,a ,,lie ,,never ,,justifiable ,a ,study in ,ethics ,,by ,h4 ,,clay ,,trumbull #ahef ,,preface4 ,that there was need of a book on the subject of which this treats1 will be evidenced to those who examine its contents4 ,whether this book meets the need1 it is for those to decide who are its readers4 ,the circumstances of its writing are recited in its opening chapter4 ,i was urged to the undertaking by valued friends4 ,at every step in its progress ,i have been helped by those friends1 and others4 ,for much of that which is valuable in it1 they deserve credit4 ,for its imperfections and lack1 ,i alone am at fault4 ,although ,i make no claim to exhaustiveness of treatment in this work1 ,i do claim to have attempted a treatment that is exceptionally comprehensive and thorough4 ,my researches have included extensive and varied fields of fact and of thought1 even though very much in those fields has been left ungathered4 ,what is here presented is at least suggestive of the abundance and richness of the matter available in this line4 ,while not presuming to think that ,i have said the last word on this question of the ages1 ,i do venture to hope that ,i have furnished fresh material for its more intelligent consideration4 ,it may be that1 in view of the data here presented1 some will settle the question finally for themselves--by settling it right4 ,if the work tends to bring any considerable number to this practical issue1 ,i shall be more than repaid for the labor expended on it2 for ,i have a profound conviction that it is the question of questions in ethics1 now as always4 ,h4 ,,clay ,,trumbull4 ,,philadelphia1 ,august #ad1ahic ,,contents4 ,i4 ,a ,,question ,,of ,,the ,,ages4 ,is a ,lie ,ever ,justifiable8--,two ,proffered ,answers4--,inducements and ,temptations ,influencing a ,decision4--,incident in ,army ,prison ,life4--,difference in ,opinion4--,killing ,enemy1 or ,lying to ,him4--,killing1 but not ,lying1 ,possibility with ,god4--,beginning of this ,discussion4--,its ,continuance4--,origin of this ,book4 ,,ii4 ,,ethnic ,,conceptions4 ,standards and ,practices of ,primitive ,peoples4--,sayings and ,doings of ,hindoos4--,teachings of the ,mahabharata4--,harischandra and ,viswamitra1 the ,job and ,satan of ,hindoo ,passion-,play4--,scandinavian ,legends4--,fridthjof and ,ingeborg4--,persian ,ideals4--,zoroastrian ,heaven and ,hell4--,home of ,song1 and ,home of the ,lie4--,truth the ,main ,cardinal ,virtue with ,egyptians4--,no ,hope for the ,liar4--,ptah1 ,lord of ,truth4--,truth ,fundamental to ,deity4--,relatively ,low ,standard of ,greeks4--,incidental ,testimony of ,herodotus4--,truthfulness of ,achilles4--,plato4--,aristotle4--,theog nis4--,pindar4--,tragedy of ,philoctetes4--,roman ,standard4--,cicero4--,marcus ,aurelius4--,german ,ideal4--,veracity a ,primitive ,conception4--,lie ,abhorrent among ,hill ,tribes of ,india4--,khonds4--,sonthals4--,todas4-- ,bheels4--,sowrahs4-- ,tipperahs4--,arabs4--,american ,indians4--,patagonians4--,hottentots4-- ,east ,africans4--,mandingoes4--,dyaks of ,borneo1--,lying ,heaps4--,veddahs of ,ceylon4--,javanese4--,lying ,incident of ,civilization4--,influence of ,spirit of ,barter4--,punic ,faith4--,false ,philosophy of ,morals4 ,,iii4 ,,bible ,,teachings4 ,principles1 not ,rules1 the ,bible ,standard4--,two ,pictures of ,paradise4--,place of ,liars4--,god ,true1 though ,men ,lie4--,hebrew ,midwives4--,jacob and ,esau4--,rahab the ,lying ,harlot4--,samuel at ,bethlehem4--,micaiah before ,jehoshaphat and ,ahab4--,character and ,conduct4--,abraham4--,isaac4--,jacob4-- ,david4--,ananias and ,sapphira4--,bible ,injunctions and ,warnings4 ,,iv4 ,,definitions4 ,importance of a ,definition4--,lie ,positive1 and ,lie ,negative4--,speech and ,act4--,element of ,intention4--,concealment ,justifiable1 and ,concealment ,unjustifiable4--,witness in ,court4--,concealment that is ,right4--,concealment that is ,sinful4--,first ,duty of ,fallen ,man4--,brutal ,frankness4--,indecent ,exposure of ,personal ,opinion4--,lie ,never ,tolerable as ,means of ,concealing4--,false ,leg or ,eye4--,duty of ,disclosure ,conditioned on ,relations to ,others4--,deception ,purposed1 and ,resultant ,deception4--,limits of ,responsibility for ,results of ,action4--,surgeon ,refusing to ,leave ,patient4--,father with ,drowning ,child4--,mother and ,wife ,choosing4--,others ,self-,deceived concerning ,us4--,facial ,expression4--,a ,blind ,patch4--,broken ,vase4--,closed ,shutters in ,midsummer4--,opened ,shutters4--,absent ,man's ,hat in ,front ,hall4--,when ,concealment is ,proper4--,when ,concealment is ,wrong4--,contagious ,diseases4--,selling a ,horse or ,cow4--,covering ,pit4--,wearing ,wig4--,god's ,method with ,man4--,delicate ,distinction4-- ,truthful ,statements ,resulting in ,false ,impressions4--,concealing ,family ,trouble4--,physician and ,inquiring ,patient4--,illustrations ,explain ,principle1 not ,define it4 ,v4 ,,the ,,plea ,,of ,,necessity4 ,quaker and ,dry-goods ,salesman4--,supposed ,profitableness of ,lying4--,plea for ,lies of ,necessity4--,lying not ,justifiable between ,enemies in ,war-time4--,rightfulness of ,concealing ,movements and ,plans from ,enemy4--,responsibility with ,flag of ,truce4--,difference between ,scout and ,spy4--,ethical ,distinctions ,recognized by ,belligerents4--,illustration3 ,federal ,prisoner ,questioned by ,confederate ,captors4--,libby ,prison ,experiences4--,physicians and ,patients4--,concealment not ,necessarily ,deception4--,loss of ,reputation for ,truthfulness by ,lying ,physicians4--,loss of ,power ,thereby4--,impolicy of ,lying to ,insane4--,dr4 ,kirkbride's ,testimony4--,life not ,worth ,saving by ,lie4--,concealing ,one's ,condition from ,robber in ,bedroom4--,questions of ,would-be ,murderer4--,do ,right though the ,heavens ,fall4--,duty to ,god not to be ,counted out of ,problem4--,deserting ,god's ,service by ,lying4--,parting ,prayer4 ,,vi4 ,,centuries ,,of ,,discussion4 ,wide ,differences of ,opinion4--,views of ,talmudists4--,hamburger's ,testimony4--,strictness in ,principle4--,exceptions in ,practice4--,isaac ,abohab's ,testimony4--,christian ,fathers not ,agreed4--,martyrdom ,price of ,truthtelling4--,justin ,martyr's ,testimony4--,temptations of ,early ,christians4--,words of ,shepherd of ,hermas4--,tertullian's ,estimate4--,origen on ,false ,speaking4--,peter and ,paul at ,antioch4-- ,gregory of ,nyssa and ,basil the ,great4--,deceit in ,interests of ,harmony4--,chrysostom's ,deception of ,basil4--,chrysostom's ,defense of ,deceit4--,augustine's ,firmness of ,position4--,condemnation of ,lying4--,examination of ,excuses4--,jerome's ,weakness and ,error4--,final ,agreement with ,augustine4--,repetition of ,arguments of ,augustine and ,chrysostom4--,representative ,disputants4--,thomas ,aquinas4--,masterly ,discussion4--,errors of ,duns ,scotus4--,john ,calvin4--,martin ,luther4-- ,ignatius ,loyola4--,position of ,jesuits4--,protestants ,defending ,lying4 --,jeremy ,taylor4--,errors and ,inconsistencies4--,wrong ,definitions4-- ,misapplication of ,scripture4--,richard ,rothe4--,character1 ,ability1 and ,influence4 in ,definition of ,lie4--,failure to ,recognize4--,error ,love to ,god as ,only ,basis of ,love to ,man4--,exceptions in ,favor of ,lying4--,nitzsch's ,claim of ,wiser and ,nobler ,methods than ,lying in ,love4--,rothe's ,claim of ,responsibility of ,loving ,guardianship--,no ,countenance of ,deception in ,example of ,jesus4--,prime ,error of ,rothe4 --,opinions of ,contemporary ,critics4--,isaac ,augustus ,dorner4-- ,character and ,principles4--,keen ,definitions4--,high ,standards4-- ,clearness and ,consistency4--,hans ,lassen ,martensen4--,logic ,swayed by ,feeling4--,right ,premises and ,wavering ,reasonings4--,lofty ,ideals4-- ,story of ,jeanie ,deans4--,correct ,conclusions4--,influence of ,personal ,peculiarities on ,ethical ,convictions4--,contrast of ,charles ,hodge and ,james ,h4 ,thornwell4--,dr4 ,hodge's ,correct ,premises and ,amiable ,inconsistencies4--,truth the ,substratum of ,deity4--,misconceptions of ,bible ,teachings4--,suggestion of ,deception by ,jesus ,christ4--,error as to ,general ,opinion of ,christians4--,dr4 ,hodge's ,conclusions ,crushed by his ,premises4--,dr4 ,thornwell's ,thorough ,treatment of ,subject4-- ,right ,basis4--,sound ,argument4--,correct ,definitions4--,firmness for ,truth4--,newman ,smyth's ,manual4--,good ,beginning and ,bad ,ending4-- ,confusion of ,terms4--,inconsistencies in ,argument4--,loose ,reasoning4 --,dangerous ,teachings4--,james ,martineau4--,fine ,moral ,sense4--,conflict between ,feeling and ,conviction4--,safe ,instincts4--,thomas ,fowler4-- ,higher ,expediency of ,veracity4--,importance to ,general ,good4--,leslie ,stephen4--,duty of ,veracity ,result of ,moral ,progress4--,kant and ,fichte4--,jacobi ,misrepresented4--,false ,assumptions by ,advocates of ,lie of ,necessity4--,enemies in ,warfare not ,justified in ,lying4--,testimony of ,cicero4--,macaulay on ,lord ,clive's ,treachery4--,woolsey on ,international ,law4--,no ,place for ,lying in ,medical ,ethics4--,opinions and ,experiences of ,physicians4--,pliny's ,story of ,roman ,matron4--,victor ,hugo's ,sister ,simplice4--,words of ,abb ,sicard4--,tact and ,principle4--,legal ,ethics4--,whewell's ,view4--,opinion of ,chief-,justice ,sharswood4--,mistakes of ,dr4 ,hodge4--,lord ,brougham's ,claim4--,false ,charge against ,charles ,phillips4--,chancellor ,kent on ,moral ,obligations in ,law and in ,equity4--,clerical ,profession ,chiefly ,involved4--,clergymen for and against ,lying4--,temptation to ,lies of ,love4--,supreme ,importance of ,sound ,principle4--,duty of ,veracity to ,lower ,animals4--,dr4 ,dabney's ,view4--,views of ,dr4 ,newman ,smyth4--,duty of ,truthfulness an ,obligation toward ,god4--,lower ,animals not ,exempt from ,principle of ,universal ,application4--,fishing4--,hunting4--,ca tching ,horse4--,professor ,bowne's ,psychological ,view4--,no ,place for ,lying in ,god's ,universe4--,small ,improvement on ,chrysostom's ,argument for ,lying4--,limits of ,consistency in ,logical ,plea4--,god1 or ,satan4 ,,vii4 ,,the ,,gist ,,of ,,the ,,matter4 ,one ,all-,dividing ,line4--,primal and ,eternal ,difference4--,lie ,inevitably ,hostile to ,god4--,lying ,separates from ,god4--,sin per se4--,perjury ,justifiable if ,lying be ,justifiable4--,lying--,lying ,defiles ,liar1 apart from ,questions of ,gain in ,lying4--,social ,evils ,resultant from ,lying4--,confidence ,essential to ,society4--,lying ,destructive of ,confidence4--,lie ,never ,harmless4 ,,indexes4 ,,topical ,,index4 ,,scriptural ,,index4 ,i4 ,a ,,question ,,of ,,the ,,ages4 ,whether a lie is ever justifiable1 is a question that has been in discussion1 not only in all the ,christian centuries1 but ever since questions concerning human conduct were first a possibility4 ,on the one hand1 it has been claimed that a lie is by its very nature irreconcilable with the eternal principles of justice and right2 and1 on the other hand1 it has been asserted that great emergencies may necessitate a departure from all ordinary rules of human conduct1 and that therefore there may be1 in an emergency1 such a thing as the lie of necessity4 ,it is not so easy to consider fairly a question like this in the hour when vital personal interests pivot on the decision1 as it is in a season of rest and safety2 yet1 if in a time of extremest peril the unvarying duty of truthfulness shines clearly through an atmosphere of sore temptation1 that light may be accepted as diviner because of its very power to penetrate clouds and to dispel darkness4 ,being forced to consider1 in an emergency1 the possible justification of the so-called lie of necessity1 ,i was brought to a settlement of that question in my own mind1 and have since been led to an honest endeavor to bring others to a like settlement of it4 ,hence this monograph4 ,in the summer of #ahfc ,i was a prisoner of war in ,columbia1 ,south ,carolina4 ,the ,federal prisoners were confined in the common jail1 under military guard1 and with no parole binding them not to attempt an escape4 ,they were subject to the ordinary laws of war4 ,their captors were responsible for their detention in imprisonment1 and it was their duty to escape from captivity1 and to return to the army of the government to which they owed allegiance1 if they could do so by any right means4 ,no obligations were on them toward their captors1 save those which are binding at all times1 even when a state of war suspends such social duties as are merely conventional4 ,only he who has been a prisoner of war in a ,southern prison in midsummer1 or in a ,northern prison in the dead of winter1 in time of active hostilities outside1 can fully realize the heart-longings of a soldier prisoner to find release from his sufferings in confinement1 and to be again at his post of duty at the front1 or can understand how gladly such a man would find a way1 consistent with the right1 to escape1 at any involved risk4 ,but all can believe that plans of escape were in frequent discussion among the restless ,federal prisoners in ,columbia1 of whom ,i was one4 ,a plan proposed to me by a fellow-officer seemed to offer peculiar chances of success1 and ,i gladly joined in it4 ,but as its fuller details were considered1 ,i found that a probable contingency would involve the telling of a lie to an enemy1 or a failure of the whole plan4 ,at this my moral sense recoiled2 and ,i expressed my unwillingness to tell a lie1 even to regain my personal liberty or to advantage my government by a return to its army4 ,this opened an earnest discussion of the question whether there is such a thing as a lie of necessity1 or a justifiable lie4 ,my friend was a pure-minded man of principle1 ready to die for his convictions2 and he looked at this question with a sincere desire to know the right1 and to conform to it4 ,he argued that a condition of war suspended ordinary social relations between the combatants1 and that the obligation of truth-speaking was one of the duties thus suspended4 ,i1 on the other hand1 felt that a lie was necessarily a sin against ,god1 and therefore was never justifiable4 ,my friend asked me whether ,i would hesitate to kill an enemy who was on guard over me1 or whom ,i met outside1 if it were essential to our escape4 ,i replied that ,i would not hesitate to do so1 any more than ,i would hesitate at it if we were over against each other in battle4 ,in time of war the soldiers of both sides take the risks of a life-and-death struggle2 and now that we were unparoled prisoners it was our duty to escape if we could do so1 even at the risk of our lives or of the lives of our captors1 and it was their duty to prevent our escape at a similar risk4 ,my friend then asked me on what principle ,i could justify the taking of a man's life as an enemy1 and yet not feel justified in telling him a lie in order to save his life and secure our liberty4 ,how could it be claimed that it was more of a sin to tell a lie to a man who had forfeited his social rights1 than to kill him4 ,i confessed that ,i could not at that time see the reason for the distinction1 which my moral sense assured me was a real one1 and ,i asked time to think of it4 ,thus it was that ,i came first to face a question of the ages1 ,is a lie ever justifiable8 under circumstances that involved more than life to me1 and when ,i had a strong inducement to see the force of reasons in favor of a lie of necessity4 ,in my careful study1 at that time1 of the principles involved in this question1 ,i came upon what seemed to me the conclusion of the whole matter4 ,god is the author of life4 ,he who gives life has the right to take it again4 ,what ,god can do by himself1 ,god can authorize another to do4 ,human governments derive their just powers from ,god4 ,the powers that be are ordained of ,god4 ,a human government acts for ,god in the administering of justice1 even to the extent of taking life4 ,if a war waged by a human government be righteous1 the officers of that government take life1 in the prosecution of the war1 as ,god's agents4 ,in the case then in question1 we who were in prison as ,federal officers were representatives of our government1 and would be justified in taking the lives of enemies of our government who hindered us as ,god's agents in the doing of our duty to ,god and to our government4 ,on the other hand1 ,god1 who can justly take life1 cannot lie4 ,a lie is contrary to the very nature of ,god4 ,it is impossible for ,god to lie4#a ,and if ,god cannot lie1 ,god cannot authorize another to lie4 ,what is unjustifiable in ,god's sight1 is without a possibility of justification in the universe4 ,no personal or social emergency can justify a lie1 whatever may be its apparent gain1 or whatever harm may seem to be involved in a refusal to speak it4 ,therefore we who were ,federal prisoners in war-time could not be justified in doing what was a sin per se1 and what ,god was by his very nature debarred from authorizing or approving4 ,i could see no way of evading this conclusion1 and ,i determinedly refused to seek release from imprisonment at the cost of a sin against ,god4 ,footnote #a3 ,heb4 #f3 #ah ,at this time ,i had no special familiarity with ethics as a study1 and ,i was unacquainted with the prominence of the question of the lie of necessity in that realm of thought4 ,but on my return from army service1 with my newly awakened interest in the subject1 ,i came to know how vigorous had been its discussion1 and how varied had been the opinions with reference to it1 among philosophic thinkers in all the centuries2 and ,i sought to learn for myself what could be known concerning the principles involved in this question1 and their practical application to the affairs of human life4 ,and now1 after all these years of study and thought1 ,i venture to make my contribution to this phase of ,christian ethics1 in an exhibit of the facts and principles which have gone to confirm the conviction of my own moral sense1 when first ,i was called to consider this question as a question4 ,,ii4 ,,ethnic ,,conceptions4 ,the habit of lying is more or less common among primitive peoples1 as it is among those of higher cultivation2 but it is of interest to note that widely1 even among them1 the standard of truthfulness as a duty is recognized as the correct standard1 and lying is1 in theory at least1 a sin4 ,the highest conception of right observable among primitive peoples1 and not the average conformity to that standard in practice1 is the true measure of right in the minds of such peoples4 ,if we were to look at the practices of such men in times of temptation1 we might be ready to say sweepingly with the ,psalmist1 in his impulsiveness1 ,i said in my haste1 ,all men are liars6#a ,but if we fixed our minds on the loftiest conception of truthfulness as an invariable duty1 recognized by races of men who are notorious as liars1 we should see how much easier it is to have a right standard than to conform to it4 ,footnote #a3 ,psa4 #aaf3 ,,ii4 ,a careful observer of the people of ,india1 who was long a resident among them1#a says3 ,more systematic1 more determined1 liars1 than the people of the ,east1 cannot1 in my opinion1 be found in the world4 ,they often utter falsehoods without any apparent reason2 and even when truth would be an advantage1 they will not tell it4444 ,yet1 strange to say1 some of their works and sayings represent a falsehood as almost the unpardonable sin4 ,take the following for an example3 ',the sin of killing a ,brahman is as great as that of killing a hundred cows2 and the sin of killing a hundred cows is as great as that of killing a woman2 the sin of killing a hundred women is as great as that of killing a child in the womb2 and the sin of killing a hundred children in the womb is as great as that of telling a lie4' ,footnote #a3 ,joseph ,roberts1 in his ,oriental ,illustrations1 p4 #ehj4 ,the ,mahabharata is one of the great epics of ancient ,india4 ,it contains a history of a war between two rival families1 or peoples1 and its text includes teachings with reference to everything that it concerned a cultivated ,hindoo to know4 ,the heroes in this recorded war1 between the ,pandavas and the ,kauravas1 are in the habit of lying without stint2 yet there is evidence that they recognized the sin of lying even to an enemy in time of war1 and when a decisive advantage might be gained by it4 ,at a point in the combat when ,yudhishthira1 a leader of the ,pandavas1 was in extremity in his battling with ,drona1 a leader of the ,kauravas1 the divine ,krishna told ,yudhishthira that1 if he would tell ,drona 7for in these mythical contests the combatants were usually within speaking distance of each other7 that his loved son ,aswatthanea was dead1 the old warrior would immediately lay down his arms and become an easy prey4 ,but ,yudhishthira had never been known to tell a falsehood1 and in this instance he utterly refused to tell a lie1 even to secure the death of so powerful an enemy4 #a ,although it came about that ,drona was1 as a matter of fact1 defeated by treachery1 the sin of lying1 even in time of war1 and to an enemy1 is clearly brought out as a recognized principle of both theory and action among the ancient ,hindoos4 ,footnote #a3 ,see ,wheeler's ,history of ,india1 ,i41 #cba4 ,there is a famous passion-play popular in ,southern ,india and ,ceylon1 which illustrates the ,hindoo ideal of truthfulness at every risk or cost4 ,viswamitra1 the tempter and accuser as represented in the ,vedas1 appears in the council of the gods1 face to face with ,indra4 ,the question is raised by ,indra1 who is the most virtuous sovereign on earth4 ,he asks1 ,what chief of mortals is there1 who has never told a lie8 ,harischandra1 king of ,ayodiah 7,oude7 is named as such a man4 ,viswamitra denies it4 ,it is agreed 7as in the testing of ,job1 according to the ,bible story7 that ,viswamitra may employ any means whatsoever for the inducing of ,harischandra to lie1 unhindered by ,indra or any other god4 ,if he succeeds in his effort1 he shall secure to himself all the merit of the good deeds of ,harischandra2 but if ,harischandra cannot be induced to lie1 ,viswamitra must add half his merit to that of ,harischandra4#a ,footnote #a3 ,arichandra1 the ,martyr of ,truth3 ,a ,tamil ,drama translated into ,english by ,muta ,coomra ,swmy2 cited in ,conway's ,demonology and ,devil ,lore1 ,,ii41 #ce-dc4 ,first1 ,viswamitra induces ,harischandra to become the custodian of a fabulous treasure1 with a promise to deliver it up when called for4 ,then he brings him into such a strait that he must give up to ,viswamitra all his possessions1 including that treasure and his kingdom1 in order to retain his personal virtue4 ,after this1 ,viswamitra demands the return by ,harischandra of the gold which has been already surrendered1 claiming that its surrender was not according to the contract4 ,in this emergency ,viswamitra suggests1 that if ,harischandra will only deny that he owes this amount to his enemy the debt shall at once be canceled4 ,such a declaration ,i can never make1 says ,harischandra4 ,i owe thee the gold1 and pay it ,i will4 ,from this time forward the efforts of ,viswamitra are directed to the inducing of ,harischandra to say that he is not in debt to his adversary2 but in every trial ,harischandra refuses to tell a lie4 ,his only son dies in the desert4 ,he and his wife are in poverty and sorrow2 while all the time he is told that his kingdom and his treasures shall be restored to him1 if he will tell only one lie4 ,at last his wife is condemned to death on a false accusation1 and he is appointed1 by the sovereign of the land where she and he have been sold as slaves1 to be her executioner4 ,she calls on him to do his duty1 and strike off her head4 ,just then ,viswamitra appears to him1 saying3 ,wicked man1 spare her6 ,tell a lie even now1 and be restored to your former state6 ,harischandra's answer is3 ,even though thou didst offer to me the throne of ,indra1 ,i would not tell a lie4 ,and to his wife1 ,chandravati1 he says encouragingly3 ,this keen saber will do its duty4 ,thou dead1 thy husband dies too--this selfsame sword shall pierce my breast4444 ,yes1 let all men perish1 let all gods cease to exist1 let the stars that shine above grow dim1 let all seas be dried up1 let all mountains be leveled to the ground1 let wars rage1 blood flow in streams1 let millions of millions of ,harischandras be thus persecuted2 yet let truth be maintained1 let truth ride victorious over all1 let truth be the light1--truth alone the lasting solace of mortals and immortals4 ,as ,harischandra strikes at the neck of ,chandravati1 the sword1 instead of harming her1 is transformed into a necklace of pearls1 which winds itself around her4 ,the gods of heaven1 all sages1 and all kings1 appear suddenly to the view of ,harischandra1 and ,siva1 the first of the gods1 commends him for his fidelity to truth1 and tells him that his dead son shall be brought again to life1 and his kingdom and treasures and honors shall be restored to him4 ,and thus the story of ,harischandra stands as a rebuke to the ,christian philosopher who could suppose that ,god1 or the gods1 would co-work with a man who acted on the supposition that there is such an anomaly in the universe as a lie of necessity4 ,the old ,scandinavian heroes were valiant in war1 but they held that a lie was not justifiable under any pressure of an emergency4 ,their ,valhalla heaven was the home of those who had fought bravely2 but there was no place for liars in it4 ,a fine illustration of their conception of the unvarying duty of truthfulness is given in the saga of ,fridthjof4 ,fridthjof1 heroic son of ,thorstein1 loved ,ingeborg1 daughter of his father's friend1 ,king ,bele4 ,ingeborg's brother ,helge1 successor to his father's throne1 opposed the match1 and shut her up within the sacred enclosure of the god ,balder4 ,fridthjof ventured within the forbidden ground1 in order to pledge to her his manly troth4 ,the lovers were pure in purpose and in act1 but1 if their interview were known1 they would both be permanently harmed in reputation and in standing4 ,a rumor of their secret meeting was circulated1 and ,fridthjof was summoned before the council of heroes to answer to the charge4 ,if ever a lie were justifiable1 it would seem to be when a pure woman's honor was at stake1 and when a hero's happiness and power for good pivoted on it4 ,fridthjof tells to ,ingeborg the story of his sore temptation when1 in the presence of the council1 ,helge challenges his course4 ',say1 ,fridthjof1 ,balder's peace hast thou not broken1 ,not seen my sister in his house while ,day ,concealed himself1 abashed1 before your meeting8 ,speak6 yea or nay6' ,then echoed from the ring ,of crowded warriors1 ',say but nay1 say nay6 ,thy simple word we'll trust2 we'll court for thee1--,thou1 ,thorstein's son1 art good as any king's4 ,say nay6 say nay6 and thine is ,ingeborg6' ',the happiness1' ,i answered1 'of my life ,on one word hangs2 but fear not therefore1 ,helge6 ,i would not lie to gain the joys of ,valhal1 ,much less this earth's delights4 ,i've seen thy sister1 ,have spoken with her in the temple's night1 ,but have not therefore broken ,balder's peace6' ,more none would hear4 ,a murmur of deep horror ,the diet traversed2 they who nearest stood ,drew back1 as ,i had with the plague been smitten4#a ,footnote #a3 ,anderson's ,viking ,tales of the ,north1 p4 #bbc4 ,and so1 because ,fridthjof would not lie1 he lost his bride and became a wanderer from his land1 and ,ingeborg became the wife of another2 and this record is to this day told to the honor of ,fridthjof1 in accordance with the standard of the ,north in the matter of truth-telling4 ,in ancient ,persia1 the same high standard prevailed4 ,herodotus says of the ,persians3 ,the most disgraceful thing in the world1 they think1 is to tell a lie2 the next worse1 to owe a debt2 because1 among other reasons1 the debtor is obliged to tell lies4#a ,their sons are carefully instructed1 from their fifth to their twentieth year1 in three things alone1--to ride1 to draw the bow1 and to speak the truth4#b ,here the one duty in the realm of morals is truth-telling4 ,in the famous inscription of ,darius1 the son of ,hystaspes1 on the ,rock of ,behistun1#c there are repeated references to lying as the chief of sins1 and to the evil time when lying was introduced into ,persia1 and the lie grew in the provinces1 in ,persia as well as in ,media and in the other provinces4 ,darius claims to have had the help of ,ormuzd and the other gods that may exist1 because he was not wicked1 nor a liar2 and he enjoins it on his successor to punish severely him who is a liar or a rebel4 ,footnote #a3 ,rawlinson's ,herodotus1 ,bk4 ,i41 #aci4 ,footnote #b3 ,ibid41 ,bk4 ,i41 #acf4 ,footnote #c3 ,sayce's ,introduction to ,ezra1 ,nehemiah1 and ,esther1 pp4 #abj-acg4 ,the ,zoroastrian designation of heaven was the ,home of ,song2 while hell was known as the ,home of the ,lie4#a ,there was in the ,zoroastrian thought only two rival principles in the universe1 represented by ,ormuzd and ,ahriman1 as the ,god of truth1 and the father of lies2 and the lie was ever and always an offspring of ,ahriman1 the evil principle3 it could not emanate from or be consistent with the ,god of truth4 ,the same idea was manifest in the designation of the subordinate divinities of the ,zoroastrian religion4 ,mithra was the god of light1 and as there is no concealment in the light1 ,mithra was also god of truth4 ,a liar was the enemy of righteousness4#b ,footnote #a3 ,mller's ,sacred ,books of the ,east1 ,,xxxi41 #ahd4 ,footnote #b3 ,mller's ,sacred ,books of the ,east1 ,,xxiii41 #aai f41 #abd f41 #abh1 #aci4 ,see reference to ,jackson's paper on the ancient ,persians' abhorrence of falsehood1 illustrated from the ,avesta1 in ,journal of ,am4 ,oriental ,soc41 ,vol4 ,,xiii41 p4 cii4 ,truth was the main cardinal virtue among the ,egyptians1 and falsehood was considered disgraceful among them4#a ,ra and ,ma were symbols of ,light and ,truth2 and their representation was worn on the breastplate of priest and judge1 like the ,urim and ,thummim of the ,hebrews4#b ,when the soul appeared in the ,hall of ,two ,truths1 for final judgment1 it must be able to say1 ,i have not told a falsehood1 or fail of acquittal4#c ,ptah1 the creator1 a chief god of the ,egyptians1 was called ,lord of ,truth4#d ,the ,egyptian conception of ,deity was3 ,god is the truth1 he lives by truth1 he lives upon the truth1 he is the king of truth4#e ,the ,egyptians1 like the ,zoroastrians1 seemed to count the one all-dividing line in the universe the line between truth and falsehood1 between light and darkness4 ,footnote #a3 ,wilkinson's ,ancient ,egyptians1 ,i41 #bii2 ,,iii41 #ahc-ahe4 ,footnote #b3 ,exod4 #ci3 #h-ba2 ,lev4 #h3 #h4 ,footnote #c3 ,bunsen's ,egypt's ,place in ,universal ,history1 ,v41 #bed4 ,footnote #d3 ,wilkinson's ,anc4 ,egyp41 ,,iii41 #ae-ag4 ,footnote #e3 ,budge's ,the ,dwellers on the ,nile1 p4 #aca4 ,among the ancient ,greeks the practice of lying was very general1 so general that writers on the social life of the ,greeks have been accustomed to give a low place relatively to that people in its estimate of truthfulness as a virtue4 ,professor ,mahaffy says on this point3 ,at no period did the nation ever attain that high standard which is the great feature in ,germanic civilization4 ,even the ,romans1 with all their coarseness1 stood higher in this respect4 ,but neither in ,iliad nor in ,odyssey is there1 except in phrases1 any reprobation of deceit as such4 ,he points to the testimony of ,cicero1 concerning the ,greeks1 who concedes to them all the high qualities they choose to claim save one--that of truthfulness4#a ,yet the very way in which ,herodotus tells to the credit of the ,persians that they allowed no place for the lie in their ethics#b seems to indicate his apprehension of a higher standard of veracity than that which was generally observed among his own people4 ,moreover1 in the ,iliad1 ,achilles is represented as saying3 ,him ,i hate as ,i do the gates of ,hades1 who hides one thing in his heart and utters another2 and it is the straightforward ,achilles1 rather than the wily and shiftful ,ulysses1 who is the admired hero of the ,greeks4#c ,plato asserts1 and argues in proof of his assertion1 that the veritable lie 444 is hated by all gods and men4 ,he includes in the term veritable lie1 or genuine lie1 a lie in the soul as back of the spoken lie1 and he is sure that the divine nature is incapable of a lie1 and that in proportion as the soul of a man is conformed to the divine image1 the man will speak1 act1 and live in accordance with the truth4#d ,aristotle1 also1 while recognizing different degrees of veracity1 insists that the man who is in his soul a lover of truth will be truthful even when he is tempted to swerve from the truth4 ,for the lover of truth1 who is truthful where nothing is at stake or where it makes no difference1 will yet more surely be truthful where there is a stake or where it does make a difference2 for he will then shun the lie as shameful1 since he shuns it simply because it is a lie4#e ,and1 again1 ,falsehood abstractly is bad and blamable1 and truth honorable and praiseworthy2 and thus the truthful man being in the mean is praiseworthy1 while the false in either extreme1 of overstating or of understating are both blamable1 but the exaggerating man more so than the other4#f ,footnote #a3 ,mahaffy's ,social ,life in ,greece1 pp4 #bg1 #abc4 ,see also ,fowler's ,principles of ,morals1 ,,ii41 #bai-bba4 ,footnote #b3 ,hist41 ,bk4 ,i41 #aci4 ,footnote #c3 ,professor ,fowler seems to be quite forgetful of this fact4 ,he speaks of ,ulysses as if he had precedence of ,achilles in the esteem of the ,greeks4 ,see his ,principles of ,morals1 ,,ii41 #bai4 ,footnote #d3 ,plato's ,republic1 ,,ii41 #chb1 a1 b4 ,footnote #e3 ,aristotle's ,eth4 ,nic41 ,,iv41 #ac1 #aabg1 a1 b4 ,footnote #f3 ,ibid41 ,,iv4 ,theognis recognizes this high ideal of the duty and the beauty of truthfulness1 when he says3 ,at first there is a small attractiveness about a lie1 but in the end the gain it brings is both shameful and harmful4 ,that man has no fair glory1 in whose heart dwells a lie1 and from whose mouth it has once issued4#a ,footnote #a3 ,theognis1 #fjg4 ,pindar looks toward the same standard when he says to ,hiero1 ,forge thy tongue on the anvil of truth2#a and when he declares emphatically1 ,i will not stain speech with a lie4#b ,so1 again1 when his appeal to a divinity is3 ,thou that art the beginning of lofty virtue1 ,lady ,truth1 forbid thou that my poem or composition should stumble against a lie1 harsh rock of offense4#c ,in his tragedy of the ,philoctetes1 ,sophocles makes the whole play pivot on the remorse of ,neoptolemus1 son of ,achilles1 over his having lied to ,philoctetes 7who is for the time being an enemy of the ,greeks71 in order to secure through him the killing of ,paris and the overthrow of ,troy4 ,the lie was told at the instigation of ,ulysses2 but ,neoptolemus repents its utterance1 and refuses to take advantage of it1 even though the fate of ,troy and the triumph of ,greek arms depend on the issue4 ,the plain teaching of the tragedy is that the purposes of heaven are not to be served by a lie2 and that the simplicity of the young son of truth-loving ,achilles is better in the sight of heaven1 even when it seems to lead to failure1 than all the cleverness of guileful ,ulysses4#d ,footnote #a3 ,pythian ,ode1 ,i1 #hf4 ,footnote #b3 ,olympian ,ode1 #d1 #af4 ,footnote #c3 ,bergk's ,pindar1 #ahc #bba4 ,footnote #d3 ,professor ,lamberton ,it is admitted on all hands that the ,romans and the ,germans had a high ideal as to the duty of truthfulness and the sin of lying4#a ,and so it was in fact with all peoples which had any considerable measure of civilization in former ages4 ,it is a noteworthy fact that the duty of veracity is often more prominent among primitive peoples than among the more civilized1 and that1 correspondingly1 lying is abhorred as a vice1 or seems to be unknown as an expedient in social intercourse4 ,this is not always admitted in the theories of writers on morals1 but it would seem to be borne out by an examination into the facts of the case4 ,lecky1 in his study of the natural history of morals1#b claims that veracity usually increases with civilization1 and he seeks to show why it is so4 ,but this view of ,lecky's is an unfounded assumption1 in support of which he proffers no evidence2 while ,herbert ,spencer's exhibit of facts1 in his ,cyclopaedia of ,descriptive ,sociology1 seems to disprove the claim of ,lecky2 and he directly asserts that surviving remnants of some primitive races in ,india have natures in which truthfulness seems to be organic2 that not only to the surrounding ,hindoos1 higher intellectually and relatively advanced in culture1 are they in this respect far superior1 but they are superior to ,europeans4#c ,footnote #a3 ,see ,fowler's ,principles of ,morals1 ,,ii41 #bbj2 also ,mahaffy's ,social ,life in ,greece1 p4 #bg4 ,note1 for instance1 the high standard as to truthfulness indicated by ,cicero1 in his ,offices1 ,,iii41 #ab-ag1 #cb4 ,pretense and dissimulation ought to be banished from the whole of life4 ,reason 444 requires that nothing be done insidiously1 nothing dissemblingly1 nothing falsely4 ,note1 also1 ,juvenal1 ,satire ,,xiii41 as to the sin of a lie purposed1 even if not spoken2 and ,marcus ,aurelius in his ,thoughts1 ,book ,,ix43 ,he 444 who lies is guilty of impiety to the same highest divinity4 ,he1 then1 who lies intentionally is guilty of impiety1 inasmuch as he acts unjustly by deceiving2 and he also who lies unintentionally1 inasmuch as he is at variance with the universal nature1 and inasmuch as he disturbs the order by fighting against the nature of the world2 for he fights against it1 who is moved of himself to that which is contrary to truth1 for he had received powers from nature through the neglect of which he is not able now to distinguish falsehood from truth4 ,footnote #b3 ,history of ,european ,morals1 ,i41 #adc4 ,footnote #c3 ,see ,spencer's ,principles of ,sociology1 ,,ii41 #bcd ff42 also his ,inductions of ,ethics1 p4 #dje f4 ,among those ,hill ,tribes of ,india which have been most secluded1 and which have retained the largest measure of primitive life and customs1 fidelity to truth in speech and act is still the standard1 and a lie is abhorrent to the normal instincts of the race4 ,of the ,khonds of ,central ,india it is said that they1 in common with many other wild races1 bear a singular character for truthfulness and honesty2#a and that especially the aborigine is the most truthful of beings4#b ,the ,khonds believe that truthfulness is one of the most sacred of duties imposed by the gods4#c ,they are men of one word4#d ,the truth is by a ,sonthals held sacred4 #e ,the ,todas call falsehood one of the worst of vices4#f ,although it is said by one traveler that the ,todas practice dissimulation toward ,europeans1 yet he recognizes this as a trait consequent on their intercourse with ,europeans4#g ,the ,bheels1 which were said to be a race of unmitigated savages1 without any sense of natural religion4 #h and which have preserved their rude habits and manners to the present day1 are yet imbued with a sense of truth and honor strangely at contrast with their external character4#i ,bishop ,heber says that their word is more to be depended on than that of their conquerors4#aj ,of the ,sowrahs it is said3 ,a pleasing feature in their character is their complete truthfulness4 ,they do not know how to tell a lie4#aa ,indeed1 as ,mr4 ,spencer sums up the case on this point1 there are ,hill ,tribes in ,india originally distinguished by their veracity1 but who are rendered less veracious by contact with the whites4 ',so rare is lying among these aboriginal races when unvitiated by the 'civilized1' that of those in ,bengal1 ,hunter singles out the ,tipperahs as 'the only ,hill ,tribe in which this vice is met with4'#ab ,footnote #a3 ,glasfurd1 cited in ,cycl4 of ,descrip4 ,sociol41 ,v41 #cb4 ,footnote #b3 ,forsyth1 ,ibid4 ,footnote #c3 ,macpherson1 cited in ,ibid4 ,footnote #d3 ,ibid4 ,footnote #e3 ,sherwill1 cited in ,ibid4 ,footnote #f3 ,harkness1 cited in ,cycl4 of ,descrip4 ,sociol41 ,v41 #ca4 ,footnote #g3 ,spencer's ,principles of ,sociology1 ,,ii41 #bcd4 ,footnote #h3 ,marshman1 cited in ,cycl4 of ,descrip4 ,sociol41 ,v41 #ca4 ,footnote #i3 ,wheeler1 cited in ,ibid4 ,footnote #aj3 ,cited in ,ibid4 ,footnote #aa3 ,shortt1 cited in ,ibid4 ,footnote #ab3 ,spencer's ,principles of ,sociology1 ,,ii41 #bcd ff4 ,the ,arabs are more truthful in their more primitive state than where they are influenced by civilization1 or by dealings with those from civilized communities4#a ,and the same would seem to be true of the ,american ,indians4#b ,of the ,patagonians it is said3 ,a lie with them is held in detestation4 #c ,the word of a ,hottentot is sacred2 and the good quality of a rigid adherence to truth1 he is master of in an eminent degree4#d ,dr4 ,livingstone says that lying was known to be a sin by the ,east ,africans before they knew aught of ,europeans or their teaching4#e ,and ,mungo ,park says of the ,mandingoes1 among the inland ,africans1 that1 while they seem to be thieves by nature1 one of the first lessons in which the ,mandingo women instruct their children is the practice of truth4 ,the only consolation of a mother whose son had been murdered1 was the reflection that the poor boy1 in the course of his blameless life1 had never told a lie4#f ,richard ,burton is alone among modern travelers in considering lying natural to all primitive or savage peoples4 ,carl ,bock1 like other travelers1 testifies to the unvarying truthfulness of the ,dyaks in ,borneo1#g and another observant traveler tells of the disgrace that attaches to a lie in that land1 as shown by the lying heaps of sticks or stones along the roadside here and there4 ,each heap is in remembrance of some man who has told a stupendous lie1 or failed in carrying out an engagement2 and every passer-by takes a stick or a stone to add to the accumulation1 saying at the time he does it1 ',for ,so-and-so's lying heap4' ,it goes on for generations1 until they sometimes forget who it was that told the lie1 but1 notwithstanding that1 they continue throwing the stones4#h ,what a blocking of the paths of civilization there would be if a lying heap were piled up wherever a lie had been told1 or a promise had been broken1 by a child of civilization6 ,footnote #a3 ,denham1 and ,palgrave1 cited in ,cycl4 of ,des4 ,social41 ,v41 #cj1ca4 ,footnote #b3 ,see ,morgan's ,league of the ,iroquois1 p4 #cce2 also ,schoolcraft1 and ,keating1 on the ,chippewas1 cited in ,cycl4 of ,descrip4 ,sociol41 ,,vi41 #cj4 ,footnote #c3 ,snow1 cited in ,ibid4 ,footnote #d3 ,kolben1 and ,barrow1 cited in ,cycl4 of ,descrip4 ,sociol41 ,,iv41 #be4 ,footnote #e3 ,cycl4 of ,descrip4 ,sociol41 ,,iv41 #bf4 ,footnote #f3 ,cycl4 of ,descrip4 ,social41 ,,iv41 #bg4 ,footnote #g3 ,head ,hunters of ,borneo1 p4 #bji4 ,see also ,boyle1 cited in ,spencer's ,cycl4 of ,descrip4 ,social41 ,,iii41 #ce4 ,footnote #h3 ,st4 ,john's ,life in the ,forests of the ,far ,east1 ,i41 #hh f4 ,the ,veddahs of ,ceylon1 one of the most primitive of peoples1 are proverbially truthful4#a ,the natives of ,java are peculiarly free from the vice of lying1 except in those districts which have had most intercourse with ,europeans4#b ,footnote #a3 ,bailey1 cited in ,spencer's ,cycl4 of ,descrip4 ,social41 ,,iii41 #cb4 ,footnote #b3 ,earl1 and ,raffles1 cited in ,ibid41 p4 #ce4 ,it is found1 in fact1 that in all the ages1 the world over1 primitive man's highest ideal conception of deity has been that of a ,god who could not tolerate a lie2 and his loftiest standard of human action has included the readiness to refuse to tell a lie under any inducement1 or in any peril1 whether it be to a friend or to an enemy4 ,this is the teaching of ethnic conceptions on the subject4 ,the lie would seem to be a product of civilization1 or an outgrowth of the spirit of trade and barter1 rather than a natural impulse of primitive man4 ,it appeared in full flower and fruitage in olden time among the commercial ,phoenicians1 so prominently that ,punic faith became a synonym of falsehood in social dealings4 ,yet it is in the face of facts like these that a writer like ,professor ,fowler baldly claims1 in support of the same presupposed theory as that of ,lecky1 that it is probably owing mainly to the development of commerce1 and to the consequent necessity1 in many cases1 of absolute truthfulness1 that veracity has come to take the prominent position which it now occupies among the virtues2 though the keen sense of honor1 engendered by chivalry1 may have had something to do in bringing about the same result4#a ,footnote #a3 ,principles of ,morality1 ,,ii41 #bbj4 ,,iii4 ,,bible ,,teachings4 ,in looking at the ,bible for light in such an investigation as this1 it is important to bear in mind that the ,bible is not a collection of specific rules of conduct1 but rather a book of principles illustrated in historic facts1 and in precepts based on those principles1--announced or presupposed4 ,the question1 therefore1 is not1 ,does the ,bible authoritatively draw a line separating the truth from a lie1 and making the truth to be always right1 and a lie to be always wrong8 but it is1 ,does the ,bible evidently recognize an unvarying and ever-existing distinction between a truth and a lie1 and does the whole sweep of its teachings go to show that in ,god's sight a lie1 as by its nature opposed to the truth and the right1 is always wrong8 ,the ,bible opens with a picture of the first pair in ,paradise1 to whom ,god tells the simple truth1 and to whom the enemy of man tells a lie2 and it shows the ruin of mankind wrought by that lie1 and the author of the lie punished because of its telling4#a ,the ,bible closes with a picture of ,paradise1 into which are gathered the lovers and doers of truth1 and from which is excluded every one that loveth and doeth a lie2#b while all liars are to have their part in the lake that burneth with fire and brimstone2 which is the second death4#c ,in the ,old ,testament and in the ,new1 ,god is represented as himself the ,truth1 to whom1 by his very nature1 the doing or the speaking of a lie is impossible1#d while ,satan is represented as a liar and as the father of lies4#e ,footnote #a3 ,gen4 #b1 #c4 ,footnote #b3 ,rev4 #bb4 ,footnote #c3 ,rev4 #ba3 #e-h4 ,footnote #d3 ,psa4 #ca3e2 #adf3f2 ,john #ad3f2 ,num4 #bc3ai2 #a ,sam4 #ae3bi2 ,titus #a3b2 ,heb4 #f3ah2 #a ,john #e3g4 ,footnote #e3 ,john #h3dd4 ,while the human servants of ,god1 as represented in the ,bible narrative1 are in many instances guilty of lying1 their lies are clearly contrary to the great principle1 in the light of which the ,bible itself is written1 that a lie is always wrong1 and that it cannot have justification in ,god's sight4 ,the idea of the ,bible record is that ,god is true1 though every man were a liar4#a ,god is uniformly represented as opposed to lies and to liars1 and a lie in his sight is spoken of as a lie unto him1 or as a lie against him4 ,in the few cases where the ,bible narrative has been thought by some to indicate an approval by the ,lord of a lie1 that was told1 as it were1 in his interest1 an examination of the facts will show that they offer no exception to the rule that1 by the ,bible standard1 a lie is never justifiable4 ,footnote #a3 ,rom4 #c3d4 ,take1 for example1 the case of the ,hebrew midwives1 who lied to the officials of ,pharaoh1 when they were commanded to kill every ,hebrew male child2#a and of whom it is said that ,god dealt well with the midwives2444 and 444 because the midwives feared ,god1444 he made them houses4#b ,here it is plain that ,god commended their fear of him1 not their lying in behalf of his people1 and that it was because the midwives feared ,god not because they lied1 that he made them houses4 ,it was their choice of the ,lord above the gods and rulers of ,egypt that won them the approval of the ,lord1 even though they were sinners in being liars2 as in an earlier day it was the approval of ,jacob's high estimate of the birthright1 and not the deceits practiced by him on ,esau and his father ,isaac1 that the ,lord showed in confirming a blessing to ,jacob4#c ,footnote #a3 ,exod4 #a3 #ae-ai4 ,footnote #b3 ,exod4 ,i3 #bj1 #ba4 ,footnote #c3 ,gen4 #be3 #bg-cd2 #bg2 #a-dj2 #bh3 #a-bb ,so1 also1 in the narrative of ,rahab1 the ,canaanitish young woman1 who concealed the ,israelitish spies sent into her land by ,joshua1 and lied about them to her countrymen1 and who was commended by the ,lord for her faith in this transaction4#a ,rahab was a harlot by profession and a liar by practice4 ,when the ,hebrew spies entered ,jericho1 they went to her house as a place of common resort4 ,rahab1 on learning who they were1 expressed her readiness1 sinner as she was1 to trust the ,god of ,israel rather than the gods of ,canaan2 and because of her trust she put herself1 with all her heathen habits of mind and conduct1 at the disposal of the ,god of ,israel1 and she lied1 as she had been accustomed to lie1 to her own people1 as a means of securing safety to her ,hebrew visitors4 ,because of her faith1 which was shown in this way1 but not necessarily because of her way of showing her faith1 the ,lord approved of her spirit in choosing his service rather than the service of the gods of her people4 ,the record of her approval is1 ,by faith ,rahab the harlot perished not with them that were disobedient1 having received the spies with peace4#b ,footnote #a3 ,josh4 #b3 #a-ba4 ,footnote #b3 ,heb4 ,,ii3 #ca4 ,it would be quite as fair to claim that ,god approved of ,rahab's harlotry1 in this case1 as to claim that he approved of her lying4 ,rahab was a harlot and a liar1 and she was ready to practice in both these lines in the service of the spies4 ,she was not to be commended for either of those vices2 but she was to be commended in that1 with all her vices1 she was yet ready to give herself just as she was1 and with her ways as they were1 to ,jehovah's side1 in the crisis hour of conflict between him and the gods of her people4 ,it was the faith that prompted her to this decision that ,god commended2 and by faith she was preserved from destruction when her people perished4 ,another case that has been thought to imply a divine approval of an untrue statement1 is that of ,samuel1 when he went to ,bethlehem to anoint ,david as ,saul's successor on the throne of ,israel1 and1 at the ,lord's command1 said he had come to offer a sacrifice to ,god4#a ,but here clearly the narrative shows no lie1 nor false statement1 made or approved4 ,samuel1 as judge and prophet1 was ,god's representative in ,israel4 ,he was accustomed to go from place to place in the line of his official ministry1 including the offering at times of sacrifices of communion4#b ,when1 on this occasion1 the ,lord told ,samuel of his purpose of designating a son of ,jesse to succeed ,saul on the throne1 and desired him to go to ,bethlehem for further instructions1 ,samuel was unnecessarily alarmed1 and said1 in his fear1 ,how can ,i go8 if ,saul hear it1 he will kill me4 ,the ,lord's simple answer was1 ,take an heifer with thee1 and say1 ,i am come to sacrifice to the ,lord4 ,and call ,jesse to the sacrifice1 and ,i will shew thee what thou shalt do3 and thou shalt anoint unto me him whom ,i name unto thee4 ,footnote #a3 #a ,sam4 #af3 #a-c4 ,footnote #b3 #a ,sam4 #g3 #ae-ag2 #i3 #bb-bd2 #aa3 #ad1ae2 #bj3bi4 ,in other words1 the ,lord said to ,samuel1 ,i want you to go to ,bethlehem as my representative1 and offer a sacrifice there4 ,say this fearlessly4 ,in due time ,i will give you other directions2 but do not borrow trouble on account of them4 ,do your duty step by step4 ,speak out the plain truth as to all that the authorities of ,bethlehem have any right to know2 and do not fear any harm through my subsequent private revelations to you4 ,in these directions of the ,lord there is no countenance of the slightest swerving from the truth by ,samuel2 nor is there an authorized concealment of any fact that those to whom ,samuel was sent had any claim to know4 ,still another ,bible incident that has been a cause of confusion to those who did not see how ,god could approve lying1 and a cause of rejoicing to those who wanted to find evidence of his justification of that practice1 is the story of the prophet ,micaiah1 saying before ,jehoshaphat and ,ahab that the ,lord had put a lying spirit into the mouths of all the false prophets who were at that time before those kings4#a ,herbert ,spencer actually cites this incident as an illustration of the example set before the people of ,israel1 by their ,god1 of lying as a means of accomplishing a desired end4#b ,but just look at the story as it stands6 ,footnote #a3 #a ,kings #bb3 #a-bc2 #b ,chron4 #ah3 #a-cd4 ,footnote #b3 ,the ,inductions of ,ethics1 p4 #aeh4 ,four hundred of ,ahab's prophets were ready to tell him that a campaign which he wanted to enter upon would be successful4 ,micaiah1 an honest prophet of the ,lord1 was sent for at ,jehoshaphat's request1 and was urged by the messenger to prophesy to the same effect as ,ahab's prophets4 ,micaiah replied that he should give the ,lord's message1 whether it was agreeable or not to ,ahab4 ,he came1 and at first he spoke satirically as if he agreed with the other prophets in deeming the campaign a hopeful one4 ,it was as though he said to the king1 ,you want me to aid you in your plans1 not to give you counsel from the ,lord2 therefore ,i will say1 as your prophets have said1 ,go ahead1 and have success4 ,it was evident1 however1 to ,ahab1 that the prophet's words were not to be taken literally1 but were a rebuke to him in ,oriental style1 and therefore he told the prophet to give him the ,lord's message plainly4 ,then the prophet gave a parable1 or a message in ,oriental guise1 showing that these four hundred prophets of ,ahab were speaking falsely1 as if inspired by a lying spirit1 and that1 if ,ahab followed their counsel1 he would go to his ruin4 ,to cite this parable as a proof of ,jehovah's commendation of lying is an absurdity4 ,jehovah's prophet ,micaiah was there before the king1 telling the simple truth to the king4 ,and1 in order to meet effectively the claim of the false prophets that they were inspired1 he related1 as it were1 a vision1 or a parable1 in which he declared that he had seen preparations making in heaven for their inspiring by a lying spirit4 ,this was1 as every ,oriental would understand it1 a parliamentary way of calling the four hundred prophets a pack of liars2 and the event proved that all of them were liars1 and that ,micaiah alone1 as ,jehovah's prophet1 was a truth-teller4 ,what folly could be greater than the attempt to count this public charge against the lying prophets as an item of evidence in proof of the ,lord's responsibility for their lying--which the ,lord's prophet took this method of exposing and rebuking6 ,there are1 indeed1 various instances in the ,bible story of lies told by men who were in favor with ,god1 where there is no ground for claiming that those lies had approval with ,god4 ,the men of the ,bible story are shown as men1 with the sins and follies and weaknesses of men4 ,their conduct is to be judged by the principles enunciated in the ,bible1 and their character is to be estimated by the relation which they sustained toward ,god in spite of their human infirmities4 ,abraham is called the father of the faithful1#a and he was known as the friend of ,god4#b ,but he indulged in the vice of concubinage1#c in accordance with the loose morals of his day and of his surroundings2 and when he was down in ,egypt he lied through his distrust of ,god1 apparently thinking that there was such a thing as a lie of necessity1 and he brought upon himself the rebuke of an ,egyptian king because of his lying4#d ,but it would be folly to claim that ,god approved of concubinage or of lying1 because a man whom he was saving was guilty of either of these vices4 ,isaac also lied1#e and so did ,jacob2#f but it was not because of their lies that these men had favor with ,god4 ,david was a man after ,god's own heart#g in his fidelity of spirit to ,god as the only true ,god1 in contrast with the gods of the nations round about ,israel2 but ,david lied1#h as ,david committed adultery4#i ,it would hardly be claimed1 however1 that either his adultery or his lying in itself made ,david a man after ,god's own heart4 ,so all along the ,bible narrative1 down to the time when ,ananias and ,sapphira1 prominent among the early ,christians1 lied unto ,god concerning their very gifts into his treasury1 and were struck dead as a rebuke of their lying4#aj ,footnote #a3 ,josh4 #bd3c2 ,isa4 #ea3 #b2 ,matt4 #c3 #i2 ,rom4 #d3ab2 ,gal4 #c3i ,footnote #b3 #b ,chron4 #bj3 #g2 ,isa4 #da3 #h2 ,jas4 #b3 #bc4 ,footnote #c3 ,gen4 #af3 #a-f4 ,footnote #d3 ,gen4 #ab3 #aj-ai4 ,footnote #e3 ,gen4 #bf3 #f-aj4 ,footnote #f3 ,gen4 #bg3 #f-bi4 ,footnote #g3 #a ,sam4 #aa3 #a-bg ,footnote #h3 #a ,sam4 #ba3 #a1b4 ,footnote #i3 #b ,sam4 #aa3 #a-bg4 ,footnote #aj3 ,acts #e3 #a-aa4 ,the whole sweep of ,bible teaching is opposed to lying2 and the specific injunctions against that sin1 as well as the calls to the duty of truth-speaking1 are illustrative of that sweep4 ,ye shall not steal2 neither shall ye deal falsely1 nor lie one to another1#a says the ,lord1 in holding up the right standard before his children4 ,a lying tongue is said to be an abomination before the ,lord4#b ,a faithful witness will not lie3 but a false witness breatheth out lies1#c says ,solomon1 in marking the one all-dividing line of character2 and as to the results of lying he says1 ,he that breatheth out lies shall not escape1#d and he that breatheth out lies shall perish4#e ,and he adds the conclusion of wisdom1 in view of the supposed profit of lying1 ,a poor man is better than a liar2#f that is1 a truth-telling poor man is better than a rich liar4 ,footnote #a3 ,lev4 #ai3aa4 ,footnote #b3 ,prov4 #f3af1 #ag4 ,footnote #c3 ,prov4 #ad3e4 ,footnote #d3 ,prov4 #ai3e4 ,footnote #e3 ,prov4 #ai3i4 ,footnote #f3 ,prov4 #ai3bb4 ,the inspired ,psalms are full of such teachings3 ,the wicked are estranged from the womb3 they go astray as soon as they be born1 speaking lies4#a ,they delight in lies4#b ,the mouth of them that speak lies shall be stopped4#c ,he that speaketh falsehood shall not be established before mine the ,psalmist's eyes4#d ,and the ,psalmist prays1 ,deliver my soul1 ,o ,lord1 from lying lips4#e ,in the ,new ,testament it is much the same as in the ,old4 ,lie not one to another2 seeing that ye have put off the old man with his doings1#f is the apostolic injunction2 and again1 ,speak ye truth each one with his neighbor3 for we are members one of another4#g ,there is no place for a lie in ,bible ethics1 under the earlier dispensation or the later4 ,footnote #a3 ,psa4 #eh3c4 ,footnote #b3 ,psa4 #fb3d4 ,footnote #c3 ,psa4 #fc3aa4 ,footnote #d3 ,psa4 #aja3 #g4 ,footnote #e3 ,psa4 #abj3 #b4 ,footnote #f3 ,col4 #c3 #i4 ,footnote #g3 ,eph4 #d3 #be4 ,,iv4 ,,definitions4 ,it would seem to be clear that the ,bible1 and also the other sacred books of the world1 and the best moral sense of mankind everywhere1 are united in deeming a lie incompatible with the idea of a holy ,god1 and consistent only with the spirit of man's arch-enemy--the embodiment of all evil4 ,therefore he who1 admitting this1 would find a place in ,god's providential plan for a lie of necessity must begin with claiming that there are lies which are not lies4 ,hence it is of prime importance to define a lie clearly1 and to distinguish it from allowable and proper concealments of truth4 ,a lie1 in its stricter sense1 is the affirming1 by word or by action1 of that which is not true1 with a purpose of deceiving2 or the denying1 by word or by action1 of that which is true1 with a purpose of deceiving4 ,but the suppressing or concealing of essential facts1 from one who is entitled to know them1 with a purpose of deceiving1 may practically amount to a lie4 ,obviously a lie may be by act1 as really as by word2 as when a man is asked to tell the right road1 and he silently points in the wrong direction4 ,obviously1 also1 the intention or purpose of deceiving is in the essence of the lie2 for if a man says that which is not true1 supposing it to be true1 he makes a misstatement1 but he does not lie2 or1 again1 if he speaks an untruth playfully where no deception is wrought or intended1 as by saying1 when the mercury is below zero1 that it is good summer weather1 there is no lie in the patent untruth4 ,so far all are likely to be agreed2 but when it comes to the question of that concealment which is in the realm of the lie1 as distinct from right and proper concealment1 there is more difficulty in making the lines of distinction clear to all minds4 ,yet those lines can be defined1 and it is important that they should be4 ,a witness on the stand in a court of law is bound by his oath1 or his affirmation1 to tell the truth1 the whole truth1 and nothing but the truth1 in the testimony that he gives in response to the questions asked of him4 ,if1 therefore1 in the course of his testimony1 he declares that he received five dollars for his share in a certain transaction1 when in reality he received five hundred dollars1 his concealment of the fact that he received a hundred times as much as he admits having received1 is practically a lie1 and is culpable as such4 ,any intentional concealment of essential facts in the matter at issue1 in his answers to questions asked of him as a witness1 is a lie in essence4 ,but a person who is not before a court of justice is not necessarily bound to tell all the facts involved to every person whom he addresses1 or who desires to have him do so2 and therefore1 while a concealment of facts which ought to be disclosed may be equivalent to a lie1 there is such a thing as the concealment of facts which is not only allowable1 but which is an unmistakable duty4 ,and to know when concealment is right1 and when it is wrong1 is to know when concealment partakes of the nature of a lie1 and when it is a totally different matter4 ,concealment1 so far from being in itself a sin1 is in itself right2 it is only in its misuse that it becomes reprehensible in a given case4 ,concealment is a prime duty of man2 as truly a duty as truth-speaking1 or chastity1 or honesty4 ,god1 who cannot lie to his creatures1 conceals much from his creatures4 ,the secret things belong unto the ,lord our ,god3 but the things that are revealed belong unto us and to our children for ever1#a says the author of ,deuteronomy2 and the whole course of ,god's revelation to man is in accordance with this announced principle of ,god's concealment of that which ought to be concealed4 ,he who is himself the revelation of ,god says to his chosen disciples1 even when he is speaking his latest words to them before his death3 ,i have yet many things to say unto you1 but ye cannot bear them now2#b and he conceals what1 as yet1 it is better for them should remain concealed4 ,footnote #a3 ,deut4 #bi3 #bi4 ,footnote #b3 ,john #af3ab4 ,there is a profound meaning in the suggestion1 in the ,bible story of man's fall1 that1 when man had come to the knowledge of good and evil1 the first practical duty which he recognized as incumbent upon himself1 was the duty of concealment2#a and from that day to this that duty has been incumbent on him4 ,man has a duty to conceal his besetting impurities of thought and inclinations to sin2 to conceal such of his doubts and fears as would dishearten others and weaken himself by their expression2 to conceal his unkindnesses of spirit and his unjust prejudices of feeling2 to conceal1 in fact1 whatever of his innermost personality is liable to work harm by its disclosure1 and to a knowledge of which his fellows have no just claim4 ,in the world as it is1 there is more to be concealed than to be disclosed in every individual life2 and concealment rather than disclosure is the rule of personal action4 ,footnote #a3 ,gen4 #c3f1 #g4 ,absolute and unrestricted frankness in social intercourse would be brutal4 ,the speaking of the whole truth at all times and to everybody could have neither justification nor excuse between man and man4 ,we have no right to tell our fellows all that we think of them1 or fear for them1 or suspect them of4 ,we have no right to betray the confidences of those who trust us1 or to disclose to all the fact that we have such confidences to conceal4 ,we have no right to let it be generally known that there are such peculiar struggles within us as make our lives a ceaseless battle with temptations and fears and doubts4 ,there is such a thing as an indecent exposure of personal opinions1 and as a criminal disclosure of the treasures of the inner life4#a ,how to conceal aright that which ought to be concealed1 is one of the vital questions of upright living4 ,footnote #a3 ,see #b ,kings #bj3 #ab-ai4 ,the duty of right concealment stands over against the sin of lying4 ,whatever ought to be concealed1 should be concealed1 if concealment is a possibility without sinning4 ,but the strongest desire for concealment can never justify a lie as a means of concealment2 and concealment at the cost of a lie becomes a sin through the means employed for its securing4 ,on the other hand1 when disclosure is a duty1 concealment is sinful1 because it is made to stand in the way of the performance of a duty4 ,concealment is not in itself wrong1 but it may become wrong through its misuse4 ,lying is in itself wrong1 and it cannot be made right through any seeming advantage to be gained by it4 ,concealment which is right in one instance may be wrong in another instance1 the difference being in the relations of the two parties in the case4 ,a man who has lost a leg or an eye may properly conceal from others generally the fact of his loss by any legitimate means of concealment4 ,his defect is a purely personal matter4 ,the public has no claim upon him for all the facts in the premises4 ,he may have an artificial limb or an artificial eye1 so constructed as to conceal his loss from the ordinary observer4 ,there is nothing wrong in this4 ,it is in the line of man's primal duty of concealment4 ,but if a man thus disabled were applying for a life-insurance policy1 or were an applicant for re-enlistment in the army1 or were seeking employment where bodily wholeness is a requisite1 it would be his duty to make known his defect2 and the concealment of it from the parties interested would be in the realm of the lie4 ,so1 again1 if a man were proposing marriage1 or were entering into confidential relations with a partner in business1 or were seeking financial aid from a bank1 he would have no right to conceal from the party interested many a fact which he could properly conceal from the public4 ,a man who would be justified in concealing from the general public his mental troubles1 or his business embarrassments1 or his spiritual perplexities1 could not properly conceal the essential facts in the case from his chosen adviser in medicine1 or in law1 or in matters of religion4 ,it is a man's duty to disclose the whole truth to him who has a right to know the whole truth4 ,it is a man's right1 and it may become his duty1 to conceal a measure of the truth from one who is not entitled to know that portion of the truth1 so far as he can properly make concealment4 ,but as a lie is never justifiable1 it is never a proper means of concealment2 and if concealment be1 in any case1 a mode of lying1 it is as bad as any other form of lying4 ,but concealment1 even when it is of facts that others have no right to know1 may cause others to be deceived1 and deliberate deceit is one form of a lie4 ,how1 then1 can concealment that is sure to result in deception be free from the sin that invariably attaches to a lie in any form1 or of any nature whatsoever8 ,concealment which is for the purpose of deception1 is one thing2 concealment which is only for the purpose of concealment1 but which is sure to result in deception1 is quite another thing4 ,the one is not justifiable1 the other may be4 ,in the one case it is a man's purpose to deceive his fellow-man2 in the other case it is simply his purpose to conceal what his fellow-man has no right to know1 and that fellow-man receives a false impression1 or deceives himself1 in consequence4 ,we may1 or we may not1 be responsible for the obvious results of our action2 and the moral measure of any action depends on the measure of our responsibility in the premises4 ,a surgeon1 who is engaged in an important and critical operation1 is told that he is wanted elsewhere in a case of life and death4 ,if he sees it to be his duty to continue where he is because he cannot safely leave this case at this time1 he obviously is not responsible for results which come because of his absence from the side of the other sufferer4 ,a man is by a river bank when a boy is sinking before his eyes4 ,if the man were to reach out his arms to him1 the boy might be saved4 ,but the man makes no movement in the boy's behalf1 and the boy drowns4 ,it might seem as though that man were responsible for that boy's death2 but when it is known that the man is at that moment occupied in saving the life of his own son1 who is also struggling in the water1 it will have to be admitted that the father is not responsible for the results of his inaction in another sphere than that which is for the moment the sphere of his imperative duty4 ,if a wife and mother has to choose between her loving ministry to her sick husband and to her sick child1 and she chooses that which she sees to be the more important duty of the hour1 she is not responsible for any results that follow from her inability to be in two places at the same time4 ,a man with a limited income may know that ten families are in need of money1 while he can give help to only two of them4 ,even though others starve while he is supplying food to all whom he can aid1 he is not responsible for results that flow from his decision to limit his ministry to his means4 ,in all our daily life1 our decision to do the one duty of the hour involves our refusal to do what is not our duty1 and we have no responsibility for the results which come from such a refusal4 ,so in the matter of the duty of concealment1 if a man simply purposes the concealment from another of that which the other has no right to know1 and does not specifically affirm by word or act that which is not true1 nor deny by act or word that which is true1 he is in no degree responsible for the self-deception by another concerning a point which is no proper concern of that other person4 ,others are self-deceived with reference to us in many things1 beyond our responsibility or knowledge4 ,we may be considered weaker or stronger1 wiser or more simple1 younger or older1 gladder or sadder1 than we are2 but for the self-deception on that point by the average observer we are not responsible4 ,we may not even be aware of it4 ,it is really no concern of ours--or of our neighbor's4 ,it is merely an incident of human life as it is4 ,we may have an aching tooth or an aching heart1 and yet refrain from disclosing this fact in the expression of our face4 ,in such a case we merely conceal what is our own possession from those who have no claim to know it4 ,even though they deceive themselves as to our condition in consequence of our looks1 we are not responsible for their self-deception1 because they are not possessed of all the facts1 nor have they any right to them1 nor yet to a fixed opinion in the case4 ,if a man were to have a patch put on his coat1 he might properly have it put on the under side of the coat instead of the outer side1 thus making what is called a blind patch1 for the purpose of concealing the defect in his garment4 ,even though this course might result in a false impression on the mind of the casual observer1 the man would not be blameworthy1 as he would be if he had pursued the same course with a purpose of deceiving a purchaser of the coat4 ,so1 again1 in the case of a mender of bric-a-brac3 it would be right for him to cement carefully the parts of a broken vase for the mere purpose of concealing its damaged condition from the ordinary eye1 but not for the purpose of deceiving one who would be a purchaser4 ,a man whose city house is closed from the public in the summer season1 because of his absence in the country1 has a perfect right to come to that house for a single night1 without opening the shutters and lighting up the rooms in intimation of his presence4 ,he may even keep those shutters closed while his room is lighted1 for the express purpose of concealing the fact of his presence there1 and yet not be responsible for any false impression on the minds of passers-by1 who think that the proprietor is still in the country1 and that the city house is vacant4 ,on the other hand1 if the house be left lighted up all through the night1 with the shutters open1 while the inmates are asleep1 for the very purpose of concealing from those outside the fact that no one in the house is awake and on guard1 the proprietor is not responsible for any self-deception which results to those who have no right to know the facts in the case4 ,and so1 again1 in the matter of having a man's hat or coat on the rack in the front hall1 while there are only women in the house1 the sole purpose of the action may be the concealment of the real condition of affairs from those who have no claim to know the truth1 and not the deliberate deception of any party in interest4 ,in so far as the purpose is merely the concealment from others of the defenseless condition of the house the action is obviously a proper one1 notwithstanding its liability to result in false impressions on the minds of those who have no right to an opinion in the case4 ,while a man would be justified in concealing1 without falsehood1 the fact of a bodily lack or infirmity on his part which concerned himself alone1 he would not be justified in concealing the fact that he was sick of a contagious disease1 or that his house was infected by a disease that might be given to a caller there4 ,nor would he be justified in concealing a defect in a horse or a cow in order to deceive a man into the purchase of that animal as a sound one1 any more than he would be justified in slightly covering an opening in the ground before his house1 so as to deceive a disagreeable visitor into stumbling into that hole4 ,it would be altogether proper for a man with a bald head to conceal his baldness from the general public by a well-constructed wig4 ,it would likewise be proper for him to wear a wig in order to guard his shining pate against flies while at church in ,july1 or against danger from pneumonia in ,january1 even though wide-awake children in the neighboring pews deceived themselves into thinking that he had a fine head of natural hair4 ,but if that man were to wear that wig for the purpose of deceiving a young woman1 whom he wished to marry1 as to his age and as to his freedom from bodily defects1 it would be quite a different matter4 ,concealment for the mere purpose of concealment may be1 not only justifiable1 but a duty4 ,concealment for the purpose of deception is never justifiable4 ,it would seem that this is the principle on which ,god acts with reference to both the material and the moral universe4 ,he conceals facts1 with the result that many a man is self-deceived1 in his ignorance1 as to the size of the stars1 and the cause of eclipses1 and the processes of nature1 and the consequences of conduct1 in many an important particular4 ,but man1 and not ,god1 is responsible for man's self-deception concerning points at which man can make no claim to a right to know all the truth4 ,it is true that this distinction is a delicate one1 but it is a distinction none the less real on that account4 ,a moral line1 like a mathematical line1 has length1 but neither breadth nor thickness4 ,and the line that separates a justifiable concealment which causes self-deception on the part of those who are not entitled to know the whole truth in the matter1 and the deliberate concealment of truth for the specific purpose of deception1 is a line that runs all the way up from the foundations to the summit of the universe4 ,this line of distinction is vital to an understanding of the question of the duty of truth-speaking1 and of the sin of lying4 ,an effort at right concealment may include truthful statements which are likely1 or even sure1 to result in false impressions on the mind of the one to whom they are addressed1 and who in consequence deceives himself as to the facts1 when the purpose of those statements is not the deception of the hearer4 ,a husband may have had a serious misunderstanding with his wife that causes him pain of heart1 so that his face gives sign of it as he comes out of the house in the morning4 ,the difficulty which has given him such mental anxiety is one which he ought to conceal4 ,he has no right to disclose it to others4 ,yet he has no right to speak an untruth for the purpose of concealing that which he ought to conceal4 ,it may be that the mental trouble has already deprived him of sleep1 and has intensified his anxiety over a special business matter that awaits his attention down town1 and that all this shows in his face4 ,if so1 these facts are secondary but very real causes of his troubled look1 as he meets a neighbor on leaving his house1 who says to him3 ,you look very much troubled this morning4 ,what's the matter with you8 ,now1 if he were to say in reply1 ,then my looks belie me2 for ,i have no special trouble1 he would say what was not true4 ,but he might properly say1 ,i think it is very likely4 ,i didn't sleep well last night1 and ,i am very tired this morning4 ,and ,i have work before me to-day that ,i am not easy about4 ,those statements being literally true1 and being made for the purpose of concealing facts which his questioner has no right to know1 their utterance is justifiable1 regardless of the workings of the mind of the one who hears them4 ,they are made in order to conceal what is back of them1 not in order to deceive one who is entitled to know those primary facts4 ,if1 again1 a physician in attendance on a patient sees that there is cause for grave anxiety in the patient's condition1 and deems it important to conceal his fears1 so far as he can without untruthfulness1 he may1 in answer to direct questions from his patient1 give truthful answers that are designed to conceal what he has a right to conceal1 without his desiring to deceive his patient1 and without his being responsible for any self-deception on his patient's part that results from their conversation4 ,the patient may ask1 ,doctor1 am ,i very sick8 ,the doctor may answer truthfully1 ,not so sick as you might be1 by a good deal4 ,he may give this answer with a cheerful look and tone1 and it may result in calming the patient's fears4 ,if1 however1 the patient goes on to ask1 ,but1 doctor1 do you think ,i'm going to die8 the doctor may respond lightly1 ,well1 most of us will die sooner or later1 and ,i suppose you are not to be exempt from the ordinary lot of mortals4 ,but1 continues the patient1 do you think ,i am going to die of this disease8 ,then the doctor can say1 seriously and truthfully1 ,i'm sure ,i don't know4 ,the future is concealed from me4 ,you may live longer than ,i do4 ,i certainly hope you are not going to die yet awhile1 and ,i'm going to do all ,i can to prevent it4 ,all this would be justifiable1 and be within the limits of truthfulness4 ,concealment of the opinions of the physician as to the patient's chances of life1 and not the specific deception of the patient1 is the object of these answers4 ,in no event1 however1 would the physician be justified in telling a lie1 any more than he would be in committing any other sin1 as a means of good4 ,he is necessarily limited by the limits of right1 in the exercise of his professional skill1 and in the choice of available means4 ,he is in no wise responsible for the consequences of his refusal to go beyond those limits4 ,concealment may be1 or may not be1 of the nature of deception4 ,concealment is not right when disclosure is a duty4 ,concealment of that which may properly be concealed is not in itself wrong4 ,efforts at concealment must1 in order to be right1 be kept within the limits of strict truthfulness of statement4 ,concealment for the purpose of deception is in the realm of the lie4 ,concealment for the mere purpose of concealment may be in the realm of positive duty--in the sight of ,god and for the sake of our fellows4 ,it is to be borne in mind that the definitions here given do not pivot on the specific illustrations proffered for their explanation4 ,if1 in any instance1 the illustration seems inapt or imperfect1 it may be thrown aside1 and reference made to the definition itself4 ,the definition represents the principle involved2 the illustration is only a suggestion of the principle4 ,v4 ,,the ,,plea ,,of ,,necessity4 ,the story is told of an old ,quaker1 who1 after listening for a time to the unstinted praises1 by a dry-goods salesman1 of the various articles he was trying to dispose of1 said quietly3 ,friend1 it is a great pity that lying is a sin1 since it seems so necessary in thy business4 ,it has been generally supposed that this remark of the old ,quaker was a satirical one1 rather than a serious expression of regret over the clashing of the demands of ,god's nature with the practical necessities of men4 ,yet1 as a matter of fact1 there are moral philosophers1 and writers on ,christian ethics1 who seem to take seriously the position assumed by this ,quaker1 and who argue deliberately that there are such material advantages to be secured by lying1 in certain emergencies1 that it would be a great pity to recognize any unvarying rule1 with reference to lying1 that would shut off all possibility of desired gain from this practice under conditions of greatest urgency4 ,it is claimed that lying proffers such unmistakable advantages in time of war1 and of sickness1 and in dealings with would-be criminals and the insane1 and other classes exempt from ordinary social consideration1 that lying becomes a necessity when the gain from it is of sufficient magnitude4 ,looked at in this light1 lying is not sinful per se1 but simply becomes sinful by its misuse or untimeliness2 for if it be sinful per se1 no temporary or material advantage from its exercise could ever make it other than sinful4 ,if1 indeed1 the rightfulness of lying is contingent on the results to be hoped for or to be feared from it1 the prime question with reference to it1 in a moral estimate of its propriety1 is the limit of profit1 or of gain1 which will justify it as a necessity4 ,but with all that has been written on this subject in the passing centuries1 the advocates of the lie of necessity have had to contend with the moral sense of the world as to the sinfulness of lying1 and with the fact that lying is not merely a violation of a social duty1 but is contrary to the demands of the very nature of ,god1 and of the nature of man as formed in the image of ,god4 ,and it has been the practice of such advocates to ignore or to deny the testimony of this moral sense of the race1 and to persist in looking at lying mainly in the light of its social aspects4 ,that the moral sense of the race is against the admissibility of the rightfulness of lying1 is shown by the estimate of this sin as a sin in the ethnic conceptions of it1 even among peoples who indulge freely in its practice1 as well as in the teachings of the sacred books of the ages4 ,and1 moreover1 it is not the fact1 as is often claimed1 that lying is generally admitted to be allowable between enemies in war time1 or by a physician to his patient1 or by a sane man to one who is insane1 or in order to the prevention of crime1 or for the purpose of securing some real or supposed advantage in any case4 ,the right to conceal from the enemy one's weakness1 or one's plans1 by any exhibit of quaker guns1 or of mock fortifications1 or of movements and counter-movements1 or of feints of attack1 or of surplus watchfires1 in time of warfare1 is recognized on all sides4 ,but the right to lie to or to deceive the enemy by sending out a flag of truce1 as if in desire for a peaceful conference1 and following it up with an attack on his lines in an unsuspecting moment1 is not admitted in any theory of civilized warfare4 ,and while a scout may creep within the enemy's lines1 and make observations of the enemy's weakness and strength of position1 without being open to any charge of dishonorable conduct1--if he comes disguised as a soldier of the other side than his own1 or if he claims to be a mere civilian or non-combatant1 he is held to be a spy1 and as such he is denied a soldier's death1 and must yield his life on the gallows as a deceiver and a liar4 ,the distinction between justifiable concealment for the mere purpose of concealment1 and concealment for the express purpose of deceiving1 is recognized as clearly in warfare as in peaceful civil life2 and the writer on ,christian ethics who appeals to the approved practices of warfare in support of the lie of necessity can have only the plea of ignorance as an excuse for his baseless argument4 ,an enemy in warfare has no right to know the details of his opponent's plans for his overcoming2 but his opponent has no right to lie to him1 by word or action1 as a means of concealment2 for a lie is never justifiable1 and therefore is never a necessity4 ,and this is admitted in the customs of honorable warfare4 ,illustrations of this distinction are abundant4 ,a ,federal officer1 taken prisoner in battle1 was brought before a ,confederate officer for examination4 ,he was asked his name1 his rank1 his regiment1 his brigade1 his division1 and his corps4 ,to all these questions he gave truthful answers promptly2 for the enemy had a right to information at these points concerning a prisoner of war4 ,but when the question came1 ,what is the present strength of your corps8 he replied1 ,two and a half millions4 ,that cannot be true1 said the ,confederate officer4 ,do you expect me to tell you the truth1 ,colonel1 in such a matter8 he responded1 in reminder of the fact that it was proper for him to conceal facts which the other had no right to know2 and his method of concealment was by an answer that was intended to conceal1 but not to deceive4 ,in ,libby ,prison1 during war time1 the attempt to prevent written messages being carried out by released prisoners was at first made by the careful examination of the clothing and persons of such prisoners2 but this proved to be ineffectual4 ,then it was decided to put every outgoing prisoner on his word of honor as a soldier in this matter2 and that was effectual4 ,a true soldier would require something more than the average treatise on ,christian ethics to convince him that a lie to an enemy in war time is justifiable as a lie of necessity1 on the ground of its profitableness4 ,in dealing with the sick1 however desirable it may be1 in any instance1 to conceal from a patient his critical condition1 the difference must always be observed between truthful statements that conceal that which the physician1 or other speaker1 has a right to conceal1 and statements that are not strictly true1 or that are made for the explicit purpose of deceiving the patient4 ,it is a physician's duty to conceal from a patient his sense of the grave dangers disclosed to his professional eye1 and which he is endeavoring to meet successfully4 ,and1 in wellnigh every case1 it is possible for him to give truthful answers that will conceal from his patient what he ought to conceal2 for the best physician does not know the future1 and his professional guesses are not to be put forward as if they were assured certitudes4 ,if1 indeed1 it were generally understood1 as many ethical writers are disposed to claim1 that physicians are ready to lie as a help to their patients' recovery1 physicians1 as a class1 would thereby be deprived of the power of encouraging their patients by words of sincere and hearty confidence4 ,there are physicians whose most hopeful assurances are of little or no service to their patients1 because those physicians are known to be willing to lie to a patient in an emergency2 and how can a timid patient be sure that his case does not present such an emergency8 ,therefore it is that a physician's habit of lying to his patients as a means of cure would cause him to lose the power of aiding by truthful assurances those patients who most needed help of this sort4 ,it is poor policy1 as policy1 to venture a lie in behalf of a single patient1 at the cost of losing the power to make the truth beneficial to a hundred patients whose lives may be dependent on wise words of encouragement4 ,and the policy is still poorer as policy1 when it is in the line of an unmistakable sin4 ,and many a good physician like many a good soldier1 repudiates the idea of a lie of necessity in his profession4 ,since lying is sinful because a lie is always a lie unto ,god1 the fact that a lie is spoken to an insane person or to a would-be criminal does not make it any the less a sin in ,god's sight4 ,and it is held by some of the most eminent physicians to the insane that lying to the insane is as poor policy as it is bad morals1 and that it is never justifiable1 and therefore is never a necessity in that sphere4#a ,footnote #a3 ,see1 for example1 the views of ,dr4 ,thomas ,s4 ,kirkbride1 physician-in-chief and superintendent of the ,pennsylvania ,hospital for the ,insane1 in the ,report of that institution for #ahhc1 at pages #gd-gf4 ,in speaking of the duty of avoiding deception in dealings with the insane1 he said3 ,i never think it right to speak anything but the truth4 ,so also in dealing with the would-be criminal1 a lie is not justifiable in order to save one's life1 or one's possessions that are dearer than life1 nor yet to prevent the commission of a crime or to guard the highest interests of those whom we love4 ,yet concealment of that which ought to be concealed is as truly a duty when disclosure would lead to crime1 or would imperil the interests of ourselves or others1 as it is in all the ordinary affairs of life2 but lying as a means of concealment is not to be tolerated in such a case any more than in any other case4 ,if a robber1 with a pistol in his hand1 were in a man's bedroom at night1 it would not be wrong for the defenseless inmate to remain quiet in his bed1 in concealment of the fact that he was awake1 if thereby he could save his life1 at the expense of his property4 ,if a would-be murderer were seeking his victim1 and a man who knew this fact were asked to tell of his whereabouts1 it would be that man's duty to conceal his knowledge at this point by all legitimate means4 ,he might refuse to speak1 even though his own life were risked thereby2 for it were better to die than to lie4 ,and so in many another emergency4 ,a lie being a sin per se1 no price paid for it1 nor any advantage to be gained from it1 would make it other than a sin4 ,the temptation to look at it as a necessity may1 indeed1 be increased by increasing the supposed cost of its refusal2 but it is a temptation to wrong-doing to the last4 ,it was a heathen maxim1 ,do right though the heavens fall1 and ,christian ethics ought not to have a lower standard than that of the best heathen morality4 ,duty toward ,god cannot be counted out of this question4 ,god himself cannot lie4 ,god cannot justify or approve a lie4 ,hence it follows that he who deliberately lies in order to secure a gain to himself1 or to one whom he loves1 must by that very act leave the service of ,god1 and put himself for the time being under the rule of the father of lies4 ,thus in an emergency which seems to a man to justify a lie of necessity that man's attitude toward ,god might be indicated in this address to him3 ,lord1 ,i should prefer to continue in your service1 and ,i would do so if you were able and willing to help me4 ,but ,i find myself in an emergency where a lie is a 'necessity1' and so ,i must avail myself of the help of 'the father of lies4' ,if ,i am carried through this crisis by his help1 ,i shall be glad to resume my position in your service4 ,the man whose whole moral nature recoils from this position1 will not be led into it by the best arguments of ,christian philosophers in favor of the lie of necessity4 ,,vi4 ,,centuries ,,of ,,discussion4 ,because of the obvious gain in lying in times of extremity1 and because of the manifest peril or cost of truth-telling in an emergency1 attempts have been made1 by interested or prejudiced persons1 all along the ages1 to reconcile the general duty of adhering to an absolute standard of right1 with the special inducements1 or temptations1 to depart from that standard for the time being4 ,it has been claimed by many that the results of a lie would1 under certain circumstances1 justify the use of a lie1--the good end in this case justifying the bad means in this case4 ,and the endeavor has also been made to show that what is called a lie is not always a lie4 ,yet there have ever been found stalwart champions of the right1 ready to insist that a lie is a sin per se1 and therefore not to be justified by any advantage or profit in its utterance4 ,prominent in the earlier recorded discussions of the centuries concerning the admissibility of the lie1 are those of the ,jewish ,talmudists and of the ,christian ,fathers4 ,as in the ,bible story the standard of right is recognized as unvariable1 even though such ,bible characters as ,abraham and ,jacob and ,david1 and ,ananias and ,sapphira1 fail to conform to it in personal practice2 so in the records of the ,talmud and the ,fathers there are not wanting instances of godly men who are ready to speak in favor of a departure from the strictest requirement of the law of truth1 even while the great sweep of sentiment is seen to be in favor of the line that separates the lie from the truth eternally4 ,hamburger1 a recognized ,jewish authority in this sphere1 represents the teachings of the ,talmud as even more comprehensive and explicit than the ,bible itself1 in favor of the universal duty of truthfulness4 ,he says3 ,mosaism1 with its fundamental law of holiness1 has established the standard of truthfulness with incomparable definiteness and sharpness 7see ,lev4 #ai3 #b1 #ab1 #ac1 #cd-cg74 ,truthfulness is here presented as derived directly from the principle of holiness1 and to be practiced without regard to resulting benefit or injury to foe or to friend1 to foreigner or to countryman4 ,in this moral loftiness these ,mosaic teachings as to truthfulness pervade the whole ,bible4 ,in the ,talmud they receive a profounder comprehension and a further development4 ,truthfulness toward men is represented as a duty toward ,god2 and1 on the other hand1 any departure from it is a departure from ,god4#a ,footnote #a3 ,hamburger's ,real-,encyclopadie fr ,bibel und ,talmud1 ,i41 art4 ,truthfulness 7,wahrhaftigkeit74 ,as specimen illustrations of the teachings of the ,talmud on this theme1 ,hamburger quotes these utterances from its pages3 ,he who alters his word1 at the same time commits idolatry4 ,three are hated of ,god3 he who speaks with his mouth otherwise than as he feels with his heart2 he who knows of evidence against any one1 and does not disclose it1 etc4 ,four cannot appear before ,god3 the scorner1 the hypocrite1 the liar1 and the slanderer4 ',a just measure thou shalt keep2' that is1 we should not think one thing in our heart1 and speak another with our mouth4 ,seven commit the offense of theft3 he who steals sneaks into the good will of another2 he who invites his friend to visit him1 and does not mean it in his heart2 he who offers his neighbor presents1 knowing beforehand that he will not receive them1 etc4 ,and ,hamburger adds3 ,every lie1 therefore1 however excellent the motive1 is decidedly forbidden4444 ,in the tract ,jebamoth1 #fc1 ,raba blames his son for employing a 'lie of necessity' 7nothlge7 to restore peace between his father and his mother4444 ,it is clear that the ,talmud decidedly rejects the principle that 'the end justifies the means4'#a ,footnote #a3 ,compare also art4 ,falseness 7,falscheit74 ,on the other hand1 ,hamburger cites ,rabbi ,ishmael1 one of the ,talmudists1 as teaching that a ,jew might transgress even the prohibition of idolatry 7and lying is1 according to ,talmudic teaching1 equivalent to idolatry7 in order to save his life1 provided the act was not done in public4 ,in support of his position1 ,rabbi ,ishmael cited the declaration concerning the statutes of ,moses in ,leviticus #ah3 #e1 which if a man do he shall live in them1 and added by way of explanation3 ,he the ,israelite is to live through the law1 but is not to die through it4#a ,footnote #a3 ,see ,hamburger's ,real-,encyc41 ,,ii41 art4 ,ismael ,r4 ,and ,isaac ,abohab1 an eminent ,spanish rabbi1 in his ,menorath ,hammaor#a gives other illustrations from the ,talmud of the advocacy of special exceptions to the strict law of truthfulness1 with a good purpose in view1 notwithstanding the sweeping claim to the contrary by ,hamburger4 ,he says3 ,only when it is the intention to bring about peace between men1 may anything be altered in discourse2 as is taught in the tract ,jebamoth4 ,rabbi ,ilai says1 in the name of ,rabbi ,jehuda1 son of ,rabbi ,simeon3 ',one may alter something in discourse for the sake of establishing harmony4'444 ,rabbi ,nathan says3 ',this indeed is a duty4'444 ,rabbi ,ishmael taught3 ',peace is of such importance that for its sake ,god even alters facts4' ,in each of these cases the rabbi cited misapplies a ,bible passage in support of his position4 ,footnote #a3 ,see ,german translation by ,r4,j4 ,frstenthal1 ,discourse ,,ii41 ,i4 ,isaac ,abohab adds3 ,in like manner the rabbis say that one may praise a bride in the presence of her bridegroom1 and say that she is handsome and devout1 when she is neither1 if the intention predominates to make her attractive in the eyes of her bridegroom4 ,nevertheless a man is not to tell lies even in trifling matters1 lest lying should come to be a habit with him1 as is warned against in the tract ,jebamoth4 ,thus it would appear that there were discussions on this subject among the rabbis of the ,talmud1 and that while there were those who advocated the lie of necessity1 as a matter of personal gain or as a means of good to others1 there were those who stood firmly against any form of the lie1 or any falsity1 as in itself at variance with the very nature of ,god1 and with the plain duty of ,god's children4 ,among the ,christian ,fathers it was much the same as among the ,jewish rabbis1 in discussions over this question4 ,the one unvarying standard was recognized1 by the clearest thinkers1 as binding on all for always2 yet there were individuals inclined to find a reason for exceptions in the practical application of this standard4 ,the phase of the question that immediately presented itself to the early ,christians was1 whether it were allowable for a man to deny to a pagan enemy that he was a ,christian1 or that one whom he held dear was a ,christian1 when the speaking of the truth would cost him his life1 or cost the life of one whom he loved4 ,there were those who held that the duty to speak the truth was merely a social obligation1 and that when a man showed himself as an enemy of ,god and of his fellows1 he shut himself out from the pale of this social obligation2 moreover1 that when such a man could be deterred from crime1 and at the same time a ,christian's life could be preserved1 by the telling of an untruth1 a falsehood would be justifiable4 ,if the lie were told in private under such circumstances1 it was by such persons considered different from a public denial of one's faith4 ,but1 on the other hand1 the great body of ,christians1 in the apostolic age1 and in the age early following1 acted on the conviction that a lie is a sin per se1 and that no emergency could make a lie a necessity4 ,and it was in fidelity to this conviction that the roll of ,christian martyrs was so gloriously extended4 ,justin ,martyr1 whose ,apologies in behalf of the ,christians are the earliest extant1 speaks for the best of the class he represents when he says3 ,it is in our power1 when we are examined1 to deny that we are ,christians2 but we would not live by telling a lie4#a ,and again3 ,when we are examined1 we make no denial1 because we are not conscious of any evil1 but count it impious not to speak the truth in all things1 which also we know is pleasing to ,god4#b ,there was no thought in such a mind as ,justin ,martyr's1 or in the minds of his fellow-martyrs1 that any life was worth saving at the cost of a lie in ,god's sight4 ,footnote #a3 ,first ,apology1 ,chapter #h4 ,footnote #b3 ,second ,apology1 ,chapter #d4 ,there were many temptations1 and great ones1 to the early ,christians1 to evade the consequences of being known as refusers to worship the gods of the ,romans2 and it is not to be wondered at that many poor mortals yielded to those temptations4 ,exemption from punishment could be purchased by saying that one had offered sacrifices to the gods1 or by accepting a certificate that such sacrifice had been made1 even when such was not the fact2 or1 again1 by professing a readiness to sacrifice1 without the intention of such compliance1 or by permitting a friend to testify falsely as to the facts2 and there were those who thought a lie of this sort justifiable1 for the saving of their lives1 when they would not have openly renounced their ,christian faith4#a ,there was much discussion over these practices in the writings of the ,fathers2 but while there was recognized a difference between open apostasy and the tolerance of a falsehood in one's behalf1 it was held by the church authorities that a lie was always sinful1 even though there were degrees in modes of sinning4 ,footnote #a3 ,see ,smith and ,cheetham's ,dictionary of ,christian ,antiquities1 art4 ,libelli4 ,see also ,bingham's ,antiquities of the ,christian ,church1 ,book ,,xvi41 ,chap4 #ac1 ,section #e2 also ,book ,,xvi41 ,chap4 #c1 ,section #ad2 with citations from ,tertullian1 ,origen1 and ,cyprian4 ,ringing words against all forms of lying were spoken by some of the ,christian ,fathers4 ,says the ,shepherd of ,hermas3 ,love the truth1 and let nothing but truth proceed from your mouth1 that the spirit which ,god has placed in your flesh may be found truthful before all men2 and the ,lord1 who dwelleth in you1 will be glorified1 because the ,lord is truthful in every word1 and in him is no falsehood4 ,they1 therefore1 who lie1 deny the ,lord1 and rob him1 not giving back to him the deposit which they have received4 ,for they received from him a spirit free from falsehood4 ,if they give him back this spirit untruthful1 they pollute the commandment of the ,lord1 and become robbers4#a ,footnote #a3 ,book ,,ii41 ,commandment ,third4 ,the ,ante-,nicene ,fathers 7,am4 ed471 ,,ii41 #ba4 ,tertullian names among sins of daily committal1 to which we all are liable1 the sin of lying1 from bashfulness or modesty1 or 'necessity4'#a ,origen also speaks of the frequency of lying1 or of idle talking2#b as if possibly its frequency were in some sense an excuse for it4 ,and ,origen specifically claimed that the apostles ,peter and ,paul agreed together to deceive their hearers at ,antioch by simulating a dissension between themselves1 when in reality they were agreed4#c ,origen also seemed to approve of false speaking to those who were not entitled to know all the truth2 as when he says of the cautious use of falsehood1 a man on whom necessity imposes the responsibility of lying is bound to use very great care1 and to use falsehood as he would a stimulant or a medicine1 and strictly to preserve its measure1 and not go beyond the bounds observed by ,judith in her dealings with ,holofernes1 whom she overcame by the wisdom with which she dissembled her words4#d ,footnote #a3 ,on ,modesty1 ,chap4 #ai4 ,the ,ante-,nicene ,fathers1 ,,xiv41 #ig4 ,footnote #b3 ,origen's ,commentaries on ,matthew1 ,tract ,,vi41 p4 #fj2 cited in ,bingham's ,antiq4 of ,chr4 ,ch41 ,book ,,xvi41 ,chap4 #c4 ,footnote #c3 ,gal4 #b3 #aa-ad4 ,a concise statement of the influence of this teaching of ,origen on the patristic interpretations of the passage in ,galatians1 is given by ,lightfoot in his commentary on ,galatians1 sixth edition1 pp4 #abh-acb4 ,footnote #d3 ,quoted from the sixth book of ,origen's ,miscellanies by ,jerome1 in his ,apology against ,rufinus1 ,book ,i41 #ah4 ,see ,the ,nicene and ,post-,nicene ,fathers1 second series 7,am4 ed471 ,,iii41 #dib4 ,see1 also1 ,neander's ,geschichte der ,christlichen ,ethik1 pp4 #afj1 #afg4 ,there were ,christian ,fathers who found it convenient to lie1 in their own behalf or in behalf of others2 and it was quite natural for such mortals to seek to find an excuse for lies that seemed so necessary for their purposes4 ,when ,gregory of ,nyssa1 in his laudable effort to bring about a reconciliation between his elder brother ,basil and their uncle1 was induced to practice a deceit which was as irreconcilable with ,christian principles as with common sense1#a he was ready to argue in defense of such a course4 ,footnote #a3 ,moore's ,life of ,s4 ,gregory of ,nyssa4 ,the ,nicene and ,post-,nicene ,fathers1 second series 7,am4 ed471 ,v41 #e4 ,so again1 when his brother ,basil was charged with falsehood in a comparatively trivial matter1 7where1 in fact1 he had merely been in error unintentionally17 ,gregory falls back upon the comforting suggestion1 that as to lying1 in one way or another everybody is at fault2 accordingly1 we accept that general statement which the ,holy ,spirit uttered by the ,prophet1 ',every man is a liar4'#a ,gregory protests against the solemn reflections on falsehood by ,eunomius1 in this connection1 and his seeing equal heinousness in it whether in great or very trivial matters4 ,cease1 he says1 to bid us think it of no account to measure the guilt of a falsehood by the slightness or importance of the circumstances4 ,basil1 on the contrary1 asserts without qualification1 as his conviction1 that it never is permissible to employ a falsehood even for a good purpose4 ,he appeals to the words of ,christ that all lies are of the ,devil4#b ,footnote #a3 ,ibid41 p4 #df4 ,footnote #b3 ,neander's ,geschichte der ,christlichen ,ethik1 p4 #bai4 ,chrysostom1 as a young man1 evaded ordination for himself and secured it to his dearest friend ,basil 7who should not be confounded with ,basil the ,great1 the brother of ,gregory of ,nyssa7 by a course of deception1 which he afterwards labored to justify by the claim that there were lies of necessity1 and that ,god approved of deception as a means of good to others4#a ,in the course of his exculpatory argument1 he said to his much aggrieved friend ,basil3 ,great is the value of deceit1 provided it be not introduced with a mischievous intention4 ,in fact1 action of this sort ought not to be called deceit1 but rather a kind of good management1 cleverness1 and skill1 capable of finding out ways where resources fail1 and making up for the defects of the mind4444 ,that man would fairly deserve to be called a deceiver who made an unrighteous use of the practice1 not one who did so with a salutary purpose4 ,and often it is necessary to deceive1 and to do the greatest benefits by means of this device1 whereas he who has gone by a straight course has done great mischief to the person whom he has not deceived4#b ,footnote #a3 ,see ,smith and ,wace's ,dictionary of ,christian ,biography1 ,i41 #eai f42 art4 ,chrysostom1 ,john4 ,footnote #b3 ,see ,chrysostom's ,treatise on the ,priesthood1 in ,the ,nicene and ,post-,nicene ,fathers1 first series 7,am4 ed471 ,,ix41 #cd-ch4 ,in fact1 ,chrysostom seems1 in this argument1 to recognize no absolute and unvarying standard of truthfulness as binding on all at all times2 but to judge lies and deceptions as wrong only when they are wrongly used1 or when they result in evil to others4 ,he appears to act on the anti-,christian theory#a that the end justifies the means4 ,indeed1 ,dr4 ,schaff1 in reprobating this pious fraud of ,chrysostom1 as conduct which every sound ,christian conscience must condemn1 says of the whole matter3 ,the ,jesuitical maxim1 'the end justifies the means1' is much older than ,jesuitism1 and runs through the whole apocryphal1 pseudo-prophetic1 pseudo-apostolic1 pseudo-,clementine1 and pseudo-,isidorian literature of the early centuries4 ,several of the best ,fathers show a surprising want of a strict sense of veracity4 ,they introduce a sort of cheat even into their strange theory of redemption1 by supposing that the ,devil caused the crucifixion under the delusion intentionally produced by ,god that ,christ was a mere man1 and thus lost his claim upon the fallen race4 #b ,footnote #a3 ,rom4 #c3 #g1 #h4 ,footnote #b3 ,see ,dr4 ,schaff's ,prologemena to ,the ,life and ,works of ,st4 ,chrysostom1 in ,the ,nicene and ,post-,nicene ,fathers1 first ,series 7,am4 ed471 ,,ix41 #h4 ,chrysostom1 like ,gregory of ,nyssa1 having done that which was wrong in itself1 with a laudable end in view1 naturally attempts its defense by the use of arguments based on a confusion in his own mind of things which are unjustifiable1 with things which are allowable4 ,he does not seem to distinguish between deliberate deception as a mode of lying1 and concealment of that which one has a right to conceal4 ,like many another defender of the right to lie in behalf of a worthy cause1 in all the centuries1 ,chrysostom essays no definition of the lie1 and indicates no distinction between culpable concealment1 and concealment that is right and proper4 ,yet ,chrysostom was a man of loving heart and of unwavering purpose of life4 ,in an age of evil-doing1 he stood firm for the right4 ,and in spite of any lack of logical perceptions on his part in a matter like this1 it can be said of him with truth that perhaps few have ever exercised a more powerful influence over the hearts and affections of the most exalted natures4#a ,footnote #a3 ,smith and ,wace's ,dictionary of ,christian ,biography1 ,i41 #ecb4 ,augustine1 on the other hand1 looks at this question1 in accordance with the qualities of his logical mind1 in its relation to an absolute standard2 and he is ready to accept the consequences of an adherence to that standard1 whether they be in themselves desirable or deplorable4 ,he is not afraid to define a lie1 and to stand by his definition in his argument4 ,he sees and notes the difference between justifiable concealment1 and concealment that is for the purpose of deception4 ,it is lawful then1 he says on this point1 to conceal at fitting time whatever seems fit to be concealed3 but to tell a lie is never lawful1 therefore neither to conceal by telling a lie4#a ,in his treatise ,on ,lying 7,de ,mendacid71#b and in his treatise ,against ,lying 7,contra ,mendaciuni7#c as well as in his treatise on ,faith1 ,hope1 and ,love 7,enchiridion71#d and again in his ,letters to ,jerome1#e ,augustine states the principle involved in this vexed question of the ages1 and goes over all the arguments for and against the so-called lie of necessity4 ,he sees a lie to be a sin per se1 and therefore never admissible for any purpose whatsoever4 ,he sees truthfulness to be a duty growing out of man's primal relation to ,god1 and therefore binding on man while man is in ,god's sight4 ,he strikes through the specious arguments based on any temporary advantages to be secured through lying1 and rejects utterly the suggestion that man may do evil that good may come4 ,footnote #a3 ,the ,nicene and ,post-,nicene ,fathers1 first series 7,am4 ed471 ,,ix41 #dff4 ,footnote #b3 ,ibid41 ,,iii41 #dee-dgg4 ,footnote #c3 ,ibid41 pp4 #dgi-ejj4 ,footnote #d3 ,ibid41 pp4 #bcj-bgf4 ,footnote #e3 ,ibid41 ,i41 ,letters of ,st4 ,augustine4 ,the sound words of ,augustine on this question1 as based on his sound arguments1 come down to us with strength and freshness through the intervening centuries2 and they are worthy of being emphasized as the expressions of unchanging truth concerning the duty of truthfulness and the sin of lying4 ,there is a great question about lying1 he says at the start1 which often arises in the midst of our everyday business1 and gives us much trouble1 that we may not either rashly call that a lie which is not such1 or decide that it is sometimes right to tell a lie2 that is1 a kind of honest1 well-meant1 charitable lie4 ,this question he discusses with fulness1 and in view of all that can be said on both sides4 ,even though life or salvation were to pivot on the telling of a lie1 he is sure that no good to be gained could compensate for the committal of a sin4 ,arguing that a lie is essentially opposed to ,god's truth--by which alone man can have eternal life--,augustine insists that to attempt to save another's life through lying1 is to set off one's eternal life against the mere bodily life of another4 ,since then by lying eternal life is lost1 never for any man's temporal life must a lie be told4 ,and as to those who take it ill1 and are indignant that one should refuse to tell a lie1 and thereby slay his own soul in order that another may grow old in the flesh1 what if by our committing adultery a person might be delivered from death3 are we therefore to steal1 to commit whoredom4444 ,to ask whether a man ought to tell a lie for the safety of another1 is just the same as asking whether for another's safety a man ought to commit iniquity4 ,good men1 he says1 should never tell lies4 ,to tell a lie is never lawful1 therefore neither to conceal when concealment is desirable by telling a lie4 ,referring to the fact that some seek to find a justification in the ,bible teachings for lying in a good cause1--even in the midst of the very words of the divine testimonies seeking place for a lie1--he insists1 after a full examination of this claim1 that those cited testimonies of ,scripture have none other meaning than that we must never at all tell a lie4 ,a lie is not allowable1 even to save another from injury4 ,every lie must be called a sin4 ,nor are we to suppose that there is any lie that is not a sin1 because it is sometimes possible1 by telling a lie1 to do service to another4 ,it cannot be denied that they have attained a very high standard of goodness who never lie except to save a man from injury2 but in the case of men who have reached this standard1 it is not the deceit1 but their good intention1 that is justly praised1 and sometimes even rewarded1--as in the case of ,rahab in the ,bible story4 ,there is no lie that is not contrary to truth4 ,for as light and darkness1 piety and impiety1 justice and injustice1 sin and righteousness1 health and sickness1 life and death1 so are truth and a lie contrary the one to the other4 ,whence by how much we love the former1 by so much ought we to hate the latter4 ,it does indeed make very much difference for what cause1 with what end1 with what intention1 a thing be done3 but those things which are clearly sins1 are upon no plea of a good cause1 with no seeming good end1 no alleged good intention1 to be done4 ,those works1 namely1 of men1 which are not in themselves sins1 are now good1 now evil1 according as their causes are good or evil4444 ,when1 however1 the works in themselves are evil1444 who is there that will say1 that upon good causes1 they may be done1 so as either to be no sins1 or1 what is more absurd1 to be just sins8 ,he who says that some lies are just1 must be judged to say no other than that some sins are just1 and that therefore some things are just which are unjust3 than which what can be more absurd8 ,either then we are to eschew lies by right doing1 or to confess them when guilty of them by repenting3 but not1 while they unhappily abound in our living1 to make them more by teaching also4 ,in replying to the argument that it would be better to lie concerning an innocent man whose life was sought by an enemy1 or by an unjust accuser1 than to betray him to his death1 ,augustine said courageously3 ,how much braver1444 how much more excellent1 to say1 ',i will neither betray nor lie4' ,this1 he said1 did a former bishop of the ,church of ,tagaste1 ,firmus by name1 and even more firm in will4 ,for when he was asked by command of the emperor1 through officers sent by him1 for a man who was taking refuge with him1 and whom he kept in hiding with all possible care1 he made answer to their questions1 that he could neither tell a lie nor betray a man2 and when he had suffered so many torments of body 7for as yet emperors were not ,christians71 he stood firm in his purpose4 ,thereupon1 being brought before the emperor1 his conduct appeared so admirable that he without any difficulty obtained a pardon for the man whom he was trying to save4 ,what conduct could be more brave and constant8#a ,footnote #a3 ,see ,the ,nicene and ,post-,nicene ,fathers1 first series 7,am4 ed471 ,,iii41 #djh4 ,the treatise ,against ,lying was written by ,augustine with special reference to the practice and teaching of the sect of ,priscillianists4 ,these ,christians affirmed1 with some other of the theosophic sects1 that falsehood was allowable for a holy end4 ,absolute veracity was only binding between fellow-members of their sect4#a ,hence it was claimed by some other ,christians that it would be fair to shut out ,priscillianists from a right to have only truth spoken to them1 since they would not admit that it is always binding between man and man4 ,this view of truthfulness as merely a social obligation ,augustine utterly repudiated2 as1 indeed1 must be the case with every one who reckons lying a sin in and of itself4 ,augustine considered1 in this treatise1 various hypothetical cases1 in which the telling of the truth might result in death to a sick man1 while the telling of a falsehood might save his life4 ,he said frankly3 ,and who can bear men casting up to him what a mischief it is to shun a lie that might save life1 and to choose truth which might murder a man8 ,i am moved by this objection exceedingly1 but it were doubtful whether also wisely4 ,yet he sees that it were never safe to choose sin as a means to good1 in preference to truth and right with all their consequences4 ,footnote #a3 ,see ,smith and ,wace's ,dict4 of ,chris4 ,biog41 ,,iv41 #dgh1 art4 ,priscillianus4 ,jerome having1 like many others1 adopted ,origen's explanation of the scene between ,peter and ,paul at ,antioch1 ,augustine wrote to him in protest against such teaching1 with its implied approval of deceit and falsehood4#a ,a correspondence on this subject was continued between these two ,fathers for years2#b and finally ,jerome was led to adopt ,augustine's view of the matter1#c and also to condemn ,origen for his loose views as to the duty of veracity4#d ,but however ,jerome might vacillate in his theory1 as in his practice1 concerning the permanent obligations of truthfulness1 ,augustine stood firm from first to last in the position which is justified by the teachings of the ,bible and by the moral sense of the human race as a whole1--that a lie is always a lie and always a sin1 and that a lie can never be justified as a means to even the best of ends4 ,footnote #a3 ,see ,the ,nicene and ,post-,nicene ,fathers1 first series 7,am4 ed471 ,i41 ,letters ,,xxviii41 ,,xl4 ,footnote #b3 ,ibid41 ,letters ,,lxvii41 ,,lxviii41 ,,lxxii41 ,,lxxiii41 ,,lxxiv41 ,,lxxv4 ,footnote #c3 ,ibid41 ,letter ,,clxxx4 ,footnote #d3 ,the ,nicene and ,post-,nicene ,fathers1 second series 7,am4 ed471 ,,iii41 #dfj ff42 ,rufinus' ,apology1 ,book ,,ii42 ,jerome's ,apology1 ,book ,i41 p4 #dib4 ,from the days of ,chrysostom and ,augustine to the present time1 all discussions of this question have been but a repetition of the arguments and objections then brought forward and examined4 ,there can be1 in fact1 only two positions maintained with any show of logical consistency4 ,either a lie is in its very nature antagonistic to the being of ,god1 and therefore not to be used or approved by him1 whatever immediate advantages might accrue from it1 or whatever consequences might pivot on its rejection2 or a lie is not in itself a sin1 is not essentially at variance with the nature of ,god1 but is good or evil according to the spirit of its use1 and the end to be gained by it2 and therefore on occasions ,god could lie1 or could approve lying on the part of those who represent him4 ,the first of these positions is that maintained by the ,shepherd of ,hermas1 by ,justin ,martyr1 by ,basil the ,great1 and by ,augustine2 the second is practically that occupied by ,gregory of ,nyssa and ,chrysostom1 even though they do not explicitly define1 or even seem to perceive1 it as their position4 ,there are1 again1 those like ,origen and ,jerome1 who are now on one side of the dividing line1 and now on the other2 but they are not logically consistent with themselves in their opinions or practices4 ,and those who are not consistent usually refrain from explicit definitions of the lie and of falsehood2 they make no attempt at distinguishing between justifiable concealment1 and concealment for the very purpose of deception4 ,with all the arguments on this question1 in all the centuries1 comprised within these well-defined bounds1 it were useless to name each prominent disputant1 in order merely to classify him as on the one side or on the other1 or as zigzagging along the line which he fails to perceive4 ,it were sufficient to point out a few pre-eminent mountain peaks1 in the centuries between the fifth and the nineteen of the ,christian era1 as indicative of the perspective history of this discussion4 ,towering above the greatest of the ,schoolmen in the later middle ages stands ,thomas ,aquinas4 ,as a man of massive intellect1 of keenness of perception1 of consistent logical instincts1 and of unquestioned sincerity and great personal devoutness1 we might expect him to be found1 like ,augustine1 on the side of principle against policy1 in unqualified condemnation of lying under any circumstances whatsoever1 and in advocacy of truthfulness at all hazards4 ,and that1 as a matter of fact1 is his position4 ,in his ,summa ,theologies#a ,aquinas discusses this whole question with eminent fairness1 and with great thoroughness4 ,he first states the claims of those who1 from the days of ,chrysostom1 had made excuses for lying with a good end in view1 and then he meets those claims severally4 ,he looks upon lies as evil in themselves1 and as in no way to be deemed good and lawful1 since a right concurrence of all elements is essential to a thing's being good4 ,whence1 every lie is a sin1 as ,augustine says in his book ',against ,lying4' ,his conclusion1 in view of all that is to be said on both sides of the question1 is3 ,lying is sinful not only as harmful to our neighbor1 but because of its own disorderliness4 ,it is no more permitted to do what is disorderly that is1 contrary to the divine order of the universe in order to prevent harm1 than it is to steal for the purpose of giving alms1 except indeed in case of necessity when all things are common property when1 for instance1 the taking of needful food in time of a great disaster1 as on a wrecked ship1 is not stealing4 ,and therefore it is not allowable to utter a lie with this view1 that we may deliver one from some peril4 ,it is allowable1 however1 to conceal the truth prudently1 by a sort of dissimulation1 as ,augustine says4 ,this recognizes the correctness of ,augustine's position1 that concealment of what one has a right to conceal may be right1 provided no lie is involved in the concealment4 ,as to the relative grades of sin in lying1 ,aquinas counts lying to another's hurt as a mortal sin1 and lying to avert harm from another as a venial sin2 but he sees that both are sins4 ,footnote #a3 ,secunda ,secundae1 ,quaestio ,,cx41 art4 ,,iii4 ,it is natural to find ,aquinas1 as a representative of the keen-minded ,dominicans1 standing by truth as an eternal principle1 regardless of consequences2 as it is also natural to find1 on the other side1 ,duns ,scotus1 as a representative of the easy-going ,franciscans1 with his denial of good absolute save as manifested in the arbitrary will of ,god4 ,duns ,scotus accepted the theory of a twofold truth1 ascribed to ,averroes1 that one and the same affirmation might be theologically true and philosophically false1 and vice versa4 ,in ,duns ,scotus's view1 ,god does not choose a thing because it is good1 but the thing chosen is good because ,god chooses it2 it is good simply and solely because ,god has willed it precisely so2 but he might just as readily have willed the opposite thereof4 ,hence also ,god is not eternally bound by his commands1 and he can in fact annul them4#a ,according to this view1 ,god could forbid lying to-day and justify it to-morrow4 ,it is not surprising1 therefore1 that falsehood and misrepresentation are under certain circumstances allowable1 in the opinion of ,duns ,scotus4 ,footnote #a3 ,see ,kurtz's ,church ,history 7,macpherson's ,translation71 ,,ii41 #aja1 #afg-afi2 ,ueberweg's ,history of ,philosophy1 ,i41 #daf1 #def f42 ,wuttke's ,christian ,ethics 7,am4 ed471 ,i41 #bah1 ,sec4 #cd4 ,so1 all along the centuries1 the religious teacher who holds to the line between truth and falsehood as an eternal line must1 if logically consistent1 refuse to admit any possible justification of lying4 ,only he who denies an eternally absolute line between the true and the false could admit with consistency the justification by ,god of an act that is essentially hostile to the divine nature4 ,any exception to this rule is likely to be where a sympathetic nature inclines a teacher to seek for an excuse for that which seems desirable even though it be theoretically wrong4 ,when it comes to the days of the ,protestant ,reformation1 we find ,john ,calvin1 like his prototype ,augustine1 and like ,augustine's follower ,aquinas1 standing firmly against a lie as antagonistic to the very nature of ,god1 and therefore never justifiable4 ,martin ,luther1 also1 is a fearless lover of the truth2 but he is disposed to find excuses for a lie told with a good end in view1 although he refrains from asserting that even the best disposed lie lacks the element of sinfulness4#a ,on the other hand1 ,ignatius ,loyola1 and his associates in the founding of the ,society of ,jesus as a means of checking the ,protestant ,reformation1 acted on the idea that was involved in the theology of ,duns ,scotus1 that the only standard of truth and right is in the absolute and arbitrary will of ,god2 and that1 therefore1 if ,god1 speaking through his representative in the newly formed ,society1 commands the telling of a lie1 a lie is justifiable1 and its telling is a duty4 ,moreover1 these ,jesuit leaders in defining1 or in explaining away1 the lie1 include1 under the head of justifiable concealment1 equivocations and falsifications that the ordinary mind would see to be forms of the lie4#b ,footnote #a3 ,see ,martensen's ,christian ,ethics1 p4 #baf4 ,compare1 for example1 ,luther's comments on ,exodus ,i3 #ae-ba1 with ,calvin's comments on ,genesis #ab3 #ad-bj4 ,footnote #b3 ,see ,symonds's ,renaissance in ,italy1 ,i41 #bfc-bfg2 ,cartwright's ,the ,jesuits2 ,meyrick's ,moral ,theology of the ,church of ,rome2 ,pascal's ,provincial ,letters4 ,see1 also1 ,kurtz's ,church ,history1 ,,ii41 #dcj4 ,it is common to point to the arguments of the ,jesuits in favor of lies of expediency1 in their work for the ,church and for souls1 as though their position were exceptional1 and they stood all by themselves in including falsehood as a means to be employed rightfully for a good end4 ,but in this they are simply logically consistent followers of those ,christian ,fathers1 and their successors in every branch of the ,church1 who have held that a lie for righteous purposes was admissible when the results to be secured by it were of vital importance4 ,all the refinements of casuistry have their value to those who admit that a lie may be right under certain conceivable circumstances2 but to those who1 like ,augustine and ,aquinas1 insist that a lie is a sin per se1 and therefore never admissible1 casuistry itself has no interest as a means of showing when a sin is not sinful4#a ,footnote #a3 ,hence the casuistry of the ,schoolmen and of the ,jesuits1 and the question of ,mental ,reservations1 and of ,probabilities1 are not treated in detail here4 ,some of the zealous defenders of the principles and methods of the ,jesuits affirm that1 in their advocacy of dissimulation and prevarication in the interests of a good cause1 the ,jesuits do not intend to justify lying1 but are pointing out methods of proper concealment which are not within the realm of the lie4 ,in this 7waiving the question whether these defenders are right or not as to the fact7 they seem even more desirous of being counted against lying than those teachers1 in the ,romish ,church or among ,protestants1 who boldly affirm that a lie itself is sometimes justifiable4 ,thus it is claimed by a ,roman ,catholic writer1 in defense of the ,jesuits1 that ,liguori1 their favorite theologian1 taught that to speak falsely is immutably a sin against ,god4 ,it may be permitted under no circumstances1 not even to save life4 ,pope ,innocent ,,iii4 says1 ',not even to defend our life is it lawful to speak falsely2' therefore1 when ,liguori approves any actions that seem opposed to truthfulness1 he allows the instances because they are not falsehood4#a ,on the other hand1 ,jeremy ,taylor squarely asserts3 ,it is lawful to tell a lie to children or to madmen1 because they1 having no powers of judging1 have no right to the truth4#b ,footnote #a3 ,see ,meyrick's ,moral ,theology of the ,church of ,rome1 ,appendix1 p4 #bef f4 ,footnote #b3 ,jeremy ,taylor's ,ductor ,dubitantium1 in his ,works1 ,x41 #ajc4 ,but ,jeremy ,taylor's trouble is in his indefinite definition of a lie1 and in his consequent confusion of mind and of statement with reference to the limitations of the duty of veracity4 ,he writes on this subject at considerable length1#a and in alternation declares himself plainly first on one side1 and then on the other1 of the main question1 without even an attempt at logical consistency4 ,he starts out with the idea that we are to endeavor to be like ,god1 who is truth essentially2 that ,god speaks truth because it is his nature2 that the ,holy ,scriptures of the ,old and ,new ,testament do indefinitely and severely forbid lying1 and our blessed ,saviour condemns it by declaring every lie to be of the ,devil2 and that beyond these things nothing can could be said for the condemnation of lying4 ,all that certainly is explicit and sound1--as sound as ,basil the ,great1 as ,st4 ,augustine1 or as ,thomas ,aquinas6 ,footnote #a3 ,jeremy ,taylor's ,ductor ,dubitantium1 in his ,works1 ,x41 #ajj-acb4 ,when he attempts the definition of a lie1 however1 ,jeremy ,taylor would seem to claim that injustice toward others and an evil motive are of its very essence1 and that1 if these be lacking1 a lie is not a lie4 ,lying is to be understood to be something said or written to the hurt of a neighbor1 which cannot be understood by the hearer or reader otherwise than to differ from the mind of him that speaks4 ,as ,melanchthon says1 ,to lie is to deceive our neighbor to his hurt4 ,if a lie be unjust1 it can never become lawful2 but if it can be separate from injustice1 then it may be innocent4 ,jeremy ,taylor naturally falls back on the ,bible stories of the ,hebrew midwives and ,rahab the harlot1 and assumes that ,god commended their lying1 as lying1 because they had a good end in view2 and he asserts that it is necessary sometimes by a lie to advantage charity by losing of a truth to save a life1 and that to tell a lie for charity1 to save a man's life1 the life of a friend1 of a husband1 of a prince1 of an useful and a public person1 hath not only been done in all times1 but commended by great and wise and good men4 ,from this it would appear that lying1 which ,jeremy ,taylor sets out with denouncing as contrary to ,god's nature1 and as declared by our ,saviour to be always of the ,devil1 may1 under certain circumstances1 be a godly sin4 ,gregory of ,nyssa and young ,chrysostom could not have done better than this in showing the sinlessness of a sin in a good cause4 ,seeing that concealment of that which is true is often a duty1 and seeing also that concealment of that which ought to be disclosed is often practically a lie1 ,jeremy ,taylor apparently2 jumps to the conclusion that concealment and equivocation and lying are practically the same thing1 and that therefore lying is sometimes a duty1 while again it is a sin4 ,he holds that the right to be spoken to in truthfulness1 though it be regularly and commonly belonging to all men1 yet it may be taken away by a superior right supervening2 or it may be lost1 or it may be hindered1 or it may cease upon a greater reason4 ,as that which is but the half of a true proposition either signifies nothing or is directly a lie1 it must be admitted that in the same cases in which it is lawful to tell a lie1 in the same cases it is lawful to use a mental reservation2 and where it is lawful to lie1 it is lawful to equivocate1 which may be something less than a plain lie4 ,moreover1 it is lawful upon a just cause of great charity or necessity to use1 in our answers and intercourses1 words of divers signification1 though it does deceive him that asks4 ,jeremy ,taylor ingenuously confesses that1 in certain cases where lying is allowable or is a duty1 the prejudice which the question is like to have is in the meaning and evil sound of the word lying2 which1 because it is so hateful to ,god and man1 casts a cloud upon anything that it comes near4 ,but1 on the whole1 ,jeremy ,taylor is willing to employ with commendation that very word lying which is so hateful to ,god and man4 ,and in various cases he insists that it is lawful to tell a lie1 although the lie must be charitable and useful1--a good lie1 and not a wicked lie2 for a good lie is good1 and a wicked lie is wicked4 ,he does not shrink from the consequences of his false position4 ,jeremy ,taylor can therefore be cited as arguing that a lie is never admissible1 but that it often is commendable4 ,he does not seem to be quite sure of any real difference between lying and justifiable concealment1 or to have in his mind an unvarying line between truthfulness and lying4 ,he admits that ,god and man hate lying1 but that a good lie1 nevertheless1 is a very good thing4 ,and so he leaves the subject in more of a muddle than he found it4 ,coming down to the present century1 perhaps the most prominent and influential defender of the lie of necessity1 or of limitations to the law of veracity1 is ,richard ,rothe2 therefore it is important to give special attention to his opinions and arguments on this subject4 ,rothe was a man of great ability1 of lovely spirit1 and of pervasive personal influence2 and as a consequence his opinions carry special weight with his numerous pupils and followers4 ,kurtz#a characterizes ,rothe as one of the most profound thinkers of the century1 equaled by none of his contemporaries in the grasp1 depth1 and originality of his speculation1 and his ,theological ,ethics as a work which in depth1 originality1 and conclusiveness of reasoning1 is almost unapproached4 ,and in the opinion of ,lichtenberger1#b ,rothe is unquestionably the most distinguished theologian of the ,school of ,conciliation1 and the most original thinker since ,schleiermacher1 while he also showed himself to be one of the humblest ,christians and one of the finest formed characters of his age4 ,it is not to be wondered at therefore1 that1 when such a leader in thought and in influence as ,rothe declares himself in favor of a judicious use of falsehood as a means of good1 many are inclined to feel that there must be some sound reason for his course4 ,yet1 on the other hand1 the arguments in favor of falsehood1 put forward by even such a man1 ought to be scrutinized with care1 in order to ascertain if they are anything more than the familiar arguments on the same side repeated in varying phrase in all the former centuries from ,chrysostom to ,jeremy ,taylor4 ,footnote #a3 ,church ,history 7,macpherson's translation71 ,,iii41 #bja4 ,footnote #b3 ,history of ,german ,theology in the #aith ,century1 p4 #dib4 ,the trouble with ,rothe in his treatment of this ,matter#a is1 that he considers the duty of truthfulness merely in its personal and social aspects1 without any direct reference to the nature1 and the declared will1 of ,god4 ,moreover1 his peculiar definition of a lie is adapted to his view of the necessities of the case4 ,he defines a lie as the unloving misuse of speech 7or of other recognized means of communication7 to the intentional deception of our neighbor4 ,in his mind1 lovelessness toward one's fellow-man is of the very essence of the lie1 and when one speaks falsely in expression of a spirit of love to others1 it is not necessarily a lie4 ,footnote #a3 ,rothe's ,theologische ,ethik1 ,i,vter ,band1 #ajfd1 #ajfe4 ,rothe does not seem to recognize1 in its application to this matter1 the great principle that there is no true love for man except in conformity to and in expression of love for ,god2 hence that nothing that is in direct violation of a primal law of ,god can be an exhibition of real love for one of ,god's creatures4 ,it is true that ,rothe assumes that the subject of ,theological ,ethics is an essential branch of ,speculative ,theology2 but in his treatment of ,special ,duties he seems to assume that ,society rather than ,god is their background1 and therefore the idea of sin as sin does not enter into the discussion4 ,his whole argument and his conclusions are an illustration of the folly of attempting to solve any problem in ethics without considering the relation to it of ,god's eternal laws1 and of the eternal principles which are involved in the very conception of ,god4 ,ethics necessarily includes more than social duties1 and must be considered in the light of duty to ,god as above all4 ,the intentional deception of our neighbor1 says ,rothe1 by saying what is untrue1 is not invariably and unqualifiedly a lie4 ,the question in this case is essentially one of the purpose4444 ,it is only in the case where the untruth spoken with intent to deceive is at the same time an act of unlovingness toward our neighbor1 that it is a violation of truthfulness as already defined1 that is1 a lie4 ,in ,rothe's view1 there are relations of men to each other in which for the time being avowedly the ethical fellowship does not exist1 although the suspension of this fellowship must1 of course1 always be regarded as temporary1 and this indeed as a matter of duty for at least one of the parties4 ,here there can be no mention of love1 and therefore no more of the want of it4 ,social duties being in such cases suspended1 and the idea of any special duty toward ,god not being in consideration1 it is quite proper1 as ,rothe sees it1 for enemies in war1 or in private life1 to speak falsely to each other4 ,such enemies naturally have in speech simply a weapon which one may use against the other4444 ,the duty of speaking the truth cannot even be thought of as existing between persons so arrayed against each other4444 ,however they may try to deceive each other1 even with the help of speech1 they do not lie4 ,but ,rothe goes even farther than this in the advocacy of such violations1 or abrogations1 of the law of veracity1 as would undermine the very foundations of social life1 and as would render the law against falsehood little more than a variable personal rule for limited and selected applications1--after the fashion of the ,american humorist who believed in universal salvation if he could pick his men4 ,rothe teaches that falsehood is a duty1 not only when it is needful in dealing with public or personal enemies1 but often1 also1 in dealing with children1 the sick1 the insane1 the drunken1 the passionately excited1 and the morally weak1--and that takes in a large share of the human race4 ,he gives many illustrations of falsehood supposed to be necessary 7where1 in fact1 they would seem to the keen-minded reader to be quite superfluous#a7 and having affirmed the duty of false speaking in these cases1 he takes it for granted 7in a strange misconception of the moral sense of mankind7 that the deceived parties would1 if appealed to in their better senses1 justify the falsehoods spoken by mothers in the nursery1 by physicians in the sick-room1 and by the clear-headed sober man in his intercourse with the angry or foolish or drunken individual4 ,footnote #a3 ,nitzsch1 the most eminent dogmatic theologian among ,schleiermacher's immediate disciples1 denies the possibility of conceiving of a case where loving consideration for others1 or any other dutiful regard for them1 will not attain its end otherwise and more truly and nobly than by lying to them1 or where the loving liar or falsifier might not have acted still more lovingly and wisely without any falsification4444 ,the lie told from supposed necessity or to serve another is always1 even in the most favorable circumstances1 a sign either of a wisdom which is lacking in love and truth1 or of a love which is lacking in wisdom4 ,of course1 he says1 such a procedure presupposes a certain relation of guardianship1 on the part of the one who speaks untruth1 over him whom he deceives1 and a relative irresponsibility on the part of the other1--an incapacity to make use of certain truths except to his actual moral injury4 ,and in each case all depends on the accuracy of this assumption4 ,it is appalling to find a man like ,rothe announcing a principle like this as operative in social ethics6 ,every man to decide for himself 7taking the responsibility1 of course1 for his personal decision7 whether he is in any sense such a guardian of his fellow-man as shall make it his duty to speak falsely to him in love6 ,rothe frankly admits that there is no evidence that ,jesus ,christ1 while setting an example here among men1 ever spoke one of these dutiful untruths2 although it certainly would seem that ,jesus might have fairly claimed as good a right to a guardianship of his earthly fellows as the average man of nowadays4#a ,but this does not restrain ,rothe from deliberately advising his fellow-men to a different course4 ,footnote #a3 ,rothe says on this point3 ,that the ,saviour spoke untruth is a charge to whose support only a single passage1 ,john #g3h1 can be alleged with any show of plausibility4 ,but even here there was no speaking of untruth1 even if ,greek3 anka disputed reading be regarded as the right reading4 ,see on this passage ,meyer in his ,commentary1 and ,westcott in ,the ,bible ,commentary4 ,rothe names ,marheineke1 ,de,wette1 von ,ammon1 ,herbart1 ,hartenstein1 ,schwartz1 ,harless1 and ,reinhard1 as agreeing in the main with his position2 while as opposed to it he mentions ,kant1 ,fichte1 ,krause1 ,schleiermacher1 von ,hirscher1 ,nitzsch1 ,flatt1 and ,baumgarten-,crusius4 ,but this is by no means a question to be settled by votes2 and not one of the writers cited by ,rothe as of his mind1 in this controversy1 has anything new to offer in defense of a position in such radical disagreement with the teachings of the ,bible1 and with the moral sense of the race1 on this point1 as that taken by ,rothe4 ,in his ignoring of the nature and the will of ,god as the basis of an argument in this matter1 and in his arbitrary and unauthorized definition of a lie 7with its inclusion of the claim that the deliberate utterance of a statement known to be false1 for the express purpose of deceiving the one to whom it is spoken1 is not necessarily and inevitably a lie71 ,rothe stands quite pre-eminent4 ,wuttke says1 indeed1 of ,rothe's treatment of ethics3 ,morality as he sees it is an independent something alongside of piety1 and rests by no means on piety1--is entirely co-ordinate to and independent of it4#a ,yet so great is the general influence of ,rothe1 that various echoes of his arguments for falsehoods in love are to be found in subsequent ,english and ,american utterances on ,christian ethics4 ,footnote #a3 ,wuttke's ,christian ,ethics 7,lacroix's transl471 #dh4 ,contemporaneous with ,richard ,rothe1 and fully his peer in intellectual force and ,christ-likeness of spirit1 stands ,isaac ,august ,dorner4 ,dr4 ,schaff says of him3#a ,dr4 ,dorner was one of the profoundest and most learned theologians of the nineteenth century1 and ranks with ,schleiermacher1 ,neander1 ,nitzsch1 ,julius ,mller1 and ,richard ,rothe4 ,he mastered the theology of ,schleiermacher and the philosophy of ,hegel1 appropriated the best elements of both1 infused into them a positive evangelical faith and a historic spirit2 and as a lecturer1 especially on dogmatics and ethics 444 he excelled all his contemporaries4 ,and to this estimate of him ,professor ,mead adds3#b ,even one who knows ,dorner merely as the theological writer1 will in his writings easily detect the fine ,christian tone which characterized the man2 but no one who did not personally know him can get a true impression of the ,johannean tenderness and childlike simplicity which distinguished him above almost any one of equal eminence whom the world has ever known4 ,footnote #a3 ,supplement to ,schaff-,hertzog ,encyc4 of ,relig4 ,knowl41 p4 #eh4 ,footnote #b3 ,preface to ,dorner's ,system of ,christian ,ethics 7,am4 ed471 p4 vii4 ,when1 therefore1 it is considered that1 after ,rothe had given his views on veracity to the world1 ,dorner wrote on the same subject1 as the very last work of his maturest life1 a special interest attaches to his views on this mooted question4 ,and ,dorner is diametrically opposed to ,rothe in this thing4 ,dorner bases the duty of truthfulness on our common membership in ,christ1 and the love that grows out of such a relation4#a ,truth does not1 indeed1 demand that all that is in a man should be brought out1 else it would be a moral duty for him to let also the evil that is in him come forth1 whereas it is his duty to keep it down4 ,but if an untrue statement be made with the intention to deceive1 it is a lie4 ,footnote #a3 ,see ,dorner's ,system of ,christian ,ethics 7,am4 ed471 pp4 #dhg-dib4 ,are there cases1 he asks1 where lying is allowable8 ,can we make out the so-called 'white lie' to be morally permissible8 ,then he takes up the cases of children and the insane1 who are not entitled to know all the truth1 and asks if it be right not only to conceal the truth but to falsify it1 in talking with them4 ,concealment may be a duty1 he admits1 but he denies that falsifying is ever a duty4 ,how shall ethics ever be brought to lay down a duty of lying of 'white lying'1 to recommend evil that good may come8 ,the test for us is1 whether we could ever imagine ,christ acting in this way1 either for the sake of others1 or--which would be quite as justifiable1 since self-love is a moral duty--for his own sake4 ,as to falsifying to a sick or dying man1 he says1 we overestimate the value of human life1 and1 besides1 we in a measure usurp the place of ,providence1 when we believe we may save it by committing sin4 ,in other words1 ,dorner counts falsifying with the intention of deceiving1 even with the best of motives1 a lie1 and therefore a sin--never justifiable4 ,like ,augustine1 ,dorner recognizes degrees of guilt in lies1 according to the spirit and motive of their telling2 but in any event1 if there be falsehood with the purpose of deceiving1 it is a sin--to be regretted and repented of4 ,dorner makes a fresh distinction between the stratagems of war and lying1 which is worthy of note4 ,he says that playful fictions1 after the manner of riddles to be guessed out1 are clearly allowable4 ,so in war1 too1 something like a game of this kind is carried on1 when by way of stratagem some deceptive appearance is produced1 and a riddle is thus given to the enemy4 ,in such cases there is no falsehood2 for from the conditions of the situation1--whether friendly or hostile1--the appearance that is given is confessedly nothing more than an appearance1 and is therefore honest4 ,the simplicity and clearness of ,dorner1 in his unsophistical treatment of this question1 is in refreshing contrast with the course of ,rothe1--who confuses the whole matter in discussion by his arbitrary claim that a lie is not a lie1 if it be told with a good purpose and a loving spirit4 ,and the two men are representative disputants in this controversy of the centuries1 as truly as were ,augustine and ,chrysostom4 ,a close friend of ,dorner was ,hans ,lassen ,martensen1 the greatest theologian of ,denmark1 and a thinker of the first class1 with high speculative endowments1 and a considerable tincture of theosophical mysticism4#a ,martensen's ,christian ,ethics do not ignore ,god and the ,bible as factors in any question of practical morals under discussion4 ,he characterizes the result of such an omission as a reckoning of an account whose balance has been struck elsewhere2 if we bring out another figure1 we have reckoned wrong4 ,martensen's treatment of the duty of veracity is a remarkable exhibit of the workings of a logical mind in full view of eternal principles1 yet measurably hindered and retarded by the heart-drawings of an amiable sentiment4 ,he sees the all-dividing line1 and recognizes the primal duty of conforming to it2 yet he feels that it is a pity that such conformity must be so expensive in certain imaginary cases1 and he longs to find some allowance for desirable exceptions4#b ,footnote #a3 ,see ,kurtz's ,church ,history 7,macpherson's transl471 ,,iii41 #bja2 ,supplement to ,schaff-,hertzog ,encyc4 of ,relig4 ,knowl41 p4 #eg2 ,johnson's ,univ4 ,cycl441 art4 ,martensen4 ,footnote #b3 ,martensen's ,christian ,ethics 7,individual71 7,eng4 trans417 pp4 #bje-bbf4 ,martensen gives as large prominence as ,rothe to love for one's fellow-man2 but he bases that love entirely1 as ,rothe does not1 on love for ,christ4 ,only in ,christ1 and in the light which1 proceeding from him1 is poured over human nature and all human life1 can we love men in the central sense1 and only then does philanthropy receive its deepest religious and moral character1 when it is rooted in the truth of ,christ4 ,and as ,christ is ,truth1 those who are ,christ's must never violate the truth4 ',thou shalt not bear false witness2 thou shalt not lie1 neither in word nor deed2 thou shalt neither deny the truth1 nor give out anything that is not truth for truth1'--this commandment must dominate and penetrate all our life's relations4 ,truth does not exist for man's sake1 but man for the sake of the truth1 because the truth would reveal itself to man1 would be owned and testified by him4 ,this would seem to be explicit enough to shut out the possibility of a justifiable lie6 ,yet it does not follow from this1 says ,martensen1 that our duty to communicate the truth to others is unlimited4444 ',there is a time to be silent1 and a time to speak4' ,no one is bound to say everything to everybody4 ,here he distinguishes between justifiable concealment and falsehood4 ,then he comes to the question whether the so-called 'lie of exigency' can ever be justifiable4 ,he runs over the arguments on both sides1 and recalls the centuries of discussion on the subject4 ,he thinks that adherence to the general principle which forbids lying would1 in certain cases where love prompted to falsehood1 cause in most minds an inward feeling that the letter killeth1 and that to follow the promptings of love were better4 ,hence he argues that as in other departments there are actions which1 although from the standpoint of the ideal they are to be rejected1 yet1 from the hardness of men's hearts1 must be approved and admitted1 and under this restriction become relatively justifiable and dutiful actions1 simply because greater evils are thereby averted2 so there is also an untruth from exigency that must still be allowed for the sake of human weakness4 ,and in his opinion it comes to this1 that the question of casuistry cannot be solved by general and abstract directions1 but must be solved in an individual1 personal way1 especially according to the stage of moral and religious development and ripeness on which the person in question is found4 ,having made these concessions1 in the realm of feeling1 to the defenders of the lie of exigency1 which may be either uttered from love to men1 or as defense against men--a defense in which either a justifiable self-love or sympathy with others is operative1 ,martensen proceeds to show that every such falsehood is abnormal and immoral4 ,when we thus maintain1 he says1 that in certain difficult cases an 'untruth from necessity' may occur1 which is to be allowed for the sake of human weakness1 and under the given relations may be said to be justified and dutiful1 we cannot but allow1 on the other hand1 that in every such untruth there is something of sin1 nay something that needs excuse and forgiveness4444 ,certainly even the truth of the letter1 the external1 actual truth1 even the formally correct1 finds its right1 the ground of its validity1 in ,god's holy order of the world4 ,but by every lie of exigency the command is broken1 ',thou shalt not bear false witness4' ,martensen protests against the claim of ,rothe that a falsehood spoken in love is not at all to be called a lie1 but can be absolutely defended as morally normal1 and so in no respect needs pardon4 ,however sharply we may distinguish between lie and untruth 7mendacium and falsilo-quium71 the untruth in question can never be resolved into the morally normal4 ,and he suggests that if one had more of wisdom and courage and faith1 he might be true to the truth in an emergency without fear of the consequences4 ,let us suppose1 for instance1 he says1 the 444 case1 where the husband deceives his sick spouse from fear that she could not survive the news of the death of her child2 who dare maintain that if the man had been able in the right way1 that is in the power of the gospel1 with the wisdom and the comfort of faith1 to announce the death of the child1 a religious crisis might not have arisen in her soul1 which might have a healing and quickening effect upon her bodily state8 ,and supposing that it had even led to her death1 who dare maintain that that death1 if it was a ,christian death1 were an evil1 whether for the mother herself1 or for the survivors8 ,or1 let us take the woman who1 to save her chastity1 applies the defense of an untruth3 who dare maintain that if she said the truth to her persecutors1 but uttered it in womanly heroism1 with a believing look to ,god1 with the courage1 the elevation of soul springing from a pure conscience1 exhibiting to her persecutors the badness and unworthiness of their object1 she might not have disarmed them by that might that lies in the good1 the just cause1 the cause whose defense and shield ,god himself will be8 ,and even if she had to suffer what is unworthy1 who dare maintain that she could not in suffering preserve her moral worth8 ,martensen recalls the story of ,jeanie ,deans1 in ,scott's ,heart of ,midlothian1 who refuses to tell a lie of exigency in order to save her sister's life2 yet who1 having uttered the truth which led to her sister's sentence of death1 set herself1 in faith in ,god1 to secure that sister's pardon1 and by ,god's grace compassed it4 ,most people would at least be disposed to excuse ,jeanie ,deans1 and to forgive her1 if she had here made a false oath1 and thereby had afforded her protection to the higher truth4 ,and if a loving lie of exigency be a duty before ,god1 an appeal to his knowledge of the fact is1 of course1 equally a duty4 ,to refuse to appeal to ,god in witness of the truth of a falsehood that is told from a loving sense of duty1 is to show a lack of confidence in ,god's approval of such an untruth4 ,but she will1 can1 and dare1 for her conscience' sake1 not do this4 ,but the best thing in this tale1 adds ,martensen1 is that it is no mere fiction4 ,the kernel of this celebrated romance is actual history4 ,and ,sir ,walter ,scott caused a monument to be erected in his garden1 with the following inscription1 in memory of this faithful truth-lover3 ,this stone was placed by the ,author of ',waverley' in memory of ,helen ,walker1 who fell asleep in the year of our ,lord #agia4 ,this maiden practiced in humility all the virtues with which fancy had adorned the character that bears in fiction the name of ,jeanie ,deans4 ,she would not depart a foot's breadth from the path of truth1 not even to save her sister's life2 and yet she obtained the liberation of her sister from the severity of the law by personal sacrifices whose greatness was not less than the purity of her aims4 ,honor to the grave where poverty rests in beautiful union with truthfulness and sisterly love4 ,who will not readily obey this request1 adds ,martensen1 and hold such a memory in honor8444 ,who does not feel himself penetrated with involuntary1 most hearty admiration8 ,in conclusion1 in view of all that can be said on either side of the question1 ,martensen is sure that the lie of exigency itself1 which we call inevitable1 leaves in us the feeling of something unworthy1 and this unworthiness should1 simply in following ,christ1 more and more disappear from our life4 ,that is1 the inevitableness of the lie of exigency will disappear in the same measure that an individual develops into a true personality1 a true character4444 ,a lie of exigency cannot occur with a personality that is found in possession of full courage1 of perfect love and holiness1 as of the enlightened1 all-penetrating glance4 ,not even as against madmen and maniacs will a lie of exigency be required1 for to the word of the truly sanctified personality there belongs an imposing commanding power that casts out demons4 ,it is this that we see in ,christ1 in whose mouth no guile was found1 in whom we find nothing that even remotely belongs to the category of the exigent lie4 ,so it is evident that if one would seek excuse for the lie of exigency1 in the concessions made by ,martensen1 he must do so only on the score of the hardness of his heart1 and the softness of his head1 as one lacking a proper measure of wisdom1 of courage1 and of faith1 to enable him to conform to the proper ideal standard of human conduct4 ,and even then he must recognize the fact that in his weakness he has done something to be ashamed of1 and to demand repentance4 ,cold comfort that for a decent man6 ,it would seem that personal temperament and individual peculiarities had their part in deciding a man's attitude toward the question of the unvarying duty of veracity1 quite as surely as the man's recognition of great principles4 ,an illustration of this truth is shown in the treatment of the subject by ,dr4 ,charles ,hodge on the one hand1 and by ,dr4 ,james ,h4 ,thornwell on the other1 as representatives1 severally1 of ,calvinistic ,augustinianism in the ,presbyterian ,church of the ,united ,states1 in its ,northern and ,southern branches4 ,starting from the same point of view1 and agreeing as to the principles involved1 these two thinkers are by no means together in their conclusions2 and this1 not because of any real difference in their processes of reasoning1 but apparently because of the larger place given by the former to the influence of personal feeling1 as over against the imperative demands of truth4 ,dr4 ,hodge begins with the recognition and asseveration of eternal principles1 that can know no change or variation in their application to this question2 and then1 as he proceeds with its discussion1 he is amiably illogical and good-naturedly inconsistent1 and he ends in a maze1 without seeming quite sure as to his own view of the case1 or giving his readers cause to know what should be their view4 ,dr4 ,thornwell1 on the other hand1 beginning in the same way1 proceeds unwaveringly to the close1 in logical consistency of reasoning2 leaving his readers at the last as fully assured as he is as to the application of unchangeable principles to man's life and duties4 ,no one could state the underlying principles involved in this question more clearly and explicitly than does ,dr4 ,hodge at the outset2#a and it would seem from this statement that he could not be in doubt as to the issue of the discussion of this question of the ages4 ,the command to keep truth inviolate belongs to a different class of commands from those relating to the sabbath1 to marriage1 or to property4 ,these are founded on the permanent relations of men in the present state of existence4 ,they are not in their own nature immutable4 ,but truth is at all times sacred1 because it is one of the essential attributes of ,god1 so that whatever militates against or is hostile to truth is in opposition to the very nature of ,god4 ,footnote #a3 ,see ,hodge's ,systematic ,theology1 ,,iii41 #dcg-dfc4 ,truth is1 so to speak1 the very substratum of ,deity4 ,it is in such a sense the foundation of all the moral perfections of ,god1 that without it they cannot be conceived of as existing4 ,unless ,god really is what he declares himself to be2 unless he means what he declares himself to mean2 unless he will do what he promises1--the whole idea of ,god is lost4 ,as there is no ,god but the true ,god1 so without truth there is and can be no ,god4 ,as this attribute is the foundation1 so to speak1 of the divine1 so it is the foundation of the physical and moral order of the universe4444 ,there is1 therefore1 something awfully sacred in the obligations of truth4 ,a man who violates the truth1 sins against the very foundation of his moral being4 ,as a false god is no god1 so a false man is no man2 he can never be what man was designed to be2 he can never answer the end of his being4 ,there can be in him nothing that is stable1 trustworthy1 or good4 ,here is a platform that would seem to be the right standing-place for all and for always4 ,dr4 ,hodge apparently recognizes its well-defined limits and bounds2 yet when he comes to discuss the question whether a certain person is1 in a supposable case1 on it1 or off it1 he does not seem so sure as to its precise boundary lines4 ,he begins to waver when he cites ,bible incidents4 ,recognizing the fact that fables and parables1 and works of fiction1 even though untrue1 are not falsehoods1 he strangely jumps to the conclusion that the intention to deceive is not always culpable4 ,he immediately follows this non-sequitur with a reference to the lying ,hebrew midwives1#a and he quotes the declaration of ,god's blessing on them1 as if it were an approval of their lying1 or their false speaking with an intention to deceive1 instead of an approval of their spirit of devotion to ,god's people4#b ,footnote #a3 ,exod4 ,i3 #ai1 #bj4 ,footnote #b3 ,comp4 p4 #ce f41 supra4 ,from the midwives he passes to ,samuel1 sent of ,god to ,bethlehem2 #a and under cover of the expressed opinions of others1 ,dr4 ,hodge says vaguely3 ,here1 it is said1 is a case of intentional deception commanded4 ,saul was to be deceived as to the object of ,samuel's journey to ,bethlehem4 ,yet1 whoever said this was guilty of a gratuitous charge of intentional deception1 against the ,almighty4 ,samuel was directed of ,god to speak the truth1 so far as he spoke at all1 while he concealed from others that which others had no right to know4#b ,it would appear1 however1 throughout this discussion1 that ,dr4 ,hodge does not perceive the clear and important distinction between justifiable concealment from those who have no right to a knowledge of the facts1 and concealment1 or even false speaking1 with the deliberate intention of deceiving those interested4 ,in fact1 ,dr4 ,hodge does not even mention concealment1 as apart from its use for the specific purpose of deception4 ,footnote #a3 ,i ,sam4 #af3 i1 #b4 ,footnote #b3 ,comp4 pp4 #ch-dj1 supra4 ,again ,dr4 ,hodge cites the incident of ,elisha at ,dothan#a as if in illustration of the rightfulness of deception under certain circumstances4 ,but in this case it was concealment of facts that might properly be concealed1 and not the deception of enemies as enemies1 that ,elisha compassed4 ,the ,syrians wanted to find ,elisha4 ,their eyes were blinded1 so that they did not recognize him when in his presence4 ,in order to teach them a lesson1 ,elisha told the ,syrians that they could not find him1 or the city which was his home1 by their own seeking2 but if they would follow him he would bring them to the man whom they sought4 ,they followed him1 and he showed himself to them4 ,when their eyes were opened in ,samaria he would not suffer them to be harmed1 but had them treated as guests1 and sent back safely to their king4 ,footnote #a3 ,kings #f3 #ad-bj4 ,having cited these three cases1 no one of which can fairly be made to apply to the argument he is pursuing1 ,dr4 ,hodge complacently remarks3 ,examples of this kind of deception are numerous in the ,old ,testament4 ,some of them are simply recorded facts1 without anything to indicate how they were regarded in the sight of ,god2 but others1 as in the cases above cited1 received either directly or by implication the divine sanction4 ,but ,dr4 ,hodge goes even farther than this4 ,he ventures to suggest that ,jesus ,christ deceived his disciples by intimating what was not true as to his purpose1 in more than one instance4 ,of our blessed ,lord himself it is said in ,luke #bd3bh1 ',he made as though ,greek3 prosepoieito--he made a show of3 he would have gone further4' ,he so acted as to make the impression on the two disciples that it was his purpose to continue his journey4 7,comp4 ,mark #f3 #dh47a ,this suggestion of ,dr4 ,hodge's would have been rebuked by even ,richard ,rothe1 and would have shocked ,august ,dorner4 ,would ,dr4 ,hodge deny that ,jesus could have had it in his mind to go further1 or to have passed by his disciples1 if they would not ask him to stop8 ,and if this were a possibility1 is it fair to intimate that a purpose of deception was in his mind1 when there is nothing in the text that makes that a necessary conclusion8 ,dr4 ,hodge1 indeed1 adds the suggestion that many theologians do not admit that the fact recorded in ,luke #bd3bh which he cites as an illustration of justifiable deception by our ,lord involved any intentional deception2 but this fact does not deter him from putting it forward in this light4 ,footnote #a3 ,when ,jesus came walking on the sea1 toward his disciples in their tempest-tossed boat1 he would have passed them by2 but their cry of fear drew him toward them4 ,in the discussion of the application to emergencies1 in practical life1 of the eternal principle which he points out at the beginning1 ,dr4 ,hodge is as far from consistency as in his treatment of ,bible narratives4 ,it is generally admitted1 he says1 that in criminal falsehoods there must be not only the enunciation or signification of what is false1 and an intention to deceive1 but also a violation of some obligation4 ,what obligation can be stronger than the obligation to be true to ,god and true to one's self8 ,if1 as ,dr4 ,hodge declares1 a man who violates the truth1 sins against the very foundation of his moral being1 a man would seem to be always under an obligation not to violate the truth by speaking that which is false with an intention to deceive4 ,but ,dr4 ,hodge seems to lose sight of his premises1 in all his progress toward his conclusions on this subject4 ,there will always be cases1 he continues1 in which the rule of duty is a matter of doubt4 ,it is often said that the rule above stated applies when a robber demands your purse4 ,it is said to be right to deny that you have anything of value about you4 ,you are not bound to aid him in committing a crime2 and he has no right to assume that you will facilitate the accomplishment of his object4 ,this is not so clear4 ,the obligation to speak the truth is a very solemn one2 and when the choice is left a man to tell a lie or lose his money1 he had better let his money go4 ,on the other hand1 if a mother sees a murderer in pursuit of her child1 she has a perfect right to mislead him by any means in her power including lying82 because the general obligation to speak the truth is merged or lost1 for the time being1 in the higher obligation4 ,yet ,dr4 ,hodge starts out with the declaration that the obligation to keep truth inviolate1 is highest of all2 that truth is at all times sacred1 because it is one of the essential attributes of ,god2 that ,god himself cannot suspend or modify this obligation2 and that man is always under its force4 ,and now1 strangely enough1 he claims that in various emergencies the general obligation to speak the truth is merged1 or lost1 for the time being1 in the higher obligation4 ,the completest and most crushing answer to the vicious conclusions of ,dr4 ,hodge as to the varying claims of veracity1 is to be found in the explicit terms of his unvaryingly correct premises in the discussion4 ,dr4 ,hodge appears to be conscious of his confusion of mind in this discussion1 but not to be quite sure of the cause of it4 ,as to his claim that the general obligation to speak the truth may be merged for the time being in a higher obligation1 he says3 ,this principle is not invalidated by its possible or actual abuse4 ,it has been greatly abused4 ,and he adds1 farther on1 in the course of the discussion3 ,the question now under consideration is not whether it is ever right to do wrong1 which is a solecism2 nor is the question whether it is ever right to lie2 but rather what constitutes a lie4 ,having claimed that a lie necessarily includes falsity of statement1 an intention to deceive1 and a violation of some obligation1 ,dr4 ,hodge goes on to show that every lie is a violation of a promise1 as growing out of the nature of human society1 where every man is expected to speak the truth1 and is under a tacit but binding promise not to deceive his neighbor by word or act4 ,and1 after all this1 he is inclined to admit that there are cases in which falsehoods with the intention of deceiving are not lying1 and are justifiable4 ,this1 however1 he goes on to say1 is not always admitted4 ,augustine1 for example1 makes every intentional deception1 no matter what the object or what the circumstances1 to be sinful4 ,and then1 in artless simplicity1 ,dr4 ,hodge concludes3 ,this would be the simplest ground for the moralist to take4 ,but as shown above1 and as generally admitted1 there are cases of intentional deception which are not criminal4 ,according to the principles laid down at the start by ,dr4 ,hodge1 there is no place for a lie in ,god's service2 but according to the inferences of ,dr4 ,hodge1 in the discussion of this question1 there are places where falsehoods spoken with intent to deceive are admissible in ,god's sight and service4 ,his whole treatment of this subject reminds me of an incident in my army-prison life1 where this question as a question was first forced upon my attention4 ,the ,union prisoners1 in ,columbia at that time1 received their rations from the ,confederate authorities1 and had them cooked in their own way1 and at their own expense1 by an old colored woman whom they employed for the purpose4 ,two of us had a dislike for onions in our stew1 while the others were well pleased with them4 ,so we two agreed with old ,maggie1 for a small consideration1 to prepare us a separate mess without onions4 ,the next day our mess came by itself4 ,we took it1 and began our meal with peculiar satisfaction2 but the first taste showed us an unmistakable onion flavor in our stew4 ,when old ,maggie came again1 we remonstrated with her on her breach of engagement4 ,bless your hearts1 honeys1 she replied1 you must have some onions in your stew6 ,she could not comprehend the possibility of a beef stew without onions1 even though she had formally agreed to make it4 ,dr4 ,hodge's premises in the discussion of the duty of truthfulness rule out onions2 but his inferences and conclusions have the odor and the taste of onions4 ,he stands on a safe platform to begin with2 but he is an unsafe guide when he walks away from it4 ,his arguments in this case are an illustration of his own declaration3 ,an adept in logic may be a very poor reasoner4 ,dr4 ,thornwell's ,discourses on ,truth#a are a thorough treatment of the obligation of veracity and the sin of lying4 ,he is clear in his definitions1 marking the distinction between rightful concealment as concealment1 and concealment for the purpose of deception4 ,there are things which men have a right to keep secret1 he says1 and if a prurient curiosity prompts others officiously to pry into them1 there is nothing criminal or dishonest in refusing to minister to such a spirit4 ,our silence or evasive answers may have the effect of misleading4 ,that is not our fault1 as it was not our design4 ,our purpose was simply to leave the inquirer as nearly as possible in the state of ignorance in which we found him3 it was not to misinform him1 but not to inform him at all4 ,footnote #a3 ,in ,thornwell's ,collected ,writings1 ,,ii41 #dea-fac4 ',every man1' says ,dr4 ,dick1 'has not a right to hear the truth when he chooses to demand it4 ,we are not bound to answer every question which may be proposed to us4 ,in such cases we may be silent1 or we may give as much information as we please1 and suppress the rest4 ,if the person afterward discover that the information was partial1 he has no title to complain1 because he had no right even to what he obtained2 and we are not guilty of a falsehood unless we made him believe1 by something which we said1 that the information was complete4' ,the intention of the speaker1 and the effect consequent upon it1 are very different things4 ,dr4 ,thornwell recognizes the fact that the moral sense of humanity discerns the invariable superiority of truth over falsehood4 ,if we place virtue in sentiment1 he says1 there is nothing1 according to the confession of all mankind1 more beautiful and lovely than truth1 more ugly and hateful than a lie4 ,if we place it in calculations of expediency1 nothing1 on the one hand1 is more conspicuously useful than truth and the confidence it inspires2 nothing1 on the other1 more disastrous than falsehood1 treachery1 and distrust4 ,if there be then a moral principle to which1 in every form1 humanity has given utterance1 it is the obligation of veracity4 ,no man ever tells a lie without a certain degree of violence to his nature4 ,dr4 ,thornwell bases this obligation of veracity on the nature of ,god1 and on the duty of man to conform to the image of ,god in which he was created4 ,jesus ,christ commends himself to our confidence and love1 he says1 on the ground of his being the truth2444 and makes it the glory of the ,father that he is the ,god of truth1 and the shame and everlasting infamy of the prince of darkness that he is the father of lies2 and he adds3 ,the mind cannot move in charity1 nor rest in ,providence1 unless it turn upon the poles of truth4 ,every man is as distinctly organized in reference to truth1 as in reference to any other purpose4 ,in ,dr4 ,thornwell's view1 it is not1 as ,dr4 ,paley would have it1 that a lie is a breach of promise1 because as between man and man the truth is expected1 according to a tacit understanding4 ,as ,dr4 ,thornwell sees it1 we are not bound by any other expectations of man but those which we have authorized2 and he deems it surprising to what an extent this superficial theory of 'contract' has found advocates among divines and moralists1 as1 for example1 ,dr4 ,robert ,south1 whom he quotes4#a ,if ,dr4 ,paley had pushed his inquiries a little farther1 adds ,thornwell1 he might have accounted for this expectation of truthfulness which certainly exists1 independently of a promise1 upon principles firmer and surer than any he has admitted in the structure of his philosophy4 ,he might have seen it in the language of our nature proclaiming the will of our nature's ,god4 ,the moral sense of mankind demands veracity1 and abhors falsehood4 ,footnote #a3 ,smith's ,sermon1 on ,falsehood and ,lying4 ,dr4 ,thornwell is clear as to the teachings of the ,bible1 in its principles1 and in the illustration of those principles in the sacred narrative4 ,the ,bible as he sees it teaches the unvarying duty of veracity1 and the essential sinfulness of falsehood and deception4 ,he repudiates the idea that ,god1 in any instance1 approved deception1 or that ,jesus ,christ practiced it4 ,when our ,saviour 'made as though he would have gone farther1' he effectually questioned his disciples as to the condition of their hearts in relation to the duties of hospitality4 ,the angels1 in pretending that it was their purpose to abide in the street all night1 made the same experiment on ,lot4 ,this species of simulation involves no falsehood2 its design is not to deceive1 but to catechize and instruct4 ,the whole action is to be regarded as a sign by which a question is proposed1 or the mind excited to such a degree of curiosity and attention that lessons of truth can be successfully imparted4 ,and so on through other ,bible incidents4 ,dr4 ,thornwell has no hesitation in distinguishing when concealment is right concealment1 and when concealment is wrong because intended to deceive4 ,exposing the incorrectness of the claim1 made by ,dr4 ,paley1 as by others1 that certain specific falsehoods are not lies1 ,dr4 ,thornwell shows himself familiar with the discussion of this question of the ages in all the centuries2 and he moves on with his eye fixed unerringly on the polar star of truth1 in refreshing contrast with the amiable wavering of ,dr4 ,hodge's footsteps4 ,paley's law1 he concludes1 would obviously be the destruction of all confidence4 ,how much nobler and safer is the doctrine of the ,scriptures1 and of the unsophisticated language of man's moral constitution1 that truth is obligatory on its own account1 and that he who undertakes to signify to another1 no matter in what form1 and no matter what may be the right in the case to know the truth1 is bound to signify according to the convictions of his own mind6 ,he is not always bound to speak1 but whenever he does speak he is solemnly bound to speak nothing but the truth4 ,the universal application of this principle would be the diffusion of universal confidence4 ,it would banish deceit and suspicion from the world1 and restrict the use of signs to their legitimate offices4 ,a later work on ,christian ,ethics1 which acquires special prominence through its place in ,the ,international ,theological ,library1 edited by ,drs4 ,briggs and ,salmond1 is by ,dr4 ,newman ,smyth4 ,it shows signs of strength in the premises assumed by the writer1 in accordance with the teachings of ,scripture and of the best moral sense of mankind2 and signs of weakness in his processes of reasoning1 and in his final conclusion1 according to the mental methods of those who have wavered on this subject1 from ,john ,chrysostom to ,richard ,rothe and ,charles ,hodge4 ,dr4 ,smyth rightly bases ,christian ethics on the nature and will of ,god1 as illustrated in the life and teachings of the divine-human ,son of ,god4 ,a thoroughly scientific ethics must not only be adequate to the common moral sense of men1 but prove true also to the moral consciousness of the ,son of man4 ,no ethics has right to claim to be thoroughly scientific1 or to offer itself as the only science of ethics possible to us in our present experience1 until it has sought to enter into the spirit of ,christ1 and has brought all its1 analysis and theories of man's moral life to the light of the luminous ethical personality of ,jesus ,christ4#a ,footnote #a3 ,smyth's ,christian ,ethics1 p4 #f4 ,in his general statement of the duty of speaking the truth1 ,dr4 ,smyth is also clear1 sound1 and emphatic4#a ,the law of truthfulness is1 he says1 a supreme inward law of thought4 ,the obligation of veracity 444 is an obligation which every man owes to himself4 ,it is a primal personal obligation4 ,kant was profoundly right when he regarded falsehood as a forfeiture of personal worth1 a destruction of personal integrity4444 ,truthfulness is the self-consistency of character2 falsehood is a breaking up of the moral integrity4 ,inward truthfulness is essential to moral growth and personal vigor1 as it is necessary to the live oak that it should be of one fiber and grain from root to branch4 ,what a flaw is in steel1 what a foreign substance is in any texture1 that a falsehood is to the character1--a source of weakness1 a point where under strain it may break4444 ,truthfulness1 then1 is due1 first by the individual to himself as the obligation of personal integrity4 ,the unity of the personal life consists in it4 ,footnote #a3 ,ibid41 pp4 #chf-chi4 ,and in addition to the obligation of veracity as a duty to one's self1 ,dr4 ,smyth recognizes it as a duty to others4 ,he says3 ,truthfulness is owed to society as essential to its integrity4 ,it is the indispensable bond of social life4 ,men can be members1 one of another in a social organism only as they live together in truth4 ,society would fall1 to pieces without credit2 but credit rests on the general social virtue of truthfulness4444 ,the liar is rightly regarded as an enemy to mankind4 ,a lie is not only an affront against the person to whom it is told1 but it is an offense against humanity4 ,if ,dr4 ,smyth had been content to leave this matter with the explicit statement of the principles that are unvaryingly operative1 he would have done good service to the world1 and his work could have been commended as sound and trustworthy in this department of ethics2 but as soon as he begins to question and reason on the subject1 he begins to waver and grow confused2 and in the end his inconclusive conclusions are pitiably defective and reprehensible4#a ,footnote #a3 ,smyth's ,christian ,ethics1 pp4 #cib-djc ,in considering the so-called lies of necessity1 ,dr4 ,smyth declares with frankness3 ,some moralists in their supreme regard for truth will not admit that under any conceivable circumstances a lie can be deemed necessary1 not even to save life or to prevent a murderer from accomplishing his fiendish purpose4 ,and then over against this he indicates his fatal confusion of mind and weakness of reasoning in the suggestion3 ,but the sound human understanding1 in spite of the moralists1 will prevaricate1 and often with great vigor and success1 in such cases4 ,who is right1--,kant1 or the common moral sense8 ,which should be followed1--the philosophic morality1 or the practice of otherwise most truthful men8 ,it is to be noted that1 in these two declarations1 ,dr4 ,smyth puts lying as if it were synonymous with prevarication2 else there is no reason for his giving the one as over against the other4 ,and this indicates a peculiar difficulty in the whole course of ,dr4 ,smyth's argument concerning the so-called lie of necessity4 ,he essays no definition of the lie4 ,he draws no clear line of distinction between a lie1 a falsehood1 a deceit1 and a prevarication1 or between a justifiable concealment and an unjustifiable concealment2 and in his various illustrations of his position he uses these terms indiscriminately1 in such a way as to indicate that he knows no essential difference between them1 or that he does not care to emphasize any difference4 ,if1 in the instance given above1 ,dr4 ,smyth means that the sound human understanding1 in spite of the moralists1 will approve lying1 or falsifying with the intention to deceive1 he ought to know that the sound human understanding will not justify such a course1 and that it is unfair to intimate such a thing4#a ,and when he asks1 in connection with this suggestion1 ,who is right1--,kant1 or the common moral sense8 ,which should be followed1 the philosophic morality1 or the practice of otherwise most truthful men8 his own preliminary assertions are his conclusive answer4 ,he says specifically1 ,kant was profoundly right when he regarded falsehood as a forfeiture of personal worth1 a destruction of personal integrity2 and the common moral sense of humanity is with ,kant in this thing1 in accordance with ,dr4 ,smyth's primary view of the case1 as over against the intimation of ,dr4 ,smyth's question4 ,as to the suggested practice of otherwise most truthful men in this thing1--if men who generally tell the truth1 lie1 or speak falsely1 or deceive1 under certain circumstances1 they are much like men who are generally decent1 but who occasionally1 under temptation1 are unchaste or dishonest2 they are better examples in their uprightness than in their sinning4 ,footnote #a3 ,see pp4 #i-cb1 supra4 ,it would seem1 indeed1 that1 notwithstanding his sound basis of principles1 which recognizes the incompatibility of falsehood with true manhood and with man's duty to his fellows1 ,dr4 ,smyth does not carry with him in his argument the idea of the essential sinfulness of a lie1 and therefore he is continually inconsistent with himself4 ,he says1 for example1 in speaking of the suspension of social duties in war time3 ,if the war is justifiable1 the ethics of warfare come at once into play4 ,it would be absurd to say that it is right to kill an enemy1 but not to deceive him4 ,falsehood1 it may be admitted1 as military strategy1 is justifiable1 if the war is righteous4 ,here1 again1 is the interchange of the terms deception and falsehood4 ,but unless this is an intentional jugglery of words1 which is not to be supposed1 this means that it would be absurd to say that it is right to kill an enemy1 but not right to tell him a falsehood4 ,and nothing could more clearly show ,dr4 ,smyth's error of mind on this whole subject than this declaration4 ,absurd to claim that while it is right to take a man's life in open warfare1 in a just cause1 it would not be right to forfeit one's personal worth1 and to destroy one's personal integrity1 which ,dr4 ,smyth says are involved in a falsehood6 ,absurd to claim that while ,god who is the author of life can justify the taking of life1 he cannot justify the sin of lying6 ,no1 no1 the absurdity of the case is not on that side of the line4 ,there is no consistency of argument on this subject in ,dr4 ,smyth's work4 ,his premises are sound4 ,his reasoning is confused and inconsistent4 ,not only in some cases of necessity is falsehood permissible1 but we may recognize a positive obligation of love to the concealment of the truth1 he says4 ,here again is that apparent confounding of unjustifiable falsehood with perfectly proper concealment of truth4 ,he continues3 ,other duties which under such circumstances have become paramount1 may require the preservation of one's own or another's life through a falsehood4 ,not only ought one not to tell the truth under the supposed conditions1 but1 if the principle assumed be sound1 a good conscience may proceed to enforce a positive obligation of untruthfulness4444 ,there are occasions when the interests of society and the highest motives of ,christian love may render it much more preferable to discharge the duty of self-defense through the humanity of a successful falsehood1 than by the barbarity of a stunning blow or a pistol-shot4 ,general benevolence demands that the lesser evil1 if possible1 rather than the greater1 should be inflicted on another4 ,just compare these conclusions of ,dr4 ,smyth with his own premises4 ,truthfulness 444 is an obligation which every man owes to himself4 ,it is a primal personal obligation4444 ,truthfulness is the self-consistency of character2 falsehood is a breaking up of the moral integrity4 ,the liar is rightly regarded as an enemy to mankind4 ,a lie is not only an affront against the person to whom it is told1 but it is an offense against humanity4 ,but what of all that8 ,there are occasions when the interests of society and the highest motives of ,christian love may render it much more preferable to discharge the duty of self-defense through the humanity of a successful falsehood1 than by the barbarity of a stunning blow or a pistol-shot4 ,general benevolence demands that the lesser evil1 if possible1 rather than the greater1 should be inflicted on another4 ,better break up one's moral integrity1 and fail in one's primal personal obligation to himself1--better become an enemy of mankind1 and commit an offense against humanity1--than defend one's self against an outlaw by the barbarity of a stunning blow or a bullet6 ,would any one suppose from his premises that ,dr4 ,smyth looked upon personal truthfulness as a minor virtue1 and upon falsehood as a lesser vice8 ,does he seem in those premises to put veracity below chastity1 and falsehood below personal impurity8 ,yet is he to be understood as intimating1 in this phase of his argument1 that unchastity1 or dishonesty1 or any other vice than falsehood1 is to be preferred1 in practice1 over a stunning blow or a fatal bullet against a would-be murderer8#a ,the looseness of ,dr4 ,smyth's logic1 as indicated in this reasoning on the subject of veracity1 would in its tendency be destructive to the safeguards of personal virtue and of social purity2 and his arguments for the lie of exigency are similar to those which are put forward in excuse for common sins against chastity1 by the free-and-easy defenders of a lax standard in such matters4 ,some moralists1 says the average young man of the world1 in their extreme regard for personal purity1 will not admit that any act of unchastity is necessary1 even to protect one's health1 or as an act of love4 ,but the men of virility and strong feeling will let down occasionally at this point1 in spite of the moralists4 ,which should be followed1--the philosophic morality1 or the practice of many otherwise decent and very respectable men8 ,footnote #a3 ,see ,augustine's words on this point1 quoted at p4 #ajj1 supra4 ,confounding1 as always1 a wise and right concealment of truth with actual falsehood1 ,dr4 ,smyth says of the duty of a teacher in the matter of imparting truth to a pupil according to the measure of the pupil's ability to receive it3 ,an occasional friendly use of truth as a crash towel may be wholesome2 but ordinarily there is a more excellent way4 ,that is a counting of truth precious1 with a vengeance6 ,dr4 ,smyth seems inclined to accept in the main the conclusions1 on this whole subject1 of ,rothe1 but without ,rothe's measure of consistency in the argument4 ,rothe starts wrong1 and of course ends wrong4 ,dr4 ,smyth1 like ,dr4 ,hodge1 starts right and ends wrong4 ,no sorer condemnation of ,dr4 ,smyth's position can be made1 than by the simple presentation of his own review of his own argument1 when he says3 ,to sum up1 then1 what has been said concerning the so-called lies of necessity1 the principle to be applied with wisdom is simply this3 give the truth always to those who in the bonds of humanity have the right to the truth2 conceal it or falsify it only when it is unmistakably evident that the human right to the truth from others has been forfeited1 or temporarily is held in abeyance by sickness1 weakness1 or some criminal intent3 do not in any case prevaricate1 unless you can tell the necessary falsehood deliberately and positively1 from principle1 with a good conscience void of offense toward men1 and sincere in the sight of ,god4 ,what says the moral sense of humanity to such a position as that8 ,as over against the erroneous claim1 made by ,richard ,rothe1 and ,newman ,smyth1 and others1 that the moral sense of mankind is at variance with the demands of rigid moralists1 in regard to the unjustifiableness of falsehood1 it is of interest to note the testimony of strong thinkers1 who have written on this subject with the fullest freedom1 from the standpoint of speculative philosophy1 rather than of exclusively ,christian ethics4 ,for example1 ,james ,martineau1 while a ,christian philosopher1 discusses the question of veracity as a philosopher1 rather than as a ,christian1 in his ,types of ,ethical ,theory2#a and he insists that veracity is strictly natural1 that is1 it is implied in the very nature which leads us to intercommunion in speech4 ,footnote #a3 ,martineau's ,types of ,ethical ,theory1 ,,ii41 #bee-bfe4 ,as he sees it1 a man is treacherous to himself who speaks falsely at any time to any one1 and the man's moral sense recoils from his action accordingly4 ,dr4 ,martineau says3 ,it is perhaps1 the peculiar treachery of this process which fixes upon falsehood a stamp of meanness quite exceptional2 and renders it impossible1 ,i think1 to yield to its inducements1 even in cases supposed to be venial1 without a disgust little distinguishable from compunction4 ,this must have been ,kant's feeling when he said3 ',a lie is the abandonment1 or1 as it were1 the annihilation of the dignity of man4' ,dr4 ,martineau is not so rigid a moralist but that he is ready to agree with those easy-going theologians who find a place for exceptional falsehoods in their reasoning2 yet he is so true a man in his moral instincts that his nature recoils from the results of such reasoning4 ,after all1 he says1 there is something in this problem which refuses to be thus laid to rest2 and in treating it1 it is hardly possible to escape the uneasiness of a certain moral inconsequence4 ,if we consult the casuist of ,common ,sense he usually tells us that1 in theory1 ,veracity can have no exceptions2 but that1 in practice1 he is brought face to face with at least a few2 and he cheerfully accepts a dispensation1 when required1 at the hands of ,necessity4 ,i confess rather to an inverse experience4 ,the theoretic reasons for certain limits to the rule of veracity appear to me unanswerable2 nor can ,i condemn any one who acts in accordance with them4 ,yet when ,i place myself in a like position1 at one of the crises demanding a deliberate lie1 an unutterable repugnance returns upon me1 and makes the theory seem shameful4 ,if brought to the test1 ,i should probably act rather as ,i think than as ,i feel1#a without1 however1 being able to escape the stab of an instant compunction and the secret wound of a long humiliation4 ,is this the mere weakness of superstition8 ,it may be so4 ,but may it not also spring from an ineradicable sense of a common humanity1 still leaving social ties to even social aliens1 and1 in the presence of an imperishable fraternal unity1 forbidding to the individual of the moment the proud right of spiritual ostracism8444 ,footnote #a3 ,no1 a man who feels like that would be true in the hour of temptation4 ,his doubt of himself is only the tremulousness of true courage4 ,how could ,i ever face the soul ,i had deceived1 when perhaps our relations are reversed1 and he meets my sins1 not with self-protective repulse1 but with winning love8 ,and if with thoughts like these there also blends that inward reverence for reality which clings to the very essence of human reason1 and renders it incredible1 priori1 that falsehood should become an implement of good1 it is perhaps intelligible how there may be an irremediable discrepancy between the dioptric certainty of the understanding and the immediate insight of the conscience3 not all the rays of spiritual truth are refrangible2 some there are beyond the intellectual spectrum1 that wake invisible response1 and tremble in the dark4 ,dr4 ,martineau's definition of right and wrong is this3#a ,every action is right1 which1 in presence of a lower principle1 follows a higher3 every action is wrong1 which1 in presence of a higher principle1 follows a lower2 and his moral sense will not admit the possibility of falsehood being at any time higher than truth1 or of veracity ever being lower than a lie4 ,footnote #a3 ,types of ,ethical ,theory1 ,,ii41 #bgj4 ,professor ,thomas ,fowler1 of the ,university of ,oxford1 writing as a believer in the gradual evolution of morals1 and basing his philosophy on experience without any recognition of priori principles1 is much more nearly in accord1 at this point1#a with ,martineau1 than with ,rothe1 ,hodge1 and ,smyth4 ,although he is ready to concede that a lie may1 theoretically1 be justifiable1 he is sure that the moral sense of mankind is1 at the present state of average development1 against its propriety4 ,hence1 he asserts that1 even when justice might deny an answer to an improper question1 outside the limits of justice1 and irrespectively of their duty to others1 many persons are often restrained1 and quite rightly so1 from returning an untruthful or ambiguous answer by purely self-regarding feelings4 ,they feel that to give an untruthful answer1 even under such circumstances as ,i have supposed1 would be to burden themselves with the subsequent consciousness of cowardice or lack of self-respect4 ,and hence1 whatever inconvenience or annoyance it may cost them1 they tell the naked truth1 rather than stand convicted to themselves of a want of courage or dignity4 ,footnote #a3 ,principles of ,morals1 ,,ii41 #aei-afa4 ,veracity1 though this was by no means always the case1 ,professor ,fowler continues1 has become the point of honor in the upper ranks of modern civilized societies1 and hence it is invested with a sanctity which seems to attach to no other virtue2 and to the uninstructed conscience of the unreflective man1 the duty of telling the truth appears1 of all duties1 to be the only duty which never admits of any exceptions1 from the unavoidable conflict with other duties4 ,he ranges the moral sense of the upper ranks of modern civilized societies1 and the uninstructed conscience of the unreflective man1 against any tolerance of the lie of necessity1 leaving only the locality of ,muhammad's coffin for those who are arrayed against the rigid moralists on this question4 ,while he admits the theoretical possibility of the lie of necessity1 ,professor ,fowler concludes as to its practical expediency3 ,without maintaining that there are no conceivable circumstances under which a man will be justified in committing a breach of veracity1 it may at least be said that1 in the lives of most men1 there is no case likely to occur in which the greater social good would not be attained by the observation of the general rule to tell the truth1 rather than by the recognition of an exception in favor of a lie1 even though that lie were told for purely benevolent reasons4 ,that is nearer right than the conclusions of many an inconsistent intuitionist6 ,leslie ,stephen1 a consistent agnostic1 and a believer in the slow evolution of morals1 in his ,science of ,ethics1#a naturally holds1 like ,herbert ,spencer1 to the gradual development of the custom of truthfulness1 as a necessity of society4#b ,the moral sense of primitive man1 as he sees it1 might seem to justify falsehood to an enemy1 rather than1 as ,rothe and ,smyth would claim1 to those who are wards of love4 ,in illustration of this he says3 ,the obligation to truthfulness is primarily limited to relations with members of the same tribe or state2 and1 more generally1 it is curious to observe how a kind of local or special morality is often developed in regard to this virtue4 ,the schoolboy thinks it a duty to his fellows to lie to his master1 the merchant to his customer1 and the servant to his employer2 and1 inversely1 the duty is often recognized as between members of some little clique or profession1 as soon as it is seen to be important for their corporate interest1 even at the expense of the wider social organization4 ,there is honor among thieves1 both of the respectable and other varieties4 ,footnote #a3 ,leslie ,stephen's ,science of ,ethics1 pp4 #bjb-bji4 ,footnote #b3 ,see pp4 #bf-cb1 supra4 ,but ,leslie ,stephen sees that1 in the progress of the race1 the importance of veracity has come to a recognition1 in which it differs from the other virtues4 ,while the law of marriage may vary at different periods1 the rule of truthfulness1 on the other hand1 seems to possess the a priori quality of a mathematical axiom4444 ,truth1 in short1 being always the same1 truthfulness must be unvarying4 ,thus1 ',be truthful' means1 ',speak the truth whatever the consequences1 whether the teller or the hearer receives benefit or injury4' ,and hence1 it is inferred1 truthfulness implies a quality independent of the organization of the agent or of society4 ,while ,mr4 ,stephen would himself find a place for the lie of necessity under conceivable circumstances1 he is clear-minded enough to perceive that the moral sense of the civilized world is opposed to this view2 and in this he is nearer correct than those who claim the opposite4 ,it is true that those who seek an approbation of their defense of falsehoods which they deem a necessity1 assume1 without proof1 their agreement with the moral sense of the race4 ,but it is also true that there stands opposed to their theory the best moral sense of primitive man1 as shown in a wide area of investigation1 and also of thinkers all the way up from the lowest moral grade to the most rigorous moralists1 including intuitionists1 utilitarians1 and agnostics4 ,however deficient may be the practice of erring mortals1 the ideal standard in theory1 is veracity1 and not falsehood4 ,as to the opinions of purely speculative philosophers1 concerning the admissibility of the lie of necessity1 they have little value except as personal opinions4 ,this question is one that cannot be discussed fairly without relation to the nature and law of ,god4 ,it is of interest1 however1 to note that a keen mind like ,kant's insists that the highest violation of the duty owed by man to himself1 considered as a moral being singly 7owed to the humanity subsisting in his person71 is a departure from truth1 or lying4#a ,and when a man like ,fichte1#b whom ,carlyle characterizes as that cold1 colossal1 adamantine spirit1 standing erect like a ,cato ,major among degenerate men2 fit to have been the teacher of the ,stoa1 and to have discoursed of beauty and virtue in the groves of ,academe1 declares that no measure of evil results from truth-speaking would induce him to tell a lie1 a certain moral weight attaches to his testimony4 ,and so with all the other philosophers4 ,no attempt at exhaustiveness in their treatment is made in this work4 ,but the fullest force of any fresh argument made by them in favor of occasional lying is recognized so far as it is known4 ,footnote #a3 ,see ,semple's ,kant's ,metaphysic of ,ethics1 p4 #bfg4 ,footnote #b3 ,see ,martensen's ,christian ,ethics 7,individual71 #ig4 ,one common misquotation from a well-known philosopher1 in this line1 is1 however1 sufficiently noteworthy for special mention here4 ,jacobi1 in his intense theism1 protests against the unqualified idealism of ,fichte1 and the indefinite naturalism of ,schelling2 and1 in his famous ,letter to ,fichte1#a he says vehemently3 ,but the ,good what is it8 ,i have no answer if there be no ,god4 ,as to me1 this world of phenomena--if it have all its truth in these phenomena1 and no more profound significance1 if it have nothing beyond itself to reveal to me--becomes a repulsive phantom1 in whose presence ,i curse the consciousness which has called it into existence1 and ,i invoke against it annihilation as a deity4 ,even so1 also1 everything that ,i call good1 beautiful1 and sacred1 turns to a chimera1 disturbing my spirit1 and rending the heart out of my bosom1 as soon as ,i assume that it stands not in me as a relation to a higher1 real ,being1--not a mere resemblance or copy of it in me2--when1 in fine1 ,i have within me an empty and fictitious consciousness only4 ,i admit also that ,i know nothing of 'the ,good per se1' or 'the ,true per se1' that ,i even have nothing but a vague notion of what such terms stand for4 ,i declare that it revolts me when people seek to obtrude upon me the ,will which wills nothing1 this empty nut of independence and freedom in absolute indifference1 and accuse me of atheism1 the true and proper godlessness1 because ,i show reluctance to accept it4 ,footnote #a3 ,f4,h4 ,jacobi's ,werke1 ,i,i,iter ,band1 pp4 #cf-ch4 ,insisting thus that he must have the will of a personal ,god as a source of obligation to conform to the law of truth and virtue1 and that without such a source no assumed law can be binding on him1 ,jacobi adds3 ,yes ,i am the atheist1 and the godless man who1 in opposition to the ,will that wills nothing1 will lie as the lying ,desdemona lied2 will lie and deceive as did ,pylades in passing himself off as ,orestes2 will commit murder as did ,timoleon2 break law and oath as did ,epaminondas1 as did ,john ,de ,witt2 will commit suicide as did ,otho2 will undertake sacrilege with ,david2 yes and rub ears of corn on the ,sabbath merely because ,i am an hungered1 and because the law is made for man and not man for the law4 ,jacobi's reference1 in this statement1 to lying and other sins1 was taken by itself as the motto to one of ,coleridge's essays2#a and this seems to have given currency to the idea that ,jacobi was in favor of lying4 ,hence he is unfairly cited by ethical writers#b as having declared himself for the lie of expediency2 whereas the context shows that that is not his position4 ,he is simply stating the logical consequences of a philosophy which he repudiates4 ,footnote #a3 ,coleridge's ,works3 ,the ,friend1 ,essay ,,xv4 ,footnote #b3 ,see1 for instance1 ,martensen's ,christian ,ethics 7,individual71 #ig4 ,among the false assumptions that are made by many of the advocates of the lie of necessity is the claim that in war1 in medical practice1 and in the legal profession1 the propriety of falsehood and deceit1 in certain cases1 is recognized and admitted on all sides4 ,while the baselessness of this claim has been pointed out1 incidentally1 in the progress of the foregoing discussion1#a it would seem desirable to give particular attention to the matter in a fuller treatment of it1 before closing this record of centuries of discussion4 ,footnote #a3 ,see pp4 #ga-ge1 supra4 ,it is not true that in civilized warfare there is an entire abrogation1 or suspension1 of the duty of truthfulness toward an enemy4 ,there is no material difference between war and peace in this respect4 ,enemies1 on both sides1 understand that in warfare they are to kill each other if they can1 by the use of means that are allowable as means2 but this does not give them the privilege of doing what is utterly inconsistent with true manhood4 ,enemies are not bound to disclose their plans to each other4 ,they have a duty of concealing those plans from each other4 ,hence1 as ,dorner has suggested1 they proffer to each other's sight only appearances1 not assurances2 and it is for each to guess out1 if he can1 the real purpose of the other1 below the appearance4 ,an enemy can protect his borders by pitfalls1 or torpedoes1 or ambushes1 carefully concealed from sight1 in order to guard the life of his own people by destroying the life of his opponents1 or may make demonstrations1 before the enemy1 of possible movements1 in order to conceal his purposed movements2 but in doing this he does only what is allowable1 in effect1 in time of peace4#a ,footnote #a3 ,several of the illustrations of ,oriental warfare in the ,bible record are to be explained in accordance with this principle4 ,thus with the ambush set by ,joshua before ,ai 7,josh4 #h3 #a-bf73 the ,canaanites did not read aright the riddle of the ,israelitish commander1 and they suffered accordingly4 ,yet ,dr4 ,dabney 7,theology1 p4 #dbd7 cites this as an instance of an intentional deception which was innocent in ,god's sight4 ,and again1 in the case recorded at #b ,kings #g3 #f1 where the ,lord made the host of the ,syrians to hear a noise of chariots1 and a noise of horses1 even the noise of a great host1444 and they arose and 444 fled for their life1 thinking that ,hittite and ,egyptian forces were approaching1 it is evident that ,god simply caused the ,syrians1 who were contending with his people1 to feel that they were fighting hopelessly against ,god's cause4 ,the impression ,god made on their minds was a correct one4 ,he could bring chariots and horses as a great host against them4 ,they did well to realize this fact4 ,but the ,syrians' explanation of this impression was incorrect in its details4 ,a similar method of mystifying his opponent is adopted by the base-ball pitcher in his demonstrations with the ball before letting it drive at the batsman4 ,the batsman holds himself responsible for reading the riddle of the pitcher's motions4 ,yet the pitcher is forbidden to deceive the batsman by a feint of delivering the ball without delivering it4 ,if an enemy attempts any communication with his opponent1 he has no right to lie to1 or to deceive him4 ,he must not draw him into an ambuscade1 or over concealed torpedoes1 on the plea of desiring an amicable interview with him2 and his every word given to an enemy must be observed sacredly as an obligation of truth4 ,even before the ,christian era1 and centuries prior to the time when ,chrysostom was confused in his mind on this point1 ,cicero wrote as to the obligations of veracity upon enemies in time of war1 and in repudiation of the idea that warfare included a suspension of all moral relations between belligerents during active hostilities4#a ,footnote #a3 ,cicero's ,de ,officiis1 ,i41 #ab1 #ac4 ,he said3 ,the equities of war are prescribed most carefully by the heralds' law 7lex fetialis7 of the ,roman people1 and he went on to give illustrations of the recognized duty of combatants to keep within the bounds of mutual social obligations4 ,even where private persons1 under stress of circumstances1 have made any promise to the enemy1 he said1 they should observe the exactest good faith1 as did ,regulus1 in the first ,punic war1 when taken prisoner and sent to ,rome to treat of the exchange of prisoners1 having sworn that he would return4 ,first1 when he had arrived1 he did not vote in the ,senate for the return of the prisoners4 ,then1 when his friends and kinsmen would have detained him1 he preferred to go back to punishment rather than evade his faith plighted to the enemy4 ,in the second ,punic war also1 after the battle of ,cannae1 of the ten ,romans whom ,hannibal sent to ,rome bound by an oath that they would return unless they obtained an agreement for the redemption of prisoners1 the censors kept disfranchised those who perjured themselves1 making no exception in favor of him who had devised a fraudulent evasion of his oath4 ,for when by leave of ,hannibal he had departed from the camp1 he went back a little later1 on pretense of having forgotten something4 ,then departing again from the camp without renewing his oath1 he counted himself set free from the obligation of his oath4 ,and so he was free so far as the words went1 but not so in reality2 for always in a promise we must have regard to the meaning of our words1 rather than to the words themselves4 ,in modern times1 when ,lord ,clive1 in ,india1 acted on the theory that an utter lack of veracity and good faith on the part of an enemy justified a suspension of all moral obligations toward him1 and practiced deceit on a ,bengalee by the name of ,omichund1 in order to gain an advantage over the ,nabob of ,bengal1 he was condemned by the moral sense of the nation for which he thus acted deceitfully2 and1 in spite of the specious arguments put forth by his partisan defenders1 his name is infamous because of this transaction4 ,english valor and ,english intelligence have done less to extend and preserve our ,oriental empire than ,english veracity1 says ,lord ,macaulay4 ,all that we could have gained by imitating the doublings1 the evasions1 the fictions1 the perjuries1 which have been employed against us1 is as nothing when compared with what we have gained by being the one power in ,india on whose word reliance can be placed4 ,no oath which superstition can devise1 no hostage however precious1 inspires a hundredth part of the confidence which is produced by the 'yea1 yea1' and the 'nay1 nay1' of a ,british envoy4 ,therefore it is that ,lord ,macaulay is sure that looking at the question of expediency in the lowest sense of the word1 and using no arguments but such as ,machiavelli might have employed in his conferences with ,borgia1 we are convinced that ,clive was altogether in the wrong1 and that he committed1 not merely a crime but a blunder4#a ,footnote #a3 ,macaulay's ,essay on ,lord ,clive4 ,so again when an ,english vessel of war made signals of distress1 off the coast of ,france1 during the war with ,napoleon1 and thereby deceived men from the enemy into coming to its relief1 and then held them as prisoners1 the act was condemned by the moral sense of the world4 ,as ,woolsey says1 in his ,international ,law3#a ,breach of faith between enemies has always been strongly condemned1 and that vindication of it is worthless which maintains that1 without an express or tacit promise to our enemy1 we are not bound to keep faith with him4 ,footnote #a3 ,sect4 #acc1 p4 #bac4 ,the theologian who assumes that the duty of veracity is suspended between enemies in war time is ignorant of the very theory of civilized warfare2 or else he fails to distinguish between justifiable concealment1 by the aid of methods of mystifying1 and falsehood which is never justifiable4 ,and that commander who should attempt to justify falsehood and bad faith in warfare on the ground that it is held justifiable in certain works on ,christian ethics1 would incur the scorn of the civilized world for his credulity2 and he would be told that it is absurd to claim that because he is entitled to kill a man in warfare it must be fair to lie to him4 ,in the treatment of the medical profession1 many writers on ethics have been as unfair1 as in their misrepresentation of the general moral sense with reference to warfare4 ,they have spoken as if the ethics of the medical profession had a recognized place for falsehood in the treatment of the sick4 ,but this assumption is only an assumption4 ,there are physicians who will lie1 and there are physicians who will not lie2 and in each case the individual physician acts in this matter on his own responsibility3 he has no code of professional ethics justifying a lie on his part as a physician1 when it would not be justifiable in a layman4 ,concealment of that which he has a right to conceal1 is as clearly a duty1 in many a case1 on the part of a physician1 as it is on the part of any other person2 but falsehood is never a legitimate1 or an allowable1 means of concealment by physician or layman4 ,as has been already stated#a if it be once known that a physician is ever ready to speak words of cheer to a patient falsely1 that physician is measurably deprived of the possibility of encouraging a patient by truthful words of cheer when he would gladly do so4 ,and physicians would probably be surprised to know how generally they are estimated in the community according to their reputation in this matter4 ,one is known as a man who will speak falsely to his patients as a means of encouragement1 while another is known as a man who will be cautious about giving his opinion concerning chances of recovery1 but who will never tell an untruth to a patient or to any other person4 ,but in no case can a physician claim that the ethics of his profession as a profession justify him in a falsehood to any person--patient or no patient4 ,footnote #a3 ,see p4 #ge f41 supra4 ,a distinguished professor in one of the prominent medical colleges of this country1 in denying the claim of a writer on ethics that it may become the duty of a physician to deceive his patient as a means of curing him1 declares that a physician acting on this theory will not be found in accord with the best and the highest medical teaching of the present day2 and he goes on to say3#a ,in my profession to-day1 the truth properly presented1 we have found1 carries with it a convincing and adjusting element which does not fail to bring the afflicted person to that condition of mind that is most conducive to his physical well-being1 and let me add also1 ,i believe1 to his spiritual welfare4 ,this statement was made in connection with the declaration that in the hospital which was in his charge it is not deemed right or wise to deceive a patient as to any operation to be performed upon him4 ,and there are other well-known physicians who testify similarly as to the ethics of their profession4 ,footnote #a3 ,in a personal communication to the author4 ,an illustration of the possible good results of concealing an unpleasant fact from a sick person1 that has been a favorite citation all along the centuries with writers on ethics who would justify emergency falsehoods1 is one which is given in his correspondence by ,pliny the younger1 eighteen centuries ago4#a ,footnote #a3 ,epistles of ,pliny the ,younger1 ,book ,,iii41 ,epis4 #af4 ,pliny to ,nepos4 ,caecinna ,paetus and his son were both at the same time attacked with what seemed a mortal illness1 of which the son died4444 ,his mother ,arria managed his funeral so privately that ,paetus did not know of his death4 ,whenever she came into his bedchamber1 she pretended that her son was better1 and1 as often as he inquired after his health1 would answer that he had rested well1 or had eaten with an appetite4 ,when she found she could no longer restrain her grief1 but her tears were gushing out1 she would leave the room1 and1 having given vent to her passion1 return again with dry eyes and a serene countenance1 as if she had dismissed every sentiment of sorrow4 ,this ,roman matron also committed suicide1 as an encouragement to her husband whom she desired to have put an end to his own life1 when he was likely to have it taken from him by the executioner2 and ,pliny commends her nobleness of conduct in both cases4 ,it is common among ethical writers1 in citing this instance in favor of lying1 to say nothing about the suicide1 and to omit mention of the fact that the mother squarely lied1 by saying that her dead boy had eaten a good breakfast1 instead of employing language that might have been the truth as far as it went1 while it concealed that portion of the truth which she thought it best to conceal4 ,it is common to quote her as simply saying of her son ,he is better2#a quite a different version from ,pliny's1 and presenting a different issue4 ,footnote #a3 ,see ,newman ,smyth's ,christian ,ethics1 p4 #cie1 where this case is stated with vagueness of phrase1 and as thus stated is approved4 ,it was perfectly proper for that mother to conceal the signs of her sorrow from her sick husband1 who had no right to know the truth concerning matters outside of his sick-room at such a time4 ,and if1 indeed1 she could say in all sincerity1 as expressive of her feelings in the death of her son1 by the will of the gods1 ,he is better1 it would have been possible for her to feel that she was entitled to say that as the truth1 and not as a falsehood2 and in that case she would not have intended a deceit1 but only a concealment4 ,but when1 on the other hand1 she told a deliberate lie--spoke falsely in order to deceive--she committed a sin in so doing1 and her sin was none the less a sin because it resulted in apparent good to her husband4 ,an illustration does not overturn a principle1 but it may misrepresent it4 ,another illustration1 on the other side of the case1 is worth citing here4 ,victor ,hugo pictures1 in his ,les ,miserables1#a a sister of charity adroitly concealing facts from a sick person in a hospital1 while refusing to tell a falsehood even for the patient's good4 ,never to have told a falsehood1 never to have said for any advantage1 or even indifferently1 a thing which was not the truth1 the holy truth1 was the characteristic feature of ,sister ,simplice4 ,she had taken the name of ,simplice through special choice4 ,simplice1 of ,sicily1 our readers will remember1 is the saint who sooner let her bosom be plucked out than say she was a native of ,segeste1 as she was born at ,syracuse1 though the falsehood would have saved her4 ,such a patron saint suited this soul4 ,and in speaking of ,sister ,simplice1 as never having told even a white lie1 ,victor ,hugo quotes a letter from the ,abb ,sicard1 to his deaf-mute pupil ,massieu1 on this point3 ,can there be such a thing as a white lie1 an innocent lie8 ,lying is the absolute of evil4 ,lying a little is not possible4 ,the man who lies tells the whole lie4 ,lying is the face of the fiend2 and ,satan has two names1--he is called ,satan and ,lying4 ,victor ,hugo the romancer would seem to be a safer guide1 so far1 for the physician or the nurse in the sick-room1 than ,pliny the rhetorician1 or ,rothe the theologian4#b ,footnote #a3 ,book ,,vii4 ,footnote #b3 ,yet ,victor ,hugo afterwards represents even ,sister ,simplice as lying unqualifiedly1 when sorely tempted--although not in the sick-room4 ,a well-known physician1 in speaking to me of this subject1 said3 ,it is not so difficult to avoid falsehood in dealing with anxious patients as many seem to suppose4 ,tact1 as well as principle1 will do a good deal to help a physician out1 in an emergency4 ,i have never seen any need of lying1 in my practice4 ,and yet another physician1 who had been in a widely varied practice for forty years1 said that he had never found it necessary to tell a lie to a patient2 although he thought he might have done so if he had deemed it necessary to save a patient's life4 ,in other words1 while he admitted the possible justification of an emergency lie1 he had never found a first-class opening for one in his practice4 ,and he added1 that he knew very well that if he had been known to lie to his patients1 his professional efficiency1 as well as his good name1 would have suffered4 ,medical men do not always see1 in their practice1 the supposed advantages of lying1 which have so large prominence in the minds of ethical writers4 ,another profession1 which is popularly and wrongly accused of having a place for the lie in its system of ethics1 is the legal profession4 ,whewell refers to this charge in his ,elements of ,morality 7citing ,paley in its support74 ,he says3 ,some moralists have ranked with the cases in which convention supersedes the general rule of truth1 an advocate asserting the justice1 or his belief in the justice1 of his client's cause4 ,but as to an advocate's right in this matter1 ,whewell says explicitly3 ,if1 in pleading1 he assert his belief that his cause is just1 when he believes it unjust1 he offends against truth2 as any other man would do who1 in like manner1 made a like assertion4#a ,footnote #a3 ,whewell's ,elements of ,morality1 #djj4 ,chief-,justice ,sharswood1 of ,pennsylvania1 in his standard work on ,legal ,ethics1 cites this opinion of ,whewell with unqualified approval2 and1 in speaking for the legal profession1 he says3 ,no counsel can with propriety and good conscience express to court or jury his belief in the justice of his client's cause1 contrary to the fact4 ,indeed1 the occasions are very rare in which he ought to throw the weight of his private opinion into the scales in favor of the side he has espoused4 ,calling attention to the fact that the official oath of an attorney1 on his admission to the bar1 in the state of ,pennsylvania1 includes the specific promise to use no falsehood1 he says3 ,truth in all its simplicity--truth to the court1 client1 and adversary--should be indeed the polar star of the lawyer4 ,the influence of only slight deviations from truth upon professional character is very observable4 ,a man may as well be detected in a great as a little lie4 ,a single discovery1 among professional brethren1 of a failure of truthfulness1 makes a man the object of distrust1 subjects him to constant mortification1 and soon this want of confidence extends itself beyond the ,bar to those who employ the ,bar4 ,that lawyer's case is truly pitiable1 upon the escutcheon of whose honesty or truth rests the slightest tarnish4#a ,footnote #a3 ,sharswood's ,essay on ,professional ,ethics1 pp4 #eg1 #ii1ajb1afg f4 ,as illustrative of the carelessness with which popular charges against an entire profession are made the basis of reflections upon the ethical standard of that profession1 the comments of ,dr4 ,hodge on this matter are worthy of particular notice4 ,in connection with his assertion that the principles of professional men allow of many things which are clearly inconsistent with the requirements of the ninth commandment1 he says3 ,lord ,brougham is reported to have said1 in the ,house of ,lords1 that an advocate knows no one but his client4 ,he is bound per fas et nefas1 if possible1 to clear him4 ,if necessary for the accomplishment of that object1 he is at liberty to accuse and defame the innocent1 and even 7as the report stated7 to ruin his country4 ,it is not unusual1 especially in trials for murder1 for the advocates of the accused to charge the crime on innocent parties and to exert all their ingenuity to convince the jury of their guilt4 ,and ,dr4 ,hodge adds the note that ,lord ,brougham1 according to the public papers1 uttered these sentiments in vindication of the conduct of the famous ,irish advocate ,phillips1 who on the trial of ,courvoisier for the murder of ,lord ,russell1 endeavored to fasten the guilt on the butler and housemaid1 whom he knew to be innocent1 as his client had confessed to him that he had committed the murder4#a ,footnote #a3 ,hodge's ,systematic ,theology1 ,,iii41 #dci4 ,now the facts1 in the two very different cases thus erroneously intermingled by ,dr4 ,hodge1 as given by ,justice ,sharswood1#a present quite another aspect from that in which ,dr4 ,hodge sees them1 as bearing on the accepted ethics of the legal profession4 ,it would appear that ,lord ,brougham was not speaking in defense of another attorney's action1 but in defense of his own course as attorney of ,queen ,caroline1 thirty years before the ,courvoisier murder trial4 ,as ,justice ,sharswood remarks of ,lord ,brougham's extravagant claims3 ,no doubt he was led by the excitement of so great an occasion to say what cool reflection and sober reason certainly never can approve4 ,yet ,lord ,brougham does not appear to have suggested1 in his claim1 that a lawyer had a right to falsify the facts involved1 or to utter an untruth4 ,he was speaking of his supposed duty to defend his client1 the ,queen1 against the charges of the ,king1 regardless of the consequences to himself or to his country through his advocacy of her cause1 which he deemed a just one4 ,footnote #a3 ,sharswood's ,legal ,ethics1 p4 #hf f4 ,and as to the charge against the eminent advocate1 ,charles ,phillips1 of seeking to fasten the crime on the innocent1 when he knew that his client was guilty1 in the trial of ,courvoisier for the murder of ,lord ,russell1 that charge was overwhelmingly refuted by the testimony of lawyers and judges present at that trial4 ,mr4 ,phillips supposed his client an innocent man until the trial was nearly concluded4 ,then came the unexpected confession from the guilty man1 accompanied by the demand that his counsel continue in his case to the end4 ,at first ,mr4 ,phillips proposed to retire at once from the case2 but1 on advising with eminent counsel1 he was told that it would be wrong for him to betray the prisoner's confidence1 and practically to testify against him1 by deserting him at that hour4 ,he then continued in the case1 but1 as is shown conclusively in his statement of the facts1 with its accompanying proofs1 without saying a word or doing a thing that might properly be deemed in the realm of false assertion or intimations4#a ,footnote #a3 ,see ,sharswood's ,legal ,ethics1 pp4 #ajc-ajg1 #ahc-aif4 ,the very prominence given in the public press to the charges against ,mr4 ,phillips1 and to their refutation1 are added proof that the moral sense of the community is against falsehood under any circumstances or in any profession4 ,members of the legal profession are bound by the same ethical obligations as other men2 yet the civil law1 in connection with which they practice their profession1 is not in all points identical with the moral law2 although it is not in conflict with any of its particulars4 ,as ,chancellor ,kent says3 ,human laws are not so perfect as the dictates of conscience1 and the sphere of morality is more enlarged than the limits of civil jurisdiction4 ,there are many duties that belong to the class of imperfect obligations1 which are binding on conscience1 but which human laws do not and cannot undertake directly to enforce4 ,but when the aid of a ,court of ,equity is sought to carry into execution 444 a contract1 then the principles of ethics have a more extensive sway4#a ,footnote #a3 ,kent's ,commentaries1 ,lect4 #ci1 p4 #dij f4 7#dth ed472 cited in ,story's ,equity ,jurisprudence1 ,,vi41 p4 #bbi 7#acth ed474 ,in the decisions of ,equity courts1 while the duty of absolute truthfulness between parties in interest is insisted on as vital1 and a suppression of the truth from one who had a right to its knowledge1 or a suggestion of that which is untrue in a similar case7suggestio falsi aut suppressio veri71 is deemed an element of fraud1 the distinction between mere silence when one is entitled to be silent1 and concealment with the purpose of deception1 is distinctly recognized1 as it is not in all manuals on ethics4#a ,this is indicated1 on the one hand1 in the legal maxim ,aliud est celare1 aliud tacere1--,it is one thing to conceal1 another to be silent2 silence is not necessarily deceptive concealment2#b and on the other hand in such a statement as this1 in ,benjamin's great work on ,sales3 ,the nondisclosure of hidden facts to a party in interest is the more objectionable when any artifice is employed to throw the buyer off his guard2 as by telling half the truth4#c ,it is not in any principles which are recognized by the legal profession as binding on the conscience1 that loose ethics are to find defense or support4 ,footnote #a3 ,see ,bispham's ,principles of ,equity1 p4 #bfa1 7#c;d ed472 ,broom's ,legal ,maxims1 p4 #gha f4 7#gth ,am4 ed472 ,merrill's ,american and ,english ,encyclopedia of ,law1 art4 ,fraud4 ,footnote #b3 ,see ,anderson's ,dictionary of ,law1 p4 #bbj2 ,abbott's ,law ,dictionary1 ,i41 #ec4 ,footnote #c3 ,treatise on the ,law of ,sale of ,personal ,property1 p4 #dea f4 ,but the profession that has most at stake in this discussion1 and that1 indeed1 is most involved in its issue1 is the ministerial1 or clerical1 profession4 ,while it was ,jewish rabbis who affirmed most positively1 in olden time1 the unwavering obligations of truthfulness1 it was ,jewish rabbis1 also1 who sought to find extenuation or excuse for falsehoods uttered with a good intention4 ,and while it was ,christian ,fathers1 like the ,shepherd of ,hermas1 and ,justin ,martyr1 and ,basil the ,great1 and ,augustine1 who insisted that no tolerance should be allowed to falsehood or deceit1 it was also ,christian ,fathers1 like ,gregory of ,nyssa1 and ,chrysostom1 who having practiced deceit for what they deemed a good end1 first attempted a special plea for such falsities as they had found convenient in their professional labors4 ,and it was other ,christian ,fathers1 like ,origen and ,jerome1 who sought to find arguments for laxity of practice1 at this point1 in the course of the ,apostles themselves4 ,all the way along the centuries1 while the strongest defenders of the law of truthfulness have been found among clergymen1 more has been written in favor of the lie of necessity by clergymen than by men of any other class or profession4 ,and if it be true1 as many of these have claimed1 that deceit and falsehood are a duty1 on the part of a ,god-loving teacher1 toward those persons who1 through weakness1 or mental incapacity1 or moral obliquity1 are in the relation to him of wards of love1 or of subjects of guardianship1 there is no profession in which there is more of a call for godly deception1 and for holy falsehood1 than the ,christian ministry4 ,if it be true that a lie1 or a falsehood1 is justifiable in order to the saving of the physical life of another1 how much better were it to tell such a lie in the loving desire to save a soul4 ,if the lie of necessity be allowable for any purpose1 it would seem to be more important as a means of good in the exercise of the ministerial profession1 than of any other profession or occupation4 ,and if it be understood that this is the case1 what dependence can be put1 by the average hearer1 on the most earnest words of a preacher1 who may be declaring a truth from ,god1 and who1 on the other hand1 may be uttering falsehoods in love8 ,and if it be true1 also1 as some of these clergymen have claimed1 that ,god specifically approved falsehood and deception1 according to the ,bible record1 and that ,jesus ,christ practiced in this line1 while here on earth1 what measure of confidence can fallible man place in the sacred text as it has come to him8 ,the statement of this view of the case1 is the best refutation of the claim of a possible justification for the most loving lie imaginable4 ,the only other point remaining untouched1 in this review of the centuries of discussion concerning the possible justifiableness of a lie under conceivable circumstances1 is in its relation to the lower animals4 ,it has been claimed that all admit that there is no impropriety in using any available means for the decoying of fish or of beasts to their death1 or in saving one's self from an enraged animal2 hence that a lie is not to be counted as a sin per se1 but depends for its moral value on the relation subsisting between its utterer and the one toward whom it is uttered4 ,dr4 ,dabney1 who is far less clear and sound than ,dr4 ,thornwell in his reasoning on this ethical question1 says3 ,i presume that no man would feel himself guilty for deceiving a mad dog in order to destroy him2#a and he argues from this assumption that when a man1 through insanity or malice1 is not a rational man1 but a brute1 he may fairly be deemed as outside of the pale of humanity1 so far as the obligations of veracity1 viewed only as a social virtue1 are concerned4 ,footnote #a3 ,dabney's ,theology 7second edition71 p4 #dbe f4 ,dr4 ,newman ,smyth expands this idea4#a ,he says3 ,we may say that animals1 strictly speaking1 can have no immediate right to our words of truth1 since they belong below the line of existence which marks the beginning of any functions of speech4 ,he adds that animals may have direct claims upon our humanity1 and so indirectly put us under obligations to give them straightforward and fair treatment1 and that truthfulness to the domestic animal1 to the horse or the dog1 is to be included as a part of our general obligation of kindness to creatures that are entirely dependent upon our fidelity to them and their wants4 ,but he cites the driving of horses with blinders1#b and the fishing for trout with artificial flies1 as evidence of the fact that man recognizes no sinfulness in the deceiving of the lower animals1 and hence that the duty of veracity is not one of universal obligation4 ,footnote #a3 ,smyth's ,christian ,ethics1 p4 #cih4 ,footnote #b3 ,here is another illustration of ,dr4 ,smyth's strange confusion of concealment with deception4 ,it would seem as though a man must have blinders before his own eyes1 to render him incapable of perceiving the difference between concealing a possible cause of fright from an animal1 and intentionally deceiving that animal4 ,if1 indeed1 the duty of truthfulness were only a social obligation1 there might be a force in this reasoning that is lacking when we see that falsehood and deceit are against the very nature of ,god1 and are a violation of man's primal nature4 ,a lie is a sin1 whenever and however and to whomsoever spoken or acted4 ,it is a sin against ,god when uttered in his sight4 ,man is given authority from ,god over all the lower animals2#a and he is empowered to take their lives1 if necessary for his protection or for his sustenance4 ,in the exercise of this right1 man is entitled to conceal from the animals he would kill or capture the means employed for the purpose2 as he is entitled to conceal similarly from his fellow-man1 when he is authorized to kill him as an enemy1 in time of war waged for ,god4 ,thus it is quite proper for a man to conceal the hook or the net from the fish1 or the trap or the pitfall from the beast2 but it is not proper to deceive an animal by an imitation of the cry of the animal's offspring in order to lure that animal to its destruction2 and the moral sense of the human race makes this distinction4 ,footnote #a3 ,gen4 #a3bh2 #i3a-c4 ,an illustration that has been put forward1 as involving a nice question in the treatment of an animal1 is that of going toward a loose horse with a proffered tuft of grass in one hand1 and a halter for his capture concealed behind the back in the other hand4 ,it is right to conceal the halter1 and to proffer the grass1 provided they are used severally in their proper relations4 ,if the grass be held forth as an assurance of the readiness of the man to provide for the needs of the horse1 and it be given to him when he comes for it1 there is no deception practiced so far2 and if1 when horse and man are thus on good terms1 the man brings out the halter for its use in the relation of master and servitor between the two1 that also is proper1 and the horse would so understand it4 ,but if the man were to refuse the grass to the horse1 when the two had come together1 and were to substitute for it the halter1 the man would do wrong1 and the horse would recognize the fact1 and not be caught again in that way4 ,even a writer like ,professor ,bowne1 who is not quite sure as to the right in all phases of the lying question1 sees this point in its psychological aspects to better advantage than those ethical writers who would look at the duty of truthfulness as mainly a social virtue3 ,even in cases where we regard truth as in our own power1 he says1 there are considerations of expediency which are by no means to be disregarded4 ,there is first the psychological fact that inexactness of statement1 exaggeration1 unreality in speech1 are sure to react upon the mental habit of the person himself1 and upon the estimate in which his statements are held by others4 ,in dealing with children1 also1 however convenient a romancing statement might momentarily be1 it is unquestionable that exact truthfulness is the only way which does not lead to mischief4 ,even in dealing with animals1 it pays in the long run to be truthful4 ,the horse that is caught once by false pretenses will not be long in finding out the trick4 ,the physician also who dissembles1 quickly comes to lose the confidence of his patient1 and has thereafter no way of getting himself believed4#a ,footnote #a3 ,bowne's ,principles of ,ethics1 p4 #bbd4 ,the main question is not whether it is fair toward an animal for a man to lie to him1 but whether it is fair toward a man's self1 or toward ,god the maker of animals and of men1 for a man to lie to an animal4 ,a lie has no place1 even theoretically1 in the universe1 unless it be in some sphere where ,god has no cognizance and man has no individuality4 99 99 99 99 99 ,it were useless to follow farther the ever-varying changes of the never-varying reasonings for the justification of the unjustifiable lie of necessity in the course of the passing centuries4 ,it is evident that the specious arguments put forth by young ,chrysostom1 in defense of his inexcusable lie of love fifteen centuries ago1 have neither been added to nor improved on by any subsequent apologist of lying and deception4 ,the action of ,chrysostom is declared by his biographers to be utterly at variance with the principles of truth and honor1 one which every sound ,christian conscience must condemn2 yet those modern ethical writers who find force and reasonableness in his now venerable though often-refuted fallacies1 are sure that the moral sense of the race is with ,chrysostom4 ,every man who recognizes the binding force of intuitions of a primal law of truthfulness1 and who gives weight to priori arguments for the unchanging opposition of truth and falsehood1 either admits1 in his discussion of this question1 that a lie is never justifiable1 or he is obviously illogical and inconsistent in his processes of reasoning1 and in his conclusions4 ,even those who deny any priori argument for the superiority of truthfulness over falsehood1 and whose philosophy rests on the experimental evidence of the good or evil of a given course1 are generally inclined to condemn any departure from strict truthfulness as in its tendencies detrimental to the interests of society1 aside from any question of its sinfulness4 ,the only men who are thoroughly consistent in their arguments in favor of occasional lying1 are those who start with the false premise that there is no higher law of ethics than that of such a love for one's neighbor as will make one ready to do whatever seems likely to advantage him in the present life4 ,centuries of discussion have only brought out with added clearness the essential fact that a lie is eternally opposed to the truth2 and that he who would be a worthy child of the ,father of truth must refuse to employ1 under any circumstances1 modes of speech and action which belong exclusively to the father of lies4 ,,vii4 ,,the ,,gist ,,of ,,the ,,matter4 ,it would seem that the one all-dividing line in the universe1 which never changes or varies1 is the line between the true and the false1 between the truth and a lie4 ,all other lines of distinction1 such even as those which separate good from evil1 light from darkness1 purity from impurity1 love from hate1 are in a sense relative and variable lines1 taking their decisive measure from this one primal and eternal dividing line4 ,this is the one line which goes back of our very conception of a personal ,god1 or which is inherent in that conception4 ,we cannot conceive of ,god as ,god1 unless we conceive of him as the true ,god1 and the ,god of truth4 ,if there be any falsity in him1 he is not the true ,god4 ,truth is of ,god's very nature4 ,to admit in our thought that a lie is of ,god1 is to admit that falsity is in him1 or1 in other words1 that he is a false god4 ,a lie is the opposite of truth1 and a being who will lie stands opposed to ,god1 who by his very nature cannot lie4 ,hence he who lies takes a stand1 by that very act1 in opposition to ,god4 ,therefore if it be necessary at any time to lie1 it is necessary to desert ,god and be in hostility to him so long as the necessity for lying continues4 ,if there be such a thing as a sin per se1 a lie is that thing2 as a lie is1 in its very nature1 in hostility to the being of ,god4 ,whatever1 therefore1 be the temptation to lie1 it is a temptation to sin by lying4 ,whatever be the seeming gain to result from a lie1 it is the seeming gain from a sin4 ,whatever be the apparent cost or loss from refusing to lie1 it is the apparent cost or loss from refusing to sin4 ,man1 formed in the moral image of ,god1 is so far a representative of ,god4 ,if a man lies1 he misrepresents and dishonors ,god1 and must incur ,god's disapproval because of his course4 ,this fact is recognized in the universal habit of appealing to ,god in witness of the truthfulness of a statement1 when there is room for doubt as to its correctness4 ,the feeling is general that a man who believes in ,god will not lie unto ,god under the solemnity of an oath4 ,if1 however1 it were possible for ,god to approve a lie on the part of one of his children1 then that child of ,god might confidently make solemn oath to the truth of his lie1 appealing to ,god to bear witness to the lie--which in ,god's mind is1 in this case1 better than the truth4 ,in ,god's sight an oath is no more sacred than a yea1 yea2 and every child of ,god speaks always as in the sight of ,god4 ,perjury is no more of an immorality than ordinary lying2 nor is ordinary lying any less a sin than formal perjury4 ,the sin of lying consists primarily and chiefly in its inconsistency with the nature of ,god and with the nature of ,god's image in man4 ,it is not mainly as a sin against one's neighbor1 but it is as a sin against ,god and one's self1 that a lie is ever and always a sin4 ,if it were possible to lie without harming or offending one's neighbor1 or even if it were possible to benefit one's fellow-man by a lie1 no man could ever tell a lie1 under any circumstances or for any purpose whatsoever1 without doing harm to his own nature1 and offending against ,god's very being4 ,if a lie comes out of a man on any inducement or provocation1 or for any purpose of good1 that man is the worse for it4 ,the lie is evil1 and its coming out of the man is harmful to him4 ,the things which proceed out of the man are those that defile the man1#a said our ,lord2 and the experience of mankind bears witness to the correctness of this asseveration4 ,footnote #a3 ,mark #g3ae4 ,yet1 although the main sin and guilt and curse of a lie are ever on him who utters that lie1 whatever be his motive in so doing1 the evil consequences of lying are immeasurable in the community as a community2 and whoever is guilty of a new lie adds to the burden of evil that weighs down society1 and that tends to its disintegration and ruin4 ,the bond of society is confidence4 ,a lie is inconsistent with confidence2 and the knowledge that a lie is1 under certain circumstances1 deemed proper by a man1 throws doubt on all that that man says or does under any circumstances4 ,no matter why or where the one opening for an allowable lie be made in the reservoir of public confidence1 if it be made at all1 the final emptying of that reservoir is merely a question of time4 ,to-day1 as in all the days1 the chief need of men1 for themselves and for their fellows1 is a likeness to ,god in the impossibility of lying2 and the chief longing of the community is for such confidence of men in one another as will give them assurance that they will not lie one to another4 ,there was never yet a lie uttered which did not bring more of harm than of good2 nor will there ever be a harmless lie1 while ,god is ,truth1 and ,satan is the father of lies4 ,,topical ,,index4 ,abb ,sicard3 cited ,abbott1 ,benjamin ,v42 cited ,abohab1 ,isaac3 quotation from ,abraham3 his deceiving ,achilles1 truthfulness of ,act and speech1 lying in ,advantages of lying1 supposed ,africans1 truthfulness among ,ahab's false prophets ,ahriman1 father of lies ,american ,indians1 habits of ,ananias and ,sapphira ,anderson1 ,rasmus ,b43 cited ,animals1 deception of ,aquinas1 ,thomas3 cited ,arabs1 influence of civilization on ,aristotle3 cited ,army prison life1 incidents in ,augustine3 cited ,aurelius1 ,marcus3 cited ,bailey3 cited ,barrow1 ,sir ,john3 cited ,base-ball1 concealment in ,basil1 friend of ,chrysostom ,basil the ,great3 cited ,baumgarten-,crusius3 cited ,benjamin1 ,judah ,p43 cited ,bergk1 ,theodor3 cited ,bethlehem1 ,samuel at ,bheels1 estimate of truth by ,bible3 principles1 not rules1 in first record of lie in story of man's fall in standard of right forbids lying ,bible teachings on lying ,bingham1 ,joseph3 cited ,bispham1 ,george ,t43 cited ,bock1 ,carl3 cited ,bowne1 ,b4,p41 quotation from ,boyle1 ,f43 cited ,brahmans1 estimate of truth by ,briggs and ,salmond3 cited ,broom1 ,dr4 ,herbert3 cited ,brougham1 ,lord3 cited ,budge1 ,e4,a43 cited ,bunsen1 ,c4,k4,j12 cited ,burton1 ,richard3 cited1 #cj4 ,caecinna ,paetus3 cited ,calvin1 ,john3 cited ,carlyle1 ,thomas3 cited ,cartwright1 ,william ,c43 cited ,chastity1 lying to save ,children's right to truth ,choosing between duties ,christ1 example of ,christian ethics1 basis of ,christian ,fathers1 discussion by ,christians1 early1 discussion by ,chrysostom3 cited ,cicero3 cited ,clergymen1 position of ,clive1 ,lord3 cited ,coleridge1 ,s4,t43 cited ,concealment1 justifiable ,concealment1 unjustifiable ,confidence essential to society ,contract1 overpressing theory of ,conway1 ,moncure ,d43 cited ,court1 oath in ,courvoisier1 trial of ,crime1 lying to prevent ,cyprian3 cited ,dabney1 ,dr4 ,r4,l43 cited ,darius1 inscription of ,david3 his deceiving ,deans1 ,jeanie1 story of ,deception3 antagonistic to nature of ,god among ,phoenicians by ,hebrew midwives by ,rahab by ,jacob ,samuel charged with ,micah charged with by ,abraham by ,isaac by ,david by ,ananias and ,sapphira in speech and in act concealment not necessarily purposed and resultant of lower animals in medical profession of insane in flag of truce teaching of ,talmudists as to ,peter and ,paul charged with teaching of ,jesuits of the intoxicated ,elisha charged with ,joshua charged with in legal profession in ministerial profession1 ,definitions of lie ,denham3 cited ,de ,wette3 cited ,dick1 ,dr41 quotation from ,dorner1 ,dr4 ,isaac ,a43 cited ,drona1 story of ,yudhishthira and ,duns ,scotus3 cited ,duty3 of truthfulness2 of disclosure1 conditional2 choosing of more important2 of right concealment2 to ,god not to be counted out4 ,dyaks2 their truthfulness ,earl1 ,g4,w43 cited ,early ,christians1 temptations of ,east ,africans1 estimate of truth by ,egyptian idea of deity synonymous with truth ,elisha and ,syrians ,enemy1 duty of truthfulness to ,esau1 deceit practiced on ,eunomius3 cited ,evil as a means of good ,exigency1 lie of 7see ,lie of ,necessity7 ,false impressions1 limit of responsibility for ,falsehood3 estimate of1 in ,india2 in ,ceylon2 in ,persia2 in ,egypt2 ,punic faith1 synonym of2 in medical profession2 its use as means of good2 spoken in love2 in legal profession4 ,family troubles1 concealment of ,fichte3 cited ,firmus1 ,bishop3 cited ,flag of truce1 sending of ,flatt3 cited ,forsyth1 ,capt4 ,j43 cited ,fowler1 ,professor3 cited ,frankness1 brutal ,fridthjof and ,ingeborg1 story of ,frstenthal1 ,r4,j43 cited ,german ideal of truth ,glasfurd3 cited ,god3 killing1 but not lying1 a possibility with2 cannot lie2 his concealments from man2 is truth2 called to witness lie2 ,greeks1 ancient3 their estimate of truth ,gregory of ,nyssa3 cited ,hall of two truths ,hamburger1 ,dr4 ,i43 cited ,hannibal3 cited ,harischandra1 story of ,harkness1 ,capt4 ,henry3 cited ,harless3 cited ,hartenstein3 cited ,heber1 ,bishop3 cited ,hebrew midwives ,hebrew spies ,hegel3 cited ,heralds' law ,herbart3 cited ,hennas1 ,shepherd of3 cited ,herodotus3 cited ,hill ,tribes of ,india3 their estimate of truth ,hindoo2 estimate of truth2 passion-play4 ,hodge1 ,dr4 ,charles2 cited ,home of ,song ,home of the ,lie ,hottentot1 estimate of truth ,hugo1 ,victor3 cited ,hunter1 ,w4,w43 cited ,ilai1 ,rabbi3 cited ,iliad1 estimate of truth in ,indians1 ,american1 influence of civilization on ,ingeborg and ,fridthjof of1 story of ,innocent ,,iii43 cited ,insane3 lying to their right to truth ,inscription of ,darius ,intoxicated1 the3 their right to truth ,isaac3 his deceiving ,isaac1 ,jacob1 and ,esau ,ishmael1 ,rabbi3 cited ,jackson1 ,prof4 ,a4,v4,w43 cited ,jacob3 his deceiving his lie to ,isaac ,jacobi1 ,f4,h43 cited ,javanese3 their truthfulness ,jehoshaphat and ,ahab ,jehuda1 ,rabbi3 cited ,jerome3 cited ,jesuits1 teaching of ,jewish ,talmudists1 discussions of ,johnson's ,cyclopaedia3 cited ,judith and ,holofernes ,justin ,martyr3 cited ,juvenal3 cited ,kant1 ,immanuel3 cited ,keating1 ,w4,h43 cited ,kent1 ,chancellor3 cited ,khonds of ,central ,india1 truthfulness among ,killing an enemy or lying to him ,kirkbride1 ,dr4 ,thomas ,s41 testimony of ,kolben1 ,p43 cited ,krause3 cited ,kurtz1 ,prof4 ,j4,h43 cited ,lamberton1 ,prof4 ,w4,a43 cited ,lecky1 ,w4,e4,h43 cited ,legal profession1 ethics of ,legends1 ,scandinavian ,liar3 an enemy of righteousness form of prayer for ,liars1 place of ,libby ,prison1 incident of ,lichtenberger1 ,f43 cited ,life1 losing of truth to save ,life insurance1 truthfulness in ,lightfoot1 ,bishop3 cited ,liguori3 cited ,livingstone1 ,david3 cited ,logic swayed by feeling ,loyola1 ,ignatius3 cited ,luther1 ,martin3 cited ,,ma1 symbol of ,truth ,macaulay1 ,lord1 on ,lord ,clive's treachery ,macpherson1 ,lieutenant3 cited ,mahabharata on lying ,mahaffy1 ,prof4 ,j4,p43 cited ,mandingoes3 their estimate of truth ,marcus ,aurelius1 quotation from ,marheineke3 cited ,marriage1 duty of truthfulness in connection with ,marshman1 ,joshua3 cited ,martensen1 ,hans ,lassen3 cited ,martineau1 ,dr4 ,james1 quotations from ,martyrdom price of truth-telling ,mead1 ,professor3 cited ,medical profession1 no justifiable falsehood in ,melanchthon3 cited ,menorath ,hammaor1 reference to ,merrill1 ,j4,h43 cited ,meyer1 ,dr4 ,h4,a4,w43 cited ,meyrick1 ,rev4 ,f43 cited ,micaiah1 story of ,midwives1 ,hebrew1 lies of ,mithra1 god of truth ,moore1 ,william3 cited ,moral sense of man against lying ,morgan3 cited ,mller1 ,julius3 cited ,mller1 ,prof4 ,max3 cited ,murderer1 concealment from would-be ,nathan1 ,rabbi3 cited ,neander3 cited ,nitzsch3 cited ,oath of witness in court ,omichund1 deceit practiced on ,one all-dividing line ,origen3 cited ,ormuzd1 ,zoroastrian god of truth ,paley1 ,dr43 definition of lie ,palgrave1 ,w4,g43 cited ,paradise1 two pictures of ,park1 ,mungo3 cited ,pascal3 cited ,passion-play1 ,hindoo ,patagonians3 their view of lying ,patient1 deception of1 by physician ,paul and ,peter3 suggestion of their deceiving ,perjury justifiable1 if lying be ,persian ideals ,peter and ,paul3 suggestion of their deceiving ,phillips1 ,charles1 misrepresented ,philoctetes1 tragedy of ,phoenicians3 their untruthfulness ,physician1 lying by ,pindar3 cited ,place of liars ,plato3 cited ,pliny the younger3 cited ,pope ,innocent ,,iii43 cited ,prayer1 form of1 for liar ,principles1 not rules1 ,bible standard ,priscillianists1 sect of ,prophets1 lying ,plan1 lord of truth ,punic faith1 synonym of falsehood ,pylades and ,orestes ,quaker and salesman ,quaker guns1 concealment by means of ,ra1 symbol of light ,raba3 cited ,raffles1 ,sir ,t4,s43 cited ,rahab the harlot1 lying of ,rawlinson1 ,prof4 ,george3 cited ,reinhard3 cited ,responsibility1 limit of ,robber3 concealment from lying to ,roberts1 ,joseph1 quotation from ,rock of ,behistun1 inscription on ,roman ,catholic writers1 views of ,roman matron1 story of3 cited by ,pliny ,roman standard of truthfulness ,rothe1 ,richard3 cited ,st4 ,john1 ,sir ,spencer3 cited ,samuel at ,bethlehem ,sapphira3 her deceiving ,satan1 father of lies ,sayce1 ,prof4 ,a4,h43 cited ,scandinavian legends ,schaff1 ,dr4 ,philip3 cited ,schaff-,hertzog3 cited ,schleiermacher3 cited ,schoolcraft1 ,h4,r43 cited ,schwartz3 cited ,scott ,sir ,walter3 cited ,self-deception in others1 limit of responsibility for ,semple1 ,j4,w43 cited ,sharswood1 ,chief-,justice3 cited ,shepherd of ,hermas1 quotation from ,sherwill3 cited ,shorn1 ,dr4 ,j43 cited ,sick3 their right to truth ,simplice1 ,sister1 story of ,sin per se1 lying ,smith and ,cheetham3 cited ,smith and ,wace3 cited ,smyth1 ,dr4 ,newman3 cited ,sonthals1 truthfulness among ,south1 ,dr4 ,robert3 cited ,sowrahs1 truthfulness among ,speech and act1 lying in ,spencer1 ,herbert3 cited ,spies1 ,hebrew1 ,rahab and ,spy denied soldier's death ,stephen1 ,leslie3 cited ,story1 ,justice3 cited ,surgeon's responsibility for his action testimony as to deceiving patient ,symonds ,j4,a43 cited ,syrians1 ,elisha and ,talmud1 teachings of ,talmudists1 discussion among ,taylor1 ,jeremy2 cited ,teaching of ,jesuits ,temptations influencing decision ,tertullian3 cited ,theognis3 cited ,thornwell1 ,dr4 ,james ,h43 cited ,tipperahs3 their habit of lying ,todas1 truthfulness among ,tragedy of ,philoctetes ,truce1 flag of1 use of ,truth3 universal duty of telling ,god is not every one entitled to full dearer than life justifiable concealment of unjustifiable concealment of ,truth1 estimate of3 among ,hindoos among ,scandinavians in ancient ,persia in ancient ,egypt among ,romans among ancient ,greeks among ancient ,germans among ,hill ,tribes of ,india among ,arabs among ,american ,indians among ,patagonians among ,africans among ,dyaks among ,veddahs among ,javanese ,ueberweg1 ,f43 cited ,ulysses1 reference to ,urim and ,thummim ,veddahs of ,ceylon3 their truthfulness ,veracity3 duty of of ,greeks of ,persians of primitive and civilized peoples compared of ,hill ,tribes of ,india of ,arabs of ,american ,indians of ,africans of ,dyaks of ,veddahs of ,javanese ,viswamitra and ,indra1 story of ,von ,ammon3 cited ,von ,hirscher3 cited ,walker1 ,helen1 example of ,war3 justifiable concealment in duty of veracity in ,westcott1 ,bishop3 cited ,wheeler1 ,j4 ,talboys2 cited ,whewell1 ,dr4 ,william3 cited ,white lie ,wig1 concealment by ,wilkinson1 ,sir ,j4,g43 cited ,witness1 oath of1 in court ,woolsey1 ,president3 cited ,wuttke1 ,dr4 ,adolf3 cited ,yudhishthira and ,drona1 mythical story of ,zoroastrian designation of heaven and hell ,,scriptural ,,index4 ,,genesis4 #a3 #bh #b and #c #c3 #f1 #g #i3 #a-c #ab3 #aj-ai #ab3 #ad-bj #af3 #a-f #be3 #bg-cd #bf3 #f-aj #bg3 #a-dj #bg3 #f-bi #bh3 #a-bb #ci3 #h-ba ,,exodus4 #a3 #ae-ai #a3 #ae-ba #a3 #ai1 #bj #a3 #bj1 #ba ,,leviticus4 #h3 #h #ah3 #e #ai3 #b1 #ab1 #ac1 #cd-cg #ai3 #aa ,,numbers4 #bc3 #ai ,,deuteronomy4 #bi3 #bi ,,joshua4 #b3 #a-ba #h3 #a-bf #bd3 #c #a ,,samuel4 #g3 #ae-ag #i3 #bb-bd #aa3 #ad1 #ae #ac3 #ad #ae3 #bi #af3 #a1 #b #af3 #a-c #bj3 #bi #ba3 #a1 #b #b ,,samuel4 #aa3 #a-bg #a ,,kings4 #bb3 #a-bc #b ,,kings4 #f3 #ad-bj #g3 #f #bj3 #ab-ai #b ,,chronicles4 #ah3 #a-cd #bj3 #g ,,psalms4 #ca3 #e #eh3 #c #fb3 #d #fc3 #aa #aja3 #g #aaf3 #aa #abj3 #b #adf3 #f ,,proverbs4 #f3 #af1 #ag #ad3 #e #ai3 #e1 #i1 #bb ,,isaiah4 #da3 #h #ea3 #b ,,matthew4 #c3 #i ,,mark4 #f3 #dh #g3 #ae ,,luke4 #bd3 #bh ,,john4 #g3 #h #h3 #dd #ad3 #f #af3 #ab ,,acts4 #e3 #a-aa #ac3 #bb ,,romans4 #c3 #d #c3 #g1 #h #d3 #ab ,,galatians4 #b3 #aa-ad #c3 #i ,,ephesians4 #d3 #be ,,colossians4 #c3 #i ,,titus4 #a3 #b ,,hebrews4 #f3 #ah #aa3 #ca ,,james4 #b3 #bc #a ,,john4 #e3 #g ,,revelation4 #ba3 #e-h #bb