 when ,i cannot perceive it myself1 and when ,i declare that ,i do not2 and yet can see that dogs or elephants do not think1 when they give all the demonstration of it imaginable1 except only telling us that they do so4 ,this some may suspect to be a step beyond the ,rosicrucians2 it seeming easier to make one's self invisible to others1 than to make another's thoughts visible to me1 which are not visible to himself4 ,but it is but defining the soul to be 8a substance that always thinks10 and the business is done4 ,if such definition be of any authority1 ,i know not what it can serve for but to make many men suspect that they have no souls at all2 since they find a good part of their lives pass away without thinking4 ,for no definitions that ,i know1 no suppositions of any sect1 are of force enough to destroy constant experience2 and perhaps it is the affectation of knowing beyond what we perceive1 that makes so much useless dispute and noise in the world4 #bj4 ,no ideas but from ,sensation and ,reflection1 evident1 if we observe ,children4 ,i see no reason1 therefore1 to believe that the soul thinks before the senses have furnished it with ideas to think on2 and as those are increased and retained1 so it comes1 by exercise1 to improve its faculty of thinking in the several parts of it2 as well as1 afterwards1 by compounding those ideas1 and reflecting on its own operations1 it increases its stock1 as well as facility in remembering1 imagining1 reasoning1 and other modes of thinking4 #ba4 ,state of a child in the mother's womb4 ,he that will suffer himself to be informed by observation and experience1 and not make his own hypothesis the rule of nature1 will find few signs of a soul accustomed to much thinking in a new-born child1 and much fewer of any reasoning at all4 ,and yet it is hard to imagine that the rational soul should think so much1 and not reason at all4 ,and he that will consider that infants newly come into the world spend the greatest part of their time in sleep1 and are seldom awake but when either hunger calls for the teat1 or some pain 7the most importunate of all sensations71 or some other violent impression on the body1 forces the mind to perceive and attend to it2--he1 ,i say1 who considers this1 will perhaps find reason to imagine that a ,ftus in the mother's womb differs not much from the state of a vegetable1 but passes the greatest part of its time without perception or thought2 doing very little but sleep in a place where it needs not seek for food1 and is surrounded with liquor1 always equally soft1 and near of the same temper2 where the eyes have no light1 and the ears so shut up are not very susceptible of sounds2 and where there is little or no variety1 or change of objects1 to move the senses4 #bb4 ,the mind thinks in proportion to the matter it gets from experience to think about4 ,follow a child from its birth1 and observe the alterations that time makes1 and you shall find1 as the mind by the senses comes more and more to be furnished with ideas1 it comes to be more and more awake2 thinks more1 the more it has matter to think on4 ,after some time it begins to know the objects which1 being most familiar with it1 have made lasting impressions4 ,thus it comes by degrees to know the persons it daily converses with1 and distinguishes them from strangers2 which are instances and effects of its coming to retain and distinguish the ideas the senses convey to it4 ,and so we may observe how the mind1 ,,by ,,degrees1 improves in these2 and ,,advances to the exercise of those other faculties of enlarging1 compounding1 and abstracting its ideas1 and of reasoning about them1 and reflecting upon all these2 of which ,i shall have occasion to speak more hereafter4 #bc4 ,a man begins to have ideas when he first has sensation4 ,what sensation is4 ,if it shall be demanded then1 ,,when a man ,,begins to have any ideas1 ,i think the true answer is1--,,when ,,he ,,first ,,has ,,any ,,sensation4 ,for1 since there appear not to be any ideas in the mind before the senses have conveyed any in1 ,i conceive that ideas in the understanding are coeval with ,,sensation2 ,,which ,,is ,,such ,,an ,,impression ,,or ,,motion ,,made ,,in ,,some ,,part ,,of ,,the ,,body1 ,,as ,,makes ,,it ,,be ,,taken ,,notice ,,of ,,in ,,the ,,understanding4 #bd4 ,the ,original of all our ,knowledge4 ,the impressions then that are made on our sense by outward objects that are extrinsical to the mind2 and its own operations about these impressions1 reflected on by itself1 as proper objects to be contemplated by it1 are1 ,i conceive1 the original of all knowledge4 ,thus the first capacity of human intellect is1--that the mind is fitted to receive the impressions made on it2 either through the senses by outward objects1 or by its own operations when it reflects on them4 ,this is the first step a man makes towards the discovery of anything1 and the groundwork whereon to build all those notions which ever he shall have naturally in this world4 ,all those sublime thoughts which tower above the clouds1 and reach as high as heaven itself1 take their rise and footing here3 in all that great extent wherein the mind wanders1 in those remote speculations it may seem to be elevated with1 it stirs not one jot beyond those ideas which ,,sense or ,,reflection have offered for its contemplation4 #be4 ,in the ,reception of simple ,ideas1 the ,understanding is for the most part passive4 ,in this part the understanding is merely passive2 and whether or no it will have these beginnings1 and as it were materials of knowledge1 is not in its own power4 ,for the objects of our senses do1 many of them1 obtrude their particular ideas upon our minds whether we will or not2 and the operations of our minds will not let us be without1 at least1 some obscure notions of them4 ,no man can be wholly ignorant of what he does when he thinks4 ,these simple ideas1 when offered to the mind1 the understanding can no more refuse to have1 nor alter when they are imprinted1 nor blot them out and make new ones itself1 than a mirror can refuse1 alter1 or obliterate the images or ideas which the objects set before it do therein produce4 ,as the bodies that surround us do diversely affect our organs1 the mind is forced to receive the impressions2 and cannot avoid the perception of those ideas that are annexed to them4 ,,chapter ,,ii4 ,,of ,,simple ,,ideas4 #a4 ,uncompounded ,appearances4 ,the better to understand the nature1 manner1 and extent of our knowledge1 one thing is carefully to be observed concerning the ideas we have2 and that is1 that some of them1 are ,,simple and some ,,complex4 ,though the qualities that affect our senses are1 in the things themselves1 so united and blended1 that there is no separation1 no distance between them2 yet it is plain1 the ideas they produce in the mind enter by the senses simple2 and unmixed4 ,for1 though the sight and touch often take in from the same object1 at the same time1 different ideas2--as a man sees at once motion and colour2 the hand feels softness and warmth in the same piece of wax3 yet the simple ideas thus united in the same subject1 are as perfectly distinct as those that come in by different senses4 ,the coldness and hardness which a man feels in a piece of ice being as distinct ideas in the mind as the smell and whiteness of a lily2 or as the taste of sugar1 and smell of a rose4 ,and there is nothing can be plainer to a man than the clear and distinct perception he has of those simple ideas2 which1 being each in itself uncompounded1 contains in it nothing but ,,one ,,uniform ,,appearance1 ,,or ,,conception ,,in ,,the ,,mind1 and is not distinguishable into different ideas4 #b4 ,the ,mind can neither make nor destroy them4 ,these simple ideas1 the materials of all our knowledge1 are suggested and furnished to the mind only by those two ways above mentioned1 viz4 sensation and reflection4 ,when the understanding is once stored with these simple ideas1 it has the power to repeat1 compare1 and unite them1 even to an almost infinite variety1 and so can make at pleasure new complex ideas4 ,but it is not in the power of the most exalted wit1 or enlarged understanding1 by any quickness or variety of thought1 to ,,invent or ,,frame one new simple idea in the mind1 not taken in by the ways before mentioned3 nor can any force of the understanding ,,destroy those that are there4 ,the dominion of man1 in this little world of his own understanding being much what the same as it is in the great world of visible things2 wherein his power1 however managed by art and skill1 reaches no farther than to compound and divide the materials that are made to his hand2 but can do nothing towards the making the least particle of new matter1 or destroying one atom of what is already in being4 ,the same inability will every one find in himself1 who shall go about to fashion in his understanding one simple idea1 not received in by his senses from external objects1 or by reflection from the operations of his own mind about them4 ,i would have any one try to fancy any taste which had never affected his palate2 or frame the idea of a scent he had never smelt3 and when he can do this1 ,i will also conclude that a blind man hath ideas of colours1 and a deaf man true distinct notions of sounds4 #c4 ,only the qualities that affect the senses are imaginable4 ,this is the reason why--though we cannot believe it impossible to ,god to make a creature with other organs1 and more ways to convey into the understanding the notice of corporeal things than those five1 as they are usually counted1 which he has given to man--yet ,i think it is not possible for any ,,man to imagine any other qualities in bodies1 howsoever constituted1 whereby they can be taken notice of1 besides sounds1 tastes1 smells1 visible and tangible qualities4 ,and had mankind been made but with four senses1 the qualities then which are the objects of the fifth sense had been as far from our notice1 imagination1 and conception1 as now any belonging to a sixth1 seventh1 or eighth sense can possibly be2--which1 whether yet some other creatures1 in some other parts of this vast and stupendous universe1 may not have1 will be a great presumption to deny4 ,he that will not set himself proudly at the top of all things1 but will consider the immensity of this fabric1 and the great variety that is to be found in this little and inconsiderable part of it which he has to do with1 may be apt to think that1 in other mansions of it1 there may be other and different intelligent beings1 of whose faculties he has as little knowledge or apprehension as a worm shut up in one drawer of a cabinet hath of the senses or understanding of a man2 such variety and excellency being suitable to the wisdom and power of the ,maker4 ,i have here followed the common opinion of man's having but five senses2 though1 perhaps1 there may be justly counted more2--but either supposition serves equally to my present purpose4 ,,chapter ,,iii4 ,,of ,,simple ,,ideas ,,of ,,sense4 #a4 ,division of simple ideas4 ,the better to conceive the ideas we receive from sensation1 it may not be amiss for us to consider them1 in reference to the different ways whereby they make their approaches to our minds1 and make themselves perceivable by us4 ,,first1 then1 ,there are some which come into our minds ,,by ,,one ,,sense ,,only4 ,,secondly1 ,there are others that convey themselves into the mind ,,by ,,more ,,senses ,,than ,,one4 ,,thirdly1 ,others that are had from ,,reflection ,,only4 ,,fourthly1 ,there are some that make themselves way1 and are suggested to the mind ,,by ,,all ,,the ,,ways ,,of ,,sensation ,,and ,,reflection4 ,we shall consider them apart under these several heads4 ,ideas of one ,sense4 ,there are some ideas which have admittance only through one sense1 which is peculiarly adapted to receive them4 ,thus light and colours1 as white1 red1 yellow1 blue2 with their several degrees or shades and mixtures1 as green1 scarlet1 purple1 sea-green1 and the rest1 come in only by the eyes4 ,all kinds of noises1 sounds1 and tones1 only by the ears4 ,the several tastes and smells1 by the nose and palate4 ,and if these organs1 or the nerves which are the conduits to convey them from without to their audience in the brain1--the mind's presence-room 7as ,i may so call it7--are any of them so disordered as not to perform their functions1 they have no postern to be admitted by2 no other way to bring themselves into view1 and be perceived by the understanding4 ,the most considerable of those belonging to the touch1 are heat and cold1 and solidity3 all the rest1 consisting almost wholly in the sensible configuration1 as smooth and rough2 or else1 more or less firm adhesion of the parts1 as hard and soft1 tough and brittle1 are obvious enough4 #b4 ,few simple ,ideas have ,names4 ,i think it will be needless to enumerate all the particular simple ideas belonging to each sense4 ,nor indeed is it possible if we would2 there being a great many more of them belonging to most of the senses than we have names for4 ,the variety of smells1 which are as many almost1 if not more1 than species of bodies in the world1 do most of them want names4 ,sweet and stinking commonly serve our turn for these ideas1 which in effect is little more than to call them pleasing or displeasing2 though the smell of a rose and violet1 both sweet1 are certainly very distinct ideas4 ,nor are the different tastes1 that by our palates we receive ideas of1 much better provided with names4 ,sweet1 bitter1 sour1 harsh1 and salt are almost all the epithets we have to denominate that numberless variety of relishes1 which are to be found distinct1 not only in almost every sort of creatures1 but in the different parts of the same plant1 fruit1 or animal4 ,the same may be said of colours and sounds4 ,i shall1 therefore1 in the account of simple ideas ,i am here giving1 content myself to set down only such as are most material to our present purpose1 or are in themselves less apt to be taken notice of though they are very frequently the ingredients of our complex ideas2 amongst which1 ,i think1 ,i may well account solidity1 which therefore ,i shall treat of in the next chapter4 ,,chapter ,,iv4 ,,idea ,,of ,,solidity4 #a4 ,we receive this ,idea from ,touch4 ,the idea of ,,solidity we receive by our touch3 and it arises from the resistance which we find in body to the entrance of any other body into the place it possesses1 till it has left it4 ,there is no idea which we receive more constantly from sensation than solidity4 ,whether we move or rest1 in what posture soever we are1 we always feel something under us that supports us1 and hinders our further sinking downwards2 and the bodies which we daily handle make us perceive that1 whilst they remain between them1 they do1 by an insurmountable force1 hinder the approach of the parts of our hands that press them4 ,,that ,,which ,,thus ,,hinders ,,the ,,approach ,,of ,,two ,,bodies1 ,,when ,,they ,,are ,,moved ,,one ,,towards ,,another1 ,i ,,call ,,solidity4 ,i will not dispute whether this acceptation of the word solid be nearer to its original signification than that which mathematicians use it in4 ,it suffices that ,i think the common notion of solidity will allow1 if not justify1 this use of it2 but if any one think it better to call it ,,impenetrability1 he has my consent4 ,only ,i have thought the term solidity the more proper to express this idea1 not only because of its vulgar use in that sense1 but also because it carries something more of positive in it than impenetrability2 which is negative1 and is perhaps more a consequence of solidity1 than solidity itself4 ,this1 of all other1 seems the idea most intimately connected with1 and essential to body2 so as nowhere else to be found or imagined1 but only in matter4 ,and though our senses take no notice of it1 but in masses of matter1 of a bulk sufficient to cause a sensation in us3 yet the mind1 having once got this idea from such grosser sensible bodies1 traces it further1 and considers it1 as well as figure1 in the minutest particle of matter that can exist2 and finds it inseparably inherent in body1 wherever or however modified4 #b4 ,solidity fills ,space4 ,this is the idea which belongs to body1 whereby we conceive it to fill space4 ,the idea of which filling of space is1--that where we imagine any space taken up by a solid substance1 we conceive it so to possess it1 that it excludes all other solid substances2 and will for ever hinder any other two bodies1 that move towards one another in a straight line1 from coming to touch one another1 unless it removes from between them in a line not parallel to that which they move in4 ,this idea of it1 the bodies which we ordinarily handle sufficiently furnish us with4 #c4 ,distinct from ,space4 ,this resistance1 whereby it keeps other bodies out of the space which it possesses1 is so great1 that no force1 how great soever1 can surmount it4 ,all the bodies in the world1 pressing a drop of water on all sides1 will never be able to overcome the resistance which it will make1 soft as it is1 to their approaching one another1 till it be removed out of their way3 whereby our idea of solidity is distinguished both from pure space1 which is capable neither of resistance nor motion2 and from the ordinary idea of hardness4 ,for a man may conceive two bodies at a distance1 so as they may approach one another1 without touching or displacing any solid thing1 till their superficies come to meet2 whereby1 ,i think1 we have the clear idea of space without solidity4 ,for 7not to go so far as annihilation of any particular body7 ,i ask1 whether a man cannot have the idea of the motion of one single body alone1 without any other succeeding immediately into its place8 ,i think it is evident he can3 the idea of motion in one body no more including the idea of motion in another1 than the idea of a square figure in one body includes the idea of a square figure in another4 ,i do not ask1 whether bodies do so ,,exist1 that the motion of one body cannot really be without the motion of another4 ,to determine this either way1 is to beg the question for or against a ,,vacuum4 ,but my question is1--whether one cannot have the ,,idea of one body moved1 whilst others are at rest8 ,and ,i think this no one will deny4 ,if so1 then the place it deserted gives us the idea of pure space without solidity2 whereinto any other body may enter1 without either resistance or protrusion of anything4 ,when the sucker in a pump is drawn1 the space it filled in the tube is certainly the same whether any other body follows the motion of the sucker or not3 nor does it imply a contradiction that1 upon the motion of one body1 another that is only contiguous to it should not follow it4 ,the necessity of such a motion is built only on the supposition that the world is full2 but not on the distinct ,,ideas of space and solidity1 which are as different as resistance and not resistance1 protrusion and not protrusion4 ,and that men have ideas of space without a body1 their very disputes about a vacuum plainly demonstrate1 as is shown in another place4 #d4 ,from ,hardness4 ,solidity is hereby also differenced from hardness1 in that solidity consists in repletion1 and so an utter exclusion of other bodies out of the space it possesses3 but hardness1 in a firm cohesion of the parts of matter1 making up masses of a sensible bulk1 so that the whole does not easily change its figure4 ,and indeed1 hard and soft are names that we give to things only in relation to the constitutions of our own bodies2 that being generally called hard by us1 which will put us to pain sooner than change figure by the pressure of any part of our bodies2 and that1 on the contrary1 soft1 which changes the situation of its parts upon an easy and unpainful touch4 ,but this difficulty of changing the situation of the sensible parts amongst themselves1 or of the figure of the whole1 gives no more solidity to the hardest body in the world than to the softest2 nor is an adamant one jot more solid than water4 ,for1 though the two flat sides of two pieces of marble will more easily approach each other1 between which there is nothing but water or air1 than if there be a diamond between them2 yet it is not that the parts of the diamond are more solid than those of water1 or resist more2 but because the parts of water1 being more easily separable from each other1 they will1 by a side motion1 be more easily removed1 and give way to the approach of the two pieces of marble4 ,but if they could be kept from making place by that side motion1 they would eternally hinder the approach of these two pieces of marble1 as much as the diamond2 and it would be as impossible by any force to surmount their resistance1 as to surmount the resistance of the parts of a diamond4 ,the softest body in the world will as invincibly resist the coming together of any other two bodies1 if it be not put out of the way1 but remain between them1 as the hardest that can be found or imagined4 ,he that shall fill a yielding soft body well with air or water1 will quickly find its resistance4 ,and he that thinks that nothing but bodies that are hard can keep his hands from approaching one another1 may be pleased to make a trial1 with the air inclosed in a football4 ,the experiment1 ,i have been told1 was made at ,florence1 with a hollow globe of gold filled with water1 and exactly closed2 which further shows the solidity of so soft a body as water4 ,for the golden globe thus filled1 being put into a press1 which was driven by the extreme force of screws1 the water made itself way through the pores of that very close metal1 and finding no room for a nearer approach of its particles within1 got to the outside1 where it rose like a dew1 and so fell in drops1 before the sides of the globe could be made to yield to the violent compression of the engine that squeezed it4 #e4 ,on ,solidity depend ,impulse1 ,resistance and ,protrusion4 ,by this idea of solidity is the extension of body distinguished from the extension of space3--the extension of body being nothing but the cohesion or continuity of solid1 separable1 movable parts2 and the extension of space1 the continuity of unsolid1 inseparable1 and immovable parts4 ,upon the solidity of bodies also depend their mutual impulse1 resistance1 and protrusion4 ,of pure space then1 and solidity1 there are several 7amongst which ,i confess myself one7 who persuade themselves they have clear and distinct ideas2 and that they can think on space1 without anything in it that resists or is protruded by body4 ,this is the idea of pure space1 which they think they have as clear as any idea they can have of the extension of body3 the idea of the distance between the opposite parts of a concave superficies being equally as clear without as with the idea of any solid parts between3 and on the other side1 they persuade themselves that they have1 distinct from that of pure space1 the idea of ,,something ,,that ,,fills ,,space1 that can be protruded by the impulse of other bodies1 or resist their motion4 ,if there be others that have not these two ideas distinct1 but confound them1 and make but one of them1 ,i know not how men1 who have the same idea under different names1 or different ideas under the same name1 can in that case talk with one another2 any more than a man who1 not being blind or deaf1 has distinct ideas of the colour of scarlet and the sound of a trumpet1 could discourse concerning scarlet colour with the blind man ,i mentioned in another place1 who fancied that the idea of scarlet was like the sound of a trumpet4 #f4 ,what ,solidity is4 ,if any one asks me1 ,,what ,,this ,,solidity ,,is1 ,i send him to his senses to inform him4 ,let him put a flint or a football between his hands1 and then endeavour to join them1 and he will know4 ,if he thinks this not a sufficient explication of solidity1 what it is1 and wherein it consists2 ,i promise to tell him what it is1 and wherein it consists1 when he tells me what thinking is1 or wherein it consists2 or explains to me what extension or motion is1 which perhaps seems much easier4 ,the simple ideas we have1 are such as experience teaches them us2 but if1 beyond that1 we endeavour by words to make them clearer in the mind1 we shall succeed no better than if we went about to clear up the darkness of a blind man's mind by talking2 and to discourse into him the ideas of light and colours4 ,the reason of this ,i shall show in another place4 ,,chapter ,v4 ,,of ,,simple ,,ideas ,,of ,,divers ,,senses4 ,ideas received both by seeing and touching4 ,the ideas we get by more than one sense are1 of ,,space or ,,extension1 ,,figure1 ,,rest1 and ,,motion4 ,for these make perceivable impressions1 both on the eyes and touch2 and we can receive and convey into our minds the ideas of the extension1 figure1 motion1 and rest of bodies1 both by seeing and feeling4 ,but having occasion to speak more at large of these in another place1 ,i here only enumerate them4 ,,chapter ,,vi4 ,,of ,,simple ,,ideas ,,of ,,reflection4 ,simple ,ideas are the ,operations of ,mind about its other ,ideas4 ,the mind receiving the ideas mentioned in the foregoing chapters from without1 when it turns its view inward upon itself1 and observes its own actions about those ideas it has1 takes from thence other ideas1 which are as capable to be the objects of its contemplation as any of those it received from foreign things4 ,the ,idea of ,perception1 and ,idea of ,willing1 we have from ,reflection4 ,the two great and principal actions of the mind1 which are most frequently considered1 and which are so frequent that every one that pleases may take notice of them in himself1 are these two3-- ,,perception1 or ,,thinking2 and ,,volition1 or ,,willing4 ,the power of thinking is called the ,,understanding1 and the power of volition is called the ,,will2 and these two powers or abilities in the mind are denominated faculties4 ,of some of the ,,modes of these simple ideas of reflection1 such as are ,,remembrance1 ,,discerning1 ,,reasoning1 ,,judging1 ,,knowledge1 ,,faith1 c41 ,i shall have occasion to speak hereafter4 ,,chapter ,,vii4 ,,of ,,simple ,,ideas ,,of ,,both ,,sensation ,,and ,,reflection4 #a4 ,ideas of ,pleasure and ,pain4 ,there be other simple ideas which convey themselves into the mind by all the ways of sensation and reflection1 viz4 ,pleasure or ,delight1 and its opposite1 ,pain1 or ,uneasiness2 ,power2 ,existence2 ,unity mix with almost all our other ,ideas4 #b4 ,delight or uneasiness1 one or other of them1 join themselves to almost all our ideas both of sensation and reflection3 and there is scarce any affection of our senses from without1 any retired thought of our mind within1 which is not able to produce in us pleasure or pain4 ,by pleasure and pain1 ,i would be understood to signify1 whatsoever delights or molests us2 whether it arises from the thoughts of our minds1 or anything operating on our bodies4 ,for1 whether we call it2 satisfaction1 delight1 pleasure1 happiness1 c41 on the one side1 or uneasiness1 trouble1 pain1 torment1 anguish1 misery1 c41 the other1 they are still but different degrees of the same thing1 and belong to the ideas of pleasure and pain1 delight or uneasiness2 which are the names ,i shall most commonly use for those two sorts of ideas4 #c4 ,as motives of our actions4 ,the infinite wise ,author of our being1 having given us the power over several parts of our bodies1 to move or keep them at rest as we think fit2 and also1 by the motion of them1 to move ourselves and other contiguous bodies1 in which consist all the actions of our body3 having also given a power to our minds1 in several instances1 to choose1 amongst its ideas1 which it will think on1 and to pursue the inquiry of this or that subject with consideration and attention1 to excite us to these actions of thinking and motion that we are capable of1--has been pleased to join to several thoughts1 and several sensations a perception of delight4 ,if this were wholly separated from all our outward sensations1 and inward thoughts1 we should have no reason to prefer one thought or action to another2 negligence to attention1 or motion to rest4 ,and so we should neither stir our bodies1 nor employ our minds1 but let our thoughts 7if ,i may so call it7 run adrift1 without any direction or design1 and suffer the ideas of our minds1 like unregarded shadows1 to make their appearances there1 as it happened1 without attending to them4 ,in which state man1 however furnished with the faculties of understanding and will1 would be a very idle1 inactive creature1 and pass his time only in a lazy1 lethargic dream4 ,it has therefore pleased our wise ,creator to annex to several objects1 and the ideas which we receive from them1 as also to several of our thoughts1 a concomitant pleasure1 and that in several objects1 to several degrees1 that those faculties which he had endowed us with might not remain wholly idle and unemployed by us4 #d4 ,an end and use of pain4 ,pain has the same efficacy and use to set us on work that pleasure has1 we being as ready to employ our faculties to avoid that1 as to pursue this3 only this is worth our consideration1 that pain is often produced by the same objects and ideas that produce pleasure in us4 ,this their near conjunction1 which makes us often feel pain in the sensations where we expected pleasure1 gives us new occasion of admiring the wisdom and goodness of our ,maker1 who1 designing the preservation of our being1 has annexed pain to the application of many things to our bodies1 to warn us of the harm that they will do1 and as advices to withdraw from them4 ,but he1 not designing our preservation barely1 but the preservation of every part and organ in its perfection1 hath in many cases annexed pain to those very ideas which delight us4 ,thus heat1 that is very agreeable to us in one degree1 by a little greater increase of it proves no ordinary torment3 and the most pleasant of all sensible objects1 light itself1 if there be too much of it1 if increased beyond a due proportion to our eyes1 causes a very painful sensation4 ,which is wisely and favourably so ordered by nature1 that when any object does1 by the vehemency of its operation1 disorder the instruments of sensation1 whose structures cannot but be very nice and delicate1 we might1 by the pain1 be warned to withdraw1 before the organ be quite put out of order1 and so be unfitted for its proper function for the future4 ,the consideration of those objects that produce it may well persuade us1 that this is the end or use of pain4 ,for1 though great light be insufferable to our eyes1 yet the highest degree of darkness does not at all disease them3 because that1 causing no disorderly motion in it1 leaves that curious organ unharmed in its natural state4 ,but yet excess of cold as well as heat pains us3 because it is equally destructive to that temper which is necessary to the preservation of life1 and the exercise of the several functions of the body1 and which consists in a moderate degree of warmth2 or1 if you please1 a motion of the insensible parts of our bodies1 confined within certain bounds4 #e4 ,another end4 ,beyond all this1 we may find another reason why ,god hath scattered up and down several degrees of pleasure and pain1 in all the things that environ and affect us2 and blended them together in almost all that our thoughts and senses have to do with2--that we1 finding imperfection1 dissatisfaction1 and want of complete happiness1 in all the enjoyments which the creatures can afford us1 might be led to seek it in the enjoyment of ,him with whom there is fullness of joy1 and at whose right hand are pleasures for evermore4 #f4 ,goodness of ,god in annexing pleasure and pain to our other ideas4 ,though what ,i have here said may not1 perhaps1 make the ideas of pleasure and pain clearer to us than our own experience does1 which is the only way that we are capable of having them2 yet the consideration of the reason why they are annexed to so many other ideas1 serving to give us due sentiments of the wisdom and goodness of the ,sovereign ,disposer of all things1 may not be unsuitable to the main end of these inquiries3 the knowledge and veneration of him being the chief end of all our thoughts1 and the proper business of all understandings4 #g4 ,ideas of ,existence and ,unity4 ,,existence and ,,unity are two other ideas that are suggested to the understanding by every object without1 and every idea within4 ,when ideas are in our minds1 we consider them as being actually there1 as well as we consider things to be actually without us2--which is1 that they exist1 or have existence4 ,and whatever we can consider as one thing1 whether a real being or idea1 suggests to the understanding the idea of unity4 #h4 ,idea of ,power4 ,,power also is another of those simple ideas which we receive from sensation and reflection4 ,for1 observing in ourselves that we do and can think1 and that we can at pleasure move several parts of our bodies which were at rest2 the effects1 also1 that natural bodies are able to produce in one another1 occurring every moment to our senses1--we both these ways get the idea of power4 #i4 ,idea of ,succession4 ,besides these there is another idea1 which1 though suggested by our senses1 yet is more constantly offered to us by what passes in our minds2 and that is the idea of ,,succession4 ,for if we look immediately into ourselves1 and reflect on what is observable there1 we shall find our ideas always1 whilst we are awake1 or have any thought1 passing in train1 one going and another coming1 without intermission4 #aj4 ,simple ,ideas the materials of all our ,knowledge4 ,these1 if they are not all1 are at least 7as ,i think7 the most considerable of those simple ideas which the mind has1 out of which is made all its other knowledge2 all which it receives only by the two forementioned ways of sensation and reflection4 ,nor let any one think these too narrow bounds for the capacious mind of man to expatiate in1 which takes its flight further than the stars1 and cannot be confined by the limits of the world2 that extends its thoughts often even beyond the utmost expansion of ,matter1 and makes excursions into that incomprehensible ,inane4 ,i grant all this1 but desire any one to assign any ,,simple ,,idea which is not received from one of those inlets before mentioned1 or any ,,complex ,,idea not made out of those simple ones4 ,nor will it be so strange to think these few simple ideas sufficient to employ the quickest thought1 or largest capacity2 and to furnish the materials of all that various knowledge1 and more various fancies and opinions of all mankind1 if we consider how many words may be made out of the various composition of twenty-four letters2 or if1 going one step further1 we will but reflect on the variety of combinations that may be made with barely one of the above-mentioned ideas1 viz4 number1 whose stock is inexhaustible and truly infinite3 and what a large and immense field doth extension alone afford the mathematicians8 ,,chapter ,,viii4 ,,some ,,further ,,considerations ,,concerning ,,our ,,simple ,,ideas ,,of ,,sensation4 #a4 ,positive ,ideas from privative causes4 ,concerning the simple ideas of ,sensation2 it is to be considered1--that whatsoever is so constituted in nature as to be able1 by affecting our senses1 to cause any perception in the mind1 doth thereby produce in the understanding a simple idea2 which1 whatever be the external cause of it1 when it comes to be taken notice of by our discerning faculty1 it is by the mind looked on and considered there to be a real positive idea in the understanding1 as much as any other whatsoever2 though1 perhaps1 the cause of it be but a privation of the subject4 #b4 ,ideas in the mind distinguished from that in things which gives rise to them4 ,thus the ideas of heat and cold1 light and darkness1 white and black1 motion and rest1 are equally clear and positive ideas in the mind2 though1 perhaps1 some of the causes which produce them are barely privations1 in those subjects from whence our senses derive those ideas4 ,these the understanding1 in its view of them1 considers all as distinct positive ideas1 without taking notice of the causes that produce them3 which is an inquiry not belonging to the idea1 as it is in the understanding1 but to the nature of the things existing without us4 ,these are two very different things1 and carefully to be distinguished2 it being one thing to perceive and know the idea of white or black1 and quite another to examine what kind of particles they must be1 and how ranged in the superficies1 to make any object appear white or black4 #c4 ,we may have the ideas when we are ignorant of their physical causes4 ,a painter or dyer who never inquired into their causes hath the ideas of white and black1 and other colours1 as clearly1 perfectly1 and distinctly in his understanding1 and perhaps more distinctly1 than the philosopher who hath busied himself in considering their natures1 and thinks he knows how far either of them is1 in its cause1 positive or privative2 and the idea of black is no less positive in his mind than that of white1 however the cause of that colour in the external object may be only a privation4 #d4 ,why a privative cause in nature may occasion a positive idea4 ,if it were the design of my present undertaking to inquire into the natural causes and manner of perception1 ,i should offer this as a reason why a privative cause might1 in some cases at least1 produce a positive idea2 viz4 that all sensation being produced in us only by different degrees and modes of motion in our animal spirits1 variously agitated by external objects1 the abatement of any former motion must as necessarily produce a new sensation as the variation or increase of it2 and so introduce a new idea1 which depends only on a different motion of the animal spirits in that organ4 #e4 ,negative names need not be meaningless4 ,but whether this be so or not ,i will not here determine1 but appeal to every one's own experience1 whether the shadow of a man1 though it consists of nothing but the absence of light 7and the more the absence of light is1 the more discernible is the shadow7 does not1 when a man looks on it1 cause as clear and positive idea in his mind1 as a man himself1 though covered over with clear sunshine8 ,and the picture of a shadow is a positive thing4 ,indeed1 we have negative names1 to which there be no positive ideas2 but they consist wholly in negation of some certain ideas1 as ,,silence1 ,,invisible2 but these signify not any ideas in the mind but their absence4 #f4 ,whether any ideas are due to causes really private4 ,and thus one may truly be said to see darkness4 ,for1 supposing a hole perfectly dark1 from whence no light is reflected1 it is certain one may see the figure of it1 or it may be painted2 or whether the ink ,i write with makes any other idea1 is a question4 ,the privative causes ,i have here assigned of positive ideas are according to the common opinion2 but1 in truth1 it will be hard to determine whether there be really any ideas from a privative cause1 till it be determined1 whether rest be any more a privation than motion4 #g4 ,ideas in the ,mind1 ,qualities in ,bodies4 ,to discover the nature of our ,,ideas the better1 and to discourse of them intelligibly1 it will be convenient to distinguish them ,,as ,,they ,,are ,,ideas ,,or ,,perceptions ,,in ,,our ,,minds2 and ,,as ,,they ,,are ,,modifications ,,of ,,matter ,,in ,,the ,,bodies ,,that ,,cause ,,such ,,perceptions ,,in ,,us3 that so we may not think 7as perhaps usually is done7 that they are exactly the images and resemblances of something inherent in the subject2 most of those of sensation being in the mind no more the likeness of something existing without us1 than the names that stand for them are the likeness of our ideas1 which yet upon hearing they are apt to excite in us4 #h4 ,our ,ideas and the ,qualities of ,bodies4 ,whatsoever the mind perceives ,,in ,,itself1 or is the immediate object of perception1 thought1 or understanding1 that ,i call ,,idea2 and the power to produce any idea in our mind1 ,i call ,,quality of the subject wherein that power is4 ,thus a snowball having the power to produce in us the ideas of white1 cold1 and round1--the power to produce those ideas in us1 as they are in the snowball1 ,i call qualities2 and as they are sensations or perceptions in our understandings1 ,i call them ideas2 which ,,ideas1 if ,i speak of sometimes as in the things themselves1 ,i would be understood to mean those qualities in the objects which produce them in us4 #i4 ,primary ,qualities of ,bodies4 ,concerning these qualities1 we1 ,i think1 observe these primary ones in bodies that produce simple ideas in us1 viz4 ,,solidity1 ,,extension1 ,,motion or ,,rest1 ,,number or ,,figure4 ,these1 which ,i call ,,original or ,,primary qualities of body1 are wholly inseparable from it2 and such as in all the alterations and changes it suffers1 all the force can be used upon it1 it constantly keeps2 and such as sense constantly finds in every particle of matter which has bulk enough to be perceived2 and the mind finds inseparable from every particle of matter1 though less than to make itself singly be perceived by our senses3 v4g4 ,take a grain of wheat1 divide it into two parts2 each part has still solidity1 extension1 figure1 and mobility3 divide it again1 and it retains still the same qualities2 and so divide it on1 till the parts become insensible2 they must retain still each of them all those qualities4 ,for division 7which is all that a mill1 or pestle1 or any other body1 does upon another1 in reducing it to insensible parts7 can never take away either solidity1 extension1 figure1 or mobility from any body1 but only makes two or more distinct separate masses of matter1 of that which was but one before2 all which distinct masses1 reckoned as so many distinct bodies1 after division1 make a certain number4 #aj4 not in early editions #aa4 ,how ,bodies produce ,ideas in us4 ,the next thing to be considered is1 how bodies operate one upon another2 and that is manifestly by impulse1 and nothing else4 ,it being impossible to conceive that body should operate on ,,what ,,it ,,does ,,not ,,touch 7which is all one as to imagine it can operate where it is not71 or when it does touch1 operate any other way than by motion4 #ab4 ,by motions1 external1 and in our organism4 ,if then external objects be not united to our minds when they produce ideas therein2 and yet we perceive these ,,original qualities in such of them as singly fall under our senses1 it is evident that some motion must be thence continued by our nerves1 or animal spirits1 by some parts of our bodies1 to the brains or the seat of sensation1 there to produce in our minds the particular ideas we have of them4 ,and since the extension1 figure1 number1 and motion of bodies of an observable bigness1 may be perceived at a distance by the sight1 it is evident some singly imperceptible bodies must come from them2 to the eyes1 and thereby convey to the brain some motion2 which produces these ideas which we have of them in us4 #ac4 ,how secondary ,qualities produce their ideas4 ,after the same manner that the ideas of these original qualities are produced in us1 we may conceive that the ideas of ,,secondary qualities are also produced1 viz4 by the operation of insensible particles on our senses4 ,for1 it being manifest that there are bodies and good store of bodies1 each whereof are so small1 that we cannot by any of our senses discover either their bulk1 figure1 or motion1--as is evident in the particles of the air and water1 and others extremely smaller than those2 perhaps as much smaller than the particles of air and water1 as the particles of air and water are smaller than peas or hail-stones2--let us suppose at present that1 the different motions and figures1 bulk and number1 of such particles1 affecting the several organs of our senses1 produce in us those different sensations which we have from the colours and smells of bodies2 v4g4 that a violet1 by the impulse of such insensible particles of matter1 of peculiar figures and bulks1 and in different degrees and modifications of their motions1 causes the ideas of the blue colour1 and sweet scent of that flower to be produced in our minds4 ,it being no more impossible to conceive that ,god should annex such ideas to such motions1 with which they have no similitude1 than that he should annex the idea of pain to the motion of a piece of steel dividing our flesh1 with which that idea hath no resemblance4 #ad4 ,they depend on the primary ,qualities4 ,what ,i have said concerning colours and smells may be understood also of tastes and sounds1 and other the like sensible qualities2 which1 whatever reality we by mistake attribute to them1 are in truth nothing in the objects themselves1 but powers to produce various sensations in us2 and depend on those primary qualities1 viz4 bulk1 figure1 texture1 and motion of parts and therefore ,i call them ,,secondary ,,qualities4 #ae4 ,ideas of primary ,qualities are ,resemblances2 of secondary1 not4 ,from whence ,i think it easy to draw this observation1--that the ideas of primary qualities of bodies are resemblances of them1 and their patterns do really exist in the bodies themselves1 but the ideas produced in us by these secondary qualities have no resemblance of them at all4 ,there is nothing like our ideas1 existing in the bodies themselves4 ,they are1 in the bodies we denominate from them1 only a power to produce those sensations in us3 and what is sweet1 blue1 or warm in idea1 is but the certain bulk1 figure1 and motion of the insensible parts1 in the bodies themselves1 which we call so4 #af4 ,examples4 ,flame is denominated hot and light2 snow1 white and cold2 and manna1 white and sweet1 from the ideas they produce in us4 ,which qualities are commonly thought to be the same in those bodies that those ideas are in us1 the one the perfect resemblance of the other1 as they are in a mirror1 and it would by most men be judged very extravagant if one should say otherwise4 ,and yet he that will consider that the same fire that1 at one distance produces in us the sensation of warmth1 does1 at a nearer approach1 produce in us the far different sensation of pain1 ought to bethink himself what reason he has to say--that this idea of warmth1 which was produced in him by the fire1 is ,,actually ,,in ,,the ,,fire2 and his idea of pain1 which the same fire produced in him the same way1 is ,,not in the fire4 ,why are whiteness and coldness in snow1 and pain not1 when it produces the one and the other idea in us2 and can do neither1 but by the bulk1 figure1 number1 and motion of its solid parts8 #ag4 ,the ideas of the ,primary alone really exist4 ,the particular bulk1 number1 figure1 and motion of the parts of fire or snow are really in them1--whether any one's senses perceive them or no3 and therefore they may be called ,,real qualities1 because they really exist in those bodies4 ,but light1 heat1 whiteness1 or coldness1 are no more really in them than sickness or pain is in manna4 ,take away the sensation of them2 let not the eyes see light or colours1 nor the ear hear sounds2 let the palate not taste1 nor the nose smell1 and all colours1 tastes1 odours1 and sounds1 ,,as ,,they ,,are ,,such ,,particular ,,ideas1 vanish and cease1 and are reduced to their causes1 i4e4 bulk1 figure1 and motion of parts4 #ah4 ,the secondary exist in things only as modes of the primary4 ,a piece of manna of a sensible bulk is able to produce in us the idea of a round or square figure2 and by being removed from one place to another1 the idea of motion4 ,this idea of motion represents it as it really is in manna moving3 a circle or square are the same1 whether in idea or existence1 in the mind or in the manna4 ,and this1 both motion and as figure1 are really in the manna1 whether we take notice of primary1 them or no3 this everybody is ready to agree to4 ,besides1 manna1 by the bulk1 figure1 texture1 and motion of its parts1 has a power to produce the sensations of sickness1 and sometimes of acute pains or gripings in us4 ,that these ideas of sickness and pain are ,,not in the manna1 but effects of its operations on us1 and are nowhere when we feel them not2 this also every one readily agrees to4 ,and yet men are hardly to be brought to think that sweetness and whiteness are not really in manna2 which are but the effects of the operations of manna1 by the motion1 size1 and figure of its particles1 on the eyes and palate3 as the pain and sickness caused by manna are confessedly nothing but the effects of its operations on the stomach and guts1 by the size1 motion1 and figure of its insensible parts1 7for by nothing else can a body operate1 as has been proved73 as if it could not operate on the eyes and palate1 and thereby produce in the mind particular distinct ideas1 which in itself it has not1 as well as we allow it can operate on the guts and stomach1 and thereby produce distinct ideas1 which in itself it has not4 ,these ideas1 being all effects of the operations of manna on several parts of our bodies1 by the size1 figure1 number1 and motion of its parts2--why those produced by the eyes and palate should rather be thought to be really in the manna1 than those produced by the stomach and guts2 or why the pain and sickness1 ideas that are the effect of manna1 should be thought to be nowhere when they are not felt2 and yet the sweetness and whiteness1 effects of the same manna on other parts of the body1 by ways equally as unknown1 should be thought to exist in the manna1 when they are not seen or tasted1 would need some reason to explain4 #ai4 ,examples4 ,let us consider the red and white colours in porphyry4 ,hinder light from striking on it1 and its colours vanish2 it no longer produces any such ideas in us3 upon the return of light it produces these appearances on us again4 ,can any one think any real alterations are made in the porphyry by the presence or absence of light2 and that those ideas of whiteness and redness are really in porphryry in the light1 when it is plain ,,it ,,has ,,no ,,colour ,,in ,,the ,,dark8 ,it has1 indeed1 such a configuration of particles1 both night and day1 as are apt1 by the rays of light rebounding from some parts of that hard stone1 to produce in us the idea of redness1 and from others the idea of whiteness2 but whiteness or redness are not in it at any time1 but such a texture that hath the power to produce such a sensation in us4 #bj4 ,pound an almond1 and the clear white colour will be altered into a dirty one1 and the sweet taste into an oily one4 ,what real alteration can the beating of the pestle make in an body1 but an alteration of the texture of it8 #ba4 ,explains how water felt as cold by one hand may be warm to the other4 ,ideas being thus distinguished and understood1 we may be able to give an account how the same water1 at the same time1 may produce the idea of cold by one hand and of heat by the other3 whereas it is impossible that the same water1 if those ideas were really in it1 should at the same time be both hot and cold4 ,for1 if we imagine ,,warmth1 as it is in our hands1 to be nothing but a certain sort and degree of motion in the minute particles of our nerves or animal spirits1 we may understand how it is possible that the same water may1 at the same time1 produce the sensations of heat in one hand and cold in the other2 which yet ,,figure never does1 that never producing the idea of a square by one hand which has produced the idea of a globe by another4 ,but if the sensation of heat and cold be nothing but the increase or diminution of the motion of the minute parts of our bodies1 caused by the corpuscles of any other body1 it is easy to be understood1 that if that motion be greater in one hand than in the other2 if a body be applied to the two hands1 which has in its minute particles a greater motion than in those of one of the hands1 and a less than in those of the other1 it will increase the motion of the one hand and lessen it in the other2 and so cause the different sensations of heat and cold that depend thereon4 #bb4 ,an excursion into natural philosophy4 ,i have in what just goes before been engaged in physical inquiries a little further than perhaps ,i intended4 ,but1 it being necessary to make the nature of sensation a little understood2 and to make the difference between the ,,qualities in bodies1 and the ,,ideas produced by them in the mind1 to be distinctly conceived1 without which it were impossible to discourse intelligibly of them2--,i hope ,i shall be pardoned this little excursion into natural philosophy2 it being necessary in our present inquiry to distinguish the ,,primary and ,,real qualities of bodies1 which are always in them 7viz4 solidity1 extension1 figure1 number1 and motion1 or rest1 and are sometimes perceived by us1 viz4 when the bodies they are in are big enough singly to be discerned71 from those ,,secondary and ,,imputed qualities1 which are but the powers of several combinations of those primary ones1 when they operate without being distinctly discerned2--whereby we may also come to know what ideas are1 and what are not1 resemblances of something really existing in the bodies we denominate from them4 #bc4 ,three ,sorts of ,qualities in ,bodies4 ,the qualities1 then1 that are in bodies1 rightly considered are of three sorts3-- ,,first1 ,the bulk1 figure1 number1 situation1 and motion or rest of their solid parts4 ,those are in them1 whether we perceive them or not2 and when they are of that size that we can discover them1 we have by these an idea of the thing as it is in itself2 as is plain in artificial things4 ,these ,i call ,,primary ,,qualities4 ,,secondly1 ,the power that is in any body1 by reason of its insensible primary qualities1 to operate after a peculiar manner on any of our senses1 and thereby produce in ,,us the different ideas of several colours1 sounds1 smells1 tastes1 c4 ,these are usually called ,,sensible ,,qualities4 ,,thirdly1 ,the power that is in any body1 by reason of the particular constitution of its primary qualities1 to make such a change in the bulk1 figure1 texture1 and motion of ,,another ,,body1 as to make it operate on our senses differently from what it did before4 ,thus the sun has a power to make wax white1 and fire to make lead fluid4 ,the first of these1 as has been said1 ,i think may be properly called real1 original1 or primary qualities2 because they are in the things themselves1 whether they are perceived or not3 and upon their different modifications it is that the secondary qualities depend4 ,the other two are only powers to act differently upon other things3 which powers result from the different modifications of those primary qualities4 #bd4 ,the first are ,resemblances2 the second thought to be ,resemblances1 but are not1 the third neither are nor are thought so4 ,but1 though the two latter sorts of qualities are powers barely1 and nothing but powers1 relating to several other bodies1 and resulting from the different modifications of the original qualities1 yet they are generally otherwise thought of4 ,for the ,,second sort1 viz4 the powers to produce several ideas in us1 by our senses1 are looked upon as real qualities in the things thus affecting us3 but the ,,third sort are called and esteemed barely powers1 v4g4 ,the idea of heat or light1 which we receive by our eyes1 or touch1 from the sun1 are commonly thought real qualities existing in the sun1 and something more than mere powers in it4 ,but when we consider the sun in reference to wax1 which it melts or blanches1 we look on the whiteness and softness produced in the wax1 not as qualities in the sun1 but effects produced by powers in it4 ,whereas1 if rightly considered1 these qualities of light and warmth1 which are perceptions in me when ,i am warmed or enlightened by the sun1 are no otherwise in the sun1 than the changes made in the wax1 when it is blanched or melted1 are in the sun4 ,they are all of them equally ,,powers ,,in ,,the ,,sun1 ,,depending ,,on ,,its ,,primary ,,qualities2 whereby it is able1 in the one case1 so to alter the bulk1 figure1 texture1 or motion of some of the insensible parts of my eyes or hands1 as thereby to produce in me the idea of light or heat2 and in the other1 it is able so to alter the bulk1 figure1 texture1 or motion of the insensible parts of the wax1 as to make them fit to produce in me the distinct ideas of white and fluid4 #be4 ,why the secondary are ordinarily taken for real ,qualities and not for bare ,powers4 ,the reason why the one are ordinarily taken for real qualities1 and the other only for bare powers1 seems to be because the ideas we have of distinct colours1 sounds1 c4 containing nothing at all in them of bulk1 figure1 or motion we are not apt to think them the effects of these primary qualities2 which appear not1 to our senses1 to operate in their production1 and with which they have not any apparent congruity or conceivable connexion4 ,hence it is that we are so forward as to imagine1 that those ideas are the resemblances of something really existing in the objects themselves since sensation discovers nothing of bulk1 figure1 or motion of parts in their production2 nor can reason show how bodies ,,by ,,their ,,bulk1 ,,figure1 ,,and ,,motion1 should produce in the mind the ideas of blue or yellow1 c4 ,but1 in the other case in the operations of bodies changing the qualities one of another1 we plainly discover that the quality produced hath commonly no resemblance with anything in the thing producing it2 wherefore we look on it as a bare effect of power4 ,for1 through receiving the idea of heat or light from the sun1 we are apt to think ,,it is a perception and resemblance of such a quality in the sun2 yet when we see wax1 or a fair face1 receive change of colour from the sun1 we cannot imagine ,,that to be the reception or resemblance of anything in the sun1 because we find not those different colours in the sun itself4 ,for1 our senses being able to observe a likeness or unlikeness of sensible qualities in two different external objects1 we forwardly enough conclude the production of any sensible quality in any subject to be an effect of bare power1 and not the communication of any quality which was really in the efficient1 when we find no such sensible quality in the thing that produced it4 ,but our senses1 not being able to discover any unlikeness between the idea produced in us1 and the quality of the object producing it1 we are apt to imagine that our ideas are resemblances of something in the objects1 and not the effects of certain powers placed in the modification of their primary qualities1 with which primary qualities the ideas produced in us have no resemblance4 #bf4 ,secondary ,qualities twofold2 first1 immediately perceivable2 secondly1 mediately perceivable4 ,to conclude4 ,beside those before-mentioned primary qualities in bodies1 viz4 bulk1 figure1 extension1 number1 and motion of their solid parts2 all the rest1 whereby we take notice of bodies1 and distinguish them one from another1 are nothing else but several powers in them1 depending on those primary qualities2 whereby they are fitted1 either by immediately operating on our bodies to produce several different ideas in us2 or else1 by operating on other bodies1 so to change their primary qualities as to render them capable of producing ideas in us different from what before they did4 ,the former of these1 ,i think1 may be called secondary qualities ,,immediately ,,perceivable3 the latter1 secondary qualities1 ,,mediately ,,perceivable4 ,,chapter ,,ix4 ,,of ,,perception4 #a4 ,perception the first simple ,idea of ,reflection4 ,,perception1 as it is the first faculty of the mind exercised about our ideas2 so it is the first and simplest idea we have from reflection1 and is by some called thinking in general4 ,though thinking1 in the propriety of the ,english tongue1 signifies that sort of operation in the mind about its ideas1 wherein the mind is active2 where it1 with some degree of voluntary attention1 considers anything4 ,for in bare naked perception1 the mind is1 for the most part1 only passive2 and what it perceives1 it cannot avoid perceiving4 #b4 ,reflection alone can give us the idea of what perception is4 ,what perception is1 every one will know better by reflecting on what he does himself1 when he sees1 hears1 feels1 c41 or thinks1 than by any discourse of mine4 ,whoever reflects on what passes in his own mind cannot miss it4 ,and if he does not reflect1 all the words in the world cannot make him have any notion of it4 #c4 ,arises in sensation only when the mind notices the organic impression4 ,this is certain1 that whatever alterations are made in the body1 if they reach not the mind2 whatever impressions are made on the outward parts1 if they are not taken notice of within1 there is no perception4 ,fire may burn our bodies with no other effect than it does a billet1 unless the motion be continued to the brain1 and there the sense of heat1 or idea of pain1 be produced in the mind2 wherein consists actual perception4 #d4 ,impulse on the organ insufficient4 ,how often may a man observe in himself1 that whilst his mind is intently employed in the contemplation of some objects1 and curiously surveying some ideas that are there1 it takes no notice of impressions of sounding bodies made upon the organ of hearing1 with the same alteration that uses to be for the producing the idea of sound8 ,a sufficient impulse there may be on the organ2 but it not reaching the observation of the mind1 there follows no perception3 and though the motion that uses to produce the idea of sound be made in the ear1 yet no sound is heard4 ,want of sensation1 in this case1 is not through any defect in the organ1 or that the man's ears are less affected than at other times when he does hear but that which uses to produce the idea1 though conveyed in by the usual organ1 not being taken notice of in the understanding1 and so imprinting no idea in the mind1 there follows no sensation4 ,so that wherever there is sense of perception1 there some idea is actually produced1 and present in the understanding4 #e4 ,children1 though they may have ,ideas in the ,womb1 have none innate4 ,therefore ,i doubt not but children1 by the exercise of their senses about objects that affect them in the womb receive some few ideas before they are born1 as the unavoidable effects1 either of the bodies that environ them1 or else of those wants or diseases they suffer2 amongst which 7if one may conjecture concerning things not very capable of examination7 ,i think the ideas of hunger and warmth are two3 which probably are some of the first that children have1 and which they scarce ever part with again4 #f4 ,the effects of ,sensation in the womb4 ,but though it be reasonable to imagine that children receive some ideas before they come into the world1 yet these simple ideas are far from those ,,innate ,,principles which some contend for1 and we1 above1 have rejected4 ,these here mentioned1 being the effects of sensation1 are only from some affections of the body1 which happen to them there1 and so depend on something exterior to the mind2 no otherwise differing in their manner of production from other ideas derived from sense1 but only in the precedency of time4 ,whereas those innate principles are supposed to be quite of another nature2 not coming into the mind by any accidental alterations in1 or operations on the body2 but1 as it were1 original characters impressed upon it1 in the very first moment of its being and constitution4 #g4 ,which ,ideas appear first is not evident1 nor important4 ,as there are some ideas which we may reasonably suppose may be introduced into the minds of children in the womb1 subservient to the necessities of their life and being there3 so1 after they are born1 those ideas are the earliest imprinted which happen to be the sensible qualities which first occur to them2 amongst which light is not the least considerable1 nor of the weakest efficacy4 ,and how covetous the mind is to be furnished with all such ideas as have no pain accompanying them1 may be a little guessed by what is observable in children new-born2 who always turn their eyes to that part from whence the light comes1 lay them how you please4 ,but the ideas that are most familiar at first1 being various according to the divers circumstances of children's first entertainment in the world1 the order wherein the several ideas come at first into the mind is very various1 and uncertain also2 neither is it much material to know it4 #h4 ,sensations often changed by the ,judgment4 ,we are further to consider concerning perception1 that the ideas we receive by sensation are often1 in grown people1 altered by the judgment1 without our taking notice of it4 ,when we set before our eyes a round globe of any uniform colour1 v4g4 gold1 alabaster1 or jet1 it is certain that the idea thereby imprinted on our mind is of a flat circle1 variously shadowed1 with several degrees of light and brightness coming to our eyes4 ,but we having1 by use1 been accustomed to perceive what kind of appearance convex bodies are wont to make in us2 what alterations are made in the reflections of light by the difference of the sensible figures of bodies2--the judgment presently1 by an habitual custom1 alters the appearances into their causes4 ,so that from that which is truly variety of shadow or colour1 collecting the figure1 it makes it pass for a mark of figure1 and frames to itself the perception of a convex figure and an uniform colour2 when the idea we receive from thence is only a plane variously coloured1 as is evident in painting4 ,to which purpose ,i shall here insert a problem of that very ingenious and studious promoter of real knowledge1 the learned and worthy ,mr4 ,molineux1 which he was pleased to send me in a letter some months since2 and it is this3--8,suppose a man ,,born blind1 and now adult1 and taught by his ,,touch to distinguish between a cube and a sphere of the same metal1 and nighly of the same bigness1 so as to tell1 when he felt one and the other1 which is the cube1 which the sphere4 ,suppose then the cube and sphere placed on a table1 and the blind man be made to see3 quaere1 whether ,,by ,,his ,,sight1 ,,before ,,he ,,touched ,,them1 he could now distinguish and tell which is the globe1 which the cube80 ,to which the acute and judicious proposer answers1 8,not4 ,for1 though he has obtained the experience of how a globe1 how a cube affects his touch1 yet he has not yet obtained the experience1 that what affects his touch so or so1 must affect his sight so or so2 or that a protuberant angle in the cube1 that pressed his hand unequally1 shall appear to his eye as it does in the cube40--,i agree with this thinking gentleman1 whom ,i am proud to call my friend1 in his answer to this problem2 and am of opinion that the blind man1 at first sight1 would not be able with certainty to say which was the globe1 which the cube1 whilst he only saw them2 though he could unerringly name them by his touch1 and certainly distinguish them by the difference of their figures felt4 ,this ,i have set down1 and leave with my reader1 as an occasion for him to consider how much he may be beholden to experience1 improvement1 and acquired notions1 where he thinks he had not the least use of1 or help from them4 ,and the rather1 because this observing gentleman further adds1 that 8having1 upon the occasion of my book1 proposed this to divers very ingenious men1 he hardly ever met with one that at first gave the answer to it which he thinks true1 till by hearing his reasons they were convinced40 #i4 ,this judgement apt to be mistaken for direct perception4 ,but this is not1 ,i think1 usual in any of our ideas1 but those received by sight4 ,because sight1 the most comprehensive of all our senses1 conveying to our minds the ideas of light and colours1 which are peculiar only to that sense2 and also the far different ideas of space1 figure1 and motion1 the several varieties whereof change the appearances of its proper object1 viz4 light and colours2 we bring ourselves by use to judge of the one by the other4 ,this1 in many cases by a settled habit1--in things whereof we have frequent experience is performed so constantly and so quick1 that we take that for the perception of our sensation which is an idea formed by our judgment2 so that one1 viz4 that of sensation1 serves only to excite the other1 and is scarce taken notice of itself2--as a man who reads or hears with attention and understanding1 takes little notice of the characters or sounds1 but of the ideas that are excited in him by them4 #aj4 ,how1 by ,habit1 ideas of ,sensation are unconsciously changed into ideas of ,judgment4 ,nor need we wonder that this is done with so little notice1 if we consider how quick the actions of the mind are performed4 ,for1 as itself is thought to take up no space to have no extension2 so its actions seem to require no time but many of them seem to be crowded into an instant4 ,i speak this in comparison to the actions of the body4 ,any one may easily observe this in his own thoughts1 who will take the pains to reflect on them4 ,how1 as it were in an instant1 do our minds1 with one glance1 see all the parts of a demonstration1 which may very well be called a long one1 if we consider the time it will require to put it into words1 and step by step show it another8 ,secondly1 we shall not be so much surprised that this is done in us with so little notice1 if we consider how the facility which we get of doing things1 by a custom of doing1 makes them often pass in us without our notice4 ,habits1 especially such as are begun very early1 come at last to produce actions in us1 which often escape our observation4 ,how frequently do we1 in a day1 cover our eyes with our eyelids1 without perceiving that we are at all in the dark6 ,men that1 by custom1 have got the use of a by-word1 do almost in every sentence pronounce sounds which1 though taken notice of by others1 they themselves neither hear nor observe4 ,and therefore it is not so strange1 that our mind should often change the idea of its sensation into that of its judgment1 and make one serve only to excite the other1 without our taking notice of it4 #aa4 ,perception puts the difference between ,animals and ,vegetables4 ,this faculty of perception seems to me to be1 that which puts the distinction betwixt the animal kingdom and the inferior parts of nature4 ,for1 however vegetables have1 many of them1 some degrees of motion1 and upon the different application of other bodies to them1 do very briskly alter their figures and motions1 and so have obtained the name of sensitive plants1 from a motion which has some resemblance to that which in animals follows upon sensation3 yet ,i suppose it is all bare ,,mechanism2 and no otherwise produced than the turning of a wild oat-beard1 by the insinuation of the particles of moisture1 or the shortening of a rope1 by the affusion of water4 ,all which is done without any sensation in the subject1 or the having or receiving any ideas4 #ab4 ,perception in all animals4 ,perception1 ,i believe1 is1 in some degree1 in all sorts of animals2 though in some possibly the avenues provided by nature for the reception of sensations are so few1 and the perception they are received with so obscure and dull1 that it comes extremely short of the quickness and variety of sensation which is in other animals2 but yet it is sufficient for1 and wisely adapted to1 the state and condition of that sort of animals who are thus made4 ,so that the wisdom and goodness of the ,maker plainly appear in all the parts of this stupendous fabric1 and all the several degrees and ranks of creatures in it4 #ac4 ,according to their condition4 ,we may1 ,i think1 from the make of an oyster or cockle1 reasonably conclude that it has not so many1 nor so quick senses as a man1 or several other animals2 nor if it had1 would it1 in that state and incapacity of transferring itself from one place to another1 be bettered by them4 ,what good would sight and hearing do to a creature that cannot move itself to or from the objects wherein at a distance it perceives good or evil8 ,and would not quickness of sensation be an inconvenience to an animal that must lie still where chance has once placed it1 and there receive the afflux of colder or warmer1 clean or foul water1 as it happens to come to it8 #ad4 ,decay of perception in old age4 ,but yet ,i cannot but think there is some small dull perception1 whereby they are distinguished from perfect insensibility4 ,and that this may be so1 we have plain instances1 even in mankind itself4 ,take one in whom decrepit old age has blotted out the memory of his past knowledge1 and clearly wiped out the ideas his mind was formerly stored with1 and has1 by destroying his sight1 hearing1 and smell quite1 and his taste to a great degree1 stopped up almost all the passages for new ones to enter2 or if there be some of the inlets yet half open1 the impressions made are scarcely perceived1 or not at all retained4 ,how far such an one 7notwithstanding all that is boasted of innate principles7 is in his knowledge and intellectual faculties above the condition of a cockle or an oyster1 ,i leave to be considered4 ,and if a man had passed sixty years in such a state1 as it is possible he might1 as well as three days1 ,i wonder what difference there would be1 in any intellectual perfections1 between him and the lowest degree of animals4 #ae4 ,perception the ,inlet of all materials of ,knowledge4 ,perception then being the ,,first step and degree towards knowledge1 and the inlet of all the materials of it2 the fewer senses any man1 as well as any other creature1 hath2 and the fewer and duller the impressions are that are made by them2 and the duller the faculties are that are employed about them1--the more remote are they from that knowledge which is to be found in some men4 ,but this being in great variety of degrees 7as may be perceived amongst men7 cannot certainly be discovered in the several species of animals1 much less in their particular individuals4 ,it suffices me only to have remarked here1--that perception is the first operation of all our intellectual faculties1 and the inlet of all knowledge in our minds4 ,and ,i am apt too to imagine1 that it is perception1 in the lowest degree of it1 which puts the boundaries between animals and the inferior ranks of creatures4 ,but this ,i mention only as my conjecture by the by2 it being indifferent to the matter in hand which way the learned shall determine of it4 ,,chapter ,x4 ,,of ,,retention4 #a4 ,contemplation ,the next faculty of the mind1 whereby it makes a further progress towards knowledge1 is that which ,i call ,,retention2 or the keeping of those simple ideas which from sensation or reflection it hath received4 ,this is done two ways4 ,first1 by keeping the idea which is brought into it1 for some time actually in view1 which is called ,,contemplation4 #b4 ,memory4 ,the other way of retention is1 the power to revive again in our minds those ideas which1 after imprinting1 have disappeared1 or have been as it were laid aside out of sight4 ,and thus we do1 when we conceive heat or light1 yellow or sweet1--the object being removed4 ,this is ,,memory1 which is as it were the storehouse of our ideas4 ,for1 the narrow mind of man not being capable of having many ideas under view and consideration at once1 it was necessary to have a repository1 to lay up those ideas which1 at another time1 it might have use of4 ,but1 our ,,ideas being nothing but actual perceptions in the mind1 which cease to be anything2 when there is no perception of them2 this laying up of our ideas in the repository of the memory signifies no more but this1--that the mind has a power in many cases to revive perceptions which it has once had1 with this additional perception annexed to them1 that ,,it ,,has ,,had ,,them ,,before4 ,and in this sense it is that our ideas are said to be in our memories1 when indeed they are actually nowhere2--but only there is an ability in the mind when it will to revive them again1 and as it were paint them anew on itself1 though some with more1 some with less difficulty2 some more lively1 and others more obscurely4 ,and thus it is1 by the assistance of this faculty1 that we are said to have all those ideas in our understandings which1 though we do not actually contemplate yet we ,,can bring in sight1 and make appear again1 and be the objects of our thoughts1 without the help of those sensible qualities which first imprinted them there4 #c4 ,attention1 ,repetition1 ,pleasure and ,pain1 fix ,ideas4 ,attention and repetition help much to the fixing any ideas in the memory4 ,but those which naturally at first make the deepest and most lasting impressions1 are those which are accompanied with pleasure or pain4 ,the great business of the senses being1 to make us take notice of what hurts or advantages the body1 it is wisely ordered by nature1 as has been shown1 that pain should accompany the reception of several ideas2 which1 supplying the place of consideration and reasoning in children1 and acting quicker than consideration in grown men1 makes both the old and young avoid painful objects with that haste which is necessary for their preservation2 and in both settles in the memory a caution for the future4 #d4 ,ideas fade in the ,memory4 ,concerning the several degrees of lasting1 wherewith ideas are imprinted on the memory1 we may observe1--that some of them have been produced in the understanding by an object affecting the senses once only1 and no more than once2 others1 that have more than once offered themselves to the senses1 have yet been little taken notice of3 the mind1 either heedless1 as in children1 or otherwise employed1 as in men intent only on one thing2 not setting the stamp deep into itself4 ,and in some1 where they are set on with care and repeated impressions1 either through the temper of the body1 or some other fault1 the memory is very weak4 ,in all these cases1 ideas in the mind quickly fade1 and often vanish quite out of the understanding1 leaving no more footsteps or remaining characters of themselves than shadows do flying over fields of corn1 and the mind is as void of them as if they had never been there4 #e4 ,causes of oblivion4 ,thus many of those ideas which were produced in the minds of children1 in the beginning of their sensation1 7some of which perhaps1 as of some pleasures and pains1 were before they were born1 and others in their infancy17 if in the future course of their lives they are not repeated again1 are quite lost1 without the least glimpse remaining of them4 ,this may be observed in those who by some mischance have lost their sight when they were very young2 in whom the ideas of colours having been but slightly taken notice of1 and ceasing to be repeated1 do quite wear out2 so that some years after1 there is no more notion nor memory of colours left in their minds1 than in those of people born blind4 ,the memory of some men1 it is true1 is very tenacious1 even to a miracle4 ,but yet there seems to be a constant decay of all our ideas1 even of those which are struck deepest1 and in minds the most retentive2 so that if they be not sometimes renewed1 by repeated exercise of the senses1 or reflection on those kinds of objects which at first occasioned them1 the print wears out1 and at last there remains nothing to be seen4 ,thus the ideas1 as well as children1 of our youth1 often die before us3 and our minds represent to us those tombs to which we are approaching2 where1 though the brass and marble remain1 yet the inscriptions are effaced by time1 and the imagery moulders away4 ,the pictures drawn in our minds are laid in fading colours2 and if not sometimes refreshed1 vanish and disappear4 ,how much the constitution of our bodies are concerned in this2 and whether the temper of the brain makes this difference1 that in some it retains the characters drawn on it like marble1 in others like freestone1 and in others little better than sand1 ,i shall here inquire2 though it may seem probable that the constitution of the body does sometimes influence the memory1 since we oftentimes find a disease quite strip the mind of all its ideas1 and the flames of a fever in a few days calcine all those images to dust and confusion1 which seemed to be as lasting as if graved in marble4 #f4 ,constantly repeated ,ideas can scarce be lost4 ,but concerning the ideas themselves1 it is easy to remark1 that those that are oftenest refreshed 7amongst which are those that are conveyed into the mind by more ways than one7 by a frequent return of the objects or actions that produce them1 fix themselves best in the memory1 and remain clearest and longest there2 and therefore those which are of the original qualities of bodies1 viz4 solidity1 extension1 figure1 motion1 and rest2 and those that almost constantly affect our bodies1 as heat and cold2 and those which are the affections of all kinds of beings1 as existence1 duration1 and number1 which almost every object that affects our senses1 every thought which employs our minds1 bring along with them2--these1 ,i say1 and the like ideas1 are seldom quite lost1 whilst the mind retains any ideas at all4 #g4 ,in ,remembering1 the ,mind is often active4 ,in this secondary perception1 as ,i may so call it1 or viewing again the ideas that are lodged in the memory1 the mind is oftentimes more than barely passive2 the appearance of those dormant pictures depending sometimes on the ,,will4 ,the mind very often sets itself on work in search of some hidden idea1 and turns as it were the eye of the soul upon it2 though sometimes too they start up in our minds of their own accord1 and offer themselves to the understanding2 and very often are roused and tumbled out of their dark cells into open daylight1 by turbulent and tempestuous passions2 our affections bringing ideas to our memory1 which had otherwise lain quiet and unregarded4 ,this further is to be observed1 concerning ideas lodged in the memory1 and upon occasion revived by the mind1 that they are not only 7as the word ,,revive imports7 none of them new ones1 but also that the mind takes notice of them as of a former impression1 and renews its acquaintance with them1 as with ideas it had known before4 ,so that though ideas formerly imprinted are not all constantly in view1 yet in remembrance they are constantly known to be such as have been formerly imprinted2 i4e4 in view1 and taken notice of before1 by the understanding4 #h4 ,two defects in the ,memory1 ,oblivion and ,slowness4 ,memory1 in an intellectual creature1 is necessary in the next degree to perception4 ,it is of so great moment1 that1 where it is wanting1 all the rest of our faculties are in a great measure useless4 ,and we in our thoughts1 reasonings1 and knowledge1 could not proceed beyond present objects1 were it not for the assistance of our memories2 wherein there may be two defects3-- ,first1 ,that it loses the idea quite1 and so far it produces perfect ignorance4 ,for1 since we can know nothing further than we have the idea of it1 when that is gone1 we are in perfect ignorance4 ,secondly1 ,that it moves slowly1 and retrieves not the ideas that it has1 and are laid up in store1 quick enough to serve the mind upon occasion4 ,this1 if it be to a great degree1 is stupidity2 and he who1 through this default in his memory1 has not the ideas that are really preserved there1 ready at hand when need and occasion calls for them1 were almost as good be without them quite1 since they serve him to little purpose4 ,the dull man1 who loses the opportunity1 whilst he is seeking in his mind for those ideas that should serve his turn1 is not much more happy in his knowledge than one that is perfectly ignorant4 ,it is the business therefore of the memory to furnish to the mind those dormant ideas which it has present occasion for2 in the having them ready at hand on all occasions1 consists that which we call invention1 fancy1 and quickness of parts4 #i4 ,a defect which belongs to the memory of ,man1 as finite4 ,these are defects we may observe in the memory of one man compared with another4 ,there is another defect which we may conceive to be in the memory of man in general2--compared with some superior created intellectual beings1 which in this faculty may so far excel man1 that they may have ,,constantly in view the whole scene of all their former actions1 wherein no one of the thoughts they have ever had may slip out of their sight4 ,the omniscience of ,god1 who knows all things1 past1 present1 and to come1 and to whom the thoughts of men's hearts always lie open1 may satisfy us of the possibility of this4 ,for who can doubt but ,god may communicate to those glorious spirits1 his immediate attendants1 any of his perfections2 in what proportions he pleases1 as far as created finite beings can be capable8 ,it is reported of that prodigy of parts1 ,monsieur ,pascal1 that till the decay of his health had impaired his memory1 he forgot nothing of what he had done1 read1 or thought1 in any part of his rational age4 ,this is a privilege so little known to most men1 that it seems almost incredible to those who1 after the ordinary way1 measure all others by themselves2 but yet1 when considered1 may help us to enlarge our thoughts towards greater perfections of it1 in superior ranks of spirits4 ,for this of ,monsieur ,pascal was still with the narrowness that human minds are confined to here1--of having great variety of ideas only by succession1 not all at once4 ,whereas the several degrees of angels may probably have larger views2 and some of them be endowed with capacities able to retain together1 and constantly set before them1 as in one picture1 all their past knowledge at once4 ,this1 we may conceive1 would be no small advantage to the knowledge of a thinking man1--if all his past thoughts and reasonings could be ,,always present to him4 ,and therefore we may suppose it one of those ways1 wherein the knowledge of separate spirits may exceedingly surpass ours4 #aj4 ,brutes have ,memory4 ,this faculty of laying up and retaining the ideas that are brought into the mind1 several other animals seem to have to a great degree1 as well as man4 ,for1 to pass by other instances1 birds learning of tunes1 and the endeavours one may observe in them to hit the notes right1 put it past doubt with me1 that they have perception1 and retain ideas in their memories1 and use them for patterns4 ,for it seems to me impossible that they should endeavour to conform their voices to notes 7as it is plain they do7 of which they had no ideas4 ,for1 though ,i should grant sound may mechanically cause a certain motion of the animal spirits in the brains of those birds1 whilst the tune is actually playing2 and that motion may be continued on to the muscles of the wings1 and so the bird mechanically be driven away by certain noises1 because this may tend to the bird's preservation2 yet that can never be supposed a reason why it should cause mechanically--either whilst the tune is playing1 much less after it has ceased--such a motion of the organs in the bird's voice as should conform it to the notes of a foreign sound1 which imitation can be of no use to the bird's preservation4 ,but1 which is more1 it cannot with any appearance of reason be supposed 7much less proved7 that birds1 without sense and memory1 can approach their notes nearer and nearer by degrees to a tune played yesterday2 which if they have no idea of in their memory1 is now nowhere1 nor can be a pattern for them to imitate1 or which any repeated essays can bring them nearer to4 ,since there is no reason why the sound of a pipe should leave traces in their brains1 which1 not at first1 but by their after-endeavours1 should produce the like sounds2 and why the sounds they make themselves1 should not make traces which they should follow1 as well as those of the pipe1 is impossible to conceive4 ,,chapter ,,xi4 ,,of ,,discerning1 ,,and ,,other ,,operations ,,of ,,the ,,mind4 #a4 ,no ,knowledge without ,discernment4 ,another faculty we may take notice of in our minds is that of ,,discerning and ,,distinguishing between the several ideas it has4 ,it is not enough to have a confused perception of something in general4 ,unless the mind had a distinct perception of different objects and their qualities1 it would be capable of very little knowledge1 though the bodies that affect us were as busy about us as they are now1 and the mind were continually employed in thinking4 ,on this faculty of distinguishing one thing from another depends the evidence and certainty of several1 even very general1 propositions1 which have passed for innate truths2--because men1 overlooking the true cause why those propositions find universal assent1 impute it wholly to native uniform impressions2 whereas it in truth depends upon this clear discerning faculty of the mind1 whereby it ,,perceives two ideas to be the same1 or different4 ,but of this more hereafter4 #b4 ,the ,difference of ,wit and ,judgment4 ,how much the imperfection of accurately discriminating ideas one from another lies1 either in the dulness or faults of the organs of sense2 or want of acuteness1 exercise1 or attention in the understanding2 or hastiness and precipitancy1 natural to some tempers1 ,i will not here examine3 it suffices to take notice1 that this is one of the operations that the mind may reflect on and observe in itself4 ,it is of that consequence to its other knowledge1 that so far as this faculty is in itself dull1 or not rightly made use of1 for the distinguishing one thing from another1--so far our notions are confused1 and our reason and judgment disturbed or misled4 ,if in having our ideas in the memory ready at hand consists quickness of parts2 in this1 of having them unconfused1 and being able nicely to distinguish one thing from another1 where there is but the least difference1 consists1 in a great measure1 the exactness of judgment1 and clearness of reason1 which is to be observed in one man above another4 ,and hence perhaps may be given some reason of that common observation1--that men who have a great deal of wit1 and prompt memories1 have not always the clearest judgment or deepest reason4 ,for ,,wit lying most in the assemblage of ideas1 and putting those together with quickness and variety1 wherein can be found any resemblance or congruity1 thereby to make up pleasant pictures and agreeable visions in the fancy2 ,,judgment1 on the contrary1 lies quite on the other side1 in separating carefully1 one from another1 ideas wherein can be found the least difference1 thereby to avoid being misled by similitude1 and by affinity to take one thing for another4 ,this is a way of proceeding quite contrary to metaphor and allusion2 wherein for the most part lies that entertainment and pleasantry of wit1 which strikes so lively on the fancy1 and therefore is so acceptable to all people1 because its beauty appears at first sight1 and there is required no labour of thought to examine what truth or reason there is in it4 ,the mind1 without looking any further1 rests satisfied with the agreeableness of the picture and the gaiety of the fancy4 ,and it is a kind of affront to go about to examine it1 by the severe rules of truth and good reason2 whereby it appears that it consists in something that is not perfectly conformable to them4 #c4 ,clearness alone hinders ,confusion4 ,to the well distinguishing our ideas1 it chiefly contributes that they be ,,clear and ,,determinate4 ,and when they are so1 it will not breed any confusion or mistake about them1 though the senses should 7as sometimes they do7 convey them from the same object differently on different occasions1 and so seem to err4 ,for1 though a man in a fever should from sugar have a bitter taste1 which at another time would produce a sweet one1 yet the idea of bitter in that man's mind would be as clear and distinct from the idea of sweet as if he had tasted only gall4 ,nor does it make any more confusion between the two ideas of sweet and bitter that the same sort of body produces at one time one1 and at another time another idea by the taste1 than it makes a confusion in two ideas of white and sweet1 or white and round1 that the same piece of sugar produces them both in the mind at the same time4 ,and the ideas of orange-colour and azure1 that are produced in the mind by the same parcel of the infusion of lignum nephritium1 are no less distinct ideas than those of the same colours taken from two very different bodies4 #d4 ,comparing4 ,the ,,comparing them one with another1 in respect of extent1 degrees1 time1 place1 or any other circumstances1 is another operation of the mind about its ideas1 and is that upon which depends all that large tribe of ideas comprehended under ,,relation2 which1 of how vast an extent it is1 ,i shall have occasion to consider hereafter4 #e4 ,brutes compare but imperfectly4 ,how far brutes partake in this faculty1 is not easy to determine4 ,i imagine they have it not in any great degree1 for1 though they probably have several ideas distinct enough1 yet it seems to me to be the prerogative of human understanding1 when it has sufficiently distinguished any ideas1 so as to perceive them to be perfectly different1 and so consequently two1 to cast about and consider in what circumstances they are capable to be compared4 ,and therefore1 ,i think1 beasts compare not their ideas further than some sensible circumstances annexed to the objects themselves4 ,the other power of comparing1 which may be observed in men1 belonging to general ideas1 and useful only to abstract reasonings1 we may probably conjecture beasts have not4 #f4 ,compounding4 ,the next operation we may observe in the mind about its ideas is ,,composition2 whereby it puts together several of those simple ones it has received from sensation and reflection1 and combines them into complex ones4 ,under this of composition may be reckoned also that of ,,enlarging1 wherein1 though the composition does not so much appear as in more complex ones1 yet it is nevertheless a putting several ideas together1 though of the same kind4 ,thus1 by adding several units together1 we make the idea of a dozen2 and putting together the repeated ideas of several perches1 we frame that of a furlong4 #g4 ,brutes compound but little4 ,in this also1 ,i suppose1 brutes come far short of man4 ,for1 though they take in1 and retain together1 several combinations of simple ideas1 as possibly the shape1 smell1 and voice of his master make up the complex idea a dog has of him1 or rather are so many distinct marks whereby he knows him2 yet ,i do not think they do of themselves ever compound them1 and make complex ideas4 ,and perhaps even where we think they have complex ideas1 it is only one simple one that directs them in the knowledge of several things1 which possibly they distinguish less by their sight than we imagine4 ,for ,i have been credibly informed that a bitch will nurse1 play with1 and be fond of young foxes1 as much as1 and in place of her puppies1 if you can but get them once to suck her so long that her milk may go through them4 ,and those animals which have a numerous brood of young ones at once1 appear not to have any knowledge of their number2 for though they are mightily concerned for any of their young that are taken from them whilst they are in sight or hearing1 yet if one or two of them be stolen from them in their absence1 or without noise1 they appear not to miss them1 or to have any sense that their number is lessened4 #h4 ,naming4 ,when children have1 by repeated sensations1 got ideas fixed in their memories1 they begin by degrees to learn the use of signs4 ,and when they have got the skill to apply the organs of speech to the framing of articulate sounds1 they begin to make use of words1 to signify their ideas to others4 ,these verbal signs they sometimes borrow from others1 and sometimes make themselves1 as one may observe among the new and unusual names children often give to things in the first use of language4 #i4 ,abstraction4 ,the use of words then being to stand as outward mark of our internal ideas1 and those ideas being taken from particular things1 if every particular idea that we take up should have a distinct name1 names must be endless4 ,to prevent this1 the mind makes the particular ideas received from particular objects to become general2 which is done by considering them as they are in the mind such appearances1--separate from all other existences1 and the circumstances of real existence1 as time1 place1 or any other concomitant ideas4 ,this is called ,,abstraction1 whereby ideas taken from particular beings become general representatives of all of the same kind2 and their names general names1 applicable to whatever exists conformable to such abstract ideas4 ,such precise1 naked appearances in the mind1 without considering how1 whence1 or with what others they came there1 the understanding lays up 7with names commonly annexed to them7 as the standards to rank real existences into sorts1 as they agree with these patterns1 and to denominate them accordingly4 ,thus the same colour being observed to-day in chalk or snow1 which the mind yesterday received from milk1 it considers that appearance alone1 makes it a representative of all of that kind2 and having given it the name ,,whiteness1 it by that sound signifies the same quality wheresoever to be imagined or met with2 and thus universals1 whether ideas or terms1 are made4 #aj4 ,brutes abstract not4 ,if it may be doubted whether beasts compound and enlarge their ideas that way to any degree2 this1 ,i think1 ,i may be positive in1--that the power of abstracting is not at all in them2 and that the having of general ideas is that which puts a perfect distinction betwixt man and brutes1 and is an excellency which the faculties of brutes do by no means attain to4 ,for it is evident we observe no footsteps in them of making use of general signs for universal ideas2 from which we have reason to imagine that they have not the faculty of abstracting1 or making general ideas1 since they have no use of words1 or any other general signs4 #aa4 ,brutes abstract not1 yet are not bare machines4 ,nor can it be imputed to their want of fit organs to frame articulate sounds1 that they have no use or knowledge of general words2 since many of them1 we find1 can fashion such sounds1 and pronounce words distinctly enough1 but never with any such application4 ,and1 on the other side1 men who1 through some defect in the organs1 want words1 yet fail not to express their universal ideas by signs1 which serve them instead of general words1 a faculty which we see beasts come short in4 ,and1 therefore1 ,i think1 we may suppose1 that it is in this that the species of brutes are discriminated from man3 and it is that proper difference wherein they are wholly separated1 and which at last widens to so vast a distance4 ,for if they have any ideas at all1 and are not bare machines1 7as some would have them17 we cannot deny them to have some reason4 ,it seems as evident to me1 that they do reason1 as that they have sense2 but it is only in particular ideas1 just as they received them from their senses4 ,they are the best of them tied up within those narrow bounds1 and have not 7as ,i think7 the faculty to enlarge them by any kind of abstraction4 #ab4 ,idiots and ,madmen4 ,how far idiots are concerned in the want or weakness of any1 or all of the foregoing faculties1 an exact observation of their several ways of faultering would no doubt discover4 ,for those who either perceive but dully1 or retain the ideas that come into their minds but ill1 who cannot readily excite or compound them1 will have little matter to think on4 ,those who cannot distinguish1 compare1 and abstract1 would hardly be able to understand and make use of language1 or judge or reason to any tolerable degree2 but only a little and imperfectly about things present1 and very familiar to their senses4 ,and indeed any of the forementioned faculties1 if wanting1 or out of order1 produce suitable defects in men's understandings and knowledge4 #ac4 ,difference between ,idiots and ,madmen4 ,in fine1 the defect in naturals seems to proceed from want of quickness1 activity1 and motion in the intellectual faculties1 whereby they are deprived of reason2 whereas madmen1 on the other side1 seem to suffer by the other extreme4 ,for they do not appear to me to have lost the faculty of reasoning1 but having joined together some ideas very wrongly1 they mistake them for truths2 and they err as men do that argue right from wrong principles4 ,for1 by the violence of their imaginations1 having taken their fancies for realities1 they make right deductions from them4 ,thus you shall find a distracted man fancying himself a king1 with a right inference require suitable attendance1 respect1 and obedience3 others who have thought themselves made of glass1 have used the caution necessary to preserve such brittle bodies4 ,hence it comes to pass that a man who is very sober1 and of a right understanding in all other things1 may in one particular be as frantic as any in ,bedlam2 if either by any sudden very strong impression1 or long fixing his fancy upon one sort of thoughts1 incoherent ideas have been cemented together so powerfully1 as to remain united4 ,but there are degrees of madness1 as of folly2 the disorderly jumbling ideas together is in some more1 and some less4 ,in short1 herein seems to lie the difference between idiots and madmen3 that madmen put wrong ideas together1 and so make wrong propositions1 but argue and reason right from them2 but idiots make very few or no propositions1 and reason scarce at all4 #ad4 ,method followed in this explication of ,faculties4 ,these1 ,i think1 are the first faculties and operations of the mind1 which it makes use of in understanding2 and though they are exercised about all its ideas in general1 yet the instances ,i have hitherto given have been chiefly in simple ideas4 ,and ,i have subjoined the explication of these faculties of the mind to that of simple ideas1 before ,i come to what ,i have to say concerning complex ones1 for these following reasons3-- ,first1 ,because several of these faculties being exercised at first principally about simple ideas1 we might1 by following nature in its ordinary method1 trace and discover them1 in their rise1 progress1 and gradual improvements4 ,secondly1 ,because observing the faculties of the mind1 how they operate about simple ideas1--which are usually1 in most men's minds1 much more clear1 precise1 and distinct than complex ones1--we may the better examine and learn how the mind extracts1 denominates1 compares1 and exercises1 in its other operations about those which are complex1 wherein we are much more liable to mistake4 ,thirdly1 ,because these very operations of the mind about ideas received from sensations1 are themselves1 when reflected on1 another set of ideas1 derived from that other source of our knowledge1 which ,i call reflection2 and therefore fit to be considered in this place after the simple ideas of sensation4 ,of compounding1 comparing1 abstracting1 c41 ,i have but just spoken1 having occasion to treat of them more at large in other places4 #ae4 ,the true ,beginning of ,human ,knowledge4 ,and thus ,i have given a short1 and1 ,i think1 true ,,history ,,of ,,the ,,first ,,beginnings ,,of ,,human ,,knowledge2--whence the mind has its first objects2 and by what steps it makes its progress to the laying in and storing up those ideas1 out of which is to be framed all the knowledge it is capable of3 wherein ,i must appeal to experience and observation whether ,i am in the right3 the best way to come to truth being to examine things as really they are1 and not to conclude they are1 as we fancy of ourselves1 or have been taught by others to imagine4 #af4 ,appeal to ,experience4 ,to deal truly1 this is the only way that ,i can discover1 whereby the ,,ideas ,,of ,,things are brought into the understanding4 ,if other men have either innate ideas or infused principles1 they have reason to enjoy them2 and if they are sure of it1 it is impossible for others to deny them the privilege that they have above their neighbours4 ,i can speak but of what ,i find in myself1 and is agreeable to those notions1 which1 if we will examine the whole course of men in their several ages1 countries1 and educations1 seem to depend on those foundations which ,i have laid1 and to correspond with this method in all the parts and degrees thereof4 #ag4 ,dark ,room4 ,i pretend not to teach1 but to inquire2 and therefore cannot but confess here again1--that external and internal sensation are the only passages ,i can find of knowledge to the understanding4 ,these alone1 as far as ,i can discover1 are the windows by which light is let into this ,,dark ,,room4 ,for1 methinks1 the understanding is not much unlike a closet wholly shut from light1 with only some little openings left1 to let in external visible resemblances1 or ideas of things without3 which1 would they but stay there1 and lie so orderly as to be found upon occasion1 it would very much resemble the understanding of a man1 in reference to all objects of sight1 and the ideas of them4 ,these are my guesses concerning the means whereby the understanding comes to have and retain simple ideas1 and the modes of them1 with some other operations about them4 ,i proceed now to examine some of these simple ideas and their modes a little more particularly4 ,,chapter ,,xii4 ,,of ,,complex ,,ideas4 #a4 ,made by the ,mind out of simple ,ones4 ,we have hitherto considered those ideas1 in the reception whereof the mind is only passive1 which are those simple ones received from sensation and reflection before mentioned1 whereof the mind cannot make one to itself1 nor have any idea which does not wholly consist of them4 ,as simple ideas are observed to exist in several combinations united together1 so the mind has a power to consider several of them united together as one idea2 and that not only as they are united in external objects1 but as itself has joined them together4 ,ideas thus made up of several simple ones put together1 ,i call ,,complex2--such as are beauty1 gratitude1 a man1 an army1 the universe2 which1 though complicated of various simple ideas1 or complex ideas made up of simple ones1 yet are1 when the mind pleases1 considered each by itself1 as one entire thing1 signified by one name4 #b4 ,made voluntarily4 ,in this faculty of repeating and joining together its ideas1 the mind has great power in varying and multiplying the objects of its thoughts1 infinitely beyond what sensation or reflection furnished it with3 but all this still confined to those simple ideas which it received from those two sources1 and which are the ultimate materials of all its compositions4 ,for simple ideas are all from things themselves1 and of these the mind ,,can have no more1 nor other than what are suggested to it4 ,it can have no other ideas of sensible qualities than what come from without 99dropped word the senses2 nor any ideas of other kind of operations of a thinking substance1 than what it finds in itself4 ,but when it has once got these simple ideas1 it is not confined barely to observation1 and what offers itself from without2 it can1 by its own power1 put together those ideas it has1 and make new complex ones1 which it never received so united4 #c4 ,complex ideas are either of ,modes1 ,substances1 or ,relations4 ,,complex ,,ideas1 however compounded and decompounded1 though their number be infinite1 and the variety endless1 wherewith they fill and entertain the thoughts of men2 yet ,i think they may be all reduced under these three heads3--#a4 ,,modes4 #b4 ,,substances4 #c4 ,,relations4 #d4 ,ideas of ,modes4 ,first1 ,,modes ,i call such complex ideas which1 however compounded1 contain not in them the supposition of subsisting by themselves1 but are considered as dependences on1 or affections of substances2--such as are the ideas signified by the words triangle1 gratitude1 murder1 c4 ,and if in this ,i use the word mode in somewhat a different sense from its ordinary signification1 ,i beg pardon2 it being unavoidable in discourses1 differing from the ordinary received notions1 either to make new words1 or to use old words in somewhat a new signification2 the later whereof1 in our present case1 is perhaps the more tolerable of the two4 #e4 ,simple and mixed ,modes of ,ideas4 ,of these ,,modes1 there are two sorts which deserve distinct consideration3-- ,first1 there are some which are only variations1 or different combinations of the same simple idea1 without the mixture of any other2--as a dozen1 or score2 which are nothing but the ideas of so many distinct units added together1 and these ,i call ,,simple ,,modes as being contained within the bounds of one simple idea4 ,secondly1 there are others compounded of simple ideas of several kinds1 put together to make one complex one2--v4g4 beauty1 consisting of a certain composition of colour and figure1 causing delight to the beholder2 theft1 which being the concealed change of the possession of anything1 without the consent of the proprietor1 contains1 as is visible1 a combination of several ideas of several kinds3 and these ,i call ,,mixed ,,modes4 #f4 ,ideas of ,substances1 single or collective4 ,secondly1 the ideas of ,,substances are such combinations of simple ideas as are taken to represent distinct ,,particular things subsisting by themselves2 in which the supposed or confused idea of substance1 such as it is1 is always the first and chief4 ,thus if to substance be joined the simple idea of a certain dull whitish colour1 with certain degrees of weight1 hardness1 ductility1 and fusibility1 we have the idea of lead2 and a combination of the ideas of a certain sort of figure1 with the powers of motion1 thought and reasoning1 joined to substance1 make the ordinary idea of a man4 ,now of substances also1 there are two sorts of ideas3--one of ,,single substances1 as they exist separately1 as of a man or a sheep2 the other of several of those put together1 as an army of men1 or flock of sheep--which ,,collective ideas of several substances thus put together are as much each of them one single idea as that of a man or an unit4 #g4 ,ideas of ,relation4 ,thirdly1 the last sort of complex ideas is that we call ,,relation1 which consists in the consideration and comparing one idea with another4 ,of these several kinds we shall treat in their order4 #h4 ,the abstrusest ,ideas we can have are all from two ,sources4 ,if we trace the progress of our minds1 and with attention observe how it repeats1 adds together1 and unites its simple ideas received from sensation or reflection1 it will lead us further than at first perhaps we should have imagined4 ,and1 ,i believe1 we shall find1 if we warily observe the originals of our notions1 that ,,even ,,the ,,most ,,abstruse ,,ideas1 how remote soever they may seem from sense1 or from any operations of our own minds1 are yet only such as the understanding frames to itself1 by repeating and joining together ideas that it had either from objects of sense1 or from its own operations about them3 so that those even large and abstract ideas are derived from sensation or reflection1 being no other than what the mind1 by the ordinary use of its own faculties1 employed about ideas received from objects of sense1 or from the operations it observes in itself about them1 may1 and does1 attain unto4 ,this ,i shall endeavour to show in the ideas we have of space1 time1 and infinity1 and some few others that seem the most remote1 from those originals4 ,,chapter ,,xiii4 ,,complex ,,ideas ,,of ,,simple ,,modes3--,,and ,,first1 ,,of ,,the ,,simple ,,modes ,,of ,,idea ,,of ,,space4 #a4 ,simple modes of simple ideas4 ,though in the foregoing part ,i have often mentioned simple ideas1 which are truly the materials of all our knowledge2 yet having treated of them there1 rather in the way that they come into the mind1 than as distinguished from others more compounded1 it will not be perhaps amiss to take a view of some of them again under this consideration1 and examine those different modifications of the ,,same idea2 which the mind either finds in things existing1 or is able to make within itself without the help of any extrinsical object1 or any foreign suggestion4 ,those modifications of any ,,one simple idea 7which1 as has been said1 ,i call ,,simple ,,modes7 are as perfectly different and distinct ideas in the mind as those of the greatest distance or contrariety4 ,for the idea of two is as distinct from that of one1 as blueness from heat1 or either of them from any number3 and yet it is made up only of that simple idea of an unit repeated2 and repetitions of this kind joined together make those distinct simple modes1 of a dozen1 a gross1 a million4 ,simple ,modes of ,idea of ,space4 #b4 ,idea of ,space4 ,i shall begin with the simple idea of ,,space4 ,i have showed above1 chap4 #d1 that we get the idea of space1 both by our sight and touch2 which1 ,i think1 is so evident1 that it would be as needless to go to prove that men perceive1 by their sight1 a distance between bodies of different colours1 or between the parts of the same body1 as that they see colours themselves3 nor is it less obvious1 that they can do so in the dark by feeling and touch4 #c4 ,space and ,extension4 ,this space1 considered barely in length between any two beings1 without considering anything else between them1 is called ,,distance3 if considered in length1 breadth1 and thickness1 ,i think it may be called ,,capacity4 ,when considered between the extremities of matter1 which fills the capacity of space with something solid1 tangible1 and moveable1 it is properly called ,,extension4 ,and so extension is an idea belonging to body only2 but space may1 as is evident1 be considered without it4 ,at least ,i think it most intelligible1 and the best way to avoid confusion1 if we use the word extension for an affection of matter or the distance of the extremities of particular solid bodies2 and space in the more general signification1 for distance1 with or without solid matter possessing it4 #d4 ,immensity4 ,each different distance is a different modification of space2 and each idea of any different distance1 or space1 is a ,,simple ,,mode of this idea4 ,men having1 by accustoming themselves to stated lengths of space1 which they use for measuring other distances--as a foot1 a yard or a fathom1 a league1 or diameter of the earth--made those ideas familiar to their thoughts1 can1 in their minds1 repeat them as often as they will1 without mixing or joining to them the idea of body1 or anything else2 and frame to themselves the ideas of long1 square1 or cubic feet1 yards or fathoms1 here amongst the bodies of the universe1 or else beyond the utmost bounds of all bodies2 and1 by adding these still one to another1 enlarge their ideas of space as much as they please4 ,the power of repeating or doubling any idea we have of any distance1 and adding it to the former as often as we will1 without being ever able to come to any stop or stint1 let us enlarge it as much as we will1 is that which gives us the idea of ,,immensity4 #e4 ,figure4 ,there is another modification of this idea1 which is nothing but the relation which the parts of the termination of extension1 or circumscribed space1 have amongst themselves4 ,this the touch discovers in sensible bodies1 whose extremities come within our reach2 and the eye takes both from bodies and colours1 whose boundaries are within its view3 where1 observing how the extremities terminate1--either in straight lines which meet at discernible angles1 or in crooked lines wherein no angles can be perceived2 by considering these as they relate to one another1 in all parts of the extremities of any body or space1 it has that idea we call ,,figure1 which affords to the mind infinite variety4 ,for1 besides the vast number of different figures that do really exist in the coherent masses of matter1 the stock that the mind has in its power1 by varying the idea of space1 and thereby making still new compositions1 by repeating its own ideas1 and joining them as it pleases1 is perfectly inexhaustible4 ,and so it can multiply figures ,,in ,,infinitum4 #f4 ,endless variety of figures4 ,for the mind having a power to repeat the idea of any length directly stretched out1 and join it to another in the same direction1 which is to double the length of that straight line2 or else join another with what inclination it thinks fit1 and so make what sort of angle it pleases3 and being able also to shorten any line it imagines1 by taking from it one half1 one fourth1 or what part it pleases1 without being able to come to an end of any such divisions1 it can make an angle of any bigness4 ,so also the lines that are its sides1 of what length it pleases1 which joining again to other lines1 of different lengths1 and at different angles1 till it has wholly enclosed any space1 it is evident that it can multiply figures1 both in their shape and capacity1 ,,in ,,infinitum2 all which are but so many different simple modes of space4 ,the same that it can do with straight lines1 it can also do with crooked1 or crooked and straight together2 and the same it can do in lines1 it can also in superficies2 by which we may be led into farther thoughts of the endless variety of figures that the mind has a power to make1 and thereby to multiply the simple modes of space4 #g4 ,place4 ,another idea coming under this head1 and belonging to this tribe1 is that we call ,,place4 ,as in simple space1 we consider the relation of distance between any two bodies or points2 so in our idea of place1 we consider the relation of distance betwixt anything1 and any two or more points1 which are considered as keeping the same distance one with another1 and so considered as at rest4 ,for when we find anything at the same distance now which it was yesterday1 from any two or more points1 which have not since changed their distance one with another1 and with which we then compared it1 we say it hath kept the same place3 but if it hath sensibly altered its distance with either of those points1 we say it hath changed its place3 though1 vulgarly speaking1 in the common notion of place1 we do not always exactly observe the distance from these precise points1 but from larger portions of sensible objects1 to which we consider the thing placed to bear relation1 and its distance from which we have some reason to observe4 #h4 ,place relative to particular bodies4 ,thus1 a company of chess-men1 standing on the same squares of the chess-board where we left them1 we say they are all in the ,,same place1 or unmoved1 though perhaps the chessboard hath been in the mean time carried out of one room into another2 because we compared them only to the parts of the chess-board1 which keep the same distance one with another4 ,the chess-board1 we also say1 is in the same place it was1 if it remain in the same part of the cabin1 though perhaps the ship which it is in sails all the while4 ,and the ship is said to be in the same place1 supposing it kept the same distance with the parts of the neighbouring land2 though perhaps the earth hath turned round1 and so both chess-men1 and board1 and ship1 have every one changed place1 in respect of remoter bodies1 which have kept the same distance one with another4 ,but yet the distance from certain parts of the board being that which determines the place of the chess-men2 and the distance from the fixed parts of the cabin 7with which we made the comparison7 being that which determined the place of the chess-board2 and the fixed parts of the earth that by which we determined the place of the ship1--these things may be said to be in the same place in those respects3 though their distance from some other things1 which in this matter we did not consider1 being varied1 they have undoubtedly changed place in that respect2 and we ourselves shall think so1 when we have occasion to compare them with those other4 #i4 ,place relative to a present purpose4 ,but this modification of distance we call place1 being made by men for their common use1 that by it they might be able to design the particular position of things1 where they had occasion for such designation2 men consider and determine of this place by reference to those adjacent things which best served to their present purpose1 without considering other things which1 to another purpose1 would better determine the place of the same thing4 ,thus in the chess-board1 the use of the designation of the place of each chess-man being determined only within that chequered piece of wood1 it would cross that purpose to measure it by anything else2 but when these very chess-men are put up in a bag1 if any one should ask where the black king is1 it would be proper to determine the place by the part of the room it was in1 and not by the chessboard2 there being another use of designing the place it is now in1 than when in play it was on the chessboard1 and so must be determined by other bodies4 ,so if any one should ask1 in what place are the verses which report the story of ,nisus and ,euryalus1 it would be very improper to determine this place1 by saying1 they were in such a part of the earth1 or in ,bodley's library3 but the right designation of the place would be by the parts of ,virgil's works2 and the proper answer would be1 that these verses were about the middle of the ninth book of his ,a,eneids1 and that they have been always constantly in the same place ever since ,virgil was printed3 which is true1 though the book itself hath moved a thousand times1 the use of the idea of place here being1 to know in what part of the book that story is1 that so1 upon occasion1 we may know where to find it1 and have recourse to it for use4 #aj4 ,place of the universe4 ,that our idea of place is nothing else but such a relative position of anything as ,i have before mentioned1 ,i think is plain1 and will be easily admitted1 when we consider that we can have no idea of the place of the universe1 though we can of all the parts of it2 because beyond that we have not the idea of any fixed1 distinct1 particular beings1 in reference to which we can imagine it to have any relation of distance2 but all beyond it is one uniform space or expansion1 wherein the mind finds no variety1 no marks4 ,for to say that the world is somewhere1 means no more than that it does exist2 this1 though a phrase borrowed from place1 signifying only its existence1 not location3 and when one can find out1 and frame in his mind1 clearly and distinctly the place of the universe1 he will be able to tell us whether it moves or stands still in the undistinguishable inane of infinite space3 though it be true that the word place has sometimes a more confused sense1 and stands for that space which anybody takes up2 and so the universe is in a place4 ,the idea1 therefore1 of place we have by the same means that we get the idea of space1 7whereof this is but a particular limited consideration17 viz4 by our sight and touch2 by either of which we receive into our minds the ideas of extension or distance4 #aa4 ,extension and ,body not the same4 ,there are some that would persuade us1 that body and extension are the same thing1 who either change the signification of words1 which ,i would not suspect them of1--they having so severely condemned the philosophy of others1 because it hath been too much placed in the uncertain meaning1 or deceitful obscurity of doubtful or insignificant terms4 ,if1 therefore1 they mean by body and extension the same that other people do1 viz4 by ,,body something that is solid and extended1 whose parts are separable and movable different ways2 and by ,,extension1 only the space that lies between the extremities of those solid coherent parts1 and which is possessed by them1--they confound very different ideas one with another2 for ,i appeal to every man's own thoughts1 whether the idea of space be not as distinct from that of solidity1 as it is from the idea of scarlet colour8 ,it is true1 solidity cannot exist without extension1 neither can scarlet colour exist without extension1 but this hinders not1 but that they are distinct ideas4 ,many ideas require others1 as necessary to their existence or conception1 which yet are very distinct ideas4 ,motion can neither be1 nor be conceived1 without space2 and yet motion is not space1 nor space motion2 space can exist without it1 and they are very distinct ideas2 and so1 ,i think1 are those of space and solidity4 ,solidity is so inseparable an idea from body1 that upon that depends its filling of space1 its contact1 impulse1 and communication of motion upon impulse4 ,and if it be a reason to prove that spirit is different from body1 because thinking includes not the idea of extension in it2 the same reason will be as valid1 ,i suppose1 to prove that space is not body1 because it includes not the idea of solidity in it2 ,,space and ,,solidity being as distinct ideas as ,,thinking and ,,extension1 and as wholly separable in the mind one from another4 ,body then and extension1 it is evident1 are two distinct ideas4 ,for1 #ab4 ,extension not solidity4 ,first1 ,extension includes no solidity1 nor resistance to the motion of body1 as body does4 #ac4 ,the parts of space inseparable1 both really and mentally4 ,secondly1 ,the parts of pure space are inseparable one from the other2 so that the continuity cannot be separated1 both neither really nor mentally4 ,for ,i demand of any one to remove any part of it from another1 with which it is continued1 even so much as in thought4 ,to divide and separate actually is1 as ,i think1 by removing the parts one from another1 to make two superficies1 where before there was a continuity3 and to divide mentally is1 to make in the mind two superficies1 where before there was a continuity1 and consider them as removed one from the other2 which can only be done in things considered by the mind as capable of being separated2 and by separation1 of acquiring new distinct superficies1 which they then have not1 but are capable of4 ,but neither of these ways of separation1 whether real or mental1 is1 as ,i think1 compatible to pure space4 ,it is true1 a man may consider so much of such a space as is answerable or commensurate to a foot1 without considering the rest1 which is1 indeed1 a partial consideration1 but not so much as mental separation or division2 since a man can no more mentally divide1 without considering two superficies separate one from the other1 than he can actually divide1 without making two superficies disjoined one from the other3 but a partial consideration is not separating4 ,a man may consider light in the sun without its heat1 or mobility in body without its extension1 without thinking of their separation4 ,one is only a partial consideration1 terminating in one alone2 and the other is a consideration of both1 as existing separately4 #ad4 ,the parts of space immovable4 ,thirdly1 ,the parts of pure space are immovable1 which follows from their inseparability2 motion being nothing but change of distance between any two things2 but this cannot be between parts that are inseparable1 which1 therefore1 must needs be at perpetual rest one amongst another4 ,thus the determined idea of simple space distinguishes it plainly and sufficiently from body2 since its parts are inseparable1 immovable1 and without resistance to the motion of body4 #ae4 ,the ,definition of ,extension explains it not4 ,if any one ask me ,,what this space ,i speak of ,,is1 ,i will tell him when he tells me what his extension is4 ,for to say1 as is usually done1 that extension is to have partes extra partes1 is to say only1 that extension is extension4 ,for what am ,i the better informed in the nature of extension1 when ,i am told that extension is to have parts that are extended1 exterior to parts that are extended1 i4 e4 extension consists of extended parts8 ,as if one1 asking what a fibre was1 ,i should answer him1--that it was a thing made up of several fibres4 ,would he thereby be enabled to understand what a fibre was better than he did before8 ,or rather1 would he not have reason to think that my design was to make sport with him1 rather than seriously to instruct him8 #af4 ,division of ,beings into ,bodies and ,spirits proves not ,space and ,body the same4 ,those who contend that space and body are the same1 bring this dilemma3--either this space is something or nothing2 if nothing be between two bodies1 they must necessarily touch2 if it be allowed to be something1 they ask1 ,whether it be body or spirit8 ,to which ,i answer by another question1 ,who told them that there was1 or could be1 nothing2 but ,,solid ,,beings1 ,,which ,,could ,,not ,,think1 and ,,thinking ,,beings ,,that ,,were ,,not ,,extended8--which is all they mean by the terms ,,body and ,,spirit4 #ag4 ,substance1 which we know not1 no ,proof against ,space without ,body4 ,if it be demanded 7as usually it is7 whether this space1 void of body1 be ,,substance or ,,accident1 ,i shall readily answer ,i know not2 nor shall be ashamed to own my ignorance1 till they that ask show me a clear distinct idea of substance4 #ah4 ,different meanings of substance4 ,i endeavour as much as ,i can to deliver myself from those fallacies which we are apt to put upon ourselves1 by taking words for things4 ,it helps not our ignorance to feign a knowledge where we have none1 by making a noise with sounds1 without clear and distinct significations4 ,names made at pleasure1 neither alter the nature of things1 nor make us understand them1 but as they are signs of and stand for determined ideas4 ,and ,i desire those who lay so much stress on the sound of these two syllables1 ,,substance1 to consider whether applying it1 as they do1 to the infinite1 incomprehensible ,god1 to finite spirits1 and to body1 it be in the same sense2 and whether it stands for the same idea1 when each of those three so different beings are called substances4 ,if so1 whether it will thence follow--that ,god1 spirits1 and body1 agreeing in the same common nature of substance1 differ not any otherwise than in a bare different ,,modification of that substance2 as a tree and a pebble1 being in the same sense body1 and agreeing in the common nature of body1 differ only in a bare modification of that common matter1 which will be a very harsh doctrine4 ,if they say1 that they apply it to ,god1 finite spirit1 and matter1 in three different significations and that it stands for one idea when ,god is said to be a substance2 for another when the soul is called substance2 and for a third when body is called so2--if the name substance stands for three several distinct ideas1 they would do well to make known those distinct ideas1 or at least to give three distinct names to them1 to prevent in so important a notion the confusion and errors that will naturally follow from the promiscuous use of so doubtful a term2 which is so far from being suspected to have three distinct1 that in ordinary use it has scarce one clear distinct signification4 ,and if they can thus make three distinct ideas of substance1 what hinders why another may not make a fourth8 #ai4 ,substance and accidents of little use in ,philosophy4 ,they who first ran into the notion of ,,accidents1 as a sort of real beings that needed something to inhere in1 were forced to find out the word ,,substance to support them4 ,had the poor ,indian philosopher 7who imagined that the earth also wanted something to bear it up7 but thought of this word substance1 he needed not to have been at the trouble to find an elephant to support it1 and a tortoise to support his elephant3 the word substance would have done it effectually4 ,and he that inquired might have taken it for as good an answer from an ,indian philosopher1--that substance1 without knowing what it is1 is that which supports the earth1 as take it for a sufficient answer and good doctrine from our ,european philosophers1--that substance1 without knowing what it is1 is that which supports accidents4 ,so that of substance1 we have no idea of what it is1 but only a confused obscure one of what it does4 #bj4 ,sticking on and under-propping4 ,whatever a learned man may do here1 an intelligent ,american1 who inquired into the nature of things1 would scarce take it for a satisfactory account1 if1 desiring to learn our architecture1 he should be told that a pillar is a thing supported by a basis1 and a basis something that supported a pillar4 ,would he not think himself mocked1 instead of taught1 with such an account as this8 ,and a stranger to them would be very liberally instructed in the nature of books1 and the things they contained1 if he should be told that all learned books consisted of paper and letters1 and that letters were things inhering in paper1 and paper a thing that held forth letters3 a notable way of having clear ideas of letters and paper4 ,but were the ,latin words1 inhaerentia and substantio1 put into the plain ,english ones that answer them1 and were called ,,sticking ,,on and ,,under-,,propping1 they would better discover to us the very great clearness there is in the doctrine of substance and accidents1 and show of what use they are in deciding of questions in philosophy4 #ba4 ,a ,vacuum beyond the utmost ,bounds of ,body4 ,but to return to our idea of space4 ,if body be not supposed infinite1 7which ,i think no one will affirm17 ,i would ask1 whether1 if ,god placed a man at the extremity of corporeal beings1 he could not stretch his hand beyond his body8 ,if he could1 then he would put his arm where there was before space without body2 and if there he spread his fingers1 there would still be space between them without body4 ,if he could not stretch out his hand1 it must be because of some external hindrance2 7for we suppose him alive1 with such a power of moving the parts of his body that he hath now1 which is not in itself impossible1 if ,god so pleased to have it2 or at least it is not impossible for ,god so to move him37 and then ,i ask1--whether that which hinders his hand from moving outwards be substance or accident1 something or nothing8 ,and when they have resolved that1 they will be able to resolve themselves1--what that is1 which is or may be between two bodies at a distance1 that is not body1 and has no solidity4 ,in the mean time1 the argument is at least as good1 that1 where nothing hinders1 7as beyond the utmost bounds of all bodies17 a body put in motion may move on1 as where there is nothing between1 there two bodies must necessarily touch4 ,for pure space between is sufficient to take away the necessity of mutual contact2 but bare space in the way is not sufficient to stop motion4 ,the truth is1 these men must either own that they think body infinite1 though they are loth to speak it out1 or else affirm that space is not body4 ,for ,i would fain meet with that thinking man that can in his thoughts set any bounds to space1 more than he can to duration2 or by thinking hope to arrive at the end of either4 ,and therefore1 if his idea of eternity be infinite1 so is his idea of immensity2 they are both finite or infinite alike4 #bb4 ,the ,power of ,annihilation proves a ,vacuum4 ,farther1 those who assert the impossibility of space existing without matter1 must not only make body infinite1 but must also deny a power in ,god to annihilate any part of matter4 ,no one1 ,i suppose1 will deny that ,god can put an end to all motion that is in matter1 and fix all the bodies of the universe in a perfect quiet and rest1 and continue them so long as he pleases4 ,whoever then will allow that ,god can1 during such a general rest1 ,,annihilate either this book or the body of him that reads it1 must necessarily admit the possibility of a vacuum4 ,for1 it is evident that the space that was filled by the parts of the annihilated body will still remain1 and be a space without body4 ,for the circumambient bodies being in perfect rest1 are a wall of adamant1 and in that state make it a perfect impossibility for any other body to get into that space4 ,and indeed the necessary motion of one particle of matter into the place from whence another particle of matter is removed1 is but a consequence from the supposition of plenitude2 which will therefore need some better proof than a supposed matter of fact1 which experiment can never make out2--our own clear and distinct ideas plainly satisfying that there is no necessary connexion between space and solidity1 since we can conceive the one without the other4 ,and those who dispute for or against a vacuum1 do thereby confess they have distinct ,,ideas of vacuum and plenum1 i4 e4 that they have an idea of extension void of solidity1 though they deny its ,,existence2 or else they dispute about nothing at all4 ,for they who so much alter the signification of words1 as to call extension body1 and consequently make the whole essence of body to be nothing but pure extension without solidity1 must talk absurdly whenever they speak of vacuum2 since it is impossible for extension to be without extension4 ,for vacuum1 whether we affirm or deny its existence1 signifies space without body2 whose very existence no one can deny to be possible1 who will not make matter infinite1 and take from ,god a power to annihilate any particle of it4 #bc4 ,motion proves a ,vacuum4 ,but not to go so far as beyond the utmost bounds of body in the universe1 nor appeal to ,god's omnipotency to find a vacuum1 the motion of bodies that are in our view and neighbourhood seems to me plainly to evince it4 ,for ,i desire any one so to divide a solid body1 of any dimension he pleases1 as to make it possible for the solid parts to move up and down freely every way within the bounds of that superficies1 if there be not left in it a void space as big as the least part into which he has divided the said solid body4 ,and if1 where the least particle of the body divided is as big as a mustard-seed1 a void space equal to the bulk of a mustard-seed be requisite to make room for the free motion of the parts of the divided body within the bounds of its superficies1 where the particles of matter are #ajj1jjj1jjj less than a mustard-seed1 there must also be a space void of solid matter as big as #ajj1jjj1jjj part of a mustard-seed2 for if it hold in the one it will hold in the other1 and so on ,,in ,,infinitum4 ,and let this void space be as little as it will1 it destroys the hypothesis of plenitude4 ,for if there can be a space void of body equal to the smallest separate particle of matter now existing in nature1 it is still space without body2 and makes as great a difference between space and body as if it were mega chasma1 a distance as wide as any in nature4 ,and therefore1 if we suppose not the void space necessary to motion equal to the least parcel of the divided solid matter1 but to #a_/aj or #a_/ajjj of it1 the same consequence will always follow of space without matter4 #bd4 ,the ,ideas of ,space and ,body distinct4 ,but the question being here1--,whether the idea of space or extension be the same with the idea of body8 it is not necessary to prove the real existence of a ,,vacuum1 but the idea of it2 which it is plain men have when they inquire and dispute whether there be a ,,vacuum or no4 ,for if they had not the idea of space without body1 they could not make a question about its existence3 and if their idea of body did not include in it something more than the bare idea of space1 they could have no doubt about the plenitude of the world2 and it would be as absurd to demand1 whether there were space without body1 as whether there were space without space1 or body without body1 since these were but different names of the same idea4 #be4 ,extension being inseparable from ,body1 proves it not the same4 ,it is true1 the idea of extension joins itself so inseparably with all visible1 and most tangible qualities1 that it suffers us to ,,see no one1 or ,,feel very few external objects1 without taking in impressions of extension too4 ,this readiness of extension to make itself be taken notice of so constantly with other ideas1 has been the occasion1 ,i guess1 that some have made the whole essence of body to consist in extension2 which is not much to be wondered at1 since some have had their minds1 by their eyes and touch1 7the busiest of all our senses17 so filled with the idea of extension1 and1 as it were1 wholly possessed with it1 that they allowed no existence to anything that had not extension4 ,i shall not now argue with those men1 who take the measure and possibility of all being only from their narrow and gross imaginations3 but having here to do only with those who conclude the essence of body to be extension1 because they say they cannot imagine any sensible quality of any body without extension1--,i shall desire them to consider1 that1 had they reflected on their ideas of tastes and smells as much as on those of sight and touch2 nay1 had they examined their ideas of hunger and thirst1 and several other pains1 they would have found that ,,they included in them no idea of extension at all1 which is but an affection of body1 as well as the rest1 discoverable by our senses1 which are scarce acute enough to look into the pure essences of things4 #bf4 ,essences of ,things4 ,if those ideas which are constantly joined to all others1 must therefore be concluded to be the essence of those things which have constantly those ideas joined to them1 and are inseparable from them2 then unity is without doubt the essence of everything4 ,for there is not any object of sensation or reflection which does not carry with it the idea of one3 but the weakness of this kind of argument we have already shown sufficiently4 #bg4 ,ideas of ,space and ,solidity distinct4 ,to conclude3 whatever men shall think concerning the existence of a ,,vacuum1 this is plain to me--that we have as clear an idea of space distinct from solidity1 as we have of solidity distinct from motion1 or motion from space4 ,we have not any two more distinct ideas2 and we can as easily conceive space without solidity1 as we can conceive body or space without motion1 though it be never so certain that neither body nor motion can exist without space4 ,but whether any one will take space to be only a ,,relation resulting from the existence of other beings at a distance2 or whether they will think the words of the most knowing ,king ,solomon1 #8,the heaven1 and the heaven of heavens1 cannot contain thee2' or those more emphatical ones of the inspired philosopher ,st4 ,paul1 #8,in him we live1 move1 and have our being1' are to be understood in a literal sense1 ,i leave every one to consider3 only our idea of space is1 ,i think1 such as ,i have mentioned1 and distinct from that of body4 ,for1 whether we consider1 in matter itself1 the distance of its coherent solid parts1 and call it1 in respect of those solid parts1 extension2 or whether1 considering it as lying between the extremities of any body in its several dimensions1 we call it length1 breadth1 and thickness2 or else1 considering it as lying between any two bodies or positive beings1 without any consideration whether there be any matter or not between1 we call it distance2--however named or considered1 it is always the same uniform simple idea of space1 taken from objects about which our senses have been conversant2 whereof1 having settled ideas in our minds1 we can revive1 repeat1 and add them one to another as often as we will1 and consider the space or distance so imagined1 either as filled with solid parts1 so that another body cannot come there without displacing and thrusting out the body that was there before2 or else as void of solidity1 so that a body of equal dimensions to that empty or pure space may be placed in it1 without the removing or expulsion of anything that was there4 #bh4 ,men differ little in clear1 simple ideas4 ,the knowing precisely what our words stand for1 would1 ,i imagine1 in this as well as a great many other cases1 quickly end the dispute4 ,for ,i am apt to think that men1 when they come to examine them1 find their simple ideas all generally to agree1 though in discourse with one another they perhaps confound one another with different names4 ,i imagine that men who abstract their thoughts1 and do well examine the ideas of their own minds1 cannot much differ in thinking2 however they may perplex themselves with words1 according to the way of speaking of the several schools or sects they have been bred up in3 though amongst unthinking men1 who examine not scrupulously and carefully their own ideas1 and strip them not from the marks men use for them1 but confound them with words1 there must be endless dispute1 wrangling1 and jargon2 especially if they be learned1 bookish men1 devoted to some sect1 and accustomed to the language of it1 and have learned to talk after others4 ,but if it should happen that any two thinking men should really have different ideas1 ,i do not see how they could discourse or argue one with another4 ,here ,i must not be mistaken1 to think that every floating imagination in men's brains is presently of that sort of ideas ,i speak of4 ,it is not easy for the mind to put off those confused notions and prejudices it has imbibed from custom1 inadvertency1 and common conversation4 ,it requires pains and assiduity to examine its ideas1 till it resolves them into those clear and distinct simple ones1 out of which they are compounded2 and to see which1 amongst its simple ones1 have or have not a ,,necessary connexion and dependence one upon another4 ,till a man doth this in the primary and original notions of things1 he builds upon floating and uncertain principles1 and will often find himself at a loss4 ,,chapter ,,xiv4 ,,idea ,,of ,,duration ,,and ,,its ,,simple ,,modes4 #a4 ,duration is fleeting ,extension4 ,there is another sort of distance1 or length1 the idea whereof we get not from the permanent parts of space1 but from the fleeting and perpetually perishing parts of succession4 ,this we call ,,duration2 the simple modes whereof are any different lengths of it whereof we have distinct ideas1 as ,,hours1 ,,days1 ,,years1 c41 ,,time and ,,eternity4 #b4 ,its ,idea from ,reflection on the ,train of our ,ideas4 ,the answer of a great man1 to one who asked what time was3 ,si non rogas intelligo1 7which amounts to this2 ,the more ,i set myself to think of it1 the less ,i understand it17 might perhaps persuade one that time1 which reveals all other things1 is itself not to be discovered4 ,duration1 time1 and eternity1 are1 not without reason1 thought to have something very abstruse in their nature4 ,but however remote these may seem from our comprehension1 yet if we trace them right to their originals1 ,i doubt not but one of those sources of all our knowledge1 viz4 sensation and reflection1 will be able to furnish us with these ideas1 as clear and distinct as many others which are thought much less obscure2 and we shall find that the idea of eternity itself is derived from the same common original with the rest of our ideas4 #c4 ,nature and origin of the idea of ,duration4 ,to understand ,,time and ,,eternity aright1 we ought with attention to consider what idea it is we have of ,,duration1 and how we came by it4 ,it is evident to any one who will but observe what passes in his own mind1 that there is a train of ideas which constantly succeed one another in his understanding1 as long as he is awake4 ,reflection on these appearances of several ideas one after another in our minds1 is that which furnishes us with the idea of ,,succession3 and the distance between any parts of that succession1 or between the appearance of any two ideas in our minds1 is that we call ,,duration4 ,for whilst we are thinking1 or whilst we receive successively several ideas in our minds1 we know that we do exist2 and so we call the existence1 or the continuation of the existence of ourselves1 or anything else1 commensurate to the succession of any ideas in our minds1 the duration of ourselves1 or any such other thing co-existent with our thinking4 #d4 ,proof that its idea is got from reflection on the train of our ideas4 ,that we have our notion of succession and duration from this original1 viz4 from reflection on the train of ideas1 which we find to appear one after another in our own minds1 seems plain to me1 in that we have no perception of duration but by considering the train of ideas that take their turns in our understandings4 ,when that succession of ideas ceases1 our perception of duration ceases with it2 which every one clearly experiments in himself1 whilst he sleeps soundly1 whether an hour or a day1 a month or a year2 of which duration of things1 while he sleeps or thinks not1 he has no perception at all1 but it is quite lost to him2 and the moment wherein he leaves off to think1 till the moment he begins to think again1 seems to him to have no distance4 ,and so ,i doubt not it would be to a waking man1 if it were possible for him to keep ,,only ,,one idea in his mind1 without variation and the succession of others4 ,and we see1 that one who fixes his thoughts very intently on one thing1 so as to take but little notice of the succession of ideas that pass in his mind whilst he is taken up with that earnest contemplation1 lets slip out of his account a good part of that duration1 and thinks that time shorter than it is4 ,but if sleep commonly unites the distant parts of duration1 it is because during that time we have no succession of ideas in our minds4 ,for if a man1 during his sleep1 dreams1 and variety of ideas make themselves perceptible in his mind one after another1 he hath then1 during such dreaming1 a sense of duration1 and of the length of it4 ,by which it is to me very clear1 that men derive their ideas of duration from their reflections on the train of the ideas they observe to succeed one another in their own understandings2 without which observation they can have no notion of duration1 whatever may happen in the world4 #e4 ,the ,idea of ,duration applicable to ,things whilst we sleep4 ,indeed a man having1 from reflecting on the succession and number of his own thoughts1 got the notion or idea of duration1 he can apply that notion to things which exist while he does not think2 as he that has got the idea of extension from bodies by his sight or touch1 can apply it to distances1 where no body is seen or felt4 ,and therefore1 though a man has no perception of the length of duration which passed whilst he slept or thought not2 yet1 having observed the revolution of days and nights1 and found the length of their duration to be in appearance regular and constant1 he can1 upon the supposition that that revolution has proceeded after the same manner whilst he was asleep or thought not1 as it used to do at other times1 he can1 ,i say1 imagine and make allowance for the length of duration whilst he slept4 ,but if ,adam and ,eve1 7when they were alone in the world17 instead of their ordinary night's sleep1 had passed the whole twenty-four hours in one continued sleep1 the duration of that twenty-four hours had been irrecoverably lost to them1 and been for ever left out of their account of time4 #f4 ,the ,idea of ,succession not from ,motion4 ,thus by reflecting on the appearing of various ideas one after another in our understandings1 we get the notion of succession2 which1 if any one should think we did rather get from our observation of motion by our senses1 he will perhaps be of my mind when he considers1 that even motion produces in his mind an idea of succession no otherwise than as it produces there a continued train of distinguishable ideas4 ,for a man looking upon a body really moving1 perceives yet no motion at all unless that motion produces a constant train of successive ideas3 v4g4 a man becalmed at sea1 out of sight of land1 in a fair day1 may look on the sun1 or sea1 or ship1 a whole hour together1 and perceive no motion at all in either2 though it be certain that two1 and perhaps all of them1 have moved during that time a great way4 ,but as soon as he perceives either of them to have changed distance with some other body1 as soon as this motion produces any new idea in him1 then he perceives that there has been motion4 ,but wherever a man is1 with all things at rest about him1 without perceiving any motion at all1--if during this hour of quiet he has been thinking1 he will perceive the various ideas of his own thoughts in his own mind1 appearing one after another1 and thereby observe and find succession where he could observe no motion4 #g4 ,very slow motions unperceived4 ,and this1 ,i think1 is the reason why motions very slow1 though they are constant1 are not perceived by us2 because in their remove from one sensible part towards another1 their change of distance is so slow1 that it causes no new ideas in us1 but a good while one after another4 ,and so not causing a constant train of new ideas to follow one another immediately in our minds1 we have no perception of motion2 which consisting in a constant succession1 we cannot perceive that succession without a constant succession of varying ideas arising from it4 #h4 ,very swift motions unperceived4 ,on the contrary1 things that move so swift as not to affect the senses distinctly with several distinguishable distances of their motion1 and so cause not any train of ideas in the mind1 are not also perceived4 ,for anything that moves round about in a circle1 in less times than our ideas are wont to succeed one another in our minds1 is not perceived to move2 but seems to be a perfect entire circle of the matter or colour1 and not a part of a circle in motion4 #i4 ,the ,train of ,ideas has a certain ,degree of ,quickness4 ,hence ,i leave it to others to judge1 whether it be not probable that our ideas do1 whilst we are awake1 succeed one another in our minds at certain distances2 not much unlike the images in the inside of a lantern1 turned round by the heat of a candle4 ,this appearance of theirs in train1 though perhaps it may be sometimes faster and sometimes slower1 yet1 ,i guess1 varies not very much in a waking man3 there seem to be certain bounds to the quickness and slowness of the succession of those ideas one to another in our minds1 beyond which they can neither delay nor hasten4 #aj4 ,real succession in swift motions without sense of succession4 ,the reason ,i have for this odd conjecture is1 from observing that1 in the impressions made upon any of our senses1 we can but to a certain degree perceive any succession2 which1 if exceeding quick1 the sense of succession is lost1 even in cases where it is evident that there is a real succession4 ,let a cannon-bullet pass through a room1 and in its way take with it any limb1 or fleshy parts of a man1 it is as clear as any demonstration can be1 that it must strike successively the two sides of the room3 it is also evident1 that it must touch one part of the flesh first1 and another after1 and so in succession3 and yet1 ,i believe1 nobody who ever felt the pain of such a shot1 or heard the blow against the two distant walls1 could perceive any succession either in the pain or sound of so swift a stroke4 ,such a part of duration as this1 wherein we perceive no succession1 is that which we call an ,,instant1 and is that which takes up the time of only one idea in our minds1 without the succession of another2 wherein1 therefore1 we perceive no succession at all4 #aa4 ,in slow motions4 ,this also happens where the motion is so slow as not to supply a constant train of fresh ideas to the senses1 as fast as the mind is capable of receiving new ones into it2 and so other ideas of our own thoughts1 having room to come into our minds between those offered to our senses by the moving body1 there the sense of motion is lost2 and the body1 though it really moves1 yet1 not changing perceivable distance with some other bodies as fast as the ideas of our own minds do naturally follow one another in train1 the thing seems to stand still2 as is evident in the hands of clocks1 and shadows of sun-dials1 and other constant but slow motions1 where1 though1 after certain intervals1 we perceive1 by the change of distance1 that it hath moved1 yet the motion itself we perceive not4 #ab4 ,this ,train1 the ,measure of other ,successions4 ,so that to me it seems1 that the constant and regular succession of ,,ideas in a waking man1 is1 as it were1 the measure and standard of all other successions4 ,whereof if any one either exceeds the pace of our ideas1 as where two sounds or pains1 c41 take up in their succession the duration of but one idea2 or else where any motion or succession is so slow1 as that it keeps not pace with the ideas in our minds1 or the quickness in which they take their turns1 as when any one or more ideas in their ordinary course come into our mind1 between those which are offered to the sight by the different perceptible distances of a body in motion1 or between sounds or smells following one another1--there also the sense of a constant continued succession is lost1 and we perceive it not1 but with certain gaps of rest between4 #ac4 ,the ,mind cannot fix long on one invariable ,idea4 ,if it be so1 that the ideas of our minds1 whilst we have any there1 do constantly change and shift in a continual succession1 it would be impossible1 may any one say1 for a man to think long of any one thing4 ,by which1 if it be meant that a man may have one self-same single idea a long time alone in his mind1 without any variation at all1 ,i think1 in matter of fact1 it is not possible4 ,for which 7not knowing how the ideas of our minds are framed1 of what materials they are made1 whence they have their light1 and how they come to make their appearances7 ,i can give no other reason but experience3 and ,i would have any one try1 whether he can keep one unvaried single idea in his mind1 without any other1 for any considerable time together4 #ad4 ,proof4 ,for trial1 let him take any figure1 any degree of light or whiteness1 or what other he pleases1 and he will1 ,i suppose1 find it difficult to keep all other ideas out of his mind2 but that some1 either of another kind1 or various considerations of that idea1 7each of which considerations is a new idea17 will constantly succeed one another in his thoughts1 let him be as wary as he can4 #ae4 ,the extent of our power over the succession of our ideas4 ,all that is in a man's power in this case1 ,i think1 is only to mind and observe what the ideas are that take their turns in his understanding2 or else to direct the sort1 and call in such as he hath a desire or use of3 but hinder the constant succession of fresh ones1 ,i think he cannot1 though he may commonly choose whether he will heedfully observe and consider them4 #af4 ,ideas1 however made1 include no sense of motion4 ,whether these several ideas in a man's mind be made by certain motions1 ,i will not here dispute2 but this ,i am sure1 that they include no idea of motion in their appearance2 and if a man had not the idea of motion otherwise1 ,i think he would have none at all1 which is enough to my present purpose2 and sufficiently shows that the notice we take of the ideas of our own minds1 appearing there one after another1 is that which gives us the idea of succession and duration1 without which we should have no such ideas at all4 ,it is not then ,,motion1 but the constant train of ,,ideas in our minds whilst we are waking1 that furnishes us with the idea of duration2 whereof motion no otherwise gives us any perception than as it causes in our minds a constant succession of ideas1 as ,i have before showed3 and we have as clear an idea of succession and duration1 by the train of other ideas succeeding one another in our minds1 without the idea of any motion1 as by the train of ideas caused by the uninterrupted sensible change of distance between two bodies1 which we have from motion2 and therefore we should as well have the idea of duration were there no sense of motion at all4 #ag4 ,time is ,duration set out by ,measures4 ,having thus got the idea of duration1 the next thing natural for the mind to do1 is to get some measure of this common duration1 whereby it might judge of its different lengths1 and consider the distinct order wherein several things exist2 without which a great part of our knowledge would be confused1 and a great part of history be rendered very useless4 ,this consideration of duration1 as set out by certain periods and marked by certain measures or epochs1 is that1 ,i think1 which most properly we call ,,time4 #ah4 ,a good ,measure of ,time must divide its whole ,duration into equal ,periods4 ,in the measuring of extension1 there is nothing more required but the application of the standard or measure we make use of to the thing of whose extension we would be informed4 ,but in the measuring of duration this cannot be done1 because no two different parts of succession can be put together to measure one another4 ,and nothing being a measure of duration but duration1 as nothing is of extension but extension1 we cannot keep by us any standing1 unvarying measure of duration1 which consists in a constant fleeting succession1 as we can of certain lengths of extension1 as inches1 feet1 yards1 c41 marked out in permanent parcels of matter4 ,nothing then could serve well for a convenient measure of time1 but what has divided the whole length of its duration into apparently equal portions1 by constantly repeated periods4 ,what portions of duration are not distinguished1 or considered as distinguished and measured1 by such periods1 come not so properly under the notion of time2 as appears by such phrases as these1 viz4 #8,before all time1' and #8,when time shall be no more4' #ai4 ,the ,revolutions of the ,sun and ,moon1 the properest ,measures of ,time for mankind4 ,the diurnal and annual revolutions of the sun1 as having been1 from the beginning of nature1 constant1 regular1 and universally observable by all mankind1 and supposed equal to one another1 have been with reason made use of for the measure of duration4 ,but the distinction of days and years having depended on the motion of the sun1 it has brought this mistake with it1 that it has been thought that motion and duration were the measure one of another4 ,for men1 in the measuring of the length of time1 having been accustomed to the ideas of minutes1 hours1 days1 months1 years1 c41 which they found themselves upon any mention of time or duration presently to think on1 all which portions of time were measured out by the motion of those heavenly bodies1 they were apt to confound time and motion2 or at least to think that they had a necessary connexion one with another4 ,whereas any constant periodical appearance1 or alteration of ideas1 in seemingly equidistant spaces of duration1 if constant and universally observable1 would have as well distinguished the intervals of time1 as those that have been made use of4 ,for1 supposing the sun1 which some have taken to be a fire1 had been lighted up at the same distance of time that it now every day comes about to the same meridian1 and then gone out again about twelve hours after1 and that in the space of an annual revolution it had sensibly increased in brightness and heat1 and so decreased again1--would not such regular appearances serve to measure out the distances of duration to all that could observe it1 as well without as with motion8 ,for if the appearances were constant1 universally observable1 in equidistant periods1 they would serve mankind for measure of time as well were the motion away4 #bj4 ,but not by their ,motion1 but periodical ,appearances4 ,for the freezing of water1 or the blooming of a plant1 returning at equidistant periods in all parts of the earth1 would as well serve men to reckon their years by1 as the motions of the sun3 and in effect we see1 that some people in ,america counted their years by the coming of certain birds amongst them at their certain seasons1 and leaving them at others4 ,for a fit of an ague2 the sense of hunger or thirst2 a smell or a taste2 or any other idea returning constantly at equidistant periods1 and making itself universally be taken notice of1 would not fail to measure out the course of succession1 and distinguish the distances of time4 ,thus we see that men born blind count time well enough by years1 whose revolutions yet they cannot distinguish by motions that they perceive not4 ,and ,i ask whether a blind man1 who distinguished his years either by the heat of summer1 or cold of winter2 by the smell of any flower of the spring1 or taste of any fruit of the autumn1 would not have a better measure of time than the ,romans had before the reformation of their calendar by ,julius ,caesar1 or many other people1 whose years1 notwithstanding the motion of the sun1 which they pretended to make use of1 are very irregular8 ,and it adds no small difficulty to chronology1 that the exact lengths of the years that several nations counted by1 are hard to be known1 they differing very much one from another1 and ,i think ,i may say all of them from the precise motion of the sun4 ,and if the sun moved from the creation to the flood constantly in the equator1 and so equally dispersed its light and heat to all the habitable parts of the earth1 in days all of the same length without its annual variations to the tropics1 as a late ingenious author supposes1 ,i do not think it very easy to imagine1 that 7notwithstanding the motion of the sun7 men should in the antediluvian world1 from the beginning1 count by years1 or measure their time by periods that had no sensible mark very obvious to distinguish them by4 #ba4 ,no two ,parts of ,duration can be certainly known to be equal4 ,but perhaps it will be said1--without a regular motion1 such as of the sun1 or some other1 how could it ever be known that such periods were equal8 ,to which ,i answer1--the equality of any other returning appearances might be known by the same way that that of days was known1 or presumed to be so at first2 which was only by judging of them by the train of ideas which had passed in men's minds in the intervals2 by which train of ideas discovering inequality in the natural days1 but none in the artificial days1 the artificial days1 or nuchthaemera1 were guessed to be equal1 which was sufficient to make them serve for a measure2 though exacter search has since discovered inequality in the diurnal revolutions of the sun1 and we know not whether the annual also be not unequal4 ,these yet1 by their presumed and apparent equality1 serve as well to reckon time by 7though not to measure the parts of duration exactly7 as if they could be proved to be exactly equal4 ,we must1 therefore1 carefully distinguish betwixt duration itself1 and the measures we make use of to judge of its length4 ,duration1 in itself1 is to be considered as going on in one constant1 equal1 uniform course3 but none of the measures of it which we make use of can be ,,known to do so1 nor can we be assured that their assigned parts or periods are equal in duration one to another2 for two successive lengths of duration1 however measured1 can never be demonstrated to be equal4 ,the motion of the sun1 which the world used so long and so confidently for an exact measure of duration1 has1 as ,i said1 been found in its several parts unequal4 ,and though men have1 of late1 made use of a pendulum1 as a more steady and regular motion than that of the sun1 or1 7to speak more truly17 of the earth2--yet if any one should be asked how he certainly knows that the two successive swings of a pendulum are equal1 it would be very hard to satisfy him that they are infallibly so2 since we cannot be sure that the cause of that motion1 which is unknown to us1 shall always operate equally2 and we are sure that the medium in which the pendulum moves is not constantly the same3 either of which varying1 may alter the equality of such periods1 and thereby destroy the certainty and exactness of the measure by motion1 as well as any other periods of other appearances2 the notion of duration still remaining clear1 though our measures of it cannot 7any of them7 be demonstrated to be exact4 ,since then no two portions of succession can be brought together1 it is impossible ever certainly to know their equality4 ,all that we can do for a measure of time is1 to take such as have continual successive appearances at seemingly equidistant periods2 of which seeming equality we have no other measure1 but such as the train of our own ideas have lodged in our memories1 with the concurrence of other ,,probable reasons1 to persuade us of their equality4 #bb4 ,time not the ,measure of ,motion ,one thing seems strange to me1--that whilst all men manifestly measured time by the motion of the great and visible bodies of the world1 time yet should be defined to be the #8measure of motion'3 whereas it is obvious to every one who reflects ever so little on it1 that to measure motion1 space is as necessary to be considered as time2 and those who look a little farther will find also the bulk of the thing moved necessary to be taken into the computation1 by any one who will estimate or measure motion so as to judge right of it4 ,nor indeed does motion any otherwise conduce to the measuring of duration1 than as it constantly brings about the return of certain sensible ideas1 in seeming equidistant periods4 ,for if the motion of the sun were as unequal as of a ship driven by unsteady winds1 sometimes very slow1 and at others irregularly very swift2 or if1 being constantly equally swift1 it yet was not circular1 and produced not the same appearances1--it would not at all help us to measure time1 any more than the seeming unequal motion of a comet does4 #bc4 ,minutes1 hours1 days1 and years are1 then1 no more ,minutes1 ,hours1 ,days1 and ,years not necessary ,measures of duration1 necessary to time or duration1 than inches1 feet1 yards1 and miles1 marked out in any matter1 are to extension4 ,for1 though we in this part of the universe1 by the constant use of them1 as of periods set out by the revolutions of the sun1 or as known parts of such periods1 have fixed the ideas of such lengths of duration in our minds1 which we apply to all parts of time whose lengths we would consider2 yet there may be other parts of the universe1 where they no more use these measures of ours1 than in ,japan they do our inches1 feet1 or miles2 but yet something analogous to them there must be4 ,for without some regular periodical returns1 we could not measure ourselves1 or signify to others1 the length of any duration2 though at the same time the world were as full of motion as it is now1 but no part of it disposed into regular and apparently equidistant revolutions4 ,but the different measures that may be made use of for the account of time1 do not at all alter the notion of duration1 which is the thing to be measured2 no more than the different standards of a foot and a cubit alter the notion of extension to those who make use of those different measures4 #bd4 ,our ,measure of ,time applicable to ,duration before ,time4 ,the mind having once got such a measure of time as the annual revolution of the sun1 can apply that measure to duration wherein that measure itself did not exist1 and with which1 in the reality of its being1 it had nothing to do4 ,for should one say1 that ,abraham was born in the two thousand seven hundred and twelfth year of the ,julian period1 it is altogether as intelligible as reckoning from the beginning of the world1 though there were so far back no motion of the sun1 nor any motion at all4 ,for1 though the ,julian period be supposed to begin several hundred years before there were really either days1 nights1 or years1 marked out by any revolutions of the sun1--yet we reckon as right1 and thereby measure durations as well1 as if really at that time the sun had existed1 and kept the same ordinary motion it doth now4 ,the idea of duration equal to an annual revolution of the sun1 is as easily ,,applicable in our thoughts to duration1 where no sun or motion was1 as the idea of a foot or yard1 taken from bodies here1 can be applied in our thoughts to distances beyond the confines of the world1 where are no bodies at all4 #be4 ,as we can measure space in our thoughts where there is no body4 ,for supposing it were #efci miles1 or millions of miles1 from this place to the remotest body of the universe1 7for1 being finite1 it must be at a certain distance17 as we suppose it to be #efci years from this time to the first existence of any body in the beginning of the world2--we can1 in our thoughts1 apply this measure of a year to duration before the creation1 or beyond the duration of bodies or motion1 as we can this measure of a mile to space beyond the utmost bodies2 and by the one measure duration1 where there was no motion1 as well as by the other measure space in our thoughts1 where there is no body4 #bf4 ,the assumption that the world is neither boundless nor eternal4 ,if it be objected to me here1 that1 in this way of explaining of time1 ,i have begged what ,i should not1 viz4 that the world is neither eternal nor infinite2 ,i answer1 ,that to my present purpose it is not needful1 in this place1 to make use of arguments to evince the world to be finite both in duration and extension4 ,but it being at least as conceivable as the contrary1 ,i have certainly the liberty to suppose it1 as well as any one hath to suppose the contrary2 and ,i doubt not1 but that every one that will go about it1 may easily conceive in his mind the beginning of motion1 though not of all duration1 and so may come to a step and non ultra in his consideration of motion4 ,so also1 in his thoughts1 he may set limits to body1 and the extension belonging to it2 but not to space1 where no body is1 the utmost bounds of space and duration being beyond the reach of thought1 as well as the utmost bounds of number are beyond the largest comprehension of the mind2 and all for the same reason1 as we shall see in another place4 #bg4 ,eternity4 ,by the same means1 therefore1 and from the same original that we come to have the idea of time1 we have also that idea which we call ,eternity2 viz4 having got the idea of succession and duration1 by reflecting on the train of our own ideas1 caused in us either by the natural appearances of those ideas coming constantly of themselves into our waking thoughts1 or else caused by external objects successively affecting our senses2 and having from the revolutions of the sun got the ideas of certain lengths of duration1--we can in our thoughts add such lengths of duration to one another1 as often as we please1 and apply them1 so added1 to durations past or to come4 ,and this we can continue to do on1 without bounds or limits1 and proceed in infinitum1 and apply thus the length of the annual motion of the sun to duration1 supposed before the sun's or any other motion had its being1 which is no more difficult or absurd1 than to apply the notion ,i have of the moving of a shadow one hour to-day upon the sun-dial to the duration of something last night1 v4 g4 the burning of a candle1 which is now absolutely separate from all actual motion2 and it is as impossible for the duration of that flame for an hour last night to co-exist with any motion that now is1 or for ever shall be1 as for any part of duration1 that was before the beginning of the world1 to co exist with the motion of the sun now4 ,but yet this hinders not but that1 having the ,,idea of the length of the motion of the shadow on a dial between the marks of two hours1 ,i can as distinctly measure in my thoughts the duration of that candle-light last night1 as ,i can the duration of anything that does now exist3 and it is no more than to think1 that1 had the sun shone then on the dial1 and moved after the same rate it doth now1 the shadow on the dial would have passed from one hour-line to another whilst that flame of the candle lasted4 #bh4 ,our measures of ,duration dependent on our ideas4 ,the notion of an hour1 day1 or year1 being only the idea ,i have of the length of certain periodical regular motions1 neither of which motions do ever all at once exist1 but only in the ideas ,i have of them in my memory derived from my senses or reflection2 ,i can with the same ease1 and for the same reason1 apply it in my thoughts to duration antecedent to all manner of motion1 as well as to anything that is but a minute or a day antecedent to the motion that at this very moment the sun is in4 ,all things past are equally and perfectly at rest2 and to this way of consideration of them are all one1 whether they were before the beginning of the world1 or but yesterday3 the measuring of any duration by some motion depending not at all on the ,,real co-existence of that thing to that motion1 or any other periods of revolution1 but the having a clear ,,idea of the length of some periodical known motion1 or other interval of duration1 in my mind1 and applying that to the duration of the thing ,i would measure4 #bi4 ,the ,duration of anything need not be co-existent with the motion we measure it by4 ,hence we see that some men imagine the duration of of the world1 from its first existence to this present year #afhi1 to have been #efci years1 or equal to #efci annual revolutions of the sun1 and others a great deal more2 as the ,egyptians of old1 who in the time of ,alexander counted #bc1jjj years from the reign of the sun2 and the ,chinese now1 who account the world #c1bfi1jjj years old1 or more2 which longer duration of the world1 according to their computation1 though ,i should not believe to be true1 yet ,i can equally imagine it with them1 and as truly understand1 and say one is longer than the other1 as ,i understand1 that ,methusalem's life was longer than ,enoch's4 ,and if the common reckoning of #efci should be true1 7as it may be as well as any other assigned17 it hinders not at all my imagining what others mean1 when they make the world one thousand years older1 since every one may with the same facility imagine 7,i do not say believe7 the world to be #ej1jjj years old1 as #efci2 and may as well conceive the duration of #ej1jjj years as #efci4 ,whereby it appears that1 to the measuring the duration of anything by time1 it is not requisite that that thing should be co-existent to the motion we measure by1 or any other periodical revolution2 but it suffices to this purpose1 that we have the idea of the length of ,,any regular periodical appearances1 which we can in our minds apply to duration1 with which the motion or appearance never co-existed4 #cj4 ,infinity in ,duration4 ,for1 as in the history of the creation delivered by ,moses1 ,i can imagine that light existed three days before the sun was1 or had any motion1 barely by thinking that the duration of light before the sun was created was so long as 7,,if the sun had moved then as it doth now7 would have been equal to three of his diurnal revolutions2 so by the same way ,i can have an idea of the chaos1 or angels1 being created before there was either light or any continued motion1 a minute1 an hour1 a day1 a year1 or one thousand years4 ,for1 if ,i can but consider duration equal to one minute1 before either the being or motion of any body1 ,i can add one minute more till ,i come to sixty2 and by the same way of adding minutes1 hours1 or years 7i4e4 such or such parts of the sun's revolutions1 or any other period whereof ,i have the idea7 proceed ,,in ,,infinitum1 and suppose a duration exceeding as many such periods as ,i can reckon1 let me add whilst ,i will1 which ,i think is the notion we have of eternity2 of whose infinity we have no other notion than we have of the infinity of number1 to which we can add for ever without end4 #ca4 ,origin of our ,ideas of ,duration1 and of the measures of it4 ,and thus ,i think it is plain1 that from those two fountains of all knowledge before mentioned1 viz4 reflection and sensation1 we got the ideas of duration1 and the measures of it4 ,for1 ,first1 by observing what passes in our minds1 how our ideas there in train constantly some vanish and others begin to appear1 we come by the idea of ,,succession4 ,secondly1 by observing a distance in the parts of this succession1 we get the idea of ,,duration4 ,thirdly1 by sensation observing certain appearances1 at certain regular and seeming equidistant periods1 we get the ideas of certain ,,lengths or ,,measures ,,of ,,duration1 as minutes1 hours1 days1 years1 c4 ,fourthly1 by being able to repeat those measures of time1 or ideas of stated length of duration1 in our minds1 as often as we will1 we can come to imagine ,,duration1--,,where ,,nothing ,,does ,,really ,,endure ,,or ,,exist2 and thus we imagine to-morrow1 next year1 or seven years hence4 ,fifthly1 by being able to repeat ideas of any length of time1 as of a minute1 a year1 or an age1 as often as we will in our own thoughts1 and adding them one to another1 without ever coming to the end of such addition1 any nearer than we can to the end of number1 to which we can always add2 we come by the idea of ,,eternity1 as the future eternal duration of our souls1 as well as the eternity of that infinite ,being which must necessarily have always existed4 ,sixthly1 by considering any part of infinite duration1 as set out by periodical measures1 we come by the idea of what we call ,,time in general4 ,,chapter ,,xv4 ,,ideas ,,of ,,duration ,,and ,,expansion1 ,,considered ,,together4 #a4 ,both capable of greater and less4 ,though we have in the precedent chapters dwelt pretty long on the considerations of space and duration1 yet1 they being ideas of general concernment1 that have something very abstruse and peculiar in their nature1 the comparing them one with another may perhaps be of use for their illustration2 and we may have the more clear and distinct conception of them by taking a view of them together4 ,distance or space1 in its simple abstract conception1 to avoid confusion1 ,i call ,,expansion1 to distinguish it from extension1 which by some is used to express this distance only as it is in the solid parts of matter1 and so includes1 or at least intimates1 the idea of body3 whereas the idea of pure distance includes no such thing4 ,i prefer also the word expansion to space1 because space is often applied to distance of fleeting successive parts1 which never exist together1 as well as to those which are permanent4 ,in both these 7viz4 expansion and duration7 the mind has this common idea of continued lengths1 capable of greater or less quantities4 ,for a man has as clear an idea of the difference of the length of an hour and a day1 as of an inch and a foot4 #b4 ,expansion not bounded by ,matter4 ,the mind1 having got the idea of the length of any part of expansion1 let it be a span1 or a pace1 or what length you will1 ,,can1 as has been said1 repeat that idea1 and so1 adding it to the former1 enlarge its idea of length1 and make it equal to two spans1 or two paces2 and so1 as often as it will1 till it equals the distance of any parts of the earth one from another1 and increase thus till it amounts to the distance of the sun or remotest star4 ,by such a progression as this1 setting out from the place where it is1 or any other place1 it can proceed and pass beyond all those lengths1 and find nothing to stop its going on1 either in or without body4 ,it is true1 we can easily in our thoughts come to the end of ,,solid extension2 the extremity and bounds of all body we have no difficulty to arrive at3 but when the mind is there1 it finds nothing to hinder its progress into this endless expansion2 of that it can neither find nor conceive any end4 ,nor let any one say1 that beyond the bounds of body1 there is nothing at all2 unless he will confine ,god within the limits of matter4 ,solomon1 whose understanding was filled and enlarged with wisdom1 seems to have other thoughts when he says1 #8,heaven1 and the heaven of heavens1 cannot contain thee4' ,and he1 ,i think1 very much magnifies to himself the capacity of his own understanding1 who persuades himself that he can extend his thoughts further than ,god exists1 or imagine any expansion where ,he is not4 #c4 ,nor ,duration by ,motion4 ,just so is it in duration4 ,the mind having got the idea of any length of duration1 can double1 multiply1 and enlarge it1 not only beyond its own1 but beyond the existence of all corporeal beings1 and all the measures of time1 taken from the great bodies of all the world and their motions4 ,but yet every one easily admits1 that1 though we make duration boundless1 as certainly it is1 we cannot yet extend it beyond all being4 ,god1 every one easily allows1 fills eternity2 and it is hard to find a reason why any one should doubt that ,he likewise fills immensity4 ,his infinite being is certainly as boundless one way as another2 and methinks it ascribes a little too much to matter to say1 where there is no body1 there is nothing4 #d4 ,why ,men more easily admit infinite ,duration than infinite ,expansion4 ,hence ,i think we may learn the reason why every one familiarly and without the least hesitation speaks of and supposes ,eternity1 and sticks not to ascribe ,,infinity to ,,duration2 but it is with more doubting and reserve that many admit or suppose the ,,infinity ,,of ,,space4 ,the reason whereof seems to me to be this1--,that duration and extension being used as names of affections belonging to other beings1 we easily conceive in ,god infinite duration1 and we cannot avoid doing so3 but1 not attributing to him extension1 but only to matter1 which is finite1 we are apter to doubt of the existence of expansion without matter2 of which alone we commonly suppose it an attribute4 ,and1 therefore1 when men pursue their thoughts of space1 they are apt to stop at the confines of body3 as if space were there at an end too1 and reached no further4 ,or if their ideas1 upon consideration1 carry them further1 yet they term what is beyond the limits of the universe1 imaginary space3 as if ,,it were nothing1 because there is no body existing in it4 ,whereas duration1 antecedent to all body1 and to the motions which it is measured by1 they never term imaginary3 because it is never supposed void of some other real existence4 ,and if the names of things may at all direct our thoughts towards the original of men's ideas1 7as ,i am apt to think they may very much17 one may have occasion to think by the name ,,duration1 that the continuation of existence1 with a kind of resistance to any destructive force1 and the continuation of solidity 7which is apt to be confounded with1 and if we will look into the minute anatomical parts of matter1 is little different from1 hardness7 were thought to have some analogy1 and gave occasion to words so near of kin as durare and durum esse4 ,and that durare is applied to the idea of hardness1 as well as that of existence1 we see in ,horace1 ,epod4 xvi4 ferro duravit secula4 ,but1 be that as it will1 this is certain1 that whoever pursues his own thoughts1 will find them sometimes launch out beyond the extent of body1 into the infinity of space or expansion2 the idea whereof is distinct and separate from body and all other things3 which may1 7to those who please17 be a subject of further meditation4 #e4 ,time to ,duration is as ,place to ,expansion4 ,time in general is to duration as place to expansion4 ,they are so much of those boundless oceans of eternity and immensity as is set out and distinguished from the rest1 as it were by landmarks2 and so are made use of to denote the position of ,,finite real beings1 in respect one to another1 in those uniform infinite oceans of duration and space4 ,these1 rightly considered1 are only ideas of determinate distances from certain known points1 fixed in distinguishable sensible things1 and supposed to keep the same distance one from another4 ,from such points fixed in sensible beings we reckon1 and from them we measure our portions of those infinite quantities2 which1 so considered1 are that which we call ,,time and ,,place4 ,for duration and space being in themselves uniform and boundless1 the order and position of things1 without such known settled points1 would be lost in them2 and all things would lie jumbled in an incurable confusion4 #f4 ,time and ,place are taken for so much of either as are set out by the ,existence and ,motion of ,bodies4 ,time and place1 taken thus for determinate distinguishable portions of those infinite abysses of space and duration1 set out or supposed to be distinguished from the rest1 by marks and known boundaries1 have each of them a twofold acceptation4 ,,first1 ,time in general is commonly taken for so much of infinite duration as is measured by1 and co-existent with1 the existence and motions of the great bodies of the universe1 as far as we know anything of them3 and in this sense time begins and ends with the frame of this sensible world1 as in these phrases before mentioned1 #8,before all time1' or1 #8,when time shall be no more4' ,place likewise is taken sometimes for that portion of infinite space which is possessed by and comprehended within the material world2 and is thereby distinguished from the rest of expansion2 though this may be more properly called extension than place4 ,within these two are confined1 and by the observable parts of them are measured and determined1 the particular time or duration1 and the particular extension and place1 of all corporeal beings4 #g4 ,sometimes for so much of either as we design by ,measures taken from the ,bulk or ,motion of ,bodies4 ,,secondly1 sometimes the word time is used in a larger sense1 and is applied to parts of that infinite duration1 not that were really distinguished and measured out by this real existence1 and periodical motions of bodies1 that were appointed from the beginning to be for signs and for seasons and for days and years1 and are accordingly our measures of time2 but such other portions too of that infinite uniform duration1 which we upon any occasion do suppose equal to certain lengths of measured time2 and so consider them as bounded and determined4 ,for1 if we should suppose the creation1 or fall of the angels1 was at the beginning of the ,julian period1 we should speak properly enough1 and should be understood if we said1 it is a longer time since the creation of angels than the creation of the world1 by #gfdj years3 whereby we would mark out so much of that undistinguished duration as we suppose equal to1 and would have admitted1 #gfdj annual revolutions of the sun1 moving at the rate it now does4 ,and thus likewise we sometimes speak of place1 distance1 or bulk1 in the great ,,inane1 beyond the confines of the world1 when we consider so much of that space as is equal to1 or capable to receive1 a body of any assigned dimensions1 as a cubic foot2 or do suppose a point in it1 at such a certain distance from any part of the universe4 #h4 ,they belong to all finite beings4 ,,where and ,,when are questions belonging to all finite existences1 and are by us always reckoned from some known parts of this sensible world1 and from some certain epochs marked out to us by the motions observable in it4 ,without some such fixed parts or periods1 the order of things would be lost1 to our finite understandings1 in the boundless invariable oceans of duration and expansion1 which comprehend in them all finite beings1 and in their full extent belong only to the ,deity4 ,and therefore we are not to wonder that we comprehend them not1 and do so often find our thoughts at a loss1 when we would consider them1 either abstractly in themselves1 or as any way attributed to the first incomprehensible ,being4 ,but when applied to any particular finite beings1 the extension of any body is so much of that infinite space as the bulk of the body takes up4 ,and place is the position of any body1 when considered at a certain distance from some other4 ,as the idea of the particular duration of anything is1 an idea of that portion of infinite duration which passes during the existence of that thing2 so the time when the thing existed is1 the idea of that space of duration which passed between some known and fixed period of duration1 and the being of that thing4 ,one shows the distance of the extremities of the bulk or existence of the same thing1 as that it is a foot square1 or lasted two years2 the other shows the distance of it in place1 or existence from other fixed points of space or duration1 as that it was in the middle of ,lincoln's ,inn ,fields1 or the first degree of ,taurus1 and in the year of our ,lord #afga1 or the #ajjjth year of the ,julian period4 ,all which distances we measure by preconceived ideas of certain lengths of space and duration1--as inches1 feet1 miles1 and degrees1 and in the other1 minutes1 days1 and years1 c4 #i4 ,all the ,parts of ,extension are ,extension1 and all the ,parts of ,duration are ,duration4 ,there is one thing more wherein space and duration have a great conformity1 and that is1 though they are justly reckoned amongst our ,,simple ,,ideas1 yet none of the distinct ideas we have of either is without all manner of composition3 it is the very nature of both of them to consist of parts3 but their parts being all of the same kind1 and without the mixture of any other idea1 hinder them not from having a place amongst simple ideas4 ,could the mind1 as in number1 come to so small a part of extension or duration as excluded divisibility1 ,,that would be1 as it were1 the indivisible unit or idea2 by repetition of which1 it would make its more enlarged ideas of extension and duration4 ,but1 since the mind is not able to frame an idea of ,,any space without parts1 instead thereof it makes use of the common measures1 which1 by familiar use in each country1 have imprinted themselves on the memory 7as inches and feet2 or cubits and parasangs2 and so seconds1 minutes1 hours1 days1 and years in duration72--the mind makes use1 ,i say1 of such ideas as these1 as simple ones3 and these are the component parts of larger ideas1 which the mind upon occasion makes by the addition of such known lengths which it is acquainted with4 ,on the other side1 the ordinary smallest measure we have of either is looked on as an unit in number1 when the mind by division would reduce them into less fractions4 ,though on both sides1 both in addition and division1 either of space or duration1 when the idea under consideration becomes very big or very small1 its precise bulk becomes very obscure and confused2 and it is the ,,number of its repeated additions or divisions that alone remains clear and distinct2 as will easily appear to any one who will let his thoughts loose in the vast expansion of space1 or divisibility of matter4 ,every part of duration is duration too2 and every part of extension is extension1 both of them capable of addition or division in infinitum4 ,but ,,the ,,least ,,portions ,,of ,,either ,,of ,,them1 ,,whereof ,,we ,,have ,,clear ,,and ,,distinct ,,ideas1 may perhaps be fittest to be considered by us1 as the simple ideas of that kind out of which our complex modes of space1 extension1 and duration are made up1 and into which they can again be distinctly resolved4 ,such a small part in duration may be called a ,,moment1 and is the time of one idea in our minds1 in the train of their ordinary succession there4 ,the other1 wanting a proper name1 ,i know not whether ,i may be allowed to call a ,,sensible ,,point1 meaning thereby the least particle of matter or space we can discern1 which is ordinarily about a minute1 and to the sharpest eyes seldom less than thirty seconds of a circle1 whereof the eye is the centre4 #aj4 ,their ,parts inseparable4 ,expansion and duration have this further agreement1 that1 though they are both considered by us as having parts1 yet their parts are not separable one from another1 no not even in thought3 though the parts of bodies from whence we take our ,,measure of the one2 and the parts of motion1 or rather the succession of ideas in our minds1 from whence we take the ,,measure of the other1 may be interrupted and separated2 as the one is often by rest1 and the other is by sleep1 which we call rest too4 #aa4 ,duration is as a ,line1 ,expansion as a ,solid4 ,but there is this manifest difference between them1--,that the ideas of length which we have of expansion are turned every way1 and so make figure1 and breadth1 and thickness2 but duration is but as it were the length of one straight line1 extended in infinitum1 not capable of multiplicity1 variation1 or figure2 but is one common measure of all existence whatsoever1 wherein all things1 whilst they exist1 equally partake4 ,for this present moment is common to all things that are now in being1 and equally comprehends that part of their existence1 as much as if they were all but one single being2 and we may truly say1 they all exist in the ,,same moment of time4 ,whether angels and spirits have any analogy to this1 in respect to expansion1 is beyond my comprehension3 and perhaps for us1 who have understandings and comprehensions suited to our own preservation1 and the ends of our own being1 but not to the reality and extent of all other beings1 it is near as hard to conceive any existence1 or to have an idea of any real being1 with a perfect negation of all manner of expansion1 as it is to have the idea of any real existence with a perfect negation of all manner of duration4 ,and therefore1 what spirits have to do with space1 or how they communicate in it1 we know not4 ,all that we know is1 that bodies do each singly possess its proper portion of it1 according to the extent of solid parts2 and thereby exclude all other bodies from having any share in that particular portion of space1 whilst it remains there4 #ab4 ,duration has never two ,parts together1 ,expansion altogether4 ,,duration1 and ,,time which is a part of it1 is the idea we have of ,,perishing distance1 of which no two parts exist together1 but follow each other in succession2 an ,,expansion is the idea of ,,lasting distance1 all whose parts exist together and are not capable of succession4 ,and therefore1 though we cannot conceive any duration without succession1 nor can put it together in our thoughts that any being does ,,now exist to-morrow1 or possess at once more than the present moment of duration2 yet we can conceive the eternal duration of the ,almighty far different from that of man1 or any other finite being4 ,because man comprehends not in his knowledge or power all past and future things3 his thoughts are but of yesterday1 and he knows not what to-morrow will bring forth4 ,what is once past he can never recall2 and what is yet to come he cannot make present4 ,what ,i say of man1 ,i say of all finite beings2 who1 though they may far exceed man in knowledge and power1 yet are no more than the meanest creature1 in comparison with ,god himself4 ,finite or any magnitude holds not any proportion to infinite4 ,god's infinite duration1 being accompanied with infinite knowledge and infinite power1 he sees all things1 past and to come2 and they are no more distant from his knowledge1 no further removed from his sight1 than the present3 they all lie under the same view3 and there is nothing which he cannot make exist each moment he pleases4 ,for the existence of all things1 depending upon his good pleasure1 all things exist every moment that he thinks fit to have them exist4 ,to conclude3 expansion and duration do mutually embrace and comprehend each other2 every part of space being in every part of duration1 and every part of duration in every part of expansion4 ,such a combination of two distinct ideas is1 ,i suppose1 scarce to be found in all that great variety we do or can conceive1 and may afford matter to further speculation4 ,,chapter ,,xvi4 ,,idea ,,of ,,number4 #a4 ,number the simplest and most universal ,idea4 ,amongst all the ideas we have1 as there is none suggested to the mind by more ways1 so there is none more simple1 than that of ,,unity1 or one3 it has no shadow of variety or composition in it3 every object our senses are employed about2 every idea in our understandings2 every thought of our minds1 brings this idea along with it4 ,and therefore it is the most intimate to our thoughts1 as well as it is1 in its agreement to all other things1 the most universal idea we have4 ,for number applies itself to men1 angels1 actions1 thoughts2 everything that either doth exist or can be imagined4 #b4 ,its ,modes made by ,addition4 ,by repeating this idea in our minds1 and adding the repetitions together1 we come by the ,,complex ideas of the ,,modes of it4 ,thus1 by adding one to one1 we have the complex idea of a couple2 by putting twelve units together we have the complex idea of a dozen2 and so of a score or a million1 or any other number4 #c4 ,each ,mode distinct4 ,the ,,simple ,,modes of ,,number are of all other the most distinct2 every the least variation1 which is an unit1 making each combination as clearly different from that which approacheth nearest to it1 as the most remote2 two being as distinct from one1 as two hundred2 and the idea of two as distinct from the idea of three1 as the magnitude of the whole earth is from that of a mite4 ,this is not so in other simple modes1 in which it is not so easy1 nor perhaps possible for us to distinguish betwixt two approaching ideas1 which yet are really different4 ,for who will undertake to find a difference between the white of this paper and that of the next degree to it3 or can form distinct ideas of every the least excess in extension8 #d4 ,therefore ,demonstrations in ,numbers the most precise4 ,the clearness and distinctness of each mode of number from all others1 even those that approach nearest1 makes me apt to think that demonstrations in numbers1 if they are not more evident and exact than in extension1 yet they are more general in their use1 and more determinate in their application4 ,because the ideas of numbers are more precise and distinguishable than in extension2 where every equality and excess are not so easy to be observed or measured2 because our thoughts cannot in space arrive at any determined smallness beyond which it cannot go1 as an unit2 and therefore the quantity or proportion of any the least excess cannot be discovered2 which is clear otherwise in number1 where1 as has been said1 #ia is as distinguishable from #ij as from #ijjj1 though #ia be the next immediate excess to #ij4 ,but it is not so in extension1 where1 whatsoever is more than just a foot or an inch1 is not distinguishable from the standard of a foot or an inch2 and in lines which appear of an equal length1 one may be longer than the other by innumerable parts3 nor can any one assign an angle1 which shall be the next biggest to a right one4 #e4 ,names necessary to ,numbers4 ,by the repeating1 as has been said1 the idea of an unit1 and joining it to another unit1 we make thereof one collective idea1 marked by the name two4 ,and whosoever can do this1 and proceed on1 still adding one more to the last collective idea which he had of any number1 and gave a name to it1 may count1 or have ideas1 for several collections of units1 distinguished one from another1 as far as he hath a series of names for following numbers1 and a memory to retain that series1 with their several names3 all numeration being but still the adding of one unit more1 and giving to the whole together1 as comprehended in one idea1 a new or distinct name or sign1 whereby to know it from those before and after1 and distinguish it from every smaller or greater multitude of units4 ,so that he that can add one to one1 and so to two1 and so go on with his tale1 taking still with him the distinct names belonging to every progression2 and so again1 by subtracting an unit from each collection1 retreat and lessen them1 is capable of all the ideas of numbers within the compass of his language1 or for which he hath names1 though not perhaps of more4 ,for1 the several simple modes of numbers being in our minds but so many combinations of units1 which have no variety1 nor are capable of any other difference but more or less1 names or marks for each distinct combination seem more necessary than in any other sort of ideas4 ,for1 without such names or marks1 we can hardly well make use of numbers in reckoning1 especially where the combination is made up of any great multitude of units2 which put together1 without a name or mark to distinguish that precise collection1 will hardly be kept from being a heap in confusion4 #f4 ,another reason for the necessity of names to numbers4 ,this ,i think to be the reason why some ,americans ,i have spoken with1 7who were otherwise of quick and rational parts enough17 could not1 as we do1 by any means count to #ajjj2 nor had any distinct idea of that number1 though they could reckon very well to #bj4 ,because their language being scanty1 and accommodated only to the few necessaries of a needy1 simple life1 unacquainted either with trade or mathematics1 had no words in it to stand for #ajjj2 so that when they were discoursed with of those greater numbers1 they would show the hairs of their head1 to express a great multitude1 which they could not number2 which inability1 ,i suppose1 proceeded from their want of names4 ,the ,tououpinambos had no names for numbers above #e2 any number beyond that they made out by showing their fingers1 and the fingers of others who were present4 ,and ,i doubt not but we ourselves might distinctly number in words a great deal further than we usually do1 would we find out but some fit denominations to signify them by2 whereas1 in the way we take now to name them1 by millions of millions of millions1 c41 it is hard to go beyond eighteen1 or at most1 four and twenty1 decimal progressions1 without confusion4 ,but to show how much distinct names conduce to our well reckoning1 or having useful ideas of numbers1 let us see all these following figures in one continued line1 as the marks of one number3 v4 g4 ,nonillions4 #hegcbd ,octillions4 #afbdhf ,septillions4 #cdehif ,sextillions4 #dcgiah ,quintrillions4 #dbcadg ,quartrillions4 #bdhajf ,trillions4 #bcedba ,billions4 #bfagcd ,millions4 #cfhadi ,units4 #fbcacg ,the ordinary way of naming this number in ,english1 will be the often repeating of millions1 of millions1 of millions1 of millions1 of millions1 of millions1 of millions1 of millions1 7which is the denomination of the second six figures74 ,in which way1 it will be very hard to have any distinguishing notions of this number4 ,but whether1 by giving every six figures a new and orderly denomination1 these1 and perhaps a great many more figures in progression1 might not easily be counted distinctly1 and ideas of them both got more easily to ourselves1 and more plainly signified to others1 ,i leave it to be considered4 ,this ,i mention only to show how necessary distinct names are to numbering1 without pretending to introduce new ones of my invention4 #g4 ,why ,children number not earlier4 ,thus children1 either for want of names to mark the several progressions of numbers1 or not having yet the faculty to collect scattered ideas into complex ones1 and range them in a regular order1 and so retain them in their memories1 as is necessary to reckoning1 do not begin to number very early1 nor proceed in it very far or steadily1 till a good while after they are well furnished with good store of other ideas3 and one may often observe them discourse and reason pretty well1 and have very clear conceptions of several other things1 before they can tell twenty4 ,and some1 through the default of their memories1 who cannot retain the several combinations of numbers1 with their names1 annexed in their distinct orders1 and the dependence of so long a train of numeral progressions1 and their relation one to another1 are not able all their lifetime to reckon1 or regularly go over any moderate series of numbers4 ,for he that will count twenty1 or have any idea of that number1 must know that nineteen went before1 with the distinct name or sign of every one of them1 as they stand marked in their order2 for wherever this fails1 a gap is made1 the chain breaks1 and the progress in numbering can go no further4 ,so that to reckon right1 it is required1 7#a7 ,that the mind distinguish carefully two ideas1 which are different one from another only by the addition or subtraction of ,,one unit3 7#b7 ,that it retain in memory the names or marks of the several combinations1 from an unit to that number2 and that not confusedly1 and at random1 but in that exact order that the numbers follow one another4 ,in either of which1 if it trips1 the whole business of numbering will be disturbed1 and there will remain only the confused idea of multitude1 but the ideas necessary to distinct numeration will not be attained to4 #h4 ,number measures all ,measurables4 ,this further is observable in number1 that it is that which the mind makes use of in measuring all things that by us are measurable1 which principally are ,,expansion and ,,duration2 and our idea of infinity1 even when applied to those1 seems to be nothing but the infinity of number4 ,for what else are our ideas of ,eternity and ,immensity1 but the repeated additions of certain ideas of imagined parts of duration and expansion1 with the infinity of number2 in which we can come to no end of addition8 ,for such an inexhaustible stock1 number 7of all other our ideas7 most clearly furnishes us with1 as is obvious to every one4 ,for let a man collect into one sum as great a number as he pleases1 this multitude how great soever1 lessens not one jot the power of adding to it1 or brings him any nearer the end of the inexhaustible stock of number2 where still there remains as much to be added1 as if none were taken out4 ,and this ,,endless ,,addition or ,,addibility 7if any one like the word better7 of numbers1 so apparent to the mind1 is that1 ,i think1 which gives us the clearest and most distinct idea of infinity3 of which more in the following chapter4 ,,chapter ,,xvii4 ,,of ,,infinity4 #a4 ,infinity1 in its original ,intention1 attributed to ,space1 ,duration1 and ,number4 ,he that would know what kind of idea it is to which we give the name of ,,infinity1 cannot do it better than by considering to what infinity is by the mind more immediately attributed2 and then how the mind comes to frame it4 ,,finite and ,,infinite seem to me to be looked upon by the mind as the ,,modes ,,of ,,quantity1 and to be attributed primarily in their first designation only to those things which have parts1 and are capable of increase or diminution by the addition or subtraction of any the least part3 and such are the ideas of space1 duration1 and number1 which we have considered in the foregoing chapters4 ,it is true1 that we cannot but be assured1 that the great ,god1 of whom and from whom are all things1 is incomprehensibly infinite3 but yet1 when we apply to that first and supreme ,being our idea of infinite1 in our weak and narrow thoughts1 we do it primarily in respect to his duration and ubiquity2 and1 ,i think1 more figuratively to his power1 wisdom1 and goodness1 and other attributes which are properly inexhaustible and incomprehensible1 c4 ,for1 when we call ,,them infinite1 we have no other idea of this infinity but what carries with it some reflection on1 and imitation of1 that number or extent of the acts or objects of ,god's power1 wisdom1 and goodness1 which can never be supposed so great1 or so many1 which these attributes will not always surmount and exceed1 let us multiply them in our thoughts as far as we can1 with all the infinity of endless number4 ,i do not pretend to say how these attributes are in ,god1 who is infinitely beyond the reach of our narrow capacities3 they do1 without doubt1 contain in them all possible perfection3 but this1 ,i say1 is our way of conceiving them1 and these our ideas of their infinity4 #b4 ,the ,idea of ,finite easily got4 ,finite then1 and infinite1 being by the mind looked on as ,,modifications of expansion and duration1 the next thing to be considered1 is1--,,how ,,the ,,mind ,,comes ,,by ,,them4 ,as for the idea of finite1 there is no great difficulty4 ,the obvious portions of extension that affect our senses1 carry with them into the mind the idea of finite3 and the ordinary periods of succession1 whereby we measure time and duration1 as hours1 days1 and years1 are bounded lengths4 ,the difficulty is1 how we come by those ,,boundless ,,ideas of eternity and immensity2 since the objects we converse with come so much short of any approach or proportion to that largeness4 #c4 ,how we come by the ,idea of ,infinity4 ,every one that has any idea of any stated lengths of space1 as a foot1 finds that he can repeat that idea2 and joining it to the former1 make the idea of two feet2 and by the addition of a third1 three feet2 and so on1 without ever coming to an end of his additions1 whether of the same idea of a foot1 or1 if he pleases1 of doubling it1 or any other idea he has of any length1 as a mile1 or diameter of the earth1 or of the orbis magnus3 for whichever of these he takes1 and how often soever he doubles1 or any otherwise multiplies it1 he finds1 that1 after he has continued his doubling in his thoughts1 and enlarged his idea as much as he pleases1 he has no more reason to stop1 nor is one jot nearer the end of such addition1 than he was at first setting out3 the power of enlarging his idea of space by further additions remaining still the same1 he hence takes the idea of infinite space4 #d4 ,our ,idea of ,space boundless4 ,this1 ,i think1 is the way whereby the mind gets the ,,idea of infinite space4 ,it is a quite different consideration1 to examine whether the mind has the idea of such a boundless space ,,actually ,,existing2 since our ideas are not always proofs of the existence of things3 but yet1 since this comes here in our way1 ,i suppose ,i may say1 that we are ,,apt ,,to ,,think that space in itself is actually boundless1 to which imagination the idea of space or expansion of itself naturally leads us4 ,for1 it being considered by us1 either as the extension of body1 or as existing by itself1 without any solid matter taking it up1 7for of such a void space we have not only the idea1 but ,i have proved1 as ,i think1 from the motion of body1 its necessary existence17 it is impossible the mind should be ever able to find or suppose any end of it1 or be stopped anywhere in its progress in this space1 how far soever it extends its thoughts4 ,any bounds made with body1 even adamantine walls1 are so far from putting a stop to the mind in its further progress in space and extension that it rather facilitates and enlarges it4 ,for so far as that body reaches1 so far no one can doubt of extension2 and when we are come to the utmost extremity of body1 what is there that can there put a stop1 and satisfy the mind that it is at the end of space1 when it perceives that it is not2 nay1 when it is satisfied that body itself can move into it8 ,for1 if it be necessary for the motion of body1 that there should be an empty space1 though ever so little1 here amongst bodies2 and if it be possible for body to move in or through that empty space2--nay1 it is impossible for any particle of matter to move but into an empty space2 the same possibility of a body's moving into a void space1 beyond the utmost bounds of body1 as well as into a void space interspersed amongst bodies1 will always remain clear and evident3 the idea of empty pure space1 whether within or beyond the confines of all bodies1 being exactly the same1 differing not in nature1 though in bulk2 and there being nothing to hinder body from moving into it4 ,so that wherever the mind places itself by any thought1 either amongst1 or remote from all bodies1 it can1 in this uniform idea of space1 nowhere find any bounds1 any end2 and so must necessarily conclude it1 by the very nature and idea of each part of it1 to be actually infinite4 #e4 ,and so of ,duration4 ,as1 by the power we find in ourselves of repeating1 as often as we will1 any idea of space1 we get the idea of ,,immensity2 so1 by being able to repeat the idea of any length of duration we have in our minds1 with all the endless addition of number1 we come by the idea of ,,eternity4 ,for we find in ourselves1 we can no more come to an end of such repeated ideas than we can come to the end of number2 which every one perceives he cannot4 ,but here again it is another question1 quite different from our having an ,,idea of eternity1 to know whether there were ,,any ,,real ,,being1 whose duration has been eternal4 ,and as to this1 ,i say1 he that considers something now existing1 must necessarily come to ,something eternal4 ,but having spoke of this in another place1 ,i shall say here no more of it1 but proceed on to some other considerations of our idea of infinity4 #f4 ,why other ,ideas are not capable of ,infinity4 ,if it be so1 that our idea of infinity be got from the power we observe in ourselves of repeating1 without end1 our own ideas1 it may be demanded1--,why we do not attribute infinity to other ideas1 as well as those of space and duration2 since they may be as easily1 and as often1 repeated in our minds as the other3 and yet nobody ever thinks of infinite sweetness or infinite whiteness1 though he can repeat the idea of sweet or white1 as frequently as those of a yard or a day8 ,to which ,i answer1--,all the ideas that are considered as having parts1 and are capable of increase by the addition of an equal or less parts1 afford us1 by their repetition1 the idea of infinity2 because1 with this endless repetition1 there is continued an enlargement of which there ,,can be no end4 ,but for other ideas it is not so4 ,for to the largest idea of extension or duration that ,i at present have1 the addition of any the least part makes an increase2 but to the perfectest idea ,i have of the whitest whiteness1 if ,i add another of a less equal whiteness1 7and of a whiter than ,i have1 ,i cannot add the idea17 it makes no increase1 and enlarges not my idea at all2 and therefore the different ideas of whiteness1 c4 are called degrees4 ,for those ideas that consist of part are capable of being augmented by every addition of the least part2 but if you take the idea of white1 which one parcel of snow yielded yesterday to our sight1 and another idea of white from another parcel of snow you see to-day1 and put them together in your mind1 they embody1 as it were1 all run into one1 and the idea of whiteness is not at all increased and if we add a less degree of whiteness to a greater1 we are so far from increasing1 that we diminish it4 ,those ideas that consist not of parts cannot be augmented to what proportion men please1 or be stretched beyond what they have received by their senses2 but space1 duration1 and number1 being capable of increase by repetition1 leave in the mind an idea of endless room for more2 nor can we conceive anywhere a stop to a further addition or progression3 and so those ideas ,,alone lead our minds towards the thought of infinity4 #g4 ,difference between infinity of ,space1 and ,space infinite4 ,though our idea of infinity arise from the contemplation of quantity1 and the endless increase the mind is able to make in quantity1 by the repeated additions of what portions thereof it pleases2 yet ,i guess we cause great confusion in our thoughts1 when we join infinity to any supposed idea of quantity the mind can be thought to have1 and so discourse or reason about an infinite quantity1 as an infinite space1 or an infinite duration4 ,for1 as our idea of infinity being1 as ,i think1 ,,an ,,endless ,,growing ,,idea1 but the idea of any quantity the mind has1 being at that time ,,terminated in that idea1 7for be it as great as it will1 it can be no greater than it is17--to join infinity to it1 is to adjust a standing measure to a growing bulk2 and therefore ,i think it is not an insignificant subtilty1 if ,i say1 that we are carefully to distinguish between the idea of the infinity of space1 and the idea of a space infinite4 ,the first is nothing but a supposed endless progression of the mind1 over what repeated ideas of space it pleases2 but to have actually in the mind the idea of a space infinite1 is to suppose the mind already passed over1 and actually to have a view of ,,all those repeated ideas of space which an ,,endless repetition can never totally represent to it2 which carries in it a plain contradiction4 #h4 ,we have no ,idea of infinite ,space4 ,this1 perhaps1 will be a little plainer1 if we consider it in numbers4 ,the infinity of numbers1 to the end of whose addition every one perceives there is no approach1 easily appears to any one that reflects on it4 ,but1 how clear soever this idea of the infinity of number be1 there is nothing yet more evident than the absurdity of the actual idea of an infinite number4 ,whatsoever ,,positive ideas we have in our minds of any space1 duration1 or number1 let them be ever so great1 they are still finite2 but when we suppose an inexhaustible remainder1 from which we remove all bounds1 and wherein we allow the mind an endless progression of thought1 without ever completing the idea1 there we have our idea of infinity3 which1 though it seems to be pretty clear when we consider nothing else in it but the negation of an end1 yet1 when we would frame in our minds the idea of an infinite space or duration1 that idea is very obscure and confused1 because it is made up of two parts1 very different1 if not inconsistent4 ,for1 let a man frame in his mind an idea of any space or number1 as great as he will2 it is plain the mind ,,rests ,,and ,,terminates in that idea1 which is contrary to the idea of infinity1 which ,,consists ,,in ,a ,,supposed ,,endless ,,progression4 ,and therefore ,i think it is that we are so easily confounded1 when we come to argue and reason about infinite space or duration1 c4 ,because the parts of such an idea not being perceived to be1 as they are1 inconsistent1 the one side or other always perplexes1 whatever consequences we draw from the other2 as an idea of motion not passing on would perplex any one who should argue from such an idea1 which is not better than an idea of motion at rest4 ,and such another seems to me to be the idea of a space1 or 7which is the same thing7 a number infinite1 i4 e4 of a space or number which the mind actually has1 and so views and terminates in2 and of a space or number1 which1 in a constant and endless enlarging and progression1 it can in thought never attain to4 ,for1 how large soever an idea of space ,i have in my mind1 it is no larger than it is that instant that ,i have it1 though ,i be capable the next instant to double it1 and so on in infinitum2 for that alone is infinite which has no bounds2 and that the idea of infinity1 in which our thoughts can find none4 #i4 ,number affords us the clearest ,idea of ,infinity4 ,but of all other ideas1 it is number1 as ,i have said1 which ,i think furnishes us with the clearest and most distinct idea of infinity we are capable of4 ,for1 even in space and duration1 when the mind pursues the idea of infinity1 it there makes use of the ideas and repetitions of numbers1 as of millions and millions of miles1 or years1 which are so many distinct ideas1--kept best by number from running into a confused heap1 wherein the mind loses itself2 and when it has added together as many millions1 c41 as it pleases1 of known lengths of space or duration1 the clearest idea it can get of infinity1 is the confused incomprehensible remainder of endless addible numbers1 which affords no prospect of stop or boundary4 #aj4 ,our different ,conceptions of the ,infinity of ,number contrasted with those of ,duration and ,expansion4 ,it will1 perhaps1 give us a little further light into the idea we have of infinity1 and discover to us1 that it is ,,nothing ,,but ,,the ,,infinity ,,of ,,number ,,applied ,,to ,,determinate ,,parts1 ,,of ,,which ,,we ,,have ,,in ,,our ,,minds ,,the ,,distinct ,,ideas1 if we consider that number is not generally thought by us infinite1 whereas duration and extension are apt to be so2 which arises from hence1--that in number we are at one end1 as it were3 for there being in number nothing ,,less than an unit1 we there stop1 and are at an end2 but in addition1 or increase of number1 we can set no bounds3 and so it is like a line1 whereof one end terminating with us1 the other is extended still forwards1 beyond all that we can conceive4 ,but in space and duration it is otherwise4 ,for in duration we consider it as if this line of number were extended ,,both ways--to an unconceivable1 undeterminate1 and infinite length2 which is evident to anyone that will but reflect on what consideration he hath of ,eternity2 which1 ,i suppose1 will find to be nothing else but the turning this infinity of number both ways1 a parte ante and a parte post1 as they speak4 ,for1 when we would consider eternity1 a parte ante1 what do we but1 beginning from ourselves and the present time we are in1 repeat in our minds ideas of years1 or ages1 or any other assignable portion of duration past1 with a prospect of proceeding in such addition with all the infinity of number3 and when we would consider eternity1 a parte post1 we just after the same rate begin from ourselves1 and reckon by multiplied periods yet to come1 still extending that line of number as before4 ,and these two being put together1 are that infinite duration we call ,,eternity which1 as we turn our view either way1 forwards or backward appears infinite1 because we still turn that way the infinite end of number1 i4e4 the power still of adding more4 #aa4 ,how we conceive the ,infinity of ,space4 ,the same happens also in space1 wherein1 conceiving ourselves to be1 as it were1 in the centre1 we do on all sides pursue those indeterminable lines of number2 and reckoning any way from ourselves1 a yard1 mile1 diameter of the earth or orbis magnus1--by the infinity of number1 we add others to them1 as often as we will4 ,and having no more reason to set bounds to those repeated ideas than we have to set bounds to number1 we have that indeterminable idea of immensity4 #ab4 ,infinite ,divisibility4 ,and since in any bulk of matter our thoughts can never arrive at the utmost divisibility1 therefore there is an apparent infinity to us also in that1 which has the infinity also of number2 but with this difference1--that1 in the former considerations of the infinity of space and duration1 we only use addition of numbers2 whereas this is like the division of an unit into its fractions1 wherein the mind also can proceed in infinitum1 as well as in the former additions2 it being indeed but the addition still of new numbers3 though in the addition of the one1 we can have no more the ,,positive idea of a space infinitely great1 than1 in the division of the other1 we can have the positive idea of a body infinitely little2--our idea of infinity being1 as ,i may say1 a growing or fugitive idea1 still in a boundless progression1 that can stop nowhere4 #ac4 ,no positive ,idea of ,infinity4 ,though it be hard1 ,i think1 to find anyone so absurd as to say he has the ,,positive idea of an actual infinite number2--the infinity whereof lies only in a power still of adding any combination of units to any former number1 and that as long and as much as one will2 the like also being in the infinity of space and duration1 which power leaves always to the mind room for endless additions2--yet there be those who imagine they have positive ideas of infinite duration and space4 ,it would1 ,i think1 be enough to destroy any such positive idea of infinite1 to ask him that has it1--whether he could add to it or no2 which would easily show the mistake of such a positive idea4 ,we can1 ,i think1 have no positive idea of any space or duration which is not made up of1 and commensurate to1 repeated numbers of feet or yards1 or days and years2 which are the common measures1 whereof we have the ideas in our minds1 and whereby we judge of the greatness of this sort of quantities4 ,and therefore1 since an infinite idea of space or duration must needs be made up of infinite parts1 it can have no other infinity than that of number ,,capable still of further addition2 but not an actual positive idea of a number infinite4 ,for1 ,i think it is evident1 that the addition of finite things together 7as are all lengths whereof we have the positive ideas7 can never otherwise produce the idea of infinite than as number does2 which consisting of additions of finite units one to another1 suggests the idea of infinite1 only by a power we find we have of still increasing the sum1 and adding more of the same kind2 without coming one jot nearer the end of such progression4 #ad4 ,how we cannot have a positive idea of infinity in ,quantity4 ,they who would prove their idea of infinite to be positive1 seem to me to do it by a pleasant argument1 taken from the negation of an end2 which being negative1 the negation on it is positive4 ,he that considers that the end is1 in body1 but the extremity or superficies of that body1 will not perhaps be forward to grant that the end is a bare negative3 and he that perceives the end of his pen is black or white1 will be apt to think that the end is something more than a pure negation4 ,nor is it1 when applied to duration1 the bare negation of existence1 but more properly the last moment of it4 ,but as they will have the end to be nothing but the bare negation of existence1 ,i am sure they cannot deny but the beginning of the first instant of being1 and is not by any body conceived to be a bare negation2 and therefore1 by their own argument1 the idea of eternal1 ,a ,,parte ,,ante1 or of a duration without a beginning1 is but a negative idea4 #ae4 ,what is positive1 what negative1 in our ,idea of infinite4 ,the idea of infinite has1 ,i confess1 something of positive in all those things we apply to it4 ,when we would think of infinite space or duration1 we at first step usually make some very large idea1 as perhaps of millions of ages1 or miles1 which possibly we double and multiply several times4 ,all that we thus amass together in our thoughts is positive1 and the assemblage of a great number of positive ideas of space or duration4 ,but what still remains beyond this we have no more a positive distinct notion of than a mariner has of the depth of the sea2 where1 having let down a large portion of his sounding-line1 he reaches no bottom4 ,whereby he knows the depth to be so many fathoms1 and more2 but how much the more is1 he hath no distinct notion at all3 and could he always supply new line1 and find the plummet always sink1 without ever stopping1 he would be something in the posture of the mind reaching after a complete and positive idea of infinity4 ,in which case1 let this line be ten1 or ten thousand fathoms long1 it equally discovers what is beyond it1 and gives only this confused and comparative idea1 that this is not all1 but one may yet go farther4 ,so much as the mind comprehends of any space1 it has a positive idea of3 but in endeavouring to make it infinite1--it being always enlarging1 always advancing1--the idea is still imperfect and incomplete4 ,so much space as the mind takes a view of in its contemplation of greatness1 is a clear picture1 and positive in the understanding3 but infinite is still greater4 #a4 ,then the idea of ,,so ,,much is positive and clear4 #b4 ,the idea of ,,greater is also clear2 but it is but a comparative idea1 the idea of ,,so ,,much ,,greater ,,as ,,cannot ,,be ,,comprehended4 #c4 ,and this is plainly negative3 not positive4 ,for he has no positive clear idea of the largeness of any extension1 7which is that sought for in the idea of infinite71 that has not a comprehensive idea of the dimensions of it3 and such1 nobody1 ,i think1 pretends to in what is infinite4 ,for to say a man has a positive clear idea of any quantity1 without knowing how great it is1 is as reasonable as to say1 he has the positive clear idea of the number of the sands on the sea-shore1 who knows not how many there be1 but only that they are more than twenty4 ,for just such a perfect and positive idea has he of an infinite space or duration1 who says it is ,,larger ,,than the extent or duration of ten1 one hundred1 one thousand1 or any other number of miles1 or years1 whereof he has or can have a positive idea2 which is all the idea1 ,i think1 we have of infinite4 ,so that what lies beyond our positive idea ,,towards infinity1 lies in obscurity1 and has the indeterminate confusion of a negative idea1 wherein ,i know ,i neither do nor can comprehend all ,i would1 it being too large for a finite and narrow capacity4 ,and that cannot but be very far from a positive complete idea1 wherein the greatest part of what ,i would comprehend is left out1 under the undeterminate intimation of being still greater4 ,for to say1 that1 having in any quantity measured so much1 or gone so far1 you are not yet at the end1 is only to say that that quantity is greater4 ,so that the negation of an end in any quantity is1 in other words1 only to say that it is bigger2 and a total negation of an end is but carrying this bigger still with you1 in all the progressions your thoughts shall make in quantity2 and adding this ,,idea ,,of ,,still ,,greater to ,,all the ideas you have1 or can be supposed to have1 of quantity4 ,now1 whether such an idea as that be positive1 ,i leave any one to consider4 #af4 ,we have no positive ,idea of an infinite ,duration4 ,i ask those who say they have a positive idea of eternity1 whether their idea of duration includes in it succession1 or not8 ,if it does not1 they ought to show the difference of their notion of duration1 when applied to an eternal ,being1 and to a finite2 since1 perhaps1 there may be others as well as ,i1 who will own to them their weakness of understanding in this point1 and acknowledge that the notion they have of duration forces them to conceive1 that whatever has duration1 is of a longer continuance to-day than it was yesterday4 ,if1 to avoid succession in external existence1 they return to the punctum stans of the schools1 ,i suppose they will thereby very little mend the matter1 or help us to a more clear and positive idea of infinite duration2 there being nothing more inconceivable to me than duration without succession4 ,besides1 that punctum stans1 if it signify anything1 being not quantum1 finite or infinite cannot belong to it4 ,but1 if our weak apprehensions cannot separate succession from any duration whatsoever1 our idea of eternity can be nothing but of ,,infinite ,,succession ,,of ,,moments ,,of ,,duration ,,wherein ,,anything ,,does ,,exist2 and whether any one has1 or can have1 a positive idea of an actual infinite number1 ,i leave him to consider1 till his infinite number be so great that he himself can add no more to it2 and as long as he can increase it1 ,i doubt he himself will think the idea he hath of it a little too scanty for positive infinity4 #ag4 ,no complete ,idea of ,eternal ,being4 ,i think it unavoidable for every considering1 rational creature1 that will but examine his own or any other existence1 to have the notion of an eternal1 wise ,being1 who had no beginning3 and such an idea of infinite duration ,i am sure ,i have4 ,but this negation of a beginning1 being but the negation of a positive thing1 scarce gives me a positive idea of infinity2 which1 whenever ,i endeavour to extend my thoughts to1 ,i confess myself at a loss1 and ,i find ,i cannot attain any clear comprehension of it4 #ah4 ,no positive ,idea of infinite ,space4 ,he that thinks he has a positive idea of infinite space1 will1 when he considers it1 find that he can no more have a positive idea of the greatest1 than he has of the least space4 ,for in this latter1 which seems the easier of the two1 and more within our comprehension1 we are capable only of a comparative idea of smallness1 which will always be less than any one whereof we have the positive idea4 ,all our ,,positive ideas of any quantity1 whether great or little1 have always bounds1 though our ,,comparative idea1 whereby we can always add to the one1 and take from the other1 hath no bounds4 ,for that which remains1 either great or little1 not being comprehended in that positive idea which we have1 lies in obscurity2 and we have no other idea of it1 but of the power of enlarging the one and diminishing the other1 ,,without ,,ceasing4 ,a pestle and mortar will as soon bring any particle of matter to indivisibility1 as the acutest thought of a mathematician2 and a surveyor may as soon with his chain measure out infinite space1 as a philosopher by the quickest flight of mind reach it or by thinking comprehend it2 which is to have a positive idea of it4 ,he that thinks on a cube of an inch diameter1 has a clear and positive idea of it in his mind1 and so can frame one of #a_/b1 #a_/d1 #a_/h1 and so on1 till he has the idea in his thoughts of something very little2 but yet reaches not the idea of that incomprehensible littleness which division can produce4 ,what remains of smallness is as far from his thoughts as when he first began2 and therefore he never comes at all to have a clear and positive idea of that smallness which is consequent to infinite divisibility4 #ai4 ,what is positive1 what negative1 in our ,idea of ,infinite4 ,every one that looks towards infinity does1 as ,i have said1 at first glance make some very large idea of that which he applies it to1 let it be space or duration2 and possibly he wearies his thoughts1 by multiplying in his mind that first large idea3 but yet by that he comes no nearer to the having a positive clear idea of what remains to make up a positive infinite1 than the country fellow had of the water which was yet to come1 and pass the channel of the river where he stood3 #8,rusticus expectat dum defluat amnis1 at ille ,labitur1 et labetur in omne volubilis vum4' #bj4 ,some think they have a positive ,idea of ,eternity1 and not of infinite ,space4 ,there are some ,i have met that put so much difference between infinite duration and infinite space1 that they persuade themselves that they have a positive idea of eternity1 but that they have not1 nor can have any idea of infinite space4 ,the reason of which mistake ,i suppose to be this--that finding1 by a due contemplation of causes and effects1 that it is necessary to admit some ,eternal ,being1 and so to consider the real existence of that ,being as taken up and commensurate to their idea of eternity2 but1 on the other side1 not finding it necessary1 but1 on the contrary1 apparently absurd1 that body should be infinite1 they forwardly conclude that they can have no idea of infinite space1 because they can have no idea of infinite matter4 ,which consequence1 ,i conceive1 is very ill collected1 because the existence of matter is no ways necessary to the existence of space1 no more than the existence of motion1 or the sun1 is necessary to duration1 though duration uses to be measured by it4 ,and ,i doubt not but that a man may have the idea of ten thousand miles square1 without any body so big1 as well as the idea of ten thousand years1 without any body so old4 ,it seems as easy to me to have the idea of space empty of body1 as to think of the capacity of a bushel without corn1 or the hollow of a nut-shell without a kernel in it3 it being no more necessary that there should be existing a solid body1 infinitely extended1 because we have an idea of the infinity of space1 than it is necessary that the world should be eternal1 because we have an idea of infinite duration4 ,and why should we think our idea of infinite space requires the real existence of matter to support it1 when we find that we have as clear an idea of an infinite duration to come1 as we have of infinite duration past8 ,though ,i suppose nobody thinks it conceivable that anything does or has existed in that future duration4 ,nor is it possible to join our idea of future duration with present or past existence1 any more than it is possible to make the ideas of yesterday1 to-day1 and to-morrow to be the same2 or bring ages past and future together1 and make them contemporary4 ,but if these men are of the mind1 that they have clearer ideas of infinite duration than of infinite space1 because it is past doubt that ,god has existed from all eternity1 but there is no real matter co-extended with infinite space2 yet those philosophers who are of opinion that infinite space is possessed by ,god's infinite omnipresence1 as well as infinite duration by his eternal existence1 must be allowed to have as clear an idea of infinite space as of infinite duration2 though neither of them1 ,i think1 has any positive idea of infinity in either case4 ,for whatsoever positive ideas a man has in his mind of any quantity1 he can repeat it1 and add it to the former1 as easy as he can add together the ideas of two days1 or two paces1 which are positive ideas of lengths he has in his mind1 and so on as long as he pleases3 whereby1 if a man had a positive idea of infinite1 either duration or space1 he could add two infinites together2 nay1 make one infinite infinitely bigger than another--absurdities too gross to be confuted4 #ba4 ,supposed positive ,ideas of ,infinity1 cause of ,mistakes4 ,but yet if after all this1 there be men who persuade themselves that they have clear positive comprehensive ideas of infinity1 it is fit they enjoy their privilege3 and ,i should be very glad 7with some others that ,i know1 who acknowledge they have none such7 to be better informed by their communication4 ,for ,i have been hitherto apt to think that the great and inextricable difficulties which perpetually involve all discourses concerning infinity1--whether of space1 duration1 or divisibility1 have been the certain marks of a defect in our ideas of infinity1 and the disproportion the nature thereof has to the comprehension of our narrow capacities4 ,for1 whilst men talk and dispute of infinite space or duration1 as if they had as complete and positive ideas of them as they have of the names they use for them1 or as they have of a yard1 or an hour1 or any other determinate quantity2 it is no wonder if the incomprehensible nature of the thing they discourse of1 or reason about1 leads them into perplexities and contradictions1 and their minds be overlaid by an object too large and mighty to be surveyed and managed by them4 #bb4 ,all these are modes of ,ideas got from ,sensation and ,reflection4 ,if ,i have dwelt pretty long on the consideration of duration1 space1 and number1 and what arises from the contemplation of them1--,infinity1 it is possibly no more than the matter requires2 there being few simple ideas whose ,,modes give more exercise to the thoughts of men than those do4 ,i pretend not to treat of them in their full latitude4 ,it suffices to my design to show how the mind receives them1 such as they are1 from sensation and reflection2 and how even the idea we have of infinity1 how remote soever it may seem to be from any object of sense1 or operation of our mind1 has1 nevertheless1 as all our other ideas1 its original there4 ,some mathematicians perhaps1 of advanced speculations1 may have other ways to introduce into their minds ideas of infinity4 ,but this hinders not but that they themselves1 as well as all other men1 got the first ideas which they had of infinity from sensation and reflection1 in the method we have here set down4 ,,chapter ,,xviii4 ,,other ,,simple ,,modes4 #a4 ,other simple ,modes of simple ,ideas of sensation4 ,though ,i have1 in the foregoing chapters1 shown how from simple ideas taken in by sensation1 the mind comes to extend itself even to infinity2 which1 however it may of all others seem most remote from any sensible perception1 yet at last hath nothing in it but what is made out of simple ideas3 received into the mind by the senses1 and afterwards there put together1 by the faculty the mind has to repeat its own ideas2 --,though1 ,i say1 these might be instances enough of simple modes of the simple ideas of sensation1 and suffice to show how the mind comes by them1 yet ,i shall1 for method's sake1 though briefly1 give an account of some few more1 and then proceed to more complex ideas4 #b4 ,simple modes of motion4 ,to slide1 roll1 tumble1 walk1 creep1 run1 dance1 leap1 skip1 and abundance of others that might be named1 are words which are no sooner heard but every one who understands ,english has presently in his mind distinct ideas1 which are all but the different modifications of motion4 ,modes of motion answer those of extension2 swift and slow are two different ideas of motion1 the measures whereof are made of the distances of time and space put together2 so they are complex ideas1 comprehending time and space with motion4 #c4 ,modes of ,sounds4 ,the like variety have we in sounds4 ,every articulate word is a different modification of sound2 by which we see that1 from the sense of hearing1 by such modifications1 the mind may be furnished with distinct ideas1 to almost an infinite number4 ,sounds also1 besides the distinct cries of birds and beasts1 are modified by diversity of notes of different length put together1 which make that complex idea called a tune1 which a musician may have in his mind when he hears or makes no sound at all1 by reflecting on the ideas of those sounds1 so put together silently in his own fancy4 #d4 ,modes of ,colours4 ,those of colours are also very various3 some we take notice of as the different degrees1 or as they were termed shades1 of the same colour4 ,but since we very seldom make assemblages of colours1 either for use or delight1 but figure is taken in also1 and has its part in it1 as in painting1 weaving1 needleworks1 c42--those which are taken notice of do most commonly belong to ,,mixed ,,modes1 as being made up of ideas of divers kinds1 viz4 figure and colour1 such as beauty1 rainbow1 c4 #e4 ,modes of ,tastes4 ,all compounded tastes and smells are also modes1 made up of the simple ideas of those senses4 ,but they1 being such as generally we have no names for1 are less taken notice of1 and cannot be set down in writing2 and therefore must be left without enumeration to the thoughts and experience of my reader4 #f4 ,some simple ,modes have no ,names4 ,in general it may be observed1 that those simple modes which are considered but as different ,,degrees of the same simple idea1 though they are in themselves many of them very distinct ideas1 yet have ordinarily no distinct names1 nor are much taken notice of1 as distinct ideas1 where the difference is but very small between them4 ,whether men have neglected these modes1 and given no names to them1 as wanting measures nicely to distinguish them2 or because1 when they were so distinguished1 that knowledge would not be of general or necessary use1 ,i leave it to the thoughts of others4 ,it is sufficient to my purpose to show1 that all our simple ideas come to our minds only by sensation and reflection2 and that when the mood has them1 it can variously repeat and compound them1 and so make new complex ideas4 ,but1 though white1 red1 or sweet1 c4 have not been modified1 or made into complex ideas1 by several combinations1 so as to be named1 and thereby ranked into species2 yet some others of the simple ideas1 viz4 those of unity1 duration1 and motion1 c41 above instanced in1 as also power and thinking1 have been thus modified to a great variety of complex ideas1 with names belonging to them4 #g4 ,why some ,modes have1 and others have not1 ,names4 ,the reason whereof1 ,i suppose1 has been this1--,that the great concernment of men being with men one amongst another1 the knowledge of men1 and their actions1 and the signifying of them to one another1 was most necessary2 and therefore they made ideas of ,,actions very nicely modified1 and gave those complex ideas names1 that they might the more easily record and discourse of those things they were daily conversant in1 without long ambages and circumlocutions2 and that the things they were continually to give and receive information about might be the easier and quicker understood4 ,that this is so1 and that men in framing different complex ideas1 and giving them names1 have been much governed by the end of speech in general1 7which is a very short and expedite way of conveying their thoughts one to another71 is evident in the names which in several arts have been found out1 and applied to several complex ideas of modified actions1 belonging to their several trades1 for dispatch sake1 in their direction or discourses about them4 ,which ideas are not generally framed in the minds of men not conversant about these operations4 ,and thence the words that stand for them1 by the greatest part of men of the same language1 are not understood3 v4 g4 ,,coltshire1 ,,drilling1 ,,filtration1 ,,cohobation1 are words standing for certain complex ideas1 which being seldom in the minds of any but those few whose particular employments do at every turn suggest them to their thoughts1 those names of them are not generally understood but by smiths and chymists2 who1 having framed the complex ideas which these words stand for1 and having given names to them1 or received them from others1 upon hearing of these names in communication1 readily conceive those ideas in their minds2-as by ,,cohobation all the simple ideas of distilling1 and the pouring the liquor distilled from anything back upon the remaining matter1 and distilling it again4 ,thus we see that there are great varieties of simple ideas1 as of tastes and smells1 which have no names2 and of modes many more2 which either not having been generally enough observed1 or else not being of any great use to be taken notice of in the affairs and converse of men1 they have not had names given to them1 and so pass not for species4 ,this we shall have occasion hereafter to consider more at large1 when we come to speak of ,,words4 ,,chapter ,,xix4 ,,of ,,the ,,modes ,,of ,,thinking4 #a4 ,sensation1 ,remembrance1 ,contemplation1 c41 modes of thinking4 ,when the mind turns its view inwards upon itself1 and contemplates its own actions1 ,,thinking is the first that occurs4 ,in it the mind observes a great variety of modifications1 and from thence receives distinct ideas4 ,thus the perception or thought which actually accompanies1 and is annexed to1 any impression on the body1 made by an external object1 being distinct from all other modifications of thinking1 furnishes the mind with a distinct idea1 which we call ,,sensation2--which is1 as it were1 the actual entrance of any idea into the understanding by the senses4 ,the same idea1 when it again recurs without the operation of the like object on the external sensory1 is ,,remembrance3 if it be sought after by the mind1 and with pain and endeavour found1 and brought again in view1 it is ,,recollection3 if it be held there long under attentive consideration1 it is ,,contemplation3 when ideas float in our mind without any reflection or regard of the understanding1 it is that which the ,french call ,,reverie2 our language has scarce a name for it3 when the ideas that offer themselves 7for1 as ,i have observed in another place1 whilst we are awake1 there will always be a train of ideas succeeding one another in our minds7 are taken notice of1 and1 as it were1 registered in the memory1 it is ,,attention3 when the mind with great earnestness1 and of choice1 fixes its view on any idea1 considers it on all sides1 and will not be called off by the ordinary solicitation of other ideas1 it is that we call ,,intention or ,,study3 sleep1 without dreaming1 is rest from all these3 and ,,dreaming itself is the having of ideas 7whilst the outward senses are stopped1 so that they receive not outward objects with their usual quickness7 in the mind1 not suggested by any external objects1 or known occasion2 nor under any choice or conduct of the understanding at all3 and whether that which we call ,,ecstasy be not dreaming with the eyes open1 ,i leave to be examined4 #b4 ,other modes of thinking4 ,these are some few instances of those various modes of thinking1 which the mind may observe in itself1 and so have as distinct ideas of as it hath of white and red1 a square or a circle4 ,i do not pretend to enumerate them all1 nor to treat at large of this set of ideas1 which are got from reflection3 that would be to make a volume4 ,it suffices to my present purpose to have shown here1 by some few examples1 of what sort these ideas are1 and how the mind comes by them2 especially since ,i shall have occasion hereafter to treat more at large of ,,reasoning1 ,,judging1 ,,volition1 and ,,knowledge1 which are some of the most considerable operations of the mind1 and modes of thinking4 #c4 ,the various degrees of ,attention in thinking4 ,but perhaps it may not be an unpardonable digression1 nor wholly impertinent to our present design1 if we reflect here upon the different state of the mind in thinking1 which those instances of attention1 reverie1 and dreaming1 c41 before mentioned1 naturally enough suggest4 ,that there are ideas1 some or other1 always present in the mind of a waking man1 every one's experience convinces him2 though the mind employs itself about them with several degrees of attention4 ,sometimes the mind fixes itself with so much earnestness on the contemplation of some objects1 that it turns their ideas on all sides2 marks their relations and circumstances2 and views every part so nicely and with such intention1 that it shuts out all other thoughts1 and takes no notice of the ordinary impressions made then on the senses1 which at another season would produce very sensible perceptions3 at other times it barely observes the train of ideas that succeed in the understanding1 without directing and pursuing any of them3 and at other times it lets them pass almost quite unregarded1 as faint shadows that make no impression4 #d4 ,hence it is probable that ,thinking is the ,action1 not the ,essence of the ,soul4 ,this difference of intention1 and remission of the mind in thinking1 with a great variety of degrees between earnest study and very near minding nothing at all1 every one1 ,i think1 has experimented in himself4 ,trace it a little further1 and you find the mind in sleep retired as it were from the senses1 and out of the reach of those motions made on the organs of sense1 which at other times produce very vivid and sensible ideas4 ,i need not1 for this1 instance in those who sleep out whole stormy nights1 without hearing the thunder1 or seeing the lightning1 or feeling the shaking of the house1 which are sensible enough to those who are waking4 ,but in this retirement of the mind from the senses1 it often retains a yet more loose and incoherent manner of thinking1 which we call dreaming4 ,and1 last of all1 sound sleep closes the scene quite1 and puts an end to all appearances4 ,this1 ,i think almost every one has experience of in himself1 and his own observation without difficulty leads him thus far4 ,that which ,i would further conclude from hence is1 that since the mind can sensibly put on1 at several times1 several degrees of thinking1 and be sometimes1 even in a waking man1 so remiss1 as to have thoughts dim and obscure to that degree that they are very little removed from none at all2 and at last1 in the dark retirements of sound sleep1 loses the sight perfectly of all ideas whatsoever3 since1 ,i say1 this is evidently so in matter of fact and constant experience1 ,i ask whether it be not probable1 that thinking is the action and not the essence of the soul8 ,since the operations of agents will easily admit of intention and remission3 but the essences of things are not conceived capable of any such variation4 ,but this by the by4 ,,chapter ,,xx4 ,,of ,,modes ,,of ,,pleasure ,,and ,,pain4 #a4 ,pleasure and ,pain1 simple ,ideas4 ,,amongst the simple ideas which we receive both from sensation and reflection1 ,,pain and ,,pleasure are two very considerable ones4 ,for as in the body there is sensation barely in itself1 or accompanied with pain or pleasure1 so the thought or perception of the mind is simply so1 or else accompanied also with pleasure or pain1 delight or trouble1 call it how you please4 ,these1 like other simple ideas1 cannot be described1 nor their names defined2 the way of knowing them is1 as of the simple ideas of the senses1 only by experience4 ,for1 to define them by the presence of good or evil1 is no otherwise to make them known to us than by making us reflect on what we feel in ourselves1 upon the several and various operations of good and evil upon our minds1 as they are differently applied to or considered by us4 #b4 ,good and evil1 what4 ,things then are good or evil1 only in reference to pleasure or pain4 ,that we call ,,good1 which is apt to cause or increase pleasure1 or diminish pain in us2 or else to procure or preserve us the possession of any other good or absence of any evil4 ,and1 on the contrary1 we name that ,,evil which is apt to produce or increase any pain1 or diminish any pleasure in us3 or else to procure us any evil1 or deprive us of any good4 ,by pleasure and pain1 ,i must be understood to mean of body or mind1 as they are commonly distinguished2 though in truth they be only different constitutions of the ,,mind1 sometimes occasioned by disorder in the body1 sometimes by thoughts of the mind4 #c4 ,our passions moved by ,good and ,evil4 ,pleasure and pain and that which causes them1--good and evil1 are the hinges on which our passions turn4 ,and if we reflect on ourselves1 and observe how these1 under various considerations1 operate in us2 what modifications or tempers of mind1 what internal sensations 7if ,i may so call them7 they produce in us we may thence form to ourselves the ideas of our passions4 #d4 ,love4 ,thus any one reflecting upon the thought he has of the delight which any present or absent thing is apt to produce in him1 has the idea we call ,,love4 ,for when a man declares in autumn when he is eating them1 or in spring when there are none1 that he loves grapes1 it is no more but that the taste of grapes delights him3 let an alteration of health or constitution destroy the delight of their taste1 and he then can be said to love grapes no longer4 #e4 ,hatred4 ,on the contrary1 the thought of the pain which anything present or absent is apt to produce in us1 is what we call ,,hatred4 ,were it my business here to inquire any further than into the bare ideas of our passions1 as they depend on different modifications of pleasure and pain1 ,i should remark that our love and hatred of inanimate insensible beings is commonly founded on that pleasure and pain which we receive from their use and application any way to our senses though with their destruction4 ,but hatred or love1 to beings capable of happiness or misery1 is often the uneasiness of delight which we find in ourselves1 arising from their very being or happiness4 ,thus the being and welfare of a man's children or friends1 producing constant delight in him1 he is said constantly to love them4 ,but it suffices to note1 that our ideas of love and hatred are but the dispositions of the mind1 in respect of pleasure and pain in general1 however caused in us4 #f4 ,desire4 ,the uneasiness a man finds in himself upon the absence of anything whose present enjoyment carries the idea of delight with it1 is that we call ,,desire2 which is greater or less as that uneasiness is more or less vehement4 ,where1 by the by1 it may perhaps be of some use to remark1 that the chief1 if not only spur to human industry and action is ,,uneasiness4 ,for whatsoever good is proposed1 if its absence carries no displeasure or pain with it1 if a man be easy and content without it1 there is no desire of it1 nor endeavour after it2 there is no more but a bare velleity1 the term used to signify the lowest degree of desire1 and that which is next to none at all1 when there is so little uneasiness in the absence of anything1 that it carries a man no further than some faint wishes for it1 without any more effectual or vigorous use of the means to attain it4 ,desire also is stopped or abated by the opinion of the impossibility or unattainableness of the good proposed1 as far as the uneasiness is cured or allayed by that consideration4 ,this might carry our thoughts further1 were it seasonable in this place4 #g4 ,joy4 ,,joy is a delight of the mind1 from the consideration of the present or assured approaching possession of a good2 and we are then possessed of any good1 when we have it so in our power that we can use it when we please4 ,thus a man almost starved has joy at the arrival of relief1 even before he has the pleasure of using it3 and a father1 in whom the very well-being of his children causes delight1 is always1 as long as his children are in such a state1 in the possession of that good2 for he needs but to reflect on it1 to have that pleasure4 #h4 ,sorrow4 ,,sorrow is uneasiness in the mind1 upon the thought of a good lost1 which might have been enjoyed longer2 or the sense of a present evil4 #i4 ,hope4 ,,hope is that pleasure in the mind1 which every one finds in himself1 upon the thought of a probable future enjoyment of a thing which is apt to delight him4 #aj4 ,fear4 ,,fear is an uneasiness of the mind1 upon the thought of future evil likely to befall us4 #aa4 ,despair4 ,,despair is the thought of the unattainableness of any good1 which works differently in men's minds1 sometimes producing uneasiness or pain1 sometimes rest and indolency4 #ab4 ,anger4 ,,anger is uneasiness or discomposure of the mind1 upon the receipt of any injury1 with a present purpose of revenge4 #ac4 ,envy4 ,,envy is an uneasiness of the mind1 caused by the consideration of a good we desire obtained by one we think should not have had it before us4 #ad4 ,what ,passions all ,men have4 ,these two last1 ,,envy and ,,anger1 not being caused by pain and pleasure simply in themselves1 but having in them some mixed considerations of ourselves and others1 are not therefore to be found in all men1 because those other parts1 of valuing their merits1 or intending revenge1 is wanting in them4 ,but all the rest1 terminating purely in pain and pleasure1 are1 ,i think1 to be found in all men4 ,for we love1 desire1 rejoice1 and hope1 only in respect of pleasure2 we hate1 fear1 and grieve1 only in respect of pain ultimately4 ,in fine1 all these passions are moved by things1 only as they appear to be the causes of pleasure and pain1 or to have pleasure or pain some way or other annexed to them4 ,thus we extend our hatred usually to the subject 7at least1 if a sensible or voluntary agent7 which has produced pain in us2 because the fear it leaves is a constant pain3 but we do not so constantly love what has done us good2 because pleasure operates not so strongly on us as pain1 and because we are not so ready to have hope it will do so again4 ,but this by the by4 #ae4 ,pleasure and ,pain1 what4 ,by pleasure and pain1 delight and uneasiness1 ,i must all along be understood 7as ,i have above intimated7 to mean not only bodily pain and pleasure1 but whatsoever delight or uneasiness is felt by us1 whether arising from any grateful or unacceptable sensation or reflection4 #af4 ,removal or lessening of either4 ,it is further to be considered1 that1 in reference to the passions1 the removal or lessening of a pain is considered1 and operates1 as a pleasure3 and the loss or diminishing of a pleasure1 as a pain4 #ag4 ,shame4 ,the passions too have most of them1 in most persons1 operations on the body1 and cause various changes in it2 which not being always sensible1 do not make a necessary part of the idea of each passion4 ,for ,,shame1 which is an uneasiness of the mind upon the thought of having done something which is indecent1 or will lessen the valued esteem which others have for us1 has not always blushing accompanying it4 #ah4 ,these ,instances to show how our ,ideas of the ,passions are got from ,sensation and ,reflection4 ,i would not be mistaken here1 as if ,i meant this as a ,discourse of the ,passions2 they are many more than those ,i have here named3 and those ,i have taken notice of would each of them require a much larger and more accurate discourse4 ,i have only mentioned these here1 as so many instances of modes of pleasure and pain resulting in our minds from various considerations of good and evil4 ,i might perhaps have instanced in other modes of pleasure and pain1 more simple than these2 as the pain of hunger and thirst1 and the pleasure of eating and drinking to remove them3 the pain of teeth set on edge2 the pleasure of music2 pain from captious uninstructive wrangling1 and the pleasure of rational conversation with a friend1 or of well-directed study in the search and discovery of truth4 ,but the passions being of much more concernment to us1 ,i rather made choice to instance in them1 and show how the ideas we have of them are derived from sensation or reflection4 ,,chapter ,,xxi4 ,,of ,,power4 #a4 ,this ,idea how got4 ,the mind being every day informed1 by the senses1 of the alteration of those simple ideas it observes in things without2 and taking notice how one comes to an end1 and ceases to be1 and another begins to exist which was not before2 reflecting also on what passes within itself1 and observing a constant change of its ideas1 sometimes by the impression of outward objects on the senses1 and sometimes by the determination of its own choice2 and concluding from what it has so constantly observed to have been1 that the like changes will for the future be made in the same things1 by like agents1 and by the like ways1--considers in one thing the possibility of having any of its simple ideas changed1 and in another the possibility of making that change2 and so comes by that idea which we call ,,power4 ,thus we say1 ,fire has a power to melt gold1 i4 e4 to destroy the consistency of its insensible parts1 and consequently its hardness1 and make it fluid2 and gold has a power to be melted2 that the sun has a power to blanch wax1 and wax a power to be blanched by the sun1 whereby the yellowness is destroyed1 and whiteness made to exist in its room4 ,in which1 and the like cases1 the power we consider is in reference to the change of perceivable ideas4 ,for we cannot observe any alteration to be made in1 or operation upon anything1 but by the observable change of its sensible ideas2 nor conceive any alteration to be made1 but by conceiving a change of some of its ideas4 #b4 ,power1 active and passive4 ,power thus considered is two-fold1 viz4 as able to make1 or able to receive any change4 ,the one may be called ,,active1 and the other ,,passive power4 ,whether matter be not wholly destitute of active power1 as its author1 ,god1 is truly above all passive power2 and whether the intermediate state of created spirits be not that alone which is capable of both active and passive power1 may be worth consideration4 ,i shall not now enter into that inquiry1 my present business being not to search into the original of power1 but how we come by the ,,idea of it4 ,but since active powers make so great a part of our complex ideas of natural substances1 7as we shall see hereafter17 and ,i mention them as such1 according to common apprehension2 yet they being not1 perhaps1 so truly ,,active powers as our hasty thoughts are apt to represent them1 ,i judge it not amiss1 by this intimation1 to direct our minds to the consideration of ,god and spirits1 for the clearest idea of ,,active power4 #c4 ,power includes ,relation4 ,i confess power includes in it some kind of ,,relation 7a relation to action or change17 as indeed which of our ideas of what kind soever1 when attentively considered1 does not4 ,for1 our ideas of extension1 duration1 and number1 do they not all contain in them a secret relation of the parts8 ,figure and motion have something relative in them much more visibly4 ,and sensible qualities1 as colours and smells1 c4 what are they but the powers of different bodies1 in relation to our perception1 c48 ,and1 if considered in the things themselves1 do they not depend on the bulk1 figure1 texture1 and motion of the parts8 ,all which include some kind of relation in them4 ,our idea therefore of power1 ,i think1 may well have a place amongst other ,,simple ,,ideas1 and be considered as one of them2 being one of those that make a principal ingredient in our complex ideas of substances1 as we shall hereafter have occasion to observe4 #d4 ,the clearest ,idea of active ,power had from ,spirit4 ,of passive power all sensible things abundantly furnish us with sensible ideas1 whose sensible qualities and beings we find to be in continual flux4 ,and therefore with reason we look on them as liable still to the same change4 ,nor have we of ,,active power 7which is the more proper signification of the word power7 fewer instances4 ,since whatever change is observed1 the mind must collect a power somewhere able to make that change1 as well as a possibility in the thing itself to receive it4 ,but yet1 if we will consider it attentively1 bodies1 by our senses1 do not afford us so clear and distinct an idea of active power1 as we have from reflection on the operations of our minds4 ,for all power relating to action1 and there being but two sorts of action whereof we have an idea1 viz4 thinking and motion1 let us consider whence we have the clearest ideas of the powers which produce these actions4 7#a7 ,of thinking1 body affords us no idea at all2 it is only from reflection that we have that4 7#b7 ,neither have we from body any idea of the beginning of motion4 ,a body at rest affords us no idea of any active power to move2 and when it is set in motion itself1 that motion is rather a passion than an action in it4 ,for1 when the ball obeys the motion of a billiard-stick1 it is not any action of the ball1 but bare passion4 ,also when by impulse it sets another ball in motion that lay in its way1 it only communicates the motion it had received from another1 and loses in itself so much as the other received3 which gives us but a very obscure idea of an ,,active power of moving in body1 whilst we observe it only to ,,transfer1 but not ,,produce any motion4 ,for it is but a very obscure idea of power which reaches not the production of the action1 but the continuation of the passion4 ,for so is motion in a body impelled by another2 the continuation of the alteration made in it from rest to motion being little more an action1 than the continuation of the alteration of its figure by the same blow is an action4 ,the idea of the ,,beginning of motion we have only from reflection on what passes in ourselves2 where we find by experience1 that1 barely by willing it1 barely by a thought of the mind1 we can move the parts of our bodies1 which were before at rest4 ,so that it seems to me1 we have1 from the observation of the operation of bodies by our senses1 but a very imperfect obscure idea of ,,active power2 since they afford us not any idea in themselves of the power to begin any action1 either motion or thought4 ,but if1 from the impulse bodies are observed to make one upon another1 any one thinks he has a clear idea of power1 it serves as well to my purpose2 sensation being one of those ways whereby the mind comes by its ideas3 only ,i thought it worth while to consider here1 by the way1 whether the mind doth not receive its idea of active power clearer from reflection on its own operations1 than it doth from any external sensation4 #e4 ,will and ,understanding two ,powers in ,mind or ,spirit4 ,this1 at least1 ,i think evident1--,that we find in ourselves a power to begin or forbear1 continue or end several actions of our minds1 and motions of our bodies1 barely by a thought or preference of the mind ordering1 or as it were commanding1 the doing or not doing such or such a particular action4 ,this power which the mind has thus to order the consideration of any idea1 or the forbearing to consider it2 or to prefer the motion of any part of the body to its rest1 and vice versa1 in any particular instance1 is that which we call the ,,will4 ,the actual exercise of that power1 by directing any particular action1 or its forbearance1 is that which we call ,,volition or ,,willing4 ,the forbearance of that action1 consequent to such order or command of the mind1 is called ,,voluntary4 ,and whatsoever action is performed without such a thought of the mind1 is called ,,involuntary4 ,the power of perception is that which we call the ,,understanding4 ,perception1 which we make the act of the understanding1 is of three sorts3--#a4 ,the perception of ideas in our minds4 #b4 ,the perception of the signification of signs4 #c4 ,the perception of the connexion or repugnancy1 agreement or disagreement1 that there is between any of our ideas4 ,all these are attributed to the understanding1 or perceptive power1 though it be the two latter only that use allows us to say we understand4 #f4 ,faculties not real beings4 ,these powers of the mind1 viz4 of perceiving1 and of preferring1 are usually called by another name4 ,and the ordinary way of speaking is1 that the understanding and will are two ,,faculties of the mind2 a word proper enough1 if it be used1 as all words should be1 so as not to breed any confusion in men's thoughts1 by being supposed 7as ,i suspect it has been7 to stand for some real beings in the soul that performed those actions of understanding and volition4 ,for when we say the ,,will is the commanding and superior faculty of the soul2 that it is or is not free2 that it determines the inferior faculties2 that it follows the dictates of the understanding1 c41--though these and the like expressions1 by those that carefully attend to their own ideas1 and conduct their thoughts more by the evidence of things than the sound of words1 may be understood in a clear and distinct sense--yet ,i suspect1 ,i say1 that this way of speaking of ,,faculties has misled many into a confused notion of so many distinct agents in us1 which had their several provinces and authorities1 and did command1 obey1 and perform several actions1 as so many distinct beings2 which has been no small occasion of wrangling1 obscurity1 and uncertainty1 in questions relating to them4 #g4 ,whence the ,ideas of ,liberty and ,necessity4 ,every one1 ,i think1 finds in ,,himself a power to begin or forbear1 continue or put an end to several actions in himself4 ,from the consideration of the extent of this power of the mind over the actions of the man1 which everyone finds in himself1 arise the ,,ideas of ,,liberty and ,,necessity4 #h4 ,liberty1 what4 ,all the actions that we have any idea of reducing themselves1 as has been said1 to these two1 viz4 thinking and motion2 so far as a man has power to think or not to think1 to move or not to move1 according to the preference or direction of his own mind1 so far is a man ,,free4 ,wherever any performance or forbearance are not equally in a man's power2 wherever doing or not doing will not equally ,,follow upon the preference of his mind directing it1 there he is not free1 though perhaps the action may be voluntary4 ,so that the idea of ,,liberty is1 the idea of a power in any agent to do or forbear any particular action1 according to the determination or thought of the mind1 whereby either of them is preferred to the other3 where either of them is not in the power of the agent to be produced by him according to his volition1 there he is not at liberty2 that agent is under ,,necessity4 ,so that liberty cannot be where there is no thought1 no volition1 no will2 but there may be thought1 there may be will1 there may be volition1 where there is no liberty4 ,a little consideration of an obvious instance or two may make this clear4 #i4 ,supposes ,understanding and ,will4 ,a tennis-ball1 whether in motion by the stroke of a racket1 or lying still at rest1 is not by any one taken to be a free agent4 ,if we inquire into the reason1 we shall find it is because we conceive not a tennis-ball to think1 and consequently not to have any volition1 or ,,preference of motion to rest1 or vice versa2 and therefore has not liberty1 is not a free agent2 but all its both motion and rest come under our idea of necessary1 and are so called4 ,likewise a man falling into the water1 7a bridge breaking under him17 has not herein liberty1 is not a free agent4 ,for though he has volition1 though he prefers his not falling to falling2 yet the forbearance of that motion not being in his power1 the stop or cessation of that motion follows not upon his volition2 and therefore therein he is not free4 ,so a man striking himself1 or his friend1 by a convulsive motion of his arm1 which it is not in his power1 by volition or the direction of his mind1 to stop or forbear1 nobody thinks he has in this liberty2 every one pities him1 as acting by necessity and constraint4 #aj4 ,belongs not to ,volition4 ,again3 suppose a man be carried1 whilst fast asleep1 into a room where is a person he longs to see and speak with2 and be there locked fast in1 beyond his power to get out3 he awakes1 and is glad to find himself in so desirable company1 which he stays willingly in1 i4 e4 prefers his stay to going away4 ,i ask1 is not this stay voluntary8 ,i think nobody will doubt it3 and yet1 being locked fast in1 it is evident he is not at liberty not to stay1 he has not freedom to be gone4 ,so that liberty is not an idea belonging to volition1 or preferring2 but to the person having the power of doing1 or forbearing to do1 according as the mind shall choose or direct4 ,our idea of liberty reaches as far as that power1 and no farther4 ,for wherever restraint comes to check that power1 or compulsion takes away that indifferency of ability to act1 or to forbear acting1 there liberty1 and our notion of it1 presently ceases4 #aa4 ,voluntary opposed to involuntary4 ,we have instances enough1 and often more than enough1 in our own bodies4 ,a man's heart beats1 and the blood circulates1 which it is not in his power by any thought or volition to stop2 and therefore in respect of these motions1 where rest depends not on his choice1 nor would follow the determination of his mind1 if it should prefer it1 he is not a free agent4 ,convulsive motions agitate his legs1 so that though he wills it ever so much1 he cannot by any power of his mind stop their motion1 7as in that odd disease called chorea sancti viti71 but he is perpetually dancing2 he is not at liberty in this action1 but under as much necessity of moving1 as a stone that falls1 or a tennis-ball struck with a racket4 ,on the other side1 a palsy or the stocks hinder his legs from obeying the determination of his mind1 if it would thereby transfer his body to another place4 ,in all these there is want of freedom2 though the sitting still1 even of a paralytic1 whilst he prefers it to a removal1 is truly voluntary4 ,voluntary1 then1 is not opposed to necessary but to involuntary4 ,for a man may prefer what he can do1 to what he cannot do2 the state he is in1 to its absence or change2 though necessity has made it in itself unalterable4 #ab4 ,liberty1 what4 ,as it is in the motions of the body1 so it is in the thoughts of our minds3 where any one is such1 that we have power to take it up1 or lay it by1 according to the preference of the mind1 there we are at liberty4 ,a waking man1 being under the necessity of having some ideas constantly in his mind1 is not at liberty to think or not to think2 no more than he is at liberty1 whether his body shall touch any other or no1 but whether he will remove his contemplation from one idea to another is many times in his choice2 and then he is1 in respect of his ideas1 as much at liberty as he is in respect of bodies he rests on2 he can at pleasure remove himself from one to another4 ,but yet some ideas to the mind1 like some motions to the body1 are such as in certain circumstances it cannot avoid1 nor obtain their absence by the utmost effort it can use4 ,a man on the rack is not at liberty to lay by the idea of pain1 and divert himself with other contemplations3 and sometimes a boisterous passion hurries our thoughts1 as a hurricane does our bodies1 without leaving us the liberty of thinking on other things1 which we would rather choose4 ,but as soon as the mind regains the power to stop or continue1 begin or forbear1 any of these motions of the body without1 or thoughts within1 according as it thinks fit to prefer either to the other1 we then consider the man as a ,,free ,,agent again4 #ac4 ,wherever thought is wholly wanting1 or the power to act or forbear according to the direction of thought1 there necessity takes place4 ,this1 in an agent capable of volition1 when the beginning or continuation of any action is contrary to that preference of his mind1 is called compulsion2 when the hindering or stopping any action is contrary to his volition1 it is called restraint4 ,agents that have no thought1 no volition at all1 are in everything ,,necessary ,,agents4 #ad4 ,if this be so1 7as ,i imagine it is17 ,i leave it to be considered1 whether it may not help to put an end to that long agitated1 and1 ,i think1 unreasonable1 because unintelligible question1 viz4 ,,whether ,,man',s ,,will ,,be ,,free ,,or ,,no8 ,for if ,i mistake not1 it follows from what ,i have said1 that the question itself is altogether improper2 and it is as insignificant to ask whether man's ,,will be free1 as to ask whether his sleep be swift1 or his virtue square3 liberty being as little applicable to the will1 as swiftness of motion is to sleep1 or squareness to virtue4 ,every one would laugh at the absurdity of such a question as either of these3 because it is obvious that the modifications of motion belong not to sleep1 nor the difference of figure to virtue2 and when any one well considers it1 ,i think he will as plainly perceive that liberty1 which is but a power1 belongs only to ,agents1 and cannot be an attribute or modification of the will1 which is also but a power4 #ae4 ,volition4 ,such is the difficulty of explaining and giving clear notions of internal actions by sounds1 that ,i must here warn my reader1 that ,,ordering1 ,,directing1 ,,choosing1 ,,preferring1 c4 which ,i have made use of1 will not distinctly enough express volition1 unless he will reflect on what he himself does when he wills4 ,for example1 preferring1 which seems perhaps best to express the act of volition1 does it not precisely4 ,for though a man would prefer flying to walking1 yet who can say he ever wills it8 ,volition1 it is plain1 is an act of the mind knowingly exerting that dominion it takes itself to have over any part of the man1 by employing it in1 or withholding it from1 any particular action4 ,and what is the will1 but the faculty to do this8 ,and is that faculty anything more in effect than a power2 the power of the mind to determine its thought1 to the producing1 continuing1 or stopping any action1 as far as it depends on us8 ,for can it be denied that whatever agent has a power to think on its own actions1 and to prefer their doing or omission either to other1 has that faculty called will8 ,,will1 then1 is nothing but such a power4 ,,liberty1 on the other side1 is the power a ,,man has to do or forbear doing any particular action according as its doing or forbearance has the actual preference in the mind2 which is the same thing as to say1 according as he himself wills it4 #af4 ,powers belonging to ,agents4 ,it is plain then that the will is nothing but one power or ability1 and ,,freedom another power or ability so that1 to ask1 whether the will has freedom1 is to ask whether one power has another power1 one ability another ability2 a question at first sight too grossly absurd to make a dispute1 or need an answer4 ,for1 who is it that sees not that powers belong only to agents1 and are attributes only of substances1 and not of powers themselves8 ,so that this way of putting the question 7viz4 whether the will be free7 is in effect to ask1 whether the will be a substance1 an agent1 or at least to suppose it1 since freedom can properly be attributed to nothing else4 ,if freedom can with any propriety of speech be applied to power1 it may be attributed to the power that is in a man to produce1 or forbear producing1 motion in parts of his body1 by choice or preference2 which is that which denominates him free1 and is freedom itself4 ,but if any one should ask1 whether freedom were free1 he would be suspected not to understand well what he said2 and he would be thought to deserve ,midas's ears1 who1 knowing that rich was a denomination for the possession of riches1 should demand whether riches themselves were rich4 #ag4 ,how the will instead of the man is called free4 ,however1 the name ,,faculty1 which men have given to this power called the will1 and whereby they have been led into a way of talking of the will as acting1 may1 by an appropriation that disguises its true sense1 serve a little to palliate the absurdity2 yet the will1 in truth1 signifies nothing but a power or ability to prefer or choose3 and when the will1 under the name of a faculty1 is considered as it is1 barely as an ability to do something1 the absurdity in saying it is free1 or not free1 will easily discover itself4 ,for1 if it be reasonable to suppose and talk of faculties as distinct beings that can act1 7as we do1 when we say the will orders1 and the will is free17 it is fit that we should make a speaking faculty1 and a walking faculty1 and a dancing faculty1 by which these actions are produced1 which are but several modes of motion2 as well as we make the will and understanding to be faculties1 by which the actions of choosing and perceiving are produced1 which are but several modes of thinking4 ,and we may as properly say that it is the singing faculty sings1 and the dancing faculty dances1 as that the will chooses1 or that the understanding conceives2 or1 as is usual1 that the will directs the understanding1 or the understanding obeys or obeys not the will3 it being altogether as proper and intelligible to say that the power of speaking directs the power of singing1 or the power of singing obeys or disobeys the power of speaking4 #ah4 ,this way of talking causes confusion of thought4 ,this way of talking1 nevertheless1 has prevailed1 and1 as ,i guess1 produced great confusion4 ,for these being all different powers in the mind1 or in the man1 to do several actions1 he exerts them as he thinks fit3 but the power to do one action is not operated on by the power of doing another action4 ,for the power of thinking operates not on the power of choosing1 nor the power of choosing on the power of thinking2 no more than the power of dancing operates on the power of singing1 or the power of singing on the power of dancing1 as any one who reflects on it will easily perceive4 ,and yet this is it which we say when we thus speak1 that the will operates on the understanding1 or the understanding on the will4 #ai4 ,powers are relations1 not agents4 ,i grant1 that this or that actual thought may be the occasion of volition1 or exercising the power a man has to choose2 or the actual choice of the mind1 the cause of actual thinking on this or that thing3 as the actual singing of such a tune may be the cause of dancing such a dance1 and the actual dancing of such a dance the occasion of singing such a tune4 ,but in all these it is not one ,,power that operates on another3 but it is the mind that operates1 and exerts these powers2 it is the man that does the action2 it is the agent that has power1 or is able to do4 ,for powers are relations1 not agents3 and that which has the power or not the power to operate1 is that alone which is or is not free1 and not the power itself4 ,for freedom1 or not freedom1 can belong to nothing but what has or has not a power to act4 #bj4 ,liberty belongs not to the ,will4 ,the attributing to faculties that which belonged not to them1 has given occasion to this way of talking3 but the introducing into discourses concerning the mind1 with the name of faculties1 a notion of ,,their operating1 has1 ,i suppose1 as little advanced our knowledge in that part of ourselves1 as the great use and mention of the like invention of faculties1 in the operations of the body1 has helped us in the knowledge of physic4 ,not that ,i deny there are faculties1 both in the body and mind3 they both of them have their powers of operating1 else neither the one nor the other could operate4 ,for nothing can operate that is not able to operate2 and that is not able to operate that has no power to operate4 ,nor do ,i deny that those words1 and the like1 are to have their place in the common use of languages that have made them current4 ,it looks like too much affectation wholly to lay them by3 and philosophy itself1 though it likes not a gaudy dress1 yet1 when it appears in public1 must have so much complacency as to be clothed in the ordinary fashion and language of the country1 so far as it can consist with truth and perspicuity4 ,but the fault has been1 that faculties have been spoken of and represented as so many distinct agents4 ,for1 it being asked1 what it was that digested the meat in our stomachs8 it was a ready and very satisfactory answer to say1 that it was the ,,digestive ,,faculty4 ,what was it that made anything come out of the body8 the ,,expulsive ,,faculty4 ,what moved8 the ,,motive ,,faculty4 ,and so in the mind1 the ,,intellectual ,,faculty1 or the understanding1 understood2 and the ,,elective ,,faculty1 or the will1 willed or commanded4 ,this is1 in short1 to say1 that the ability to digest1 digested2 and the ability to move1 moved2 and the ability to understand1 understood4 ,for faculty1 ability1 and power1 ,i think1 are but different names of the same things3 which ways of speaking1 when put into more intelligible words1 will1 ,i think1 amount to thus much2--,that digestion is performed by something that is able to digest1 motion by something able to move1 and understanding by something able to understand4 ,and1 in truth1 it would be very strange if it should be otherwise2 as strange as it would be for a man to be free without being able to be free4 #ba4 ,but to the ,agent1 or ,man4 ,to return1 then1 to the inquiry about liberty1 ,i think the question is not proper1 ,,whether ,,the ,,will ,,be ,,free1 but ,,whether ,a ,,man ,,be ,,free4 ,thus1 ,i think1 ,first1 ,that so far as any one can1 by the direction or choice of his mind1 preferring the existence of any action to the non-existence of that action1 and vice versa1 make ,,it to exist or not exist1 so far ,,he is free4 ,for if ,i can1 by a thought directing the motion of my finger1 make it move when it was at rest1 or vice versa1 it is evident1 that in respect of that ,i am free3 and if ,i can1 by a like thought of my mind1 preferring one to the other1 produce either words or silence1 ,i am at liberty to speak or hold my peace3 and as far as this power reaches1 of acting or not acting1 by the determination of his own thought preferring either1 so far is a man free4 ,for how can we think any one freer1 than to have the power to do what he will8 ,and so far as any one can1 by preferring any action to its not being1 or rest to any action1 produce that action or rest1 so far can he do what he will4 ,for such a preferring of action to its absence1 is the willing of it3 and we can scarce tell how to imagine any being freer1 than to be able to do what he wills4 ,so that in respect of actions within the reach of such a power in him1 a man seems as free as it is possible for freedom to make him4 #bb4 ,in respect of willing1 a ,man is not free4 ,but the inquisitive mind of man1 willing to shift off from himself1 as far as he can1 all thoughts of guilt1 though it be by putting himself into a worse state than that of fatal necessity1 is not content with this3 freedom1 unless it reaches further than this1 will not serve the turn3 and it passes for a good plea1 that a man is not free at all1 if he be not as ,,free ,,to ,,will as he is to ,,act ,,what ,,he ,,wills4 ,concerning a man's liberty1 there yet1 therefore1 is raised this further question1 ,,whether ,a ,,man ,,be ,,free ,,to ,,will8 which ,i think is what is meant1 when it is disputed whether the will be free4 ,and as to that ,i imagine4 #bc4 ,how a man cannot be free to will4 ,secondly1 ,that willing1 or volition1 being an action1 and freedom consisting in a power of acting or not acting1 a man in respect of willing or the act of volition1 when any action in his power is once proposed to his thoughts1 as presently to be done1 cannot be free4 ,the reason whereof is very manifest4 ,for1 it being unavoidable that the action depending on his will should exist or not exist1 and its existence or not existence following perfectly the determination and preference of his will1 he cannot avoid willing the existence or non-existence of that action2 it is absolutely necessary that he will the one or the other2 i4e4 prefer the one to the other3 since one of them must necessarily follow2 and that which does follow follows by the choice and determination of his mind2 that is1 by his willing it3 for if he did not will it1 it would not be4 ,so that1 in respect of the act of willing1 a man is not free3 liberty consisting in a power to act or not to act2 which1 in regard of volition1 a man1 has not4 #bd4 ,liberty is freedom to execute what is willed4 ,this1 then1 is evident1 ,that ,a ,,man ,,is ,,not ,,at ,,liberty ,,to ,,will1 ,,or ,,not ,,to ,,will1 ,,anything ,,in ,,his ,,power ,,that ,,he ,,once ,,considers ,,of3 liberty consisting in a power to act or to forbear acting1 and in that only4 ,for a man that sits still is said yet to be at liberty2 because he can walk if he wills it4 ,a man that walks is at liberty also1 not because he walks or moves2 but because he can stand still if he wills it4 ,but if a man sitting still has not a power to remove himself1 he is not at liberty2 so likewise a man falling down a precipice1 though in motion1 is not at liberty1 because he cannot stop that motion if he would4 ,this being so1 it is plain that a man that is walking1 to whom it is proposed to give off walking1 is not at liberty1 whether he will determine himself to walk1 or give off walking or not3 he must necessarily prefer one or the other of them2 walking or not walking4 ,and so it is in regard of all other actions in our power2 they being once proposed1 the mind has not a power to act or not to act1 wherein consists liberty4 ,the mind1 in that case1 has not a power to forbear ,,willing2 it cannot avoid some determination concerning them1 let the consideration be as short1 the thought as quick as it will1 it either leaves the man in the state he was before thinking1 or changes it2 continues the action1 or puts an end to it4 ,whereby it is manifest1 that ,,it orders and directs one1 in preference to1 or with neglect of the other1 and thereby either the continuation or change becomes ,,unavoidably voluntary4 #be4 ,the ,will determined by something without it4 ,since then it is plain that1 in most cases1 a man is not at liberty1 whether he will or no1 7for1 when an action in his power is proposed to his thoughts1 he ,,cannot forbear volition2 he ,,must determine one way or the other27 the next thing demanded is1--,,whether ,a ,,man ,,be ,,at ,,liberty ,,to ,,will ,,which ,,of ,,the ,,two ,,he ,,pleases1 ,,motion ,,or ,,rest8 ,this question carries the absurdity of it so manifestly in itself1 that one might thereby sufficiently be convinced that liberty concerns not the will4 ,for1 to ask whether a man be at liberty to will either motion or rest1 speaking or silence1 which he pleases1 is to ask whether a man can will what he wills1 or be pleased with what he is pleased with8 ,a question which1 ,i think1 needs no answer3 and they who can make a question of it must suppose one will to determine the acts of another1 and another to determine that1 and so on in infinitum4 #bf4 ,the ideas of ,,liberty and ,,volition must be defined4 ,to avoid these and the like absurdities1 nothing can be of greater use than to establish in our minds determined ideas of the things under consideration4 ,if the ideas of liberty and volition were well fixed in our understandings1 and carried along with us in our minds1 as they ought1 through all the questions that are raised about them1 ,i suppose a great part of the difficulties that perplex men's thoughts1 and entangle their understandings1 would be much easier resolved2 and we should perceive where the confused signification of terms1 or where the nature of the thing caused the obscurity4 #bg4 ,freedom4 ,first1 then1 it is carefully to be remembered1 ,that freedom consists in the dependence of the existence1 or not existence of any ,,action1 upon our ,,volition of it2 and not in the dependence of any action1 or its contrary1 on our ,,preference4 ,a man standing on a cliff1 is at liberty to leap twenty yards downwards into the sea1 not because he has a power to do the contrary action1 which is to leap twenty yards upwards1 for that he cannot do2 but he is therefore free1 because he has a power to leap or not to leap4 ,but if a greater force than his1 either holds him fast1 or tumbles him down1 he is no longer free in that case2 because the doing or forbearance of that particular action is no longer in his power4 ,he that is a close prisoner in a room twenty feet square1 being at the north side of his chamber1 is at liberty to walk twenty feet southward1 because he can walk or not walk it2 but is not1 at the same time1 at liberty to do the contrary1 i4e4 to walk twenty feet northward4 ,in this1 then1 consists ,,freedom1 viz4 in our being able to act or not to act1 according as we shall choose or will4 #bh4 ,what ,volition and action mean4 ,secondly1 we must remember1 that ,,volition or ,,willing is an act of the mind directing its thought to the production of any action1 and thereby exerting its power to produce it4 ,to avoid multiplying of words1 ,i would crave leave here1 under the word ,,action1 to comprehend the forbearance too of any action proposed3 sitting still1 or holding one's peace1 when walking or speaking are proposed1 though mere forbearances1 requiring as much the determination of the will1 and being as often weighty in their consequences1 as the contrary actions1 may1 on that consideration1 well enough pass for actions too3 but this ,i say1 that ,i may not be mistaken1 if 7for brevity's sake7 ,i speak thus4 #bi4 ,what determines the ,will4 ,thirdly1 the will being nothing but a power in the mind to direct the operative faculties of a man to motion or rest as far as they depend on such direction2 to the question1 ,what is it determines the will8 the true and proper answer is1 ,the mind4 ,for that which determines the general power of directing1 to this or that particular direction1 is nothing but the agent itself exercising the power it has that particular way4 ,if this answer satisfies not1 it is plain the meaning of the question1 ,what determines the will8 is this1--,what moves the mind1 in every particular instance1 to determine its general power of directing1 to this or that particular motion or rest8 ,and to this ,i answer1--,the motive for continuing in the same state or action1 is only the present satisfaction in it2 the motive to change is always some uneasiness3 nothing setting us upon the change of state1 or upon any new action1 but some uneasiness4 ,this is the great motive that works on the mind to put it upon action1 which for shortness' sake we will call determining of the will1 which ,i shall more at large explain4 #cj4 ,will and ,desire must not be confounded4 ,but1 in the way to it1 it will be necessary to premise1 that1 though ,i have above endeavoured to express the act of volition1 by ,,choosing1 ,,preferring1 and the like terms1 that signify desire as well as volition1 for want of other words to mark that act of the mind whose proper name is ,,willing or ,,volition2 yet1 it being a very simple act1 whosoever desires to understand what it is1 will better find it by reflecting on his own mind1 and observing what it does when it wills1 than by any variety of articulate sounds whatsoever4 ,this caution of being careful not to be misled by expressions that do not enough keep up the difference between the ,,will and several acts of the mind that are quite distinct from it1 ,i think the more necessary1 because ,i find the will often confounded with several of the affections1 especially ,,desire1 and one put for the other2 and that by men who would not willingly be thought not to have had very distinct notions of things1 and not to have writ very clearly about them4 ,this1 ,i imagine1 has been no small occasion of obscurity and mistake in this matter2 and therefore is1 as much as may be1 to be avoided4 ,for he that shall turn his thoughts inwards upon what passes in his mind when he wills1 shall see that the will or power of volition is conversant about nothing but our own ,,actions2 terminates there2 and reaches no further2 and that volition is nothing but that particular determination of the mind1 whereby1 barely by a thought1 the mind endeavours to give rise1 continuation1 or stop1 to any action which it takes to be in its power4 ,this1 well considered1 plainly shows that the will is perfectly distinguished from desire2 which1 in the very same action1 may have a quite contrary tendency from that which our will sets us upon4 ,a man1 whom ,i cannot deny1 may oblige me to use persuasions to another1 which1 at the same time ,i am speaking1 ,i may wish may not prevail on him4 ,in this case1 it is plain the will and desire run counter4 ,i will the action2 that tends one way1 whilst my desire tends another1 and that the direct contrary way4 ,a man who1 by a violent fit of the gout in his limbs1 finds a doziness in his head1 or a want of appetite in his stomach removed1 desires to be eased too of the pain of his feet or hands1 7for wherever there is pain1 there is a desire to be rid of it17 though yet1 whilst he apprehends that the removal of the pain may translate the noxious humour to a more vital part1 his will is never determined to any one action that may serve to remove this pain4 ,whence it is evident that desiring and willing are two distinct acts of the mind2 and consequently1 that the will1 which is but the power of volition1 is much more distinct from desire4 #ca4 ,uneasiness determines the ,will4 ,to return1 then1 to the inquiry1 what is it that determines the will in regard to our actions8 ,and that1 upon second thoughts1 ,i am apt to imagine is not1 as is generally supposed1 the greater good in view2 but some 7and for the most part the most pressing7 ,,uneasiness a man is at present under4 ,this is that which successively determines the will1 and sets us upon those actions we perform4 ,this uneasiness we may call1 as it is1 ,,desire2 which is an uneasiness of the mind for want of some absent good4 ,all pain of the body1 of what sort soever1 and disquiet of the mind1 is uneasiness3 and with this is always joined desire1 equal to the pain or uneasiness felt2 and is scarce distinguishable from it4 ,for desire being nothing but an uneasiness in the want of an absent good1 in reference to any pain felt1 ease is that absent good2 and till that ease be attained1 we may call it desire2 nobody feeling pain that he wishes not to be eased of1 with a desire equal to that pain1 and inseparable from it4 ,besides this desire of ease from pain1 there is another of absent positive good2 and here also the desire and uneasiness are equal4 ,as much as we desire any absent good1 so much are we in pain for it4 ,but here all absent good does not1 according to the greatness it has1 or is acknowledged to have1 cause pain equal to that greatness2 as all pain causes desire equal to itself3 because the absence of good is not always a pain1 as the presence of pain is4 ,and therefore absent good may be looked on and considered without desire4 ,but so much as there is anywhere of desire1 so much there is of uneasiness4 #cb4 ,desire is ,uneasiness4 ,that desire is a state of uneasiness1 every one who reflects on himself will quickly find4 ,who is there that has not felt in desire what the wise man says of hope1 7which is not much different from it17 that it being #8deferred makes the heart sick'2 and that still proportionable to the greatness of the desire1 which sometimes raises the uneasiness to that pitch1 that it makes people cry out1 #8,give me children1' give me the thing desired1 #8or ,i die4' ,life itself1 and all its enjoyments1 is a burden cannot be borne under the lasting and unremoved pressure of such an uneasiness4 #cc4 ,the ,uneasiness of ,desire determines the ,will4 ,good and evil1 present and absent1 it is true1 work upon the mind4 ,but that which ,,immediately determines the will from time to time1 to every voluntary action1 is the ,,uneasiness ,,of ,,desire1 fixed on some absent good3 either negative1 as indolence to one in pain2 or positive1 as enjoyment of pleasure4 ,that it is this uneasiness that determines the will to the successive voluntary actions1 whereof the greatest part of our lives is made up1 and by which we are conducted through different courses to different ends1 ,i shall endeavour to show1 both from experience1 and the reason of the thing4 #cd4 ,this is the ,spring of ,action4 ,when a man is perfectly content with the state he is in--which is when he is perfectly without any uneasiness--what industry1 what action1 what will is there left1 but to continue in it8 ,of this every man's observation will satisfy him4 ,and thus we see our all-wise ,maker1 suitably to our constitution and frame1 and knowing what it is that determines the will1 has put into man the uneasiness of hunger and thirst1 and other natural desires1 that return at their seasons1 to move and determine their wills1 for the preservation of themselves1 and the continuation of their species4 ,for ,i think we may conclude1 that1 if the ,,bare ,,contemplation of these good ends to which we are carried by these several uneasinesses had been sufficient to determine the will1 and set us on work1 we should have had none of these natural pains1 and perhaps in this world little or no pain at all4 #8,it is better to marry than to burn1' says ,st4 ,paul1 where we may see what it is that chiefly drives men into the enjoyments of a conjugal life4 ,a little burning felt pushes us more powerfully than greater pleasure in prospect draw or allure4 #ce4 ,the greatest positive ,good determines not the ,will1 but present ,uneasiness alone4 ,it seems so established and settled a maxim1 by the general consent of all mankind1 that good1 the greater good1 determines the will1 that ,i do not at all wonder that1 when ,i first published my thoughts on this subject ,i took it for granted2 and ,i imagine that1 by a great many1 ,i shall be thought more excusable for having then done so1 than that now ,i have ventured to recede from so received an opinion4 ,but yet1 upon a stricter inquiry1 ,i am forced to conclude that ,,good1 the ,,greater ,,good1 though apprehended and acknowledged to be so1 does not determine the will1 until our desire1 raised proportionably to it1 makes us uneasy in the want of it4 ,convince a man never so much1 that plenty has its advantages over poverty2 make him see and own1 that the handsome conveniences of life are better than nasty penury3 yet1 as long as he is content with the latter1 and finds no uneasiness in it1 he moves not2 his will never is determined to any action that shall bring him out of it4 ,let a man be ever so well persuaded of the advantages of virtue1 that it is as necessary to a man who has any great aims in this world1 or hopes in the next1 as food to life3 yet1 till he hungers or thirsts after righteousness1 till he ,,feels ,,an ,,uneasiness in the want of it1 his ,,will will not be determined to any action in pursuit of this confessed greater good2 but any other uneasiness he feels in himself shall take place1 and carry his will to other actions4 ,on the other side1 let a drunkard see that his health decays1 his estate wastes2 discredit and diseases1 and the want of all things1 even of his beloved drink1 attends him in the course he follows3 yet the returns of uneasiness to miss his companions1 the habitual thirst after his cups at the usual time1 drives him to the tavern1 though he has in his view the loss of health and plenty1 and perhaps of the joys of another life3 the least of which is no inconsiderable good1 but such as he confesses is far greater than the tickling of his palate with a glass of wine1 or the idle chat of a soaking club4 ,it is not want of viewing the greater good3 for he sees and acknowledges it1 and1 in the intervals of his drinking hours1 will take resolutions to pursue the greater good2 but when the uneasiness to miss his accustomed delight returns1 the greater acknowledged good loses its hold1 and the present uneasiness determines the will to the accustomed action2 which thereby gets stronger footing to prevail against the next occasion1 though he at the same time makes secret promises to himself that he will do so no more2 this is the last time he will act against the attainment of those greater goods4 ,and thus he is1 from time to time1 in the state of that unhappy complainer1 ,video meliora1 proboque1 deteriora sequor3 which sentence1 allowed for true1 and made good by constant experience1 may in this1 and possibly no other way1 be easily made intelligible4 #cf4 ,because the ,removal of ,uneasiness is the first ,step to ,happiness4 ,if we inquire into the reason of what experience makes so evident in fact1 and examine1 why it is uneasiness alone operates on the will1 and determines it in its choice1 we shall find that1 we being capable but of one determination of the will to one action at once1 the present uneasiness that we are under does ,,naturally determine the will1 in order to that happiness which we all aim at in all our actions4 ,for1 as much as whilst we are under any uneasiness1 we cannot apprehend ourselves happy1 or in the way to it2 pain and uneasiness being1 by every one1 concluded and felt to be inconsistent with happiness1 spoiling the relish even of those good things which we have3 a little pain serving to mar all the pleasure we rejoiced in4 ,and1 therefore1 that which of course determines the choice of our will to the next action will always be--the removing of pain1 as long as we have any left1 as the first and necessary step towards happiness4 #cg4 ,because ,uneasiness alone is present4 ,another reason why it is uneasiness alone determines the will1 is this3 because that alone is present and1 it is against the nature of things1 that what is absent should operate where it is not4 ,it may be said that absent good may1 by contemplation1 be brought home to the mind and made present4 ,the idea of it indeed may be in the mind and viewed as present there2 but nothing will be in the mind as a present good1 able to counterbalance the removal of any uneasiness which we are under1 till it raises our desire2 and the uneasiness of that has the prevalency in determining the will4 ,till then1 the idea in the mind of whatever is good is there only1 like other ideas1 the object of bare unactive speculation2 but operates not on the will1 nor sets us on work2 the reason whereof ,i shall show by and by4 ,how many are to be found that have had lively representations set before their minds of the unspeakable joys of heaven1 which they acknowledge both possible and probable too1 who yet would be content to take up with their happiness here8 ,and so the prevailing uneasiness of their desires1 let loose after the enjoyments of this life1 take their turns in the determining their wills2 and all that while they take not one step1 are not one jot moved1 towards the good things of another life1 considered as ever so great4 #ch4 ,because all who allow the ,joys of ,heaven possible1 pursue them not4 ,were the will determined by the views of good1 as it appears in contemplation greater or less to the understanding1 which is the state of all absent good1 and that which1 in the received opinion1 the will is supposed to move to1 and to be moved by1--,i do not see how it could ever get loose from the infinite eternal joys of heaven1 once proposed and considered as possible4 ,for1 all absent good1 by which alone1 barely proposed1 and coming in view1 the will is thought to be determined1 and so to set us on action1 being only possible1 but not infallibly certain1 it is unavoidable that the infinitely greater possible good should regularly and constantly determine the will in all the successive actions it directs2 and then we should keep constantly and steadily in our course towards heaven1 without ever standing still1 or directing our actions to any other end3 the eternal condition of a future state infinitely outweighing the expectation of riches1 or honour1 or any other worldly pleasure which we can propose to ourselves1 though we should grant these the more probable to be obtained3 for nothing future is yet in possession1 and so the expectation even of these may deceive us4 ,if it were so that the greater good in view determines the will1 so great a good1 once proposed1 could not but seize the will1 and hold it fast to the pursuit of this infinitely greatest good1 without ever letting it go again3 for the will having a power over1 and directing the thoughts1 as well as other actions1 would1 if it were so1 hold the contemplation of the mind fixed to that good4 #ci4 ,but any great ,uneasiness is never neglected4 ,this would be the state of the mind1 and regular tendency of the will in all its determinations1 were it determined by that which is considered and in view the greater good4 ,but that it is not so1 is visible in experience2 the infinitely greatest confessed good being often neglected1 to satisfy the successive uneasiness of our desires pursuing trifles4 ,but1 though the greatest allowed1 even everlasting unspeakable1 good1 which has sometimes moved and affected the mind1 does not stedfastly hold the will1 yet we see any very great and prevailing uneasiness having once laid hold on the will1 let it not go2 by which we may be convinced1 what it is that determines the will4 ,thus any vehement pain of the body2 the ungovernable passion of a man violently in love2 or the impatient desire of revenge1 keeps the will steady and intent2 and the will1 thus determined1 never lets the understanding lay by the object1 but all the thoughts of the mind and powers of the body are uninterruptedly employed that way1 by the determination of the will1 influenced by that topping uneasiness1 as long as it lasts2 whereby it seems to me evident1 that the will1 or power of setting us upon one action in preference to all others1 is determined in us by uneasiness3 and whether this be not so1 ,i desire every one to observe in himself4 #dj4 ,desire accompanies all ,uneasiness4 ,i have hitherto chiefly instanced in the ,,uneasiness of desire1 as that which determines the will3 because that is the chief and most sensible2 and the will seldom orders any action1 nor is there any voluntary action performed1 without some desire accompanying it2 which ,i think is the reason why the will and desire are so often confounded4 ,but yet we are not to look upon the uneasiness which makes up1 or at least accompanies1 most of the other passions1 as wholly excluded in the case4 ,aversion1 fear1 anger1 envy1 shame1 c4 have each their uneasinesses too1 and thereby influence the will4 ,these passions are scarce any of them1 in life and practice1 simple and alone1 and wholly unmixed with others2 though usually1 in discourse and contemplation1 that carries the name which operates strongest1 and appears most in the present state of the mind4 ,nay1 there is1 ,i think1 scarce any of the passions to be found without desire joined with it4 ,i am sure wherever there is uneasiness1 there is desire4 ,for we constantly desire happiness2 and whatever we feel of uneasiness1 so much it is certain we want of happiness2 even in our own opinion1 let our state and condition otherwise be what it will4 ,besides1 the present moment not being our eternity1 whatever our enjoyment be1 we look beyond the present1 and desire goes with our foresight1 and that still carries the will with it4 ,so that even in joy itself1 that which keeps up the action whereon the enjoyment depends1 is the desire to continue it1 and fear to lose it3 and whenever a greater uneasiness than that takes place in the mind1 the will presently is by that determined to some new action1 and the present delight neglected4 #da4 ,the most pressing ,uneasiness naturally determines the ,will4 ,but we being in this world beset with sundry uneasinesses1 distracted with different desires1 the next inquiry naturally will be1--,which of them has the precedency in determining the will to the next action8 and to that the answer is1--,that ordinarily which is the most pressing of those that are judged capable of being then removed4 ,for1 the will being the power of directing our operative faculties to some action1 for some end1 cannot at any time be moved towards what is judged at that time unattainable3 that would be to suppose an intelligent being designedly to act for an end1 only to lose its labour2 for so it is to act for what is judged not attainable2 and therefore very great uneasinesses move not the will1 when they are judged not capable of a cure3 they in that case put us not upon endeavours4 ,but1 these set apart the most important and urgent uneasiness we at that time feel1 is that which ordinarily determines the will1 successively1 in that train of voluntary actions which makes up our lives4 ,the greatest present uneasiness is the spur to action1 that is constantly most felt1 and for the most part determines the will in its choice of the next action4 ,for this we must carry along with us1 that the proper and only object of the will is some action of ours1 and nothing else4 ,for we producing nothing by our willing it1 but some action in our power1 it is there the will terminates1 and reaches no further4 #db4 ,all desire ,happiness4 ,if it be further asked1--,what it is moves desire8 ,i answer1--happiness1 and that alone4 ,happiness and misery are the names of two extremes1 the utmost bounds whereof we know not2 it is what be in itself good2 and what is apt to produce any degree of pain be evil2 yet it often happens that we do not call it so when it comes in competition with a greater of its sort2 because1 when they come in competition1 the degrees also of pleasure and pain have justly a preference4 ,so that if we will rightly estimate what we call good and evil1 we shall find it lies much in comparison3 for the cause of every less degree of pain1 as well as every greater degree of pleasure1 has the nature of good1 and vice versa4 #dc4 99 missing #dd4 ,what ,good is desired1 what not4 ,though this be that which is called good and evil1 and all good be the proper object of desire in general2 yet all good1 even seen and confessed to be so1 does not necessarily move every particular man's desire2 but only that part1 or so much of it as is considered and taken to make a necessary part of ,,his happiness4 ,all other good1 however great in reality or appearance1 excites not a man's desires who looks not on it to make a part of that happiness wherewith he1 in his present thoughts1 can satisfy himself4 ,happiness1 under this view1 every one constantly pursues1 and desires what makes any part of it3 other things1 acknowledged to be good1 he can look upon without desire1 pass by1 and be content without4 ,there is nobody1 ,i think1 so senseless as to deny that there is pleasure in knowledge3 and for the pleasures of sense1 they have too many followers to let it be questioned whether men are taken with them or no4 ,now1 let one man place his satisfaction in sensual pleasures1 another in the delight of knowledge3 though each of them cannot but confess1 there is great pleasure in what the other pursues2 yet1 neither of them making the other's delight a part of ,,his happiness1 their desires are not moved1 but each is satisfied without what the other enjoys2 and so his will is not determined to the pursuit of it4 ,but yet1 as soon as the studious man's hunger and thirst make him uneasy1 he1 whose will was never determined to any pursuit of good cheer1 poignant sauces1 delicious wine1 by the pleasant taste he has found in them1 is1 by the uneasiness of hunger and thirst1 presently determined to eating and drinking1 though possibly with great indifferency1 what wholesome food comes in his way4 ,and1 on the other side1 the epicure buckles to study1 when shame1 or the desire to recommend himself to his mistress1 shall make him uneasy in the want of any sort of knowledge4 ,thus1 how much soever men are in earnest and constant in pursuit of happiness1 yet they may have a clear view of good1 great and confessed good1 without being concerned for it1 or moved by it1 if they think they can make up their happiness without it4 ,though as to pain1 ,,that they are always concerned for2 they can feel no uneasiness without being moved4 ,and therefore1 being uneasy in the want of whatever is judged necessary to their happiness1 as soon as any good appears to make a part of their portion of happiness1 they begin to desire it4 #de4 ,why the greatest ,good is not always desired4 ,this1 ,i think1 any one may observe in himself and others1--,that the greater visible good does not always raise men's desires in proportion to the greatness it appears1 and is acknowledged1 to have3 though every little trouble moves us1 and sets us on work to get rid of it4 ,the reason whereof is evident from the nature of our happiness and misery itself4 ,all present pain1 whatever it be1 makes a part of our present misery3 but all absent good does not at any time make a necessary part of our present happiness1 nor the absence of it make a part of our misery4 ,if it did1 we should be constantly and infinitely miserable2 there being infinite degrees of happiness which are not in our possession4 ,all uneasiness therefore being removed1 a moderate portion of good serve at present to content men2 and a few degrees of pleasure in a succession of ordinary enjoyments1 make up a happiness wherein they can be satisfied4 ,if this were not so1 there could be no room for those indifferent and visibly trifling actions1 to which our wills are so often determined1 and wherein we voluntarily waste so much of our lives2 which remissness could by no means consist with a constant determination of will or desire to the greatest apparent good4 ,that this is so1 ,i think few people need go far from home to be convinced4 ,and indeed in this life there are not many whose happiness reaches so far as to afford them a constant train of moderate mean pleasures1 without any mixture of uneasiness2 and yet they could be content to stay here for ever3 though they cannot deny1 but that it is possible there may be a state of eternal durable joys after this life1 far surpassing all the good that is to be found here4 ,nay1 they cannot but see that it is more possible than the attainment and continuation of that pittance of honour1 riches1 or pleasure which they pursue1 and for which they neglect that eternal state4 ,but yet1 in full view of this difference1 satisfied of the possibility of a perfect1 secure1 and lasting happiness in a future state1 and under a clear conviction that it is not to be had here1--whilst they bound their happiness within some little enjoyment or aim of this life1 and exclude the joys of heaven from making any necessary part of it1--their desires are not moved by this greater apparent good1 nor their wills determined to any action1 or endeavour for its attainment4 #df4 ,why not being desired1 it moves not the ,will4 ,the ordinary necessities of our lives fill a great part of them with the uneasinesses of hunger1 thirst1 heat1 cold1 weariness1 with labour1 and sleepiness1 in their constant returns1 c4 ,to which1 if1 besides accidental harms1 we add the fantastical uneasiness 7as itch after honour1 power1 or riches1 c47 which acquired habits1 by fashion1 example1 and education1 have settled in us1 and a thousand other irregular desires1 which custom has made natural to us1 we shall find that a very little part of our life is so vacant from ,,these uneasinesses1 as to leave us free to the attraction of remoter absent good4 ,we are seldom at ease1 and free enough from the solicitation of our natural or adopted desires1 but a constant succession of uneasinesses out of that stock which natural wants or acquired habits have heaped up1 take the will in their turns2 and no sooner is one action dispatched1 which by such a determination of the will we are set upon1 but another uneasiness is ready to set us on work4 ,for1 the removing of the pains we feel1 and are at present pressed with1 being the getting out of misery1 and consequently the first thing to be done in order to happiness1--absent good1 though thought on1 confessed1 and appearing to be good1 not making any part of this unhappiness in its absence1 is justled out1 to make way for the removal of those uneasinesses we feel2 till due and repeated contemplation has brought it nearer to our mind1 given some relish of it1 and raised in us some desire3 which then beginning to make a part of our present uneasiness1 stands upon fair terms with the rest to be satisfied1 and so1 according to its greatness and pressure1 comes in its turn to determine the will4 #dg4 ,due ,consideration raises ,desire4 ,and thus1 by a due consideration1 and examining any good proposed1 it is in our power to raise our desires in a due proportion to the value of that good1 whereby in its turn and place it may come to work upon the will1 and be pursued4 ,for good1 though appearing and allowed ever so great1 yet till it has raised desires in our minds1 and thereby made us uneasy in its want1 it reaches not our wills2 we are not within the sphere of its activity1 our wills being under the determination only of those uneasinesses which are present to us1 which 7whilst we have any7 are always soliciting1 and ready at hand1 to give the will its next determination4 ,the balancing1 when there is any in the mind1 being only1 which desire shall be next satisfied1 which uneasiness first removed4 ,whereby it comes to pass that1 as long as any uneasiness1 any desire1 remains in our mind1 there is no room for good1 barely as such1 to come at the will1 or at all to determine it4 ,because1 as has been said1 the ,,first step in our endeavours after happiness being to get wholly out of the confines of misery1 and to feel no part of it1 the will can be at leisure for nothing else1 till every uneasiness we feel be perfectly removed3 which1 in the multitude of wants and desires we are beset with in this imperfect state1 we are not like to be ever freed from in this world4 #dh4 ,the ,power to suspend the ,prosecution of any ,desire makes way for consideration4 ,there being in us a great many uneasinesses1 always soliciting and ready to determine the will1 it is natural1 as ,i have said1 that the greatest and most pressing should determine the will to the next action2 and so it does for the most part1 but not always4 ,for1 the mind having in most cases1 as is evident in experience1 a power to ,,suspend the execution and satisfaction of any of its desires2 and so all1 one after another2 is at liberty to consider the objects of them1 examine them on all sides1 and weigh them with others4 ,in this lies the liberty man has2 and from the not using of it right comes all that variety of mistakes1 errors1 and faults which we run into in the conduct of our lives1 and our endeavours after happiness2 whilst we precipitate the determination of our wills1 and engage too soon1 before due examination4 ,to prevent this1 we have a power to suspend the prosecution of this or that desire2 as every one daily may experiment in himself4 ,this seems to me the source of all liberty2 in this seems to consist that which is 7as ,i think improperly7 called ,,free-,,will4 ,for1 during this suspension of any desire1 before the will be determined to action1 and the action 7which follows that determination7 done1 we have opportunity to examine1 view1 and judge of the good or evil of what we are going to do2 and when1 upon due examination1 we have judged1 we have done our duty1 all that we can1 or ought to do1 in pursuit of our happiness2 and it is not a fault1 but a perfection of our nature1 to desire1 will1 and act according to the last result of a fair examination4 #di4 ,to be determined by our own ,judgment1 is no ,restraint to ,liberty4 ,this is so far from being a restraint or diminution of freedom1 that it is the very improvement and benefit of it2 it is not an abridgment1 it is the end and use of our liberty2 and the further we are removed from such a determination1 the nearer we are to misery and slavery4 ,a perfect indifference in the mind1 not determinable by its last judgment of the good or evil that is thought to attend its choice1 would be so far from being an advantage and excellency of any intellectual nature1 that it would be as great an imperfection1 as the want of indifferency to act1 or not to act1 till determined by the will1 would be an imperfection on the other side4 ,a man is at liberty to lift up his hand to his head1 or let it rest quiet3 he is perfectly indifferent in either2 and it would be an imperfection in him1 if he wanted that power1 if he were deprived of that indifferency4 ,but it would be as great an imperfection1 if he had the same indifferency1 whether he would prefer the lifting up his hand1 or its remaining in rest1 when it would save his head or eyes from a blow he sees coming3 it is as much a perfection1 that desire1 or the power of preferring1 should be determined by good1 as that the power of acting should be determined by the will2 and the certainer such determination is1 the greater is the perfection4 ,nay1 were we determined by anything but the last result of our own minds1 judging of the good or evil of any action1 we were not free4 #ej4 ,the freest ,agents are so determined4 ,if we look upon those superior beings above us1 who enjoy perfect happiness1 we shall have reason to judge that they are more steadily determined in their choice of good than we2 and yet we have no reason to think they are less happy1 or less free1 than we are4 ,and if it were fit for such poor finite creatures as we are to pronounce what infinite wisdom and goodness could do1 ,i think we might say1 that ,god himself ,,cannot choose what is not good2 the freedom of the ,almighty hinders not his being determined by what is best4 #ea4 ,a constant ,determination to a ,pursuit of ,happiness no ,abridgment of ,liberty4 ,but to give a right view of this mistaken part of liberty let me ask1--,would any one be a changeling1 because he is less determined by wise considerations than a wise man8 ,is it worth the name of freedom to be at liberty to play the fool1 and draw shame and misery upon a man's self8 ,if to break loose from the conduct of reason1 and to want that restraint of examination and judgment which keeps us from choosing or doing the worse1 be liberty1 true liberty1 madmen and fools are the only freemen3 but yet1 ,i think1 nobody would choose to be mad for the sake of such liberty1 but he that is mad already4 ,the constant desire of happiness1 and the constraint it puts upon us to act for it1 nobody1 ,i think1 accounts an abridgment of liberty1 or at least an abridgment of liberty to be complained of4 ,god ,almighty himself is under the necessity of being happy2 and the more any intelligent being is so1 the nearer is its approach to infinite perfection and happiness4 ,that1 in this state of ignorance1 we short-sighted creatures might not mistake true felicity1 we are endowed with a power to suspend any particular desire1 and keep it from determining the will1 and engaging us in action4 ,this is standing still1 where we are not sufficiently assured of the way3 examination is consulting a guide4 ,the determination of the will upon inquiry1 is following the direction of that guide3 and he that has a power to act or not to act1 according as ,,such determination directs1 is a free agent3 such determination abridges not that power wherein liberty consists4 ,he that has his chains knocked off1 and the prison doors set open to him1 is perfectly at liberty1 because he may either go or stay1 as he best likes1 though his preference be determined to stay1 by the darkness of the night1 or illness of the weather1 or want of other lodging4 ,he ceases not to be free2 though the desire of some convenience to be had there absolutely determines his preference1 and makes him stay in his prison4 #eb4 ,the ,necessity of pursuing true ,happiness the ,foundation of ,liberty4 ,as therefore the highest perfection of intellectual nature lies in a careful and constant pursuit of true and solid happiness2 so the care of ourselves1 that we mistake not imaginary for real happiness1 is the necessary foundation of our liberty4 ,the stronger ties we have to an unalterable pursuit of happiness in general1 which is our greatest good1 and which as such1 our desires always follow1 the more are we free from any necessary determination of our will to any particular action1 and from a necessary compliance with our desire1 so upon any particular1 and then appearing preferable good1 till we have duly examined whether it has a tendency to1 or be inconsistent with1 our real happiness3 and therefore1 till we are as much informed upon this inquiry as the weight of the matter1 and the nature of the case demands1 we are1 by the necessity of preferring and pursuing true happiness as our greatest good1 obliged to suspend the satisfaction of our desires in particular cases4 #ec4 ,power to ,suspend4 ,this is the hinge on which turns the ,,liberty of intellectual beings1 in their constant endeavours after1 and a steady prosecution of true felicity1--,that they ,,can ,,suspend this prosecution in particular cases1 till they have looked before them1 and informed themselves whether that particular thing which is then proposed or desired lie in the way to their main end1 and make a real part of that which is their greatest good4 ,for1 the inclination and tendency of their nature to happiness is an obligation and motive to them1 to take care not to mistake or miss it2 and so necessarily puts them upon caution1 deliberation1 and wariness1 in the direction of their particular actions1 which are the means to obtain it4 ,whatever necessity determines to the pursuit of real bliss1 the same necessity1 with the same force1 establishes suspense1 deliberation1 and scrutiny of each successive desire1 whether the satisfaction of it does not interfere with our true happiness1 and mislead us from it4 ,this1 as seems to me1 is the great privilege of finite intellectual beings2 and ,i desire it may be well considered1 whether the great inlet and exercise of all the liberty men have1 are capable of1 or can be useful to them1 and that whereon depends the turn of their actions1 does not lie in this1--,that they can suspend their desires1 and stop them from determining their wills to any action1 till they have duly and fairly examined the good and evil of it1 as far forth as the weight of the thing requires4 ,this we are able to do2 and when we have done it1 we have done our duty1 and all that is in our power2 and indeed all that needs4 ,for1 since the will supposes knowledge to guide its choice1 all that we can do is to hold our wills undetermined1 till we have examined the good and evil of what we desire4 ,what follows after that1 follows in a chain of consequences1 linked one to another1 all depending on the last determination of the judgment1 which1 whether it shall be upon a hasty and precipitate view1 or upon a due and mature examination1 is in our power2 experience showing us1 that in most cases1 we are able to suspend the present satisfaction of any desire4 #ed4 ,government of our ,passions the right ,improvement of ,liberty4 ,but if any extreme disturbance 7as sometimes it happens7 possesses our whole mind1 as when the pain of the rack1 an impetuous uneasiness1 as of love1 anger1 or any other violent passion1 running away with us1 allows us not the liberty of thought1 and we are not masters enough of our own minds to consider thoroughly and examine fairly2--,god1 who knows our frailty1 pities our weakness1 and requires of us no more than we are able to do1 and sees what was and what was not in our power1 will judge as a kind and merciful ,father4 ,but the forbearance of a too hasty compliance with our desires1 the moderation and restraint of our passions1 so that our understandings may be free to examine1 and reason unbiassed1 give its judgment1 being that whereon a right direction of our conduct to true happiness depends2 it is in this we should employ our chief care and endeavours4 ,in this we should take pains to suit the relish of our minds to the true intrinsic good or ill that is in things2 and not permit an allowed or supposed possible great and weighty good to slip out of our thoughts1 without leaving any relish1 any desire of itself there till1 by a due consideration of its true worth1 we have formed appetites in our minds suitable to it1 and made ourselves uneasy in the want of it1 or in the fear of losing it4 ,and how much this is in every one's power1 by making resolutions to himself1 such as he may keep1 is easy for every one to try4 ,nor let any one say1 he cannot govern his passions1 nor hinder them from breaking out1 and carrying him into action2 for what he can do before a prince or a great man1 he can do alone1 or in the presence of ,god1 if he will4 #ee4 ,how ,men come to pursue different1 and often evil ,courses4 ,from what has been said1 it is easy to give an account how it comes to pass1 that1 though all men desire happiness1 yet their wills carry them so contrarily2 and consequently1 some of them to what is evil4 ,and to this ,i say1 that the various and contrary choices that men make in the world do not argue that they do not all pursue good2 but that the same thing is not good to every man alike4 ,this variety of pursuits shows1 that every one does not place his happiness in the same thing1 or choose the same way to it4 ,were all the concerns of man terminated in this life1 why one followed study and knowledge1 and another hawking and hunting3 why one chose luxury and debauchery1 and another sobriety and riches1 would not be because every one of these did ,,not aim at his own happiness2 but because their happiness was placed in different things4 ,and therefore it was a right answer of the physician to his patient that had sore eyes3--,if you have more pleasure in the taste of wine than in the use of your sight1 wine is good for you2 but if the pleasure of seeing be greater to you than that of drinking1 wine is naught4 #ef4 ,all men seek happiness1 but not of the same sort4 ,the mind has a different relish1 as well as the palate2 and you will as fruitlessly endeavour to delight all men with riches or glory 7which yet some men place their happiness in7 as you would to satisfy all men's hunger with cheese or lobsters2 which1 though very agreeable and delicious fare to some1 are to others extremely nauseous and offensive3 and many persons would with reason prefer the griping of an hungry belly to those dishes which are a feast to others4 ,hence it was1 ,i think1 that the philosophers of old did in vain inquire1 whether summum bonum consisted in riches1 or bodily delights1 or virtue1 or contemplation3 and they might have as reasonably disputed1 whether the best relish were to be found in apples1 plums1 or nuts1 and have divided themselves into sects upon it4 ,for1 as pleasant tastes depend not on the things themselves1 but on their agreeableness to this or that particular palate1 wherein there is great variety2 so the greatest happiness consists in the having those things which produce the greatest pleasure1 and in the absence of those which cause any disturbance1 any pain4 ,now these1 to different men1 are very different things4 ,if1 therefore1 men in this life only have hope2 if in this life only they can enjoy1 it is not strange nor unreasonable1 that they should seek their happiness by avoiding all things that disease them here1 and by pursuing all that delight them2 wherein it will be no wonder to find variety and difference4 ,for if there be no prospect beyond the grave1 the inference is certainly right--#8,let us eat and drink1' let us enjoy what we delight in1 #8for to-morrow we shall die4' ,this1 ,i think1 may serve to show us the reason1 why1 though all men's desires tend to happiness1 yet they are not moved by the same object4 ,men may choose different things1 and yet all choose right2 supposing them only like a company of poor insects2 whereof some are bees1 delighted with flowers and their sweetness2 others beetles1 delighted with other kinds of viands1 which having enjoyed for a season1 they would cease to be1 and exist no more for ever4 #eg4 not in early editions #eh4 ,why men choose what makes them miserable4 ,what has been said may also discover to us the reason why men in this world prefer different things1 and pursue happiness by contrary courses4 ,but yet1 since men are always constant and in earnest in matters of happiness and misery1 the question still remains1 ,how men come often to prefer the worse to the better2 and to choose that1 which1 by their own confession1 has made them miserable8 #ei4 ,the causes of this4 ,to account for the various and contrary ways men take1 though all aim at being happy1 we must consider whence the ,,various ,,uneasinesses that determine the will1 in the preference of each voluntary action1 have their rise3-- #a4 ,from bodily pain4 ,some of them come from causes not in our power2 such as are often the pains of the body from want1 disease1 or outward injuries1 as the rack1 etc42 which1 when present and violent1 operate for the most part forcibly on the will1 and turn the courses of men's lives from virtue1 piety1 and religion1 and what before they judged to lead to happiness2 every one not endeavouring1 or not being able1 by the contemplation of remote and future good1 to raise in himself desires of them strong enough to counterbalance the uneasiness he feels in those bodily torments1 and to keep his will steady in the choice of those actions which lead to future happiness4 ,a neighbouring country has been of late a tragical theatre from which we might fetch instances1 if there needed any1 and the world did not in all countries and ages furnish examples enough to confirm that received observation3 ,,necessitas ,,cogit ,,ad ,,turpia2 and therefore there is great reason for us to pray1 #8,lead us not into temptation4' #b4 ,from wrong ,desires arising from wrong ,judgments4 ,other uneasinesses arise from our desires of absent good2 which desires always bear proportion to1 and depend on1 the judgment we make1 and the relish we have of any absent good2 in both which we are apt to be variously misled1 and that by our own fault4 #fj4 ,our judgment of present ,good or ,evil always right4 ,in the first place1 ,i shall consider the wrong judgments men make of ,,future good and evil1 whereby their desires are misled4 ,for1 as to ,,present happiness and misery1 when that alone comes into consideration1 and the consequences are quite removed1 a man never chooses amiss3 he knows what best pleases him1 and that he actually prefers4 ,things in their present enjoyment are what they seem3 the apparent and real good are1 in this case1 always the same4 ,for the pain or pleasure being just so great and no greater than it is felt1 the present good or evil is really so much as it appears4 ,and therefore were every action of ours concluded within itself1 and drew no consequences after it1 we should undoubtedly never err in our choice of good3 we should always infallibly prefer the best4 ,were the pains of honest industry1 and of starving with hunger and cold set together before us1 nobody would be in doubt which to choose3 were the satisfaction of a lust and the joys of heaven offered at once to any one's present possession1 he would not balance1 or err in the determination of his choice4 #fa4 ,our wrong judgments have regard to future good and evil only4 ,but since our voluntary actions carry not all the happiness and misery that depend on them along with them in their present performance1 but are the precedent causes of good and evil1 which they draw after them1 and bring upon us1 when they themselves are past and cease to be2 our desires look beyond our present enjoyments1 and carry the mind out to ,,absent ,,good1 according to the necessity which we think there is of it1 to the making or increase of our happiness4 ,it is our opinion of such a necessity that gives it its attraction3 without that1 we are not moved by absent good4 ,for1 in this narrow scantling of capacity which we are accustomed to and sensible of here1 wherein we enjoy but one pleasure at once1 which1 when all uneasiness is away1 is1 whilst it lasts1 sufficient to make us think ourselves happy1 it is not all remote and even apparent good that affects us4 ,because the indolency and enjoyment we have1 sufficing for our present happiness1 we desire not to venture the change2 since we judge that we are happy already1 being content1 and that is enough4 ,for who is content is happy4 ,but as soon as any new uneasiness comes in1 this happiness is disturbed1 and we are set afresh on work in the pursuit of happiness4 #fb4 ,from a wrong ,judgment of what makes a necessary ,part of their ,happiness4 ,their aptness therefore to conclude that they can be happy without it1 is one great occasion that men often are not raised to the desire of the greatest ,,absent good4 ,for1 whilst such thoughts possess them1 the joys of a future state move them not2 they have little concern or uneasiness about them2 and the will1 free from the determination of such desires1 is left to the pursuit of nearer satisfactions1 and to the removal of those uneasinesses which it then feels1 in its want of any longings after them4 ,change but a man's view of these things2 let him see that virtue and religion are necessary to his happiness2 let him look into the future state of bliss or misery1 and see there ,god1 the righteous ,judge1 ready to #8render to every man according to his deeds2 to them who by patient continuance in well-doing seek for glory1 and honour1 and immortality1 eternal life2 but unto every soul that doth evil1 indignation and wrath1 tribulation and anguish4' ,to him1 ,i say1 who hath a prospect of the different state of perfect happiness or misery that attends all men after this life1 depending on their behaviour here1 the measures of good and evil that govern his choice are mightily changed4 ,for1 since nothing of pleasure and pain in this life can bear any proportion to the endless happiness or exquisite misery of an immortal soul hereafter1 actions in his power will have their preference1 not according to the transient pleasure or pain that accompanies or follows them here1 but as they serve to secure that perfect durable happiness hereafter4 #fc4 ,a more particular ,account of wrong ,judgments4 ,but1 to account more particularly for the misery that men often bring on themselves1 notwithstanding that they do all in earnest pursue happiness1 we must consider how things come to be represented to our desires under deceitful appearances3 and that is by the judgment pronouncing wrongly concerning them4 ,to see how far this reaches1 and what are the causes of wrong judgment1 we must remember that things are judged good or bad in a double sense3-- ,first1 ,,that ,,which ,,is ,,properly ,,good ,,or ,,bad1 ,,is ,,nothing ,,but ,,barely ,,pleasure ,,or ,,pain4 ,secondly1 ,but because not only present pleasure and pain1 but that also which is apt by its efficacy or consequences to bring it upon us at a distance1 is a proper object of our desires1 and apt to move a creature that has foresight2 therefore ,,things ,,also ,,that ,,draw ,,after ,,them ,,pleasure ,,and ,,pain1 ,,are ,,considered ,,as ,,good ,,and ,,evil4 #fd4 ,no one chooses misery willingly1 but only by wrong judgment4 ,the wrong judgment that misleads us1 and makes the will often fasten on the worse side1 lies in misreporting upon the various comparisons of these4 ,the wrong judgment ,i am here speaking of is not what one man may think of the determination of another1 but what every man himself must confess to be wrong4 ,for1 since ,i lay it for a certain ground1 that every intelligent being really seeks happiness1 which consists in the enjoyment of pleasure1 without any considerable mixture of uneasiness2 it is impossible any one should willingly put into his own draught any bitter ingredient1 or leave out anything in his power that would tend to his satisfaction1 and the completing of his happiness1 but only by a ,,wrong ,,judgment4 ,i shall not here speak of that mistake which is the consequence of ,,invincible error1 which scarce deserves the name of wrong judgment2 but of that wrong judgment which every man himself must confess to be so4 #fe4 ,men may err on comparing ,present and ,future4 7,i7 ,therefore1 as to present pleasure and pain1 the mind1 as has been said1 never mistakes that which is really good or evil2 that which is the greater pleasure1 or the greater pain1 is really just as it appears4 ,but1 though present pleasure and pain show their difference and degrees so plainly as not to leave room to mistake2 yet1 ,,when ,,we ,,compare ,,present ,,pleasure ,,or ,,pain ,,with ,,future1 7which is usually the case in most important determinations of the will17 we often make wrong judgments of them2 taking our measures of them in different positions of distance4 ,objects near our view are apt to be thought greater than those of a larger size that are more remote4 ,and so it is with pleasures and pains3 the present is apt to carry it2 and those at a distance have the disadvantage in the comparison4 ,thus most men1 like spendthrift heirs1 are apt to judge a little in hand better than a great deal to come2 and so1 for small matters in possession1 part with greater ones in reversion4 ,but that this is a wrong judgment every one must allow1 let his pleasure consist in whatever it will3 since that which is future will certainly come to be present2 and then1 having the same advantage of nearness1 will show itself in its full dimensions1 and discover his wilful mistake who judged of it by unequal measures4 ,were the pleasure of drinking accompanied1 the very moment a man takes off his glass1 with that sick stomach and aching head which1 in some men1 are sure to follow not many hours after1 ,i think nobody1 whatever pleasure he had in his cups1 would1 on these conditions1 ever let wine touch his lips2 which yet he daily swallows1 and the evil side comes to be chosen only by the fallacy of a little difference in time4 ,but1 if pleasure or pain can be so lessened only by a few hours' removal1 how much more will it be so by a further distance to a man that will not1 by a right judgment1 do what time will1 i4 e4 bring it home upon himself1 and consider it as present1 and there take its true dimensions8 ,this is the way we usually impose on ourselves1 in respect of bare pleasure and pain1 or the true degrees of happiness or misery3 the future loses its just proportion1 and what is present obtains the preference as the greater4 ,i mention not here the wrong judgment1 whereby the absent are not only lessened1 but reduced to perfect nothing2 when men enjoy what they can in present1 and make sure of that1 concluding amiss that no evil will thence follow4 ,for that lies not in comparing the greatness of future good and evil1 which is that we are here speaking of2 but in another sort of wrong judgment1 which is concerning good or evil1 as it is considered to be the cause and procurement of pleasure or pain that will follow from it4 #ff4 ,causes of our judging amiss when we compare present pleasure and pain with future4 ,the cause of our judging amiss1 when we compare our present pleasure or pain with future1 seems to me to be ,,the ,,weak ,,and ,,narrow ,,constitution ,,of ,,our ,,minds4 ,we cannot well enjoy two pleasures at once2 much less any pleasure almost1 whilst pain possesses us4 ,the present pleasure1 if it be not very languid1 and almost none at all1 fills our narrow souls1 and so takes up the whole mind that it scarce leaves any thought of things absent3 or if among our pleasures there are some which are not strong enough to exclude the consideration of things at a distance1 yet we have so great an abhorrence of pain1 that a little of it extinguishes all our pleasures4 ,a little bitter mingled in our cup1 leaves no relish of the sweet4 ,hence it comes that1 at any rate1 we desire to be rid of the present evil1 which we are apt to think nothing absent can equal2 because1 under the present pain1 we find not ourselves capable of any the least degree of happiness4 ,men's daily complaints are a loud proof of this3 the pain that any one actually feels is still of all other the worst2 and it is with anguish they cry out1--#8,any rather than this3 nothing can be so intolerable as what ,i now suffer4' ,and therefore our whole endeavours and thoughts are intent to get rid of the present evil1 before all things1 as the first necessary condition to our happiness2 let what will follow4 ,nothing1 as we passionately think1 can exceed1 or almost equal1 the uneasiness that sits so heavy upon us4 ,and because the abstinence from a present pleasure that offers itself is a pain1 nay1 oftentimes a very great one1 the desire being inflamed by a near and tempting object1 it is no wonder that that operates after the same manner pain does1 and lessens in our thoughts what is future2 and so forces us1 as it were blindfold1 into its embraces4 #fg4 ,absent good unable to counterbalance present uneasiness4 ,add to this1 that absent good1 or1 which is the same thing1 future pleasure1--especially if of a sort we are unacquainted with1--seldom is able to counterbalance any uneasiness1 either of pain or desire1 which is present4 ,for1 its greatness being no more than what shall be really tasted when enjoyed1 men are apt enough to lessen that2 to make it give place to any present desire2 and conclude with themselves that1 when it comes to trial1 it may possibly not answer the report or opinion that generally passes of it3 they having often found that1 not only what others have magnified1 but even what they themselves have enjoyed with great pleasure and delight at one time1 has proved insipid or nauseous at another2 and therefore they see nothing in it for which they should forego a present enjoyment4 ,but that this is a false way of judging1 when applied to the happiness of another life1 they must confess2 unless they will say1 ,god cannot make those happy he designs to be so4 ,for that being intended for a state of happiness1 it must certainly be agreeable to every one's wish and desire3 could we suppose their relishes as different there as they are here1 yet the manna in heaven will suit every one's palate4 ,thus much of the wrong judgment we make of present and future pleasure and pain1 when they are compared together1 and so the absent considered as future4 #fh4 ,wrong judgment in considering ,consequences of ,actions4 7,,ii74 ,as to ,,things ,,good ,,or ,,bad ,,in ,,their ,,consequences1 and by the aptness that is in them to procure us good or evil in the future1 we judge amiss several ways4 #a4 ,when we judge that so much evil does not really depend on them as in truth there does4 #b4 ,when we judge that1 though the consequence be of that moment1 yet it is not of that certainty1 but that it may otherwise fall out1 or else by some means be avoided2 as by industry1 address1 change1 repentance1 c4 ,that these are wrong ways of judging1 were easy to show in every particular1 if ,i would examine them at large singly3 but ,i shall only mention this in general1 viz4 that it is a very wrong and irrational way of proceeding1 to venture a greater good for a less1 upon uncertain guesses2 and before a due examination be made1 proportionable to the weightiness of the matter1 and the concernment it is to us not to mistake4 ,this ,i think every one must confess1 especially if he considers the usual cause of this wrong judgment1 whereof these following are some3-- #fi4 ,causes of this4 7i7 ,,ignorance3 ,he that judges without informing himself to the utmost that he is capable1 cannot acquit himself of judging amiss4 7ii7 ,,inadvertency3 ,when a man overlooks even that which he does know4 ,this is an affected and present ignorance1 which misleads our judgments as much as the other4 ,judging is1 as it were1 balancing an account1 and determining on which side the odds lie4 ,if therefore either side be huddled up in haste1 and several of the sums that should have gone into the reckoning be overlooked and left out1 this precipitancy causes as wrong a judgment as if it were a perfect ignorance4 ,that which most commonly causes this is1 the prevalency of some present pleasure or pain1 heightened by our feeble passionate nature1 most strongly wrought on by what is present4 ,to check this precipitancy1 our understanding and reason were given us1 if we will make a right use of them1 to search and see1 and then judge thereupon4 ,how much sloth and negligence1 heat and passion1 the prevalency of fashion or acquired indispositions do severally contribute1 on occasion1 to these wrong judgments1 ,i shall not here further inquire4 ,i shall only add one other false judgment1 which ,i think necessary to mention1 because perhaps it is little taken notice of1 though of great influence4 #gj4 ,wrong judgment of what is necessary to our ,happiness4 ,all men desire happiness1 that is past doubt3 but1 as has been already observed1 when they are rid of pain1 they are apt to take up with any pleasure at hand1 or that custom has endeared to them2 to rest satisfied in that2 and so being happy1 till some new desire1 by making them uneasy1 disturbs that happiness1 and shows them that they are not so1 they look no further2 nor is the will determined to any action in pursuit of any other known or apparent good4 ,for since we find that we cannot enjoy all sorts of good1 but one excludes another2 we do not fix our desires on every apparent greater good1 unless it be judged to be necessary to our happiness3 if we think we can be happy without it1 it moves us not4 ,this is another occasion to men of judging wrong2 when they take not that to be necessary to their happiness which really is so4 ,this mistake misleads us1 both in the choice of the good we aim at1 and very often in the means to it1 when it is a remote good4 ,but1 which way ever it be1 either by placing it where really it is not1 or by neglecting the means as not necessary to it2--when a man misses his great end1 happiness1 he will acknowledge he judged not right4 ,that which contributes to this mistake is the real or supposed unpleasantness of the actions which are the way to this end2 it seeming so preposterous a thing to men1 to make themselves unhappy in order to happiness1 that they do not easily bring themselves to it4 #ga4 ,we can change the ,agreeableness or ,disagreeableness in ,things4 ,the last inquiry1 therefore1 concerning this matter is1--,whether it be in a man's power to change the pleasantness and unpleasantness that accompanies any sort of action8 ,and as to that1 it is plain1 in many cases he can4 ,men may and should correct their palates1 and give relish to what either has1 or they suppose has none4 ,the relish of the mind is as various as that of the body1 and like that too may be altered2 and it is a mistake to think that men cannot change the displeasingness or indifferency that is in actions into pleasure and desire1 if they will do but what is in their power4 ,a due consideration will do it in some cases2 and practice1 application1 and custom in most4 ,bread or tobacco may be neglected where they are shown to be useful to health1 because of an indifferency or disrelish to them2 reason and consideration at first recommends1 and begins their trial1 and use finds1 or custom makes them pleasant4 ,that this is so in virtue too1 is very certain4 ,actions are pleasing or displeasing1 either in themselves1 or considered as a means to a greater and more desirable end4 ,the eating of a well-seasoned dish1 suited to a man's palate1 may move the mind by the delight itself that accompanies the eating1 without reference to any other end2 to which the consideration of the pleasure there is in health and strength 7to which that meat is subservient7 may add a new ,,gusto1 able to make us swallow an ill-relished potion4 ,in the latter of these1 any action is rendered more or less pleasing1 only by the contemplation of the end1 and the being more or less persuaded of its tendency to it1 or necessary connexion with it3 but the pleasure of the action itself is best acquired or increased by use and practice4 ,trials often reconcile us to that1 which at a distance we looked on with aversion2 and by repetitions wear us into a liking of what possibly1 in the first essay1 displeased us4 ,habits have powerful charms1 and put so strong attractions of easiness and pleasure into what we accustom ourselves to1 that we cannot forbear to do1 or at least be easy in the omission of1 actions1 which habitual practice has suited1 and thereby recommends to us4 ,though this be very visible1 and every one's experience shows him he can do so2 yet it is a part in the conduct of men towards their happiness1 neglected to a degree1 that it will be possibly entertained as a paradox1 if it be said1 that men can ,,make things or actions more or less pleasing to themselves2 and thereby remedy that1 to which one may justly impute a great deal of their wandering4 ,fashion and the common opinion having settled wrong notions1 and education and custom ill habits1 the just values of things are misplaced1 and the palates of men corrupted4 ,pains should be taken to rectify these2 and contrary habits change our pleasures1 and give a relish to that which is necessary or conducive to our happiness4 ,this every one must confess he can do2 and when happiness is lost1 and misery overtakes him1 he will confess he did amiss in neglecting it1 and condemn himself for it2 and ,i ask every one1 whether he has not often done so8 #gb4 ,preference of ,vice to ,virtue a manifest wrong ,judgment4 ,i shall not now enlarge any further on the wrong judgments and neglect of what is in their power1 whereby men mislead themselves4 ,this would make a volume1 and is not my business4 ,but whatever false notions1 or shameful neglect of what is in their power1 may put men out of their way to happiness1 and distract them1 as we see1 into so different courses of life1 this yet is certain1 that morality established upon its true foundations1 cannot but determine the choice in any one that will but consider3 and he that will not be so far a rational creature as to reflect seriously upon ,,infinite happiness and misery1 must needs condemn himself as not making that use of his understanding he should4 ,the rewards and punishments of another life which the ,almighty has established1 as the enforcements of his law1 are of weight enough to determine the choice against whatever pleasure or pain this life can show1 where the eternal state is considered but in its bare possibility which nobody can make any doubt of4 ,he that will allow exquisite and endless happiness to be but the possible consequence of a good life here1 and the contrary state the possible reward of a bad one1 must own himself to judge very much amiss if he does not conclude1--,that a virtuous life1 with the certain expectation of everlasting bliss1 which may come1 is to be preferred to a vicious one1 with the fear of that dreadful state of misery1 which it is very possible may overtake the guilty2 or1 at best1 the terrible uncertain hope of annihilation4 ,this is evidently so1 though the virtuous life here had nothing but pain1 and the vicious continual pleasure3 which yet is1 for the most part1 quite otherwise1 and wicked men have not much the odds to brag of1 even in their present possession2 nay1 all things rightly considered1 have1 ,i think1 even the worse part here4 ,but when infinite happiness is put into one scale1 against infinite misery in the other2 if the worst that comes to the pious man1 if he mistakes1 be the best that the wicked can attain to1 if he be in the right1 who can without madness run the venture8 ,who in his wits would choose to come within a possibility of infinite misery2 which if he miss1 there is yet nothing to be got by that hazard8 ,whereas1 on the other side1 the sober man ventures nothing against infinite happiness to be got1 if his expectation comes not to pass4 ,if the good man be in the right1 he is eternally happy2 if he mistakes1 he is not miserable1 he feels nothing4 ,on the other side1 if the wicked man be in the right1 he is not happy2 if he mistakes1 he is infinitely miserable4 ,must it not be a most manifest wrong judgment that does not presently see to which side1 in this case1 the preference is to be given8 ,i have forborne to mention anything of the certainty or probability of a future state1 designing here to show the wrong judgment that any one must allow he makes1 upon his own principles1 laid how he pleases1 who prefers the short pleasures of a vicious life upon any consideration1 whilst he knows1 and cannot but be certain1 that a future life is at least possible4 #gc4 ,recapitulation--,liberty of indifferency4 ,to conclude this inquiry into human liberty1 which1 as it stood before1 ,i myself from the beginning fearing1 and a very judicious friend of mine1 since the publication1 suspecting to have some mistake in it1 though he could not particularly show it me1 ,i was put upon a stricter review of this chapter4 ,wherein lighting upon a very easy and scarce observable slip ,i had made1 in putting one seemingly indifferent word for another that discovery opened to me this present view1 which here1 in this second edition1 ,i submit to the learned world1 and which1 in short1 is this3 ,,liberty is a power to act or not to act1 according as the mind directs4 ,a power to direct the operative faculties to motion or rest in particular instances is that which we call the ,,will4 ,that which in the train of our voluntary actions determines the will to any change of operation is ,,some ,,present ,,uneasiness1 which is1 or at least is always accompanied with that of ,,desire4 ,desire is always moved by evil1 to fly it3 because a total freedom from pain always makes a necessary part of our happiness3 but every good1 nay1 every greater good1 does not constantly move desire1 because it may not make1 or may not be taken to make1 any necessary part of our happiness4 ,for all that we desire1 is only to be happy4 ,but1 though this general desire of happiness operates constantly and invariably1 yet the satisfaction of any particular desire ,,can ,,be ,,suspended from determining the will to any subservient action1 till we have maturely examined whether the particular apparent good which we then desire makes a part of our real happiness1 or be consistent or inconsistent with it4 ,the result of our judgment upon that examination is what ultimately determines the man2 who could not be ,,free if his will were determined by anything but his own desire1 guided by his own judgment4 #gd4 ,active and passive power1 in motions and in thinking4 ,true notions concerning the nature and extent of ,,liberty are of so great importance1 that ,i hope ,i shall be pardoned this digression1 which my attempt to explain it has led me into4 ,the ideas of will1 volition1 liberty1 and necessity1 in this ,chapter of ,power1 came naturally in my way4 ,in a former edition of this ,treatise ,i gave an account of my thoughts concerning them1 according to the light ,i then had4 ,and now1 as a lover of truth1 and not a worshipper of my own doctrines1 ,i own some change of my opinion2 which ,i think ,i have discovered ground for4 ,in what ,i first writ1 ,i with an unbiassed indifferency followed truth1 whither ,i thought she led me4 ,but neither being so vain as to fancy infallibility1 nor so disingenuous as to dissemble my mistakes for fear of blemishing my reputation1 ,i have1 with the same sincere design for truth only1 not been ashamed to publish what a severer inquiry has suggested4 ,it is not impossible but that some may think my former notions right2 and some 7as ,i have already found7 these latter2 and some neither4 ,i shall not at all wonder at this variety in men's opinions3 impartial deductions of reason in controverted points being so rare1 and exact ones in abstract notions not so very easy especially if of any length4 ,and1 therefore1 ,i should think myself not a little beholden to any one1 who would1 upon these or any other grounds1 fairly clear this subject of ,,liberty from any difficulties that may yet remain4 #ge4 ,summary of our ,original ideas4 ,and thus ,i have1 in a short draught1 given a view of ,,our ,,original ,,ideas1 from whence all the rest are derived1 and of which they are made up2 which1 if ,i would consider as a philosopher1 and examine on what causes they depend1 and of what they are made1 ,i believe they all might be reduced to these very few primary and original ones1 viz4 ,,extension1 ,,solidity1 ,,mobility1 or the power of being moved2 which by our senses we receive from body3 ,,perceptivity1 or the power of perception1 or thinking2 ,,motivity1 or the power of moving3 which by reflection we receive from ,,our ,,minds4 ,i crave leave to make use of these two new words1 to avoid the danger of being mistaken in the use of those which are equivocal4 ,to which if we add ,,existence1 ,,duration1 ,,number1 which belong both to the one and the other1 we have1 perhaps1 all the original ideas on which the rest depend4 ,for by these1 ,i imagine1 might be ,,explained the nature of colours1 sounds1 tastes1 smells1 and ,,all ,,other ,,ideas ,,we ,,have1 if we had but faculties acute enough to perceive the severally modified extensions and motions of these minute bodies1 which produce those several sensations in us4 ,but my present purpose being only to inquire into the knowledge the mind has of things1 by those ideas and appearances which ,god has fitted it to receive from them1 and how the mind comes by that knowledge2 rather than into their causes or manner of ,production1 ,i shall not1 contrary to the design of this ,essay1 see myself to inquire philosophically into the peculiar constitution of ,,bodies1 and the configuration of parts1 whereby ,,they have the power to produce in us the ideas of their sensible qualities4 ,i shall not enter any further into that disquisition2 it sufficing to my purpose to observe1 that gold or saffron has power to produce in us the idea of yellow1 and snow or milk the idea of white1 which we can only have by our sight without examining the texture of the parts of those bodies or the particular figures or motion of the particles which rebound from them1 to cause in us that particular sensation1 though1 when we go beyond the bare ideas in our minds and would inquire into their causes1 we cannot conceive anything else to be in any sensible object1 whereby it produces different ideas in us1 but the different bulk1 figure1 number1 texture1 and motion of its insensible parts4 ,,chapter ,,xxii4 ,,of ,,mixed ,,modes4 #a4 ,mixed ,modes1 what4 ,having treated of ,,simple ,,modes in the foregoing chapters1 and given several instances of some of the most considerable of them1 to show what they are1 and how we come by them2 we are now in the next place to consider those we call ,,mixed ,,modes2 such are the complex ideas we mark by the names ,,obligation1 ,,drunkenness1 a ,,lie1 c42 which consisting of several combinations of simple ideas of ,,different kinds1 ,i have called mixed modes1 to distinguish them from the more simple modes1 which consist only of simple ideas of the ,,same kind4 ,these mixed modes1 being also such combinations of simple ideas as are not looked upon to be characteristical marks of any real beings that have a steady existence1 but scattered and independent ideas put together by the mind1 are thereby distinguished from the complex ideas of substances4 #b4 ,made by the ,mind4 ,that the mind1 in respect of its simple ideas1 is wholly passive1 and receives them all from the existence and operations of things1 such as sensation or reflection offers them1 without being able to ,,make any one idea1 experience shows us4 ,but if we attentively consider these ideas ,i call mixed modes1 we are now speaking of1 we shall find their origin quite different4 ,the mind often exercises an ,,active power in making these several combinations4 ,for1 it being once furnished with simple ideas1 it can put them together in several compositions1 and so make variety of complex ideas1 without examining whether they exist so together in nature4 ,and hence ,i think it is that these ideas are called ,,notions3 as they had their original1 and constant existence1 more in the thoughts of men1 than in the reality of things2 and to form such ideas1 it sufficed that the mind put the parts of them together1 and that they were consistent in the understanding without considering whether they had any real being3 though ,i do not deny but several of them might be taken from observation1 and the existence of several simple ideas so combined1 as they are put together in the understanding4 ,for the man who first framed the idea of ,,hypocrisy1 might have either taken it at first from the observation of one who made show of good qualities which he had not2 or else have framed that idea in his mind without having any such pattern to fashion it by4 ,for it is evident that1 in the beginning of languages and societies of men1 several of those complex ideas1 which were consequent to the constitutions established amongst them1 must needs have been in the minds of men before they existed anywhere else2 and that many names that stood for such complex ideas were in use1 and so those ideas framed1 before the combinations they stood for ever existed4 #c4 ,sometimes got by the ,explication of their ,names4 ,indeed1 now that languages are made1 and abound with words standing for such combinations1 an usual way of ,,getting these complex ideas is1 by the explication of those terms that stand for them4 ,for1 consisting of a company of simple ideas combined1 they may1 by words standing for those simple ideas1 be represented to the mind of one who understands those words1 though that complex combination of simple ideas were never offered to his mind by the real existence of things4 ,thus a man may come to have the idea of ,,sacrilege or ,,murder1 by enumerating to him the simple ideas which these words stand for2 without ever seeing either of them committed4 #d4 ,the ,name ties the ,parts of mixed ,modes into one ,idea4 ,every mixed mode consisting of many distinct simple ideas1 it seems reasonable to inquire1 ,whence it has its unity2 and how such a precise multitude comes to make but one idea2 since that combination does not always exist together in nature8 ,to which ,i answer1 it is plain it has its unity from an act of the mind1 combining those several simple ideas together1 and considering them as one complex one1 consisting of those parts2 and the mark of this union1 or that which is looked on generally to complete it1 is one ,,name given to that combination4 ,for it is by their names that men commonly regulate their account of their distinct species of mixed modes1 seldom allowing or considering any number of simple ideas to make one complex one1 but such collections as there be names for4 ,thus1 though the killing of an old man be as fit in nature to be united into one complex idea1 as the killing a man's father2 yet1 there being no name standing precisely for the one1 as there is the name of ,,parricide to mark the other1 it is not taken for a particular complex idea1 nor a distinct species of actions from that of killing a young man1 or any other man4 #e4 ,the ,cause of making mixed ,modes4 ,if we should inquire a little further1 to see what it is that occasions men to make several combinations of simple ideas into distinct1 and1 as it were1 settled modes1 and neglect others1 which in the nature of things themselves1 have as much an aptness to be combined and make distinct ideas1 we shall find the reason of it to be the end of language2 which being to mark1 or communicate men's thoughts to one another with all the dispatch that may be1 they usually make ,,such collections of ideas into complex modes1 and affix names to them1 as they have frequent use of in their way of living and conversation1 leaving others which they have but seldom an occasion to mention1 loose and without names that tie them together3 they rather choosing to enumerate 7when they have need7 such ideas as make them up1 by the particular names that stand for them1 than to trouble their memories by multiplying of complex ideas with names to them1 which they seldom or never have any occasion to make use of4 #f4 ,why ,words in one ,language have none answering in another4 ,this shows us how it comes to pass that there are in every language many particular words which cannot be rendered by any one single word of another4 ,for the several fashions1 customs1 and manners of one nation1 making several combinations of ideas familiar and necessary in one1 which another people have had never an occasion to make1 or perhaps so much as take notice of1 names come of course to be annexed to them1 to avoid long periphrases in things of daily conversation2 and so they become so many distinct complex ideas in their minds4 ,thus ostrakismos amongst the ,greeks1 and proscriptio amongst the ,romans1 were words which other languages had no names that exactly answered2 because they stood for complex ideas which were not in the minds of the men of other nations4 ,where there was no such custom1 there was no notion of any such actions2 no use of such combinations of ideas as were united1 and1 as it were1 tied together1 by those terms3 and therefore in other countries there were no names for them4 #g4 ,and ,languages change4 ,hence also we may see the reason1 why languages constantly change1 take up new and lay by old terms4 ,because change of customs and opinions bringing with it new combinations of ideas1 which it is necessary frequently to think on and talk about1 new names1 to avoid long descriptions1 are annexed to them2 and so they become new species of complex modes4 ,what a number of different ideas are by this means wrapped up in one short sound1 and how much of our time and breath is thereby saved1 any one will see1 who will but take the pains to enumerate all the ideas that either ,,reprieve or ,,appeal stand for2 and instead of either of those names1 use a periphrasis1 to make any one understand their meaning4 #h4 ,mixed ,modes ,though ,i shall have occasion to consider this more at-large when ,i come to treat of ,words and their use1 yet ,i could not avoid to take thus much notice here of the ,,names ,,of ,,mixed ,,modes2 which being fleeting and transient combinations of simple ideas1 which have but a short existence anywhere but in the minds of men1 and there too have no longer any existence than whilst they are thought on1 have not so much anywhere the appearance of a constant and lasting existence as in their names3 which are therefore1 in this sort of ideas1 very apt to be taken for the ideas themselves4 ,for1 if we should inquire where the idea of a ,,triumph or ,,apotheosis exists1 it is evident they could neither of them exist altogether anywhere in the things themselves1 being actions that required time to their performance1 and so could never all exist together2 and as to the minds of men1 where the ideas of these actions are supposed to be lodged1 they have there too a very uncertain existence3 and therefore we are apt to annex them to the names that excite them in us4 #i4 ,how we get the ,ideas of mixed ,modes4 ,there are therefore three ways whereby we get these complex ideas of mixed modes3--7#a7 ,by experience and ,,observation of things themselves3 thus1 by seeing two men mixed wrestle or fence1 we get the idea of wrestling or fencing4 7#b7 ,by ,,invention1 or voluntary putting together of several simple ideas in our own minds3 so he that first invented printing or etching1 had an idea of it in his mind before it ever existed4 7#c7 ,which is the most usual way1 by ,,explaining ,,the ,,names of actions we never saw1 or motions we cannot see2 and by enumerating1 and thereby1 as it were1 setting before our imaginations all those ideas which go to the making them up1 and are the constituent parts of them4 ,for1 having by sensation and reflection stored our minds with simple ideas1 and by use got the names that stand for them1 we can by those means represent to another any complex idea we would have him conceive2 so that it has in it no simple ideas but what he knows1 and has with us the same name for4 ,for all our complex ideas are ultimately resolvable into simple ideas1 of which they are compounded and originally made up1 though perhaps their immediate ingredients1 as ,i may so say1 are also complex ideas4 ,thus1 the mixed mode which the word ,,lie stands for is made of these simple ideas3--7#a7 ,articulate sounds4 7#b7 ,certain ideas in the mind of the speaker4 7#c7 ,those words the signs of those ideas4 7#d7 ,those signs put together1 by affirmation or negation1 otherwise than the ideas they stand for are in the mind of the speaker4 ,i think ,i need not go any further in the analysis of that complex idea we call a lie3 what ,i have said is enough to show that it is made up of simple ideas4 ,and it could not be but an offensive tediousness to my reader1 to trouble him with a more minute enumeration of every particular simple idea that goes to this complex one2 which1 from what has been said1 he cannot but be able to make out to himself4 ,the same may be done in all our complex ideas whatsoever2 which1 however compounded and decompounded1 may at last be resolved into simple ideas1 which are all the materials of knowledge or thought we have1 or can have4 ,nor shall we have reason to fear that the mind is hereby stinted to too scanty a number of ideas1 if we consider what an inexhaustible stock of simple modes number and figure alone afford us4 ,how far then mixed modes1 which admit of the various combinations of different simple ideas1 and their infinite modes1 are from being few and scanty1 we may easily imagine4 ,so that1 before we have done1 we shall see that nobody need be afraid he shall not have scope and compass enough for his thoughts to range in1 though they be1 as ,i pretend1 confined only to simple ideas1 received from sensation or reflection1 and their several combinations4 #aj4 ,motion1 ,thinking1 and ,power have been most modified4 ,it is worth our observing1 which of all our simple ideas have been ,,most modified1 and had most mixed ideas made out of them1 with names given to them4 ,and those have been these three3--,,thinking and ,,motion 7which are the two ideas which comprehend in them all action17 and ,,power1 from whence these actions are conceived to flow4 ,these simple ideas1 ,i say1 of thinking1 motion1 and power1 have been those which have been most modified2 and out of whose modifications have been made most complex modes1 with names to them4 ,for ,,action being the great business of mankind1 and the whole matter about which all laws are conversant1 it is no wonder that the several modes of thinking and motion should be taken notice of1 the ideas of them observed1 and laid up in the memory1 and have names assigned to them2 without which laws could be but ill made1 or vice and disorders repressed4 ,nor could any communication be well had amongst men without such complex ideas1 with names to them3 and therefore men have settled names1 and supposed settled ideas in their minds1 of modes of actions1 distinguished by their causes1 means1 objects1 ends1 instruments1 time1 place1 and other circumstances2 and also of their powers fitted for those actions3 v4g4 ,,boldness is the power to speak or do what we intend1 before others1 without fear or disorder2 and the ,greeks call the confidence of speaking by a peculiar name1 word in ,greek3 which power or ability in man of doing anything1 when it has been acquired by frequent doing the same thing1 is that idea we name ,,habit2 when it is forward1 and ready upon every occasion to break into action1 we call it ,,disposition4 ,thus1 ,,testiness is a disposition or aptness to be angry4 ,to conclude3 ,let us examine any modes of action1 v4g4 ,,consideration and ,,assent1 which are actions of the mind2 ,,running and ,,speaking1 which are actions of the body2 ,,revenge and ,,murder1 which are actions of both together1 and we shall find them but so many collections of simple ideas1 which1 together1 make up the complex ones signified by those names4 #aa4 ,several ,words seeming to signify ,action1 signify but the effect4 ,,power being the source from whence all action proceeds1 the substances wherein these powers are1 when they 99lost line88 exert this power into act1 are called ,,causes1 and the substances which thereupon are produced1 or the simple ideas which are introduced into any subject by the exerting of that power1 are called ,,effects4 ,the ,,efficacy whereby the new substance or idea is produced is called1 in the subject exerting that power1 ,,action2 but in the subject wherein any simple idea is changed or produced1 it is called ,,passion3 which efficacy1 however various1 and the effects almost infinite1 yet we can1 ,i think1 conceive it1 in intellectual agents1 to be nothing else but modes of thinking and willing2 in corporeal agents1 nothing else but modifications of motion4 ,i say ,i think we cannot conceive it to be any other but these two4 ,for whatever sort of action besides these produces any effects1 ,i confess myself to have no notion nor idea of2 and so it is quite remote from my thoughts1 apprehensions1 and knowledge2 and as much in the dark to me as five other senses1 or as the ideas of colours to a blind man4 ,and therefore many words which seem to express some action1 signify nothing of the action or ,,modus ,,operandi at all1 but barely the effect1 with some circumstances of the subject wrought on1 or cause operating3 v4g4 ,,creation1 ,,annihilation1 contain in them no idea of the action or manner whereby they are produced1 but barely of the cause1 and the thing done4 ,and when a countryman says the cold freezes water1 though the word freezing seems to import some action1 yet truly it signifies nothing but the effect1 viz4 that water that was before fluid is become hard and consistent1 without containing any idea of the action whereby it is done4 #ab4 ,mixed ,modes made also of other ,ideas than those of ,power and ,action4 ,i think ,i shall not need to remark here that1 though power and action make the greatest part of mixed modes1 marked by names1 and familiar in the minds and mouths of men1 yet other simple ideas1 and their several combinations1 are not excluded3 much less1 ,i think1 will it be necessary for me to enumerate all the mixed modes which have been settled1 with names to them4 ,that would be to make a dictionary of the greatest part of the words made use of in divinity1 ethics1 law1 and politics1 and several other sciences4 ,all that is requisite to my present design1 is to show what sort of ideas those are which ,i call mixed modes2 how the mind comes by them2 and that they are compositions made up of simple ideas got from sensation and reflection2 which ,i suppose ,i have done4 ,,chapter ,,xxiii4 ,,of ,,our ,,complex ,,ideas ,,of ,,substances4 ,the mind being1 as ,i have declared1 furnished with a great number of the simple ideas1 conveyed in by the senses as they are found in exterior things1 or by reflection on its own operations1 takes notice also that a certain number of these simple ideas go constantly together2 which being presumed to belong to one thing1 and words being suited to common apprehensions1 and made use of for quick dispatch are called1 so united in one subject1 by one name2 which1 by inadvertency1 we are apt afterward to talk of and consider as one simple idea1 which indeed is a complication of many ideas together3 because1 as ,i have said1 not imagining how these simple ideas ,,can subsist by themselves1 we accustom ourselves to suppose some ,,substratum wherein they do subsist1 and from which they do result1 which therefore we call ,,substance4 #b4 ,our obscure ,idea of ,substance in general4 ,so that if any one will examine himself concerning his notion of pure substance in general1 he will find he has no other idea of it at all1 but only a supposition of he knows not what ,,support of such qualities which are capable of producing simple ideas in us2 which qualities are commonly called accidents4 ,if any one should be asked1 what is the subject wherein colour or weight inheres1 he would have nothing to say1 but the solid extended parts2 and if he were demanded1 what is it that solidity and extension adhere in1 he would not be in a much better case than the ,indian before mentioned who1 saying that the world was supported by a great elephant1 was asked what the elephant rested on2 to which his answer was--a great tortoise3 but being again pressed to know what gave support to the broad-backed tortoise1 replied--,,something1 ,,he ,,knew ,,not ,,what4 ,and thus here1 as in all other cases where we use words without having clear and distinct ideas1 we talk like children3 who1 being questioned what such a thing is1 which they know not1 readily give this satisfactory answer1 that it is ,,something3 which in truth signifies no more1 when so used1 either by children or men1 but that they know not what2 and that the thing they pretend to know1 and talk of1 is what they have no distinct idea of at all1 and so are perfectly ignorant of it1 and in the dark4 ,the idea then we have1 to which we give the ,,general name substance1 being nothing but the supposed1 but unknown1 support of those qualities we find existing1 which we imagine cannot subsist ,,sine ,,re ,,substante1 without something to support them1 we call that support ,,substantia2 which1 according to the true import of the word1 is1 in plain ,english1 standing under or upholding4 #c4 ,of the ,sorts of ,substances4 ,an obscure and relative idea of ,,substance ,,in ,,general being thus made we come to have the ideas of ,,particular ,,sorts ,,of ,,substances1 by collecting ,,such combinations of simple ideas as are1 by experience and observation of men's senses1 taken notice of to exist together2 and are therefore supposed to flow from the particular internal constitution1 or unknown essence of that substance4 ,thus we come to have the ideas of a man1 horse1 gold1 water1 c42 of which substances1 whether any one has any other ,,clear idea1 further than of certain simple ideas co-existent together1 ,i appeal to every one's own experience4 ,it is the ordinary qualities observable in iron1 or a diamond1 put together1 that make the true complex idea of those substances1 which a smith or a jeweller commonly knows better than a philosopher2 who1 whatever ,,substantial ,,forms he may talk of1 has no other idea of those substances1 than what is framed by a collection of those simple ideas which are to be found in them3 only we must take notice1 that our complex ideas of substances1 besides all those simple ideas they are made up of1 have always the confused idea of something to which they belong1 and in which they subsist3 and therefore when we speak of any sort of substance1 we say it is a thing having such or such qualities2 as body is a thing that is extended1 figured1 and capable of motion2 spirit1 a thing capable of thinking2 and so hardness1 friability1 and power to draw iron1 we say1 are qualities to be found in a loadstone4 ,these1 and the like fashions of speaking1 intimate that the substance is supposed always ,,something ,,besides the extension1 figure1 solidity1 motion1 thinking1 or other observable ideas1 though we know not what it is4 #d4 ,no clear or distinct idea of ,substance in general4 ,hence1 when we talk or think of any particular sort of corporeal substances1 as horse1 stone1 c41 though the idea we have of either of them be but the complication or collection of those several simple ideas of sensible qualities1 which we used to find united in the thing called horse or stone2 yet1 ,,because ,,we ,,cannot ,,conceive ,,how ,,they ,,should ,,subsist ,,alone1 ,,nor ,,one ,,in ,,another1 we suppose them existing in and supported by some common subject2 which support we denote by the name substance1 though it be certain we have no clear or distinct idea of that thing we suppose a support4 #e4 ,as clear an ,idea of spiritual substance as of corporeal substance4 ,the same happens concerning the operations of the mind1 viz4 thinking1 reasoning1 fearing1 c41 which we concluding not to subsist of themselves1 nor apprehending how they can belong to body1 or be produced by it1 we are apt to think these the actions of some other ,,substance1 which we call ,,spirit2 whereby yet it is evident that1 having no other idea or notion of matter1 but something wherein those many sensible qualities which affect our senses do subsist2 by supposing a substance wherein thinking1 knowing1 doubting1 and a power of moving1 c41 do subsist1 we have as clear a notion of the substance of spirit1 as we have of body2 the one being supposed to be 7without knowing what it is7 the ,,substratum to those simple ideas we have from without2 and the other supposed 7with a like ignorance of what it is7 to be the ,,substratum to those operations we experiment in ourselves within4 ,it is plain then1 that the idea of ,,corporeal ,,substance in matter is as remote from our conceptions and apprehensions1 as that of ,,spiritual ,,substance1 or spirit3 and therefore1 from our not having any notion of the substance of spirit1 we can no more conclude its non-existence1 than we can1 for the same reason1 deny the existence of body2 it being as rational to affirm there is no body1 because we have no clear and distinct idea of the substance of matter1 as to say there is no spirit1 because we have no clear and distinct idea of the substance of a spirit4 #f4 ,our ideas of particular ,sorts of ,substances4 ,whatever therefore be the secret abstract nature of substance in general1 all the ideas we have of particular distinct sorts of substances are nothing but several combinations of simple ideas1 co-existing in such1 though unknown1 cause of their union1 as makes the whole subsist of itself4 ,it is by such combinations of simple ideas1 and nothing else1 that we represent particular sorts of substances to ourselves2 such are the ideas we have of their several species in our minds2 and such only do we1 by their specific names1 signify to others1 v4g4 man1 horse1 sun1 water1 iron3 upon hearing which words1 every one who understands the language1 frames in his mind a combination of those several simple ideas which he has usually observed1 or fancied to exist together under that denomination2 all which he supposes to rest in and be1 as it were1 adherent to that unknown common subject1 which inheres not in anything else4 ,though1 in the meantime1 it be manifest1 and every one1 upon inquiry into his own thoughts1 will find1 that he has no other idea of any substance1 v4g4 let it be gold1 horse1 iron1 man1 vitriol1 bread1 but what he has barely of those sensible qualities1 which he supposes to inhere2 with a supposition of such a substratum as gives1 as it were1 a support to those qualities or simple ideas1 which he has observed to exist united together4 ,thus1 the idea of the sun1--what is it but an aggregate of those several simple ideas1 bright1 hot1 roundish1 having a constant regular motion1 at a certain distance from us1 and perhaps some other3 as he who thinks and discourses of the sun has been more or less accurate in observing those sensible qualities1 ideas1 or properties1 which are in that thing which he calls the sun4 #g4 ,their active and passive ,powers a great part of our complex ,ideas of ,substances4 ,for he has the perfectest idea of any of the particular sorts of substances1 who has gathered1 and put together1 most of those simple ideas which do exist in it2 among which are to be reckoned its active powers1 and passive capacities1 which1 though not simple ideas1 yet in this respect1 for brevity's sake1 may conveniently enough be reckoned amongst them4 ,thus1 the power of drawing iron is one of the ideas of the complex one of that substance we call a loadstone2 and a power to be so drawn is a part of the complex one we call iron3 which powers pass for inherent qualities in those subjects4 ,because every substance1 being as apt1 by the powers we observe in it1 to change some sensible qualities in other subjects1 as it is to produce in us those simple ideas which we receive immediately from it1 does1 by those new sensible qualities introduced into other subjects1 discover to us those powers which do thereby mediately affect our senses1 as regularly as its sensible qualities do it immediately3 v4 g4 we immediately by our senses perceive in fire its heat and colour2 which are1 if rightly considered1 nothing but powers in it to produce those ideas in ,,us3 we also by our senses perceive the colour and brittleness of charcoal1 whereby we come by the knowledge of another power in fire1 which it has to change the colour and consistency of ,,wood4 ,by the former1 fire immediately1 by the latter1 it mediately discovers to us these several powers2 which therefore we look upon to be a part of the qualities of fire1 and so make them a part of the complex idea of it4 ,for all those powers that we take cognizance of1 terminating only in the alteration of some sensible qualities in those subjects on which they operate1 and so making them exhibit to us new sensible ideas1 therefore it is that ,i have reckoned these powers amongst the simple ideas which make the complex ones of the sorts of substances2 though these powers considered in themselves1 are truly complex ideas4 ,and in this looser sense ,i crave leave to be understood1 when ,i name any of these ,,potentialities among the simple ideas which we recollect in our minds when we think of ,,particular ,,substances4 ,for the powers that are severally in them are necessary to be considered1 if we will have true distinct notions of the several sorts of substances4 #h4 ,and why4 ,nor are we to wonder that powers make a great part of our complex ideas of substances2 since their secondary qualities are those which in most of them serve principally to distinguish substances one from another1 and commonly make a considerable part of the complex idea of the several sorts of them4 ,for1 our senses failing us in the discovery of the bulk1 texture1 and figure of the minute parts of bodies1 on which their real constitutions and differences depend1 we are fain to make use of their secondary qualities as the characteristical notes and marks whereby to frame ideas of them in our minds1 and distinguish them one from another3 all which secondary qualities1 as has been shown1 are nothing but bare powers4 ,for the colour and taste of opium are1 as well as its soporific or anodyne virtues1 mere powers1 depending on its primary qualities1 whereby it is fitted to produce different operations on different parts of our bodies4 #i4 ,three sorts of ,ideas make our complex ones of ,corporeal ,substances4 ,the ideas that make our complex ones of corporeal substances1 are of these three sorts4 ,first1 the ideas of the primary qualities of things1 which are discovered by our senses1 and are in them even when we perceive them not2 such are the bulk1 figure1 number1 situation1 and motion of the parts of bodies2 which are really in them1 whether we take notice of them or not4 ,secondly1 the sensible secondary qualities1 which1 depending on these1 are nothing but the powers those substances have to produce several ideas in us by our senses2 which ideas are not in the things themselves1 otherwise than as anything is in its cause4 ,thirdly1 the aptness we consider in any substance1 to give or receive such alterations of primary qualities1 as that the substance so altered should produce in us different ideas from what it did before2 these are called active and passive powers3 all which powers1 as far as we have any notice or notion of them1 terminate only in sensible simple ideas4 ,for whatever alteration a loadstone has the power to make in the minute particles of iron1 we should have no notion of any power it had at all to operate on iron1 did not its sensible motion discover it3 and ,i doubt not1 but there are a thousand changes1 that bodies we daily handle have a power to cause in one another1 which we never suspect1 because they never appear in sensible effects4 #aj4 ,powers thus make a great ,part of our complex ,ideas of particular ,substances4 ,,powers therefore justly make a great part of our complex ideas of substances4 ,he that will examine his complex idea of gold1 will find several of its ideas that make it up to be only powers2 as the power of being melted1 but of not spending itself in the fire2 of being dissolved in ,,aqua ,,regia1 are ideas as necessary to make up our complex idea of gold1 as its colour and weight3 which1 if duly considered1 are also nothing but different powers4 ,for1 to speak truly1 yellowness is not actually in gold1 but is a power in gold to produce that idea in us by our eyes1 when placed in a due light3 and the heat1 which we cannot leave out of our ideas of the sun1 is no more really in the sun1 than the white colour it introduces into wax4 ,these are both equally powers in the sun1 operating1 by the motion and figure of its sensible parts1 so on a man1 as to make him have the idea of heat2 and so on wax1 as to make it capable to produce in a man the idea of white4 #aa4 ,the now secondary ,qualities of ,bodies would disappear1 if we could discover the primary ones of their minute ,parts4 ,had we senses acute enough to discern the minute particles of bodies1 and the real constitution on which their sensible qualities depend1 ,i doubt not but they would produce quite different ideas in us3 and that which is now the yellow colour of gold1 would then disappear1 and instead of it we should see an admirable texture of parts1 of a certain size and figure4 ,this microscopes plainly discover to us2 for what to our naked eyes produces a certain colour1 is1 by thus augmenting the acuteness of our senses1 discovered to be quite a different thing2 and the thus altering1 as it were1 the proportion of the bulk of the minute parts of a coloured object to our usual sight1 produces different ideas from what it did before4 ,thus1 sand or pounded glass1 which is opaque1 and white to the naked eye1 is pellucid in a microscope2 and a hair seen in this way1 loses its former colour1 and is1 in a great measure1 pellucid1 with a mixture of some bright sparkling colours1 such as appear from the refraction of diamonds1 and other pellucid bodies4 ,blood1 to the naked eye1 appears all red2 but by a good microscope1 wherein its lesser parts appear1 shows only some few globules of red1 swimming in a pellucid liquor1 and how these red globules would appear1 if glasses could be found that could yet magnify them a thousand or ten thousand times more1 is uncertain4 #ab4 ,our ,faculties for ,discovery of the ,qualities and powers of ,substances suited to our ,state4 ,the infinite wise ,contriver of us1 and all things about us1 hath fitted our senses1 faculties1 and organs1 to the conveniences of life1 and the business we have to do here4 ,we are able1 by our senses1 to know and distinguish things3 and to examine them so far as to apply them to our uses1 and several ways to accommodate the exigences of this life4 ,we have insight enough into their admirable contrivances and wonderful effects1 to admire and magnify the wisdom1 power and goodness of their ,author4 ,such a knowledge as this which is suited to our present condition1 we want not faculties to attain4 ,but it appears not that ,god intended we should have a perfect1 clear1 and adequate knowledge of them3 that perhaps is not in the comprehension of any finite being4 ,we are furnished with faculties 7dull and weak as they are7 to discover enough in the creatures to lead us to the knowledge of the ,creator1 and the knowledge of our duty2 and we are fitted well enough with abilities to provide for the conveniences of living3 these are our business in this world4 ,but were our senses altered1 and made much quicker and acuter1 the appearance and outward scheme of things would have quite another face to us2 and1 ,i am apt to think1 would be inconsistent with our being1 or at least wellbeing1 in the part of the universe which we inhabit4 ,he that considers how little our constitution is able to bear a remove into part of this air1 not much higher than that we commonly breathe in1 will have reason to be satisfied1 that in this globe of earth allotted for our mansion1 the all-wise ,architect has suited our organs1 and the bodies that are to affect them1 one to another4 ,if our sense of hearing were but a thousand times quicker than it is1 how would a perpetual noise distract us4 ,and we should in the quietest retirement be less able to sleep or meditate than in the middle of a sea-fight4 ,nay1 if that most instructive of our senses1 seeing1 were in any man a thousand or a hundred thousand times more acute than it is by the best microscope1 things several millions of times less than the smallest object of his sight now would then be visible to his naked eyes1 and so he would come nearer to the discovery of the texture and motion of the minute parts of corporeal things2 and in many of them1 probably get ideas of their internal constitutions3 but then he would be in a quite different world from other people3 nothing would appear the same to him and others3 the visible ideas of everything would be different4 ,so that ,i doubt1 whether he and the rest of men could discourse concerning the objects of sight1 or have any communication about colours1 their appearances being so wholly different4 ,and perhaps such a quickness and tenderness of sight could not endure bright sunshine1 or so much as open daylight2 nor take in but a very small part of any object at once1 and that too only at a very near distance4 ,and if by the help of such ,,microscopical ,,eyes 7if ,i may so call them7 a man could penetrate further than ordinary into the secret composition and radical texture of bodies1 he would not make any great advantage by the change1 if such an acute sight would not serve to conduct him to the market and exchange2 if he could not see things he was to avoid1 at a convenient distance2 nor distinguish things he had to do with by those sensible qualities others do4 ,he that was sharp-sighted enough to see the configuration of the minute particles of the spring of a clock1 and observe upon what peculiar structure and impulse its elastic motion depends1 would no doubt discover something very admirable3 but if eyes so framed could not view at once the hand1 and the characters of the hour-plate1 and thereby at a distance see what o'clock it was1 their owner could not be much benefited by that acuteness2 which1 whilst it discovered the secret contrivance of the parts of the machine1 made him lose its use4 #ac4 ,conjecture about the corporeal organs of some ,spirits4 ,and here give me leave to propose an extravagant conjecture of mine1 viz4 ,that since we have some reason 7if there be any credit to be given to the report of things that our philosophy cannot account for7 to imagine1 that ,spirits can assume to themselves bodies of different bulk1 figure1 and conformation of parts--whether one great advantage some of them have over us may not lie in this1 that they can so frame and shape to themselves organs of sensation or perception1 as to suit them to their present design1 and the circumstances of the object they would consider4 ,for how much would that man exceed all others in knowledge1 who had but the faculty so to alter the structure of his eyes1 that one sense1 as to make it capable of all the several degrees of vision which the assistance of glasses 7casually at first lighted on7 has taught us to conceive8 ,what wonders would he discover1 who could so fit his eyes to all sorts of objects1 as to see when he pleased the figure and motion of the minute particles in the blood1 and other juices of animals1 as distinctly as he does1 at other times1 the shape and motion of the animals themselves8 ,but to us1 in our present state1 unalterable organs1 so contrived as to discover the figure and motion of the minute parts of bodies1 whereon depend those sensible qualities we now observe in them1 would perhaps be of no advantage4 ,god has no doubt made them so as is best for us in our present condition4 ,he hath fitted us for the neighbourhood of the bodies that surround us1 and we have to do with2 and though we cannot1 by the faculties we have1 attain to a perfect knowledge of things1 yet they will serve us well enough for those ends above-mentioned1 which are our great concernment4 ,i beg my reader's pardon for laying before him so wild a fancy concerning the ways of perception of beings above us2 but how extravagant soever it be1 ,i doubt whether we can imagine anything about the knowledge of angels but after this manner1 some way or other in proportion to what we find and observe in ourselves4 ,and though we cannot but allow that the infinite power and wisdom of ,god may frame creatures with a thousand other faculties and ways of perceiving things without them than what we have1 yet our thoughts can go no further than our own3 so impossible it is for us to enlarge our very guesses beyond the ideas received from our own sensation and reflection4 ,the supposition1 at least1 that angels do sometimes assume bodies1 needs not startle us2 since some of the most ancient and most learned ,fathers of the church seemed to believe that they had bodies3 and this is certain1 that their state and way of existence is unknown to us4 #ad4 ,our specific ,ideas of ,substances4 ,but to return to the matter in hand1--the ideas we have of substances1 and the ways we come by them4 ,i say1 our ,,specific ideas of substances are nothing else but ,a ,,collection ,,of ,,certain ,,number ,,of ,,simple ,,ideas1 ,,considered ,,as ,,united ,,in ,,one ,,thing4 ,these ideas of substances1 though they are commonly simple apprehensions1 and the names of them simple terms1 yet in effect are complex and compounded4 ,thus the idea which an ,englishman signifies by the name swan1 is white colour1 long neck1 red beak1 black legs1 and whole feet1 and all these of a certain size1 with a power of swimming in the water1 and making a certain kind of noise1 and perhaps1 to a man who has long observed this kind of birds1 some other properties3 which all terminate in sensible simple ideas1 all united in one common subject4 #ae4 ,our ,ideas of spiritual ,substances1 as clear as of bodily ,substances4 ,besides the complex ideas we have of material sensible substances1 of which ,i have last spoken1--by the simple ideas we have taken from those operations of our own minds1 which we experiment daily in ourselves1 as thinking1 understanding1 willing1 knowing1 and power of beginning motion1 c41 co-existing in some substance1 we are able to frame the ,,complex ,,idea ,,of ,,an ,,immaterial ,,spirit4 ,and thus1 by putting together the ideas of thinking1 perceiving1 liberty1 and power of moving themselves and other things1 we have as clear a perception and notion of immaterial substances as we have of material4 ,for putting together the ideas of thinking and willing1 or the power of moving or quieting corporeal motion1 joined to substance1 of which we have no distinct idea1 we have the idea of an immaterial spirit2 and by putting together the ideas of coherent solid parts1 and a power of being moved joined with substance1 of which likewise we have no positive idea1 we have the idea of matter4 ,the one is as clear and distinct an idea as the other3 the idea of thinking1 and moving a body1 being as clear and distinct ideas as the ideas of extension1 solidity1 and being moved4 ,for our idea of substance is equally obscure1 or none at all1 in both3 it is but a supposed ,i know not what1 to support those ideas we call accidents4 ,it is for want of reflection that we are apt to think that our senses show us nothing but material things4 ,every act of sensation1 when duly considered1 gives us an equal view of both parts of nature1 the corporeal and spiritual4 ,for whilst ,i know1 by seeing or hearing1 c41 that there is some corporeal being without me1 the object of that sensation1 ,i do more certainly know1 that there is some spiritual being within me that sees and hears4 ,this1 ,i must be convinced1 cannot be the action of bare insensible matter2 nor ever could be1 without an immaterial thinking being4 #af4 ,no ,idea of abstract ,substance either in ,body or ,spirit4 ,by the complex idea of extended1 figured1 coloured1 and all other sensible qualities1 which is all that we know of it1 we are as far from the idea of the substance of body1 as if we knew nothing at all3 nor after all the acquaintance and familiarity which we imagine we have with matter1 and the many qualities men assure themselves they perceive and know in bodies1 will it perhaps upon examination be found1 that they have any more or clearer primary ideas belonging to body1 than they have belonging to immaterial spirit4 #ag4 ,cohesion of solid parts and ,impulse1 the primary ideas peculiar to ,body4 ,the primary ideas we have ,,peculiar ,,to ,,body1 as contradistinguished to spirit1 are the ,,cohesion ,,of ,,solid1 ,,and ,,consequently ,,separable1 ,,parts1 and a ,,power ,,of ,,communicating ,,motion ,,by ,,impulse4 ,these1 ,i think1 are the original ideas proper and peculiar to body2 for figure is but the consequence of finite extension4 #ah4 ,thinking and ,motivity ,the ideas we have belonging and ,,peculiar ,,to ,,spirit1 are ,,thinking1 and ,,will1 or ,a ,,power ,,of ,,putting ,,body ,,into ,,motion ,,by ,,thought1 ,,and1 ,,which ,,is ,,consequent ,,to ,,it1 ,,liberty4 ,for1 as body cannot but communicate its motion by impulse to another body1 which it meets with at rest1 so the mind can put bodies into motion1 or forbear to do so1 as it pleases4 ,the ideas of ,,existence1 ,,duration1 and ,,mobility1 are common to them both4 #ai4 ,spirits capable of ,motion4 ,there is no reason why it should be thought strange that ,i make mobility belong to spirit2 for having no other idea of motion1 but change of distance with other beings that are considered as at rest2 and finding that spirits1 as well as bodies1 cannot operate but where they are2 and that spirits do operate at several times in several places1 ,i cannot but attribute change of place to all finite spirits3 7for of the ,infinite ,spirit ,i speak not here74 ,for my soul1 being a real being as well as my body1 is certainly as capable of changing distance with any other body1 or being1 as body itself2 and so is capable of motion4 ,and if a mathematician can consider a certain distance1 or a change of that distance between two points1 one may certainly conceive a distance and a change of distance1 between two spirits2 and so conceive their motion1 their approach or removal1 one from another4 #bj4 ,proof of this4 ,every one finds in himself that his soul can think1 will1 and operate on his body in the place where that is1 but cannot operate on a body1 or in a place1 an hundred miles distant from it4 ,nobody can imagine that his soul can think or move a body at ,oxford1 whilst he is at ,london2 and cannot but know1 that1 being united to his body1 it constantly changes place all the whole journey between ,oxford and ,london1 as the coach or horse does that carries him1 and ,i think may be said to be truly all that while in motion or if that will not be allowed to afford us a clear idea enough of its motion1 its being separated from the body in death1 ,i think1 will2 for to consider it as going out of the body1 or leaving it1 and yet to have no idea of its motion1 seems to me impossible4 #ba4 ,god immoveable because infinite4 ,if it be said by any one that it cannot change place1 because it hath none1 for the spirits are not ,,in ,,loco1 but ,,ubi2 ,i suppose that way of talking will not now be of much weight to many1 in an age that is not much disposed to admire1 or suffer themselves to be deceived by such unintelligible ways of speaking4 ,but if any one thinks there is any sense in that distinction1 and that it is applicable to our present purpose1 ,i desire him to put it into intelligible ,english2 and then from thence draw a reason to show that immaterial spirits are not capable of motion4 ,indeed motion cannot be attributed to ,god2 not because he is an immaterial1 but because he is an infinite spirit4 #bb4 ,our complex idea of an immaterial ,spirit and our complex idea of ,body compared4 ,let us compare1 then1 our complex idea of an immaterial spirit with our complex idea of body1 and see whether there be any more obscurity in one than in the other1 and in which most4 ,our idea of ,,body1 as ,i think1 is ,,an ,,extended ,,solid ,,substance1 ,,capable ,,of ,,communicating ,,motion ,,by ,,impulse3 and our idea of ,,soul1 ,,as ,,an ,,immaterial ,,spirit1 is of ,a ,,substance ,,that ,,thinks1 ,,and ,,has ,a ,,power ,,of ,,exciting ,,motion ,,in ,,body1 ,,by ,,willing1 ,,or ,,thought4 ,these1 ,i think1 are our complex ideas of soul and body1 as contradistinguished2 and now let us examine which has most obscurity in it1 and difficulty to be apprehended4 ,i know that people whose thoughts are immersed in matter1 and have so subjected their minds to their senses that they seldom reflect on anything beyond them1 are apt to say1 they cannot comprehend a ,,thinking thing which perhaps is true3 but ,i affirm1 when they consider it well1 they can no more comprehend an ,,extended thing4 #bc4 ,cohesion of solid ,parts in ,body as hard to be conceived as thinking in a ,soul4 ,if any one says he knows not what it is thinks in him1 he means he knows not what the substance is of that thinking thing3 ,no more1 say ,i1 knows he what the substance is of that solid thing4 ,further1 if he says he knows not how he thinks1 ,i answer1 ,neither knows he how he is extended1 how the solid parts of body are united or cohere together to make extension4 ,for though the pressure of the particles of air may account for the cohesion of several parts of matter that are grosser than the particles of air1 and have pores less than the corpuscles of air1 yet the weight or pressure of the air will not explain1 nor can be a cause of the coherence of the particles of air themselves4 ,and if the pressure of the aether1 or any subtiler matter than the air1 may unite1 and hold fast together1 the parts of a particle of air1 as well as other bodies1 yet it cannot make bonds for ,,itself1 and hold together the parts that make up every the least corpuscle of that ,,materia ,,subtilis4 ,so that that hypothesis1 how ingeniously soever explained1 by showing that the parts of sensible bodies are held together by the pressure of other external insensible bodies1 reaches not the parts of the aether itself2 and by how much the more evident it proves1 that the parts of other bodies are held together by the external pressure of the aether1 and can have no other conceivable cause of their cohesion and union1 by so much the more it leaves us in the dark concerning the cohesion of the parts of the corpuscles of the aether itself3 which we can neither conceive without parts1 they being bodies1 and divisible1 nor yet how their parts cohere1 they wanting that cause of cohesion which is given of the cohesion of the parts of all other bodies4 #bd4 ,not explained by an ambient fluid4 ,but1 in truth1 the pressure of any ambient fluid1 how great soever1 can be no intelligible cause of the cohesion of the solid parts of matter4 ,for1 though such a pressure may hinder the avulsion of two polished superficies1 one from another1 in a line perpendicular to them1 as in the experiment of two polished marbles2 yet it can never in the least hinder the separation by a motion1 in a line parallel to those surfaces4 ,because the ambient fluid1 having a full liberty to succeed in each point of space1 deserted by a lateral motion1 resists such a motion of bodies1 so joined1 no more than it would resist the motion of that body were it on all sides environed by that fluid1 and touched no other body2 and therefore1 if there were no other cause of cohesion1 all parts of bodies must be easily separable by such a lateral sliding motion4 ,for if the pressure of the aether be the adequate cause of cohesion1 wherever that cause operates not1 there can be no cohesion4 ,and since it cannot operate against a lateral separation1 7as has been shown17 therefore in every imaginary plane1 intersecting any mass of matter1 there could be no more cohesion than of two polished surfaces1 which will always1 notwithstanding any imaginable pressure of a fluid1 easily slide one from another4 ,so that perhaps1 how clear an idea soever we think we have of the extension of body1 which is nothing but the cohesion of solid parts1 he that shall well consider it in his mind1 may have reason to conclude1 ,that it is as easy for him to have a clear idea how the soul thinks as how body is extended4 ,for1 since body is no further1 nor otherwise1 extended1 than by the union and cohesion of its solid parts1 we shall very ill comprehend the extension of body1 without understanding wherein consists the union and cohesion of its parts2 which seems to me as incomprehensible as the manner of thinking1 and how it is performed4 ,we can as little understand how the parts cohere in extension as how our spirits perceive or move4 #be4 ,i allow it is usual for most people to wonder how any one should find a difficulty in what they think they every day observe4 ,do we not see 7will they be ready to say7 the parts of bodies stick firmly together8 ,is there anything more common8 ,and what doubt can there be made of it8 ,and the like1 ,i say1 concerning thinking and voluntary motion4 ,do we not every moment experiment it in ourselves1 and therefore can it be doubted8 ,the matter of fact is clear1 ,i confess2 but when we would a little nearer look into it1 both in the one and the other2 and can as little understand how the parts of body cohere1 as how we ourselves perceive or move4 ,i would have any one intelligibly explain to me how the parts of gold1 or brass1 7that but now in fusion were as loose from one another as the particles of water1 or the sands of an hour-glass17 come in a few moments to be so united1 and adhere so strongly one to another1 that the utmost force of men's arms cannot separate them8 ,a considering man will1 ,i suppose1 be here at a loss to satisfy his own1 or another man's understanding4 #bf4 ,the cause of coherence of atoms in extended substances incomprehensible4 ,the little bodies that compose that fluid we call water are so extremely small1 that ,i have never heard of any one who1 by a microscope1 7and yet ,i have heard of some that have magnified to ten thousand2 nay1 to much above a hundred thousand times17 pretended to perceive their distinct bulk1 figure1 or motion2 and the particles of water are also so perfectly loose one from another1 that the least force sensibly separates them4 ,nay1 if we consider their perpetual motion1 we must allow them to have no cohesion one with another2 and yet let but a sharp cold come1 and they unite1 they consolidate2 these little atoms cohere1 and are not1 without great force1 separable4 ,he that could find the bonds that tie these heaps of loose little bodies together so firmly2 he that could make known the cement that makes them stick so fast one to another1 would discover a great and yet unknown secret3 and yet when that was done1 would he be far enough from making the extension of body 7which is the cohesion of its solid parts7 intelligible1 till he could show wherein consisted the union1 or consolidation of the parts of those bonds or of that cement1 or of the least particle of matter that exists4 ,whereby it appears that this primary and supposed obvious quality of body will be found1 when examined1 to be as incomprehensible as anything belonging to our minds1 and a solid extended substance as hard to be conceived as a thinking immaterial one1 whatever difficulties some would raise against it4 #bg4 ,the supposed pressure 99dropped word explain cohesion is unintelligible4 ,for1 to extend our thoughts a little further1 the pressure which is brought to explain the cohesion of bodies 99dropped line considered1 as no doubt it is1 finite1 let any one send his contemplation to the extremities of the universe1 and there see what conceivable hoops1 what bond he can imagine to hold this mass of matter in so close a pressure together2 from whence steel has its firmness1 and the parts of a diamond their hardness and indissolubility4 ,if matter be finite1 it must have its extremes2 and there must be something to hinder it from scattering asunder4 ,if1 to avoid this difficulty1 any one will throw himself into the supposition and abyss of infinite matter1 let him consider what light he thereby brings to the cohesion of body1 and whether he be ever the nearer making it intelligible1 by resolving it into a supposition the most absurd and most incomprehensible of all other3 so far is our extension of body 7which is nothing but the cohesion of solid parts7 from being clearer1 or more distinct1 when we would inquire into the nature1 cause1 or manner of it1 than the idea of thinking4 #bh4 ,communication of ,motion by ,impulse1 or by ,thought1 equally unintelligible4 ,another idea we have of body is1 ,,the ,,power ,,of ,,communication ,,of ,,motion ,,by ,,impulse2 and of our souls1 ,,the ,,power ,,of ,,exciting ,,motion ,,by ,,thought4 ,these ideas1 the one of body1 the other of our minds1 every day's experience clearly furnishes us with3 but if here again we inquire how this is done1 we are equally in the dark4 ,for1 in the communication of motion by impulse1 wherein as much motion is lost to one body as is got to the other1 which is the ordinariest case1 we can have no other conception1 but of the passing of motion out of one body into another2 which1 ,i think1 is as obscure and inconceivable as how our minds move or stop our bodies by thought1 which we every moment find they do4 ,the increase of motion by impulse1 which is observed or believed sometimes to happen1 is yet harder to be understood4 ,we have by daily experience clear evidence of motion produced both by impulse and by thought2 but the manner how1 hardly comes within our comprehension3 we are equally at a loss in both4 ,so that1 however we consider motion1 and its communication1 either from body or spirit1 the idea which belongs to spirit is at least as clear as that which belongs to body4 ,and if we consider the active power of moving1 or1 as ,i may call it1 motivity1 it is much clearer in spirit than body2 since two bodies1 placed by one another at rest1 will never afford us the idea of a power in the one to move the other1 but by a borrowed motion3 whereas the mind every day affords us ideas of an active power of moving of bodies2 and therefore it is worth our consideration1 whether active power be not the proper attribute of spirits1 and passive power of matter4 ,hence may be conjectured that created spirits are not totally separate from matter1 because they are both active and passive4 ,pure spirit1 viz4 ,god1 is only active2 pure matter is only passive2 those beings that are both active and passive1 we may judge to partake of both4 ,but be that as it will1 ,i think1 we have as many and as clear ideas belonging to spirit as we have belonging to body1 the substance of each being equally unknown to us2 and the idea of thinking in spirit1 as clear as of extension in body2 and the communication of motion by thought1 which we attribute to spirit1 is as evident as that by impulse1 which we ascribe to body4 ,constant experience makes us sensible of both these1 though our narrow understandings can comprehend neither4 ,for1 when the mind would look beyond those original ideas we have from sensation or reflection1 and penetrate into their causes1 and manner of production1 we find still it discovers nothing but its own short-sightedness4 #bi4 ,summary4 ,to conclude4 ,sensation convinces us that there are solid extended substances2 and reflection1 that there are thinking ones3 experience assures us of the existence of such beings1 and that the one hath a power to move body by impulse1 the other by thought2 this we cannot doubt of4 ,experience1 ,i say1 every moment furnishes us with the clear ideas both of the one and the other4 ,but beyond these ideas1 as received from their proper sources1 our faculties will not reach4 ,if we would inquire further into their nature1 causes1 and manner1 we perceive not the nature of extension clearer than we do of thinking4 ,if we would explain them any further1 one is as easy as the other2 and there is no more difficulty to conceive how ,a ,,substance ,,we ,,know ,,not should1 by thought1 set body into motion1 than how ,a ,,substance ,,we ,,know ,,not should1 by impulse1 set body into motion4 ,so that we are no more able to discover wherein the ideas belonging to body consist1 than those belonging to spirit4 ,from whence it seems probable to me1 that the simple ideas we receive from sensation and reflection are the boundaries of our thoughts2 beyond which the mind1 whatever efforts it would make1 is not able to advance one jot2 nor can it make any discoveries1 when it would pry into the nature and hidden causes of those ideas4 #cj4 ,our idea of ,spirit and our idea of ,body compared4 ,so that1 in short1 the idea we have of spirit1 compared with the idea we have of body1 stands thus3 the substance of spirits is unknown to us2 and so is the substance of body equally unknown to us4 ,two primary qualities or properties of body1 viz4 solid coherent parts and impulse1 we have distinct clear ideas of3 so likewise we know1 and have distinct clear ideas1 of two primary qualities or properties of spirit1 viz4 thinking1 and a power of action2 i4e4 a power of beginning or stopping several thoughts or motions4 ,we have also the ideas of several qualities inherent in bodies1 and have the clear distinct ideas of them2 which qualities are but the various modifications of the extension of cohering solid parts1 and their motion4 ,we have likewise the ideas of the several modes of thinking viz4 believing1 doubting1 intending1 fearing1 hoping2 all which are but the several modes of thinking4 ,we have also the ideas of willing1 and moving the body consequent to it1 and with the body itself too2 for1 as has been shown1 spirit is capable of motion4 #ca4 ,the ,notion of ,spirit involves no more ,difficulty in it than that of ,body4 ,lastly1 if this notion of immaterial spirit may have1 perhaps1 some difficulties in it not easily to be explained1 we have therefore no more reason to deny or doubt the existence of such spirits1 than we have to deny or doubt the existence of body2 because the notion of body is cumbered with some difficulties very hard1 and perhaps impossible to be explained or understood by us4 ,for ,i would fain have instanced anything in our notion of spirit more perplexed1 or nearer a contradiction1 than the very notion of body includes in it2 the divisibility ,,in ,,infinitum of any finite extension involving us1 whether we grant or deny it1 in consequences impossible to be explicated or made in our apprehensions consistent2 consequences that carry greater difficulty1 and more apparent absurdity1 than anything can follow from the notion of an immaterial knowing substance4 #cb4 ,we know nothing of things beyond our simple ,ideas of them4 ,which we are not at all to wonder at1 since we having but some few superficial ideas of things1 discovered to us only by the senses from without1 or by the mind1 reflecting on what it experiments in itself within1 have no knowledge beyond that1 much less of the internal constitution1 and true nature of things1 being destitute of faculties to attain it4 ,and therefore experimenting and discovering in ourselves knowledge1 and the power of voluntary motion1 as certainly as we experiment1 or discover in things without us1 the cohesion and separation of solid parts1 which is the extension and motion of bodies2 we have as much reason to be satisfied with our notion of immaterial spirit1 as with our notion of body1 and the existence of the one as well as the other4 ,for it being no more a contradiction that thinking should exist separate and independent from solidity1 than it is a contradiction that solidity should exist separate and independent from thinking1 they being both but simple ideas1 independent one from another and having as clear and distinct ideas in us of thinking as of solidity1 ,i know not why we may not as well allow a thinking thing without solidity1 i4e4 immaterial1 to exist1 as a solid thing without thinking1 i4e4 matter1 to exist2 especially since it is not harder to conceive how thinking should exist without matter1 than how matter should think4 ,for whensoever we would proceed beyond these simple ideas we have from sensation and reflection and dive further into the nature of things1 we fall presently into darkness and obscurity1 perplexedness and difficulties1 and can discover nothing further but our own blindness and ignorance4 ,but whichever of these complex ideas be clearest1 that of body1 or immaterial spirit1 this is evident1 that the simple ideas that make them up are no other than what we have received from sensation or reflection3 and so is it of all our other ideas of substances1 even of ,god himself4 #cc4 ,our complex idea of ,god4 ,for if we examine the idea we have of the incomprehensible ,supreme ,being1 we shall find that we come by it the same way2 and that the complex ideas we have both of ,god1 and separate spirits1 are made of the simple ideas we receive from reflection2 v4g4 having1 from what we experiment in ourselves1 got the ideas of existence and duration2 of knowledge and power2 of pleasure and happiness2 and of several other qualities and powers1 which it is better to have than to be without2 when we would frame an idea the most suitable we can to the ,supreme ,being1 we enlarge every one of these with our idea of infinity2 and so putting them together1 make our complex idea of ,god4 ,for that the mind has such a power of enlarging some of its ideas1 received from sensation and reflection1 has been already shown4 #cd4 ,our complex idea of ,god as infinite4 ,if ,i find that ,i know some few things1 and some of them1 or all1 perhaps imperfectly1 ,i can frame an idea of knowing twice as many2 which ,i can double again1 as often as ,i can add to number2 and thus enlarge my idea of knowledge1 by extending its comprehension to all things existing1 or possible4 ,the same also ,i can do of knowing them more perfectly2 i4e4 all their qualities1 powers1 causes1 consequences1 and relations1 c41 till all be perfectly known that is in them1 or can any way relate to them3 and thus frame the idea of infinite or boundless knowledge4 ,the same may also be done of power1 till we come to that we call infinite2 and also of the duration of existence1 without beginning or end1 and so frame the idea of an eternal being4 ,the degrees or extent wherein we ascribe existence1 power1 wisdom1 and all other perfections 7which we can have any ideas of7 to that sovereign ,being1 which we call ,g-d1 being all boundless and infinite1 we frame the best idea of him our minds are capable of3 all which is done1 ,i say1 by enlarging those simple ideas we have taken from the operations of our own minds1 by reflection2 or by our senses1 from exterior things1 to that vastness to which infinity can extend them4 #ce4 ,god in his own essence incognisable4 ,for it is infinity1 which1 joined to our ideas of existence1 power1 knowledge1 c41 makes that complex idea1 whereby we represent to ourselves1 the best we can1 the ,supreme ,being4 ,for1 though in his own essence 7which certainly we do not know1 not knowing the real essence of a pebble1 or a fly1 or of our own selves7 ,god be simple and uncompounded2 yet ,i think ,i may say we have no other idea of him1 but a complex one of existence1 knowledge1 power1 happiness1 c41 infinite and eternal3 which are all distinct ideas1 and some of them1 being relative1 are again compounded of others3 all which being1 as has been shown1 originally got from sensation and reflection1 go to make up the idea or notion we have of ,god4 #cf4 ,no ,ideas in our complex ideas of ,spirits1 but those got from ,sensation or ,reflection4 ,this further is to be observed1 that there is no idea we attribute to ,god1 bating infinity1 which is not also a part of our complex idea of other spirits4 ,because1 being capable of no other simple ideas1 belonging to anything but body1 but those which by reflection we receive from the operation of our own minds1 we can attribute to spirits no other but what we receive from thence3 and all the difference we can put between them1 in our contemplation of spirits1 is only in the several extents and degrees of their knowledge1 power1 duration1 happiness1 c4 ,for that in our ideas1 as well of spirits as of other things1 we are restrained to ,,those ,,we ,,receive ,,from ,,sensation ,,and ,,reflection1 is evident from hence1--,that1 in our ideas of spirits1 how much soever advanced in perfection beyond those of bodies1 even to that of infinite1 we cannot yet have any idea of the manner wherein they discover their thoughts one to another3 though we must necessarily conclude that separate spirits1 which are beings that have perfecter knowledge and greater happiness than we1 must needs have also a perfecter way of communicating their thoughts than we have1 who are fain to make use of corporeal signs1 and particular sounds2 which are therefore of most general use1 as being the best and quickest we are capable of4 ,but of immediate communication having no experiment in ourselves1 and consequently no notion of it at all1 we have no idea how spirits1 which use not words1 can with quickness2 or much less how spirits that have no bodies can be masters of their own thoughts1 and communicate or conceal them at pleasure1 though we cannot but necessarily suppose they have such a power4 #cg4 ,recapitulation4 ,and thus we have seen what kind of ideas we have of ,,substances ,,of ,,all ,,kinds1 wherein they consist1 and how we came by them4 ,from whence1 ,i think1 it is very evident1 ,first1 ,that all our ideas of the several ,,sorts of substances are nothing but collections of simple ideas3 with a supposition of ,,something to which they belong1 and in which they subsist2 though of this supposed something we have no clear distinct idea at all4 ,secondly1 ,that all the simple ideas1 that thus united in one common ,,substratum1 make up our complex ideas of several ,,sorts of substances1 are no other but such as we have received from sensation or reflection4 ,so that even in those which we think we are most intimately acquainted with1 and that come nearest the comprehension of our most enlarged conceptions1 we cannot go beyond those simple ideas4 ,and even in those which seem most remote from all we have to do with1 and do infinitely surpass anything we can perceive in ourselves by reflection2 or discover by sensation in other things1 we can attain to nothing but those simple ideas1 which we originally received from sensation or reflection2 as is evident in the complex ideas we have of angels1 and particularly of ,god himself4 ,thirdly1 ,that most of the simple ideas that make up our complex ideas of substances1 when truly considered1 are only ,,powers1 however we are apt to take them for positive qualities2 v4g4 the greatest part of the ideas that make our complex idea of ,,gold are yellowness1 great weight1 ductility1 fusibility1 and solubility in ,,aqua ,,regia1 c41 all united together in an unknown ,,substratum3 all which ideas are nothing else but so many relations to other substances2 and are not really in the gold1 considered barely in itself1 though they depend on those real and primary qualities of its internal constitution1 whereby it has a fitness differently to operate1 and be operated on by several other substances4 ,,chapter ,,xxiv4 ,,of ,,collective ,,ideas ,,of ,,substances4 #a4 ,a collective idea is one ,idea4 ,besides these complex ideas of several ,,single substances1 as of man1 horse1 gold1 violet1 apple1 c41 the mind hath also complex ,,collective ideas of substances2 which ,i so call1 because such ideas are made up of many particular substances considered together1 as united into one idea1 and which so joined2 are looked on as one2 v4 g4 the idea of such a collection of men as make an ,,army1 though consisting of a great number of distinct substances1 is as much one idea as the idea of a man3 and the great collective idea of all bodies whatsoever1 signified by the name ,,world1 is as much one idea as the idea of any the least particle of matter in it2 it sufficing to the unity of any idea1 that it be considered as one representation or picture1 though made up of ever so many particulars4 #b4 ,made by the ,power of composing in the ,mind4 ,these collective ideas of substances the mind makes1 by its power of composition1 and uniting severally either simple or complex ideas into one1 as it does1 by the same faculty1 make the complex ideas of particular substances1 consisting of an aggregate of divers simple ideas1 united in one substance4 ,and as the mind1 by putting together the repeated ideas of unity1 makes the collective mode1 or complex idea1 of any number1 as a score1 or a gross1 c41--so1 by putting together several particular substances1 it makes collective ideas of substances1 as a troop1 an army1 a swarm1 a city1 a fleet2 each of which every one finds that he represents to his own mind by one idea1 in one view2 and so under that notion considers those several things as perfectly one1 as one ship1 or one atom4 ,nor is it harder to conceive how an army of ten thousand men should make one idea than how a man should make one idea2 it being as easy to the mind to unite into one the idea of a great number of men1 and consider it as one as it is to unite into one particular all the distinct ideas that make up the composition of a man1 and consider them all together as one4 #c4 ,artificial things that are made up of distinct substances are our collective ,ideas4 ,amongst such kind of collective ideas are to be counted most part of artificial things1 at least such of them as are made up of distinct substances3 and1 in truth1 if we consider all these collective ideas aright1 as ,,army1 ,,constellation1 ,,universe1 as they are united into so many single ideas1 they are but the artificial draughts of the mind2 bringing things very remote1 and independent on one another1 into one view1 the better to contemplate and discourse on them1 united into one conception1 and signified by one name4 ,for there are no things so remote1 nor so contrary1 which the mind cannot1 by this art of composition1 bring into one idea2 as is visible in that signified by the name ,,universe4 ,,chapter ,,xxv4 ,,of ,,relation4 #a4 ,relation1 what4 ,,besides the ideas1 whether simple or complex1 that the mind has of things as they are in themselves1 there are others it gets from their comparison one with another4 ,the understanding1 in the consideration of anything1 is not confined to that precise object3 it can carry any idea as it were beyond itself1 or at least look beyond it1 to see how it stands in conformity to any other4 ,when the mind so considers one thing1 that it does as it were bring it to1 and set it by another1 and carries its view from one to the other--this is1 as the words import1 ,,relation and ,,respect2 and the denominations given to positive things1 intimating that respect1 and serving as marks to lead the thoughts beyond the subject itself denominated1 to something distinct from it1 are what we call ,,relatives2 and the things so brought together1 ,,related4 ,thus1 when the mind considers ,caius as such a positive being1 it takes nothing into that idea but what really exists in ,caius2 v4g4 when ,i consider him as a man1 ,i have nothing in my mind but the complex idea of the species1 man4 ,so likewise1 when ,i say ,caius is a white man1 ,i have nothing but the bare consideration of a man who hath that white colour4 ,but when ,i give ,caius the name ,,husband1 ,i intimate some other person2 and when ,i give him the name ,,whiter1 ,i intimate some other thing3 in both cases my thought is led to something beyond ,caius1 and there are two things brought into consideration4 ,and since any idea1 whether simple or complex1 may be the occasion why the mind thus brings two things together1 and as it were takes a view of them at once1 though still considered as distinct3 therefore any of our ideas may be the foundation of relation4 ,as in the above-mentioned instance1 the contract and ceremony of marriage with ,sempronia is the occasion of the denomination and relation of husband2 and the colour white the occasion why he is said to be whiter than free-stone4 #b4 ,ideas of relations without correlative ,terms1 not easily apprehended4 ,these and the like relations1 expressed by relative terms that have others answering them1 with a reciprocal intimation1 as father and son1 bigger and less1 cause and effect1 are very obvious to every one1 and everybody at first sight perceives the relation4 ,for father and son1 husband and wife1 and such other correlative terms1 seem so nearly to belong one to another1 and1 through custom1 do so readily chime and answer one another in people's memories1 that1 upon the naming of either of them1 the thoughts are presently carried beyond the thing so named2 and nobody overlooks or doubts of a relation1 where it is so plainly intimated4 ,but where languages have failed to give correlative names1 there the relation is not always so easily taken notice of4 ,,concubine is1 no doubt1 a relative name1 as well as wife3 but in languages where this and the like words have not a correlative term1 there people are not so apt to take them to be so1 as wanting that evident mark of relation which is between correlatives1 which seem to explain one another1 and not to be able to exist1 but together4 ,hence it is1 that many of those names1 which1 duly considered1 do include evident relations1 have been called ,,external ,,denominations4 ,but all names that are more than empty sounds must signify some idea1 which is either in the thing to which the name is applied1 and then it is positive1 and is looked on as united to and existing in the thing to which the denomination is given2 or else it arises from the respect the mind finds in it to something distinct from it1 with which it considers it1 and then it includes a relation4 #c4 ,some seemingly absolute ,terms contain ,relations4 ,another sort of relative terms there is1 which are not looked on to be either relative1 or so much as external denominations3 which yet1 under the form and appearance of signifying something absolute in the subject1 do conceal a tacit1 though less observable1 relation4 ,such are the seemingly positive terms of ,,old1 ,,great1 ,,imperfect1 c41 whereof ,i shall have occasion to speak more at large in the following chapters4 #d4 ,relation different from the ,things related4 ,this further may be observed1 ,that the ideas of relations may be the same in men who have far different ideas of the things that are related1 or that are thus compared3 v4 g4 those who have far different ideas of a man1 may yet agree in the notion of a father2 which is a notion superinduced to the substance1 or man1 and refers only to an act of that thing called man whereby he contributed to the generation of one of his own kind1 let man be what it will4 #e4 ,change of ,relation may be without any ,change in the things related4 ,the nature therefore of relation consists in the referring or comparing two things one to another2 from which comparison one or both comes to be denominated4 ,and if either of those things be removed1 or cease to be1 the relation ceases1 and the denomination consequent to it1 though the other receive in itself no alteration at all2 v4g4 ,caius1 whom ,i consider to-day as a father1 ceases to be so to-morrow1 only by the death of his son1 without any alteration made in himself4 ,nay1 barely by the mind's changing the object to which it compares anything1 the same thing is capable of having contrary denominations at the same time3 v4g4 ,caius1 compared to several persons1 may truly be said to be older and younger1 stronger and weaker1 c4 #f4 ,relation only betwixt two things4 ,whatsoever doth or can exist1 or be considered as one thing is positive3 and so not only simple ideas and substances1 but modes also1 are positive beings3 though the parts of which they consist are very often relative one to another3 but the whole together considered as one thing1 and producing in us the complex idea of one thing1 which idea is in our minds1 as one picture1 though an aggregate of divers parts1 and under one name1 it is a positive or absolute thing1 or idea4 ,thus a triangle1 though the parts thereof compared one to another be relative1 yet the idea of the whole is a positive absolute idea4 ,the same may be said of a family1 a tune1 c42 for there can be no relation but betwixt two things considered as two things4 ,there must always be in relation two ideas or things1 either in themselves really separate1 or considered as distinct1 and then a ground or occasion for their comparison4 #g4 ,all ,things capable of ,relation4 ,concerning relation in general1 these things may be considered3 ,first1 ,that there is no one thing1 whether simple idea1 substance1 mode1 or relation1 or name of either of them1 which is not capable of almost an infinite number of considerations in reference to other things3 and therefore this makes no small part of men's thoughts and words3 v4g4 one single man may at once be concerned in1 and sustain all these following relations1 and many more1 viz4 father1 brother1 son1 grandfather1 grandson1 father-in-law1 son-in-law1 husband1 friend1 enemy1 subject1 general1 judge1 patron1 client1 professor1 ,european1 ,englishman1 islander1 servant1 master1 possessor1 captain1 superior1 inferior1 bigger1 less1 older1 younger1 contemporary1 like1 unlike1 c41 to an almost infinite number3 he being capable of as many relations as there can be occasions of comparing him to other things1 in any manner of agreement1 disagreement1 or respect whatsoever4 ,for1 as ,i said1 relation is a way of comparing or considering two things 99dropped line from that comparison2 and sometimes giving even the relation itself a name4 #h4 ,our ,ideas of ,relations often clearer than of the ,subjects related4 ,secondly1 ,this further may be considered concerning relation1 that though it be not contained in the real existence of things1 but something extraneous and superinduced1 yet the ideas which relative words stand for are often clearer and more distinct than of those substances to which they do belong4 ,the notion we have of a father or brother is a great deal clearer and more distinct than that we have of a man2 or1 if you will1 ,,paternity is a thing whereof it is easier to have a clear idea1 than of ,,humanity2 and ,i can much easier conceive what a friend is1 than what ,god2 because the knowledge of one action1 or one simple idea1 is oftentimes sufficient to give me the notion of a relation2 but to the knowing of any substantial being1 an accurate collection of sundry ideas is necessary4 ,a man1 if he compares two things together1 can hardly be supposed not to know what it is wherein he compares them3 so that when he compares any things together1 he cannot but have a very clear idea of that relation4 ,,the ,,ideas1 ,,then1 ,,of ,,relations1 ,,are ,,capable ,,at ,,least ,,of ,,being ,,more ,,perfect ,,and ,,distinct ,,in ,,our ,,minds ,,than ,,those ,,of ,,substances4 ,because it is commonly hard to know all the simple ideas which are really in any substance1 but for the most part easy enough to know the simple ideas that make up any relation ,i think on1 or have a name for3 v4g4 comparing two men in reference to one common parent1 it is very easy to frame the ideas of brothers1 without having yet the perfect idea of a man4 ,for significant relative words1 as well as others1 standing only for ideas2 and those being all either simple1 or made up of simple ones1 it suffices for the knowing the precise idea the relative term stands for1 to have a clear conception of that which is the foundation of the relation2 which may be done without having a perfect and clear idea of the thing it is attributed to4 ,thus1 having the notion that one laid the egg out of which the other was hatched1 ,i have a clear idea of the relation of ,,dam and ,,chick between the two cassiowaries in ,st4 ,james's ,park2 though perhaps ,i have but a very obscure and imperfect idea of those birds themselves4 #i4 ,relations all terminate in simple ,ideas4 ,thirdly1 ,though there be a great number of considerations wherein things may be compared one with another1 and so a multitude of relations1 yet they all terminate in1 and are concerned about those simple ideas1 either of sensation or reflection1 which ,i think to be the whole materials of all our knowledge4 ,to clear this1 ,i shall show it in the most considerable relations that we have any notion of2 and in some that seem to be the most remote from sense or reflection3 which yet will appear to have their ideas from thence1 and leave it past doubt that the notions we have of them are but certain simple ideas1 and so originally derived from sense or reflection4 #aj4 ,terms leading the ,mind beyond the ,subject denominated1 are relative4 ,fourthly1 ,that relation being the considering of one thing with another which is extrinsical to it1 it is evident that all words that necessarily lead the mind to any other ideas than are supposed really to exist in that thing to which the words are applied are relative words3 v4g4a ,,man1 ,,black1 ,,merry1 ,,thoughtful1 ,,thirsty1 ,,angry1 ,,extended2 these and the like are all absolute1 because they neither signify nor intimate anything but what does or is supposed really to exist in the man thus denominated2 but ,,father1 ,,brother1 ,,king1 ,,husband1 ,,blacker1 ,,merrier1 c41 are words which1 together with the thing they denominate1 imply also something else separate and exterior to the existence of that thing4 #aa4 ,all relatives made up of simple ideas4 ,having laid down these premises concerning relation in general1 ,i shall now proceed to show1 in some instances1 how all the ideas we have of relation are made up1 as the others are1 only of simple ideas2 and that they all1 how refined or remote from sense soever they seem1 terminate at last in simple ideas4 ,i shall begin with the most comprehensive relation1 wherein all things that do1 or can exist1 are concerned1 and that is the relation of ,,cause and ,,effect3 the idea whereof1 how derived from the two fountains of all our knowledge1 sensation and reflection1 ,i shall in the next place consider4 ,,chapter ,,xxvi4 ,,of ,,cause ,,and ,,effect1 ,,and ,,other ,,relations4 #a4 ,whence the ,ideas of cause and effect got4 ,in the notice that our senses take of the constant vicissitude of things1 we cannot but observe that several particular1 both qualities and substances1 begin to exist2 and that they receive this their existence from the due application and operation of some other being4 ,from this observation we get our ideas of ,,cause and ,,effect4 ,,that ,,which ,,produces ,,any ,,simple ,,or ,,complex ,,idea we denote by the general name1 ,,cause1 and ,,that ,,which ,,is ,,produced1 ,,effect4 ,thus1 finding that in that substance which we call wax1 fluidity1 which is a simple idea that was not in it before1 is constantly produced by the application of a certain degree of heat we call the simple idea of heat1 in relation to fluidity in wax1 the cause of it1 and fluidity the effect4 ,so also1 finding that the substance1 wood1 which is a certain collection of simple ideas so called1 by the application of fire1 is turned into another substance1 called ashes2 i4 e41 another complex idea1 consisting of a collection of simple ideas1 quite different from that complex idea which we call wood2 we consider fire1 in relation to ashes1 as cause1 and the ashes1 as effect4 ,so that whatever is considered by us to conduce or operate to the producing any particular simple idea1 or collection of simple ideas1 whether substance or mode1 which did not before exist1 hath thereby in our minds the relation of a cause1 and so is denominated by us4 #b4 ,creation ,generation1 making ,alteration4 ,having thus1 from what our senses are able to discover in the operations of bodies on one another1 got the notion of cause and effect1 viz4 that a cause is that which makes any other thing1 either simple idea1 substance1 or mode1 begin to be2 and an effect is that which had its beginning from some other thing2 the mind finds no great difficulty to distinguish the several originals of things into two sorts3-- ,first1 ,when the thing is wholly made new1 so that no part thereof did ever exist before2 as when a new particle of matter doth begin to exist1 ,,in ,,rerum ,,natura1 which had before no being1 and this we call ,,creation4 ,secondly1 ,when a thing is made up of particles1 which did all of them before exist2 but that very thing1 so constituted of pre-existing particles1 which1 considered all together1 make up such a collection of simple ideas1 had not any existence before1 as this man1 this egg1 rose1 or cherry1 c4 ,and this1 when referred to a substance1 produced in the ordinary course of nature by internal principle1 but set on work by1 and received from1 some external agent1 or cause1 and working by insensible ways which we perceive not1 we call ,,generation4 ,when the cause is extrinsical1 and the effect produced by a sensible separation1 or juxta-position of discernible parts1 we call it ,,making2 and such are all artificial things4 ,when any simple idea is produced1 which was not in that subject before1 we call it ,,alteration4 ,thus a man is generated1 a picture made2 and either of them altered1 when any new sensible quality or simple idea is produced in either of them1 which was not there before3 and the things thus made to exist1 which were not there before1 are effects2 and those things which operated to the existence1 causes4 ,in which1 and all other cases1 we may observe1 that the notion of cause and effect has its rise from ideas received by sensation or reflection2 and that this relation1 how comprehensive soever1 terminates at last in them4 ,for to have the idea of cause and effect1 it suffices to consider any simple idea or substance1 as beginning to exist1 by the operation of some other1 without knowing the manner of that operation4 #c4 ,relations of ,time4 ,time and place are also the foundations of very large relations2 and all finite beings at least are concerned in them4 ,but having already shown in another place how we get those ideas1 it may suffice here to intimate1 that most of the denominations of things received from ,,time are only relations4 ,thus1 when any one says that ,queen ,elizabeth lived sixty-nine1 and reigned forty-five years1 these words import only the relation of that duration to some other1 and mean no more but this1 ,that the duration of her existence was equal to sixty-nine1 and the duration of her government to forty-five annual revolutions of the sun2 and so are all words1 answering1 ,,how ,,long8 ,again1 ,william the ,conqueror invaded ,england about the year #ajff2 which means this1 ,that1 taking the duration from our ,saviour's time till now for one entire great length of time1 it shows at what distance this invasion was from the two extremes2 and so do all words of time answering to the question1 ,,when1 which show only the distance of any point of time from the period of a longer duration1 from which we measure1 and to which we thereby consider it as related4 #d4 ,some ideas of ,time supposed positive and found to be relative4 ,there are yet1 besides those1 other words of time1 that ordinarily are thought to stand for positive ideas1 which yet will1 when considered1 be found to be relative2 such as are1 young1 old1 c41 which include and intimate the relation anything has to a certain length of duration1 whereof we have the idea in our minds4 ,thus1 having settled in our thoughts the idea of the ordinary duration of a man to be seventy years1 when we say a man is ,,young1 we mean that his age is yet but a small part of that which usually men attain to2 and when we denominate him ,,old1 we mean that his duration is run out almost to the end of that which men do not usually exceed4 ,and so it is but comparing the particular age or duration of this or that man1 to the idea of that duration which we have in our minds1 as ordinarily belonging to that sort of animals3 which is plain in the application of these names to other things2 for a man is called young at twenty years1 and very young at seven years old3 but yet a horse we call old at twenty1 and a dog at seven years1 because in each of these we compare their age to different ideas of duration1 which are settled in our minds as belonging to these several sorts of animals1 in the ordinary course of nature4 ,but the sun and stars1 though they have outlasted several generations of men1 we call not old1 because we do not know what period ,god hath set to that sort of beings4 ,this term belonging properly to those things which we can observe in the ordinary course of things1 by a natural decay1 to come to an end in a certain period of time2 and so have in our minds1 as it were1 a standard to which we can compare the several parts of their duration2 and1 by the relation they bear thereunto1 call them young or old2 which we cannot1 therefore1 do to a ruby or a diamond1 things whose usual periods we know not4 #e4 ,relations of ,place and ,extension4 ,the relation also that things have to one another in their ,,places and distances is very obvious to observe2 as above1 below1 a mile distant from ,charing-cross1 in ,england1 and in ,london4 ,but as in duration1 so in extension and bulk1 there are some ideas that are relative which we signify by names that are thought positive2 as ,,great and ,,little are truly relations4 ,for here also1 having1 by observation1 settled in our minds the ideas of the bigness of several species of things from those we have been most accustomed to1 we make them as it were the standards1 whereby to denominate the bulk of others4 ,thus we call a great apple1 such a one as is bigger than the ordinary sort of those we have been used to2 and a little horse1 such a one as comes not up to the size of that idea which we have in our minds to belong ordinarily to horses2 and that will be a great horse to a ,welchman1 which is but a little one to a ,fleming2 they two having1 from the different breed of their countries1 taken several-sized ideas to which they compare1 and in relation to which they denominate their great and their little4 #f4 ,absolute ,terms often stand for ,relations4 ,so likewise weak and strong are but relative denominations of power1 compared to some ideas we have at that time of greater or less power4 ,thus1 when we say a weak man1 we mean one that has not so much strength or power to move as usually men have1 or usually those of his size have2 which is a comparing his strength to the idea we have of the usual strength of men1 or men of such a size4 ,the like when we say the creatures are all weak things2 weak there is but a relative term1 signifying the disproportion there is in the power of ,god and the creatures4 ,and so abundance of words1 in ordinary speech1 stand only for relations 7and perhaps the greatest part7 which at first sight seem to have no such signification3 v4g4 the ship has necessary stores4 ,,necessary and ,,stores are both relative words2 one having a relation to the accomplishing the voyage intended1 and the other to future use4 ,all which relations1 how they are confined to1 and terminate in ideas derived from sensation or reflection1 is too obvious to need any explication4 ,,chapter ,,xxvii4 ,,of ,,identity ,,and ,,diversity4 #a4 ,wherein ,identity consists4 ,,another occasion the mind often takes of comparing1 is the very being of things1 when1 considering ,,anything ,,as ,,existing ,,at ,,any ,,determined ,,time ,,and ,,place1 we compare it with ,,itself ,,existing ,,at ,,another ,,time1 and thereon form the ideas of ,,identity and ,,diversity4 ,when we see anything to be in any place in any instant of time1 we are sure 7be it what it will7 that it is that very thing1 and not another which at that same time exists in another place1 how like and undistinguishable soever it may be in all other respects3 and in this consists ,,identity1 when the ideas it is attributed to vary not at all from what they were that moment wherein we consider their former existence1 and to which we compare the present4 ,for we never finding1 nor conceiving it possible1 that two things of the same kind should exist in the same place at the same time1 we rightly conclude1 that1 whatever exists anywhere at any time1 excludes all of the same kind1 and is there itself alone4 ,when therefore we demand whether anything be the ,,same or no1 it refers always to something that existed such a time in such a place1 which it was certain1 at that instant1 was the same with itself1 and no other4 ,from whence it follows1 that one thing cannot have two beginnings of existence1 nor two things one beginning2 it being impossible for two things of the same kind to be or exist in the same instant1 in the very same place2 or one and the same thing in different places4 ,that1 therefore1 that had one beginning1 is the same thing2 and that which had a different beginning in time and place from that1 is not the same1 but diverse4 ,that which has made the difficulty about this relation has been the little care and attention used in having precise notions of the things to which it is attributed4 #b4 ,identity of ,substances4 ,we have the ideas but of three sorts of substances3 #a4 ,,god4 #b4 ,,finite ,,intelligences4 #c4 ,,bodies4 ,first1 ,,god is without beginning1 eternal1 unalterable1 and everywhere1 and therefore concerning his identity there can be no doubt4 ,secondly1 ,,finite ,,spirits having had each its determinated time and place of beginning to exist1 the relation to that time and place will always determine to each of them its identity1 as long as it exists4 ,thirdly1 ,the same will hold of every ,,particle ,,of ,,matter1 to which no addition or subtraction of matter being made1 it is the same4 ,for1 though these three sorts of substances1 as we term them1 do not exclude one another out of the same place1 yet we cannot conceive but that they must necessarily each of them exclude any of the same kind out of the same place3 or else the notions and names of identity and diversity would be in vain1 and there could be no such distinctions of substances1 or anything else one from another4 ,for example3 could two bodies be in the same place at the same time2 then those two parcels of matter must be one and the same1 take them great or little2 nay1 all bodies must be one and the same4 ,for1 by the same reason that two particles of matter may be in one place1 all bodies may be in one place3 which1 when it can be supposed1 takes away the distinction of identity and diversity of one and more1 and renders it ridiculous4 ,but it being a contradiction that two or more should be one1 identity and diversity are relations and ways of comparing well founded1 and of use to the understanding4 #c4 ,identity of modes and relations4 ,all other things being but modes or relations ultimately terminated in substances1 the identity and diversity of each particular existence of them too will be by the same way determined3 only as to things whose existence is in succession1 such as are the actions of finite beings1 v4 g4 ,,motion and ,,thought1 both which consist in a continued train of succession1 concerning ,,their diversity there can be no question3 because each perishing the moment it begins1 they cannot exist in different times1 or in different places1 as permanent beings can at different times exist in distant places2 and therefore no motion or thought1 considered as at different times1 can be the same1 each part thereof having a different beginning of existence4 #d4 ,principium ,individuationis4 ,from what has been said1 it is easy to discover what is so much inquired after1 the ,,principium ,,individuationis2 and that1 it is plain1 is existence itself2 which determines a being of any sort to a particular time and place1 incommunicable to two beings of the same kind4 ,this1 though it seems easier to conceive in simple substances or modes2 yet1 when reflected on1 is not more difficult in compound ones1 if care be taken to what it is applied3 v4g4 let us suppose an atom1 i4e4 a continued body under one immutable superficies1 existing in a determined time and place2 it is evident1 that1 considered in any instant of its existence1 it is in that instant the same with itself4 ,for1 being at that instant what it is1 and nothing else1 it is the same1 and so must continue as long as its existence is continued2 for so long it will be the same1 and no other4 ,in like manner1 if two or more atoms be joined together into the same mass1 every one of those atoms will be the same1 by the foregoing rule3 and whilst they exist united together1 the mass1 consisting of the same atoms1 must be the same mass1 or the same body1 let the parts be ever so differently jumbled4 ,but if one of these atoms be taken away1 or one new one added1 it is no longer the same mass or the same body4 ,in the state of living creatures1 their identity depends not on a mass of the same particles1 but on something else4 ,for in them the variation of great parcels of matter alters not the identity3 an oak growing from a plant to a great tree1 and then lopped1 is still the same oak2 and a colt grown up to a horse1 sometimes fat1 sometimes lean1 is all the while the same horse3 though1 in both these cases1 there may be a manifest change of the parts2 so that truly they are not either of them the same masses of matter1 though they be truly one of them the same oak1 and the other the same horse4 ,the reason whereof is1 that1 in these two cases--a ,,mass ,,of ,,matter and a ,,living ,,body--identity is not applied to the same thing4 #e4 ,identity of ,vegetables4 ,we must therefore consider wherein an oak differs from a mass of matter1 and that seems to me to be in this1 that the one is only the cohesion of particles of matter any how united1 the other such a disposition of them as constitutes the parts of an oak2 and such an organization of those parts as is fit to receive and distribute nourishment1 so as to continue and frame the wood1 bark1 and leaves1 c41 of an oak1 in which consists the vegetable life4 ,that being then one plant which has such an organization of parts in one coherent body1 partaking of one common life1 it continues to be the same plant as long as it partakes of the same life1 though that life be communicated to new particles of matter vitally united to the living plant1 in a like continued organization conformable to that sort of plants4 ,for this organization1 being at any one instant in any one collection of matter1 is in that particular concrete distinguished from all other1 and ,,is that individual life1 which existing constantly from that moment both forwards and backwards1 in the same continuity of insensibly succeeding parts united to the living body of the plant1 it has that identity which makes the same plant1 and all the parts of it1 parts of the same plant1 during all the time that they exist united in that continued organization1 which is fit to convey that common life to all the parts so united4 #f4 ,identity of ,animals4 ,the case is not so much different in ,,brutes but that any one may hence see what makes an animal and continues it the same4 ,something we have like this in machines1 and may serve to illustrate it4 ,for example1 what is a watch8 ,it is plain it is nothing but a fit organization or construction of parts to a certain end1 which1 when a sufficient force is added to it1 it is capable to attain4 ,if we would suppose this machine one continued body1 all whose organized parts were repaired1 increased1 or diminished by a constant addition or separation of insensible parts1 with one common life1 we should have something very much like the body of an animal2 with this difference1 ,that1 in an animal the fitness of the organization1 and the motion wherein life consists1 begin together1 the motion coming from within2 but in machines the force coming sensibly from without1 is often away when the organ is in order1 and well fitted to receive it4 #g4 ,the ,identity of ,man4 ,this also shows wherein the identity of the same ,,man consists2 viz4 in nothing but a participation of the same continued life1 by constantly fleeting particles of matter1 in succession vitally united to the same organized body4 ,he that shall place the identity of man in anything else1 but1 like that of other animals1 in one fitly organized body1 taken in any one instant1 and from thence continued1 under one organization of life1 in several successively fleeting particles of matter united to it1 will find it hard to make an embryo1 one of years1 mad and sober1 the ,,same man1 by any supposition1 that will not make it possible for ,seth1 ,ismael1 ,socrates1 ,pilate1 ,st4 ,austin1 and ,caesar ,borgia1 to be the same man4 ,for if the identity of ,,soul ,,alone makes the same ,,man2 and there be nothing in the nature of matter why the same individual spirit may not be united to different bodies1 it will be possible that those men1 living in distant ages1 and of different tempers1 may have been the same man3 which way of speaking must be from a very strange use of the word man1 applied to an idea out of which body and shape are excluded4 ,and that way of speaking would agree yet worse with the notions of those philosophers who allow of transmigration1 and are of opinion that the souls of men may1 for their miscarriages1 be detruded into the bodies of beasts1 as fit habitations1 with organs suited to the satisfaction of their brutal inclinations4 ,but yet ,i think nobody1 could he be sure that the ,,soul of ,heliogabalus were in one of his hogs1 would yet say that hog were a ,,man or ,heliogabalus4 #h4 ,idea of ,identity suited to the ,idea it is applied to4 ,it is not therefore unity of substance that comprehends all sorts of identity1 or will determine it in every case2 but to conceive and judge of it aright1 we must consider what idea the word it is applied to stands for3 it being one thing to be the same ,,substance1 another the same ,,man1 and a third the same ,,person1 if ,,person1 ,,man1 and ,,substance1 are three names standing for three different ideas2--for such as is the idea belonging to that name1 such must be the identity2 which1 if it had been a little more carefully attended to1 would possibly have prevented a great deal of that confusion which often occurs about this matter1 with no small seeming difficulties1 especially concerning ,,personal identity1 which therefore we shall in the next place a little consider4 #i4 ,same man4 ,an animal is a living organized body2 and consequently the same animal1 as we have observed1 is the same continued ,,life communicated to different particles of matter1 as they happen successively to be united to that organized living body4 ,and whatever is talked of other definitions1 ingenious observation puts it past doubt1 that the idea in our minds1 of which the sound man in our mouths is the sign1 is nothing else but of an animal of such a certain form4 ,since ,i think ,i may be confident1 that1 whoever should see a creature of his own shape or make1 though it had no more reason all its life than a cat or a parrot1 would call him still a ,,man2 or whoever should hear a cat or a parrot discourse1 reason1 and philosophize1 would call or think it nothing but a ,,cat or a ,,parrot2 and say1 the one was a dull irrational man1 and the other a very intelligent rational parrot4 #aj4 ,same man4 ,for ,i presume it is not the idea of a thinking or rational being alone that makes the ,,idea ,,of ,a ,,man in most people's sense3 but of a body1 so and so shaped1 joined to it2 and if that be the idea of a man1 the same successive body not shifted all at once1 must1 as well as the same immaterial spirit1 go to the making of the same man4 #aa4 ,personal ,identity4 ,this being premised1 to find wherein personal identity consists1 we must consider what ,,person stands for2--which1 ,i think1 is a thinking intelligent being1 that has reason and reflection1 and can consider itself as itself1 the same thinking thing1 in different times and places2 which it does only by that consciousness which is inseparable from thinking1 and1 as it seems to me1 essential to it3 it being impossible for any one to perceive without ,,perceiving that he does perceive4 ,when we see1 hear1 smell1 taste1 feel1 meditate1 or will anything1 we know that we do so4 ,thus it is always as to our present sensations and perceptions3 and by this every one is to himself that which he calls ,,self3--it not being considered1 in this case1 whether the same self be continued in the same or divers substances4 ,for1 since consciousness always accompanies thinking1 and it is that which makes every one to be what he calls self1 and thereby distinguishes himself from all other thinking things1 in this alone consists personal identity1 i4e4 the sameness of a rational being3 and as far as this consciousness can be extended backwards to any past action or thought1 so far reaches the identity of that person2 it is the same self now it was then2 and it is by the same self with this present one that now reflects on it1 that that action was done4 #ab4 ,consciousness makes personal ,identity4 ,but it is further inquired1 whether it be the same identical substance4 ,this few would think they had reason to doubt of1 if these perceptions1 with their consciousness1 always remained present in the mind1 whereby the same thinking thing would be always consciously present1 and1 as would be thought1 evidently the same to itself4 ,but that which seems to make the difficulty is this1 that this consciousness being interrupted always by forgetfulness1 there being no moment of our lives wherein we have the whole train of all our past actions before our eyes in one view1 but even the best memories losing the sight of one part whilst they are viewing another2 and we sometimes1 and that the greatest part of our lives1 not reflecting on our past selves1 being intent on our present thoughts1 and in sound sleep having no thoughts at all1 or at least none with that consciousness which remarks our waking thoughts1--,i say1 in all these cases1 our consciousness being interrupted1 and we losing the sight of our past selves1 doubts are raised whether we are the same thinking thing1 i4e4 the same ,,substance or no4 ,which1 however reasonable or unreasonable1 concerns not ,,personal identity at all4 ,the question being what makes the same person2 and not whether it be the same identical substance1 which always thinks in the same person1 which1 in this case1 matters not at all3 different substances1 by the same consciousness 7where they do partake in it7 being united into one person1 as well as different bodies by the same life are united into one animal1 whose identity is preserved in that change of substances by the unity of one continued life4 ,for1 it being the same consciousness that makes a man be himself to himself1 personal identity depends on that only1 whether it be annexed solely to one individual substance1 or can be continued in a succession of several substances4 ,for as far as any intelligent being ,,can repeat the idea of any past action with the same consciousness it had of it at first1 and with the same consciousness it has of any present action2 so far it is the same personal self4 ,for it is by the consciousness it has of its present thoughts and actions1 that it is ,,self ,,to ,,itself now1 and so will be the same self1 as far as the same consciousness can extend to actions past or to come2 and would be by distance of time1 or change of substance1 no more two persons1 than a man be two men by wearing other clothes to-day than he did yesterday1 with a long or a short sleep between3 the same consciousness uniting those distant actions into the same person1 whatever substances contributed to their production4 #ac4 ,personal ,identity in ,change of ,substance4 ,that this is so1 we have some kind of evidence in our very bodies1 all whose particles1 whilst vitally united to this same thinking conscious self1 so that ,,we ,,feel when they are touched1 and are affected by1 and conscious of good or harm that happens to them1 are a part of ourselves2 i4e4 of our thinking conscious self4 ,thus1 the limbs of his body are to every one a part of himself2 he sympathizes and is concerned for them4 ,cut off a hand1 and thereby separate it from that consciousness he had of its heat1 cold1 and other affections1 and it is then no longer a part of that which is himself1 any more than the remotest part of matter4 ,thus1 we see the ,,substance whereof personal self consisted at one time may be varied at another1 without the change of personal identity2 there being no question about the same person1 though the limbs which but now were a part of it1 be cut off4 #ad4 ,personality in ,change of ,substance4 ,but the question is1 ,whether if the same substance which thinks be changed1 it can be the same person2 or1 remaining the same1 it can be different persons8 ,and to this ,i answer3 ,first1 ,this can be no question at all to those who place thought in a purely material animal constitution1 void of an immaterial substance4 ,for1 whether their supposition be true or no1 it is plain they conceive personal identity preserved in something else than identity of substance2 as animal identity is preserved in identity of life1 and not of substance4 ,and therefore those who place thinking in an immaterial substance only1 before they can come to deal with these men1 must show why personal identity cannot be preserved in the change of immaterial substances1 or variety of particular immaterial substances1 as well as animal identity is preserved in the change of material substances1 or variety of particular bodies3 unless they will say1 it is one immaterial spirit that makes the same life in brutes1 as it is one immaterial spirit that makes the same person in men2 which the ,cartesians at least will not admit1 for fear of making brutes thinking things too4 #ae4 ,whether in ,change of thinking ,substances there can be one ,person4 ,but next1 as to the first part of the question1 ,whether1 if the same thinking substance 7supposing immaterial substances only to think7 be changed1 it can be the same person8 ,i answer1 that cannot be resolved but by those who know there can what kind of substances they are that do think2 and whether the consciousness of past actions can be transferred from one thinking substance to another4 ,i grant were the same consciousness the same individual action it could not3 but it being a present representation of a past action1 why it may not be possible1 that that may be represented to the mind to have been which really never was1 will remain to be shown4 ,and therefore how far the consciousness of past actions is annexed to any individual agent1 so that another cannot possibly have it1 will be hard for us to determine1 till we know what kind of action it is that cannot be done without a reflex act of perception accompanying it1 and how performed by thinking substances1 who cannot think without being conscious of it4 ,but that which we call the same consciousness1 not being the same individual act1 why one intellectual substance may not have represented to it1 as done by itself1 what ,,it never did1 and was perhaps done by some other agent--why1 ,i say1 such a representation may not possibly be without reality of matter of fact1 as well as several representations in dreams are1 which yet whilst dreaming we take for true--will be difficult to conclude from the nature of things4 ,and that it never is so1 will by us1 till we have clearer views of the nature of thinking substances1 be best resolved into the goodness of ,god2 who1 as far as the happiness or misery of any of his sensible creatures is concerned in it1 will not1 by a fatal error of theirs1 transfer from one to another that consciousness which draws reward or punishment with it4 ,how far this may be an argument against those who would place thinking in a system of fleeting animal spirits1 ,i leave to be considered4 ,but yet1 to return to the question before us1 it must be allowed1 that1 if the same consciousness 7which1 as has been shown1 is quite a different thing from the same numerical figure or motion in body7 can be transferred from one thinking substance to another1 it will be possible that two thinking substances may make but one person4 ,for the same consciousness being preserved1 whether in the same or different substances1 the personal identity is preserved4 #af4 ,whether1 the same immaterial ,substance remaining1 there can be two ,persons4 ,as to the second part of the question1 ,whether the same immaterial substance remaining1 there may be two distinct persons2 which question seems to me to be built on this1--,whether the same immaterial being1 being conscious of the action of its past duration1 may be wholly stripped of all the consciousness of its past existence1 and lose it beyond the power of ever retrieving it again3 and so as it were beginning a new account from a new period1 have a consciousness that ,,cannot reach beyond this new state4 ,all those who hold pre-existence are evidently of this mind2 since they allow the soul to have no remaining consciousness of what it did in that pre-existent state1 either wholly separate from body1 or informing any other body2 and if they should not1 it is plain experience would be against them4 ,so that personal identity1 reaching no further than consciousness reaches1 a pre-existent spirit not having continued so many ages in a state of silence1 must needs make different persons4 ,suppose a ,christian ,platonist or a ,pythagorean should1 upon ,god's having ended all his works of creation the seventh day1 think his soul hath existed ever since2 and should imagine it has revolved in several human bodies2 as ,i once met with one1 who was persuaded his had been the ,,soul of ,socrates 7how reasonably ,i will not dispute2 this ,i know1 that in the post he filled1 which was no inconsiderable one1 he passed for a very rational man1 and the press has shown that he wanted not parts or learning27--would any one say1 that he1 being not conscious of any of ,socrates's actions or thoughts1 could be the same ,,person with ,socrates8 ,let any one reflect upon himself1 and conclude that he has in himself an immaterial spirit1 which is that which thinks in him1 and1 in the constant change of his body keeps him the same3 and is that which he calls ,,himself3 let him also suppose it to be the same soul that was in ,nestor or ,thersites1 at the siege of ,troy1 7for souls being1 as far as we know anything of them1 in their nature indifferent to any parcel of matter1 the supposition has no apparent absurdity in it17 which it may have been1 as well as it is now the soul of any other man3 but he now having no consciousness of any of the actions either of ,nestor or ,thersites1 does or can he conceive himself the same person with either of them8 ,can he be concerned in either of their actions8 attribute them to himself1 or think them his own more than the actions of any other men that ever existed8 ,so that this consciousness1 not reaching to any of the actions of either of those men1 he is no more one ,,self with either of them than of the soul of immaterial spirit that now informs him had been created1 and began to exist1 when it began to inform his present body2 though it were never so true1 that the same ,,spirit that informed ,nestor's or ,thersites' body were numerically the same that now informs his4 ,for this would no more make him the same person with ,nestor1 than if some of the particles of smaller that were once a part of ,nestor were now a part of this man the same immaterial substance1 without the same consciousness1 no more making the same person1 by being united to any body1 than the same particle of matter1 without consciousness1 united to any body1 makes the same person4 ,but let him once find himself conscious of any of the actions of ,nestor1 he then finds himself the same person with ,nestor4 #ag4 ,the body1 as well as the soul1 goes to the making of a ,man4 ,and thus may we be able1 without any difficulty1 to conceive the same person at the resurrection1 though in a body not exactly in make or parts the same which he had here1--the same consciousness going along with the soul that inhabits it4 ,but yet the soul alone1 in the change of bodies1 would scarce to any one but to him that makes the soul the man1 be enough to make the same man4 ,for should the soul of a prince1 carrying with it the consciousness of the prince's past life1 enter and inform the body of a cobbler1 as soon as deserted by his own soul1 every one sees he would be the same ,,person with the prince1 accountable only for the prince's actions3 but who would say it was the same ,,man8 ,the body too goes to the making the man1 and would1 ,i guess1 to everybody determine the man in this case1 wherein the soul1 with all its princely thoughts about it1 would not make another man3 but he would be the same cobbler to every one besides himself4 ,i know that1 in the ordinary way of speaking1 the same person1 and the same man1 stand for one and the same thing4 ,and indeed every one will always have a liberty to speak as he pleases1 and to apply what articulate sounds to what ideas he thinks fit1 and change them as often as he pleases4 ,but yet1 when we will inquire what makes the same ,,spirit1 ,,man1 or ,,person1 we must fix the ideas of spirit1 man1 or person in our minds2 and having resolved with ourselves what we mean by them1 it will not be hard to determine1 in either of them1 or the like1 when it is the same1 and when not4 #ah4 ,consciousness alone unites actions into the same ,person4 ,but though the same immaterial substance or soul does not alone1 wherever it be1 and in whatsoever state1 make the same ,,man2 yet it is plain1 consciousness1 as far as ever it can be extended--should it be to ages past--unites existences and actions very remote in time into the same ,,person1 as well as it does the existences and actions of the immediately preceding moment3 so that whatever has the consciousness of present and past actions1 is the same person to whom they both belong4 ,had ,i the same consciousness that ,i saw the ark and ,noah's flood1 as that ,i saw an overflowing of the ,thames last winter1 or as that ,i write now1 ,i could no more doubt that ,i who write this now1 that saw the ,thames overflowed last winter1 and that viewed the flood at the general deluge1 was the same ,,self1--place that self in what ,,substance you please--than that ,i who write this am the same ,,myself now whilst ,i write 7whether ,i consist of all the same substance material or immaterial1 or no7 that ,i was yesterday4 ,for as to this point of being the same self1 it matters not whether this present self be made up of the same or other substances--,i being as much concerned1 and as justly accountable for any action that was done a thousand years since1 appropriated to me now by this self-consciousness1 as ,i am for what ,i did the last moment4 #ai4 ,self depends on ,consciousness1 not on ,substance4 ,,self is that conscious thinking thing1--whatever substance made up of1 7whether spiritual or material1 simple or compounded1 it matters not7--which is sensible or conscious of pleasure and pain1 capable of happiness or misery1 and so is concerned for itself1 as far as that consciousness extends4 ,thus every one finds that1 whilst comprehended under that consciousness1 the little finger is as much a part of himself as what is most so4 ,upon separation of this little finger1 should this consciousness go along with the little finger1 and leave the rest of the body1 it is evident the little finger would be the person1 the same person2 and self then would have nothing to do with the rest of the body4 ,as in this case it is the consciousness that goes along with the substance1 when one part is separate from another1 which makes the same person1 and constitutes this inseparable self3 so it is in reference to substances remote in time4 ,that with which the consciousness of this present thinking thing ,,can join itself1 makes the same person1 and is one self with it1 and with nothing else2 and so attributes to itself1 and owns all the actions of that thing1 as its own1 as far as that consciousness reaches1 and no further2 as every one who reflects will perceive4 #bj4 ,persons1 not ,substances1 the ,objects of ,reward and ,punishment4 ,in this personal identity is founded all the right and justice of reward and punishment2 happiness and misery being that for which every one is concerned for ,,himself1 and not mattering what becomes of any ,,substance1 not joined to1 or affected with that consciousness4 ,for1 as it is evident in the instance ,i gave but now1 if the consciousness went along with the little finger when it was cut off1 that would be the same self which was concerned for the whole body yesterday1 as making part of itself1 whose actions then it cannot but admit as its own now4 ,though1 if the same body should still live1 and immediately from the separation of the little finger have its own peculiar consciousness1 whereof the little finger knew nothing1 it would not at all be concerned for it1 as a part of itself1 or could own any of its actions1 or have any of them imputed to him4 #ba4 ,which shows wherein ,personal identity consists4 ,this may show us wherein personal identity consists3 not in the identity of substance1 but1 as ,i have said1 in the identity of consciousness1 wherein if ,socrates and the present mayor of ,queenborough agree1 they are the same person3 if the same ,socrates waking and sleeping do not partake of the same consciousness1 ,socrates waking and sleeping is not the same person4 ,and to punish ,socrates waking for what sleeping ,socrates thought1 and waking ,socrates was never conscious of1 would be no more of right1 than to punish one twin for what his brother-twin did1 whereof he knew nothing1 because their outsides were so like1 that they could not be distinguished2 for such twins have been seen4 #bb4 ,absolute oblivion separates what is thus forgotten from the person1 but not from the man4 ,but yet possibly it will still be objected1--,suppose ,i wholly lose the memory of some parts of my life1 beyond a possibility of retrieving them1 so that perhaps ,i shall never be conscious of them again2 yet am ,i not the same person that did those actions1 had those thoughts that ,i once was conscious of1 though ,i have now forgot them8 ,to which ,i answer1 that we must here take notice what the word ,i is applied to2 which1 in this case1 is the ,,man only4 ,and the same man being presumed to be the same person1 ,i is easily here supposed to stand also for the same person4 ,but if it be possible for the same man to have distinct incommunicable consciousness at different times1 it is past doubt the same man would at different times make different persons2 which1 we see1 is the sense of mankind in the solemnest declaration of their opinions1 human laws not punishing the mad man for the sober man's actions1 nor the sober man for what the mad man did1--thereby making them two persons3 which is somewhat explained by our way of speaking in ,english when we say such an one is #8not himself1' or is #8beside himself'2 in which phrases it is insinuated1 as if those who now1 or at least first used them1 thought that self was changed2 the selfsame person was no longer in that man4 #bc4 ,difference between ,identity of ,man and of ,person4 ,but yet it is hard to conceive that ,socrates1 the same individual man1 should be two persons4 ,to help us a little in this1 we must consider what is meant by ,socrates1 or the same individual ,,man4 ,first1 it must be either the same individual1 immaterial1 thinking substance2 in short1 the same numerical soul1 and nothing else4 ,secondly1 or the same animal1 without any regard to an immaterial soul4 ,thirdly1 or the same immaterial spirit united to the same animal4 ,now1 take which of these suppositions you please1 it is impossible to make personal identity to consist in anything but consciousness2 or reach any further than that does4 ,for1 by the first of them1 it must be allowed possible that a man born of different women1 and in distant times1 may be the same man4 ,a way of speaking which1 whoever admits1 must allow it possible for the same man to be two distinct persons1 as any two that have lived in different ages without the knowledge of one another's thoughts4 ,by the second and third1 ,socrates1 in this life and after it1 cannot be the same man any way1 but by the same consciousness2 and so making human identity to consist in the same thing wherein we place personal identity1 there will be difficulty to allow the same man to be the same person4 ,but then they who place human identity in consciousness only1 and not in something else1 must consider how they will make the infant ,socrates the same man with ,socrates after the resurrection4 ,but whatsoever to some men makes a man1 and consequently the same individual man1 wherein perhaps few are agreed1 personal identity can by us be placed in nothing but consciousness1 7which is that alone which makes what we call ,,self17 without involving us in great absurdities4 #bd4 ,but is not a man drunk and sober the same person8 why else is he punished for the fact he commits when drunk1 though he be never afterwards conscious of it8 ,just as much the same person as a man that walks1 and does other things in his sleep1 is the same person1 and is answerable for any mischief he shall do in it4 ,human laws punish both1 with a justice suitable to ,,their way of knowledge2--because1 in these cases1 they cannot distinguish certainly what is real1 what counterfeit3 and so the ignorance in drunkenness or sleep is not admitted as a plea4 ,but in the ,great ,day1 wherein the secrets of all hearts shall be laid open1 it may be reasonable to think1 no one shall be made to answer for what he knows nothing of2 but shall receive his doom1 his conscience accusing or excusing him4 #be4 ,consciousness alone unites remote existences into one ,person4 ,nothing but consciousness can unite remote existences into the same person3 the identity of substance will not do it2 for whatever substance there is1 however framed1 without consciousness there is no person3 and a carcass may be a person1 as well as any sort of substance be so1 without consciousness4 ,could we suppose two distinct incommunicable consciousnesses acting the same body1 the one constantly by day1 the other by night2 and1 on the other side1 the same consciousness1 acting by intervals1 two distinct bodies3 ,i ask1 in the first case1 whether the day and the night--man would not be two as distinct persons as ,socrates and ,plato8 ,and whether1 in the second case1 there would not be one person in two distinct bodies1 as much as one man is the same in two distinct clothings8 ,nor is it at all material to say1 that this same1 and this distinct consciousness1 in the cases above mentioned1 is owing to the same and distinct immaterial substances1 bringing it with them to those bodies2 which1 whether true or no1 alters not the case3 since it is evident the personal identity would equally be determined by the consciousness1 whether that consciousness were annexed to some individual immaterial substance or no4 ,for1 granting that the thinking substance in man must be necessarily supposed immaterial1 it is evident that immaterial thinking thing may sometimes part with its past consciousness1 and be restored to it again3 as appears in the forgetfulness men often have of their past actions2 and the mind many times recovers the memory of a past consciousness1 which it had lost for twenty years together4 ,make these intervals of memory and forgetfulness to take their turns regularly by day and night1 and you have two persons with the same immaterial spirit1 as much as in the former instance two persons with the same body4 ,so that self is not determined by identity or diversity of substance1 which it cannot be sure of1 but only by identity of consciousness4 #bf4 ,not the substance with which the consciousness may be united4 ,indeed it may conceive the substance whereof it is now made up to have existed formerly1 united in the same conscious being3 but1 consciousness removed1 that substance is no more itself1 or makes no more a part of it1 than any other substance2 as is evident in the instance we have already given of a limb cut off1 of whose heat1 or cold1 or other affections1 having no longer any consciousness1 it is no more of a man's self than any other matter of the universe4 ,in like manner it will be in reference to any immaterial substance1 which is void of that consciousness whereby ,i am myself to myself3 so that ,i cannot upon recollection join with that present consciousness whereby ,i am now myself1 it is1 in that part of its existence1 no more ,,myself than any other immaterial being4 ,for1 whatsoever any substance has thought or done1 which ,i cannot recollect1 and by my consciousness make my own thought and action1 it will no more belong to me1 whether a part of me thought or did it1 than if it had been thought or done by any other immaterial being anywhere existing4 #bg4 ,consciousness unites substances1 material or spiritual1 with the same personality4 ,i agree1 the more probable opinion is1 that this consciousness is annexed to1 and the affection of1 one individual immaterial substance4 ,but let men1 according to their diverse hypotheses1 resolve of that as they please4 ,this every intelligent being1 sensible of happiness or misery1 must grant--that there is something that is ,,himself1 that he is concerned for1 and would have happy2 that this self has existed in a continued duration more than one instant1 and therefore it is possible may exist1 as it has done1 months and years to come1 without any certain bounds to be set to its duration2 and may be the same self1 by the same consciousness continued on for the future4 ,and thus1 by this consciousness he finds himself to be the same self which did such and such an action some years since1 by which he comes to be happy or miserable now4 ,in all which account of self1 the same numerical ,,substance is not considered a making the same self2 but the same continued ,,consciousness1 in which several substances may have been united1 and again separated from it1 which1 whilst they continued in a vital union with that wherein this consciousness then resided1 made a part of that same self4 ,thus any part of our bodies1 vitally united to that which is conscious in us1 makes a part of ourselves3 but upon separation from the vital union by which that consciousness is communicated1 that which a moment since was part of ourselves1 is now no more so than a part of another man's self is a part of me3 and it is not impossible but in a little time may become a real part of another person4 ,and so we have the same numerical substance become a part of two different persons2 and the same person preserved under the change of various substances4 ,could we suppose any spirit wholly stripped of all its memory of consciousness of past actions1 as we find our minds always are of a great part of ours1 and sometimes of them all2 the union or separation of such a spiritual substance would make no variation of personal identity1 any more than that of any particle of matter does4 ,any substance vitally united to the present thinking being is a part of that very same self which now is2 anything united to it by a consciousness of former actions1 makes also a part of the same self1 which is the same both then and now4 #bh4 ,person a forensic ,term4 ,,person1 as ,i take it1 is the name for this self4 ,wherever a man finds what he calls himself1 there1 ,i think1 another may say is the same person4 ,it is a forensic term1 appropriating actions and their merit2 and so belongs only to intelligent agents1 capable of a law1 and happiness1 and misery4 ,this personality extends itself beyond present existence to what is past1 only by consciousness1--whereby it becomes concerned and accountable2 owns and imputes to itself past actions1 just upon the same ground and for the same reason as it does the present4 ,all which is founded in a concern for happiness1 the unavoidable concomitant of consciousness2 that which is conscious of pleasure and pain1 desiring that that self that is conscious should be happy4 ,and therefore whatever past actions it cannot reconcile or ,,appropriate to that present self by consciousness1 it can be no more concerned in than if they had never been done3 and to receive pleasure or pain1 i4e4 reward or punishment1 on the account of any such action1 is all one as to be made happy or miserable in its first being1 without any demerit at all4 ,for1 supposing a ,,man punished now for what he had done in another life1 whereof he could be made to have no consciousness at all1 what difference is there between that punishment and being ,,created miserable8 ,and therefore1 conformable to this1 the apostle tells us1 that1 at the great day1 when every one shall #8receive according to his doings1 the secrets of all hearts shall be laid open4' ,the sentence shall be justified by the consciousness all persons shall have1 that ,,they ,,themselves1 in what bodies soever they appear1 or what substances soever that consciousness adheres to1 are the ,,same that committed those actions1 and deserve that punishment for them4 #bi4 ,suppositions that look strange are pardonable in our ignorance4 ,i am apt enough to think ,i have1 in treating of this subject1 made some suppositions that will look strange to some readers1 and possibly they are so in themselves4 ,but yet1 ,i think they are such as are pardonable1 in this ignorance we are in of the nature of that thinking thing that is in us1 and which we look on as ,,ourselves4 ,did we know what it was2 or how it was tied to a certain system of fleeting animal spirits2 or whether it could or could not perform its operations of thinking and memory out of a body organized as ours is2 and whether it has pleased ,god that no one such spirit shall ever be united to any but one such body1 upon the right constitution of whose organs its memory should depend2 we might see the absurdity of some of those suppositions ,i have made4 ,but taking1 as we ordinarily now do 7in the dark concerning these matters17 the soul of a man for an immaterial substance1 independent from matter1 and indifferent alike to it all2 there can1 from the nature of things1 be no absurdity at all to suppose that the same ,,soul may at different times be united to different ,,bodies1 and with them make up for that time one ,,man3 as well as we suppose a part of a sheep's body yesterday should be a part of a man's body to-morrow1 and in that union make a vital part of ,meliboeus himself1 as well as it did of his ram4 #cj4 ,the ,difficulty from ill ,use of ,names4 ,to conclude3 ,whatever substance begins to exist1 it must1 during its existence1 necessarily be the same3 whatever compositions of substances begin to exist1 during the union of those substances1 the concrete must be the same3 whatsoever mode begins to exist1 during its existence it is the same3 and so if the composition be of distinct substances and different modes1 the same rule holds4 ,whereby it will appear1 that the difficulty or obscurity that has been about this matter rather rises from the names ill-used1 than from any obscurity in things themselves4 ,for whatever makes the specific idea to which the name is applied1 if that idea be steadily kept to1 the distinction of anything into the same and divers will easily be conceived1 and there can arise no doubt about it4 #ca4 ,continuance of that which we have made to be our complex idea of man makes the same man4 ,for1 supposing a rational spirit be the idea of a ,,man1 it is easy to know what is the same man1 viz4 the same spirit--whether separate or in a body--will be the ,,same ,,man4 ,supposing a rational spirit vitally united to a body of a certain conformation of parts to make a man2 whilst that rational spirit1 with that vital conformation of parts1 though continued in a fleeting successive body1 remains1 it will be the ,,same ,,man4 ,but if to any one the idea of a man be but the vital union of parts in a certain shape2 as long as that vital union and shape remain in a concrete1 no otherwise the same but by a continued succession of fleeting particles1 it will be the ,,same ,,man4 ,for1 whatever be the composition whereof the complex idea is made1 whenever existence makes it one particular thing under any denomination1 ,,the ,,same ,,existence ,,continued preserves it the ,,same individual under the same denomination4 ,,chapter ,,xxviii4 ,,of ,,other ,,relations4 #a4 ,ideas of ,proportional relations4 ,,besides the before-mentioned occasions of time1 place1 and causality of comparing or referring things one to another1 there are1 as ,i have said1 infinite others1 some whereof ,i shall mention4 ,first1 ,the first ,i shall name is some one simple idea1 which1 being capable of parts or degrees1 affords an occasion of comparing the subjects wherein it is to one another1 in respect of that simple idea1 v4g4 whiter1 sweeter1 equal1 more1 c4 ,these relations depending on the equality and excess of the same simple idea1 in several subjects1 may be called1 if one will1 ,,proportional2 and that these are only conversant about those simple ideas received from sensation or reflection is so evident that nothing need be said to evince it4 #b4 ,natural relation4 ,secondly1 ,another occasion of comparing things together1 or considering one thing1 so as to include in that consideration some other thing1 is the circumstances of their origin or beginning2 which being not afterwards to be altered1 make the relations depending thereon as lasting as the subjects to which they belong1 v4g4 father and son1 brothers1 cousin-germans1 c41 which have their relations by one community of blood1 wherein they partake in several degrees3 countrymen1 i4e4 those who were born in the same country or tract of ground2 and these ,i call ,,natural ,,relations3 wherein we may observe1 that mankind have fitted their notions and words to the use of common life1 and not to the truth and extent of things4 ,for it is certain1 that1 in reality1 the relation is the same betwixt the begetter and the begotten1 in the several races of other animals as well as men2 but yet it is seldom said1 this bull is the grandfather of such a calf1 or that two pigeons are cousin-germans4 ,it is very convenient that1 by distinct names1 these relations should be observed and marked out in mankind1 there being occasion1 both in laws and other communications one with another1 to mention and take notice of men under these relations3 from whence also arise the obligations of several duties amongst men3 whereas1 in brutes1 men having very little or no cause to mind these relations1 they have not thought fit to give them distinct and peculiar names4 ,this1 by the way1 may give us some light into the different state and growth of languages2 which being suited only to the convenience of communication1 are proportioned to the notions men have1 and the commerce of thoughts familiar amongst them2 and not to the reality or extent of things1 nor to the various respects might be found among them2 nor the different abstract considerations might be framed about them4 ,where they had no philosophical notions1 there they had no terms to express them3 and it is no wonder men should have framed no names for those things they found no occasion to discourse of4 ,from whence it is easy to imagine why1 as in some countries1 they may have not so much as the name for a horse2 and in others1 where they are more careful of the pedigrees of their horses1 than of their own1 that there they may have not only names for particular horses1 but also of their several relations of kindred one to another4 #c4 ,ideas of ,instituted or ,voluntary relations4 ,thirdly1 ,sometimes the foundation of considering things with reference to one another1 is some act whereby any one comes by a moral right1 power1 or obligation to do something4 ,thus1 a general is one that hath power to command an army1 and an army under a general is a collection of armed men obliged to obey one man4 ,a citizen1 or a burgher1 is one who has a right to certain privileges in this or that place4 ,all this sort depending upon men's wills1 or agreement in society1 ,i call ,,instituted1 or ,,voluntary2 and may be distinguished from the natural1 in that they are most1 if not all of them1 some way or other alterable1 and separable from the persons to whom they have sometimes belonged1 though neither of the substances1 so related1 be destroyed4 ,now1 though these are all reciprocal1 as well as the rest1 and contain in them a reference of two things one to the other2 yet1 because one of the two things often wants a relative name1 importing that reference1 men usually take no notice of it1 and the relation is commonly overlooked3 v4 g4 a patron and client are easily allowed to be relations1 but a constable or dictator are not so readily at first hearing considered as such4 ,because there is no peculiar name for those who are under the command of a dictator or constable1 expressing a relation to either of them2 though it be certain that either of them hath a certain power over some others1 and so is so far related to them1 as well as a patron is to his client1 or general to his army4 #d4 ,ideas of ,moral relations4 ,fourthly1 ,there is another sort of relation1 which is the conformity or disagreement men's ,,voluntary ,,actions have to a ,,rule to which they are referred1 and by which they are judged of2 which1 ,i think1 may be called ,,moral ,,relation1 as being that which denominates our moral actions1 and deserves well to be examined2 there being no part of knowledge wherein we should be more careful to get determined ideas1 and avoid1 as much as may be1 obscurity and confusion4 ,human actions1 when with their various ends1 objects1 manners1 and circumstances1 they are framed into distinct complex ideas1 are1 as has been shown1 so many ,,mixed ,,modes1 a great part whereof have names annexed to them4 ,thus1 supposing gratitude to be a readiness to acknowledge and return kindness received2 polygamy to be the having more wives than one at once3 when we frame these notions thus in our minds1 we have there so many determined ideas of mixed modes4 ,but this is not all that concerns our actions3 it is not enough to have determined ideas of them1 and to know what names belong to such and such combinations of ideas4 ,we have a further and greater concernment1 and that is1 to know whether such actions1 so made up1 are morally good or bad4 #e4 ,moral ,good and ,evil4 ,good and evil1 as hath been shown1 7,b4 ,,ii4 chap4 xx4 ,section #b1 and chap4 xxi4 ,section #dc17 are nothing but pleasure or pain1 or that which occasions or procures pleasure or pain to us4 ,,moral ,,good ,,and ,,evil1 then1 is only ,,the ,,conformity ,,or ,,disagreement ,,of ,,our ,,voluntary ,,actions ,,to ,,some ,,law1 ,,whereby ,,good ,,or ,,evil ,,is ,,drawn ,,on ,,us1 ,,from ,,the ,,will ,,and ,,power ,,of ,,the ,,law-,,maker2 which good and evil1 pleasure or pain1 attending our observance or breach of the law by the decree of the law-maker1 is that we call ,,reward and ,,punishment4 #f4 ,moral ,rules4 ,of these moral rules or laws1 to which men generally refer1 and by which they judge of the rectitude or gravity of their actions1 there seem to me to be ,,three ,,sorts1 with their three different enforcements1 or rewards and punishments4 ,for1 since it would be utterly in vain to suppose a rule set to the free actions of men1 without annexing to it some enforcement of good and evil to determine his will1 we must1 wherever we suppose a law1 suppose also some reward or punishment annexed to that law4 ,it would be in vain for one intelligent being to set a rule to the actions of another1 if he had it not in his power to reward the compliance with1 and punish deviation from his rule1 by some good and evil1 that is not the natural product and consequence of the action itself4 ,for that1 being a natural convenience or inconvenience1 would operate of itself1 without a law4 ,this1 if ,i mistake not1 is the true nature of all law1 properly so called4 #g4 ,laws4 ,the laws that men generally refer their actions to1 to judge of their rectitude or obliquity1 seem to me to be these three3--#a4 ,the ,,divine law4 #b4 ,the ,,civil law4 #c4 ,the law of ,,opinion or ,,reputation1 if ,i may so call it4 ,by the relation they bear to the first of these1 men judge whether their actions are sins or duties2 by the second1 whether they be criminal or innocent2 and by the third1 whether they be virtues or vices4 #h4 ,divine ,law the ,measure of ,sin and ,duty4 ,first1 the ,,divine ,,law1 whereby that law which ,god has set to the actions of men1--whether promulgated to them by the light of nature1 or the voice of revelation4 ,that ,god has given a rule whereby men should govern themselves1 ,i think there is nobody so brutish as to deny4 ,he has a right to do it2 we are his creatures3 he has goodness and wisdom to direct our actions to that which is best3 and he has power to enforce it by rewards and punishments of infinite weight and duration in another life2 for nobody can take us out of his hands4 ,this is the only true touchstone of moral rectitude2 and1 by comparing them to this law1 it is that men judge of the most considerable moral good or evil of their actions2 that is1 whether1 as duties or sins1 they are like to procure them happiness or misery from the hands of the ,,almighty4 #i4 ,civil ,law the ,measure of ,crimes and ,innocence4 ,secondly1 the ,,civil ,,law--the rule set by the commonwealth to the actions of those who belong to it--is another rule to which men refer their actions2 to judge whether they be criminal or no4 ,this law nobody overlooks3 the rewards and punishments that enforce it being ready at hand1 and suitable to the power that makes it3 which is the force of the ,commonwealth1 engaged to protect the lives1 liberties1 and possessions of those who live according to its laws1 and has power to take away life1 liberty1 or goods1 from him who disobeys2 which is the punishment of offences committed against his law4 #aj4 ,philosophical ,law the ,measure of ,virtue and ,vice4 ,thirdly1 the ,,law ,,of ,,opinion ,,or ,,reputation4 ,virtue and vice are names pretended and supposed everywhere to stand for actions in their own nature right and wrong3 and as far as they really are so applied1 they so far are coincident with the divine law above mentioned4 ,but yet1 whatever is pretended1 this is visible1 that these names1 virtue and vice1 in the particular instances of their application1 through the several nations and societies of men in the world1 are constantly attributed only to such actions as in each country and society are in reputation or discredit4 ,nor is it to be thought strange1 that men everywhere should give the name of virtue to those actions1 which amongst them are judged praiseworthy2 and call that vice1 which they account blamable3 since otherwise they would condemn themselves1 if they should think anything right1 to which they allowed not commendation1 anything wrong1 which they let pass without blame4 ,thus the measure of what is everywhere called and esteemed virtue and vice is this approbation or dislike1 praise or blame1 which1 by a secret and tacit consent1 establishes itself in the several societies1 tribes1 and clubs of men in the world3 whereby several actions come to find credit or disgrace amongst them1 according to the judgment1 maxims1 or fashion of that place4 ,for1 though men uniting into politic societies1 have resigned up to the public the disposing of all their force1 so that they cannot employ it against any fellow-citizens any further than the law of the country directs3 yet they retain still the power of thinking well or ill1 approving or disapproving of the actions of those whom they live amongst1 and converse with3 and by this approbation and dislike they establish amongst themselves what they will call virtue and vice4 #aa4 ,the ,measure that ,man commonly apply to determine what they call ,virtue and ,vice4 ,that this is the common ,,measure of virtue and vice1 will appear to any one who considers1 that1 though that passes for vice in one country which is counted a virtue1 or at least not vice1 in another1 yet everywhere virtue and praise1 vice and blame1 go together4 ,virtue is everywhere1 that which is thought praiseworthy2 and nothing else but that which has the allowance of public esteem is called virtue4 ,virtue and praise are so united1 that they are called often by the same name4 ,sunt sua praemia laudi1 says ,virgil2 and so ,cicero1 ,nihil habet natura praestantius1 quam honestatem1 quam laudem1 quam dignitatem1 quam decus1 which he tells you are all names for the same thing4 ,this is the language of the heathen philosophers1 who well understood wherein their notions of virtue and vice consisted4 ,and though perhaps1 by the different temper1 education1 fashion1 maxims1 or interest of different sorts of men1 it fell out1 that what was thought praiseworthy in one place1 escaped not censure in another2 and so in different societies1 virtues and vices were changed2 yet1 as to the main1 they for the most part kept the same everywhere4 ,for1 since nothing can be more natural than to encourage with esteem and reputation that wherein every one finds his advantage1 and to blame and discountenance the contrary2 it is no wonder that esteem and discredit1 virtue and vice1 should1 in a great measure1 everywhere correspond with the unchangeable rule of right and wrong1 which the law of ,god hath established2 there being nothing that so directly and visibly secures and advances the general good of mankind in this world1 as obedience to the laws he had set them1 and nothing that breeds such mischiefs and confusion1 as the neglect of them4 ,and therefore men1 without renouncing all sense and reason1 and their own interest1 which they are so constantly true to1 could not generally mistake1 in placing their commendation and blame on that side that really deserved it not4 ,nay1 even those men whose practice was otherwise1 failed not to give their approbation right1 few being depraved to that degree as not to condemn1 at least in others1 the faults they themselves were guilty of2 whereby1 even in the corruption of manners1 the true boundaries of the law of nature1 which ought to be the rule of virtue and vice1 were pretty well preferred4 ,so that even the exhortations of inspired teachers1 have not feared to appeal to common repute3 #8,whatsoever is lovely1 whatsoever is of good report1 if there be any virtue1 if there be any praise1' c4 7,phil4 iv4 #h47 #ab4 ,its ,inforcement is ,commendation and ,discredit4 ,if any one shall imagine that ,i have forgot my own notion of a law1 when ,i make the law1 whereby men judge of virtue and vice1 to be nothing else but the consent of private men1 who have not authority enough to make a law3 especially wanting that which is so necessary and essential to a law1 a power to enforce it3 ,i think ,i may say1 that he who imagines commendation and disgrace not to be strong motives to men to accommodate themselves to the opinions and rules of those with whom they converse1 seems little skilled in the nature or history of mankind3 the greatest part whereof we shall find to govern themselves chiefly1 if not solely1 by this ,,law ,,of ,,fashion2 and so they do that which keeps them in reputation with their company1 little regard the laws of ,god1 or the magistrate4 ,the penalties that attend the breach of ,god's laws some1 nay perhaps most men1 seldom seriously reflect on3 and amongst those that do1 many1 whilst they break the law1 entertain thoughts of future reconciliation1 and making their peace for such breaches4 ,and as to the punishments due from the laws of the commonwealth1 they frequently flatter themselves with the hopes of impunity4 ,but no man escapes the punishment of their censure and dislike1 who offends against the fashion and opinion of the company he keeps1 and would recommend himself to4 ,nor is there one of ten thousand1 who is stiff and insensible enough1 to bear up under the constant dislike and condemnation of his own club4 ,he must be of a strange and unusual constitution1 who can content himself to live in constant disgrace and disrepute with his own particular society4 ,solitude many men have sought1 and been reconciled to3 but nobody that has the least thought or sense of a man about him1 can live in society under the constant dislike and ill opinion of his familiars1 and those he converses with4 ,this is a burden too heavy for human sufferance3 and he must be made up of irreconcileable contradictions1 who can take pleasure in company1 and yet be insensible of contempt and disgrace from his companions4 #ac4 ,these three ,laws the ,rules of moral ,good and ,evil4 ,these three then1 first1 the law of ,god2 secondly1 the law of politic societies2 thirdly1 the law of fashion1 or private censure1 are those to which men variously compare their actions3 and it is by their conformity to one of these laws that they take their measures1 when they would judge of their moral rectitude1 and denominate their actions good or bad4 #ad4 ,morality is the ,relation of ,voluntary ,actions to these ,rules4 ,whether the rule to which1 as to a touchstone1 we bring our voluntary actions1 to examine them by1 and try their goodness1 and accordingly to name them1 which is1 as it were1 the mark of the value we set upon them3 whether1 ,i say1 we take that rule from the fashion of the country1 or the will of a law-maker1 the mind is easily able to observe the relation any action hath to it1 and to judge whether the action agrees or disagrees with the rule2 and so hath a notion of moral goodness or evil1 which is either conformity or not conformity of any action to that rule3 and therefore is often called moral rectitude4 ,this rule being nothing but a collection of several simple ideas1 the conformity thereto is but so ordering the action1 that the simple ideas belonging to it may correspond to those which the law requires4 ,and thus we see how moral beings and notions are founded on1 and terminated in1 these simple ideas we have received from sensation or reflection4 ,for example3 let us consider the complex idea we signify by the word murder3 and when we have taken it asunder1 and examined all the particulars1 we shall find them to amount to a collection of simple ideas derived from reflection or sensation1 viz4 ,first1 from ,,reflection on the operations of our own minds1 we have the ideas of willing1 considering1 purposing beforehand1 malice1 or wishing ill to another2 and also of life1 or perception1 and self-motion4 ,secondly1 from ,,sensation we have the collection of those simple sensible ideas which are to be found in a man1 and of some action1 whereby we put an end to perception and motion in the man2 all which simple ideas are comprehended in the word murder4 ,this collection of simple ideas1 being found by me to agree or disagree with the esteem of the country ,i have been bred in1 and to be held by most men there worthy praise or blame1 ,i call the action virtuous or vicious3 if ,i have the will of a supreme invisible ,lawgiver for my rule1 then1 as ,i supposed the action commanded or forbidden by ,god1 ,i call it good or evil1 sin or duty3 and if ,i compare it to the civil law1 the rule made by the legislative power of the country1 ,i call it lawful or unlawful1 a crime or no crime4 ,so that whencesoever we take the rule of moral actions2 or by what standard soever we frame in our minds the ideas of virtues or vices1 they consist only1 and are made up of collections of simple ideas1 which we originally received from sense or reflection3 and their rectitude or obliquity consists in the agreement or disagreement with those patterns prescribed by some law4 #ae4 ,moral actions may be regarded either absolutely1 or as ideas of relation4 ,to conceive rightly of moral actions1 we must take notice of them under this two-fold consideration4 ,first1 as they are in themselves1 each made up of such a collection of simple ideas4 ,thus drunkenness1 or lying1 signify such or such a collection of simple ideas1 which ,i call mixed modes3 and in this sense they are as much ,,positive ,,absolute ideas1 as the drinking of a horse1 or speaking of a parrot4 ,secondly1 our actions are considered as good1 bad1 or indifferent2 and in this respect they are ,,relative1 it being their conformity to1 or disagreement with some rule that makes them to be regular or irregular1 good or bad2 and so1 as far as they are compared with a rule1 and thereupon denominated1 they come under relation4 ,thus the challenging and fighting with a man1 as it is a certain positive mode1 or particular sort of action1 by particular ideas1 distinguished from all others1 is called ,,duelling3 which1 when considered in relation to the law of ,god1 will deserve the name of sin2 to the law of fashion1 in some countries1 valour and virtue2 and to the municipal laws of some governments1 a capital crime4 ,in this case1 when the positive mode has one name1 and another name as it stands in relation to the law1 the distinction may as easily be observed as it is in substances1 where one name1 v4g4 ,,man1 is used to signify the thing2 another1 v4g4 ,,father1 to signify the relation4 #af4 ,the ,denominations of ,actions often mislead us4 ,but because very frequently the positive idea of the action1 and its moral relation1 are comprehended together under one name1 and the same word made use of to express both the mode or action1 and its moral rectitude or obliquity3 therefore the relation itself is less taken notice of2 and there is often no distinction made between the positive idea of the action1 and the reference it has to a rule4 ,by which confusion of these two distinct considerations under one term1 those who yield too easily to the impressions of sounds1 and are forward to take names for things1 are often misled in their judgment of actions4 ,thus1 the taking from another what is his1 without his knowledge or allowance1 is properly called ,,stealing3 but that name1 being commonly understood to signify also the moral gravity of the action1 and to denote its contrariety to the law1 men are apt to condemn whatever they hear called stealing1 as an ill action1 disagreeing with the rule of right4 ,and yet the private taking away his sword from a madman1 to prevent his doing mischief1 though it be properly denominated stealing1 as the name of such a mixed mode2 yet when compared to the law of ,god1 and considered in its relation to that supreme rule1 it is no sin or transgression1 though the name stealing ordinarily carries such an intimation with it4 #ag4 ,relations innumerable1 and only the most considerable here mentioned4 ,and thus much for the relation of human actions to a law1 which1 therefore1 ,i call ,,moral ,,relations4 ,it would make a volume to go over all sorts of ,,relations3 it is not1 therefore1 to be expected that ,i should here mention them all4 ,it suffices to our present purpose to show by these1 what the ideas are we have of this comprehensive consideration called ,,relation4 ,which is so various1 and the occasions of it so many1 7as many as there can be of comparing things one to another17 that it is not very easy to reduce it to rules1 or under just heads4 ,those ,i have mentioned1 ,i think1 are some of the most considerable2 and such as may serve to let us see from whence we get our ideas of relations1 and wherein they are founded4 ,but before ,i quit this argument1 from what has been said give me leave to observe3 #ah4 ,all ,relations terminate in simple ,ideas4 ,first1 ,that it is evident1 that all relation terminates in1 and is ultimately founded on1 those simple ideas we have got from sensation or reflection3 so that all we have in our thoughts ourselves1 7if we think of anything1 or have any meaning17 or would signify to others1 when we use words standing for relations1 is nothing but some simple ideas1 or collections of simple ideas1 compared one with another4 ,this is so manifest in that sort called proportional1 that nothing can be more4 ,for when a man says #8honey is sweeter than wax1' it is plain that his thoughts in this relation terminate in this simple idea1 sweetness2 which is equally true of all the rest3 though1 where they are compounded1 or decompounded1 the simple ideas they are made up of1 are1 perhaps1 seldom taken notice of3 v4g4 when the word father is mentioned3 first1 there is meant that particular species1 or collective idea1 signified by the word man2 secondly1 those sensible simple ideas1 signified by the word generation2 and1 thirdly1 the effects of it1 and all the simple ideas signified by the word child4 ,so the word friend1 being taken for a man who loves and is ready to do good to another1 has all these following ideas to the making of it up3 first1 all the simple ideas1 comprehended in the word man1 or intelligent being2 secondly1 the idea of love2 thirdly1 the idea of readiness or disposition2 fourthly1 the idea of action1 which is any kind of thought or motion2 fifthly1 the idea of good1 which signifies anything that may advance his happiness1 and terminates at last1 if examined1 in particular simple ideas1 of which the word good in general signifies any one2 but1 if removed from all simple ideas quite1 it signifies nothing at all4 ,and thus also all moral words terminate at last1 though perhaps more remotely1 in a collection of simple ideas3 the immediate signification of relative words1 being very often other supposed known relations2 which1 if traced one to another1 still end in simple ideas4 #ai4 ,we have ordinarily as clear a ,notion of the ,relation1 as of the simple ideas in things on which it is founded4 ,secondly1 ,that in relations1 we have for the most part1 if not always1 as clear a notion of ,,the ,,relation as we have of ,,those ,,simple ,,ideas ,,wherein ,,it ,,is ,,founded3 agreement or disagreement1 whereon relation depends1 being things whereof we have commonly as clear ideas as of any other whatsoever2 it being but the distinguishing simple ideas1 or their degrees one from another1 without which we could have no distinct knowledge at all4 ,for1 if ,i have a clear idea of sweetness1 light1 or extension1 ,i have1 too1 of equal1 or more1 or less1 of each of these3 if ,i know what it is for one man to be born of a woman1 viz4 ,sempronia1 ,i know what it is for another man to be born of the same woman ,sempronia2 and so have as clear a notion of brothers as of births1 and perhaps clearer4 ,for if ,i believed that ,sempronia digged ,titus out of the parsley-bed1 7as they used to tell children17 and thereby became his mother2 and that afterwards1 in the same manner1 she digged ,caius out of the parsley-bed1 ,i had as clear a notion of the relation of brothers between them1 as if ,i had all the skill of a midwife3 the notion that the same woman contributed1 as mother1 equally to their births1 7though ,i were ignorant or mistaken in the manner of it17 being that on which ,i grounded the relation2 and that they agreed in the circumstance of birth1 let it be what it will4 ,the comparing them then in their descent from the same person1 without knowing the particular circumstances of that descent1 is enough to found my notion of their having1 or not having1 the relation of brothers4 ,but though the ideas of ,,particular ,,relations are capable of being as clear and distinct in the minds of those who will duly consider them as those of mixed modes1 and more determinate than those of substances3 yet the names belonging to relation are often of as doubtful and uncertain signification as those of substances or mixed modes2 and much more than those of simple ideas4 ,because relative words1 being the marks of this comparison1 which is made only by men's thoughts1 and is an idea only in men's minds1 men frequently apply them to different comparisons of things1 according to their own imaginations2 which do not always correspond with those of others using the same name4 #bj4 ,the ,notion of ,relation is the same1 whether the ,rule any ,action is compared to be true or false4 ,thirdly1 ,that in these ,i call ,,moral ,,relations1 ,i have a true notion of relation1 by comparing the action with the rule1 whether the rule be true or false4 ,for if ,i measure anything by a yard1 ,i know whether the thing ,i measure be longer or shorter than that supposed yard1 though perhaps the yard ,i measure by be not exactly the standard3 which indeed is another inquiry4 ,for though the rule be erroneous1 and ,i mistaken in it2 yet the agreement or disagreement observable in that which ,i compare with1 makes me perceive the relation4 ,though1 measuring by a wrong rule1 ,i shall thereby be brought to judge amiss of its moral rectitude2 because ,i have tried it by that which is not the true rule3 yet ,i am not mistaken in the relation which that action bears to that rule ,i compare it to1 which is agreement or disagreement4 ,,chapter ,,xxix4 ,,of ,,clear ,,and ,,obscure1 ,,distinct ,,and ,,confused ,,ideas4 #a4 ,ideas1 some clear and distinct1 others obscure and confused4 ,having shown the original of our ideas1 and taken a view of their several sorts2 considered the difference between the simple and the complex2 and observed how the complex ones are divided into those of modes1 substances1 and relations--all which1 ,i think1 is necessary to be done by any one who would acquaint himself thoroughly with the progress of the mind1 in its apprehension and knowledge of things--it will1 perhaps1 be thought ,i have dwelt long enough upon the examination of ,,ideas4 ,i must1 nevertheless1 crave leave to offer some few other considerations concerning them4 ,the first is1 that some are ,,clear and others ,,obscure2 some ,,distinct and others ,,confused4 #b4 ,clear and obscure explained by ,sight4 ,the perception of the mind being most aptly explained by words relating to the sight1 we shall best understand what is meant by ,,clear and ,,obscure in our ideas1 by reflecting on what we call clear and obscure in the objects of sight4 ,light being that which discovers to us visible objects1 we give the name of ,,obscure to that which is not placed in a light sufficient to discover minutely to us the figure and colours which are observable in it1 and which1 in a better light1 would be discernible4 ,in like manner1 our simple ideas are ,,clear1 when they are such as the objects themselves from whence they were taken did or might1 in a well-ordered sensation or perception1 present them4 ,whilst the memory retains them thus1 and can produce them to the mind whenever it has occasion to consider them1 they are clear ideas4 ,so far as they either want anything of the original exactness1 or have lost any of their first freshness1 and are1 as it were1 faded or tarnished by time1 so far are they obscure4 ,complex ideas1 as they are made up of simple ones1 so they are clear1 when the ideas that go to their composition are clear1 and the number and order of those simple ideas that are the ingredients of any complex one is determinate and certain4 #c4 ,causes of ,obscurity4 ,the causes of obscurity1 in simple ideas1 seem to be either dull organs2 or very slight and transient impressions made by the objects2 or else a weakness in the memory1 not able to retain them as received4 ,for to return again to visible objects1 to help us to apprehend this matter4 ,if the organs1 or faculties of perception1 like wax over-hardened with cold1 will not receive the impression of the seal1 from the usual impulse wont to imprint it2 or1 like wax of a temper too soft1 will not hold it well1 when well imprinted2 or else supposing the wax of a temper fit1 but the seal not applied with a sufficient force to make a clear impression3 in any of these cases1 the print left by the seal will be obscure4 ,this1 ,i suppose1 needs no application to make it plainer4 #d4 ,distinct and confused1 what4 ,as a clear idea is that whereof the mind has such a full and evident perception1 as it does receive from an outward object operating duly on a well-disposed organ1 so a ,,distinct idea is that wherein the mind perceives a difference from all other2 and a ,,confused idea is such an one as is not sufficiently distinguishable from another1 from which it ought to be different4 #e4 ,objection4 ,if no idea be confused1 but such as is not sufficiently distinguishable from another from which it should be different1 it will be hard1 may any one say1 to find anywhere a ,,confused idea4 ,for1 let any idea be as it will1 it can be no other but such as the mind perceives it to be2 and that very perception sufficiently distinguishes it from all other ideas1 which cannot be other1 i4e4 different1 without being perceived to be so4 ,no idea1 therefore1 can be undistinguishable from another from which it ought to be different1 unless you would have it different from itself3 for from all other it is evidently different4 #f4 ,confusion of ,ideas is in ,reference to their ,names4 ,to remove this difficulty1 and to help us to conceive aright what it is that makes the confusion ideas are at any time chargeable with1 we must consider1 that things ranked under distinct names are supposed different enough to be distinguished1 that so each sort by its peculiar name may be marked1 and discoursed of apart upon any occasion3 and there is nothing more evident1 than that the greatest part of different names are supposed to stand for different things4 ,now every idea a man has1 being visibly what it is1 and distinct from all other ideas but itself2 that which makes it confused1 is1 when it is such that it may as well be called by another name as that which it is expressed by2 the difference which keeps the things 7to be ranked under those two different names7 distinct1 and makes some of them belong rather to the one and some of them to the other of those names1 being left out2 and so the distinction1 which was intended to be kept up by those different names1 is quite lost4 #g4 ,defaults which make this ,confusion4 ,the defaults which usually occasion this confusion1 ,i think1 are chiefly these following3 ,first1 complex ideas made up of too few simple ones4 ,first1 when any complex idea 7for it is complex ideas that are most liable to confusion7 is made up of too small a number of simple ideas1 and such only as are common to other things1 whereby the differences that make it deserve a different name1 are left out4 ,thus1 he that has an idea made up of barely the simple ones of a beast with spots1 has but a confused idea of a leopard2 it not being thereby sufficiently distinguished from a lynx1 and several other sorts of beasts that are spotted4 ,so that such an idea1 though it hath the peculiar name leopard1 is not distinguishable from those designed by the names lynx or panther1 and may as well come under the name lynx as leopard4 ,how much the custom of defining of words by general terms contributes to make the ideas we would express by them confused and undetermined1 ,i leave others to consider4 ,this is evident1 that confused ideas are such as render the use of words uncertain1 and take away the benefit of distinct names4 ,when the ideas1 for which we use different terms1 have not a difference answerable to their distinct names1 and so cannot be distinguished by them1 there it is that they are truly confused4 #h4 ,secondly1 or their simple ones jumbled disorderly together4 ,secondly1 ,another fault which makes our ideas confused is1 when1 though the particulars that make up any idea are in number enough1 yet they are so jumbled together1 that it is not easily discernible whether it more belongs to the name that is given it than to any other4 ,there is nothing properer to make us conceive this confusion than a sort of pictures1 usually shown as surprising pieces of art1 wherein the colours1 as they are laid by the pencil on the table itself1 mark out very odd and unusual figures1 and have no discernible order in their position4 ,this draught1 thus made up of parts wherein no symmetry nor order appears1 is in itself no more a confused thing1 than the picture of a cloudy sky2 wherein1 though there be as little order of colours or figures to be found1 yet nobody thinks it a confused picture4 ,what is it1 then1 that makes it be thought confused1 since the want of symmetry does not8 ,as it is plain it does not3 for another draught made barely in imitation of this could not be called confused4 ,i answer1 ,that which makes it be thought confused is1 the applying it to some name to which it does no more discernibly belong than to some other3 v4g4 when it is said to be the picture of a man1 or ,caesar1 then any one with reason counts it confused2 because it is not discernible in that state to belong more to the name man1 or ,caesar1 than to the name baboon1 or ,pompey3 which are supposed to stand for different ideas from those signified by man1 or ,caesar4 ,but when a cylindrical mirror1 placed right1 had reduced those irregular lines on the table into their due order and proportion1 then the confusion ceases1 and the eye presently sees that it is a man1 or ,caesar2 i4e4 that it belongs to those names2 and that it is sufficiently distinguishable from a baboon1 or ,pompey2 i4e4 from the ideas signified by those names4 ,just thus it is with our ideas1 which are as it were the pictures of things4 ,no one of these mental draughts1 however the parts are put together1 can be called confused 7for they are plainly discernible as they are7 till it be ranked under some ordinary name to which it cannot be discerned to belong1 any more than it does to some other name of an allowed different signification4 #i4 ,thirdly1 or their simple ones mutable and undetermined4 ,thirdly1 ,a third defect that frequently gives the name of confused to our ideas1 is1 when any one of them is uncertain and undetermined4 ,thus we may observe men who1 not forbearing to use the ordinary words of their language till they have learned their precise signification1 change the idea they make this or that term stand for1 almost as often as they use it4 ,he that does this out of uncertainty of what he should leave out1 or put into his idea of ,,church1 or ,,idolatry1 every time he thinks of either1 and holds not steady to any one precise combination of ideas that makes it up1 is said to have a confused idea of idolatry or the church3 though this be still for the same reason as the former1 viz4 because a mutable idea 7if we will allow it to be one idea7 cannot belong to one name rather than another1 and so loses the distinction that distinct names are designed for4 #aj4 ,confusion without ,reference to ,names1 hardly conceivable4 ,by what has been said1 we may observe how much ,,names1 as supposed steady signs of things1 and by their difference to stand for1 and keep things distinct that in themselves are different1 are the occasion of denominating ideas distinct or confused1 by a secret and unobserved reference the mind makes of its ideas to such names4 ,this perhaps will be fuller understood1 after what ,i say of ,words in the third ,book has been read and considered4 ,but without taking notice of such a reference of ideas to distinct names1 as the signs of distinct things1 it will be hard to say what a confused idea is4 ,and therefore when a man designs1 by any name1 a sort of things1 or any one particular thing1 distinct from all others1 the complex idea he annexes to that name is the more distinct1 the more particular the ideas are1 and the greater and more determinate the number and order of them is1 whereof it is made up4 ,for1 the more it has of these1 the more it has still of the perceivable differences1 whereby it is kept separate and distinct from all ideas belonging to other names1 even those that approach nearest to it1 and thereby all confusion with them is avoided4 #aa4 ,confusion concerns always two ,ideas4 ,confusion making it a difficulty to separate two things that should be separated1 concerns always two ideas2 and those most which most approach one another4 ,whenever1 therefore1 we suspect any idea to be confused1 we must examine what other it is in danger to be confounded with1 or which it cannot easily be separated from2 and that will always be found an idea belonging to another name1 and so should be a different thing1 from which yet it is not sufficiently distinct3 being either the same with it1 or making a part of it1 or at least as properly called by that name as the other it is ranked under2 and so keeps not that difference from that other idea which the different names import4 #ab4 ,causes of confused ,ideas4 ,this1 ,i think1 is the confusion proper to ideas2 which still carries with it a secret reference to names4 ,at least1 if there be any other confusion of ideas1 this is that which most of all disorders men's thoughts and discourses3 ideas1 as ranked under names1 being those that for the most part men reason of within themselves1 and always those which they commune about with others4 ,and therefore where there are supposed two different ideas1 marked by two different names1 which are not as distinguishable as the sounds that stand for them1 there never fails to be confusion2 and where any ideas are distinct as the ideas of those two sounds they are marked by1 there can be between them no confusion4 ,the way to prevent it is to collect and unite into one complex idea1 as precisely as is possible1 all those ingredients whereby it is differenced from others2 and to them1 so united in a determinate number and order1 apply steadily the same name4 ,but this neither accommodating men's ease or vanity1 nor serving any design but that of naked truth1 which is not always the thing aimed at1 such exactness is rather to be wished than hoped for4 ,and since the loose application of names1 to undetermined1 variable1 and almost no ideas1 serves both to cover our own ignorance1 as well as to perplex and confound others1 which goes for learning and superiority in knowledge1 it is no wonder that most men should use it themselves1 whilst they complain of it in others4 ,though ,i think no small part of the confusion to be found in the notions of men might1 by care and ingenuity1 be avoided1 yet ,i am far from concluding it everywhere wilful4 ,some ideas are so complex1 and made up of so many parts1 that the memory does not easily retain the very same precise combination of simple ideas under one name3 much less are we able constantly to divine for what precise complex idea such a name stands in another man's use of it4 ,from the first of these1 follows confusion in a man's own reasonings and opinions within himself2 from the latter1 frequent confusion in discoursing and arguing with others4 ,but having more at large treated of ,words1 their defects1 and abuses1 in the following ,book1 ,i shall here say no more of it4 #ac4 ,complex ,ideas may be distinct in one ,part1 and confused in another4 ,our complex ideas1 being made up of collections1 and so variety of simple ones1 may accordingly be very clear and distinct in one part1 and very obscure and confused in another4 ,in a man who speaks of a chiliaedron1 or a body of a thousand sides1 the ideas of the figure may be very confused1 though that of the number be very distinct2 so that he being able to discourse and demonstrate concerning that part of his complex idea which depends upon the number of thousand1 he is apt to think he has a distinct idea of a chiliaedron2 though it be plain he has no precise idea of its figure1 so as to distinguish it1 by that1 from one that has but #iii sides3 the not observing whereof causes no small error in men's thoughts1 and confusion in their discourses4 #ad4 ,this1 if not heeded1 causes ,confusion in our ,arguings4 ,he that thinks he has a distinct idea of the figure of a chiliaedron1 let him for trial sake take another parcel of the same uniform matter1 viz4 gold or wax of an equal bulk1 and make it into a figure of #iii sides4 ,he will1 ,i doubt not1 be able to distinguish these two ideas one from another1 by the number of sides2 and reason and argue distinctly about them1 whilst he keeps his thoughts and reasoning to that part only of these ideas which is contained in their numbers2 as that the sides of the one could be divided into two equal numbers1 and of the others not1 c4 ,but when he goes about to distinguish them by their figure1 he will there be presently at a loss1 and not be able1 ,i think1 to frame in his mind two ideas1 one of them distinct from the other1 by the bare figure of these two pieces of gold2 as he could1 if the same parcels of gold were made one into a cube1 the other a figure of five sides4 ,in which incomplete ideas1 we are very apt to impose on ourselves1 and wrangle with others1 especially where they have particular and familiar names4 ,for1 being satisfied in that part of the idea which we have clear2 and the name which is familiar to us1 being applied to the whole1 containing that part also which is imperfect and obscure1 we are apt to use it for that confused part1 and draw deductions from it in the obscure part of its signification1 as confidently as we do from the other4 #ae4 ,instance in ,eternity4 ,having frequently in our mouths the name ,eternity1 we are apt to think we have a positive comprehensive idea of it1 which is as much as to say1 that there is no part of that duration which is not clearly contained in our idea4 ,it is true that he that thinks so may have a clear idea of duration2 he may also have a clear idea of a very great length of duration2 he may also have a clear idea of the comparison of that great one with still a greater3 but it not being possible for him to include in his idea of any duration1 let it be as great as it will1 the ,,whole ,,extent ,,together ,,of ,a ,,duration1 ,,where ,,he ,,supposes ,,no ,,end1 that part of his idea1 which is still beyond the bounds of that large duration he represents to his own thoughts1 is very obscure and undetermined4 ,and hence it is that in disputes and reasonings concerning eternity1 or any other infinite1 we are very apt to blunder1 and involve ourselves in manifest absurdities4 #af4 ,infinite ,divisibility of ,matter4 ,in matter1 we have no clear ideas of the smallness of parts much beyond the smallest that occur to any of our senses3 and therefore1 when we talk of the divisibility of matter ,,in ,,infinitum1 though we have clear ideas of division and divisibility1 and have also clear ideas of parts made out of a whole by division2 yet we have but very obscure and confused ideas of corpuscles1 or minute bodies1 so to be divided1 when1 by former divisions1 they are reduced to a smallness much exceeding the perception of any of our senses2 and so all that we have clear and distinct ideas of is of what division in general or abstractedly is1 and the relation of ,,totum and ,,pars3 but of the bulk of the body1 to be thus infinitely divided after certain progressions1 ,i think1 we have no clear nor distinct idea at all4 ,for ,i ask any one1 whether1 taking the smallest atom of dust he ever saw1 he has any distinct idea 7bating still the number1 which concerns not extension7 betwixt the #ajj1jjjth and the #a1jjj1jjjth part of it4 ,or if he think he can refine his ideas to that degree1 without losing sight of them1 let him add ten cyphers to each of those numbers4 ,such a degree of smallness is not unreasonable to be supposed2 since a division carried on so far brings it no nearer the end of infinite division1 than the first division into two halves does4 ,i must confess1 for my part1 ,i have no clear distinct ideas of the different bulk or extension of those bodies1 having but a very obscure one of either of them4 ,so that1 ,i think1 when we talk of division of bodies in infinitum1 our idea of their distinct bulks1 which is the subject and foundation of division1 comes1 after a little progression1 to be confounded1 and almost lost in obscurity4 ,for that idea which is to represent only bigness must be very obscure and confused1 which we cannot distinguish from one ten times as big1 but only by number3 so that we have clear distinct ideas1 we may say1 of ten and one1 but no distinct ideas of two such extensions4 ,it is plain from hence1 that1 when we talk of infinite divisibility of body or extension1 our distinct and clear ideas are only of numbers3 but the clear distinct ideas of extension1 after some progress of division1 are quite lost2 and of such minute parts we have no distinct ideas at all2 but it returns1 as all our ideas of infinite do1 at last to that of ,,number ,,always ,,to ,,be ,,added2 but thereby never amounts to any distinct idea of ,,actual ,,infinite ,,parts4 ,we have1 it is true1 a clear idea of division1 as often as we think of it2 but thereby we have no more a clear idea of infinite parts in matter1 than we have a clear idea of an infinite number1 by being able still to add new numbers to any assigned numbers we have3 endless divisibility giving us no more a clear and distinct idea of actually infinite parts1 than endless addibility 7if ,i may so speak7 gives us a clear and distinct idea of an actually infinite number3 they both being only in a power still of increasing the number1 be it already as great as it will4 ,so that of what remains to be added 7,,wherein ,,consists ,,the ,,infinity7 we have but an obscure1 imperfect1 and confused idea2 from or about which we can argue or reason with no certainty or clearness1 no more than we can in arithmetic1 about a number of which we have no such distinct idea as we have of #d or #ajj2 but only this relative obscure one1 that1 compared to any other1 it is still bigger3 and we have no more a clear positive idea of it1 when we dropped line99 than if we should say it is bigger than #dj or #d3 #djj1jjj1jjj having no nearer a proportion to the end of addition or number than #d4 ,for he that adds only #d to #d1 and so proceeds1 shall as soon come to the end of all addition1 as he that adds #djj1jjj1jjj to #djj1jjj1jjj4 ,and so likewise in eternity2 he that has an idea of but four years1 has as much a positive complete idea of eternity1 as he that has one of #djj1jjj1jjj of years3 for what remains of eternity beyond either of these two numbers of years1 is as clear to the one as the other2 i4e4 neither of them has any clear positive idea of it at all4 ,for he that adds only #d years to #d1 and so on1 shall as soon reach eternity as he that adds #djj1jjj1jjj of years1 and so on2 or1 if he please1 doubles the increase as often as he will3 the remaining abyss being still as far beyond the end of all these progressions as it is from the length of a day or an hour4 ,for nothing finite bears any proportion to infinite2 and therefore our ideas1 which are all finite1 cannot bear any4 ,thus it is also in our idea of extension1 when we increase it by addition1 as well as when we diminish it by division1 and would enlarge our thoughts to infinite space4 ,after a few doublings of those ideas of extension1 which are the largest we are accustomed to have1 we lose the clear distinct idea of that space3 it becomes a confusedly great one1 with a surplus of still greater2 about which1 when we would argue or reason1 we shall always find ourselves at a loss2 confused ideas1 in our arguings and deductions from that part of them which is confused1 always leading us into confusion4 ,,chapter ,,xxx4 ,,of ,,real ,,and ,,fantastical ,,ideas4 #a4 ,ideas considered in reference to their ,archetypes4 ,besides what we have already mentioned concerning ideas1 other considerations belong to them1 in reference to ,,things ,,from ,,whence ,,they ,,are ,,taken1 or ,,which ,,they ,,may ,,be ,,supposed ,,to ,,represent2 and thus1 ,i think1 they may come under a threefold distinction1 and are3--,first1 either real or fantastical2 ,secondly1 adequate or inadequate2 ,thirdly1 true or false4 ,first1 by ,,real ,,ideas1 ,i mean such as have a foundation in nature2 such as have a conformity with the real being and existence of things1 or with their archetypes4 ,,fantastical or ,,chimerical1 ,i call such as have no foundation in nature1 nor have any conformity with that reality of being to which they are tacitly referred1 as to their archetypes4 ,if we examine the several sorts of ideas before mentioned1 we shall find that1 #b4 ,simple ,ideas are all real appearances of things4 ,first1 ,our ,,simple ,,ideas are all real1 all agree to the reality of things3 not that they are all of them the images or representations of what does exist2 the contrary whereof1 in all but the primary qualities of bodies1 hath been already shown4 ,but1 though whiteness and coldness are no more in snow than pain is2 yet those ideas of whiteness and coldness1 pain1 c41 being in us the effects of powers in things without us1 ordained by our ,maker to produce in us such sensations2 they are real ideas in us1 whereby we distinguish the qualities that are really in things themselves4 ,for1 these several appearances being designed to be the mark whereby we are to know and distinguish things which we have to do with1 our ideas do as well serve us to that purpose1 and are as real distinguishing characters1 whether they be only ,,constant ,,effects1 or else ,,exact ,,resemblances of something in the things themselves3 the reality lying in that steady correspondence they have with the distinct constitutions of real beings4 ,but whether they answer to those constitutions1 as to causes or patterns1 it matters not2 it suffices that they are constantly produced by them4 ,and thus our simple ideas are all real and true1 because they answer and agree to those powers of things which produce them on our minds2 that being all that is requisite to make them real1 and not fictions at pleasure4 ,for in simple ideas 7as has been shown7 the mind is wholly confined to the operation of things upon it1 and can make to itself no simple idea1 more than what it was received4 #c4 ,complex ,ideas are voluntary ,combinations4 ,though the mind be wholly passive in respect of its simple ideas2 yet1 ,i think1 we may say it is not so in respect of its complex ideas4 ,for those being combinations of simple ideas put together1 and united under one general name1 it is plain that the mind of man uses some kind of liberty in forming those complex ideas3 how else comes it to pass that one man's idea of gold1 or justice1 is different from another's1 but because he has put in1 or left out of his1 some simple idea which the other has not8 ,the question then is1 ,which of these are real1 and which barely imaginary combinations8 ,what collections agree to the reality of things1 and what not8 ,and to this ,i say that1 #d4 ,mixed ,modes and ,relations1 made of consistent ,ideas1 are real4 ,secondly1 ,,mixed ,,modes and ,,relations1 having no other reality but what they have in the minds of men1 there is nothing more required to this kind of ideas to make them real1 but that they be so framed1 that there be a possibility of existing conformable to them4 ,these ideas themselves1 being archetypes1 cannot differ from their archetypes1 and so cannot be chimerical1 unless any one will jumble together in them inconsistent ideas4 ,indeed1 as any of them have the names of a known language assigned to them1 by which he that has them in his mind would signify them to others1 so bare possibility of existing is not enough2 they must have a conformity to the ordinary signification of the name that is given them1 that they may not be thought fantastical3 as if a man would give the name of justice to that idea which common use calls liberality4 ,but this fantasticalness relates more to propriety of speech1 than reality of ideas4 ,for a man to be undisturbed in danger1 sedately to consider what is fittest to be done1 and to execute it steadily1 is a mixed mode1 or a complex idea of an action which may exist4 ,but to be undisturbed in danger1 without using one's reason or industry1 is what is also possible to be2 and so is as real an idea as the other4 ,though the first of these1 having the name ,,courage given to it1 may1 in respect of that name1 be a right or wrong idea2 but the other1 whilst it has not a common received name of any known language assigned to it1 is not capable of any deformity1 being made with no reference to anything but itself4 #e4 ,complex ,ideas of ,substances are real1 when they agree with the existence of ,things4 ,thirdly1 ,our complex ideas of ,,substances1 being made all of them in reference to things existing without us1 and intended to be representations of substances as they really are1 are no further real than as they are such combinations of simple ideas as are really united1 and co-exist in things without us4 ,on the contrary1 those are fantastical which are made up of such collections of simple ideas as were really never united1 never were found together in any substance3 v4 g4 a rational creature1 consisting of a horse's head1 joined to a body of human shape1 or such as the ,,centaurs are described3 or1 a body yellow1 very malleable1 fusible1 and fixed1 but lighter than common water3 or an uniform1 unorganized body1 consisting1 as to sense1 all of similar parts1 with perception and voluntary motion joined to it4 ,whether such substances as these can possibly exist or no1 it is probable we do not know3 but be that as it will1 these ideas of substances1 being made conformable to no pattern existing that we know2 and consisting of such collections of ideas as no substance ever showed us united together1 they ought to pass with us for barely imaginary3 but much more are those complex ideas so1 which contain in them any inconsistency or contradiction of their parts4 ,,chapter ,,xxxi4 ,,of ,,adequate ,,and ,,inadequate ,,ideas4 #a4 ,adequate ,ideas are such as perfectly represent their ,archetypes4 ,of our real ideas1 some are adequate1 and some are inadequate4 ,those ,i call ,,adequate1 which perfectly represent those archetypes which the mind supposes them taken from3 which it intends them to stand for1 and to which it refers them4 ,,inadequate ,,ideas are such1 which are but a partial or incomplete representation of those archetypes to which they are referred4 ,upon which account it is plain1 #b4 ,adequate ,ideas are such as perfectly represent their ,archetypes4 ,simple ,ideas all adequate4 ,first1 that ,,all ,,our ,,simple ,,ideas ,,are ,,adequate4 ,because1 being nothing but the effects of certain powers in things1 fitted and ordained by ,god to produce such sensations in us1 they cannot but be correspondent and adequate to those powers3 and we are sure they agree to the reality of things4 ,for1 if sugar produce in us the ideas which we call whiteness and sweetness1 we are sure there is a power in sugar to produce those ideas in our minds1 or else they could not have been produced by it4 ,and so each sensation answering the power that operates on any of our senses1 the idea so produced is a real idea1 7and not a fiction of the mind1 which has no power to produce any simple idea72 and cannot but be adequate1 since it ought only to answer that power3 and so all simple ideas are adequate4 ,it is true1 the things producing in us these simple ideas are but few of them denominated by us1 as if they were only the ,,causes of them2 but as if those ideas were real beings ,,in them4 ,for1 though fire be called painful to the touch1 whereby is signified the power of producing in us the idea of pain1 yet it is denominated also light and hot2 as if light and heat were really something in the fire1 more than a power to excite these ideas in us2 and therefore are called qualities in or of the fire4 ,but these being nothing1 in truth1 but powers to excite such ideas in us1 ,i must in that sense be understood1 when ,i speak of secondary qualities as being in things2 or of their ideas as being the objects that excite them in us4 ,such ways of speaking1 though accommodated to the vulgar notions1 without which one cannot be well understood1 yet truly signify nothing but those powers which are in things to excite certain sensations or ideas in us4 ,since were there no fit organs to receive the impressions fire makes on the sight and touch1 nor a mind joined to those organs to receive the ideas of light and heat by those impressions from the fire or sun1 there would yet be no more light or heat in the world than there would be pain if there were no sensible creature to feel it1 though the sun should continue just as it is now1 and ,mount ,a,etna flame higher than ever it did4 ,solidity and extension1 and the termination of it1 figure1 with motion and rest1 whereof we have the ideas1 would be really in the world as they are1 whether there were any sensible being to perceive them or no3 and therefore we have reason to look on those as the real modifications of matter1 and such as are the exciting causes of all our various sensations from bodies4 ,but this being an inquiry not belonging to this place1 ,i shall enter no further into it1 but proceed to show what complex ideas are adequate1 and what not4 #c4 ,modes are all adequate4 ,secondly1 ,,our ,,complex ,,ideas ,,of ,,modes1 being voluntary collections of simple ideas1 which the mind puts together1 without reference to any real archetypes1 or standing patterns1 existing anywhere1 are and cannot but be ,,adequate ,,ideas4 ,because they1 not being intended for copies of things really existing1 but for archetypes made by the mind1 to rank and denominate things by1 cannot want anything2 they having each of them that combination of ideas1 and thereby that perfection1 which the mind intended they should3 so that the mind acquiesces in them1 and can find nothing wanting4 ,thus1 by having the idea of a figure with three sides meeting at three angles1 ,i have a complete idea1 wherein ,i require nothing else to make it perfect4 ,that the mind is satisfied with the perfection of this its idea is plain1 in that it does not conceive that any understanding hath1 or can have1 a more complete or perfect idea of that thing it signifies by the word triangle1 supposing it to exist1 than itself has1 in that complex idea of three sides and three angles1 in which is contained all that is or can be essential to it1 or necessary to complete it1 wherever or however it exists4 ,but in our ,,ideas ,,of ,,substances it is otherwise4 ,for there1 desiring to copy things as they really do exist1 and to represent to ourselves that constitution on which all their properties depend1 we perceive our ideas attain not that perfection we intend3 we find they still want something we should be glad were in them2 and so are all inadequate4 ,but ,,mixed ,,modes and ,,relations1 being archetypes without patterns1 and so having nothing to represent but themselves1 cannot but be adequate1 everything being so to itself4 ,he that at first put together the idea of danger perceived1 absence of disorder from fear1 sedate consideration of what was justly to be done1 and executing that without disturbance1 or being deterred by the danger of it1 had certainly in his mind that complex idea made up of that combination3 and intending it to be nothing else but what is1 nor to have in it any other simple ideas but what it hath1 it could not also but be an adequate idea3 and laying this up in his memory1 with the name ,,courage annexed to it1 to signify to others1 and denominate from thence any action he should observe to agree with it1 had thereby a standard to measure and denominate actions by1 as they agreed to it4 ,this idea1 thus made and laid up for a pattern1 must necessarily be adequate1 being referred to nothing else but itself1 nor made by any other original but the good liking and will of him that first made this combination4 #d4 ,modes1 in reference to settled ,names1 may be inadequate4 ,indeed another coming after1 and in conversation learning from him the word ,,courage1 may make an idea1 to which he gives the name courage1 different from what the first author applied it to1 and has in his mind when he uses it4 ,and in this case1 if he designs that his idea in thinking should be conformable to the other's idea1 as the name he uses in speaking is conformable in sound to his from whom he learned it1 his idea may be very wrong and inadequate3 because in this case1 making the other man's idea the pattern of his idea in thinking1 as the other man's word or sound is the pattern of his in speaking1 his idea is so far defective and inadequate1 as it is distant from the archetype and pattern he refers it to1 and intends to express and signify by the name he uses for it2 which name he would have to be a sign of the other man's idea1 7to which1 in its proper use1 it is primarily annexed17 and of his own1 as agreeing to it3 to which if his own does not exactly correspond1 it is faulty and inadequate4 #e4 ,because then means1 in propriety of speech1 to correspond to the ideas in some other mind4 ,therefore these complex ideas of ,,modes1 which they are referred by the mind1 and intended to correspond to the ideas in the mind of some other intelligent being1 expressed by the names we apply to them1 they may be very deficient1 wrong1 and inadequate2 because they agree not to that which the mind designs to be their archetype and pattern3 in which respect only any idea of modes can be wrong1 imperfect1 or inadequate4 ,and on this account our ideas of mixed modes are the most liable to be faulty of any other2 but this refers more to proper speaking than knowing right4 #f4 ,ideas of ,substances1 as referred to real ,essences1 not adequate4 ,thirdly1 what ,,ideas ,,we ,,have ,,of ,,substances1 ,i have above shown4 ,now1 those ideas have in the mind a double reference3 #a4 ,sometimes they are referred to a supposed real essence of each species of things4 #b4 ,sometimes they are only designed to be pictures and representations in the mind of things that do exist1 by ideas of those qualities that are discoverable in them4 ,in both which ways these copies of those originals and archetypes are imperfect and inadequate4 ,first1 it is usual for men to make the names of substances stand for things as supposed to have certain real essences1 whereby they are of this or that species3 and names standing for nothing but the ideas that are in men's minds1 they must constantly refer their ideas to such real essences1 as to their archetypes4 ,that men 7especially such as have been bred up in the learning taught in this part of the world7 do suppose certain specific essences of substances1 which each individual in its several kinds is made conformable to and partakes of1 is so far from needing proof that it will be thought strange if any one should do otherwise4 ,and thus they ordinarily apply the specific names they rank particular substances under1 to things as distinguished by such specific real essences4 ,who is there almost1 who would not take it amiss if it should be doubted whether he called himself a man1 with any other meaning than as having the real essence of a man8 ,and yet if you demand what those real essences are1 it is plain men are ignorant1 and know them not4 ,from whence it follows1 that the ideas they have in their minds1 being referred to real essences1 as to archetypes which are unknown1 must be so far from being adequate that they cannot be supposed to be any representation of them at all4 ,the complex ideas we have of substances are1 as it has been shown1 certain collections of simple ideas that have been observed or supposed constantly to exist together4 ,but such a complex idea cannot be the real essence of any substance2 for then the properties we discover in that body would depend on that complex idea1 and be deducible from it1 and their necessary connexion with it be known2 as all properties of a triangle depend on1 and1 as far as they are discoverable1 are deducible from the complex idea of three lines including a space4 ,but it is plain that in our complex ideas of substances are not contained such ideas1 on which all the other qualities that are to be found in them do depend4 ,the common idea men have of iron is1 a body of a certain colour1 weight1 and hardness2 and a property that they look on as belonging to it1 is malleableness4 ,but yet this property has no necessary connexion with that complex idea1 or any part of it3 and there is no more reason to think that malleableness depends on that colour1 weight1 and hardness1 than that colour or that weight depends on its malleableness4 ,and yet1 though we know nothing of these real essences1 there is nothing more ordinary than that men should attribute the sorts of things to such essences4 ,the particular parcel of matter which makes the ring ,i have on my finger is forwardly by most men supposed to have a real essence1 whereby it is gold2 and from whence those qualities flow which ,i find in it1 viz4 its peculiar colour1 weight1 hardness1 fusibility1 fixedness1 and change of colour upon a slight touch of mercury1 c4 ,this essence1 from which all these properties flow1 when ,i inquire into it and search after it1 ,i plainly perceive ,i cannot discover3 the furthest ,i can go is1 only to presume that1 it being nothing but body1 its real essence or internal constitution1 on which these qualities depend1 can be nothing but the figure1 size1 and connexion of its solid parts2 of neither of which having any distinct perception at all can ,i have any idea of its essence3 which is the cause that it has that particular shining yellowness2 a greater weight than anything ,i know of the same bulk2 and a fitness to have its colour changed by the touch of quicksilver4 ,if any one will say1 that the real essence and internal constitution1 on which these properties depend1 is not the figure1 size1 and arrangement or connexion of its solid parts1 but something else1 called its particular ,,form1 ,i am further from having any idea of its real essence than ,i was before4 ,for ,i have an idea of figure1 size1 and situation of solid parts in general1 though ,i have none of the particular figure1 size1 or putting together of parts1 whereby the qualities above mentioned are produced2 which qualities ,i find in that particular parcel of matter that is on my finger1 and not in another parcel of matter1 with which ,i cut the pen ,i write with4 ,but1 when ,i am told that something besides the figure1 size1 and posture of the solid parts of that body in its essence1 something called ,,substantial ,,form1 of that ,i confess ,i have no idea at all1 but only of the sound form2 which is far enough from an idea of its real essence or constitution4 ,the like ignorance as ,i have of the real essence of this particular substance1 ,i have also of the real essence of all other natural ones3 of which essences ,i confess ,i have no distinct ideas at all2 and1 ,i am apt to suppose1 others1 when they examine their own knowledge1 will find in themselves1 in this one point1 the same sort of ignorance4 #g4 ,because men know not the real essence of substances4 ,now1 then1 when men apply to this particular parcel of matter on my finger a general name already in use1 and denominate it ,,gold1 do they not ordinarily1 or are they not understood to give it that name1 as belonging to a particular species of bodies1 having a real internal essence2 by having of which essence this particular substance comes to be of that species1 and to be called by that name8 ,if it be so1 as it is plain it is1 the name by which things are marked as having that essence must be referred primarily to that essence2 and consequently the idea to which that name is given must be referred also to that essence1 and be intended to represent it4 ,which essence1 since they who so use the names know not1 their ideas of substances must be all inadequate in that respect1 as not containing in them that real essence which the mind intends they should4 #h4 ,ideas of ,substances1 when regarded as ,collections of their ,qualities1 are all inadequate4 ,secondly1 those who1 neglecting that useless supposition of unknown real essences1 whereby they are distinguished1 endeavour to copy the substances that exist in the world1 by putting together the ideas of those sensible qualities which are found co-existing in them1 though they come much nearer a likeness of them than those who imagine they know not what real specific essences3 yet they arrive not at perfectly adequate ideas of those substances they would thus copy into their minds3 nor do those copies exactly and fully contain all that is to be found in their archetypes4 ,because those qualities and powers of substances1 whereof we make their complex ideas1 are so many and various1 that no man's complex idea contains them all4 ,that our complex ideas of substances do not contain in them ,,all the simple ideas that are united in the things themselves is evident1 in that men do rarely put into their complex idea of any substance all the simple ideas they do know to exist in it4 ,because1 endeavouring to make the signification of their names as clear and as little cumbersome as they can1 they make their specific ideas of the sorts of substance1 for the most part1 of a few of those simple ideas which are to be found in them3 but these having no original precedency1 or right to be put in1 and make the specific idea1 more than others that are left out1 it is plain that both these ways our ideas of substances are deficient and inadequate4 ,the simple ideas whereof we make our complex ones of substances are all of them 7bating only the figure and bulk of some sorts7 powers2 which being relations to other substances1 we can never be sure that we know ,,all the powers that are in any one body1 till we have tried what changes it is fitted to give to or receive from other substances in their several ways of application3 which being impossible to be tried upon any one body1 much less upon all1 it is impossible we should have adequate ideas of any substance made up of a collection of all its properties4 #i4 ,their powers usually make up our complex ideas of substances4 ,whosoever first lighted on a parcel of that sort of substance we denote by the word ,,gold1 could not rationally take the bulk and figure he observed in that lump to depend on its real essence1 or internal constitution4 ,therefore those never went into his idea of that species of body2 but its peculiar colour1 perhaps1 and weight1 were the first he abstracted from it1 to make the complex idea of that species4 ,which both are but powers2 the one to affect our eyes after such a manner1 and to produce in us that idea we call yellow2 and the other to force upwards any other body of equal bulk1 they being put into a pair of equal scales1 one against another4 ,another perhaps added to these the ideas of fusibility and fixedness1 two other passive powers1 in relation to the operation of fire upon it2 another1 its ductility and solubility in aqua regia1 two other powers1 relating to the operation of other bodies1 in changing its outward figure1 or separation of it into insensible parts4 ,these1 or parts of these1 put together1 usually make the complex idea in men's minds of that sort of body we call ,,gold4 #aj4 ,substances have innumerable powers not contained in our complex ideas of them4 ,but no one who hath considered the properties of bodies in general1 or this sort in particular1 can doubt that this1 called ,,gold1 has infinite other properties not contained in that complex idea4 ,some who have examined this species more accurately could1 ,i believe1 enumerate ten times as many properties in gold1 all of them as inseparable from its internal constitution1 as its colour or weight3 and it is probable1 if any one knew all the properties that are by divers men known of this metal1 there would be an hundred times as many ideas go to the complex idea of gold as any one man yet has in his2 and yet perhaps that not be the thousandth part of what is to be discovered in it4 ,the changes that that one body is apt to receive1 and make in other bodies1 upon a due application1 exceeding far not only what we know1 but what we are apt to imagine4 ,which will not appear so much a paradox to any one who will but consider how far men are yet from knowing all the properties of that one1 no very compound figure1 a triangle2 though it be no small number that are already by mathematicians discovered of it4 #aa4 ,ideas of ,substances1 being got only by collecting their qualities1 are all inadequate4 ,so that all our complex ideas of substances are imperfect and inadequate4 ,which would be so also in mathematical figures1 if we were to have our complex ideas of them1 only by collecting their properties in reference to other figures4 ,how uncertain and imperfect would our ideas be of an ellipsis1 if we had no other idea of it1 but some few of its properties8 ,whereas1 having in our plain idea the ,,whole essence of that figure1 we from thence discover those properties1 and demonstratively see how they flow1 and are inseparable from it4 #ab4 ,simple ,ideas1 word in ,greek1 and adequate4 ,thus the mind has three sorts of abstract ideas or nominal essences3 ,first1 ,,simple ideas1 which are word in ,greek or copies2 but yet certainly adequate4 ,because1 being intended to express nothing but the power in things to produce in the mind such a sensation1 that sensation1 when it is produced1 cannot but be the effect of that power4 ,so the paper ,i write on1 having the power in the light 7,i speak according to the common notion of light7 to produce in men the sensation which ,i call white1 it cannot but be the effect of such a power in something without the mind2 since the mind has not the power to produce any such idea in itself3 and being meant for nothing else but the effect of such a power that simple idea is 99 words missing the sensation of white1 in my mind1 being the effect of that power which is in the paper to produce it1 is perfectly adequate to that power2 or else that power would produce a different idea4 #ac4 ,ideas of ,substances are ,echthypa1 and inadequate4 ,secondly1 the ,,complex ideas of ,,substances are ectypes1 copies too2 but not perfect ones1 not adequate3 which is very evident to the mind1 in that it plainly perceives1 that whatever collection of simple ideas it makes of any substance that exists1 it cannot be sure that it exactly answers all that are in that substance4 ,since1 not having tried all the operations of all other substances upon it1 and found all the alterations it would receive from1 or cause in1 other substances1 it cannot have an exact adequate collection of all its active and passive capacities2 and so not have an adequate complex idea of the powers of any substance existing1 and its relations2 which is that sort of complex idea of substances we have4 ,and1 after all1 if we would have1 and actually had1 in our complex idea1 an exact collection of all the secondary qualities or powers of any substance1 we should not yet thereby have an idea of the ,,essence of that thing4 ,for1 since the powers or qualities that are observable by us are not the real essence of that substance1 but depend on it1 and flow from it1 any collection whatsoever of these qualities cannot be the real essence of that thing4 ,whereby it is plain1 that our ideas of substances are not adequate2 are not what the mind intends them to be4 ,besides1 a man has no idea of substance in general1 nor knows what substance is in itself4 #ad4 ,ideas of ,modes and ,relations are ,archetypes1 and cannot but be adequate4 ,thirdly1 ,,complex ideas of ,,modes ,,and ,,relations are originals1 and archetypes2 are not copies1 nor made after the pattern of any real existence1 to which the mind intends them to be conformable1 and exactly to answer4 ,these being such collections of simple ideas that the mind itself puts together1 and such collections that each of them contains in it precisely all that the mind intends that it should1 they are archetypes and essences of modes that may exist2 and so are designed only for1 and belong only to such modes as1 when they do exist1 have an exact conformity with those complex ideas ,the ideas1 therefore1 of modes and relations cannot but be adequate4 ,,chapter ,,xxxii4 ,,of ,,true ,,and ,,false ,,ideas4 #a4 ,truth and ,falsehood properly belong to ,propositions1 not to ,ideas4 ,though truth and falsehood belong1 in propriety of speech1 only to ,,propositions3 yet ,,ideas are oftentimes termed true or false 7as what words are there that are not used with great latitude1 and with some deviation from their strict and proper significations87 ,though ,i think that when ideas themselves are termed true or false1 there is still some secret or tacit proposition1 which is the foundation of that denomination3 as we shall see1 if we examine the particular occasions wherein they come to be called true or false4 ,in all which we shall find some kind of affirmation or negation1 which is the reason of that denomination4 ,for our ideas1 being nothing but bare ,,appearances1 or perceptions in our minds1 cannot properly and simply in themselves be said to be true or false1 no more than a single name of anything can be said to be true or false4 #b4 ,ideas and words may be said to be true1 inasmuch as they really are ideas and words4 ,indeed both ideas and words may be said to be true1 in a metaphysical sense of the word truth2 as all other things that any way exist are said to be true1 i4e4 really to be such as they exist4 ,though in things called true1 even in that sense1 there is perhaps a secret reference to our ideas1 looked upon as the standards of that truth2 which amounts to a mental proposition1 though it be usually not taken notice of4 #c4 ,no ,idea1 as an ,appearance in the ,mind1 either true or false4 ,but it is not in that metaphysical sense of truth which we inquire here1 when we examine1 whether our ideas are capable of being true or false1 but in the more ordinary acceptation of those words3 and so ,i say that the ideas in our minds1 being only so many perceptions or appearances there1 none of them are false2 the idea of a centaur having no more falsehood in it when it appears in our minds1 than the name centaur has falsehood in it1 when it is pronounced by our mouths1 or written on paper4 ,for truth or falsehood lying always in some affirmation or negation1 mental or verbal1 our ideas are not capable1 any of them1 of being false1 till the mind passes some judgment on them2 that is1 affirms or denies something of them4 #d4 ,ideas referred to anything extraneous to them may be true or false4 ,whenever the mind refers any of its ideas to anything extraneous to them1 they are then capable to be called true or false4 ,because the mind1 in such a reference1 makes a tacit supposition of their conformity to that thing2 which supposition1 as it happens to be true or false1 so the ideas themselves come to be denominated4 ,the most usual cases wherein this happens1 are these following3 #e4 ,other ,men's ,ideas2 real ,existence2 and supposed real ,essences1 are what ,men usually refer their ,ideas to4 ,first1 when the mind supposes any idea it has ,,conformable to that in ,,other ,,men',s ,,minds1 called by the same common name2 v4g4 when the mind intends or judges its ideas of justice1 temperance1 religion1 to be the same with what other men give those names to4 ,secondly1 when the mind supposes any idea it has in itself to be ,,conformable to some ,,real ,,existence4 ,thus the two ideas of a man and a centaur1 supposed to be the ideas of real substances1 are the one true and the other false2 the one having a conformity to what has really existed1 the other not4 ,thirdly1 when the mind ,,refers any of its ideas to that ,,real constitution and ,,essence of anything1 whereon all its properties depend3 and thus the greatest part1 if not all our ideas of substances1 are false4 #f4 ,the cause of such ,reference4 ,these suppositions the mind is very apt tacitly to make concerning its own ideas4 ,but yet1 if we will examine it1 we shall find it is chiefly1 if not only1 concerning its ,,abstract complex ideas4 ,for the natural tendency of the mind being towards knowledge2 and finding that1 if it should proceed by and dwell upon only particular things1 its progress would be very slow1 and its work endless2 therefore1 to shorten its way to knowledge1 and make each perception more comprehensive1 the first thing it does1 as the foundation of the easier enlarging its knowledge1 either by contemplation of the things themselves that it would know1 or conference with others about them1 is to bind them into bundles1 and rank them so into sorts1 that what knowledge it gets of any of them it may thereby with assurance extend to all of that sort2 and so advance by larger steps in that which is its great business1 knowledge4 ,this1 as ,i have elsewhere shown1 is the reason why we collect things under comprehensive ideas1 with names annexed to them1 into genera and species2 i4e4 into kinds and sorts4 #g4 ,names of things supposed to carry in them knowledge of their essences4 ,if therefore we will warily attend to the motions of the mind1 and observe what course it usually takes in its way to knowledge1 we shall ,i think find1 that the mind having got an idea which it thinks it may have use of either in contemplation or discourse1 the first thing it does is to abstract it1 and then get a name to it2 and so lay it up in its storehouse1 the memory1 as containing the essence of a sort of things1 of which that name is always to be the mark4 ,hence it is1 that we may often observe that1 when any one sees a new thing of a kind that he knows not1 he presently asks1 what it is2 meaning by that inquiry nothing but the name4 ,as if the name carried with it the knowledge of the species1 or the essence of it2 whereof it is indeed used as the mark1 and is generally supposed annexed to it4 #h4 ,how men suppose that their ideas must correspond to things1 and to the customary meanings of names4 ,but this ,,abstract ,,idea1 being something in the mind1 between the thing that exists1 and the name that is given to it2 it is in our ideas that both the rightness of our knowledge1 and the propriety and intelligibleness of our speaking1 consists4 ,and hence it is that men are so forward to suppose1 that the abstract ideas they have in their minds are such as agree to the things existing without them1 to which they are referred2 and are the same also to which the names they give them do by the use and propriety of that language belong4 ,for without this double conformity of their ideas1 they find they should both think amiss of things in themselves1 and talk of them unintelligibly to others4 #i4 ,simple ,ideas may be false1 in reference to others of the same ,name1 but are least liable to be so4 ,first1 then1 ,i say1 that when the truth of our ideas is judged of by the conformity they have to the ideas which other men have1 and commonly signify by the same name1 they may be any of them false4 ,but yet ,,simple ,,ideas are least of all liable to be so mistaken4 ,because a man1 by his senses and every day's observation1 may easily satisfy himself what the simple ideas are which their several names that are in common use stand for2 they being but few in number1 and such as1 if he doubts or mistakes in1 he may easily rectify by the objects they are to be found in4 ,therefore it is seldom that any one mistakes in his names of simple ideas1 or applies the name red to the idea green1 or the name sweet to the idea bitter3 much less are men apt to confound the names of ideas belonging to different senses1 and call a colour by the name of a taste1 c4 ,whereby it is evident that the simple ideas they call by any name are commonly the same that others have and mean when they use the same names4 #aj4 ,ideas of mixed ,modes most liable to be false in this ,sense4 ,complex ideas are much more liable to be false in this respect2 and the complex ideas of ,,mixed ,,modes1 much more than those of substances2 because in substances 7especially those which the common and unborrowed names of any language are applied to7 some remarkable sensible qualities1 serving ordinarily to distinguish one sort from another1 easily preserve those who take any care in the use of their words1 from applying them to sorts of substances to which they do not at all belong4 ,but in mixed modes we are much more uncertain2 it being not so easy to determine of several actions1 whether they are to be called ,,justice or ,,cruelty1 ,,liberality or ,,prodigality4 ,and so in referring our ideas to those of other men1 called by the same names1 ours may be false2 and the idea in our minds1 which we express by the word ,,justice1 may perhaps be that which ought to have another name4 #aa4 ,or at least to be thought false4 ,but whether or no our ideas of mixed modes are more liable than any sort to be different from those of other men1 which are marked by the same names1 this at least is certain4 ,that this sort of falsehood is much more familiarly attributed to our ideas of mixed modes than to any other4 ,when a man is thought to have a false idea of ,,justice1 or ,,gratitude1 or ,,glory1 it is for no other reason1 but that his agrees not with the ideas which each of those names are the signs of in other men4 #ab4 ,and why4 ,the reason whereof seems to me to be this3 ,that the abstract ideas of mixed modes1 being men's voluntary combinations of such a precise collection of simple ideas1 and so the essence of each species being made by men alone1 whereof we have no other sensible standard existing anywhere but the name itself1 or the definition of that name2 we having nothing else to refer these our ideas of mixed modes to1 as a standard to which we would conform them1 but the ideas of those who are thought to use those names in their most proper significations2 and1 so as our ideas conform or differ from ,,them1 they pass for true or false4 ,and thus much concerning the truth and falsehood of our ideas1 in reference to their names4 #ac4 ,as referred to ,real ,existence1 none of our ,ideas can be false but those of ,substances4 ,secondly1 as to the truth and falsehood of our ideas1 in reference to the real existence of things4 ,when that is made the standard of their truth1 none of them can be termed false but only our complex ideas of substances4 #ad4 ,first1 ,simple ,ideas in this ,sense not false and why4 ,first1 our simple ideas1 being barely such perceptions as ,god has fitted us to receive1 and given power to external objects to produce in us by established laws and ways1 suitable to his wisdom and goodness1 though incomprehensible to us1 their truth consists in nothing else but in such appearances as are produced in us1 and must be suitable to those powers he has placed in external objects or else they could not be produced in us3 and thus answering those powers1 they are what they should be1 true ideas4 ,nor do they become liable to any imputation of falsehood1 if the mind 7as in most men ,i believe it does7 judges these ideas to be in the things themselves4 ,for ,god in his wisdom having set them as marks of distinction in things1 whereby we may be able to discern one thing from another1 and so choose any of them for our uses as we have occasion2 it alters not the nature of our simple idea1 whether we think that the idea of blue be in the violet itself1 or in our mind only2 and only the power of producing it by the texture of its parts1 reflecting the particles of light after a certain manner1 to be in the violet itself4 ,for that texture in the object1 by a regular and constant operation producing the same idea of blue in us1 it serves us to distinguish1 by our eyes1 that from any other thing2 whether that distinguishing mark1 as it is really in the violet1 be only a peculiar texture of parts1 or else that very colour1 the idea whereof 7which is in us7 is the exact resemblance4 ,and it is equally from that appearance to be denominated blue1 whether it be that real colour1 or only a peculiar texture in it1 that causes in us that idea3 since the name1 ,,blue1 notes properly nothing but that mark of distinction that is in a violet1 discernible only by our eyes1 whatever it consists in2 that being beyond our capacities distinctly to know1 and perhaps would be of less use to us1 if we had faculties to discern4 #ae4 ,though one ,man's ,idea of ,blue should be different from another's4 ,neither would it carry any imputation of falsehood to our simple ideas1 if by the different structure of our organs it were so ordered1 that ,,the ,,same ,,object ,,should ,,produce ,,in ,,several ,,men',s ,,minds ,,different ,,ideas at the same time2 v4g4 if the idea that a violet produced in one man's mind by his eyes were the same that a marigold produced in another man's1 and vice versa4 ,for1 since this could never be known1 because one man's mind could not pass into another man's body1 to perceive what appearances were produced by those organs2 neither the ideas hereby1 nor the names1 would be at all confounded1 or any falsehood be in either4 ,for all things that had the texture of a violet1 producing constantly the idea that he called blue1 and those which had the texture of a marigold1 producing constantly the idea which he as constantly called yellow1 whatever those appearances were in his mind2 he would be able as regularly to distinguish things for his use by those appearances1 and understand and signify those distinctions marked by the name blue and yellow1 as if the appearances or ideas in his mind received from those two flowers were exactly the same with the ideas in other men's minds4 ,i am nevertheless very apt to think that the sensible ideas produced by any object in different men's minds1 are most commonly very near and undiscernibly alike4 ,for which opinion1 ,i think1 there might be many reasons offered3 but that being besides my present business1 ,i shall not trouble my reader with them2 but only mind him1 that the contrary supposition1 if it could be proved1 is of little use1 either for the improvement of our knowledge1 or conveniency of life1 and so we need not trouble ourselves to examine it4 #af4 ,simple ,ideas can none of them be false in respect of real existence4 ,from what has been said concerning our simple ideas1 ,i think it evident that our simple ideas can none of them be false in respect of things existing without us4 ,for the truth of these appearances or perceptions in our minds consisting1 as has been said1 only in their being answerable to the powers in external objects to produce by our senses such appearances in us1 and each of them being in the mind such as it is1 suitable to the power that produced it1 and which alone it represents1 it cannot upon that account1 or as referred to such a pattern1 be false4 ,blue and yellow1 bitter or sweet1 can never be false ideas3 these perceptions in the mind are just such as they are there1 answering the powers appointed by ,god to produce them2 and so are truly what they are1 and are intended to be4 ,indeed the names may be misapplied1 but that in this respect makes no falsehood in the ideas2 as if a man ignorant in the ,english tongue should call purple scarlet4 #ag4 ,secondly1 ,modes not false cannot be false in reference to essences of things4 ,secondly1 neither can our complex ideas of modes1 in reference to the essence of anything really existing1 be false2 because whatever complex ideas ,i have of any mode1 it hath no reference to any pattern existing1 and made by nature2 it is not supposed to contain in it any other ideas than what it hath2 nor to represent anything but such a complication of ideas as it does4 ,thus1 when ,i have the idea of such an action of a man who forbears to afford himself such meat1 drink1 and clothing1 and other conveniences of life1 as his riches and estate will be sufficient to supply and his station requires1 ,i have no false idea2 but such an one as represents an action1 either as ,i find or imagine it1 and so is capable of neither truth nor falsehood4 ,but when ,i give the name ,,frugality or ,,virtue to this action1 then it may be called a false idea1 if thereby it be supposed to agree with that idea to which1 in propriety of speech1 the name of frugality doth belong1 or to be conformable to that law which is the standard of virtue and vice4 #ah4 ,thirdly1 ,ideas of ,substances may be false in reference to existing things4 ,thirdly1 our complex ideas of substances1 being all referred to patterns in things themselves1 may be false4 ,that they are all false1 when looked upon as the representations of the unknown essences of things1 is so evident that there needs nothing to be said of it4 ,i shall therefore pass over that chimerical supposition1 and consider them as collections of simple ideas in the mind1 taken from combinations of simple ideas existing together constantly in things1 of which patterns they are the supposed copies2 and in this reference of them to the existence of things1 they are false ideas3--7#a7 ,when they put together simple ideas1 which in the real existence of things have no union2 as when to the shape and size that exist together in a horse1 is joined in the same complex idea the power of barking like a dog3 which three ideas1 however put together into one in the mind1 were never united in nature2 and this1 therefore1 may be called a false idea of a horse4 7#b7 ,ideas of substances are1 in this respect1 also false1 when1 from any collection of simple ideas that do always exist together1 there is separated1 by a direct negation1 any other simple idea which is constantly joined with them4 ,thus1 if to extension1 solidity1 fusibility1 the peculiar weightiness1 and yellow colour of gold1 any one join in his thoughts the negation of a greater degree of fixedness than is in lead or copper1 he may be said to have a false complex idea1 as well as when he joins to those other simple ones the idea of perfect absolute fixedness4 ,for either way1 the complex idea of gold being made up of such simple ones as have no union in nature1 may be termed false4 ,but1 if he leaves out of this his complex idea that of fixedness quite1 without either actually joining to or separating it from the rest in his mind1 it is1 ,i think1 to be looked on as an inadequate and imperfect idea1 rather than a false one2 since1 though it contains not all the simple ideas that are united in nature1 yet it puts none together but what do really exist together4 #ai4 ,truth or ,falsehood always supposes ,affirmation or ,negation4 ,though1 in compliance with the ordinary way of speaking1 ,i have shown in what sense and upon what ground our ideas may be sometimes called true or false2 yet if we will look a little nearer into the matter1 in all cases where any idea is called true or false1 it is from some ,,judgment that the mind makes1 or is supposed to make1 that is true or false4 ,for truth or falsehood1 being never without some affirmation or negation1 express or tacit1 it is not to be found but where signs are joined or separated1 according to the agreement or disagreement of the things they stand for4 ,the signs we chiefly use are either ideas or words2 wherewith we make either mental or verbal propositions4 ,truth lies in so joining or separating these representatives1 as the things they stand for do in themselves agree or disagree2 and falsehood in the contrary1 as shall be more fully shown hereafter4 #bj4 ,ideas in themselves neither true nor false4 ,any idea1 then1 which we have in our minds1 whether conformable or not to the existence of things1 or to any idea in the minds of other men1 cannot properly for this alone be called false4 ,for these representations1 if they have nothing in them but what is really existing in things without1 cannot be thought false1 being exact representations of something3 nor yet if they have anything in them differing from the reality of things1 can they properly be said to be false representations1 or ideas of things they do not represent4 ,but the mistake and falsehood is3 #ba4 ,but are false--#a4 ,when judged agreeable to another ,man's ,idea1 without being so4 ,first1 when the mind having any idea1 it ,,judges and concludes it the same that is in other men's minds1 signified by the same name2 or that it is conformable to the ordinary received signification or definition of that word1 when indeed it is not3 which is the most usual mistake in mixed modes1 though other ideas also are liable to it4 #bb4 ,secondly1 ,when judged to agree to real ,existence1 when they do not4 7#b7 ,when it having a complex idea made up of such a collection of simple ones as nature never puts together1 it ,,judges it to agree to a species of creatures really existing2 as when it joins the weight of tin to the colour1 fusibility1 and fixedness of gold4 #bc4 ,thirdly1 ,when judged adequate1 without being so4 7#c7 ,when in its complex idea it has united a certain number of simple ideas that do really exist together in some sort of creatures1 but has also left out others as much inseparable1 it ,,judges this to be a perfect complete idea of a sort of things which really it is not2 v4g4 having joined the ideas of substance1 yellow1 malleable1 most heavy1 and fusible1 it takes that complex idea to be the complete idea of gold1 when yet its peculiar fixedness1 and solubility in ,,aqua ,,regia1 are as inseparable from those other ideas1 or qualities1 of that body as they are one from another4 #bd4 ,fourthly1 ,when judged to represent the real ,essence4 7#d7 ,the mistake is yet greater1 when ,i ,,judge that this complex idea contains in it the real essence of any body existing2 when at least it contains but some few of those properties which flow from its real essence and constitution4 ,i say only some few of those properties2 for those properties consisting mostly in the active and passive powers it has in reference to other things1 all that are vulgarly known of any one body1 of which the complex idea of that kind of things is usually made1 are but a very few1 in comparison of what a man that has several ways tried and examined it knows of that one sort of things2 and all that the most expert man knows are but a few1 in comparison of what are really in that body1 and depend on its internal or essential constitution4 ,the essence of a triangle lies in a very little compass1 consists in a very few ideas3 three lines including a space make up that essence3 but the properties that flow from this essence are more than can be easily known or enumerated4 ,so ,i imagine it is in substances2 their real essences lie in a little compass1 though the properties flowing from that internal constitution are endless4 #be4 ,ideas1 when called false4 ,to conclude1 a man having no notion of anything without him1 but by the idea he has of it in his mind1 7which idea he has a power to call by what name he pleases17 he may indeed make an idea neither answering the reason of things1 nor agreeing to the idea commonly signified by other people's words2 but cannot make a wrong or false idea of a thing which is no otherwise known to him but by the idea he has of it3 v4g4 when ,i frame an idea of the legs1 arms1 and body of a man1 and join to this a horse's head and neck1 ,i do not make a false idea of anything2 because it represents nothing without me4 ,but when ,i call it a ,,man or ,,tartar1 and imagine it to represent some real being without me1 or to be the same idea that others call by the same name2 in either of these cases ,i may err4 ,and upon this account it is that it comes to be termed a false idea2 though indeed the falsehood lies not in the idea1 but in that tacit mental proposition1 wherein a conformity and resemblance is attributed to it which it has not4 ,but yet1 if1 having framed such an idea in my mind1 without thinking either that existence1 or the name ,,man or ,,tartar1 belongs to it1 ,i will call it ,,man or ,,tartar1 ,i may be justly thought fantastical in the naming2 but not erroneous in my judgment2 nor the idea any way false4 #bf4 ,more properly to be called right or wrong4 ,upon the whole matter1 ,i think that our ideas1 as they are considered by the mind1--either in reference to the proper signification of their names2 or in reference to the reality of things1--may very fitly be called ,,right or ,,wrong ideas1 according as they agree or disagree to those patterns to which they are referred4 ,but if any one had rather call them true or false1 it is fit he use a liberty1 which every one has1 to call things by those names he thinks best2 though1 in propriety of speech1 ,,truth or ,,falsehood will1 ,i think1 scarce agree to them1 but as they1 some way or other1 virtually contain in them some mental proposition4 ,the ideas that are in a man's mind1 simply considered1 cannot be wrong2 unless complex ones1 wherein inconsistent parts are jumbled together4 ,all other ideas are in themselves right1 and the knowledge about them right and true knowledge2 but when we come to refer them to anything1 as to their patterns and archetypes then they are capable of being wrong1 as far as they disagree with such archetypes4 ,,chapter ,,xxxiii4 ,,of ,,the ,,association ,,of ,,ideas4 #a4 ,something unreasonable in most ,men4 ,there is scarce any one that does not observe something that seems odd to him1 and is in itself really extravagant1 in the opinions1 reasonings1 and actions of other men4 ,the least flaw of this kind1 if at all different from his own1 every one is quick-sighted enough to espy in another1 and will by the authority of reason forwardly condemn2 though he be guilty of much greater unreasonableness in his own tenets and conduct1 which he never perceives1 and will very hardly1 if at all1 be convinced of4 #b4 ,not wholly from ,self-love4 ,this proceeds not wholly from self-love1 though that has often a great hand in it4 ,men of fair minds1 and not given up to the overweening of self-flattery1 are frequently guilty of it2 and in many cases one with amazement hears the arguings1 and is astonished at the obstinacy of a worthy man1 who yields not to the evidence of reason1 though laid before him as clear as daylight4 #c4 ,not from ,education4 ,this sort of unreasonableness is usually imputed to education and prejudice1 and for the most part truly enough1 though that reaches not the bottom of the disease1 nor shows distinctly enough whence it rises1 or wherein it lies4 ,education is often rightly assigned for the cause1 and prejudice is a good general name for the thing itself3 but yet1 ,i think1 he ought to look a little further1 who would trace this sort of madness to the root it springs from1 and so explain it1 as to show whence this flaw has its original in very sober and rational minds1 and wherein it consists4 #d4 ,a ,degree of ,madness found in most ,men4 ,i shall be pardoned for calling it by so harsh a name as madness1 when it is considered that opposition to reason deserves that name1 and is really madness2 and there is scarce a man so free from it1 but that if he should always1 on all occasions1 argue or do as in some cases he constantly does1 would not be thought fitter for ,bedlam than civil conversation4 ,i do not here mean when he is under the power of an unruly passion1 but in the steady calm course of his life4 ,that which will yet more apologize for this harsh name1 and ungrateful imputation on the greatest part of mankind1 is1 that1 inquiring a little by the bye into the nature of madness1 7b4 ii4 ch4 xi41 ,section #ac17 ,i found it to spring from the very same root1 and to depend on the very same cause we are here speaking of4 ,this consideration of the thing itself1 at a time when ,i thought not the least on the subject which ,i am now treating of1 suggested it to me4 ,and if this be a weakness to which all men are so liable1 if this be a taint which so universally infects mankind1 the greater care should be taken to lay it open under its due name1 thereby to excite the greater care in its prevention and cure4 #e4 ,from a wrong ,connexion of ,ideas4 ,some of our ideas have a ,,natural correspondence and connexion one with another3 it is the office and excellency of our reason to trace these1 and hold them together in that union and correspondence which is founded in their peculiar beings4 ,besides this1 there is another connexion of ideas wholly owing to ,,chance or ,,custom4 ,ideas that in themselves are not all of kin1 come to be so united in some men's minds1 that it is very hard to separate them2 they always keep in company1 and the one no sooner at any time comes into the understanding1 but its associate appears with it2 and if they are more than two which are thus united1 the whole gang1 always inseparable1 show themselves together4 #f4 ,this ,connexion made by custom4 ,this strong combination of ideas1 not allied by nature1 the mind makes in itself either voluntarily or by chance2 and hence it comes in different men to be very different1 according to their different inclinations1 education1 interests1 c4 ,,custom settles habits of thinking in the understanding1 as well as of determining in the will1 and of motions in the body3 all which seems to be but trains of motions in the animal spirits1 which1 once set a going1 continue in the same steps they have been used to2 which1 by often treading1 are worn into a smooth path1 and the motion in it becomes easy1 and as it were natural4 ,as far as we can comprehend thinking1 thus ideas seem to be produced in our minds2 or1 if they are not1 this may serve to explain their following one another in an habitual train1 when once they are put into their track1 as well as it does to explain such motions of the body4 ,a musician used to any tune will find that1 let it but once begin in his head1 the ideas of the several notes of it will follow one another orderly in his understanding1 without any care or attention1 as regularly as his fingers move orderly over the keys of the organ to play out the tune he has begun1 though his unattentive thoughts be elsewhere a wandering4 ,whether the natural cause of these ideas1 as well as of that regular dancing of his fingers be the motion of his animal spirits1 ,i will not determine1 how probable soever1 by this instance1 it appears to be so3 but this may help us a little to conceive of intellectual habits1 and of the tying together of ideas4 #g4 ,some ,antipathies an ,effect of it4 ,that there are such associations of them made by custom1 in the minds of most men1 ,i think nobody will question1 who has well considered himself or others2 and to this1 perhaps1 might be justly attributed most of the sympathies and antipathies observable in men1 which work as strongly1 and produce as regular effects as if they were natural2 and are therefore called so1 though they at first had no other original but the accidental connexion of two ideas1 which either the strength of the first impression1 or future indulgence so united1 that they always afterwards kept company together in that man's mind1 as if they were but one idea4 ,i say most of the antipathies1 ,i do not say all2 for some of them are truly natural1 depend upon our original constitution1 and are born with us2 but a great part of those which are counted natural1 would have been known to be from unheeded1 though perhaps early1 impressions1 or wanton fancies at first1 which would have been acknowledged the original of them1 if they had been warily observed4 ,a grown person surfeiting with honey no sooner hears the name of it1 but his fancy immediately carries sickness and qualms to his stomach1 and he cannot bear the very idea of it2 other ideas of dislike1 and sickness1 and vomiting1 presently accompany it1 and he is disturbed2 but he knows from whence to date this weakness1 and can tell how he got this indisposition4 ,had this happened to him by an over-dose of honey when a child1 all the same effects would have followed2 but the cause would have been mistaken1 and the antipathy counted natural4 #h4 ,influence of association to be watched educating young children4 ,i mention this1 not out of any great necessity there is in this present argument to distinguish nicely between natural and acquired antipathies2 but ,i take notice of it for another purpose1 viz4 that those who have children1 or the charge of their education1 would think it worth their while diligently to watch1 and carefully to prevent the undue connexion of ideas in the minds of young people4 ,this is the time most susceptible of lasting impressions2 and though those relating to the health of the body are by discreet people minded and fenced against1 yet ,i am apt to doubt1 that those which relate more peculiarly to the mind1 and terminate in the understanding or passions1 have been much less heeded than the thing deserves3 nay1 those relating purely to the understanding1 have1 as ,i suspect1 been by most men wholly overlooked4 #i4 ,wrong connexion of ideas a great ,cause of ,errors4 ,this wrong connexion in our minds of ideas in themselves loose and independent of one another1 has such an influence1 and is of so great force to set us awry in our actions1 as well moral as natural1 passions1 reasonings1 and notions themselves1 that perhaps there is not any one thing that deserves more to be looked after4 #aj4 ,as instance4 ,the ideas of goblins and sprites have really no more to do with darkness than light3 yet let but a foolish maid inculcate these often on the mind of a child1 and raise them there together1 possibly he shall never be able to separate them again so long as he lives1 but darkness shall ever afterwards bring with it those frightful ideas1 and they shall be so joined1 that he can no more bear the one than the other4 #aa4 ,another instance4 ,a man receives a sensible injury from another1 thinks on the man and that action over and over1 and by ruminating on them strongly1 or much1 in his mind1 so cements those two ideas together1 that he makes them almost one2 never thinks on the man1 but the pain and displeasure he suffered comes into his mind with it1 so that he scarce distinguishes them1 but has as much an aversion for the one as the other4 ,thus hatreds are often begotten from slight and innocent occasions1 and quarrels propagated and continued in the world4 #ab4 ,a third instance4 ,a man has suffered pain or sickness in any place2 he saw his friend die in such a room3 though these have in nature nothing to do one with another1 yet when the idea of the place occurs to his mind1 it brings 7the impression being once made7 that of the pain and displeasure with it3 he confounds them in his mind1 and can as little bear the one as the other4 #ac4 ,why ,time cures some ,disorders in the ,mind1 which ,reason cannot cure4 ,when this combination is settled1 and while it lasts1 it is not in the power of reason to help us1 and relieve us from the effects of it4 ,ideas in our minds1 when they are there1 will operate according to their natures and circumstances4 ,and here we see the cause why time cures certain affections1 which reason1 though in the right1 and allowed to be so1 has not power over1 nor is able against them to prevail with those who are apt to hearken to it in other cases4 ,the death of a child that was the daily delight of its mother's eyes1 and joy of her soul1 rends from her heart the whole comfort of her life1 and gives her all the torment imaginable3 use the consolations of reason in this case1 and you were as good preach ease to one on the rack1 and hope to allay1 by rational discourses1 the pain of his joints tearing asunder4 ,till time has by disuse separated the sense of that enjoyment and its loss1 from the idea of the child returning to her memory1 all representations1 though ever so reasonable1 are in vain2 and therefore some in whom the union between these ideas is never dissolved1 spend their lives in mourning1 and carry an incurable sorrow to their graves4 #ad4 ,another instance of the ,effect of the ,association of ,ideas4 ,a friend of mine knew one perfectly cured of madness by a very harsh and offensive operation4 ,the gentleman who was thus recovered1 with great sense of gratitude and acknowledgment owned the cure all his life after1 as the greatest obligation he could have received2 but1 whatever gratitude and reason suggested to him1 he could never bear the sight of the operator3 that image brought back with it the idea of that agony which he suffered from his hands1 which was too mighty and intolerable for him to endure4 #ae4 ,more instances4 ,many children1 imputing the pain they endured at school to their books they were corrected for1 so join those ideas together1 that a book becomes their aversion1 and they are never reconciled to the study and use of them all their lives after2 and thus reading becomes a torment to them1 which otherwise possibly they might have made the great pleasure of their lives4 ,there are rooms convenient enough1 that some men cannot study in1 and fashions of vessels1 which1 though ever so clean and commodious1 they cannot drink out of1 and that by reason of some accidental ideas which are annexed to them1 and make them offensive2 and who is there that hath not observed some man to flag at the appearance1 or in the company of some certain person not otherwise superior to him1 but because1 having once on some occasion got the ascendant1 the idea of authority and distance goes along with that of the person1 and he that has been thus subjected1 is not able to separate them4 #af4 ,a curious instance4 ,instances of this kind are so plentiful everywhere1 that if ,i add one more1 it is only for the pleasant oddness of it4 ,it is of a young gentleman1 who1 having learnt to dance1 and that to great perfection1 there happened to stand an old trunk in the room where he learnt4 ,the idea of this remarkable piece of household stuff had so mixed itself with the turns and steps of all his dances1 that though in that chamber he could dance excellently well1 yet it was only whilst that trunk was there2 nor could he perform well in any other place1 unless that or some such other trunk had its due position in the room4 ,if this story shall be suspected to be dressed up with some comical circumstances1 a little beyond precise nature1 ,i answer for myself that ,i had it some years since from a very sober and worthy man1 upon his own knowledge1 as ,i report it2 and ,i dare say there are very few inquisitive persons who read this1 who have not met with accounts1 if not examples1 of this nature1 that may parallel1 or at least justify this4 #ag4 ,influence of ,association on intellectual ,habits4 ,intellectual habits and defects this way contracted1 are not less frequent and powerful1 though less observed4 ,let the ideas of being and matter be strongly joined1 either by education or much thought2 whilst these are still combined in the mind1 what notions1 what reasonings1 will there be about separate spirits8 ,let custom from the very childhood have joined figure and shape to the idea of ,god1 and what absurdities will that mind be liable to about the ,deity8 ,let the idea of infallibility be inseparably joined to any person1 and these two constantly together possess the mind2 and then one body in two places at once1 shall unexamined be swallowed for a certain truth1 by an implicit faith1 whenever that imagined infallible person dictates and demands assent without inquiry4 #ah4 ,observable in the opposition between different ,sects of philosophy and of religion4 ,some such wrong and unnatural combinations of ideas will be found to establish the irreconcilable opposition between different sects of philosophy and religion2 for we cannot imagine every one of their followers to impose wilfully on himself1 and knowingly refuse truth offered by plain reason4 ,interest1 though it does a great deal in the case1 yet cannot be thought to work whole societies of men to so universal a perverseness1 as that every one of them to a man should knowingly maintain falsehood3 some at least must be allowed to do what all pretend to1 i4e4 to pursue truth sincerely2 and therefore there must be something that blinds their understandings1 and makes them not see the falsehood of what they embrace for real truth4 ,that which thus captivates their reasons1 and leads men of sincerity blindfold from common sense1 will1 when examined1 be found to be what we are speaking of3 some independent ideas1 of no alliance to one another1 are1 by education1 custom1 and the constant din of their party1 so coupled in their minds1 that they always appear there together2 and they can no more separate them in their thoughts than if they were but one idea1 and they operate as if they were so4 ,this gives sense to jargon1 demonstration to absurdities1 and consistency to nonsense1 and is the foundation of the greatest1 ,i had almost said of all the errors in the world2 or1 if it does not reach so far1 it is at least the most dangerous one1 since1 so far as it obtains1 it hinders men from seeing and examining4 ,when two things1 in themselves disjoined1 appear to the sight constantly united2 if the eye sees these things riveted which are loose1 where will you begin to rectify the mistakes that follow in two ideas that they have been accustomed so to join in their minds as to substitute one for the other1 and1 as ,i am apt to think1 often without perceiving it themselves8 ,this1 whilst they are under the deceit of it1 makes them incapable of conviction1 and they applaud themselves as zealous champions for truth1 when indeed they are contending for error2 and the confusion of two different ideas1 which a customary connexion of them in their minds hath to them made in effect but one1 fills their heads with false views1 and their reasonings with false consequences4 #ai4 ,conclusion4 ,having thus given an account of the original1 sorts1 and extent of our ,,ideas1 with several other considerations about these 7,i know not whether ,i may say7 instruments1 or materials of our knowledge1 the method ,i at first proposed to myself would now require that ,i should immediately proceed to show1 what use the understanding makes of them1 and what ,,knowledge we have by them4 ,this was that which1 in the first general view ,i had of this subject1 was all that ,i thought ,i should have to do3 but1 upon a nearer approach1 ,i find that there is so close a connexion between ideas and ,,words1 and our abstract ideas and general words have so constant a relation one to another1 that it is impossible to speak clearly and distinctly of our knowledge1 which all consists in propositions1 without considering1 first1 the nature1 use1 and signification of ,language2 which1 therefore1 must be the business of the next ,book4 ,,end ,,of ,,volume ,i