,on the ,improvement of the ,understanding 7,treatise on the ,emendation of the ,intellect7 by ,baruch ,spinoza ,benedict de ,spinoza ,translated by ,r4 ,h4 ,m4 ,elwes ,,table ,,of ,,contents3 #a ,on the ,improvement of the ,understanding #c ,of the ordinary objects of men's desires #ab ,of the true and final good #ag ,certain rules of life #ai ,of the four modes of perception #be ,of the best mode of perception #cc ,of the instruments of the intellect1 or true ideas #dc ,answers to objections ,first part of method3 #ej ,distinction of true ideas from fictitious ideas #fd ,and from false ideas #gg ,of doubt #ha ,of memory and forgetfulness #hf ,mental hindrances from words--and from the popular confusion of ready imagination with distinct understanding4 ,second part of method3 #ia ,its object1 the acquisition of clear and distinct ideas #id ,its means1 good definitions ,conditions of definition #ajg ,how to define understanding ---------------------------------------- ------------------------------ ,notice to the ,reader4 7,this notice to the reader was written by the editors of the ,opera ,postuma in #afgg4 ,taken from ,curley1 ,note #c1 at end7 99,this ,treatise on the ,emendation of the ,intellect etc41 which we give you here1 kind reader1 in its unfinished that is1 defective state1 was written by the author many years ago now4 ,he always intended to finish it4 ,but hindered by other occupations1 and finally snatched away by death1 he was unable to bring it to the desired conclusion4 ,but since it contains many excellent and useful things1 which--we have no doubt--will be of great benefit to anyone sincerely seeking the truth1 we did not wish to deprive you of them4 ,and so that you would be aware of1 and find less difficult to excuse1 the many things that are still obscure1 rough1 and unpolished1 we wished to warn you of them4 ,farewell499 #a 7#a7 ,after experience had taught me that all the usual surroundings of social life are vain and futile2 seeing that none of the objects of my fears contained in themselves anything either good or bad1 except in so far as the mind is affected by them1 ,i finally resolved to inquire whether there might be some real good having power to communicate itself1 which would affect the mind singly1 to the exclusion of all else3 whether1 in fact1 there might be anything of which the discovery and attainment would enable me to enjoy continuous1 supreme1 and unending happiness4 #b 7#a7 ,i say ,i finally resolved1 for at first sight it seemed unwise willingly to lose hold on what was sure for the sake of something then uncertain4 7#b7 ,i could see the benefits which are acquired through fame and riches1 and that ,i should be obliged to abandon the quest of such objects1 if ,i seriously devoted myself to the search for something different and new4 7#c7 ,i perceived that if true happiness chanced to be placed in the former ,i should necessarily miss it2 while if1 on the other hand1 it were not so placed1 and ,i gave them my whole attention1 ,i should equally fail4 #c 7#a7 ,i therefore debated whether it would not be possible to arrive at the new principle1 or at any rate at a certainty concerning its existence1 without changing the conduct and usual plan of my life2 with this end in view ,i made many efforts1 in vain4 7#b7 ,for the ordinary surroundings of life which are esteemed by men 7as their actions testify7 to be the highest good1 may be classed under the three heads--,riches1 ,fame1 and the ,pleasures of ,sense3 with these three the mind is so absorbed that it has little power to reflect on any different good4 #d 7#a7 ,by sensual pleasure the mind is enthralled to the extent of quiescence1 as if the supreme good were actually attained1 so that it is quite incapable of thinking of any other object2 when such pleasure has been gratified it is followed by extreme melancholy1 whereby the mind1 though not enthralled1 is disturbed and dulled4 7#b7 ,the pursuit of honors and riches is likewise very absorbing1 especially if such objects be sought simply for their own sake1 a inasmuch as they are then supposed to constitute the highest good4 #e 7#a7 ,in the case of fame the mind is still more absorbed1 for fame is conceived as always good for its own sake1 and as the ultimate end to which all actions are directed4 7#b7 ,further1 the attainment of riches and fame is not followed as in the case of sensual pleasures by repentance1 but1 the more we acquire1 the greater is our delight1 and1 consequently1 the more are we incited to increase both the one and the other2 on the other hand1 if our hopes happen to be frustrated we are plunged into the deepest sadness4 7#c7 ,fame has the further drawback that it compels its votaries to order their lives according to the opinions of their fellow-men1 shunning what they usually shun1 and seeking what they usually seek4 #f 7#a7 ,when ,i saw that all these ordinary objects of desire would be obstacles in the way of a search for something different and new--nay1 that they were so opposed thereto1 that either they or it would have to be abandoned1 ,i was forced to inquire which would prove the most useful to me3 for1 as ,i say1 ,i seemed to be willingly losing hold on a sure good for the sake of something uncertain4 7#f3b7 ,however1 after ,i had reflected on the matter1 ,i came in the first place to the conclusion that by abandoning the ordinary objects of pursuit1 and betaking myself to a new quest1 ,i should be leaving a good1 uncertain by reason of its own nature1 as may be gathered from what has been said1 for the sake of a good not uncertain in its nature 7for ,i sought for a fixed good71 but only in the possibility of its attainment4 #g 7#a7 ,further reflection convinced me that if ,i could really get to the root of the matter ,i should be leaving certain evils for a certain good4 7#b7 ,i thus perceived that ,i was in a state of great peril1 and ,i compelled myself to seek with all my strength for a remedy1 however uncertain it might be2 as a sick man struggling with a deadly disease1 when he sees that death will surely be upon him unless a remedy be found1 is compelled to seek a remedy with all his strength1 inasmuch as his whole hope lies therein4 7#g3c7 ,all the objects pursued by the multitude not only bring no remedy that tends to preserve our being1 but even act as hindrances1 causing the death not seldom of those who possess them1 b and always of those who are possessed by them4 #h 7#a7 ,there are many examples of men who have suffered persecution even to death for the sake of their riches1 and of men who in pursuit of wealth have exposed themselves to so many dangers1 that they have paid away their life as a penalty for their folly4 7#b7 ,examples are no less numerous of men1 who have endured the utmost wretchedness for the sake of gaining or preserving their reputation4 7#c7 ,lastly1 are innumerable cases of men1 who have hastened their death through over-indulgence in sensual pleasure4 #i 7#a7 ,all these evils seem to have arisen from the fact1 that happiness or unhappiness is made wholly dependent on the quality of the object which we love4 7#b7 ,when a thing is not loved1 no quarrels will arise concerning it--no sadness will be felt if it perishes--no envy if it is possessed by another--no fear1 no hatred1 in short no disturbances of the mind4 7#c7 ,all these arise from the love of what is perishable1 such as the objects already mentioned4 #aj 7#a7 ,but love towards a thing eternal and infinite feeds the mind wholly with joy1 and is itself unmingled with any sadness1 wherefore it is greatly to be desired and sought for with all our strength4 7#b7 ,yet it was not at random that ,i used the words1 ,if ,i could go to the root of the matter1 for1 though what ,i have urged was perfectly clear to my mind1 ,i could not forthwith lay aside all love of riches1 sensual enjoyment1 and fame4 #aa 7#a7 ,one thing was evident1 namely1 that while my mind was employed with these thoughts it turned away from its former objects of desire1 and seriously considered the search for a new principle2 this state of things was a great comfort to me1 for ,i perceived that the evils were not such as to resist all remedies4 7#aa3b7 ,although these intervals were at first rare1 and of very short duration1 yet afterwards1 as the true good became more and more discernible to me1 they became more frequent and more lasting2 especially after ,i had recognized that the acquisition of wealth1 sensual pleasure1 or fame1 is only a hindrance1 so long as they are sought as ends not as means2 if they be sought as means1 they will be under restraint1 and1 far from being hindrances1 will further not a little the end for which they are sought1 as ,i will show in due time4 #ab 7#a7 ,i will here only briefly state what ,i mean by true good1 and also what is the nature of the highest good4 7#b7 ,in order that this may be rightly understood1 we must bear in mind that the terms good and evil are only applied relatively1 so that the same thing may be called both good and bad according to the relations in view1 in the same way as it may be called perfect or imperfect4 7#c7 ,nothing regarded in its own nature can be called perfect or imperfect2 especially when we are aware that all things which come to pass1 come to pass according to the eternal order and fixed laws of nature4 #ac 7#a7 ,however1 human weakness cannot attain to this order in its own thoughts1 but meanwhile man conceives a human character much more stable than his own1 and sees that there is no reason why he should not himself acquire such a character4 7#b7 ,thus he is led to seek for means which will bring him to this pitch of perfection1 and calls everything which will serve as such means a true good4 7#ac3c7 ,the chief good is that he should arrive1 together with other individuals if possible1 at the possession of the aforesaid character4 7#d7 ,what that character is we shall show in due time1 namely1 that it is the knowledge of the union existing being the mind and the whole of nature4 c #ad 7#a7 ,this1 then1 is the end for which ,i strive1 to attain to such a character myself1 and to endeavor that many should attain to it with me4 7#b7 ,in other words1 it is part of my happiness to lend a helping hand1 that many others may understand even as ,i do1 so that their understanding and desire may entirely agree with my own4 7#c7 ,in order to bring this about1 it is necessary to understand as much of nature as will enable us to attain to the aforesaid character1 and also to form a social order such as is most conducive to the attainment of this character by the greatest number with the least difficulty and danger4 #ae 7#a7 ,we must seek the assistance of ,moral ,philosophy d and the ,theory of ,education2 further1 as health is no insignificant means for attaining our end1 we must also include the whole science of ,medicine1 and1 as many difficult things are by contrivance rendered easy1 and we can in this way gain much time and convenience1 the science of ,mechanics must in no way be despised4 #af 7#a7 ,but before all things1 a means must be devised for improving the understanding and purifying it1 as far as may be at the outset1 so that it may apprehend things without error1 and in the best possible way4 7#b7 ,thus it is apparent to everyone that ,i wish to direct all science to one end e and aim1 so that we may attain to the supreme human perfection which we have named2 and1 therefore1 whatsoever in the sciences does not serve to promote our object will have to be rejected as useless4 7#c7 ,to sum up the matter in a word1 all our actions and thoughts must be directed to this one end4 #ag 7#a7 ,yet1 as it is necessary that while we are endeavoring to attain our purpose1 and bring the understanding into the right path we should carry on our life1 we are compelled first of all to lay down certain rules of life as provisionally good1 to wit the following3-- ,i4 7#b7 ,to speak in a manner intelligible to the multitude1 and to comply with every general custom that does not hinder the attainment of our purpose4 7#c7 ,for we can gain from the multitude no small advantages1 provided that we strive to accommodate ourselves to its understanding as far as possible3 moreover1 we shall in this way gain a friendly audience for the reception of the truth4 ,,ii4 7#ag3d7 ,to indulge ourselves with pleasures only in so far as they are necessary for preserving health4 ,,iii4 7#e7 ,lastly1 to endeavor to obtain only sufficient money or other commodities to enable us to preserve our life and health1 and to follow such general customs as are consistent with our purpose4 #ah 7#a7 ,having laid down these preliminary rules1 ,i will betake myself to the first and most important task1 namely1 the amendment of the understanding1 and the rendering it capable of understanding things in the manner necessary for attaining our end4 7#b7 ,in order to bring this about1 the natural order demands that ,i should here recapitulate all the modes of perception1 which ,i have hitherto employed for affirming or denying anything with certainty1 so that ,i may choose the best1 and at the same time begin to know my own powers and the nature which ,i wish to perfect4 #ai 7#a7 ,reflection shows that all modes of perception or knowledge may be reduced to four3-- ,i4 7#b7 ,perception arising from hearsay or from some sign which everyone may name as he please4 ,,ii4 7#c7 ,perception arising from mere experience--that is1 form experience not yet classified by the intellect1 and only so called because the given event has happened to take place1 and we have no contradictory fact to set against it1 so that it therefore remains unassailed in our minds4 ,,iii4 7#ai3d7 ,perception arising when the essence of one thing is inferred from another thing1 but not adequately2 this comes when f from some effect we gather its cause1 or when it is inferred from some general proposition that some property is always present4 ,,iv4 7#e7 ,lastly1 there is the perception arising when a thing is perceived solely through its essence1 or through the knowledge of its proximate cause4 #bj 7#a7 ,all these kinds of perception ,i will illustrate by examples4 7#b7 ,by hearsay ,i know the day of my birth1 my parentage1 and other matters about which ,i have never felt any doubt4 7#c7 ,by mere experience ,i know that ,i shall die1 for this ,i can affirm from having seen that others like myself have died1 though all did not live for the same period1 or die by the same disease4 7#d7 ,i know by mere experience that oil has the property of feeding fire1 and water of extinguishing it4 7#e7 ,in the same way ,i know that a dog is a barking animal1 man a rational animal1 and in fact nearly all the practical knowledge of life4 #ba 7#a7 ,we deduce one thing from another as follows3 when we clearly perceive that we feel a certain body and no other1 we thence clearly infer that the mind is united g to the body1 and that their union is the cause of the given sensation2 but we cannot thence absolutely understand h the nature of the sensation and the union4 7#b7 ,or1 after ,i have become acquainted with the nature of vision1 and know that it has the property of making one and the same thing appear smaller when far off than when near1 ,i can infer that the sun is larger than it appears1 and can draw other conclusions of the same kind4 #bb 7#a7 ,lastly1 a thing may be perceived solely through its essence2 when1 from the fact of knowing something1 ,i know what it is to know that thing1 or when1 from knowing the essence of the mind1 ,i know that it is united to the body4 7#b7 ,by the same kind of knowledge we know that two and three make five1 or that two lines each parallel to a third1 are parallel to one another1 c4 7#c7 ,the things which ,i have been able to know by this kind of knowledge are as yet very few4 #bc 7#a7 ,in order that the whole matter may be put in a clearer light1 ,i will make use of a single illustration as follows4 7#b7 ,three numbers are given--it is required to find a fourth1 which shall be to the third as the second is to the first4 7#bc3c7 ,tradesmen will at once tell us that they know what is required to find the fourth number1 for they have not yet forgotten the rule which was given to them arbitrarily without proof by their masters2 others construct a universal axiom from their experience with simple numbers1 where the fourth number is self-evident1 as in the case of #b1 #d1 #c1 #f2 here it is evident that if the second number be multiplied by the third1 and the product divided by the first1 the quotient is #f2 when they see that by this process the number is produced which they knew beforehand to be the proportional1 they infer that the process always holds good for finding a fourth number proportional4 #bd 7#a7 ,mathematicians1 however1 know by the proof of the nineteenth proposition of the seventh book of ,euclid1 what numbers are proportionals1 namely1 from the nature and property of proportion it follows that the product of the first and fourth will be equal to the product of the second and third3 still they do not see the adequate proportionality of the given numbers1 or1 if they do see it1 they see it not by virtue of ,euclid's proposition1 but intuitively1 without going through any process4 #be 7#a7 ,in order that from these modes of perception the best may be selected1 it is well that we should briefly enumerate the means necessary for attaining our end4 ,i4 7#b7 ,to have an exact knowledge of our nature which we desire to perfect1 and to know as much as is needful of nature in general4 ,,ii4 ,to collect in this way the differences1 the agreements1 and the oppositions of things4 ,,iii4 ,to learn thus exactly how far they can or cannot be modified4 ,,iv4 ,to compare this result with the nature and power of man4 7#d7 ,we shall thus discern the highest degree of perfection to which man is capable of attaining4 #bf 7#a7 ,we shall then be in a position to see which mode of perception we ought to choose4 7#b7 ,as to the first mode1 it is evident that from hearsay our knowledge must always be uncertain1 and1 moreover1 can give us no insight into the essence of a thing1 as is manifest in our illustration2 now one can only arrive at knowledge of a thing through knowledge of its essence1 as will hereafter appear4 7#c7 ,we may1 therefore clearly conclude that the certainty arising from hearsay cannot be scientific in its character4 7#d7 ,for simple hearsay cannot affect anyone whose understanding does not1 so to speak1 meet it half way4 #bg 7#a7 ,the second mode of perception i cannot be said to give us the idea of the proportion of which we are in search4 7#b7 ,moreover its results are very uncertain and indefinite1 for we shall never discover anything in natural phenomena by its means1 except accidental properties1 which are never clearly understood1 unless the essence of the things in question be known first4 7#c7 ,wherefore this mode also must be rejected4 #bh 7#a7 ,of the third mode of perception we may say in a manner that it gives us the idea of the thing sought1 and that it us to draw conclusions without risk of error2 yet it is not by itself sufficient to put us in possession of the perfection we aim at4 #bi 7#a7 ,the fourth mode alone apprehends the adequate essence of a thing without danger of error4 7#b7 ,this mode1 therefore1 must be the one which we chiefly employ4 7#c7 ,how1 then1 should we avail ourselves of it so as to gain the fourth kind of knowledge with the least delay concerning things previously unknown8 7#d7 ,i will proceed to explain4 #cj 7#a7 ,now that we know what kind of knowledge is necessary for us1 we must indicate the way and the method whereby we may gain the said knowledge concerning the things needful to be known4 7#b7 ,in order to accomplish this1 we must first take care not to commit ourselves to a search1 going back to infinity--that is1 in order to discover the best method of finding truth1 there is no need of another method to discover such method2 nor of a third method for discovering the second1 and so on to infinity4 7#c7 ,by such proceedings1 we should never arrive at the knowledge of the truth1 or1 indeed1 at any knowledge at all4 7#cj3d7 ,the matter stands on the same footing as the making of material tools1 which might be argued about in a similar way4 7#e7 ,for1 in order to work iron1 a hammer is needed1 and the hammer cannot be forthcoming unless it has been made2 but1 in order to make it1 there was need of another hammer and other tools1 and so on to infinity4 7#f7 ,we might thus vainly endeavor to prove that men have no power of working iron4 #ca 7#a7 ,but as men at first made use of the instruments supplied by nature to accomplish very easy pieces of workmanship1 laboriously and imperfectly1 and then1 when these were finished1 wrought other things more difficult with less labour and greater perfection2 and so gradually mounted from the simplest operations to the making of tools1 and from the making of tools to the making of more complex tools1 and fresh feats of workmanship1 till they arrived at making1 complicated mechanisms which they now possess4 7#ca3b7 ,so1 in like manner1 the intellect1 by its native strength1 k1 makes for itself intellectual instruments1 whereby it acquires strength for performing other intellectual operations1 l1 and from these operations again fresh instruments1 or the power of pushing its investigations further1 and thus gradually proceeds till it reaches the summit of wisdom4 #cb 7#a7 ,that this is the path pursued by the understanding may be readily seen1 when we understand the nature of the method for finding out the truth1 and of the natural instruments so necessary complex instruments1 and for the progress of investigation4 ,i thus proceed with my demonstration4 #cc 7#a7 ,a true idea1 m1 7for we possess a true idea7 is something different from its correlate 7ideatum72 thus a circle is different from the idea of a circle4 7#b7 ,the idea of a circle is not something having a circumference and a center1 as a circle has2 nor is the idea of a body that body itself4 7#c7 ,now1 as it is something different from its correlate1 it is capable of being understood through itself2 in other words1 the idea1 in so far as its actual essence 7essentia formalis7 is concerned1 may be the subject of another subjective essence 7essentia objectiva74 #ccnote#a 7#d7 ,and1 again1 this second subjective essence will1 regarded in itself1 be something real1 capable of being understood2 and so on1 indefinitely4 #cd 7#a7 ,for instance1 the man ,peter is something real2 the true idea of ,peter is the reality of ,peter represented subjectively1 and is in itself something real1 and quite distinct from the actual ,peter4 7#b7 ,now1 as this true idea of ,peter is in itself something real1 and has its own individual existence1 it will also be capable of being understood--that is1 of being the subject of another idea1 which will contain by representation 7objective7 all that the idea of ,peter contains actually 7formaliter74 7#c7 ,and1 again1 this idea of the idea of ,peter has its own individuality1 which may become the subject of yet another idea2 and so on1 indefinitely4 7#d7 ,this everyone may make trial of for himself1 by reflecting that he knows what ,peter is1 and also knows that he knows1 and further knows that he knows that he knows1 c4 7#cd3e7 ,hence it is plain that1 in order to understand the actual ,peter1 it is not necessary first to understand the idea of ,peter1 and still less the idea of the idea of ,peter4 7#f7 ,this is the same as saying that1 in order to know1 there is no need to know that we know1 much less to know that we know that we know4 7#g7 ,this is no more necessary than to know the nature of a circle before knowing the nature of a triangle4 n4 7#h7 ,but1 with these ideas1 the contrary is the case3 for1 in order to know that ,i know1 ,i must first know4 #ce 7#a7 ,hence it is clear that certainty is nothing else than the subjective essence of a thing3 in other words1 the mode in which we perceive an actual reality is certainty4 7#b7 ,further1 it is also evident that1 for the certitude of truth1 no further sign is necessary beyond the possession of a true idea3 for1 as ,i have shown1 it is not necessary to know that we know that we know4 7#c7 ,hence1 again1 it is clear that no one can know the nature of the highest certainty1 unless he possesses an adequate idea1 or the subjective essence of a thing3 certainty is identical with such subjective essence4 #cf 7#a7 ,thus1 as the truth needs no sign--it being to possess the subjective essence of things1 or1 in other words1 the ideas of them1 in order that all doubts may be removed--it follows that the true method does not consist in seeking for the signs of truth after the acquisition of the idea1 but that the true method teaches us the order in which we should seek for truth itself1 o or the subjective essences of things1 or ideas1 for all these expressions are synonymous4 #cg 7#a7 ,again1 method must necessarily be concerned with reasoning or understanding--,i mean1 method is not identical with reasoning in the search for causes1 still less is it the comprehension of the causes of things3 it is the discernment of a true idea1 by distinguishing it from other perceptions1 and by investigating its nature1 in order that we may so train our mind that it may1 by a given standard1 comprehend whatsoever is intelligible1 by laying down certain rules as aids1 and by avoiding useless mental exertion4 #ch 7#a7 ,whence we may gather that method is nothing else than reflective knowledge1 or the idea of an idea2 and that as there can be no idea of an idea--unless an idea exists previously1--there can be no method without a pre-existent idea4 7#b7 ,therefore1 that will be a good method which shows us how the mind should be directed1 according to the standard of the given true idea4 7#ch3c7 ,again1 seeing that the ratio existing between two ideas the same as the ratio between the actual realities corresponding to those ideas1 it follows that the reflective knowledge which has for its object the most perfect being is more excellent than reflective knowledge concerning other objects--in other words1 that method will be most perfect which affords the standard of the given idea of the most perfect being whereby we may direct our mind4 #ci 7#a7 ,we thus easily understand how1 in proportion as it acquires new ideas1 the mind simultaneously acquires fresh instruments for pursuing its inquiries further4 7#b7 ,for we may gather from what has been said1 that a true idea must necessarily first of all exist in us as a natural instrument2 and that when this idea is apprehended by the mind1 it enables us to understand the difference existing between itself and all other perceptions4 7#c7 ,in this1 one part of the method consists4 7#ci3d7 ,now it is clear that the mind apprehends itself better in proportion as it understands a greater number of natural objects2 it follows1 therefore1 that this portion of the method will be more perfect in proportion as the mind attains to the comprehension of a greater number of objects1 and that it will be absolutely perfect when the mind gains a knowledge of the absolutely perfect being1 or becomes conscious thereof4 #dj 7#a7 ,again1 the more things the mind knows1 the better does it understand its own strength and the order of nature2 by increased self-knowledge1 it can direct itself more easily1 and lay down rules for its own guidance2 and1 by increased knowledge of nature1 it can more easily avoid what is useless4 7#b7 ,and this is the sum total of method1 as we have already stated4 #da 7#a7 ,we may add that the idea in the world of thought is in the same case as its correlate in the world of reality4 7#b7 ,if1 therefore1 there be anything in nature which is without connection with any other thing1 and if we assign to it a subjective essence1 which would in every way correspond to the objective reality1 the subjective essence would have no connection1 p with any other ideas--in other words1 we could not draw any conclusions with regard to it4 7#da3c7 ,on the other hand1 those things which are connected with others--as all things that exist in nature--will be understood by the mind1 and their subjective essences will maintain the same mutual relations as their objective realities--that is to say1 we shall infer from these ideas other ideas1 which will in turn be connected with others1 and thus our instruments for proceeding with our investigation will increase4 7#d7 ,this is what we were endeavoring to prove4 #db 7#a7 ,further1 from what has just been said--namely1 that an idea must1 in all respects1 correspond to its correlate in the world of reality1--it is evident that1 in order to reproduce in every respect the faithful image of nature1 our mind must deduce all its ideas from the idea which represents the origin and source of the whole of nature1 so that it may itself become the source of other ideas4 #dc 7#a7 ,it may1 perhaps1 provoke astonishment that1 after having said that the good method is that which teaches us to direct our mind according to the standard of the given true idea1 we should prove our point by reasoning1 which would seem to indicate that it is not self-evident4 7#b7 ,we may1 therefore1 be questioned as to the validity of our reasoning4 7#c7 ,if our reasoning be sound1 we must take as a starting-point a true idea4 7#d7 ,now1 to be certain that our starting-point is really a true idea1 we need proof4 7#e7 ,this first course of reasoning must be supported by a second1 the second by a third1 and so on to infinity4 #dd 7#a7 ,to this ,i make answer that1 if by some happy chance anyone had adopted this method in his investigations of nature--that is1 if he had acquired new ideas in the proper order1 according to the standard of the original true idea1 he would never have doubted q of the truth of his knowledge1 inasmuch as truth1 as we have shown1 makes itself manifest1 and all things would flow1 as it were1 spontaneously towards him4 7#dd3b7 ,but as this never1 or rarely1 happens1 ,i have been forced so to arrange my proceedings1 that we may acquire by reflection and forethought what we cannot acquire by chance1 and that it may at the same time appear that1 for proving the truth1 and for valid reasoning1 we need no other means than the truth and valid reasoning themselves3 for by valid reasoning ,i have established valid reasoning1 and1 in like measure1 ,i seek still to establish it4 #de 7#a7 ,moreover1 this is the order of thinking adopted by men in their inward meditations4 7#b7 ,the reasons for its rare employment in investigations of nature are to be found in current misconceptions1 whereof we shall examine the causes hereafter in our philosophy4 7#c7 ,moreover1 it demands1 as we shall show1 a keen and accurate discernment4 7#d7 ,lastly1 it is hindered by the conditions of human life1 which are1 as we have already pointed out1 extremely changeable4 7#e7 ,there are also other obstacles1 which we will not here inquire into4 #df 7#a7 ,if anyone asks why ,i have not at the starting-point set forth all the truths of nature in their due order1 inasmuch as truth is self-evident1 ,i reply by warning him not to reject as false any paradoxes he may find here1 but to take the trouble to reflect on the chain of reasoning by which they are supported2 he will then be no longer in doubt that we have attained to the truth4 7#b7 ,this is why ,i have as above4 #dg 7#a7 ,if there yet remains some sceptic1 who doubts of our primary truth1 and of all deductions we make1 taking such truth as our standard1 he must either be arguing in bad faith1 or we must confess that there are men in complete mental blindness either innate or due to misconceptions--that is1 to some external influence4 7#b7 ,such persons are not conscious of themselves4 7#c7 ,if they affirm or doubt anything1 they know not that they affirm or doubt3 they say that they know nothing1 and they say that they are ignorant of the very fact of their knowing nothing4 7#d7 ,even this they do not affirm absolutely1 they are afraid of confessing that they exist1 so long as they know nothing2 in fact1 they ought to remain dumb1 for fear of haply supposing which should smack of truth4 #dh 7#a7 ,lastly1 with such persons1 one should not speak of sciences3 for1 in what relates to life and conduct1 they are compelled by necessity to suppose that they exist1 and seek their own advantage1 and often affirm and deny1 even with an oath4 7#b7 ,if they deny1 grant1 or gainsay1 they know not that they deny1 grant1 or gainsay1 so that they ought to be regarded as automata1 utterly devoid of intelligence4 #di 7#a7 ,let us now return to our proposition4 7#b7 ,up to the present1 we have1 first1 defined the end to which we desire to direct all our thoughts2 secondly1 we have determined the mode of perception best adapted to aid us in attaining our perfection2 thirdly1 we have discovered the way which our mind should take1 in order to make a good beginning--namely1 that it should use every true idea as a standard in pursuing its inquiries according to fixed rules4 7#di3c7 ,now1 in order that it may thus proceed1 our method must furnish us1 first1 with a means of distinguishing a true idea from all other perceptions1 and enabling the mind to avoid the latter2 secondly1 with rules for perceiving unknown things according to the standard of the true idea2 thirdly1 with an order which enables us to avoid useless labor4 7#di3d7 ,when we became acquainted with this method1 we saw that1 fourthly1 it would be perfect when we had attained to the idea of the absolutely perfect ,being4 7#e7 ,this is an observation which should be made at the outset1 in order that we may arrive at the knowledge of such a being more quickly4 #ej 7#a7 ,let us then make a beginning with the first part of the method1 which is1 as we have said1 to distinguish and separate the true idea from other perceptions1 and to keep the mind from confusing with true ideas those which are false1 fictitious1 and doubtful4 7#b7 ,i intend to dwell on this point at length1 partly to keep a distinction so necessary before the reader's mind1 and also because there are some who doubt of true ideas1 through not having attended to the distinction between a true perception and all others4 7#c7 ,such persons are like men who1 while they are awake1 doubt not that they are awake1 but afterwards in a dream1 as often happens1 thinking that they are surely awake1 and then finding that they were in error1 become doubtful even of being awake4 7#d7 ,this state of mind arises through neglect of the distinction between sleeping and waking4 #ea 7#a7 ,meanwhile1 ,i give warning that ,i shall not here give essence of every perception1 and explain it through its proximate cause4 7#b7 ,such work lies in the province of philosophy4 7#c7 ,i shall confine myself to what concerns method--that is1 to the character of fictitious1 false and doubtful perceptions1 and the means of freeing ourselves therefrom4 7#d7 ,let us then first inquire into the nature of a fictitious idea4 #eb 7#a7 ,every perception has for its object either a thing considered as existing1 or solely the essence of a thing4 7#b7 ,now fiction is chiefly occupied with things considered as existing4 7#c7 ,i will1 therefore1 consider these first--,i mean cases where only the existence of an object is feigned1 and the thing thus feigned is understood1 or assumed to be understood4 7#d7 ,for instance1 ,i feign that ,peter1 whom ,i know to have gone home1 is gone to see me1 r or something of that kind4 7#e7 ,with what is such an idea concerned8 7#f7 ,it is concerned with things possible1 and not with things necessary or impossible4 #ec 7#a7 ,i call a thing impossible when its existence would imply a contradiction2 necessary1 when its non-existence would imply a contradiction2 possible1 when neither its existence nor its non-existence imply a contradiction1 but when the necessity or impossibility of its nature depends on causes unknown to us1 while we feign that it exists4 7#b7 ,if the necessity or impossibility of its existence depending on external causes were known to us1 we could not form any fictitious hypotheses about it2 #ed 7#a7 ,whence it follows that if there be a ,god1 or omniscient ,being1 such an one cannot form fictitious hypotheses4 7#b7 ,for1 as regards ourselves1 when ,i know that ,i exist1 s ,i cannot hypothesize that ,i exist or do not exist1 any more than ,i can hypothesize an elephant that can go through the eye of a needle2 nor when ,i know the nature of ,god1 can ,i hypothesize that ,he or does not exist4 t 7#ed3c7 ,the same thing must be said of the ,chimaera1 whereof the nature implies a contradiction4 7#d7 ,from these considerations1 it is plain1 as ,i have already stated1 that fiction cannot be concerned with eternal truths4 u #ee 7#a7 ,but before proceeding further1 ,i must remark1 in passing1 that the difference between the essence of one thing and the essence of another thing is the same as that which exists between the reality or existence of one thing and the reality or existence of another2 therefore1 if we wished to conceive the existence1 for example1 of ,adam1 simply by means of existence in general1 it would be the same as if1 in order to conceive his existence1 we went back to the nature of being1 so as to define ,adam as a being4 7#b7 ,thus1 the more existence is conceived generally1 the more is it conceived confusedly and the more easily can it be ascribed to a given object4 7#ee3c7 ,contrariwise1 the more it is conceived particularly1 the more is it understood clearly1 and the less liable is it to be ascribed1 through negligence of ,nature's order1 to anything save its proper object4 7#d7 ,this is worthy of remark4 #ef 7#a7 ,we now proceed to consider those cases which are commonly called fictions1 though we clearly understood that the thing is not as we imagine it4 7#b7 ,for instance1 ,i know that the earth is round1 but nothing prevents my telling people that it is a hemisphere1 and that it is like a half apple carved in relief on a dish2 or1 that the sun moves round the earth1 and so on4 7#ef3c7 ,however1 examination will show us that there is nothing here inconsistent with what has been said1 provided we first admit that we may have made mistakes1 and be now conscious of them2 and1 further1 that we can hypothesize1 or at least suppose1 that others are under the same mistake as ourselves1 or can1 like us1 fall under it4 7#d7 ,we can1 ,i repeat1 thus hypothesize so long as we see no impossibility4 7#ef3e7 ,thus1 when ,i tell anyone that the earth is not round1 c41 ,i merely recall the error which ,i perhaps made myself1 or which ,i might have fallen into1 and afterwards ,i hypothesize that the person to whom ,i tell it1 is still1 or may still fall under the same mistake4 7#f7 ,this ,i say1 ,i can feign so long as ,i do not perceive any impossibility or necessity2 if ,i truly understood either one or the other ,i should not be able to feign1 and ,i should be reduced to saying that ,i had made the attempt4 #eg 7#a7 ,it remains for us to consider hypotheses made in problems1 which sometimes involve impossibilities4 7#b7 ,for instance1 when we say--let us assume that this burning candle is not burning1 or1 let us assume that it burns in some imaginary space1 or where there are no physical objects4 7#c7 ,such assumptions are freely made1 though the last is clearly seen to be impossible4 7#d7 ,but1 though this be so1 there is no fiction in the case4 7#eg3e7 ,for1 in the first case1 ,i have merely recalled to memory1 x another candle not burning1 or conceived the candle before me as without a flame1 and then ,i understand as applying to the latter1 leaving its flame out of the question1 all that ,i think of the former4 7#f7 ,in the second case1 ,i have merely to abstract my thoughts from the objects surrounding the candle1 for the mind to devote itself to the contemplation of the candle singly looked at in itself only2 ,i can then draw the conclusion that the candle contains in itself no causes for its own destruction1 so that if there were no physical objects the candle1 and even the flame1 would remain unchangeable1 and so on4 7#g7 ,thus there is here no fiction1 but1 y true and bare assertions4 #eh 7#a7 ,let us now pass on to the fictions concerned with essences only1 or with some reality or existence simultaneously4 7#b7 ,of these we must specially observe that in proportion as the mind's understanding is smaller1 and its experience multiplex1 so will its power of coining fictions be larger1 whereas as its understanding increases1 its capacity for entertaining fictitious ideas becomes less4 7#eh3c7 ,for instance1 in the same way as we are unable1 while we are thinking1 to feign that we are thinking or not thinking1 so1 also1 when we know the nature of body we cannot imagine an infinite fly2 or1 when we know the nature of the soul1 z we cannot imagine it as square1 though anything may be expressed verbally4 7#d7 ,but1 as we said above1 the less men know of nature the more easily can they coin fictitious ideas1 such as trees speaking1 men instantly changed into stones1 or into fountains1 ghosts appearing in mirrors1 something issuing from nothing1 even gods changed into beasts and men and infinite other absurdities of the same kind4 #ei 7#a7 ,some persons think1 perhaps1 that fiction is limited by fiction1 and not by understanding2 in other words1 after ,i have formed some fictitious idea1 and have affirmed of my own free will that it exists under a certain form in nature1 ,i am thereby precluded from thinking of it under any other form4 7#b7 ,for instance1 when ,i have feigned 7to repeat their argument7 that the nature of body is of a certain kind1 and have of my own free will desired to convince myself that it actually exists under this form1 ,i am no longer able to hypothesize that a fly1 for example1 is infinite2 so1 when ,i have hypothesized the essence of the soul1 ,i am not able to think of it as square1 c4 #fj 7#a7 ,but these arguments demand further inquiry4 7#b7 ,first1 their upholders must either grant or deny that we can understand anything4 ,if they grant it1 then necessarily the same must be said of understanding1 as is said of fiction4 7#c7 ,if they deny it1 let us1 who know that we do know something1 see what they mean4 7#d7 ,they assert that the soul can be conscious of1 and perceive in a variety of ways1 not itself nor things which exist1 but only things which are neither in itself nor anywhere else1 in other words1 that the soul can1 by its unaided power1 create sensations or ideas unconnected with things4 7#e7 ,in fact1 they regard the soul as a sort of god4 7#fj3f7 ,further1 they assert that we or our soul have such freedom that we can constrain ourselves1 or our soul1 or even our soul's freedom4 7#g7 ,for1 after it has formed a fictitious idea1 and has given its assent thereto1 it cannot think or feign it in any other manner1 but is constrained by the first fictitious idea to keep all its other thoughts in harmony therewith4 7#h7 ,our opponents are thus driven to admit1 in support of their fiction1 the absurdities which ,i have just enumerated2 and which are not worthy of rational refutation4 #fa 7#a7 ,while leaving such persons in their error1 we will take care to derive from our argument with them a truth serviceable for our purpose1 namely1 #fa;a that the mind1 in paying attention to a thing hypothetical or false1 so as to meditate upon it and understand it1 and derive the proper conclusions in due order therefrom1 will readily discover its falsity2 and if the thing hypothetical be in its nature true1 and the mind pays attention to it1 so as to understand it1 and deduce the truths which are derivable from it1 the mind will proceed with an uninterrupted series of apt conclusions2 in the same way as it would at once discover 7as we showed just now7 the absurdity of a false hypothesis1 and of the conclusions drawn from it4 #fb 7#a7 ,we need1 therefore1 be in no fear of forming hypotheses1 so long as we have a clear and distinct perception of what is involved4 7#b7 ,for1 if we were to assert1 haply1 that men are suddenly turned into beasts1 the statement would be extremely general1 so general that there would be no conception1 that is1 no idea or connection of subject and predicate1 in our mind4 7#c7 ,if there were such a conception we should at the same time be aware of the means and the causes whereby the event took place4 7#d7 ,moreover1 we pay no attention to the nature of the subject and the predicate4 #fc 7#a7 ,now1 if the first idea be not fictitious1 and if all the other ideas be deduced therefrom1 our hurry to form fictitious ideas will gradually subside4 7#b7 ,further1 as a fictitious idea cannot be clear and distinct1 but is necessarily confused1 and as all confusion arises from the fact that the mind has only partial knowledge of a thing either simple or complex1 and does not distinguish between the known and the unknown1 and1 again1 that it directs its attention promiscuously to all parts of an object at once without making distinctions1 it follows1 first1 that if the idea be of something very simple1 it must necessarily be clear and distinct4 7#c7 ,for a very simple object cannot be known in part1 it must either be known altogether or not at all4 #fd 7#a7 ,secondly1 it follows that if a complex object be divided by thought into a number of simple component parts1 and if each be regarded separately1 all confusion will disappear4 7#b7 ,thirdly1 it follows that fiction cannot be simple1 but is made up of the blending of several confused ideas of diverse objects or actions existent in nature1 or rather is composed of attention directed to all such ideas at once1 #fd;b and unaccompanied by any mental assent4 7#fd3c7 ,now a fiction that was simple would be clear and distinct1 and therefore true1 also a fiction composed only of distinct ideas would be clear and distinct1 and therefore true4 7#d7 ,for instance1 when we know the nature of the circle and the square1 it is impossible for us to blend together these two figures1 and to hypothesize a square circle1 any more than a square soul1 or things of that kind4 #fe 7#a7 ,let us shortly come to our conclusion1 and again repeat that we need have no fear of confusing with true ideas that which is only a fiction4 7#b7 ,as for the first sort of fiction of which we have already spoken1 when a thing is clearly conceived1 we saw that if the existence of a that thing is in itself an eternal truth fiction can have no part in it2 but if the existence of the conceived be not an eternal truth1 we have only to be careful such existence be compared to the thing's essence1 and to consider the order of nature4 7#fd3c7 ,as for the second sort of fiction1 which we stated to be the result of simultaneously directing the attention1 without the assent of the intellect1 to different confused ideas representing different things and actions existing in nature1 we have seen that an absolutely simple thing cannot be feigned1 but must be understood1 and that a complex thing is in the same case if we regard separately the simple parts whereof it is composed2 we shall not even be able to hypothesize any untrue action concerning such objects1 for we shall be obliged to consider at the same time the causes and manner of such action4 #ff 7#a7 ,these matters being thus understood1 let us pass on to consider the false idea1 observing the objects with which it is concerned1 and the means of guarding ourselves from falling into false perceptions4 7#b7 ,neither of these tasks will present much difficulty1 after our inquiry concerning fictitious ideas4 7#c7 ,the false idea only differs from the fictitious idea in the fact of implying a mental assent--that is1 as we have already remarked1 while the representations are occurring1 there are no causes present to us1 wherefrom1 as in fiction1 we can conclude that such representations do not arise from external objects3 in fact1 it is much the same as dreaming with our eyes open1 or while awake4 7#fg3d7 ,thus1 a false idea is concerned with1 or 7to speak more correctly7 is attributable to1 the existence of a thing whereof the essence is known1 or the essence itself1 in the same way as a fictitious idea4 #fg 7#a7 ,if attributable to the existence of the thing1 it is corrected in the same way as a fictitious idea under similar circumstances4 7#b7 ,if attributable to the essence1 it is likewise corrected in the same way as a fictitious idea4 7#fg3c7 ,for if the nature of the thing known implies necessary existence1 we cannot possible be in error with regard to its existence2 but if the nature of the thing be not an eternal truth1 like its essence1 but contrariwise the necessity or impossibility of its existence depends on external causes1 then we must follow the same course as we adopted in the of fiction1 for it is corrected in the same manner4 #fh 7#a7 ,as for false ideas concerned with essences1 or even with actions1 such perceptions are necessarily always confused1 being compounded of different confused perceptions of things existing in nature1 as1 for instance1 when men are persuaded that deities are present in woods1 in statues1 in brute beasts1 and the like2 that there are bodies which1 by their composition alone1 give rise to intellect2 that corpses reason1 walk about1 and speak2 that ,god is deceived1 and so on4 7#fh3b7 ,but ideas which are clear and distinct can never be false3 for ideas of things clearly and distinctly conceived are either very simple themselves1 or are compounded from very simple ideas1 that is1 are deduced therefrom4 7#c7 ,the impossibility of a very simple idea being false is evident to everyone who understands the nature of truth or understanding and of falsehood4 #fi 7#a7 ,as regards that which constitutes the reality of truth1 it is certain that a true idea is distinguished from a false one1 not so much by its extrinsic object as by its intrinsic nature4 7#b7 ,if an architect conceives a building properly constructed1 though such a building may never have existed1 and amy never exist1 nevertheless the idea is true2 and the idea remains the same1 whether it be put into execution or not4 7#fi3c7 ,on the other hand1 if anyone asserts1 for instance1 that ,peter exists1 without knowing whether ,peter really exists or not1 the assertion1 as far as its asserter is concerned1 is false1 or not true1 even though ,peter actually does exist4 7#d7 ,the assertion that ,peter exists is true only with regard to him who knows for certain that ,peter does exist4 #gj 7#a7 ,whence it follows that there is in ideas something real1 whereby the true are distinguished from the false4 7#b7 ,this reality must be inquired into1 if we are to find the best standard of truth 7we have said that we ought to determine our thoughts by the given standard of a true idea1 and that method is reflective knowledge71 and to know the properties of our understanding4 7#gj3c7 ,neither must we say that the difference between true and false arises from the fact1 that true knowledge consists in knowing things through their primary causes1 wherein it is totally different from false knowledge1 as ,i have just explained it3 for thought is said to be true1 if it involves subjectively the essence of any principle which has no cause1 and is known through itself and in itself4 #ga 7#a7 ,wherefore the reality 7forma7 of true thought must exist in the thought itself1 without reference to other thoughts2 it does not acknowledge the object as its cause1 but must depend on the actual power and nature of the understanding4 7#b7 ,for1 if we suppose that the understanding has perceived some new entity which has never existed1 as some conceive the understanding of ,god before ,he created thing 7a perception which certainly could not arise any object71 and has legitimately deduced other thoughts from said perception1 all such thoughts would be true1 without being determined by any external object2 they would depend solely on the power and nature of the understanding4 7#ga3c7 ,thus1 that which constitutes the reality of a true thought must be sought in the thought itself1 and deduced from the nature of the understanding4 #gb 7#a7 ,in order to pursue our investigation1 let us confront ourselves with some true idea1 whose object we know for certain to be dependent on our power of thinking1 and to have nothing corresponding to it in nature4 7#b7 ,with an idea of this kind before us1 we shall1 as appears from what has just been said1 be more easily able to carry on the research we have in view4 7#gb3c7 ,for instance1 in order to form the conception of a sphere1 ,i invent a cause at my pleasure--namely1 a semicircle revolving round its center1 and thus producing a sphere4 7#d7 ,this is indisputably a true idea2 and1 although we know that no sphere in nature has ever actually been so formed1 the perception remains true1 and is the easiest manner of conceiving a sphere4 7#gb3e7 ,we must observe that this perception asserts the rotation of a semicircle--which assertion would be false1 if it were not associated with the conception of a sphere1 or of a cause determining a motion of the kind1 or absolutely1 if the assertion were isolated4 7#f7 ,the mind would then only tend to the affirmation of the sole motion of a semicircle1 which is not contained in the conception of a semicircle1 and does not arise from the conception of any cause capable of producing such motion4 7#gb3g7 ,thus falsity consists only in this1 that something is affirmed of a thing1 which is not contained in the conception we have formed of that thing1 as motion or rest of a semicircle4 7#h7 ,whence it follows that simple ideas cannot be other than true--e4g41 the simple idea of a semicircle1 of motion1 of rest1 of quantity1 c4 7#gb3i7 ,whatsoever affirmation such ideas contain is equal to the concept formed1 and does not extend further4 7#aj7 ,wherefore we form as many simple ideas as we please1 without any fear of error4 #gc 7#a7 ,it only remains for us to inquire by what power our mind can form true ideas1 and how far such power extends4 7#b7 ,it is certain that such power cannot extend itself infinitely4 7#c7 ,for when we affirm somewhat of a thing1 which is not contained in the concept we have formed of that thing1 such an affirmation shows a defect of our perception1 or that we have formed fragmentary or mutilated ideas4 7#d7 ,thus we have seen that the notion of a semicircle is false when it is isolated in the mind1 but true when it is associated with the concept of a sphere1 or of some cause determining such a motion4 7#gc3e7 ,but if it be the nature of a thinking being1 as seems1 prima facie1 to be the case1 to form true or adequate thoughts1 it is plain that inadequate ideas arise in us only because we are parts of a thinking being1 whose thoughts--some in their entirety1 others in fragments only--constitute our mind4 #gd 7#a7 ,but there is another point to be considered1 which was not worth raising in the case of fiction1 but which give rise to complete deception--namely1 that certain things presented to the imagination also exist in the understanding--in other words1 are conceived clearly and distinctly4 7#b7 ,hence1 so long as we do not separate that which is distinct from that which is confused1 certainty1 or the true idea1 becomes mixed with indistinct ideas4 7#c7 ,for instance1 certain ,stoics heard1 perhaps1 the term soul1 and also that the soul is immortal1 yet imagined it only confusedly2 they imaged1 also1 and understood that very subtle bodies penetrate all others1 and are penetrated by none4 7#gd3d7 ,by combining these ideas1 and being at the same time certain of the truth of the axiom1 they forthwith became convinced that the mind consists of very subtle bodies2 that these very subtle bodies cannot be divided c4 #ge 7#a7 ,but we are freed from mistakes of this kind1 so long as we endeavor to examine all our perceptions by the standard of the given true idea4 7#b7 ,we must take care1 as has been said1 to separate such perceptions from all those which arise from hearsay or unclassified experience4 7#c7 ,moreover1 such mistakes arise from things being conceived too much in the abstract2 for it is sufficiently self-evident that what ,i conceive as in its true object ,i cannot apply to anything else4 7#ge3d7 ,lastly1 they arise from a want of understanding of the primary elements of nature as a whole2 whence we proceed without due order1 and confound nature with abstract rules1 which1 although they be true enough in their sphere1 yet1 when misapplied1 confound themselves1 and pervert the order of nature4 7#e7 ,however1 if we proceed with as little abstraction as possible1 and begin from primary elements--that is1 from the source and origin of nature1 as far back as we can reach1--we need not fear any deceptions of this kind4 #gf 7#a7 ,as far as the knowledge of the origin of nature is concerned1 there is no danger of our confounding it with abstractions4 7#b7 ,for when a thing is conceived in the abstract1 as are all universal notions1 the said universal notions are always more extensive in the mind than the number of individuals forming their contents really existing in nature4 7#c7 ,again1 there are many things in nature1 the difference between which is so slight as to be hardly perceptible to the understanding2 so that it may readily happen that such things are confounded together1 if they be conceived abstractedly4 7#d7 ,but since the first principle of nature cannot 7as we shall see hereafter7 be conceived abstractedly or universally1 and cannot extend further in the understanding than it does in reality1 and has no likeness to mutable things1 no confusion need be feared in respect to the idea of it1 provided 7as before shown7 that we possess a standard of truth4 7#e7 ,this is1 in fact1 a being single and infinite #gfz2 in other words1 it is the sum total of being1 beyond which there is no being found4 #gf;a #gg 7#a7 ,thus far we have treated of the false idea4 ,we have now to investigate the doubtful idea--that is1 to inquire what can cause us to doubt1 and how doubt may be removed4 7#b7 ,i speak of real doubt existing in the mind1 not of such doubt as we see exemplified when a man says that he doubts1 though his mind does not really hesitate4 7#gg3c7 ,the cure of the latter does not fall within the province of method1 it belongs rather to inquiries concerning obstinacy and its cure4 #gh 7#a7 ,real doubt is never produced in the mind by the thing doubted of4 7#b7 ,in other words1 if there were only one idea in the mind1 whether that idea were true or false1 there would be no doubt or certainty present1 only a certain sensation4 7#c7 ,for an idea is in itself nothing else than a certain sensation4 7#d7 ,but doubt will arise through another idea1 not clear and distinct enough for us to be able to draw any certain conclusions with regard to the matter under consideration2 that is1 the idea which causes us to doubt is not clear and distinct4 7#e7 ,to take an example4 7#gh3f7 ,supposing that a man has never reflected1 taught by experience or by any other means1 that our senses sometimes deceive us1 he will never doubt whether the sun be greater or less than it appears4 7#g7 ,thus rustics are generally astonished when they hear that the sun is much larger than the earth4 7#h7 ,but from reflection on the deceitfulness of the senses #gh;a doubt arises1 and if1 after doubting1 we acquire a true knowledge of the senses1 and how things at a distance are represented through their instrumentality1 doubt is again removed4 #gi 7#a7 ,hence we cannot cast doubt on true ideas by the supposition that there is a deceitful ,deity1 who leads us astray even in what is most certain4 7#b7 ,we can only hold such an hypothesis so long as we have no clear and distinct idea--in other words1 until we reflect the knowledge which we have of the first principle of all things1 and find that which teaches us that ,god is not a deceiver1 and until we know this with the same certainty as we know from reflecting on the are equal to two right angles4 7#c7 ,but if we have a knowledge of ,god equal to that which we have of a triangle1 all doubt is removed4 7#gi3d7 ,in the same way as we can arrive at the said knowledge of a triangle1 though not absolutely sure that there is not some arch-deceiver leading us astray1 so can we come to a like knowledge of ,god under the like condition1 and when we have attained to it1 it is sufficient1 as ,i said before1 to remove every doubt which we can possess concerning clear and distinct ideas4 #hj 7#a7 ,thus1 if a man proceeded with our investigations in due order1 inquiring first into those things which should first be inquired into1 never passing over a link in the chain of association1 and with knowledge how to define his questions before seeking to answer them1 he will never have any ideas save such as are very certain1 or1 in other words1 clear and distinct2 for doubt is only a suspension of the spirit concerning some affirmation or negation which it would pronounce upon unhesitatingly if it were not in ignorance of something1 without which the knowledge of the matter in hand must needs be imperfect4 7#b7 ,we may1 therefore1 conclude that doubt always proceeds from want of due order in investigation4 #ha 7#a7 ,these are the points ,i promised to discuss in the first part of my treatise on method4 7#b7 ,however1 in order not to omit anything which can conduce to the knowledge of the understanding and its faculties1 ,i will add a few words on the subject of memory and forgetfulness4 7#ha3c7 ,the point most worthy of attention is1 that memory is strengthened both with and without the aid of the understanding4 7#d7 ,for the more intelligible a thing is1 the more easily is it remembered1 and the less intelligible it is1 the more easily do we forget it4 7#e7 ,for instance1 a number of unconnected words is much more difficult to remember than the same number in the form of a narration4 #hb 7#a7 ,the memory is also strengthened without the aid of the understanding by means of the power wherewith the imagination or the sense called common1 is affected by some particular physical object4 7#b7 ,i say particular1 for the imagination is only affected by particular objects4 7#c7 ,if we read1 for instance1 a single romantic comedy1 we shall remember it very well1 so long as we do not read many others of the same kind1 for it will reign alone in the memory 7#d7 ,if1 however1 we read several others of the same kind1 we shall think of them altogether1 and easily confuse one with another4 7#hb3e7 ,i say also1 physical4 7#f7 ,for the imagination is only affected by physical objects4 7#g7 ,as1 then1 the memory is strengthened both with and without the aid of the understanding1 we may conclude that it is different from the understanding1 and that in the latter considered in itself there is neither memory nor forgetfulness4 #hc 7#a7 ,what1 then1 is memory8 7#b7 ,it is nothing else than the actual sensation of impressions on the brain1 accompanied with the thought of a definite duration1 #hc;d of the sensation4 7#c7 ,this is also shown by reminiscence4 7#d7 ,for then we think of the sensation1 but without the notion of continuous duration2 thus the idea of that sensation is not the actual duration of the sensation or actual memory4 7#hc3e7 ,whether ideas are or are not subject to corruption will be seen in philosophy4 7#f7 ,if this seems too absurd to anyone1 it will be sufficient for our purpose1 if he reflect on the fact that a thing is more easily remembered in proportion to its singularity1 as appears from the example of the comedy just cited4 7#hc3g7 ,further1 a thing is remembered more easily in proportion to its intelligibility2 therefore we cannot help remember that which is extremely singular and sufficiently intelligible4 #hd 7#a7 ,thus1 then1 we have distinguished between a true idea and other perceptions1 and shown that ideas fictitious1 false1 and the rest1 originate in the imagination--that is1 in certain sensations fortuitous 7so to speak7 and disconnected1 arising not from the power of the mind1 but from external causes1 according as the body1 sleeping or waking1 receives various motions4 7#b7 ,but one may take any view one likes of the imagination so long as one acknowledges that it is different from the understanding1 and that the soul is passive with regard to it4 7#c7 ,the view taken is immaterial1 if we know that the imagination is something indefinite1 with regard to which the soul is passive1 and that we can by some means or other free ourselves therefrom with the help of the understanding4 7#d7 ,let no one then be astonished that before proving the existence of body1 and other necessary things1 ,i speak of imagination of body1 and of its composition4 7#e7 ,the view taken is1 ,i repeat1 immaterial1 so long as we know that imagination is something indefinite1 c4 #he 7#a7 ,as regards as a true idea1 we have shown that it is simple or compounded of simple ideas2 that it shows how and why something is or has been made2 and that its subjective effects in the soul correspond to the actual reality of its object4 7#b7 ,this conclusion is identical with the saying of the ancients1 that true proceeds from cause to effect2 though the ancients1 so far as ,i know1 never formed the conception put forward here that the soul acts according to fixed laws1 and is as it were an immaterial automaton4 #hf 7#a7 ,hence1 as far as is possible at the outset1 we have acquired a knowledge of our understanding1 and such a standard of a true idea that we need no longer fear confounding truth with falsehood and fiction4 7#b7 ,neither shall we wonder why we understand some things which in nowise fall within the scope of the imagination1 while other things are in the imagination but wholly opposed to the understanding1 or others1 again1 which agree therewith4 7#c7 ,we now know that the operations1 whereby the effects of imagination are produced1 take place under other laws quite different from the laws of the understanding1 and that the mind is entirely passive with regard to them4 #hg 7#a7 ,whence we may also see how easily men may fall into grave errors through not distinguishing accurately between the imagination and the understanding2 such as believing that extension must be localized1 that it must be finite1 that its parts are really distinct one from the other1 that it is the primary and single foundation of all things1 that it occupies more space at one time than at another and other similar doctrines1 all entirely opposed to truth1 as we shall duly show4 #hh 7#a7 ,again1 since words are a part of the imagination--that is1 since we form many conceptions in accordance with confused arrangements of words in the memory1 dependent on particular bodily conditions1--there is no doubt that words may1 equally with the imagination1 be the cause of many and great errors1 unless we strictly on our guard4 #hi 7#a7 ,moreover1 words are formed according to popular fancy and intelligence1 and are1 therefore1 signs of things as existing in the imagination1 not as existing in the understanding4 7#b7 ,this is evident from the fact that to all such things as exist only in the understanding1 not in the imagination1 negative names are often given1 such as incorporeal1 infinite1 c4 7#c7 ,so1 also1 many conceptions really affirmative are expressed negatively1 and vice versa1 such as uncreate1 independent1 infinite1 immortal1 c41 inasmuch as their contraries are much more easily imagined1 and1 therefore1 occurred first to men1 and usurped positive names4 7#hi3d7 ,many things we affirm and deny1 because the nature of words allows us to do so1 though the nature of things does not4 7#e7 ,while we remain unaware of this fact1 we may easily mistake falsehood for truth4 #ij 7#a7 ,let us also beware of another great cause of confusion1 which prevents the understanding from reflecting on itself4 7#b7 ,sometimes1 while making no distinction between the imagination and the intellect1 we think that what we more readily imagine is clearer to us2 and also we think that what we imagine we understand4 7#c7 ,thus1 we put first that which should be last3 the true order of progression is reversed1 and no legitimate conclusion is drawn4 #ia #ia;e 7#a7 ,now1 in order at length to pass on to the second part of this method1 ,i shall first set forth the object aimed at1 and next the means for its attainment4 7#b7 ,the object aimed at is the acquisition of clear and distinct ideas1 such as are produced by the pure intellect1 and not by chance physical motions4 7#c7 ,in order that all ideas may be reduced to unity1 we shall endeavor so to associate and arrange them that our mind may1 as far as possible1 reflect subjectively the reality of nature1 both as a whole and as parts4 #ib 7#a7 ,as for the first point1 it is necessary 7as we have said7 for our purpose that everything should be conceived1 either solely through its essence1 or through its proximate cause4 7#b7 ,if the thing be self-existent1 or1 as is commonly said1 the cause of itself1 it must be understood through its essence only2 if it be not self-existent1 but requires a cause for its existence1 it must be understood through its proximate cause4 7#c7 ,for1 in reality1 the knowledge1 #ib;f of an effect is nothing else than the acquisition of more perfect knowledge of its cause4 #ic 7#a7 ,therefore1 we may never1 while we are concerned with inquiries into actual things1 draw any conclusion from abstractions2 we shall be extremely careful not to confound that which is only in the understanding with that which is in the thing itself4 7#b7 ,the best basis for drawing a conclusion will be either some particular affirmative essence1 or a true and legitimate definition4 7#ic3c7 ,for the understanding cannot descend from universal axioms by themselves to particular things1 since axioms are of infinite extent1 and do not determine the understanding to contemplate one particular thing more than another4 #id 7#a7 ,thus the true method of discovery is to form thoughts from some given definition4 7#b7 ,this process will be the more fruitful and easy in proportion as the thing given be better defined4 7#c7 ,wherefore1 the cardinal point of all this second part of method consists in the knowledge of the conditions of good definition1 and the means of finding them4 7#d7 ,i will first treat of the conditions of definition4 #ie 7#a7 ,a definition1 if it is to be called perfect1 must explain the inmost essence of a thing1 and must take care not to substitute for this any of its properties4 7#b7 ,in order to illustrate my meaning1 without taking an example which would seem to show a desire to expose other people's errors1 ,i will choose the case of something abstract1 the definition of which is of little moment4 7#ie3c7 ,such is a circle4 7#d7 ,if a circle be defined as a figure1 such that all straight lines drawn from the center to the circumference are equal1 every one can see that such a definition does not in the least explain the essence of a circle1 but solely one of its properties4 7#e7 ,though1 as ,i have said1 this is of no importance in the case of figures and other abstractions1 it is of great importance in the case of physical beings and realities3 for the properties of things are not understood so long as their essences are unknown4 7#f7 ,if the latter be passed over1 there is necessarily a perversion of the succession of ideas which should reflect the succession of nature1 and we go far astray from our object4 #if ,in order to be free from this fault1 the following rules should be observed in definition3-- ,i4 7#a7 ,if the thing in question be created1 the definition must 7as we have said7 comprehend the proximate cause4 7#b7 ,for instance1 a circle should1 according to this rule1 be defined as follows3 the figure described by any line whereof one end is fixed and the other free4 7#c7 ,this definition clearly comprehends the proximate cause4 ,,ii4 7#d7 ,a conception or definition of a thing should be such that all the properties of that thing1 in so far as it is considered by itself1 and not in conjunction with other things1 can be deduced from it1 as may be seen in the definition given of a circle3 for from that it clearly follows that all straight lines drawn from the center to the circumference are equal4 7#e7 ,that this is a necessary characteristic of a definition is so clear to anyone1 who reflects on the matter1 that there is no need to spend time in proving it1 or in showing that1 owing to this second condition1 every definition should be affirmative4 7#f7 ,i speak of intellectual affirmation1 giving little thought to verbal affirmations which1 owing to the poverty of language1 must sometimes1 perhaps1 be expressed negatively1 though the idea contained is affirmative4 #ig ,the rules for the definition of an uncreated thing are as follows3-- ,i4 ,the exclusion of all idea of cause--that is1 the thing must not need explanation by ,anything outside itself4 ,,ii4 ,when the definition of the thing has been given1 there must be no room for doubt as to whether the thing exists or not4 ,,iii4 ,it must contain1 as far as the mind is concerned1 no substantives which could be put into an adjectival form2 in other words1 the object defined must not be explained through abstractions4 ,,iv4 ,lastly1 though this is not absolutely necessary1 it should be possible to deduce from the definition all the properties of the thing defined4 ,all these rules become obvious to anyone giving strict attention to the matter4 #ih 7#a7 ,i have also stated that the best basis for drawing a conclusion is a particular affirmative essence4 7#b7 ,the more specialized the idea is1 the more it is distinct1 and therefore clear4 7#c7 ,wherefore a knowledge of particular things should be sought for as diligently as possible4 #ii 7#a7 ,as regards the order of our perceptions1 and the manner in which they should be arranged and united1 it is necessary that1 as soon as is possible and rational1 we should inquire whether there be any being 7and1 if so1 what being71 that is the cause of all things1 so that its essence1 represented in thought1 may be the cause of all our ideas1 and then our mind will to the utmost possible extent reflect nature4 7#b7 ,for it will possess1 subjectively1 nature's essence1 order1 and union4 7#c7 ,thus we can see that it is before all things necessary for us to deduce all our ideas from physical things--that is1 from real entities1 proceeding1 as far as may be1 according to the series of causes1 from one real entity to another real entity1 never passing to universals and abstractions1 either for the purpose of deducing some real entity from them1 or deducing them from some real entity4 7#d7 ,either of these processes interrupts the true progress of the understanding4 #ajj 7#a7 ,but it must be observed that1 by the series of causes and real entities1 ,i do not here mean the series of particular and mutable things1 but only the series of fixed and eternal things4 7#b7 ,it would be impossible for human infirmity to follow up the series of particular mutable things1 both on account their multitude1 surpassing all calculation1 and on account of the infinitely diverse circumstances surrounding one and the same thing1 any one of which may be the cause of its existence or non-existence4 7#c7 ,indeed1 their existence has no connection with their essence1 or 7as we have said already7 is not an eternal truth4 #aja 7#a7 ,neither is there any need that we should understand their series1 for the essences of particular mutable things are not to be gathered from their series or order of existence1 which would furnish us with nothing beyond their extrinsic denominations1 their relations1 or1 at most1 their circumstances1 all of which are very different from their inmost essence4 7#aja3b7 ,this inmost essence must be sought solely from fixed and eternal things1 and from the laws1 inscribed 7so to speak7 in those things as in their true codes1 according to which all particular things take place and are arranged2 nay1 these mutable particular things depend so intimately and essentially 7so to phrase it7 upon the fixed things1 that they cannot either be conceived without them4 #ajb 7#a7 ,but1 though this be so1 there seems to be no small difficulty in arriving at the knowledge of these particular things1 for to conceive them all at once would far surpass the powers of the human understanding4 7#b7 ,the arrangement whereby one thing is understood1 before another1 as we have stated1 should not be sought from their series of existence1 nor from eternal things4 7#c7 ,for the latter are all by nature simultaneous4 7#d7 ,other aids are therefore needed besides those employed for understanding eternal things and their laws4 7#e7 ,however1 this is not the place to recount such aids1 nor is there any need to do so1 until we have acquired a sufficient knowledge of eternal things and their infallible laws1 and until the nature of our senses has become plain to us4 #ajc 7#a7 ,before betaking ourselves to seek knowledge of particular things1 it will be seasonable to speak of such aids1 as all tend to teach us the mode of employing our senses1 and to make certain experiments under fixed rules and arrangements which may suffice to determine the object of our inquiry1 so that we may therefrom infer what laws of eternal things it has been produced under1 and may gain an insight into its inmost nature1 as ,i will duly show4 7#b7 ,here1 to return to my purpose1 ,i will only endeavor to set forth what seems necessary for enabling us to attain to knowledge of eternal things1 and to define them under the conditions laid down above4 #ajd 7#a7 ,with this end1 we must bear in mind what has already been stated1 namely1 that when the mind devotes itself to any thought1 so as to examine it1 and to deduce therefrom in due order all the legitimate conclusions possible1 any falsehood which may lurk in the thought will be detected2 but if the thought be true1 the mind will readily proceed without interruption to deduce truths from it4 7#ajd3b7 ,this1 ,i say1 is necessary for our purpose1 for our thoughts may be brought to a close by the absence of a foundation4 #aje 7#a7 ,if1 therefore1 we wish to investigate the first thing of all1 it will be necessary to supply some foundation which may direct our thoughts thither4 7#b7 ,further1 since method is reflective knowledge1 the foundation which must direct our thoughts can be nothing else than the knowledge of that which constitutes the reality of truth1 and the knowledge of the understanding1 its properties1 and powers4 7#c7 ,when this has been acquired we shall possess a foundation wherefrom we can deduce our thoughts1 and a path whereby the intellect1 according to its capacity1 may attain the knowledge of eternal things1 allowance being made for the extent of the intellectual powers4 #ajf 7#a7 ,if1 as ,i stated in the first part1 it belongs to the nature of thought to form true ideas1 we must here inquire what is meant by the faculties and power of the understanding4 7#b7 ,the chief part of our method is to understand as well as possible the powers of the intellect1 and its nature2 we are1 therefore1 compelled 7by the considerations advanced in the second part of the method7 necessarily to draw these conclusions from the definition itself of thought and understanding4 #ajg 7#a7 ,but1 so far as we have not got any rules for finding definitions1 and1 as we cannot set forth such rules without a previous knowledge of nature1 that is without a definition of the understanding and its power1 it follows either that the definition of the understanding must be clear in itself1 or that we can understand nothing4 7#b7 ,nevertheless this definition is not absolutely clear in itself2 however1 since its properties1 like all things that we possess through the understanding1 cannot be known clearly and distinctly1 unless its nature be known previously1 understanding makes itself manifest1 if we pay attention to its properties1 which we know clearly and distinctly4 7#c7 ,let us1 then1 enumerate here the properties of the understanding1 let us examine them1 and begin by discussing the instruments for research which we find innate in us4 ,see #ca #ajh 7#a7 ,the properties of the understanding which ,i have chiefly remarked1 and which ,i clearly understand1 are the following3-- ,i4 7#b7 ,it involves certainty--in other words1 it knows that a thing exists in reality as it is reflected subjectively4 ,,ii4 7#ajh3c7 ,that it perceives certain things1 or forms some ideas absolutely1 some ideas from others4 7#d7 ,thus it forms the idea of quantity absolutely1 without reference to any other thoughts2 but ideas of motion it only forms after taking into consideration the idea of quantity4 ,,iii4 7#ajh3e7 ,those ideas which the understanding forms absolutely express infinity2 determinate ideas are derived from other ideas4 7#f7 ,thus in the idea of quantity1 perceived by means of a cause1 the quantity is determined1 as when a body is perceived to be formed by the motion of a plane1 a plane by the motion of a line1 or1 again1 a line by the motion of a point4 7#g7 ,all these are perceptions which do not serve towards understanding quantity1 but only towards determining it4 7#ajh3h7 ,this is proved by the fact that we conceive them as formed as it were by motion1 yet this motion is not perceived unless the quantity be perceived also2 we can even prolong the motion to form an infinite line1 which we certainly could not do unless we had an idea of infinite quantity4 ,,iv4 7#i7 ,the understanding forms positive ideas before forming negative ideas4 ,v4 7#ajh3aj7 ,it perceives things not so much under the condition of duration as under a certain form of eternity1 and in an infinite number2 or rather in perceiving things it does not consider either their number or duration1 whereas1 in imagining them1 it perceives them in a determinate number1 duration1 and quantity4 ,,vi4 7#ajh3aa7 ,the ideas which we form as clear and distinct1 seem to follow from the sole necessity of our nature1 that they appear to depend absolutely on our sole power2 with confused ideas the contrary is the case4 7#ab7 ,they are often formed against our will4 ,,vii4 7#ajh3ac7 ,the mind can determine in many ways the ideas of things1 which the understanding forms from other ideas3 thus1 for instance1 in order to define the plane of an ellipse1 it supposes a point adhering to a cord to be moved around two centers1 or1 again1 it conceives an infinity of points1 always in the same fixed relation to a given straight line1 angle of the vertex of the cone1 or in an infinity of other ways4 ,,viii4 7#ajh3ad7 ,the more ideas express perfection of any object1 the more perfect are they themselves2 for we do not admire the architect who has planned a chapel so much as the architect who has planned a splendid temple4 #aji 7#a7 ,i do not stop to consider the rest of what is referred to thought1 such as love1 joy1 c4 7#b7 ,they are nothing to our present purpose1 and cannot even be conceived unless the understanding be perceived previously4 7#c7 ,when perception is removed1 all these go with it4 #aaj 7#a7 ,false and fictitious ideas have nothing positive about them 7as we have abundantly shown71 which causes them to be called false or fictitious2 they are only considered as such through the defectiveness of knowledge4 7#b7 ,therefore1 false and fictitious ideas as such can teach us nothing concerning the essence of thought2 this must be sought from the positive properties just enumerated2 in other words1 we must lay down some common basis from which these properties necessarily follow1 so that when this is given1 the properties are necessarily given also1 and when it is removed1 they too vanish with it4 ,the rest of the treatise is wanting4 ---------------------------------------- ------------------------------ ,spinoza's ,endnotes3 ,marks as per ,curley1 see ,note #e above4 a 7#a7 ,this might be explained more at large and more clearly3 ,i mean by distinguishing riches according as they are pursued for their own sake1 in or furtherance of fame1 or sensual pleasure1 or the advancement of science and art4 7#b7 ,but this subject is reserved to its own place1 for it is not here proper to investigate the matter more accurately4 b ,these considerations should be set forth more precisely4 c ,these matters are explained more at length elsewhere4 d ,n4,b4 ,i do no more here than enumerate the sciences necessary for our purpose2 ,i lay no stress on their order4 e ,there is for the sciences but one end1 to which they should all be directed4 f 7#a7 ,in this case we do not understand anything of the cause from the consideration of it in the effect4 7#b7 ,this is sufficiently evident from the fact that the cause is only spoken of in very general terms1 such as--there exists then something2 there exists then some power1 c42 or from the that we only express it in a negative manner--it is not or that1 c4 7#c7 ,in the second case something is ascribed to the cause because of the effect1 as we shall show in an example1 but only a property1 never an essence4 g 7#a7 ,from this example may be clearly seen what ,i have just drawn attention to4 7#b7 ,for through this union we understand nothing beyond the sensation1 the effect1 to wit1 from which we inferred the cause of which we understand nothing4 h 7#a7 ,a conclusion of this sort1 though it be certain1 is yet not to be relied on without great caution2 for unless we are exceedingly careful we shall forthwith fall into error4 7#b7 ,when things are conceived thus abstractedly1 and not through their true essence1 they are apt to be confused by the imagination4 7#c7 ,for that which is in itself one1 men imagine to be multiplex4 7#d7 ,to those things which are conceived abstractedly1 apart1 and confusedly1 terms are applied which are apt to become wrested from their strict meaning1 and bestowed on things more familiar2 whence it results that these latter are imagined in the same way as the former to which the terms were originally given4 i ,i shall here treat a little more in detail of experience1 and shall examine the method adopted by the ,empirics1 and by recent philosophers4 k ,by native strength1 ,i mean that not bestowed on us by external causes1 as ,i shall afterwards explain in my philosophy4 l ,here ,i term them operations3 ,i shall explain their nature in my philosophy4 m ,i shall take care not only to demonstrate what ,i have just advanced1 but also that we have hitherto proceeded rightly1 and other things needful to be known4 #ccnote#a 7#a7 ,in modern language1 the idea may become the subject of another presentation4 7#b7 ,objectivus generally corresponds to the modern subjective1 formalis to the modern objective4 ,trans4- ,note #a n 7#a7 ,observe that we are not here inquiring how the first subjective essence is innate in us4 7#b7 ,this belongs to an investigation into nature1 where all these matters are amply explained1 and it is shown that without ideas neither affirmation1 nor negation1 nor volition are possible4 o ,the nature of mental search is explained in my philosophy4 p ,to be connected with other things is to be produced by them1 or to produce them4 q ,in the same way as we have here no doubt of the truth of our knowledge4 r ,see below the note on hypotheses1 whereof we have a clear understanding2 the fiction consists in saying that such hypotheses exist in heavenly bodies4 s 7#a7 ,as a thing1 when once it is understood1 manifests itself1 we have need only of an example without further proof4 7#b7 ,in the same way the contrary has only to be presented to our minds to be recognized as false1 as will forthwith appear when we come to discuss fiction concerning essences4 t ,observe1 that although many assert that they doubt whether ,god exists1 they have nought but his name in their minds1 or else some fiction which they call ,god3 this fiction is not in harmony with ,god's real nature1 as we will duly show4 u 7#a7 ,i shall presently show that no fiction can concern eternal truths4 ,by an eternal truth1 ,i mean that which being positive could never become negative4 7#b7 ,thus it is a primary and eternal truth that ,god exists1 but it is not an eternal truth that ,adam thinks4 7#c7 ,that the ,chimaera does not exist is an eternal truth1 that ,adam does not think is not so4 x 7#a7 ,afterwards1 when we come to speak of fiction that is concerned with essences1 it will be evident that fiction never creates or furnishes the mind with anything new2 only such things as are already in the brain or imagination are recalled to the memory1 when the attention is directed to them confusedly and all at once4 7#b7 ,for instance1 we have remembrance of spoken words and of a tree2 when the mind directs itself to them confusedly1 it forms the notion of a tree speaking4 7#c7 ,the same may be said of existence1 especially when it is conceived quite generally as an entity2 it is then readily applied to all things together in the memory4 7#d7 ,this is specially worthy of remark4 y ,we must understand as much in the case of hypotheses put forward to explain certain movements accompanying celestial phenomena2 but from these1 when applied to the celestial motions1 we any draw conclusions as to the nature of the heavens1 whereas this last may be quite different1 especially as many other causes are conceivable which would account for such motions4 z 7#a7 ,it often happens that a man recalls to mind this word soul1 and forms at the same time some corporeal image3 as the two representations are simultaneous1 he easily thinks that he imagines and feigns a corporeal soul3 thus confusing the name with the thing itself4 7#b7 ,i here beg that my readers will not be in a hurry to refute this proposition2 they will1 ,i hope1 have no mind to do so1 if they pay close attention to the examples given and to what follows4 #fa;a 7#a7 ,though ,i seem to deduce this from experience1 some may deny its cogency because ,i have given no formal proof4 7#b7 ,i therefore append the following for those who may desire it4 7#c7 ,as there can be nothing in nature contrary to nature's laws1 since all things come to pass by fixed laws1 so that each thing must irrefragably produce its own proper effect1 it follows that the soul1 as soon as it possesses the true conception of a thing1 proceeds to reproduce in thought that thing's effects4 7#d7 ,see below1 where ,i speak of the false idea4 #fd;b 7#a7 ,observe that fiction regarded in itself1 only differs from dreams in that in the latter we do not perceive the external causes which we perceive through the senses while awake4 7#b7 ,it has hence been inferred that representations occurring in sleep have no connection with objects external to us4 7#c7 ,we shall presently see that error is the dreaming of a waking man3 if it reaches a certain pitch it becomes delirium4 #gfz ,these are not attributes of ,god displaying ,his essence1 as ,i will show in my philosophy4 #gf;a 7#a7 ,this has been shown already4 7#b7 ,for if such a being did not exist it would never be produced2 therefore the mind would be able to understand more than nature could furnish2 and this has been shown above to be false4 #gh;a 7#a7 ,that is1 it is known that the senses sometimes deceive us4 7#b7 ,but it is only known confusedly1 for it is not known how they deceive us4 #hc;d 7#a7 ,if the duration be indefinite1 the recollection is imperfect2 this everyone seems to have learnt from nature4 7#b7 ,for we often ask1 to strengthen our belief in something we hear of1 when and where it happened2 though ideas themselves have their own duration in the mind1 yet1 as we are wont to determine duration by the aid of some measure of motion which1 again1 takes place by aid of imagination1 we preserve no memory connected with pure intellect4 #ia;e ,the chief rule of this part is1 as appears from the first part1 to review all the ideas coming to us through pure intellect1 so as to distinguish them from such as we imagine3 the distinction will be shown through the properties of each1 namely1 of the imagination and of the understanding4 #ib;f ,observe that it is thereby manifest that we cannot understand anything of nature without at the same time increasing our knowledge of the first cause1 or ,god4 ,end of ,on the ,improvement of the ,understanding4 ,notes by ,volunteer4 #a4 ,used1 in part1 with kind permission from3 http3_/_/www4physics4wisc4edu_/shalizi_/ ,spinoza_/,,tie_/ #b4 ,the text is that of the translation of the ,tractatus de ,intellectus ,emendatione by ,r4 ,h4 ,m4 ,elwes1 as printed by ,dover ,publications 7,,ny73#aiee71 ,,isbn #j-dhf-bjbej-,x4 ,this text is an unabridged and unaltered republication of the ,bohn ,library edition originally published by ,george ,bell and ,sons in #ahhc4 #c4 ,paragraph ,numbers1 shown thus #a1 are from ,edwin ,curley's translation in his ,the ,collected ,works of ,spinoza1 ,volume #a1 #aihe1 ,princeton ,university ,press2 ,,isbn #j-fia-jgbbb-a4 #d4 ,sentence ,numbers1 shown thus 7#a71 have been added by volunteer4 #e4 ,spinoza's endnotes are shown thus a4 ,the letter is taken from ,curley1 see ,note #c4 #f4 ,search strings are enclosed in square brackets2 include brackets4 #g4 ,,html versions of ,on the ,improvement of the ,understanding are published in the ,books ,on-,line ,web ,pages2 ttp3_/_/www4cs4cmu4edu_/books4html and they include3 http3_/_/www4physics4wisc4edu_/shalizi_/ ,spinoza_/,,tie_/ http3_/_/www4erols4com_/jyselman_/teielw es4htm